AD-A286 510

TATION PAGE

Form Approved
OPM No. 0704-0188

Pu ... 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources gathering and ma... comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for ... Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the ... get, Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)

DATE: October 1993

3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED: Final

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Military Relations With Humanitarian Relief Organizations: Observations From Restore Hope

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

C - N00014-91-C-0002

PE - 65153M

PR - C0031

6. AUTHOR(S)

JT Dworken

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Center for Naval Analyses
4401 Ford Avenue
Alexandria, Virginia 22302-0268

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

CRM 93-140

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Commanding General
Marine Corps Combat Development Command (WF 13)
Studies and Analyses Branch
Quantico, Virginia 22134

10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

DTIC
ELECTE
NOV 28 1994
S B D

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Cleared for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT *(Maximum 200 words)*

Operation RESTORE HOPE, the December 1992 U.S. Military intervention in Somalia, was a significant military operation that coincided with a massive relief effort. One aspect of the operation that was fairly new to many Marines there, and to our military as a whold, was the degree of interaction with workers from Humanitarian Relief Organizations (HROs). Although both the military and the HRSs accomplished their missions in Somalia, relations between the two groups were sometimes strained. In future operations--in which the threat might be greater and closer cooperation neessary--military-HRO relations may need to be better. As part of the CNA RESTORE HOPE reconstruction project, this paper examines military-HRO relations in that operation. The paper draws on the RESTORE HOPE experience so that future commanders can better understand the complexities of military-HRO relations. In the paper, we review various aspects of the relationship, identify the causes of the problems between the groups, and suggest options that commanders consider for improving relations in future operations.

14. SUBJECT TERMS

Disasters, foreign aid, international relatison, joint military operations, military assistantce, military operations, operation restore hope, Somalia, United Nations

15. NUMBER OF PAGES: 65

16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
CPR	CPR	CPR	SAR

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298, (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
299-01

CRM 93-140/October 1993

Military Relations With Humanitarian Relief Organizations: Observations From Restore Hope

Jonathan T. Dworken

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 5

Center for Naval Analyses
4401 Ford Avenue • P.O. Box 16268 • Alexandria, VA 22302-0268

94-36134

94 1125 082

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

Approved for distribution: October 1993

Marvin A. Pokrant

Marvin A. Pokrant
Director
Fleet Tactics and Capabilities

This document represents the best opinion of CNA at the time of issue.
It does not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of the Navy.

For copies of this document call: CNA Document Distribution Section (703)824-2107

Contents

Summary 1
Organizing relations: the HOC and CMOC 1
Areas requiring military-HRO interaction 2
Factors affecting relations 2
Options for improving relations 3

Introduction 5

Situation in Somalia 9
Military operations 10
Humanitarian operations 12

Organizing military-HRO relations 17
Humanitarian Operations Center 17
Missions and functions 18
Organization 19
Civil-Military Operations Cell 20

Areas of military-HRO interaction 21
Convoy escorts 21
Issues 22
Security 24
Issues 24
Humanitarian and civic assistance 25
Issues 26
Technical assistance 28
Issues 28
Weapons confiscation policy 28
Solution I: pink ID cards 29
Solution II: blue ID cards 30
Issues 30
Solution III: weapons policy card 31
Possible explanations of the problems 32

Factors affecting military-HRO relations 35
Command structure 35
Military's views of the mission 36
Military's views of the HROs 37
HROs' views and actions 38

What can be done to improve relations? 41
Options for improving relations: the HOC and CMOC 41
HOC and CMOC 41
Staffing 41
Headquarters collocation 42
Local forces in local HOCs 43
CMOC stature 43
Military relations with CMOC officers 43
Options for improving relations: other aspects 44
Clarity of mission 44
Education 44
Priority on relations 45
Options for improving relations: long-term issues 45
Key decisions affecting relations 45
Direct assistance 46
Civil affairs 46

Conclusions 49

Glossary 51

List of figures 53

List of tables 55

Distribution list 57

Accession For
NTIS GRA&I ☑
DTIC TAB ☐
Unannounced ☐
Justification
By
Distribution/
Availability Codes
Avail and/or
A-1

Summary

Operation Restore Hope, the December 1992 U.S. military intervention in Somalia, was a significant military operation that coincided with a massive relief effort. One aspect of the operation that was fairly new to many Marines there, and to our military as a whole, was the degree of interaction with workers from humanitarian relief organizations (HROs). Although both the military and the HROs accomplished their missions in Somalia, relations between the two groups were sometimes strained. In future operations—in which the threats might be greater and closer cooperation necessary—military-HRO relations may need to be better.

As part of the CNA Restore Hope Reconstruction Project, this paper examines military-HRO relations in that operation. The paper draws on the Restore Hope experience so that future commanders can better understand the complexities of military-HRO relations. In the paper, I review various aspects of the relationship, identify the causes of the problems between the groups, and suggest options that commanders could consider for improving relations in future operations.

Organizing relations: the HOC and CMOC

Two organizations were central to military-HRO relations in Operation Restore Hope: the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) and the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC).

The HOC had representatives from the military, HROs, and the United Nations (UN). It tried to plan, support, and monitor the delivery of relief supplies. To do so, the HOC staff developed an overall relief strategy, coordinated HRO logistics, and arranged for U.S. military support to the HROs. The HOC had a UN director, and civilian and military deputy directors. There were mini-HOCs in each major town in southern Somalia.

The CMOC was a group of officers and soldiers that served as the military's presence at the HOC, as well as the military liaison to the HRO

community. The CMOC director was also the HOC's military deputy director.

Areas requiring military-HRO interaction

Five areas required military-HRO interactions. The first two related directly to the mission; three actions came about as the operation developed. To aid the HROs, the military:

- Escorted HRO convoys to protect them from looting by Somali factions and bandits
- Provided security for HRO compounds, offices, and warehouses
- Assisted the HROs with humanitarian and civic affairs projects
- Provided technical assistance in the form of studies to HROs considering projects
- Confiscated Somalis' weapons.

In the first four areas, there was good to adequate cooperation between the military and the HROs. The fifth area —weapons confiscation policy--was the most contentious. The military confiscated the visible weapons of most Somalis, including the weapons carried by some of the HRO drivers.

Factors affecting relations

The minor problems with the first four areas of relations and the larger problems with the weapons confiscation policy may have had deeper roots. In addition to a basic lack of understanding and familiarity between the military and HRO communities, military-HRO relations were affected by the following factors:

- No clear military-HRO command structure existed—the two groups had to coordinate operations.
- Many in the military viewed their mission as only to provide security, not to help the HROs.
- Many in the military held negative stereotypes of HRO workers.

- Many HRO workers held negative stereotypes of the military, and were uncooperative and unorganized.

Underlying these factors were the different organizational cultures of the two communities.

Options for improving relations

The military has a number of options to improve military-HRO relations in future operations. The lists below suggest some of those options for commanders to implement to help ease military-HRO tensions.

The following actions center on the HOC and CMOC:

- Establish a HOC and CMOC.
- Staff the CMOC with officers experienced or trained in humanitarian and relief issues.
- If possible, collocate the HOC with the military headquarters to increase communication and coordination between the military and HROs.
- Have local forces (as opposed to officers from the joint task force headquarters) staff local HOCs to ensure that such forces are responsive to the HROs.
- Increase the stature of the CMOC to demonstrate that relations with HROs are a high priority.
- Ensure that the CMOC officers are not seen as having been co-opted by the HROs.

Another set of options exists. Although broader in scope, more vague, and difficult to implement, these actions may help:

- Ensure that the mission—and the role of assisting HROs within the mission—is clear to everyone.
- Increase education and cross-pollination between the military and HROs through briefings, meetings, and joint planning.
- Place a high priority on relations with HROs and view the HROs as partners.

Introduction

The average U.S. military officer does not often have to deal with HROs.[1] Operation Restore Hope, the December 1992 U.S. military intervention in Somalia, was a significant military operation that coincided with a massive relief effort. The military and HROs had to cooperate. As one observer noted early in the operation:

> The American-led intervention in Somalia demands something unusual—the cooperation of a big armed force drilled with precise operational instructions with a couple of dozen philanthropic agencies, many of which have questioned the value of the troops, considering them an intrusion.[2]

After several weeks, almost all the HROs welcomed the military and actively cooperated with it. At times, however, there were some problems. Relations between the two groups were often strained, and both saw the other as uncooperative. Such problems were abundantly visible when witnessing interactions between the military and HROs in Somalia.

