AD-A100 882 ARMY ENGINEER STUDIES CENTER WASHINGTON DC F/G 5/1
USACE MOBILIZATION POSTURE UPDATE: 1981.(U)
MAY 81 J H TATE
UNCLASSIFIED R-81-4 NL

1 OF 1
AD A
100882

END
DATE
FILMED
7-81
DTIC

LEVEL II

R-81-4

AD A100882

USACE MOBILIZATION POSTURE UPDATE: 1981

15

ENGINEER STUDIES CENTER
US ARMY

Prepared by
US Army Engineer Studies Center
Corps of Engineers

May 1981

DTIC FILE COPY

DTIC
ELECTE
JUL 1 1981
S D
D

THE VIEWS, OPINIONS, AND/OR FINDINGS CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR(S) AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS AN OFFICIAL DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY POSITION, POLICY, OR DECISION, UNLESS SO DESIGNATED BY OTHER OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

81 06 29 227

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM

1. REPORT NUMBER

2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. AD-A100882

3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER

4. TITLE (and Subtitle)

USACE Mobilization Posture Update: 1981

5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED

Final Report, May 1981

6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER

R-81-4

7. AUTHOR(s)

Mr. James H. Tate

8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)

9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS

US Army Engineer Studies Center
6500 Brookes Lane
Washington, DC 20315

10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS

11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS

Director of Civil Works
Office of the Chief of Engineers
Washington, DC 20315

12. REPORT DATE

May 1981

13. NUMBER OF PAGES

47

14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)

US Army Engineer Studies Center
6500 Brookes Lane
Washington, DC 20315

15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)

UNCLASSIFIED

15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE

16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)

18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

Mobilization
US Army Corps of Engineers
Mission
MOBEX 80
Management
Advance Planning
Organization Structure

20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

This report assesses the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) mobilization posture in light of MOBEX 80. There remain a number of areas in which efforts or improvements are necessary if USACE is to fulfill its mobilization roles. Recommendations are made for enhancing USACE's posture.

DD FORM 1 JAN 73 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

Accession For
NTIS GRA&I ☒
DTIC TAB ☐
Unannounced ☐
Justification
By Per DTIC Form 50
Distribution/on file
Availability Codes
Dist | Avail and/or Special
A

USACE MOBILIZATION

POSTURE UPDATE: 1981

Prepared by
US Army Engineer Studies Center
Corps of Engineers

May 1981

Principal Author: Mr. James H. Tate

DTIC
ELECTE
JUL 1 1981
S D
D

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

DISTRIBUTION LIST

No. of Copies	Addressees
	Division Engineers
2	Europe
2	Huntsville
2	Lower Mississippi Valley
2	Middle East (Rear)
2	Missouri River
2	New England
2	North Atlantic
2	North Central
2	North Pacific
2	Ohio River
2	Pacific Ocean
2	South Atlantic
2	South Pacific
2	Southwestern
	District Engineers
2	Alaska
2	Albuquerque
2	Baltimore
2	Buffalo
2	Charleston
2	Chicago
2	Detroit
2	Fort Worth
2	Galveston
2	Huntington
2	Jacksonville
2	Kansas City
2	Little Rock
2	Los Angeles
2	Louisville
2	Memphis
2	Mobile
2	Nashville
2	New Orleans
2	New York
2	Norfolk
2	Omaha
2	Philadelphia
2	Pittsburgh
2	Portland
2	Rock Island
2	Sacramento

No. of Copies	Addressees
	District Engineers--Continued
2	San Francisco
2	Savannah
2	Seattle
2	St. Louis
2	St. Paul
2	Tulsa
2	Vicksburg
2	Walla Walla
2	Wilmington
	Field Operating Agencies
1	Commander and Director, US Army Engineer Topographic Laboratories
1	Commander and Director, US Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station
1	Commander and Director, US Army Coastal Engineering Research Center
1	Commander and Director, US Army Cold Region Research and Engineers Laboratory
1	Commander and Director, US Army Construction Engineering Research Laboratory
1	Commander and Director, US Army Facilities Engineering Support Agency
1	Director, US Army Engineer Automation Support Activity
1	Resident Member, Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors
1	Commander and Director, US Army Corps of Engineers, Water Resources Support Center
36	US Army Engineer Studies Center Library
45	OCE Staff (c/o LTC Jack Sadusky)
	Other
10	Defense Technical Information Center

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Engineer Studies Center, US Army Corps of Engineers prepared this report under the sponsorship of the Director of Civil Works, Office of the Chief of Engineers. It was prepared by Mr. James H. Tate, Senior Project Director.

This report was prepared for publication by Ms. Carol A. Ciampa and Mrs. Estelle C. Coleman under the general supervision of Ms. Doreen A. Myers. The editor was Mrs. Ruby Sherwood. Mr. Christopher K. Lew coordinated the graphics preparation.

Thanks are extended to LTC Jack Sadusky who served as the staff point of contact and provided considerable assistance throughout the project. Additional thanks for facilitating research and providing insights are due to members of the USACE MOBEX 80 staff and staff representatives of the Baltimore and Fort Worth Districts.

CONTENTS

Section		Page
	DISTRIBUTION LIST	iii
	ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
	CONTENTS	vii
	ABSTRACT	ix
I	INTRODUCTION	
	Purpose	1
	Scope	1
	Background	2
II	PARTICIPANT VIEWS	
	General	4
	Inadequate Communications	4
	Inadequate Requirements Definition	4
	Inadequate Training for Personnel	5
	Inadequate Planning	5
	Inadequate Guidelines on Legal Restraints	6
	Lack of Standard Facility Designs	7
III	EVALUATION	
	Approach	8
	Issue 1	8
	Issue 2	10
	Issue 3	13
	Issue 4	15
	Issue 5	17
	Issue 6	18
	Summary Evaluation	19
IV	FUTURE ACTIONS	
	What Next?	24
	Allocate Necessary Resources	24
	Develop Plans and SOPs	25
	Determine Who is in Charge of Mobilization Construction Resources	26
	Institute "Lead-support" District Concept	27
	Ensure Adequate Communications	27
	Develop Comprehensive Training Program	28
	Identify/Refine Requirements	29
	Improve Personnel Accounting and Develop MOBTDAs	29
	Identify Mobilization Legal Constraints; Prepare Standby Override Authorities	29
	Develop Standard Facility Designs	30
	Identify CW and MC Projects to Terminate	30
	Identify Funding Authority Increases	31

Section		Page
	Institute "One-stop" Service Concept	31
	Develop Means of Testing and Evaluating Mobilization Posture	31
	Maintain Military Engineering Competence	31
	Overview	31
Figure		
1	Implementation of Key Recommendations	20
2	Priority Listing of Recommendations for Implementation	23
ANNEX A--MOBILIZATION SUPPORT STUDY ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS		A-1
ANNEX B--ENGINEER STUDIES CENTER MOBILIZATION MISSION		B-1

ABSTRACT

This report assesses the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) posture in terms of its ability to meet mobilization requirements as that posture was demonstrated in MOBEX 80. The report framework was formed by using the specific recommendations provided in the Engineer Studies Center Mobilization Support study. Despite improvements in USACE's mobilization posture over the past year, there are still areas in which major efforts or improvements are needed. These areas are addressed in priority order and additional recommendations made for further posture enhancement.

