The Atlantic Alliance: **A View from Capitol Hill**

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In 1998, the Senate gave its advice and consent to the decision to admit the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to NATO. The debate over enlargement was both thorough and thoughtful. Congress addressed not only issues pertaining to the candidate states but also examined questions on the future role of NATO and its relationship to national interests. The final vote on enlargement not only advocated the addition of these countries but reaffirmed U.S. support for the Alliance.

The viability of NATO will depend on adjustment to changing international circumstances. The Alliance has never stood still. It adapted successfully throughout its history to developments ranging from the fielding of Soviet nuclear weapons to the French withdrawal from the integrated command structure, from the erection of the Berlin Wall to the end of the Warsaw Pact.

Since 1989 the United States and its partners have evolved Alliance missions and the means to reflect the end of the Cold War, new challenges to their security interests, and the slow but sure process of European integration. The Washington Summit is the latest opportunity to adapt NATO to a changing international order. It is a chance for the allies to celebrate 50 years of success and lay the groundwork for the future. They must articulate the reasons for the continued existence of NATO. To do so, they must adopt a new Strategic Concept that reflects contemporary

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conditions and opens membership to other democracies by inviting Slovenia to begin the process of joining. They cannot simply celebrate historic or recent accomplishments, but must demonstrate foresight and courage to meet the challenges ahead.

A Vision

In the next century NATO should be an enduring political/military alliance among sovereign states whose purpose is to apply power and diplomacy to collective defense and the promotion of allied security, democratic values, the rule of law, and peace.

The United States, Canada, and European democracies have a mutual interest in sustaining and improving political, economic, and military cooperation. Such cooperation not only maintains peaceful and prosperous relations inside the Euro-Atlantic area but also is a critical building block of stability for the international order. The North Atlantic Treaty remains a vital document whose words express the basic values and interests shared by its parties. The commitment of every ally to collective defense demonstrates a will to defend those values and interests, with force if necessary. On this basis, the Euro-Atlantic allies can develop responses to new challenges to their interests. The treaty offers an enduring framework that should expand as other European democracies share its values and are ready to contribute to its fulfillment.

NATO has adapted to international conditions over five decades

NATO, shaped in the crucible of the Cold War, has adapted to international conditions over five decades. It remains the instrument that the allies should employ to mount a collective defense. The treaty also provides for the allies to use the framework of cooperation to defend and promote security interests beyond the Article 5 commitment to defend Alliance borders against direct attack.

New Era

Challenges to the interests of NATO members are of different character than those posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but they are numerous and often more complex. They will not always require armed response. But the availability of military options can frequently increase the chances for successful diplomatic resolution of issues. Moreover, maintaining core collective defense capabilities serves as a critical hedge against future challenges to the security of the allies. Consultations and cooperation can make such options available. As in the past, coalition responses will be far more politically convincing and militarily capable than those of any single nation.

America's commitment and leading role remain critical to Alliance viability. Stability and peace in Europe can best be maintained by active U.S. participation. The active involvement of the allies in security challenges in and beyond Europe also will be vital to U.S. interests. Accordingly, a few suggestions are offered for consideration by the United States and its transatlantic allies.

The Washington Summit must not only welcome new members to NATO but reaffirm the centrality of the organization. NATO is not an end in itself. Beyond the defense of territory, it is an expression of shared values and interests among its members and a vehicle to facilitate their cooperation. Its goal should be to create a system of cooperative security involving all European nations, with the transatlantic Alliance at its center. Therefore the Euro-Atlantic community can be a cornerstone for the construction of peace, justice, and stability in a wider international order.

In keeping with the admonitions of the North Atlantic Treaty, the allies must ensure that trade and economic disagreements do not disrupt cooperative relations. Moreover, the collective interest will be served only occasionally by uncompromising go-it-alone approaches on the part of the United States or its allies. When fundamental disagreements block cooperation, consultations should be used to contain the potential damage of the inability to act in concert.

Effectiveness and political vitality ultimately rely on support from member parliaments and publics. Alliance governments and NATO Parliamentary Assembly delegations must make special efforts to explain to their publics and fellow parliamentarians the importance of pursuing common interests within the NATO framework.

Given the centrality of the democratic process, the relationship of parliamentary assembly to NATO should

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Czech Republic troops during Cooperative Nugget '97.

