REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

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1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)*
09-02-2004

2. REPORT TYPE
FINAL

3. DATES COVERED *(From - To)*

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Operational Leadership in Kosovo

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)

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Paper Advisor (if Any): CAPT Mike Critz, U.S. Navy

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Joint Military Operations Department
Naval War College
686 Cushing Road
Newport, RI 02841-1207

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.

14. ABSTRACT

On the night of 24 March 1999, NATO warplanes streaked across the European skies and struck targets in Kosovo and Serbia in an attempt to coerce Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to end his campaign of ethnic cleansing against Kosovar Albanians. This event marked the beginning of Operation ALLIED FORCE, a 78-day bombing campaign that, to this day, remains the only conflict that NATO has fought as an organization.

While an abundance of literature has been published focusing on how this clash was fought and many of the decisions made as it unfolded, this paper will concentrate on operational leadership; in particular how it shaped the pre-conflict negotiations, planning, the major operation itself, and finally how it was demonstrated during campaign termination. This examination will begin with an overview of the leadership challenges faced by the commanders which will serve as the backdrop on which these examples of operational leadership will unfurl. I will then briefly review the tenets of operational leadership and the traits of an operational commander. The analysis itself will center on three of the central figures involved in the battle; Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) and Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command (CINCUSEUR), GEN Wesley Clark; Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) and Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR), ADM James Ellis; and finally Commander, Air Forces Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH) and Commander, U.S. 16th Air Force (16 AF/CC), LGEN Michael Short. The study concludes with a synopsis of the takeaways and a discussion of how to improve in future situations.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Operational Leadership, Kosovo, GEN Wesley Clark, ADM James Ellis, LGEN Michael Short

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
					Chairman, JMO Dept
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER *(include area code)*
UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED		20	401-841-3556

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

Naval War College

Newport, RI

Joint Military Operations

OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP IN KOSOVO

By

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Seminar 10 / Prof Gatchel, CAPT Critz

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College of the Department of the Navy

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9 February 2004

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and finally Commander, Air Forces Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH) and Commander, U.S. 16th Air Force (16 AF/CC), LGEN Michael Short. The study concludes with a synopsis of the takeaways and a discussion of how to improve in future situations.

This is an unclassified paper which used official documents including after action reports, press reports, congressional testimony, a variety of books, articles in various professional journals, and video accounts of the war in Kosovo to form the basis of research. The research is coupled with the author's own experience in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq to provide relevant lessons learned that apply directly to U.S. joint military operations today.

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

Map of Kosovo

INTRODUCTION

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KOSOVO SITUATION

From the beginning Kosovo presented significant challenges regarding operational leadership. There was a general reluctance within the strategic leadership of the United States to become involved with the developing crisis in Kosovo. This crisis would eventually come to a head as the severity of the Serbian ethnic cleansing and displacement of Kosovar Albanians became more public in the beginning of 1999. GEN Wesley Clark succinctly states the divergence of views and complexity of the situation:

> But the war in Kosovo was nothing like the Gulf War, not even close: no clear international consensus to fight, no sure cause, ambivalent public support, no long deployment and build-up, an incredibly complex theater environment, and difficult climactic (sic), demographic, and geographic conditions on the battlefield. For the U.S. military, it was neither the conflict we had prepared for nor the war we wanted to fight.[1]

GEN Clark had unique responsibilities as both CINCUSEUR, an American role (figure 1), and simultaneously serving as SACEUR, a NATO position (figure 2).

[1] Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War (New York: PublicAffairs 2001), 19.



U.S. Forces Command Structure

(figure 1)



NATO's Command Structure

(figure 2)

It is the nature of this dual-hatted position that would eventually lead to friction between GEN Clark and the leadership in Washington D.C. Moreover, this friction would ultimately work its way down to ADM Ellis and LGEN Short and disagreements about the actual prosecution of the air campaign would surface. Reviewing the command structure, it is not

difficult to understand the intricacies involved with the separate chains and how convoluted the process could become: e.g., in the U.S. structure LGEN Short (16 AF/CC) reported to GEN Jumper (COMUSAFE) but in the NATO structure they were hierarchical equals with LGEN Short (COMAIRSOUTH) reporting to ADM Ellis (CINCSOUTH). It's important to note that in neither case is LGEN Short reporting directly to GEN Clark. Another operational leadership concern that faced these commanders involved the complexities of conducting war as an alliance; specifically the challenges presented a commander in maintaining cohesion, any sort of freedom of action, and focus on the objective. A deeper look at these key individuals will provide some lessons that may be of value to the next generation of leaders.