USACE MOBILIZATION POSTURE UPDATE: 1981

I. INTRODUCTION

"Mobilization is decisive and (military) construction generally controls mobilization."

LTG Leslie R. Groves
1955

1. Purpose. After 2 years of intense efforts to study, test, and improve the mobilization support posture of the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the basic questions are: "How far have we come?" and "How far do we have to go?" This monograph examines the extant mobilization posture of USACE, as indicated by Exercise Proud Spirit/MOBEX 80, and illuminates for top management the major issues that remain to be resolved.

2. Scope. In its Mobilization Support study, the Engineer Studies Center (ESC) reviewed the scope of USACE responsibilities for three mobilization levels (full, total (conventional), and total (nuclear)), the capabilities of USACE for handling those responsibilities, and USACE's posture for executing its mobilization mission.[1/] The Mobilization Support study categorized USACE mobilization deficiencies under six primary issues and made specific recommendations for dealing with each issue. Annex A lists these issues and recommendations. This monograph evaluates MOBEX 80 results within the context of those recommendations and examines how fully the recommendations were implemented prior to the exercise. Although considerable effort

---

1/ The Mobilization Support study consisted of three monographs: Department of the Army, US Army Corps of Engineers, US Army Engineer Studies Center, Mobilization Environments, Washington, D.C., November 1979; Corps of Engineers Mobilization Capabilities, Requirements, and Planning, March 1980; and Corps Mobilization Posture, February 1980.

has been devoted to improving the mobilization posture of USACE over the past 2 years, MOBEX 80 evaluations revealed remaining deficiencies at all levels that need to be corrected. In evaluating MOBEX 80 within this framework, it is possible to isolate those areas that require special emphasis in the future to ensure enhancement of USACE's mobilization posture. However, before reaching this point, some background on MOBEX 80 and the views of USACE participants are in order.

3. Background.

a. MOBEX 80 was conducted after 2 years of intense emphasis by the Army to upgrade its mobilization capability. MOBEX 78 had revealed serious shortcomings throughout the Army in mobilization capability; and, as a result, the Army Chief of Staff made overcoming these shortfalls a top priority. Similarly, the Chief of Engineers (COE) made enhancing USACE's mobilization posture one of his primary goals. During 1980, in particular, considerable effort was undertaken by USACE to achieve that goal. The ESC Mobilization Support study was followed by an Action Planning Conference to define specific tasks, develop a tasking statement from the COE to divisions, districts, and field operating activities (FOAs), and develop a MOBEX 80 Exercise Plan.

b. When MOBEX 80 began, not all of the tasks assigned by the COE had been implemented, nor was it expected that all could be fully implemented. However, a considerable number of changes had been made. Probably the most significant change, as compared with 1978, was the heightened awareness throughout USACE of mobilization responsibilities. This led to greatly increased participation at all levels in the exercise. Also important were the advance planning that went into MOBEX 80 and the scheduled after-action conferences and reports. The advance planning structured the exercise so that

specific actions/conditions could be assessed. The after-action conferences and reports provided much of the needed data from all USACE elements to assess both the exercise and USACE's mobilization posture, status, shortfalls, and key areas needing improvement.

II. PARTICIPANT VIEWS

4. General. In most exercises such as MOBEX 80 the perceived strengths and shortfalls in exercise execution depend largely on the vantage points of the participants and evaluators. In this case, however, after-action reports by various USACE staff elements and FOAs and post-exercise conferences indicated a surprisingly high degree of consistency among participants in pointing out major exercise shortfalls. The importance of these shortfalls in relation to one another varied from area to area, but all elements and FOAs generally identified the same major deficiencies. These deficiencies can be grouped into six categories and are summarized in the following paragraphs.

5. Inadequate Communications. An almost universal shortcoming throughout USACE during MOBEX 80 was the lack of secure communications. This was particularly true at the division, district, and laboratory levels where USACE elements in most cases were dependent on nearby military installations for receiving and dispatching classified messages. This resulted in time delays of up to 48 hours in some cases in the receipt or transmission of messages. The problem is not only the lack of secure communication lines within the field offices, but also the lack of facilities for storing and internal handling of classified material. Delays caused by this situation would be unacceptable in a real world mobilization.

6. Inadequate Requirements Definition. The military construction (MC) requirements identified by MOBEX 80 customers amounted to approximately $3.5 billion and indicated that full mobilization requirements would not stress USACE capabilities. However, major Army commands (MACOMs) and some of their installations were still uncertain of their requirements. There was no identification of engineer assignments on the part of the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA), no mobilization construction requirements from the Air Force (AF), and little identification of tasks by other defense agencies. In light of historical experience, potential customers did not appear to fully appreciate what their requirements were. The lack of identified realistic requirements is of major concern throughout USACE and of particular concern to those field elements which must plan to satisfy these requirements.

7. Inadequate Training for Personnel. Within the divisions and districts the lack of training in mobilization mission tasks was a problem, particularly for Civil Works (CW) civilian personnel. The lack of training was acute in CW districts that had to cope with construction requirements entirely different from peacetime requirements and the methods for meeting those requirements. Training deficiencies were revealed in almost all management and engineering areas (e.g., inability to process the proper funds, lack of knowledge on handling classified data, and inability to assess military (as contrasted to CW) construction requirements). Since the bulk of the USACE work force during mobilization will be civilian, and primarily from CW, all exercise participants considered it essential that the personnel be trained to assume the mobilization role without having to acquire the training on-the-job in a crisis environment.

8. Inadequate Planning. All USACE elements expressed the need for detailed mobilization planning and the belief that there was a general lack of understanding as to what needed to be done. Generally, the belief was that the Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE) should develop broad mobilization plans for USACE as a whole and that each element should then develop its own detailed plans within the USACE framework. Additionally, there is a need for standard operating procedures (SOPs) within each USACE element covering such

aspects as the function of the emergency (mobilization) operations center, handling classified message traffic, and handling CW funds when they are transferred to MC activities. The lack of planning was less detrimental in those elements where experienced senior personnel participated directly in the exercise. In elements relying primarily on relatively young and inexperienced civilian employees for execution of mobilization functions, the lack of plans created serious difficulties. In short, the need for detailed mobilization plans is significant since civilians who have had no World War II or Korean War mobilization experience constitute an increasingly large proportion of the USACE work force and would have to carry the bulk of the mobilization workload. Also, reliance on military personnel who are transitory in their assignments offers no assurance that experienced personnel will be in the key military positions if mobilization occurs. Detailed mobilization planning is a critical first step to defining a mobilization mission for each USACE employee and to determining training needs.