982d Signal Company, Combat Camera (Victoria Romena)

Marines setting up security checkpoint in Bosnia.

1st Combat Camera Squadron (Michelle Leonard)

be enhanced through intensified consultations and cooperation. The work of the assembly is not merely supportive; it is integral to the political relevance and credibility of overall Alliance efforts.

Core Missions

Collective defense against an attack on any member, as provided in Article 5 of the treaty, must remain the core NATO mission. Members must also direct increased political attention and defense resources on emerging outer core, non-Article 5 missions, including promoting stability in Europe, dealing with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, responding to the terrorist challenge, and dealing with security threats beyond NATO borders. In the 21st century, outer core missions should be developed with the intent that the inner core mission of collective defense need not be invoked.

Members must build responses to new challenges around a solid nucleus of collective defense capabilities. They must ensure a seamless continuum between all political and military aspects of inner and outer core missions and capabilities. In this regard, military authorities should develop training, exercise, deployment, and rotation concepts that enable regular forces to maintain combat capabilities while employed in non-Article 5 operations.

The Alliance should not suggest that its missions will assume a global character or impose artificial geographic limits on such missions. Decisions should be based on the specific challenges to member security interests and the benefits or disadvantages of available options.

The allies must seek to act in unison—preferably with a mandate from the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the framework for collective security in Europe. Members must not limit themselves to acting only when such a mandate can be agreed. NATO actions should nonetheless have appropriate legal authority where possible.

It is critical that the allies share responsibility in facing security challenges while working out acceptable allocations of tasks between North America and Europe as well as in Europe itself. Although tasks can be divided among allies, responsibility must always be shared. Operations in Bosnia have proven the wisdom of sharing. The disastrous early stages of the crisis illustrated the costs of trying to divide responsibility for challenges to NATO interests.

Even if terrorism affects only one ally, each terrorist act is part of a broader phenomenon that threatens the entire Alliance. Effective burden-sharing will require that all allies demonstrably contribute to combatting terrorism. NATO should be used more actively as a forum for sharing of intelligence, consultations on counterterrorist strategies, and joint actions against threats.

The allies must extend the area of democracy and stability in Europe by opening Alliance structures to cooperation with all European states and membership to those who desire to join and meet the requirements. Moreover, there should be a constant effort to reach out to the countries of the Mediterranean region to develop mutual understanding and cooperation with willing partners in this strategic region bordering the Alliance.

Enlargement

NATO enlargement should be carefully paced, not paused. Having taken the first historic step down the enlargement path, the allies must

demonstrate that it will be a continuing process. Opening the door to eager and viable candidates reinforces the strength of NATO and leads toward a European security system that is inclusive and stabilizing.

Slovenia is well qualified to be invited to join, and is ready to make a net contribution to security and stability. Judged against the guidelines in the enlargement study, it is as qualified for membership as are the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Romania and Bulgaria are worthy candidates, and their progress toward political, economic, and military reform should eventually yield an invitation to join. If Slovakia demonstrates a strong commitment to democracy in coming years, it too should receive priority consideration.

Some have argued for pausing the enlargement process after the first group of candidates, but the political costs would be substantial, feeding suspicion that a temporary pause will become permanent. Therefore, to make it crystal clear that the open door policy is serious, Slovenia should be invited to begin accession negotiations. In addition to indicating that Slovenia is prepared for membership, it would demonstrate that the door remains open without overloading the process. Furthermore, candidate nations must be assured that their progress will be closely monitored and discussed with them annually.

arms control is critical to managing relations among European states

Enlargement should not cause competition between northern and southern candidates. The Baltic states deserve the opportunity for membership and should be integrated into the work of the Alliance. Candidate nations should be judged against the guidelines contained in the 1995 study on NATO enlargement regardless of their geographic location. As agreed in Madrid in July 1997, no European democracy whose admission would fulfill treaty objectives should be excluded.

The Partnership for Peace program must encourage partners toward maximum participation in Alliance activities. Partnership cells should be established at subregional levels in the command structure as well as at higher levels to expand opportunities for the Baltic states and other aspirants to fully engage in NATO efforts. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council should be developed as a means of channeling the views of partners into the NATO planning and decisionmaking processes for non-Article 5 operations and improving combined joint task force (CJTF) capabilities.