This is not to say, however, that the problems prevented, or obscured, the success of Operation Restore Hope. They did not; the operation was clearly a success. In sum, two words could characterize military-HRO relations during Restore Hope—good enough. Cooperation was *sufficient* for the military to accomplish its mission of improving security, and the HROs to accomplish theirs of providing relief. Most

1. As discussed below, the term HRO encompasses non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary organizations (PVOs), UN organizations, and the Red Cross Agencies.

2. Jane Perlez, "Mission to Somalia: Getting Food to the Somalis Takes Civil-military Fusion," *New York Times*, 19 December 1992, p. 16.

HROs realized that the military helped them by escorting their convoys and providing security.

If the military and HROs cooperated well enough to accomplish their missions and the military helped the HROs so much, were relations between the two groups really so poor? What exactly were the problems? How can the military attempt to ensure they are not repeated?

In this paper I seek to answer these questions. The paper draws on my experiences as a temporary CNA Field Representative with the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), which formed the core of the U.S. military command in Somalia. In that position, I spent several months working in Mogadishu. My conclusions are based on my personal observations, as well as on interviews with officers and civilians in Mogadishu. I do not provide any definitive conclusions on the subject of military-HRO relations—such conclusions are not possible for such an ambiguous topic. Instead, I explain what the problems seemed to be, make judgments on why I think they occurred, and propose several options that might help improve relations in future operations.

The next section of the paper provides the background necessary to consider military-HRO relations. After reviewing the situation in Somalia leading up to the military intervention, I explain the military and humanitarian operations. I next review the decision to establish an organization to coordinate military and HRO efforts and discuss the organization established—the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) and its military part—the Civil-Military Operations Cell (CMOC). I then examine the five issues involving military-HRO relations and the factors that affected these relations. In conclusion, I present options for improving relations between HROs and the military in future operations.

Many predict that in the future there will be more military humanitarian relief operations.[3] Maintaining cooperative relations with

3. See Lt. Gen. H. Stackpole III, USMC and Col. E. Chase, USMCR, "Humanitarian Intervention and Disaster Relief: Projecting Military Strength Abroad to Save Lives," *Marine Corps Gazette*, February 1993, pp. 16-20.

HROs could make such operations smoother and more efficient. The lessons learned in Operation Restore Hope may help the military improve its relations with HROs in future missions.

Situation in Somalia

After the 1991 fall of Somalia's leader, the country split into various factions, most along clan lines.[4] Fighting between these groups led to a ravaging of the capital (and much of southern Somalia), the break-up of the country along factional/clan lines, and wide-spread banditry. This situation created wide-spread starvation.

To help the Somali people, HROs tried to deliver relief supplies. They attempted to do so in many ways, but faced several problems.[5] It was difficult to deliver food to the major ports in Mogadishu and Kismayo because the factions were often fighting for control of them and there was general lawlessness. Some HROs delivered food to coastal towns by ship, but they could not reach the interior sites where the starvation was the worst. Airlifts to these interior towns could only carry a small amount of supplies, were extremely costly, and could only be made to the most secure towns. Cross-border convoys by HROs from Kenya did bring food to some towns in southwest Somalia.

Security problems hampered all attempts and made deliveries to some interior towns almost impossible. Somali factions or bandits looted most of the food shipped to these locations.

---

4. On the situation in Somalia, see Rakiya Omaar, *Somalia: At War with Itself, Current History*, October 1991, pp. 230-234, Samuel M. Makinda, *Security in the Horn of Africa*, Adelphi Paper 269 (Summer 1992), and United States Army, Intelligence and Threat Assessment Center, ATC-RM-065-93, *Restore Hope Soldiers Handbook*, December 1992, pp. 6-7, Unclassified.

5. Frederick C. Cuny, *How the U.S. Military Could Assist Relief Operations in Somalia*, INTERTECT, 14 August 1992.

The United Nations deployed a force to the region—dubbed UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM), which attempted to monitor a cease-fire so relief supplies could be delivered.[6] But the factions did not want them to do so, and the UN forces in Somalia were too limited in number—and by mandate—to enforce peace. As the starvation became worse, the UN Security Council authorized a U.S.-led military intervention with Security Council Resolution 793 on 3 December 1992.[7]

Military operations

At the direction of the National Command Authority (NCA), the U.S. Central Command (USCINCCENT) established Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia to perform Operation Restore Hope.[8] The I MEF staff made up the core of the JTF headquarters.[9] (The name of this command started as CJTF Somalia. but changed to United Task Force—UNITAF). The CJTF commanded Marine forces from I MEF (referred to as MARFOR) and Army forces from the Tenth Mountain Division (referred to as ARFOR), as well as Air Force and Navy assets.

Operation Restore Hope had the following objectives: secure major air and sea ports, as well as food distribution points; ensure the passage of relief supplies; and assist the UN and HROs.[10]

---

6. For information on the UN in Somalia, see United Nations, *The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia,* Reference Paper, 30 April 1993.

7. Paul Lewis, "U.N.'s Chief Requests New Force to Ease the Somalis' Misery Now," *New York Times,* November 30, 1992, p. 1.

8. For a description of the event leading up to the presidential decision to intervene, see Don Oberdorfer, "The Path to Intervention: A Massive Tragedy We Could do Something About," *Washington Post,* December 6, 1992, p. A1. For a Congressional view of the operation, see *Humanitarian Tragedy in Somalia,* Hearing before the Select Committee on Hunger, U.S. House of Representatives, January 30, 1992.

9. On the formation of the JTF, see CNA, Research Memorandum 93-114, *Operation Restore Hope Joint Task Force* (U), by K. A. W. McGrady, forthcoming, Secret.

10. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), *Mission Statement,* Briefing Slide.

The military planned a four-phase operation to secure major towns (figure 1) and turn the mission over to the UN:

- Phase I: Marine Corps forces arrive in Somalia and establish bases first in Mogadishu (Somalia's capital) and then at Baidoa.
- Phase II: Army forces join the Marines and establish bases in Belet Uen, Oddur, and Gialalassi.
- Phase III: The forces expand operations into Kismayo and Bardera.
- Phase IV: The U.S.-led coalition transfers control of the operation to the UN.[11]

The actual expansion of operations into all of the towns took 19 days.[12] The military divided southern Somalia into eight areas surrounding each major town. (A ninth area was later carved out.) The military called these areas "humanitarian relief sectors" (HRSs), rather than "military" sectors, to emphasize the humanitarian nature of the operation. At the same time, coalition forces under UNITAF control occupied some of these areas. So by mid-January, UNITAF had performed most of its military objectives and the forces were spread out in southern Somalia.

The UN did not take over the operation until early May. Although there was a great deal of interaction between the military and HROs before the end of December, most of it occurred between January and April 1993. During this period, UNITAF attempted to improve the security situation and to ready southern Somalia for transition to a UN force.

---

11. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), *Concept of Operations*, Briefing Slide.

12. UNITAF Somalia, "Restore Hope Significant Events," 18 January 1993, Unclassified. For more information on the early stages of the operation, see *Operation Restore Hope Joint Task Force*.

Figure 1. Major towns of southern Somalia



Humanitarian operations

HROs have traditionally been at the forefront of attempts to provide relief to countries racked by starvation in the Horn of Africa.[13] The HROs in Somalia fell into three groups:

- *Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs).* NGOs and PVOs are not affiliated with governments or public international organizations. In Somalia these

13. For a description of HRO involvement in the Horn of Africa and how HROs alter political events, see Mark Duffield, "NGOs, Disaster Relief and Asset Transfer in the Horn: Political Survival in a Permanent Tragedy," *Development and Change*, Vol. 24 (1993), pp. 131-157.

groups included Care, Irish Concern, Catholic Relief Services, OXFAM, and Save the Children. NGO and PVO workers tended to be independent, hard-working, and flexible, but placed little emphasis on detailed planning.

- *The International Committee for the Red Cross and International Committee for the Red Crescent.* These groups have a standing similar to that of a sovereign state.[14] These large organizations delivered a great deal of food in Somalia. Their workers tended to be more precise and analytical, and placed greater emphasis on planning.