9. Inadequate Guidelines on Legal Restraints. Considerable uncertainty was expressed by USACE field elements as to which current legal restraints would be waived in mobilization construction activities. Various environmental and safety laws or regulations have the effect of constraining construction and land use in peacetime, imposing many unacceptable constraints in a national emergency when priorities are radically changed. Yet it is not clear which restraints would be removed automatically by a Presidential declaration of national emergency or by other action of the executive agencies of Congress. These uncertainties, while of primary importance to field elements, also existed within OCE Headquarters. The need clearly exists for legal research in this area and providing specific information to all of USACE to

avoid unnecessary legal delay in implementing mobilization tasks. Where there are no provisions for automatically removing constraints, draft legislation or executive orders should be prepared in advance for immediate submission or implementation in event a mobilization is declared.

10. Lack of Standard Facility Designs. An unexpected problem that surfaced early in MOBEX 80 was the lack of standard facility designs for necessary installation expansion. Various military and production base installations would have to expand quickly in a mobilization, and the lack of up-to-date facility designs--particularly for austere, expedient construction standards--creates a potentially serious constraint on meeting these requirements. During MOBEX 80, various installation commanders submitted requests for facilities based on outdated design plans. At the same time, efforts to meet immediate requirements resulted in developing some prefabricated facility designs totally incompatible with existing utility layouts at some installations. There is a real need, as expressed by USACE field elements, for standard design plans to minimize construction start-up time.

III. EVALUATION

11. Approach. This section focuses on MOBEX 80 within the context of the Mobilization Support study's specific issues and recommendations. Within that context, MOBEX 80 experience is evaluated as a measure of how far USACE has come in enhancing its mobilization posture. MOBEX 80 after-action reports from USACE field and staff elements, along with ESC's evaluation of MOBEX play at the levels of OCE Headquarters and lead districts, constitute the basis for the evaluation. This evaluation forms the basis for the specific recommendations made in the following section.

12. Issue 1. Mobilization mission requirements must be refined if USACE is to be responsive during defense emergencies.

a. General. Assessing USACE's mobilization workload was recognized in the Mobilization Support study as a critical issue. Requirements for USACE support were judged to be understated. This situation existed at Army installations as well as in virtually all other areas that would require USACE support. The need for USACE support is underscored by the fact that studies show troop mobilization installations to be short up to 250,000 billet spaces. Until recently, USACE had done little to seek out mobilization requirements from potential customers. Rather, USACE had pursued a policy of waiting for potential customers to provide requirements. This passive approach obviously was not effective. Therefore, the Mobilization Support study urged that USACE adopt an active posture to seek out requirements, and offered specific recommendations toward this end. During 1980, and before MOBEX, the Assistant Chief of Engineers' (ACE's) office and the MC districts with CW district support launched a major effort to identify mobilization construction requirements. Although MOBEX revealed continuing uncertainties about requirements,

the work done prior to MOBEX constituted a major improvement over past results. More work remains to be done in identifying requirements, but current efforts indicate USACE is moving in the right direction.

b. MACOM requirements.

(1) Mobilization construction requirements generated by US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) installations require further review for essentiality and completeness. There were some problems in coordination between installations and lead districts in getting requirements to the right place in a timely manner. Also, there were problems with prioritizing installation requirements and developing the right facility designs.

(2) More serious problems arose in developing requirements for the US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) production base installations. In some instances there were essentially no communications between installations and USACE lead districts. Instead, requirements were transmitted by DARCOM installations through DARCOM channels to DARCOM Headquarters and then had to be retransmitted through USACE channels back to the responsible lead districts. Also, there were instances when installations did not have a grasp of their requirements until after the exercise was well underway. Only full mobilization requirements were considered in MOBEX 80, and these proved to be all that the current production base could handle. It appeared that upgrading the situation to total mobilization would have overwhelmed the production base installations.

(3) Health Services Command (HSC) estimated a bed space shortfall of 85,000. By using semi-active installations and converting troop barracks to hospital facilities, about 45,000 bed spaces of the shortfall could

be covered. However, overcoming the remaining shortfall of 40,000 bed spaces could possibly require USACE construction support or some alternative solution.

c. Other requirements. Other potential USACE customers (i.e., FEMA, Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), AF, and the US Coast Guard) did not surface any (or only a limited number of) requirements during the exercise. In part, this may have been because only the Army played the exercise for 3 weeks; other agencies stopped after 2 weeks. Still, in a real world mobilization, it is certain that a large number of actively involved agencies would have construction requirements and would look for USACE support.

13. Issue 2. USACE's response time must be reduced if USACE is to be sufficiently responsive during defense emergencies.

a. General. Immediate response in mobilization is critical if USACE is to fulfill its mobilization responsibilities. Normal peacetime USACE operations occupy most of the USACE staff, leaving only a minimum number of personnel available to do mobilization planning and coordination. A mobilization declaration would require that USACE rapidly shift resources (personnel and money) from CW functions to military tasks. Also, during peacetime, USACE construction activities often are constrained by laws and regulations that prevent the most expeditious task accomplishment. During MOBEX 80, it was demonstrated that delays resulting from shifting functions and legal and regulatory contraints frequently precluded meeting requirements as quickly as expected. While these specific areas were addressed in the Mobilization Support study and steps were taken to enhance response time, the difficulties

encountered in MOBEX 80 indicate that further refinements are needed to bring actual response time into line with what is needed.

b. Legal constraints. A variety of environmental, safety, economic, and social regulations prevent, restrict, or retard USACE peacetime actions (e.g., construction, funding, hiring). Many of these laws or regulations have built-in clauses which nullify them during a national emergency, but some do not have such clauses. In still other cases, it is unclear whether a Presidential declaration of a national emergency would set aside restrictions or implement special provisions to expedite procurement, construction, and other mobilization functions. During MOBEX 80, the effect of the uncertainty about these legal restrictions was felt in some districts and was apparent at USACE Headquarters, where a concentrated effort was made to get clarification on the legal issues. That some confusion still existed at the termination of the exercise indicates that further clarification is needed, and there is a need to ensure that field elements are fully aware of changes in regulations in a national emergency.