TENETS AND TRAITS OF OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP

The term "operational leadership" pertains to those levels of command responsible for achieving political and military strategic objectives designated by the national or alliance/coalition leadership through the employment of operational art.[2] With this definition in mind, it is simple to see how Operation ALLIED FORCE would provide GEN Clark, ADM Ellis, and LGEN Short ample opportunity to exercise their individual styles of operational leadership. Before exploring the tenets of operational leadership, an examination of the operational commander's traits is in order. Successful commanders, regardless of

their rank, have certain personality traits that set them apart. Personality is the product of both heredity and background.[3] These traits should include, at a minimum; the highest degree of strength of character, high intellect, creativity, and boldness. These qualities are developed during life, military career, and through self-study.[4] Of these aforementioned traits, character is generally considered the foundation for all others. Honesty, sound judgment, moral courage and persistence are typically embedded within strong character. As former SACEUR GEN Matthew Ridgeway stated:

> Character is the bedrock on which the whole edifice of leadership rests. It is the prime element for which every profession, every corporation, every industry searches in evaluating a member of its organization. With it, the full worth of the individual can be developed. Without it – particularly in the military profession – failure in peace, disaster in war, or, at best, mediocrity in both will result.[5]

Additional attributes include, but aren't limited to; the ability to think operationally, initiative, profound professional knowledge, decisiveness, toughness, motivational ability, mental agility, leading by example, and steadfastness of purpose.

While the list of traits may seem extensive, it is essential to remember that a leader can prove effective while possessing only a simple majority of these properties. Obviously the more qualities an

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[2] Milan Vego, Operational Art (Newport: Naval War College Press 1999), 561.

[3] Ibid., 562.

[4] Werner W. Banish, "Leadership at the Operational Level," Army, no. 8 (August 1987): 60.

[5] Vego, 561.

individual enjoys, the more "tools" he can utilize in his "leadership toolbox", increasing his chances of being a successful leader. With the understanding of the desirable traits of leader in mind we can turn our attention to the "guidelines" a leader needs to contemplate – the tenets of operational leadership. As Milan Vego powerfully suggests:

> Practical application of operational leadership is governed by relatively few tenets or cardinal rules. The strict adherence to these tenets cannot guarantee success, but the penalties for not observing them are severe.... The neglect or violation of these tenets will almost invariably impede the accomplishment of the assigned military objectives and, more often than not, result in failure of a major operation or campaign."[6]

It is also important to understand that while many of these rules are generally acknowledged, there is no universally accepted "checklist" of tenets. The tenets germane to our study are the indirect approach; absolute primacy of policy and strategy; unwavering focus on the objective; balancing the ends, means, and ways; obtaining and maintaining freedom of action; jointness; willingness to take high risks; employment of all sources of power; and finally, selection of the proper weight of effort.

Adherence to these guidelines by an operational leader will normally manifest itself in several ways: the guidance and direction a leader provides; the vision the individual possesses and how well that vision is articulated for his subordinates; and the quality of the operational decisions he/she makes.

With this understanding of the above, an assessment of the key operational leadership of ALLIED FORCE follows.

GENERAL WESLEY CLARK, USA

Of the traits for a successful operational leader, the predominant qualities displayed by GEN Clark in Kosovo were his decisiveness, steadfastness of purpose, high intellect, and finally, his persistence. All of these traits speak to GEN Clark's strength of character. It is this strength of character, however, that would ultimately lead to palpable friction between Clark, his superiors in Washington, and his subordinates in Europe.

GEN Wesley K. Clark became SACEUR / CINCUSEUR on 10 July, 1997. This "double-hatted" role has been standard for many years. It is these positions, and GEN Clark's interpretation of their unique functions, that would play a significant part in the entire operation, to include the U.S. decision to enter the conflict. It was during Clark's visit to Macedonia in March 1998 that he received his first indications that the situation in Kosovo was coming to a boil. A week before the Serb military and police had attacked and wiped out some sixty members of a large Albanian family, the Jasharis, whose head was accused of leading the shadowy Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). This action was going to provoke trouble, Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov warned. Gligorov would further presage that there was a conflict in the making, due

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[6] Ibid., 593.