- *UN agencies.* These agencies, such as the World Food Program (WFP) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), are bureaucratic, but have large resources. The WFP, for example, was the largest foreign provider of food in Somalia.

After the military intervention, the scope of HRO activities increased, as did their success.

The activities of all these HROs in Somalia varied widely. Some distributed food and medicine; others actually ran food distribution centers and health clinics. Still others worked on longer-term projects, such as infrastructure improvements, education, and agriculture.

The HRO presence in Somalia was large, and grew as the military operation improved security. As table 1 shows, the number of HROs operating in Somalia almost doubled between the December military intervention and March 1993, when planning for the transition from the U.S.-led coalition to a UN one really started.[15] In December, an estimated 350 HRO workers lived in Somalia; it is unclear how many lived there by March, although it would be safe to assume it was more than double the number.

---

14. On HROs in general and the special status of the ICRC, see Yves Beigbeder, *The Role and Status of International Humanitarian Volunteers and Organizations* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991).

15. These statistics are from UNITAF, *Civil-Military Operations Cell*, Briefing, March 1993, Unclassified.

Table 1. Number of HROs in Somalia

	International NGOs	Local NGOs	UN Agencies	Red Cross	Total HROs
December 1992	21	2	6	2	31
March 1993	44	8	6	2	60

Not only did the number of HROs increase, but the extent and geographic reach of their operations grew. The HROs were in all the HRSs, in varying numbers. Table 2 shows the number of HROs and the military force occupying each HRS.

Table 2. Number of HROs and military force in each HRS

HRS	HROs	Military Force
Baidoa	12	Australia
Baledogle	17	ARFOR
Bardera	12	MARFOR
Belet Uen	9	Canada
Gialalassi	6	Italy
Kismayo	8	Belgium, ARFOR
Marka	10	ARFOR
Mogadishu	57	MARFOR, various coalition forces
Oddur	10	France

The tables mask two important features of the HROs. First, due to the difficult and sometimes dangerous living and working conditions, many HROs came and left Somalia quickly. Others had a high turnover of personnel. Second, there was a great deal of antagonism and competition among different HROs. This lack of institutional memory and competition made the military's job of coordinating with HROs more difficult.

The HROs were not the only groups providing humanitarian assistance in Somalia, however. The U.S. government had been supporting the HRO efforts even before the intervention. In August 1992, President Bush appointed an official from the State Department's Agency for International Development (AID), Office of Foreign

Disaster Assistance (OFDA) to coordinate the interagency relief effort for Somalia.[16] The official organized a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) for Somalia. (Two DART teams had been operating in Nairobi and Mombasa, coordinating assistance with Operation Provide Relief—the airlift of relief supplies from Kenya to Somalia). OFDA maintains the capability to deploy DART members abroad to coordinate relief efforts.[17]

The U.S. effort to aid the situation in Somalia comprised the following elements:

- Emergency airlifts of food into Somalia
- Market intervention to decrease the price and increase the quantity of food available
- Provision of food and non-food relief
- Rehabilitation, especially in the livestock and agriculture sectors
- An attempt to get the UN to send security guards to Somalia.[18]

In general, the military greatly assisted the HROs in their operations. The military secured the ports and airfields that the HROs used to bring in relief supplies. (For example, from May to December 1992, ten ships delivering relief supplies were able to enter the Mogadishu port; in the *one* month following the U.S. intervention, 43 ships

---

16. For an OFDA perspective of events in Somalia and the future of humanitarian intervention, see presentation by Andrew Natsios at USCINCCENT Southwest Asia Symposium, 21 May 1993. Besides AID, the Departments of Health and Human Services, Agriculture, and Transportation also provided assistance during Restore Hope. See Robert Crane, "The Civilian Role in Restoring Hope," *Government Executive*, February 1993, p. 33.

17. OFDA and DARTS (1) organize and coordinate total U.S. government disaster relief responses, (2) respond to mission requests for disaster assistance, (3) make necessary procurement of supplies, services, and transportation, and (4) coordinate assistance efforts with NGOs/PVOs. See Air Land Sea Application Center, *Multi-Service Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations*, Draft, 24 September 1993.

18. U.S. AID, *Proposed Strategy for Somalia*, 9 October 1992, Unclassified.

unloaded there.)[19] The military also ensured that HRO convoys got through and were not looted by factions or bandits. The military repaired the country's major supply routes—the most important roads connecting many of the towns in southern Somalia—and improved the security throughout the country. With a decrease in factional violence and banditry, it was easier for the HROs to provide relief.

19. UNITAF Somalia, "Overview of Humanitarian Relief and Recovery Operations: 10 December 1992 - 14 January 1993," Memorandum, 14 January 1993, Unclassified.

Organizing military-HRO relations

I MEF planners knew that the U.S. military would need to cooperate with the HROs. To ensure close coordination, they planned to establish a Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) in Mogadishu, and mini-HOCs in the other HRSs.

They decided to use this type of organization because it had worked well in Operation Provide Relief, in which military aircraft were used to ferry relief supplies from Kenya to Somalia. Early in Operation Provide Relief, for example, the U.S. military staff had problems coordinating relief efforts with the HROs. The HROs overburdened the military command with direct requests. To solve this problem, the commander established a HOC and manned it with military officers, AID officials, and relief workers. Based on the success of the Provide Relief HOC in dealing with the HROs, HOCs were used in Somalia. (The JTF Chief of Staff during Operation Provide Relief became the military Deputy Director of the HOC in Mogadishu.)

Humanitarian Operations Center

There were nine HOCs in Somalia—one in each HRS. The Mogadishu HOC served as both the national HOC as well as the one for the Mogadishu HRS. This main HOC was collocated with the United Nations headquarters, not with the UNITAF one. There were several related reasons for placing the HOC there:

- The UN (not UNITAF) was tasked with organizing the relief effort, and a UN official was to run the HOC.
- UN agencies conducted much of the relief effort.
- UNITAF wanted to portray the Somalia effort as a UN one.

- When the U.S. military intervened, CINCCENT and the UNITAF staff thought that the UN would start taking over the operation quite quickly.
- Many of the HOC's functions (described below) require the organization to give access to a large number of non-military personnel, including Somalis. For security reasons, the U.S. military resisted giving them such wide access to the military compound.

UNITAF realized that there were advantages to having the HOC collocated with UNITAF, but had little choice but to collocate it with the UN.

When the intervention started, UNITAF moved quickly to establish the HOCs. It established the Mogadishu HOC on 11 December (two days after the intervention) and the Baidoa HOC five days later (right after U.S. forces arrived in that town). By 28 December, UNITAF had established HOCs in most HRSs.

Missions and functions

The HOC had a straight-forward general mission: to plan, support, and monitor the delivery of relief supplies in Somalia.[20]

The HOC provided a focal point for the HROs, as well as the link between the HROs, UNITAF, and UNOSOM. Those working at the HOC tried to increase the efficiency of the humanitarian efforts through better planning and coordination among the HROs and with the military. The HOC also served as a place for gathering and disseminating information. The HOC had three main functions:

- To develop and implement an overall relief strategy for Somalia
- To coordinate logistics support for the HROs
- To arrange military support for the HROs.

---

20. Except where noted, information on the HOC and CMOC is from UNITAF Somalia, *Humanitarian Operations Center*, Briefing, January 1993, Unclassified.

Organization

Figure 2 outlines the *official* organization of the HOC. The director was a UN official, the civilian Deputy Director was from AID's DART,[21] and the military Deputy Director came from UNITAF.

Figure 2. Organization of the HOC



The Standing Liaison Committee was—in theory at least—a policy-making body for humanitarian relief affairs. The HOC's Director chaired it, and its members included representatives from UNOSOM, UNITAF, AID's DART, and several UN and Red Cross agencies. The NGOs were represented by an NGO Executive Committee. In practice, the Standing Liaison Committee could only coordinate actions; it had little real authority.

21. DARTs can sometimes play an interesting and informal but important role—that of interlocutor between the HROs and the military. Most military officers have no experience with HROs, and DARTs can help them better understand HRO culture and viewpoints.

The Core Groups comprised specialists and HROs interested in specific relief issues, including agriculture, livestock, food security, water, sanitation, health/education, employment, and women's groups.