c. Project termination or curtailment. USACE resources for mobilization tasks would have to come from existing funds and manpower, at least initially. Therefore, many peacetime CW and some MC projects would have to be curtailed or terminated to generate the necessary resources. Efforts were begun prior to MOBEX 80 to identify projects that were candidates for curtailment or termination in a national emergency. For CW projects, criteria were established to guide FOAs in evaluating and prioritizing projects under design and construction, and the procedures appeared to work fairly well. However, criteria for operation and maintenance (O&M) projects still need to be developed. Priorities for MC projects are established by installation commanders

and MACOMs. There needs to be further resolution as to which MC projects can be curtailed or terminated. This will require close coordination between USACE elements and installations/MACOMs.

d. Funding authority. Historically, the mobilization construction effort has necessitated a major increase in funding authority for area, district, and division engineers. Recommendations were made in the Mobilization Support study to increase this authority by at least a factor of 10. For new MC projects, there is a statutory limitation of $100,000 that can be authorized in operations, maintenance, and administration (OMA) funds. If there is justification for appealing this limit (and by how much), it was not determined during MOBEX 80. The lack of fully quantified requirements (as noted above) and the brevity of the exercise precluded fully testing the need for expanded funding authority. OCE should determine both the necessity for increased funding authority and the amount of such increase.

e. Emergency procedures. A serious deficiency recognized in the Mobilization Support study was the lack of established emergency procedures or SOPs at major USACE elements. While divisions and districts had necessary SOPs for coping with natural disasters, no such SOPs existed for mobilization circumstances. (The existing Continuity of Operations Plans (COOPs) are designed strictly for a nuclear attack on CONUS.) MOBEX 80 substantiated the very real need for mobilization SOPs at nearly all USACE levels. The areas in which SOPs were shown to be needed ranged from emergency operations centers, to funding of MC projects, to contracting and procurement procedures, to real estate actions. In general, military districts were in a better position than CW districts relative to having SOPs appropriate for mobilization contingencies. This is attributable to greater experience in the MC area. However, it

is clear that considerable work is needed at all levels to develop the SOPs for facilitating mobilization tasks. Next time, there should be no reliance on personal memory for doing the right things in the right way.

14. Issue 3. Operational concepts for mobilization advance planning and execution must be better defined.

a. General. Operational concepts within USACE are as important for meeting mobilization requirements as response time and requirements definition. In fact, if mobilization operational concepts are thoroughly embodied in USACE, the ability to reduce response time and define requirements as well as the capacity for meeting the full range of customer needs is enhanced. Since the largest peacetime USACE workload is in CW, the basic operational concepts are peacetime oriented. The Mobilization Support study recommended adoption of certain new operational concepts to be used for mobilization. By MOBEX 80 these concepts had been approved and, to varying degrees, implemented. However, the exercise established that there was a need for greater implementation and, perhaps, some further conceptual adjustments.

b. "One-stop" service and "lead-support" district concepts. The twin hearts of the recommended operational concepts were implementation of the "one-stop" service concept for mobilization advance planning and execution, and the "lead-support" district concept. Under the first concept, potential USACE mobilization customers in a given geographic area would have but one USACE district office to go to for support, whether the support needed was in the field of planning, construction, maintenance, or real estate action. Under the second concept, a single district (one with a peacetime MC responsibility) would have initial responsibility for all mobilization activity within a fairly broad geographical area and would be supported by CW districts within

that area without regard for division boundaries. The latter concept was slightly modified by the USACE Action Planning Conference in March 1980, but it was approved in essence by the COE. MOBEX 80 demonstrated that there were problems with both concepts. Some districts, both military (lead) and CW (support), experienced difficulties with customers going to the wrong district for "one-stop" service. This problem appears to be one of educating potential mobilization customers rather than any weakness in the basic concept. More problems developed in the "lead-support" district concept. Basically, these problems hinged on the timing of when CW (support) districts would assume the responsibility for the workload at particular installations. There was no consensus on this issue. Some divisions felt that support districts should assume the workload only when the military districts became overloaded. Others felt that the workload should be shifted at or before a mobilization declaration. To some extent this problem reflects the geographic distribution of districts relative to installations to be supported in mobilization and to division boundaries. Other factors, such as normal workload and perceptions of individual division engineers, also affect the problem. In any event, considerable work must be done to ensure that the right districts assume their mobilization workload at the right time so that the work is accomplished without delay.

c. Communications. To ensure that the preceding concepts functioned during mobilization, the Mobilization Support study recommended that both vertical and lateral communications be available to all USACE elements. This would permit a lead district located in one division to communicate directly with CW support districts in another division. Given that the operational concepts for mobilization were relatively new and not fully implemented by the

time MOBEX 80 occurred, the flexible communications links worked well. There were some minor problems in some areas, but these can be corrected through experience, developing appropriate SOPs, and adjusting the "lead-support" district concept.

d. Maintaining competence. The Mobilization Support study recommended that there be a continuing effort to maintain military engineering (ME) competence at USACE laboratories, centers, and agencies. Such competence would be extremely important in a real world mobilization for supporting troop units that would need ME assistance in numerous fields. MOBEX 80 did not provide a test of this competence since the exercise was CONUS oriented. However, all USACE FOAs participated in the exercise and appear fully aware of the necessity for ME in any mobilization environment. Continued attention to this area probably is assured, both through programmed projects and future mobilization exercises.

15. Issue 4. Resource commitments to advance mobilization planning and training within USACE are inadequate for effective support during defense emergencies.

a. General. Previous experiences in mobilization exercises, especially in 1976 and 1978, demonstrated that USACE was unprepared for mobilization. There was inadequate planning, an obvious lack of knowledge on mobilization responsibilities, and only minimal exercise of mobilization functions. Basically, the major problem was that few or no resources had been committed to mobilization planning or training within USACE until after MOBEX 78. Even post-MOBEX 78 saw few resources devoted to mobilization planning or training until 1980 when pre-MOBEX 80 planning began. Even then resources so allocated were limited, as were resources for the exercise itself. However, USACE

involvement in MOBEX 80 extended to all elements; and for the first time, some appreciation of the magnitude of the mobilization mission was realized.

b. Resource allocation. During MOBEX 80 all USACE participating elements diverted some personnel to operations centers and other mobilization missions. The fact that adequate resources had not formerly been allocated to planning and training resulted in more manpower being expended than might otherwise have occurred. There was wasted motion as individuals learned their responsibilities and, in effect, created SOPs as the exercise progressed. On-the-job training was not an efficient way to conduct the exercise; and, in a real world mobilization it would be too unresponsive to mission requirements. Thus, the resources for planning and training, which should go together, need to be made available before the next MOBEX or before any real world mobilization occurs.