Beyond Arms Control

The allies have opened many doors to cooperate with Russia. The Permanent Joint Council and the Partnership for Peace program offer Russia virtually unlimited opportunities to develop a serious consultative and cooperative relationship with NATO. The Alliance must continue to stress its desire for such a relationship. Russia's importance to European security must be acknowledged and its attitude toward NATO should be moved beyond Cold War assumptions.

Arms control is critical to managing relations among European states and internationally. In particular, adapting the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe to new European conditions will be a source of long-term reassurance and stability. The allies must nonetheless ensure that the revision of the treaty does not restrict NATO flexibility to reinforce old and new members in crises or conduct peace support operations. At the same time, the treaty should draw Russia farther into the common European security structures, thus complementing the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

Defense cooperation should be used to move Russia beyond arms control to a qualitatively new level of political and military relationships. However important arms control treaties may be, the allies should persist in establishing a security system in which concepts like balance of power, zones of influence, and strategic position are replaced by cooperative, integrative relationships. Long-term political stability must be based on the growth of democracy, economic development, mutual trust, and a system of cooperative security among all states in the Euro-Atlantic area.

The allies should promote OSCE as the collective security framework in their emerging security system. They should strengthen the ability of this organization to resolve security-related disputes involving non-NATO members of OSCE.

Military Backbone

Although the allies must not violate the principle of sharing responsibilities for all missions, European members should take progressively more responsibility for their security. This evolution should be managed within the overall Alliance framework. For example, members could shoulder more of the burden and provide more leadership in the southern/Mediterranean region as resources allow. They should agree that national command prerogatives will correspond to their contribution to allied interests there. For the time being, an American officer should retain command.

Based on progress toward a viable European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within an Alliance framework, and development of NATO as a key contributor to a cooperative European security system, the French should return to the integrated command structure. If they participate, Allied Forces Southern Europe should be divided into a southwestern and southeastern command. The former should have a European commander and deputy commander (most logically a French and Spanish officer) while a U.S. officer with a European deputy should lead the latter.

The allies should concentrate on developing the capabilities to implement the current goals of European defense cooperation before elaborating additional organizational schemes or structural initiatives. This will require more effective rationalization and consolidation of defense efforts both within and among European states than heretofore. High priority should

American, British, Norwegian, and Polish troops jumping over Tuzla.

55th Signal Company, Combat Camera (William Lee)

NATO and PFP member-nation aircraft during Cooperative Key '98

30th Communications Squadron (Jeremy T. Lock)

be accorded to ways in which specialization in logistics support could make more effective use of defense resources. The United States should help and encourage the continuing consolidation of European defense efforts. But it must not be held accountable for the inability of European states to secure a more coherent role for themselves in the Alliance. It is their responsibility to develop their security and defense capabilities to give real meaning to ESDI.

Defense Planning

The process of defense planning is being expanded with a focus on forces, equipment, training, and exercises for non-Article 5 missions like Bosnia. Planning related to implementation of the CJTF concept must be given a high priority. NATO nations must increase the emphasis on force projection. Both collective defense and non-Article 5 challenges will require forces capable of operating beyond their borders. The British white paper on defense, French modernization of its non-nuclear forces, and German force restructuring plans exemplify the directions in which the allies should move. In addition, all allied nations must identify forces that could be made available for non-Article 5 missions.

NATO should transmit an annual report to the President of its parliamentary assembly on efforts to develop capabilities to meet the new mission profile, including recommendations to close remaining gaps. Members must demonstrate that they take their individual and collective security responsibilities seriously and are restructuring forces in light of guidelines in the Strategic Concept. The Alliance, particularly its political leaders and legislators, must realize where it is failing to meet the needs of its commanders and is limiting its ability to fulfill missions.

Reduced defense spending in most member states is weakening NATO ability to respond to new security challenges just as the operational tempo for allied forces is increasing. There should be a voluntary moratorium on further defense budget reductions that should continue until the allies decide on which capabilities and expenditures are needed to implement the NATO revised Strategic Concept. Even absent active major threats, member nations must remember that prudent defense can deter future threats as well as deal with current challenges.