With a few exceptions, none of the HOC's most important groups in the figure really answered to each other; instead, most coordinated among themselves. (The lines in figure 2 are not ones of direction, but coordination.) The Director answered to the UN. The civilian Deputy Director really answered to the U.S. Liaison Office (USLO—the equivalent of the U.S. embassy) and AID. The military Deputy Director answered to UNITAF. The members of the Standing Liaison Committee and Core Groups answered to their headquarters.

Civil-Military Operations Cell

The Civil-Military Operations Cell (CMOC) provided the UNITAF military presence at the HOC, and thus served as UNITAF's liaison to the HROs. The CMOC's Director was also the HOC's military Deputy Director.

The CMOC's most important function was to deal with HRO requests in the areas of convoy escorts, security, space-available flights, and technical assistance. The CMOC validated the HRO requests, and then tasked either UNITAF component commands (the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Navy) or coalition forces to fulfill the requests. The CMOC also served as the focal point for dealing with weapons confiscation policies.

The CMOC's Director was a Colonel, as was the CMOC's liaison to UNITAF. A Lieutenant Colonel was the CMOC's Deputy Director. Several other officers and enlisted Marines were on the staff. Not including the mostly part-time liaison officers from the military components and coalition forces, the CMOC staff numbered about a dozen officers and enlisted personnel.

Areas of military-HRO interaction

During Operation Restore Hope, there were five different areas involving military-HRO interaction. To aid the relief effort, the military:

- Escorted HRO convoys
- Provided security to HROs
- Assisted the HROs in humanitarian and civic assistance projects
- Provided technical assistance to HRO projects
- Confiscated weapons.

Convoy escorts

The military escorted many convoys for the HROs. Table 3 shows the number of long-haul convoys that UNITAF escorted outside of Mogadishu during the first three months of the operation. (It does not include the many escorts within the city.) Estimates provided by the CMOC staff indicate that throughout the operations, on average, UNITAF conducted 70 escorts, used 700 vehicles, and moved 9,000 metric tons of supplies each month.[22]

Table 3. UNITAF long-haul convoy escorts for HROs

	Escorts	Trucks used	Supplies (metric tons)
December 1992	12	117	1,665
January 1993	75	678	9,123
February 1993	78	722	9,731

22. The CMOC staff collected and collated monthly information on convoy statistics and routes.

The ability of the military to escort HRO relief convoys to distant parts of Somalia greatly decreased the HROs' costs of transportation, because they no longer had to airlift supplies.[23] The escorts also allowed the World Food Program (WFP) to bring its fleet of trucks to Somalia, which increased its ability to transport food and lowered the price of Somali trucking by 30 percent due to the increased supply of trucking in the competitive market.

A simple system existed for requesting convoys. The HROs filled out one-page request sheets and submitted them to the CMOC at least 48 hours before they wanted an escort. CMOC then tasked either a U.S. component or coalition force to perform the escort. The HRO and military command providing the escort then coordinated directly with each other.

The convoy's destination typically determined which command the CMOC tasked to provide the escort. In general, the component or coalition force occupying the HRS that the convoy was going *to* was primarily responsible for escorting the convoy. If the HRS was close to Mogadishu, the command provided escorts all the way there. Australia provided escorts to Baidoa, Italy to Gialalassi, and ARFOR to Marka, for example. If the HRSs were more distant, a force in Mogadishu would escort the convoy part of the way, and then the component or coalition would pick up the convoy. For example, for convoys to Belet Uen, the Italians met the Canadians at Buulobarde; for convoys to Kismayo, ARFOR met the Belgians at Jilib. Figure 3 shows the most common long-haul convoy routes. The HRSs are in bold, most common escorts in italics, and other towns in plain text.

Issues

Although this convoy system worked well, there were a few small problems. The military-HRO link-up was not always smooth. When an HRO was delayed, it was sometimes difficult to communicate the delay to the escort before the escort arrived. On occasion, the problem was due to communications difficulties. At other times, it was

23. UNITAF Somalia, "Overview of Humanitarian Relief and Recovery Operations: 10 December 1992 - 14 January 1993."

compounded by the fact that the CMOC, which received HRO calls, was not collocated with the force headquarters, which would often have to notify the command providing the escort.

Figure 3. Common long-haul convoy routes



Convoys also had problems because Somali trucks hired by the HROs would often break down. Many of the breakdowns were brought about on purpose because the Somali driver wanted to get a portion of the relief supplies. This problem was difficult to address because

the military could not provide the HROs with their own trucks, perform maintenance on the Somali trucks, or inspect every Somali truck before a convoy started. And because some of the breakdowns were purposeful, an ability to repair the trucks would not have solved the problem.

Finally, on rare occasions the military could not fulfill a request for escorts on a certain day due to a shortage of assets. All escorts were eventually performed, however.

Security

The HROs requested the military provide them with security against two different types of threats. One was sporadic banditry that continued even after the intervention. HRO guards presented another source of problems. Due to the wide-spread banditry *before* the military intervention, the HROs "hired" guards for personal and compound security. In many instances, this was not voluntary—the guards demanded to be hired or they would attack the HRO compounds. Similarly, the HROs found they could not fire the guards because the guards would threaten the HROs or rob them.

When the HROs needed security, they called a 911-type number at the CMOC. The CMOC staff notified the UNITAF Joint Operations Center (JOC). The JOC watch officer then tasked a component or coalition force to assist the HROs.

Issues

Even though UNITAF had overwhelming military force, providing security for the HROs was not always easy, especially in Mogadishu. There was a communications problem at times. Like the communications problems with convoy link-ups, this one can be partially attributed to the CMOC not being collocated with the UNITAF headquarters. When an HRO call came into the CMOC in the middle of the night, an officer had to wake up, get the proper information from the HRO, and then relay it to the JOC. It would have been much easier had the HROs been able to call the JOC—which always had several evening watch officers—directly for assistance.

It made matters worse that the HROs were dispersed. It was very difficult for the military to provide security for all the HROs that requested it. As table 4 shows, there were many places where the military could potentially be called in Mogadishu alone.[24]

Table 4. Potential HRO security points in Mogadishu

Type	North Mogadishu	South Mogadishu	Total
Offices	13	33	46
Residences	10	35	45
Warehouses	11	13	24
Feeding Centers	158	198	356
Health Clinics	44	58	102
Others	7	5	12
Total	243	342	585

Humanitarian and civic assistance

The military provided humanitarian and civic assistance (H/CA) in Somalia. The HROs and military had a web of relations outside of the HOC and CMOC. In many instances in the field, HROs would request military assistance with projects. In others, soldiers saw the HROs trying to provide relief to the Somalis and the soldiers simply helped them. The military thus provided H/CA both directly to the population and assisted the HROs in doing so.

Soldiers helped the HROs in the field for several reasons:

Most of the time there were no military operations to conduct, so soldiers had spare time.

- Soldiers were also struck by the low living standards of Somalis and simply took opportunities to help the HROs improve them.
- Many soldiers saw helping the HROs provide relief as part of the mission.

24. UNITAF Somalia, *Civil-Military Operations Cell.*

The forms of assistance given varied. Sometimes soldiers provided manual labor; in other instances they used military equipment for construction.

The military was proud of this assistance. In fact, at one point UNITAF asked all the components to submit lists of projects their troops carried out so they could be put in the daily Situation Reports (SITREPS) sent to USCINCCENT, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other military commands.[25] Instances of such humanitarian assistance were also put into briefings for visitors.

Issues

Direct assistance raised several issues. One was that some of the assistance might have pushed the bounds of what was acceptable under H/CA guidelines and laws.[26] The laws concerning H/CA for JCS-directed operations are governed by Title 10 of the U.S. Code. There are three types of H/CA:

- *Stevens H/CA* are governed by the 1985 Stevens Amendment. It now applies only to exercises, not operations.
- *Statutory H/CA* must usually be approved by the Secretary of State.
- *De minimis H/CA* is governed by section 401 of the Title 10. It allows for military forces to use a very small amount of Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds for H/CA under several

25. For example, one day's SITREP noted that in HRS Marka, ARFOR was (1) providing police with uniforms and equipment, (2) assisting town leaders in establishing a legal system, (3) setting up a Somali market, (4) building a library and stocking it with books, and (5) building a roof for a hospital. See CJTF Somalia, 181800Z Apr 93, *SITREP 134*, Unclassified.