c. Huntsville Division (HND). The Mobilization Support study recommended that HND become a mobilization center of competence. However, it was decided that certain mobilization responsibilities would remain at USACE Headquarters in the Mobilization Coordination Office and CW Directorate. Still, HND remains the logical center for the functions of developing a mobilization training program and standard facility designs for mobilization. HND is the most likely candidate for these functions, since the division is responsible for developing other USACE training programs and for the maintenance, expansion, and revision of the Army Facilities Components System (AFCS). While it was recognized that a fully developed training program could not be implemented before MOBEX 80, the exercise did serve as a means for identifying the training needed and the level of individuals needing training. A training program is expected to be developed by June 1981. Initially,

it was thought that the AFCS could be used to provide pre-engineered facility designs both for the theater of operations and CONUS mobilization stations. However, those designs from AFCS used in MOBEX 80 were not adequate for various reasons, including their lack of adaptation to the many site-peculiar requirements. Therefore, a set of designs for mobilization installations still needs to be developed, but separately from AFCS. HND's experience in AFCS should still be used for developing the pre-engineered designs for mobilization stations.

d. Personnel accounting. The Mobilization Support study recognized the need to improve the Corps of Engineers Management Information System (COEMIS) to accurately account for and allocate personnel for mobilization tasks. MOBEX 80 further demonstrated that need. Personnel assignments to mobilization tasks were often haphazard and did not always reflect the best use of personnel skills. Further, the need for a mobilization table of distribution and allowances (MOBTDA) became increasingly evident. MOBEX 80 provided valuable data on mobilization personnel losses and gains and indications of workload impact that should be used in improving the COEMIS and developing MOBTDAs. However, development of MOBTDAs is dependent primarily on workload, which for the most part is still not quantified, and on reorganization or realignment of the work force. MOBTDAs will have to be developed on the best information available and refined as required.

16. Issue 5. A determination must be made as to who is in charge of mobilizing the US contract construction industry in a defense emergency. Although MOBEX 80 did not surface particular problems in this area, the potential for problems in a real world mobilization is obvious. To cite but one example, Department of Transportation relies on the individual states to

maintain defense highways during national defense emergencies. However, the contract construction resources states may use in such maintenance could be the same resources USACE would need for other mobilization tasks. FEMA did not examine this issue in MOBEX, but it is apparent that there are problems that need to be resolved.

17. Issue 6. A plan with controls needs to be developed to specify and guide future management actions.

a. General. A key to preparing USACE for MOBEX 80 and any subsequent MOBEX or real world mobilization was to schedule tasks to be done and establish control mechanisms. Work undertaken before MOBEX 80 did enhance USACE's mobilization posture relative to what it was in MOBEX 78. However, in reviewing and evaluating MOBEX 80, it is apparent that some of the major recommendations have not been implemented and additional recommendations have surfaced that need to be addressed.

b. Past actions. The Action Planning Conference (APC) recommended in the Mobilization Support study was held as proposed in March 1980. Tasks and schedules were established at the APC resulting in a tasker on 4 August 1980 to all USACE elements. Few of the tasks were fully implemented before MOBEX 80, and most of those not implemented were the most important tasks. Also, for some of the tasks that were implemented, modifications are necessary. Therefore, although USACE has begun to improve its mobilization posture, it has some distance to go before that posture is adequate.

c. Future actions. Two major actions recommended in the Mobilization Support study that were not implemented before MOBEX 80 were to develop engineer regulations and SOPs for USACE planning elements, and to develop a means for evaluating plans on a periodic basis. Developing regulations and

SOPs has been noted before as a necessary step that would have smoothed out many of the rough spots in the exercise. As for an evaluation means for periodic assessment of plans and posture, the most logical is through mobilization exercises—not necessarily Army-wide or DOD-wide exercises, but internal USACE exercises conducted on a recurring basis.

18. Summary Evaluation.

a. How far have we come? Relative to its status in 1978, USACE has dramatically enhanced its mobilization posture; relative to what that posture must be, a lot of improvement is still required. This conclusion is evident from the foregoing evaluation and participant views. Before assessing what needs to be done, there needs to be a determination of current status as revealed by MOBEX 80. A subjective evaluation has been developed on the extent to which the Mobilization Support study's recommendations have been implemented. Figure 1 shows 15 key recommendations of the Corps Mobilization Support study and estimates the percent of implementation for each. Briefly, they are:

(1) Identify and refine requirements. This is probably about 60 percent implemented with no identification or quantification of requirements for non-DOD agencies. Also, identified and quantified requirements are for a full mobilization only; nothing is available for total mobilization.

(2) Identify mobilization legal constraints; prepare standby override authorities. This appears to be about 30 percent implemented. It is uncertain how many legal constraints have been identified since a comprehensive listing has not been prepared for field elements and no override authorities have been prepared.



Key Recommendations:

1. Identify and refine requirements.
2. Identify mobilization legal constraints; prepare standby override authorities.
3. Identify CW and MC projects to terminate.
4. Identify funding authority increases necessary.
5. Develop plans and SOPs.
6. Institute "one-stop" service concept.
7. Institute "lead-support" district concept.
8. Ensure adequate communications.
9. Maintain ME competence.
10. Allocate necessary resources.
11. Develop comprehensive training program.
12. Develop standard facility designs.
13. Improve personnel accounting; develop MOBTDAs.
14. Determine who is in charge of mobilization construction resources.
15. Develop means of regularly testing/evaluating mobilization posture.

Figure 1

(3) Identify CW and MC projects for curtailment/termination. This has been done quite well for CW design and construction projects, but not O&M projects; more work remains to be done on MC projects and CW O&M projects (to include dredging).

(4) Identify funding authority increases necessary. MOBEX 80 did not really test this element. The tenfold increase recommended in the Mobilization Support study appears to be a relatively good working base until more definitive data are available.

(5) Develop plans and SOPs. Little has been done in this area beyond the MOBEX planning. Data are available from MOBEX 80 defining areas needing emphasis in advance planning and SOPs.

(6) Institute "one-stop" service concept. This concept appears well established in the USACE structure. There needs to be more "education" of potential mobilization customers.

(7) Institute "lead-support" district concept. Although the concept appears well founded in general terms, there is a need to develop agreement among districts on its full implementation, timing, etc.

(8) Ensure adequate communications. Good lateral and vertical communications exist between districts and these do not appear to be a major problem. The problem lies in rapid, secure communications for classified material. While this problem also exists for other agencies, such as FEMA, it still needs resolution.

(9) Maintain ME competence. Although not tested in MOBEX 80, it is believed that ME competence exists. Some expansion and continued maintenance of this competency is possible through close attention to laboratory programs and ensuring that those programs continually test and update ME

skills. The technology transfer procedures of the laboratories are the logical vehicle for this program.

(10) Allocate necessary resources. Although this problem improved before, during, and after MOBEX 80, significantly more resources need to be allocated, at least until the overall mobilization posture is greatly improved.