The number of Americans deployed in Europe should be determined by national interests, including the requirement to ensure that U.S. and allied militaries can effectively plan, exercise for, and participate in agreed roles

and missions. If America is to play a leading role in establishing and employing CJTFs to deal with future threats, it will be necessary to maintain sufficient forces in Europe to make this concept viable. Based on political guidance from NATO leaders in a revised Strategic Concept, U.S. and allied military officials should advise what levels and types of forces are required to implement specified missions.

Recognizing the potential for deployed technologies to both promote and undercut the allied ability to operate as a coalition, members should undertake two initiatives. First, they should in the near future develop a technology and industrial base strategy. Its goal should be to preserve vital, competitive, and complementary defense bases on both sides of the Atlantic, pursue a progressive elimination of barriers to NATO-wide defense trade, encourage the harmonization of competition policies, and remove barriers to sharing technology among allied states.

Second, the Alliance should launch a coalition technology initiative that would establish a requirement as part of the annual defense planning process to identify emerging technologies that could affect allied collaboration. The NATO Military Committee should be tasked to recommend which specific technologies could advance coalition operations and which might impede them.

As the leader in defense affairs and technology, the United States should ensure its ability to work in coalitions. The European allies, for their part, should harmonize their defense research and development for efficiency and to minimize duplication. The United States and the European allies should identify areas in which research, development, and procurement can be organized on a transatlantic basis. They should look particularly for commercial technologies whose coordinated integration into NATO forces would promote interoperability.

Nuclear Weapons

NATO must keep a nuclear weapons component in its strategy even though today there is no active threat calling for their use. Such weapons, although not aimed at any particular nation, have a deterrent effect that contributes to overall European stability. Because either rogue states or terrorist groups could acquire and use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons of mass destruction, it would not be wise for NATO to make a blanket pledge of no first use.

The allies should nonetheless promote a progressive reduction of nuclear weapons. More critically, they should encourage international cooperation to minimize destabilizing deployments of nuclear weapons and should demonstrate resolve by cooperating with Russia and China to move nuclear weapons systems to lower levels of readiness to reduce the chance of accidental launch. The United States should maintain its token nuclear presence in Europe as long as it is seen as stabilizing.

NATO must jointly develop missile defense systems to protect its forces

The Alliance should give urgent attention to missile defense, in particular to protect forces engaged in military operations. The proliferation of missile technologies and systems, especially those that deliver weapons of mass destruction, is increasingly worrisome. It is not unthinkable that a rogue state or terrorist group could acquire missiles with the intention of threatening an ally. Given limited resources, NATO must jointly develop missile defense systems to protect its forces.

Facing Facts in the Balkans

The contribution of NATO deployments to a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrates the importance of Alliance cooperation in protecting and promoting allied interests in the Euro-Atlantic area. But as long as the Balkans are a tinderbox, there can be no stable peace in Europe. If NATO intends to continue to play a constructive role in bringing enduring peace to that region, two important lessons from that tragedy must be heeded.

First, the early hesitation of the allies to respond to the crisis undoubtedly meant many lives lost and probably cost the allies much more financially and militarily in the long run. Second, the recent experience in Kosovo suggests that NATO should only threaten military intervention when it is prepared to follow through. Empty threats only undermine the effectiveness of current policies in the Balkans and, more broadly, long-term allied credibility.

Continued U.S. presence in Bosnia remains important. However, the European role in the operation should get increased emphasis, including designation of a European officer as the overall commander, within the chain of command. If NATO sends troops into Kosovo to enforce a peace settlement with clear, attainable objectives, European allies will have an opportunity to demonstrate the capability and credibility of an emerging ESDI. It is through this lens that the United States should consider its contribution.

Although the success of NATO over the last fifty years provides much to celebrate at the Washington Summit, it is imperative that we prepare the way for another five decades with a vital transatlantic alliance. Toward this end, the summit must reaffirm the Alliance commitment to the principles and objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty and the core mission of collective defense. NATO leaders should decisively move toward enlargement by inviting Slovenia to join. We must generate the capacity to manage the challenges of the next century, while the European allies must foster a more robust, capable role. Implementing these priorities will ensure that NATO remains true to the Washington Charter and also becomes even more effective in promoting and protecting the enduring interests and values that bind the transatlantic community. JFQ