26. In a memorandum from the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) to the J-3 and CMOC, the SJA noted that H/CA "without proper authority is a violation of the law, and has serious consequences." See Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, UNITAF Somalia, *Humanitarian and Civic Action Programs*, Memorandum, 21 January 1993, Unclassified.

conditions (e.g., direct support of a mission or to ensure the security of U.S. forces).

While there are some instances when a commander does not need approval to perform H/CA with O&M funds, it was unclear whether some of the assistance provided by forces in the HRSs—and outside the purview of the staff in Mogadishu—was within the guidelines.

Those servicemen pursuing H/CA activities noted, however, that they were allowed to do so under guidelines permitting activities to protect forces. That is, they contended that humanitarian activities that made the Somalis more accepting of U.S. forces assisted the military mission, and were thus allowed. Others disputed this argument, noting that it can be applied to any H/CA activity. Because the H/CA rules are complex, commanders and officers need to be better informed before the next humanitarian operation.

Another important issue was the efficiency of the H/CA. Because no one coordinated the assistance, it was probably not as efficient as it could have been. Theoretically, the efficient allocation of resources requires collecting a complete list of requests for assistance, prioritizing the requests, and allocating assets based on the benefits of projects with regard to specific objectives. But there was no centralization of most assistance to HROs. Soldiers in the field who saw a need acted on it—they may have had no idea if there was a more pressing need nearby. Perhaps a more centralized system would have helped coordinate assets for larger projects, but the bureaucracy that would have come with it may have hampered the lower-level projects.

Furthermore, because the military was unsure about how to account for H/CA, and did not have centralized control over it, it would have been difficult to get reimbursed for the activities. In future operations, it might be possible to be reimbursed through the foreign aid budget. It might even be possible to arrange with DART for the military to be reimbursed. But without more accurate accounting and centralized control, this will be very difficult.

A final issue was that the military did not have the expertise or assets to do many of the things it probably would have liked to. Underlying this shortcoming was the view that such civil affairs activities

addressed the longer-term problems of Somalia: It was nation building, not part of the Operation Restore Hope mission. Many officers considered this best left to the UN.

Technical assistance

Not only did the military assist the HROs in projects, but they also provided technical assistance. While the military did perform projects in support of its military mission, such as repairing roads to support forward-deployed troops, some of the assistance they provided to HROs was not directly related to the military mission. Instead, it was in the form of studies and advice to assist the HROs in their projects.

As noted above, one of the functions of the HOC and CMOC was to coordinate HRO efforts and military support. Sometimes the HROs faced problems they did not have the expertise or assets to deal with, such as projects that spanned the operating areas of several HROs, were very complex (such as dams), or required extensive engineering assets the HROs did not have (such as building roads). In these cases the HROs came to the CMOC and asked the military to assess how a project could be completed and/or requested that the military do it. The military sent many teams out to perform studies on projects for the HROs.

Issues

Although the CMOC was helpful to the HROs, there was one complication with this arrangement. Sometimes the on-scene military lacked the civil affairs expertise and assets to provide as much advise as the HROs might have liked.

Weapons confiscation policy

The final—and most contentious—area of military-HRO relations was weapons confiscation policy. This situation could be interpreted as one in which the objectives of the military and needs of the HROs conflicted.

The situation was complex.[27] The HROs needed to rent vehicles from Somalis to deliver relief supplies. Most vehicles came with drivers armed to protect them from bandits. The HROs needed to bring these vehicles into areas controlled by UNITAF (such as the port and airfields) to receive relief supplies. To deliver supplies, they needed to cross HRS borders and pass through military checkpoints.

At the same time, however, UNITAF was trying to disarm the warlords, bandits, and much of the population. Some soldiers had difficulty telling bandits from Somali HRO drivers, and therefore confiscated any weapon they saw, including those belonging to the HRO drivers. Other soldiers, convinced that Somali HRO drivers took their weapons home in the evenings and became bandits, wanted to confiscate HRO weapons.

Solution I: pink ID cards

UNITAF's first solution to this problem was to issue pink identification cards to HRO drivers in Mogadishu in late December. But there were several problems with this policy. Because the cards had no pictures, fraud was common. Moreover, UNITAF did not fully disseminate the rules about the cards, and there was confusion over weapons confiscation policy in general. Furthermore, there was no countrywide policy—it differed by HRS.

The result was that UNITAF soldiers were confiscating some weapons from HRO drivers. Without their weapons, the drivers would neither drive the vehicles nor allow other HRO workers to drive them without escorts. Therefore, the HROs were paying for the vehicles to remain idle.[28]

---

27. At the time, the problems with HROs over weapons confiscation policy was described in UNITAF Somalia, *Differences between the Humanitarian Community and UTF and How to Resolve Them*, Paper, 27 January 1993, Unclassified. For a more complete retrospective, see Col. F. Lorenz, USMC, *Weapons Confiscation Policy During Operation Restore Hope*, Unpublished Paper, August 1993, Unclassified.

28. In January, a rental vehicle with two armed drivers cost the HROs on average $2,500 per month. See Lorenz, *Weapons Confiscation Policy during Restore Hope*, p. 9.

Solution II: blue ID cards

UNITAF knew it needed a new approach in late January.[29] In February UNITAF decided to issue blue photo identification cards. (It started to issue them in late February.) HROs would in effect vouch for Somalis that they needed as drivers. These Somalis would get their cards at the CMOC or local HOC. With the cards, they could enter ports and airfields, cross HRSs, pass through daylight roadblocks, and carry a limited number of authorized weapons.[30] UNITAF disseminated these rules widely.

At the same time, MARFOR was initiating a new disarmament policy in Mogadishu. The first disarmament policy allowed the military to confiscate weapons only in a few situations.[31] The second policy allowed the military to confiscate almost any weapon.[32] One element of the second policy was the rule that soldiers could confiscate any "visible" weapon. MARFOR enforced these rules vigorously.

Issues

There was a disagreement over the meaning of "visible" in the second policy. When HRO vehicles approached checkpoints and roadblocks, MARFOR soldiers often looked inside the cars, saw weapons on the

---

29. The new policy is described in UNITAF Somalia, "Identification and Weapons Policy," policy statement signed by Lt. Gen. R. Johnston, Unclassified.

30. The number of weapons in a vehicle could not be greater than the number of people in it. And the drivers could only possess those types of weapons listed on the backs of their cards.

31. The first weapons confiscation policy allowed soldiers to confiscate weapons only after a conflict, under the rules of engagement, or if weapons were unattended. See CJTF Somalia, 140553Z Dec 92, *United Task Force Somalia—Commander's Policy Guidance #1 (Weapons Collection Procedures)*, Unclassified.

32. See CJTF Somalia, 081200Z Jan 93, *UTF Somalia—Commander's Policy Guidance #3 (Weapons Confiscation and Disposition)*, Unclassified. Note that the title of the first policy guidance used the word "collection," whereas the second used the word "confiscation," indicating a more active policy.

Somali guards' laps, stopped the vehicles, and confiscated the weapons.[33] (The HRO drivers kept the weapons on their laps because if there were problems they needed to use them quickly; keeping them on the floor or in the trunk would not have allowed them to defend their vehicles against bandits.) Despite the issuance of blue ID cards, MARFOR confiscated many HRO weapons. During one week in March in Mogadishu, for example, MARFOR seized 84 weapons; 54 of those were seized from HROs because they were visible. To some extent this was a problem of interpretation and dissemination of the exact nature of the rules. But as I discuss below, it was also related to the attitude of many soldiers toward the HROs. Eventually UNITAF redefined visible to allow the drivers to carry the weapons on their laps—but not until after several weeks of serious problems concerning confiscation.

The HROs in Mogadishu were very upset over the situation. Even if the weapon were wrongly confiscated, it took four days for the military to return it. The weapons first went from the soldiers to MARFOR headquarters, where a report was filed. After this, they were taken to the CMOC. The HROs then had to file for their return, and the CMOC staff had to consider the requests. In the meantime the HRO vehicles sat idle.

Solution III: weapons policy card

By early April UNITAF had distributed a weapons policy card to soldiers and HROs.[34] The purpose of the card was to clarify and disseminate further the rules on HRO weapons policy. The card had two sides with pictures and explanations. It stated in what positions (e.g., muzzle down or on laps) HRO guards and drivers could carry their weapons depending on where they were (e.g., riding in or on the backs of vehicles). The card reiterated the other rules. Putting this information on one easy to read card, and disseminating it to soldiers and HROs seemed to solve most of the problems. But they did not

33. MARFOR soldiers also found reasons to stop cars, search them, and confiscate any unauthorized weapons. The reasons why HRO drivers carried unauthorized weapons are discussed below.