(11) Develop comprehensive training program. Some preparatory work has been done and MOBEX 80 data should assist in identifying specific programs and personnel needing training. This problem area needs considerably more attention.

(12) Develop standard facility designs. Little has been done on this problem beyond some advance thinking and recognition that AFCS designs are not adequate for CONUS mobilization installations. There is a need to push ahead with this work.

(13) Improve personnel accounting; develop MOBTDAs. Some improvements have been made in identifying personnel losses and gains during mobilization, but the system needs considerably more work. MOBTDA development is lagging.

(14) Determine who is in charge of mobilization construction resources. Virtually nothing has been done in this area beyond recognizing that a problem exists. This problem can only be solved at the top levels of USACE and FEMA.

(15) Develop means of regularly testing/evaluating mobilization posture. MOBEX 80 laid the groundwork for the planning and establishment of goals for future mobilization exercises. Internal USACE exercises need to be developed and conducted on a regular basis to periodically test and evaluate posture.

b. Priority areas. As a result of this evaluation, it is possible to identify those areas which should be given priority in efforts for further improvement of USACE's mobilization posture. Figure 2 shows the 15 key recommendations discussed above, listed by order of importance. Specific recommendations concerning future actions on these and related problems are discussed in Section IV.

PRIORITY LISTING OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION

1. Allocate necessary resources.
2. Develop plans and SOPs.
3. Determine who is in charge of mobilization construction resources.
4. Institute "lead-support" district concept.
5. Ensure adequate communications.
6. Develop comprehensive training program.
7. Identify/refine requirements.
8. Improve personnel accounting; develop MOBTDAs.
9. Identify mobilization legal constraints; prepare standby override authorities.
10. Develop standard facility designs.
11. Identify CW and MC projects to terminate.
12. Identify funding authority increases necessary.
13. Institute "one-stop" service concept.
14. Develop means of testing/evaluating mobilization posture.
15. Maintain ME competence.

Figure 2

IV. FUTURE ACTIONS

19. What Next? The 15 recommendations listed in the foregoing section constitute the basis for USACE's developing a mobilization posture commensurate with its mobilization mission. However, full implementation of each recommendation will require a number of specific actions designed to overcome MOBEX 80 identified deficiencies. In the following paragraphs a number of these needed actions are described. They are not the only actions required, but are the more important. They are keyed to the basic recommendations they support, although some actions support more than one recommendation.

20. Allocate Necessary Resources. The most important recommendation to be implemented is allocating the necessary resources to mobilization advance planning and training. Without adequate resources, none of the other recommendations can be implemented. Although mobilization is considered a primary Army mission, little has been done in the past to fund the necessary actions to prepare the nation, Army, or USACE for that mission. Since MOBEX 80, USACE has taken steps to provide funds for mobilization planning and training. To date, these are not adequate, but they do constitute a step in the right direction. As important, perhaps, has been the establishment of a small mobilization coordination office at the COE staff level. This puts responsibility for coordinating planning and other mobilization-related actions above the directorate level and assures the proper interface among all USACE staff elements. Also, it assures that mobilization receives the proper impetus from the highest level. While progress has been made in resource allocation, two additional actions should be considered.

a. During the March 1980 APC, the recommendation was made that funding for mobilization planning, training, etc., be sought primarily from CW

funds. Military funds were considered limited and complicated to obtain. However, the situation now appears to be different with significant cuts in civil funds threatened while military funding appears likely to increase markedly over the next few years. While some military funds have been designated for mobilization, consideration should be given to requesting supplemental funds in the FY 82 budget. A strong case can be made that, if overall military strength is to be increased, it will have to be based on enhancing overall mobilization posture.

b. Another recommendation from the APC was for establishing emergency management organizational elements (EMOEs) at a high level in the districts and divisions. These EMOEs would plan for both natural disasters and mobilization. In most cases, personnel assigned to such centers would occupy civil-funded positions. Now with significant reductions threatened for civil-funded positions, consideration should be given to expanding military-funded positions to cover these EMOEs to ensure mobilization planning can continue uninterrupted.

21. Develop Plans and SOPs. Implementing this recommendation is essential to USACE's mobilization posture as was demonstrated in MOBEX 80. The lack of plans and SOPs seriously detracted from exercise performance. Despite the lack of fully quantified requirements and the uncertainties of whether to plan for full or total mobilization, operational plans and procedural standards can still be developed. To do this, certain steps should be followed.

a. USACE Headquarters should develop an overall operational plan for USACE. The plan should be broad and general enough so that it does not place unnecessary restrictions on districts, divisions, and FOAs. A primary USACE strength is the geographic distribution of its field elements and decentralized control which recognizes the environmental diversities with which field

elements must contend. Thus, the field elements know their own situations and problems better than anyone else and should have the flexibility to develop their own plans suitable for their particular circumstances.

b. Once an overall USACE operational plan is developed, each district, division, and FOA should be required to develop mobilization operational plans within the guidelines of the overall plan. To do this will require that field elements clearly think through and articulate their mobilization mission as a first step. As an example, ESC examined its role in a potential mobilization and developed the mission statement and policy at Annex B.

c. In addition to a mobilization operational plan, each USACE element should develop a set of standardized procedures to be undertaken during mobilization. Such SOPs would articulate required actions in a variety of areas from handling message traffic to transferring funds from CW to MC accounts. Also covered would be the operational procedures in the emergency operations centers. MOBEX 80 provided sufficient data so that such SOPs can be developed; they should be developed now while the memory of what is needed is still acute.

22. Determine Who is in Charge of Mobilization Construction Resources. This is a major recommendation that should be implemented immediately. Its importance looms even larger now than in the past because of threatened major CW budget reductions. A national policy decision is needed in this area. Since USACE is the largest construction management agency in the country, control of construction resources would logically be accomplished by USACE during mobilization. The most important action to be taken in this area would be to develop an agreement between USACE and FEMA. This can only be done at the

highest level of both organizations. The COE should initiate the action leading to such an agreement. Prior to this, a staff study should be conducted to fully illuminate the USACE-DOD-FEMA relationship and set forth USACE's position in the construction management area.

23. Institute "Lead-support" District Concept. While this concept has been basically accepted, the problems surfaced in MOBEX 80 indicate the need for more work to refine the concept. Specifically needed are agreements between MC districts and supporting CW districts as to when the mobilization workload is handed off to the CW districts. The agreements need not be the same in each case, but should reflect the best interests of the mobilization installation(s) to be supported. These agreements should be reached between district engineers within the next few months. Where an MC district and one or more of its supporting CW districts are in different divisions, coordination between division engineers may be required to reach agreement.