34. UNITAF, *Weapons Policy Card*, March 1993, Unclassified.

solve these problems until right before UNITAF transitioned control of the operation to the UN. The problems had existed for the previous 3 to 4 months.

Possible explanations of the problems

The problems with weapons confiscation in Mogadishu were worse than those elsewhere. There were few other reports of such disagreements in other HRSs. What was special about Mogadishu?

Security situation in Mogadishu

One important aspect was that there were more security problems in Mogadishu than in the other HRSs. Therefore, there were more checkpoints, and the soldiers took the weapons confiscation policies more seriously. But why did they focus on confiscating HRO weapons? A reason often given was that the Somali HRO drivers could use their weapons as bandits in the evenings. While there were a few known instances of Somali HRO drivers using their weapons in a crime, the occasions were infrequent.

Unfamiliarity with HROs

Another possible explanation of the situation in Mogadishu was that because it was such a large city, with so many HROs, the soldiers were not familiar with all the HRO workers. The rapid turnover of HRO workers made this problem even greater. If the soldiers knew them, they could be sure they were not bandits. In smaller towns soldiers were familiar with most of the HRO drivers.

MARFOR's absence from the Mogadishu CMOC

A third peculiarity was that there was no "Mogadishu HRS" HOC. In all the other HRSs there were mini-HOCs. But the Mogadishu HOC was also the national HOC for all of Somalia. Therefore, UNITAF officers manned the Mogadishu CMOC, not officers from the military unit controlling the Mogadishu HRS—MARFOR.[35] In all the other

35. This is not to say that the MARFOR staff did not interact with HROs—they did. Solders helped them regularly, and the MARFOR staff had a liaison officer to the CMOC. But most of the CMOC officers came from elsewhere.

HRSs, the occupying force manned the HOC. So when MARFOR soldiers confiscated weapons and the HROs came to the HOC to reclaim them and complain, MARFOR officers did not have to deal with the HROs—UNITAF officers did. In other towns, however, it appeared that once the officers had to deal with the HROs, the military stopped confiscating their weapons. In this way, MARFOR was insulated from the complaints of the HROs.

U.S. Marine presence

One conclusion that might be drawn is that the problems were with the U.S. Marines who occupied most of Mogadishu. After all, there were few problems with the Army or coalition forces elsewhere. But there were also few problems with the Marines occupying other towns. This leads one to believe that this was not just a Marine problem. Rather, the causes were deeper.

Reflection of larger problems

Although there may be specific reasons for the problems being worse in Mogadishu than elsewhere, the weapons confiscation policy problems reflected the larger tensions between the military and HROs in Mogadishu. The next section of the paper examines some possible underlying factors affecting relations.

Factors affecting military-HRO relations

The problems alluded to above may have resulted from an underlying friction between the military and HROs in Mogadishu. I believe the following factors may have contributed to military-HRO tensions:

- The lack of a clear military-HRO command structure
- The military's views of the role of humanitarian relief in their mission in Somalia
- The military's views of the HROs
- The HROs' views and actions.

Command structure

No single organization was in charge of military-HRO relations. A UN official was the HOC Director, but neither UNITAF, DART, nor the HROs answered to him. As explained above, the HOC Director answered to the UN, DART to USLO, UNITAF to USCINCENT, and the HROs to their own headquarters. In past operations, either the military or the HROs (coordinated by DART) were clearly in charge; the other played a supporting role. But in Restore Hope, neither group had any authority over the other.

Thus, the military and HROs had to *coordinate* operations. Military officers—accustomed to established command and control hierarchies and clear wire diagrams to guide them in staff process—sometimes found this arrangement frustrating.

Of course UNITAF could not effect this command arrangement. It was a matter of mission and arrangements made by higher headquarters. But the military should understand that the nature of future missions may necessitate such coordination with HROs.

Military's views of the mission

What was the military's mission in Somalia? And what was the role of assisting the HROs in the military mission? There was a divergence of viewpoints on these issues. Most of the military's views fell into one of two categories: some thought that the mission was security only, others thought the military was there to help the HROs.

Part of the problem was that the mission statement for the operation was unclear about what priority to give to assisting the HROs. The official mission statement was as follows:

> When directed by the National Command Authority, USCINCCENT will conduct joint/combined military operations in Somalia, to secure major air and sea ports, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, to provide security for relief convoys and relief organization operations and to assist the United Nations/nongovernmental organizations in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices.[36]

The mission statement, therefore, identified four objectives. The first three centered on security, the fourth on assisting the HROs.[37]

U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney was also unclear in his statements about the mission. In a press conference right before the operation, he displayed the mission statement, noting that "it boils down basically to saying that our purpose is to use U.S. forces to restore the

---

36. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), *Mission Statement*, Briefing Slide, Unclassified.

37. According to members of the USCINCCENT staff, the last line of the mission statement was added to give the CJTF the authority to assist the HROs if he decided it was appropriate. In other words, they meant the last line to be permissive, not directive (though that was not at all clear from the mission statement). The USCINCCENT staff realized that it might cause confusion, but believed that it was important to give the CJTF as much authority and latitude as possible to accomplish his mission.

situation so that relief supplies can be delivered...."[38] So he seemed to state that the mission was security. But then he added: "The mission is very clear, indeed. It is a humanitarian mission."[39]

Thus, two views on the nature of the mission emerged. One view held that the mission was only to provide security; this would allow the HROs to provide relief. In this way, UNITAF assisted the HROs indirectly. Those holding this view pointed to the focus on security in the mission statement as a whole. They also noted that there was no other discussion of helping HROs anywhere in the OPLAN.

Another view held that the military was there to help the HROs—both directly and indirectly. Many who held this view quoted the last line of the mission statement *verbatim*. They also said that helping the HROs was so obviously underlying the reason for being in Somalia that of course the military should assist the HROs in any possible manner.

Most of the officers on the CMOC staff held the second view. Other officers—especially on the MARFOR staff—held the first view. The problem with disagreement over the mission, however, was *not* that the mission was not geared toward the HROs. The problem was that there was disagreement over the mission's intent toward HROs.

Military's views of the HROs

Another factor affecting military-HRO relations was the negative views many in the military held of the HROs.

Many saw the HROs as operating inefficiently: The HROs did not plan, organize, or coordinate their efforts well, especially when compared to military planning. (Note that the flip-side of these HRO attributes are flexibility and independence, the qualities HROs need

38. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), "News Briefing with Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and General Colin Powell, Chairman JCS," Friday December 4, 1992.

39. A reasonable explanation of Cheney's statements might be that the operation was security, but the objective was humanitarian.

to be successful in their efforts.) Therefore, many in the military saw the HROs as generating a great deal of confusion and waste.

As for the HRO workers, many military officers viewed them as politically liberal and often anti-military.[40] They often saw them as young, over-educated, self-righteous, incompetent, expatriate cowboys who merely came quickly into the area to "do good" without considering how best to do it or what the consequences would be. Some also saw them as greedy and corrupt.

To be fair, it is important to note that not every officer held these views. Also, most of those officers who did state these views did not hold them very deeply. When pressed, most admitted that the HRO workers were well intentioned, but sometimes self-righteous and unorganized.

Why did many in the military hold such negative views of the HRO workers? Like all stereotypes, there was some truth to the ones about the HROs. Many HROs were politically liberal and anti-military, except for some Church groups. HRO workers were mostly young and poorly organized.[41] But the existence of the stereotypes was also probably due to a lack of familiarity with the HROs. Those officers who spent the most time with the HROs got along with them the best.

HROs' views and actions

Of course, the problems in military-HRO relations were not all the fault of the military; in fact, the HROs bore a large share of the responsibility.

---

40. Many were anti-military. For every HRO, having military escorts was necessary. But some HROs at first refused to cooperate with the military. Others were almost called home for allowing the military to escort their convoys.

41. While many of the HROs were poorly organized, not all of them were. Those from large organizations that had a corporate culture stressing efficiency, such as the International Red Cross, were much better organized than those from organizations that were small and stressed helping people immediately.