24. Ensure Adequate Communications. The time delays encountered during MOBEX 80 in receiving and transmitting classified messages would be unacceptable during a real world mobilization. It is desirable that each district and division office have its own capability for directly transmitting and receiving classified messages up to and including SECRET. However, installation of such capability is subject to authorization and funding by the US Army Communications Command (USACC). USACE needs to continually push for installation of secure communications at its key offices; with the new stress on defense readiness, the chances of procuring necessary equipment may now be better. Until such equipment is installed, USACE field elements should work out with supporting military installation commanders standby SOPs for the most expeditious handling of classified traffic possible under the circumstances. Also,

division, district, and area offices need to develop internal SOPs and facilities for handling classified data and, where necessary, obtain security clearances for key personnel.

25. Develop Comprehensive Training Program. MOBEX 80 demonstrated the need for considerable training of USACE personnel in various aspects of mobilization. Steps have been taken to produce a training program for key personnel in mobilization, and a list of courses has been developed and published. More emphasis needs to be put on this training, and this will require cooperation between HND and other USACE elements.

a. All USACE elements should identify those personnel and positions within their organization that have mobilization functions. These should not be limited to "key" personnel, but should be extended to all personnel who have mobilization roles or actions differing from their peacetime roles or actions. MOBEX 80 data should be used in this identification process.

b. All USACE elements should rank the mobilization training needed by their personnel and incorporate the listing in their overall training program. Mobilization training should be balanced against all other training needs so that the former takes precedent over the latter except in the most imperative situations. (Increased funding for mobilization training should be sought by USACE both in civil and military funds.)

c. USACE elements should provide HND with identified training requirements. These should be as specific as possible and should include: numbers of people, level of positions, scope of training needed, and schedule desired. HND can use these inputs for developing a comprehensive training program.

26. Identify/Refine Requirements. Although this recommendation has been implemented to a considerable extent, historical experience indicates that identified requirements are low. Continued effort to identify and refine requirements is needed on the part of district and division staffs as well as at OCE level. Of particular concern are requirements for DOD agencies outside the Army and for non-DOD agencies. To develop these requirements probably will require interagency conferences at a relatively high level. Such conferences should be initiated by the OCE Mobilization Coordination Office.

27. Improve Personnel Accounting and Develop MOBTDAs. MOBEX 80 data should be used in each USACE element to identify mobilization losses, and the resulting data should be submitted to the OCE Resource Management Office for incorporation into COEMIS. If necessary, the COEMIS should be expanded to account for the new data. Further, provisions must be made for at least an annual review and update of all personnel data in the COEMIS. This should include a data validation. For example, data in the Corps Stratification used in the Mobilization Support study were inaccurate because files had not been purged of out-of-date data. It is essential that the accounting system be upgraded to reflect accurately USACE's personnel status. Reliable personnel data along with mobilization mission statements and operational plans should be used by all elements to develop realistic MOBTDAs.

28. Identify Mobilization Legal Constraints; Prepare Standby Override Authorities. Progress has been made in implementing this recommendation. However, additional work is needed to fully develop a reference guide, copies of which should be available to all USACE staff and field elements. Once the reference guide on current constraints is completed, the General Counsel's Office should determine what standby override authorities are needed and

prepare draft legislation or executive orders to accomplish the necessary overrides. As they appear, new regulations, laws, etc. should be reviewed to determine their impact on mobilization construction. An annual update of the reference guide should be scheduled.

29. Develop Standard Facility Designs. Facility requirements at each mobilization troop and production base installation should be determined as a basis for developing standard facility designs. The designs should be for the minimum facility standards to meet mobilization requirements. HND should be charged with developing a comprehensive set of such designs. Facility designs for each installation should be part of an installation mobilization book that includes the designs and all other data pertinent to mobilization at a particular installation that impacts the engineer construction effort. (Plans now call for having such books for each installation by the end of CY 82.) In most instances, standard facility designs will require a major updating of existing engineer drawings (E-drawings). Construction methods and materials have changed considerably since many of the current E-drawings were developed.

30. Identify CW and MC Projects to Terminate. This recommendation has been implemented quite successfully for CW projects under design or construction, but it needs to be expanded to include CW O&M projects. The major problem, however, lies with MC projects for which installation/MACOM commanders have responsibility for establishing priorities. District representatives should work with installation commanders to ensure that MC projects are realistically prioritized in event of mobilization. Each new MC project should be placed on a mobilization priority list at the time the project is authorized.

31. Identify Funding Authority Increases. This recommendation should be reviewed in each succeeding MOBEX to determine if sufficient data are available to make a firm determination as to how much funding authorities should be increased.

32. Institute "One-stop" Service Concept. This recommendation has been implemented to a great extent. Some additional action is required by district and OCE representatives to ensure that all potential mobilization customers know their point of contact for mobilization construction requirements.

33. Develop Means of Testing and Evaluating Mobilization Posture. Annual internal USACE mobilization exercises should be conducted as a means of evaluating mobilization posture.

34. Maintain Military Engineering Competence. There appears to be little trouble with this recommendation, although it was not tested in MOBEX 80. For maintaining ME competence, the USACE laboratories' technology transfer procedures should be emphasized to ensure current ME knowledge.

35. Overview.

a. MOBEX 80 provided the first opportunity to realistically assess USACE's mobilization posture on a USACE-wide scale within the context of preparatory work growing out of the Mobilization Support study. The resulting assessment shows some major deficiencies in the USACE posture that must be corrected before that posture is fully adequate. In correcting deficiencies, the problem is not only one of defining what needs to be done, but more importantly being able to do what is required. Thus, the problem is basically one of resource allocation--resources in the sense of funds, personnel, and time. Since MOBEX 80, there has been some improvement in the funding picture, and prospects for subsequent fiscal years are even better. In terms of personnel,

the commitment is still inadequate despite establishing a coordinating office in OCE. The deficiencies in personnel exist in both headquarters and field elements. However, all OCE and FOA staff elements need to be knowledgeable about their mobilization functions. To ensure this requires committing an element of each staff to mobilization planning responsibilities, and this means committing personnel resources. Thus, while the current limited personnel commitment reflects the funding commitment, it must be elevated to a higher level of concern.

b. The other resource which is limited is time. How fast USACE brings its mobilization posture to the desired level may be a critical factor from two viewpoints. First, USACE must have a credible mobilization posture in place if the agency is to justify itself as a key element for mobilization in the face of potential budget and personnel reductions. Second, in an uncertain world, a real mobilization could occur with little advance notice, and the luxury of ample time to "gear up" may not exist as it did in two world wars. Time to fully develop USACE's mobilization posture is conditioned somewhat by the allocation of funds and personnel. However, it also is heavily affected by the dedication of USACE employees without whose efforts no improvement is possible.

c. The first recommendation in the foregoing section is for increasing resource allocations. Subsequent recommendations are, to varying degrees, dependent on that first one. However, even without all the resources needed, efforts should continue as rapidly as possible for full implementation of all recommendations.