Many of the HROs held negative views of the military. They often viewed the military as being inflexible, especially on issues such as when convoys could be escorted and in the military's zeal to confiscate weapons. They also saw the military as bureaucratic in issues such as the regulations for space-available flights that HROs could take—if they filled out the required forms and managed several difficult hurdles.[42]

Ironically, a good number of the HROs also thought the military would be the solution to *all* their problems. In fact, their expectations were too high. Many of them thought the military would completely rid Somalia of the bandits and warlords. At the very least they thought the military would deter most warlords and bandits, and impose disarmament on the population—except for the HROs who were "above" the military's disarmament policy.

The HROs did not help matters much in several respects. Many did not stress organizational aspects of their operations. They were not very good at ensuring their Somali drivers followed the rules: Drivers with identification cards did not go with every group of vehicles, and drivers often brought the wrong weapons, or sometimes they simply had an extra weapon in the car. Whether through oversight or a feeling that they should be above the rules, the HROs often broke the rules.

The HROs also expected the military to provide security for their compounds, but would not consolidate them to make it easier for the military to do so. (As noted above, there were almost 600 potential security points in Mogadishu alone.) Moreover, they were presumptuous about military security—believing that the military's first priority should be the HRO's welfare.

Another difficulty in providing security for the HROs was an unfortunate result of the pre-intervention environment. Before the military

---

42. The HROs could use military aircraft if there was space available on the flights requested. For the regulations on Space-A travel, see CJTF Somalia, 131700Z Jan 93, *Transportation of Foreign Nationals aboard U.S. Aircraft*, Unclassified.

intervention, the HROs hired Somali guards to protect them. Although necessary at the time, it became less necessary after the intervention. The HROs tried to fire the guards, but they had no other jobs to go to. The guards would either refuse to be fired or steal from their employers. In one instance, demonstrating guards blackmailed the WFP into keeping their pay.

Furthermore, the HROs did not always give the military advance notice of their actions to coordinate operations. In one instance, HROs did not inform the military of their decision to establish soup kitchens in Mogadishu, even though the military might have had to supply protection for them. It would have been helpful to coordinate their placement with the military to make matters easier.

What can be done to improve relations?

There are several options that I believe could help ensure better military-HRO relations in future operations.[43] Some options center on the HOC and CMOC; others are more general in nature. It is also important to realize that two key decision are likely to affect military-HRO relations in future operations.

Options for improving relations: the HOC and CMOC

In a large operation, a key aspect of good military-HRO relations is an effective organization for coordinating relations.

HOC and CMOC

As in Operation Provide Relief, the Restore Hope experience showed that military-HRO relations are best conducted in one place—the HOC. Whatever its problems, military-HRO relations would have been much worse had there not been a HOC and all the HROs had to find their way around UNITAF's headquarters searching for the officers to answer their questions. It is clear that whenever there is substantial military-HRO interaction in an operation, a HOC should be established. The question, then, is how to improve the operation of the HOC.

Staffing

In Restore Hope, the CMOC Director and UNITAF J-3 both had experience in humanitarian operations, which proved very useful. Although the other officers at the CMOC learned quickly, it would probably be helpful to ensure that in future operations there are at

43. Examinations of military-HRO relations in other humanitarian operations may reveal more or different options. At the time of this report, I am unfamiliar with any such reports.

least a few officers with experience in humanitarian operations on the CMOC and/or JTF staff.[44] Because there may be a lack of such officers, however, it might be helpful to consider training officers for such duties. Such training might include having some officers participate in short courses on humanitarian assistance or tours with UN humanitarian operations, or even AID operations. This training would give the officers a better understanding of relief issues and a greater familiarity with relief workers.

Headquarters collocation

Collocating the HOC and military headquarters is usually advisable.[45] For the reasons discussed above, this was impossible in Restore Hope. But the problems with not having the HOC and military headquarters collocated shows just how important it is.

Collocating the HOC and the military headquarters in future operation would improve some of the communications and coordination difficulties that hampered convoy escorts and security.

More important, collocation would also increase HRO-military interaction. Increased familiarity would likely help matters in many ways. The HROs would learn more about how the military operates and see that the military really does want to help them. The military would learn more about the HROs. Although differences of opinion would still exist, there would likely be less animosity. After all, those military officers who disliked the HROs the most were the ones that had the least interaction with them. The CMOC officers and the HRO workers developed a friendly working relationship; more officers should have had such a relationship.

---

44. It would also be helpful to have an officer on the CMOC, JTF, or SJA staff who was thoroughly familiar with H/CA regulations.

45. Collocation does not mean in the same room or even building. What would seem helpful is being within safe walking distance (i.e., in the same compound or right next door). The negative aspect of collocation—the military being swamped by HROs—must be avoided.

Local forces in local HOCs

It may be important to ensure the involvement of the local military force (i.e., the force occupying that sector) in every local HOC—even if the local HOC doubles as the national HOC. In Somalia there were mini-HOCs staffed with local forces in all of the HRSs except HRS Mogadishu. In Mogadishu, there was one HOC that served as both the HOC for HRS Mogadishu and as the national HOC. The Mogadishu HOC, however, was not staffed by officers from the local military force (MARFOR), but with officers from the national headquarters (UNITAF). Therefore, local forces did not have to cooperate and interact with the HROs on all issues. In fact, they were insulated from complaints about their policies. After all, when HRO leaders had problems with the military, they confronted the officers in the HOC. But these officers were not from the local force.

Another problem with having forces from the CJTF staff in the national HOC is that they have to spend their time dealing with local problems, instead of concentrating on long-range, nation-wide planning and coordination issues.

CMOC stature

Another option—increasing the stature of the HOC and CMOC—would send a signal to all the military forces that relations with HROs were important. The CMOC Director answered to the J-3 in Restore Hope. Having a CMOC Director of higher stature and giving him the position, status, and access of a Special Staff Section head might help matters.

Military relations with CMOC officers

For the CMOC officers to be effective, it is important to attempt to ensure that they are not viewed negatively. The role of the CMOC is vital to relations with the HROs. CMOC officers must even-handedly represent the views of the military to the HROs and the views of the HROs to the military. But in Restore Hope, many MARFOR and UNITAF officers accused the CMOC officers of having been co-opted by the HROs.[46] It is easy to see how such misunderstandings could occur. After all, the job of the CMOC officers was to act as a liaison to the

HROs. They spent a great deal of time with the HROs, and understood their viewpoints well. In explaining these views to UNITAF—which was their job as CMOC officers—UNITAF officers could easily misinterpret the CMOC officers' views. But if the CMOC officers are written off by the military, effective coordination of policies with the HROs breaks down.

Options for improving relations: other aspects

There are five related options for improving military-HRO relations that do not center on the HOC or CMOC. Most can be thought of as ways to ensure that the military places greater emphasis on cooperation with the HROs.

Clarity of mission

A command can attempt to ensure clarity of the mission by making it explicit—either in the mission statement, messages, or orally—what role humanitarian assistance plays in the mission, and how the military should relate to the HROs. Of course the NCA and CINC have the final say on the mission statement, but the CJTF can influence it and disseminate his view of it. In Restore Hope, the mission statement left this question of humanitarian assistance open for interpretation. Whether or not the mission should be security or helping the HROs is not the point here. Rather, it is that *whatever mission is decided, it should be made clear.*

Education

More education and cross-pollination between the military and HROs might help relations. CMOC officers and HRO leaders could brief military officers on HRO organizations, objectives, methods of operating, etc. Education could also extend to soldiers. The military expects soldiers to be able to recognize different types of weapons

46. A phrase occasionally used was "the Stockholm Syndrome." This referred to an incident in Sweden in which people being held hostage by terrorists came to sympathize with their captors. Others used phrases such as "gone native."

and interact with the population and enemies properly. They give them handbooks to do so. There is no reason the military cannot expect soldiers to recognize HRO vehicles and interact properly with HROs. The military could easily pull together material on the HROs and issue small booklets detailing military policy toward the HROs.

But education must go both ways. Military officers could brief the HROs on military organization, strategy, and operations. Briefings on logistics capabilities and operating procedures would be especially helpful. Once each side better understands the other, cooperation may be easier.

Priority on relations

If HROs are important to the success of the military mission, the command could place a higher priority on improving relations and coordinating policies with them. For example, the military could invite HROs to planning meetings and briefings whenever possible.

The command must also might disseminate the view that HROs are allies and partners. In this way it can be made clear to junior officers and the enlisted soldiers that come into contact with the HROs what priority the military places on relations with HROs.

Options for improving relations: long-term issues

To prepare for humanitarian interventions, the Marines could include HRO interaction in exercises, develop doctrine on interaction with HROs, and send officers to the State Department or UN for training on humanitarian and relief affairs.

Key decisions affecting relations

Throughout this paper I have avoided two key, related questions. These are—in my view—among the most important ones the commander will have to answer for the next operation that has a humanitarian affairs component. They are important in their own right, of course, but are also noteworthy because they may have an impact on military-HRO relations.

Direct assistance

The first question is whether to emphasize direct assistance to the HROs and populace in the form of H/CA. In Restore Hope, the command did not emphasize it, but bit-by-bit UNITAF slid into direct assistance. The advantages to emphasizing direct assistance are obvious. It would improve HRO effectiveness and the well-being of the population. The disadvantages are also obvious. It would increase the chances of a longer deployment with mission-creep. The military might also start unsustainable projects. More emphasis on the humanitarian-side would also make the mission more complex and require more assets, especially engineering and civil affairs ones. This, in turn, would make the operation more costly.

Whatever the decision is on how much to emphasize such assistance, it should be made explicit and disseminated. A decision to emphasize assistance would improve relations with HROs because the military would be more forthcoming. A specific decision not to emphasize it would at least quell unrealistic expectations.

Civil affairs

A second key question flows from the first: Should more civil affairs assets be used? Such a course of action might increase the expertise available to the JTF and HROs, improve coordination with HROs, and increase direct assistance in general. Civil affairs officers would be especially helpful as liaison officers to HROs. It may, however, require a politically difficult call-up of the reserves.

In Restore Hope, a humanitarian assistance plan developed by DART was not accepted because it required military civil affairs assets.[47] The

47. US AID, OFDA, *Revised AID/FHA/OFDA Plan of Action for Increased Humanitarian Assistance During Upcoming Military Presence in Somalia*, 10 December 1992, Unclassified. The first draft of this plan called for using civil affairs assets in longer-term projects, but the plan was changed to focus on shorter-term projects due to fears that the military would see civil affairs missions as a quagmire.

plan called for these assets to be used in the following areas:

- General ration distribution
- Road, bridge, and building construction
- Transportation and logistics
- Supplementary feeding
- Primary health care
- Indirect food programs
- Water and sanitation programs
- Agriculture programs.

The Restore Hope experience does not answer the question of whether or not the military should use civil affairs assets for such operations. But is clear that before the next operation the military should consider how to best use civil affairs units, where they can fit into the JTF structure, and the costs and benefits of their use. If it appears that more civil affairs work will be undertaken by the Marines during such operations, some officers might be moved from the Reserves (where most civil affairs officers are at present) to active duty. Activating reserves can be politically difficult for operations short of major regional contingencies.

Conclusions

What then to make of military-HRO relations during Operation Restore Hope?

Certainly there were problems and relations could have been better. Many of the UNITAF's problems, however, were unavoidable: the USCINCCENT staff wrote their mission statement, UNITAF did not have the authority to call-up civil affairs reservists, and UNITAF could not have collocated the HOC with the military headquarters—to name just three of many examples. Besides, as many in the military argue, the mission was to provide security, not help the HROs.

The purpose of pointing out the problems in military-HRO relations, then, is not to lay blame on UNITAF. After all, the military accomplished its mission successfully. Rather, the purpose is to learn from Restore Hope so future operations are conducted even more effectively.

It is, in my opinion, not possible to pronounce military-HRO relations "good" or "bad." After all, such terms are relative, not absolute: Relations were good or bad compared to what?

One answer might be *compared to past operations*. But although there was military-HRO interaction in other operations such as Provide Relief and Provide Comfort (assisting the Kurds in Northern Iraq), the scope, duration, and security problems were all larger in Restore Hope. The operations cannot be compared in a meaningful manner.

Another answer might be *compared to expectations*. The HROs expected the military to solve all their problems. But even if they had solved most of them, anyone with a knowledge of military and HRO cultures could have predicted problems between the two groups.

Therein lies the heart of the matter. Although in humanitarian operations both the military and HROs work toward similar—or at least compatible—objectives, they have different organizational cultures. The military is hierarchical whereas the HROs are independent, to name just one (very important) difference. Thus, the key to ensuring that military-HRO relations are as close as possible lies in overcoming the differences in organizational cultures. This paper presents some ways to help do so.

There will always be differences of opinion between the military and HROs over subjects that arise. The key is to ensure that there is enough open communication that military-HRO tensions are only the result of *real* differences of opinions, not of misunderstandings and unfamiliarity between the groups.

In Restore Hope, the problems between the military and HROs had very few operational effects. But in future humanitarian interventions, when there may be greater threats, cooperation between the two groups will have to be closer.

This paper looks at how the *military* can improve relations. The HROs also have their problems and must meet the military half-way to improve relations. But the focus of this paper is on the military—and what it can do. The options in this paper, I believe, could help the military in this respect. It is hoped that such measures will induce more cooperation from the HROs.

Glossary

AID	Agency for International Development
ARFOR	Army forces
CJTF	Commander, joint task force
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Cell
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
H/CA	Humanitarian and civic assistance
HOC	Humanitarian Operations Center
HRO	Humanitarian relief organization
I MEF	First Marine Expeditionary Force
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JOC	Joint Operations Center
JTF	Joint task force
MARFOR	Marine forces
NCA	National Command Authority
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OPLAN	Operations plan
PVO	Private voluntary organizations
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
UNITAF	United Task Force
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations in Somalia
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USCINCCENT	U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Central Command
USLO	U.S. Liaison Office
UTF	United Task Force
WFP	World Food Program

List of figures

Figure 1. Major towns of southern Somalia 12

Figure 2. Organization of the HOC. 19

Figure 3. Common long-haul convoy routes 23

List of tables

Table 1. Number of HROs in Somalia 14

Table 2. Number of HROs and military force in each HRS 14

Table 3. UNITAF long-haul convoy escorts for HROs 21

Table 4. Potential HRO security points in Mogadishu 25

Distribution list

SNDL

21A1	CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
21A2	CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR
21A3	CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
22A1	COMSECONDFLT
22A2	COMSEVENTHFLT
22A2	COMTHIRDFLT
22A3	COMSIXTHFLT
23B4	COMUSNAVCENT
24J1	CG FMFLANT/HQ FMFEUR DESIGNATE
24J2	CG FMFPAC
24J3	HQ FMFEUR DESIGNATE
26A1	COMPHIBGRU TWO
26A2	COMPHIBGRU ONE
26A2	COMPHIBGRU THREE CA
45A2	CG I MEF
45A2	CG II MEF
45A2	CG III MEF
45B	CG FIRST MARDIV
45B	CG SECOND MARDIV
45B	CG THIRD MARDIV
45B	MARRESFOR
45V	13 MEU
45V	24 MEU
45V	ELEVENTH MEU
45V	FIFTEENTH MEU
45V	TWO SIX MEU
45V	TWO TWO MEU
A6	HQMC PP&O
	Attn: Col. Schmick, Plans Div.
V12	CG MCCDC
	Attn: Commanding General
	Attn: Doctrine Division
	Attn: Studies and Analyses Div.
	Attn: Training and Education
	Attn: Warfighting Division

OPNAV

N52

OTHER

50A	USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
	Attn: HAST
	Attn: J-3
	Attn: J-5
50A	USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
	Attn: J-3
	Attn: J-5
50A	USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
	Attn: J-3
	Attn: J-5
50A	USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
	Attn: J-3
	Attn: J-5
50A	USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
	Attn: J-3
	Attn: J-5
50A	USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS
	Attn: J-3
	Attn: J-5
B1B	ASD/HA
B1B	ASD/ISA
B1B	OASD (SOLIC)
B1B	USD/P
B2A	JCS
	Attn: J-3
	Attn: J-5
B3	NDU

ARMY WAR COLLEGE

RAND SANTA MONICA

US ARMY JFK CENTER

Attn: Special Warfighting Center

AID

Attn: OFDA

Attn: FHA

STATE DEPT MISC

Attn: Bureau of Politico-Military Aff.