LAST PAGE OF MAIN PAPER

ANNEX A

MOBILIZATION SUPPORT STUDY ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ANNEX A

MOBILIZATION SUPPORT STUDY ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Purpose. This annex lists the issues and recommendations from the Mobilization Support study which provide a framework for the MOBEX 80 evaluation contained in this report.

2. Issue 1: Mobilization mission requirements must be refined if USACE is to be responsive during defense emergencies. The following are recommended.

a. COE should contact customers to solicit their support in defining requirements.

b. The ACE should provide mobilization stationing data to divisions/districts.

c. USACE field elements with an MC responsibility should contact potential customers to address local support requirements.

d. CW should develop/maintain the Army's post-M-day construction plan.

e. OCE should surface identified mobilization construction requirements to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and Congress to ensure awareness of size and scope of M-[illegible] requirements.

3. Issue 2: USACE's response time must be reduced if USACE is to be sufficiently responsive during defense emergencies. The following are recommended.

a. The General Counsel's Office should be tasked to develop and maintain a current emergency actions book.

b. Directors of Civil Works and Military Programs should establish internal procedures to assess periodically all CW and MC projects scheduled by FOAs to be terminated or curtailed on M-day.

c. OCE should consider the immediate expansion of funding authority on M-day by an order of magnitude.

d. All major USACE elements should write emergency procedures appropriate under national emergency conditions, particularly in areas of procurement, contracting, real estate, programming, and funding.

e. The COE should make the Army Chief of Staff aware of the need for actions at HQDA level which are parallel to recommendations for USACE.

4. Issue 3: Operational concepts for mobilization advance planning and execution must be better defined. The following are recommended.

a. The COE should approve the "one-stop" service concept for application to advance mobilization planning and execution.

b. The COE should approve the "lead-support" district concept.

c. OCE should ensure that appropriate vertical and lateral communications capability is made available to all USACE elements which must function within the one-stop and lead-support district concept.

d. OCE should ensure that appropriate ME projects are funded within the laboratories, centers, and agencies to maintain a level of competence to satisfy possible wartime needs.

5. Issue 4: Resource commitments to advance mobilization planning and training within USACE are inadequate for effective support during defense emergencies. The following are recommended.

a. OCE should allocate resources necessary for mobilization planning, training, and testing.

b. HND should be established as a mobilization center of competence.

c. HND should develop a family of pre-engineered facility designs to facilitate rapid placement of selected facilities on installations.

d. HND should develop a comprehensive training program to foster common understanding of mobilization elements and actions.

e. OCE should modify personnel administration records to improve accounting and allocation of personnel for mobilization tasks.

6. Issue 5: A determination must be made as to who is in charge of mobilizing the US contract construction industry in a defense emergency. Recommend that USACE establish a detailed position on management responsibility for construction resources through the DOD-FEMA Interface Group.

7. Issue 6: A plan with controls needs to be developed to specify and guide future management actions. The following are recommended.

a. OCE should convene a planning conference to map out an integrated USACE action plan.

b. OCE should develop an overall schedule with specific milestones for completing plan development.

c. OCE should provide appropriate engineer regulations and SOPs to USACE planning elements.

d. OCE should develop a means for evaluating plans on a periodic basis and for phasing them in with established procedures.

LAST PAGE OF ANNEX A

ANNEX B

ENGINEER STUDIES CENTER MOBILIZATION MISSION

ANNEX B

ENGINEER STUDIES CENTER MOBILIZATION MISSION

1. Purpose: This annex sets forth a mobilization mission for ESC in event of a full or total (conventional) national military emergency.

2. Peacetime Mission.

a. ESC is an FOA under the jurisdiction of the US Army Corps of Engineers, a major Army command, and reports directly to the Deputy Chief of Engineers (DCE). It functions within the guidelines prescribed by the Army Study System and performs studies and analyses for USACE, other major commands, HQDA, and the DOD to resolve engineer or engineer-related problems.

b. ESC's principal products are published reports, action papers, and briefings. Much of the study effort is centered on mid-range problems and their solutions. Studies of this nature can take from 3 months to a year (occasionally longer) to complete. Geographically, ESC does studies in virtually all world areas where there is or could be a US military involvement. At any one time, ESC can have concurrent study efforts in such diverse areas as the CONUS, Korea, Europe, and the Middle East.

3. Mobilization Mission. A thorough review was conducted of ESC's peacetime mission during and after MOBEX 80. This review was made concurrent with an assessment of how ESC could best support USACE's mobilization effort. From the review and assessment, along with an overall appraisal of USACE and Army needs, it is believed that ESC is a valuable mobilization resource that should be continued as a separate study entity after mobilization is declared. Mobilization would impact on both ESC's program and staff, requiring program redirection and staff augmentation. Specifically, these changes would consist of:

a. Program realignment. During mobilization, ESC, as a study agency, would continue to report directly to the DCE. However, there would be significant changes in ESC's study program. These changes would ensue from the following actions:

(1) Immediately reviewing the study program to determine efforts which were not directly related to the geographic focus of the mobilization or the mobilization effort itself.

(2) Terminating all study efforts identified as not being directly relevant to the mobilization.

(3) Restructuring the study program to include only those studies dealing with problems relevant to the mobilization and the Army operational problems in the area of concern.

(4) Expanding the study program to cover subject areas not necessarily engineer or engineer-related in which ESC staff expertise can benefit the total Army effort.

(5) Orienting the study program to short-range problems and solutions with the purpose of doing studies that can be completed in 30-90 days.

b. Staff changes. An assessment of ESC's staff resources for mobilization indicates that ESC would lose approximately 14 percent of its staff if all Reserve components are activated and recently retired military are recalled. Most of these losses would occur within the professional staff. At the same time, as indicated by experience during the Vietnam conflict, ESC's workload would increase significantly. To compensate for initial personnel losses, ESC would be allocated four mobilization designees (MOBDES). The grades of these MOBDES personnel would be LTC (O-5) and/or MAJ (O-4). These

MOBDES officers should have primary or secondary specialties in operations research/systems analysis. The requirement for MOBDES personnel with this specialty is predicated on the need for them to be immediately prepared for high-priority work without having to undergo extensive on-the-job training. Additional civilian personnel also would be recruited through expedient hiring authority expected to become effective at mobilization. However, this could take a longer period than bringing MOBDES personnel on duty. At some future date, a MOBTDA for ESC may be considered. ESC could have a separate MOBTDA or have four spaces designated for ESC in an OCE MOBTDA.

LAST PAGE OF MONOGRAPH

DATE
ILMED
-8