largely to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.[7] Clark would relay this information back to Washington, where it was indifferently received, as revealed by Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff GEN Joseph Ralston: "Look, Wes, we've got a lot on our plates back here. We've got our Defense bill to get through and NATO enlargement coming up in the Senate. We can't deal with any more problems".[8]

Clark did not let this issue rest and would brief the NATO foreign ministers, including U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, about his position a few weeks later it. His position was quite clear:

> Being caught between the Pentagon's determination to resist deepening engagement in the Balkans and my duty to provide warning of a new problem, which could cause our mission in Bosnia to fail, generated enormous tension. But I believed the issue had to be faced. The facts on the ground were unmistakable. European governments were searching for an appropriate response. This was a moment for American leadership.[9]

Clark felt he could ably provide this "American leadership". The decision to commit U.S. forces to this conflict is being argued even today. Proponents of the conflict point to Milosevic's wanton campaign of cleansing and displacement and stipulate the humanitarian reasons alone provided enough reason for involvement. Some went as far as to compare the situation to the Holocaust. Opponents of the conflict stated that the deep religious hatred between these groups failed to provide a

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[7] Clark, 108.

[8] Ibid., 109.

[9] Ibid., 114.

true victim. In other words, there were no innocents as both groups were admittedly guilty of atrocities. Additionally, opponents would argue there wasn't a vital U.S. interest at stake and that committing Americans to this cause could prove disastrous, not only for our country, but for NATO as well, if victory could not be guaranteed. These arguments are inconsequential – it is literally history. What is not inconsequential is GEN Clark's dogged persistence in the matter. As an interesting aside, Clark's reverence for persistence can be traced directly to advice given him by former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin: "Persistence," he said. "It's the most important quality for a leader."[10] In any case, his persistence coupled with his unwavering focus on his objective (NATO action in the Balkans), employment of all sources of power, and willingness to take high risks (as he deftly worked the NATO and U.S. channels to get the decision he felt appropriate, despite "ruffling feathers" in Washington) eventually tipped the scales in his favor as he achieved consensus within NATO and the U.S. chain of command, resulting in ALLIED FORCE. Naturally, as the campaign continued, how GEN Clark applied these tenets would morph.

Much literature has been published in recent years concerning ALLIED FORCE, in particular, whether or not the campaign was prosecuted in a sound fashion. This is pertinent because GEN Clark's primary role as SACEUR was to plan how this war should have been

fought, present these ideas to his superiors, and execute the decisions finally wrought by NATO and United States strategic leadership. As previously mentioned, GEN Clark possessed strength of character. However, as Clausewitz warned: "…strength of character could degenerate into obstinacy. The line between these two is difficult to draw in practice, but not in theory. Obstinacy is not an intellectual defect, but a fault of temperament because it comes from reluctance to admit that one is wrong."[11] The evidence suggests that obstinacy played a significant role with regards to decisions about **how** to fight this campaign. After the opening days of the conflict proved that Milosevic wasn't capitulating as quickly as initial assessments calculated, the disagreements about target priorities became heated. Clark sums his beliefs concerning targets, operational and strategic centers of gravity, and priorities:

> The way I looked at it, the point of the campaign was either break Milosevic's will (or the will of his supporters) or, ultimately, deny him the capability to continue the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. On the strategic level, we continued to push for approval to attack the strategic communications targets, including TV stations, key bridges, and electric power stations – high-profile elements of Milosevic's system for command, control, and sustainment of the Armed Forces in Yugoslavia. That was one center of gravity. ***But the Serb ground forces were another center of gravity, and they were the priority*** *emphasis added*."[12]

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[10] Ibid., 25.

[11] Clausewitz, On War; edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, 8th printing 1984): 101.

[12] Clark, 242.

It was this belief that lead to considerable tension between Clark and his principle Airman, LGEN Short. Aggressive micromanagement on the former's part was eventually met by understandably perturbed and increasingly transparent passive-aggressive rebellion against it on the latter's.[13] The depth of this micromanagement and rebellion is evidenced by the following passage:

> Indeed, by the account of numerous observers who either participated in or later watched the video tapes of the 94 top-level video teleconferences (VTCs) conducted throughout ALLIED FORCE, a typical exchange between Clark and Short during the air war's early days would have Clark ask: "Are we bombing those ground forces yet, Mike?" To which Short would typically offer a noncommittal response. Even in the case of fixed infrastructure targets, Clark reportedly would venture deep into the most minute details of the target list.... He would also, by this account, sometimes gainsay his own intelligence experts and targeteers by looking at a particular Desired Mean Point of Impact (DMPI) placement and asking "Isn't that an apartment building?" or "Can't we move that DMPI over 100 feet?" At which point Short would be seen "slumping back in his chair, folding his arms in disgust, and mentally checking out."[14]

It's hard to imagine how a capable leader in this situation would choose to get so completely involved with the minutiae of overseeing the conflict. The day-to-day operational responsibilities of planning and executing the Air Tasking Order (ATO) should have been left to the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC), LGEN Short, working through the Joint Task Force Commander (CJTF), ADM Ellis. That would have freed GEN Clark to engage some of the substantial strategic

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[13] Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment (Santa Monica: RAND 2001): 190.

complexities involved with keeping a 19 nation alliance moving in the same general direction.

LGEN Short was not the only individual with whom Clark wasn't seeing eye to eye. The leadership is Washington had reservations with Clark's ideas also:

> But the feedback I (Clark) was getting from Washington was disturbing. Several of The Chiefs still questioned the value of risking the Apaches[15] to attack the tactical forces in Kosovo. Apparently, ***they didn't believe that the Serb forces there were in any way a center of gravity for Milosevic*** *emphasis added* and saw no connection between the destruction of these forces and the successful conclusion of the campaign.[16]

From the earliest stages of the war it was clear that a credible plan had yet to be conceived, let alone disseminated, by the senior leadership, specifically GEN Clark. After the first week, once it became apparent that Milosevic was not interested in giving up easily, GEN Clark tasked his targeteers with finding 5,000 targets. His target planners quickly convinced him that 5,000 legitimate aim points were not to be found in all of Serbia, whereupon Clark acknowledged a new goal of coming up with 2,000 target candidates, a goal later disparaged by some planners as "T2K".[17] As one U.S. officer reporting to an assignment at the

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[14] Ibid., 191.

[15] Within days after Operation ALLIED FORCE commenced, General Clark asked the Army to deploy a contingent of its AH-64 Apache attack helicopters to the combat zone to provide better close-in capability against the enemy tanks and APCs than that offered by fixed-wing assets. This idea was met with substantial concern as it was widely believed that unless ground forces were employed, the extensive risk of losing an Apache substantially outweighed the potential gains.

[16] Clark, 303.

[17] Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond, (New York: Henry Holt and Company 2000) 99.

Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) midway into the operation noted afterward, he was told upon arrival: "I know you won't believe this, but we don't have a plan."[18]

In addition to his failure to plan, GEN Clark did not select the proper weight of effort for the more strategic targets in Belgrade. More pointedly, Clark made a poor decision regarding which objectives were attainable. The operational center of gravity, the Serbian 3rd Army fielded in Kosovo, was practically impervious to air power alone. Without a NATO ground threat Milosevic's troops were able to disperse and hide, making it that much more difficult for NATO's aircrews to find and attack them.[19] After ALLIED FORCE was over, the former commander of NATO forces during Operation Deliberate Force, Admiral Leighton Smith, remarked that the Kosovo experience should go down as "possibly the worst way we employed our military forces in history."[20] Former Air Force chief of staff General Ronald Fogleman likewise observed that "just because it comes out reasonably well, at least in the eyes of the administration, doesn't mean it was conducted properly. The application of air power was flawed."[21] By the end of May, most USAF generals had deduced that NATO would be unable to find and destroy any more dispersed Serbian troops and equipment without incurring more

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[18] Lambeth, 200.

[19] Ibid., 231.

[20] "Reporters' Notebook," Defense Week, (19 July 1999): 4.

collateral civilian casualties.[22] LGEN Short would state after the campaign: "as an airman, I'd have done this a whole lot differently than I was allowed to do. We could have done this differently. We should have done this differently."[23]

ADMIRAL JAMES ELLIS, USN

ADM Ellis may be considered the "missing link" in the chain of command. It is not completely clear if this was due to GEN Clark's micromanaging nature or passivity on ADM Ellis' part, though research points to the former. Nearly every function that GEN Clark undertook himself, ADM Ellis could have, and in many cases should have, performed. Delegating these tasks is what U.S. Army General George Joulwan had done as SACEUR in 1995 with Admiral Leighton Smith during Operation DELIBERATE FORCE, so he could dedicate his full time, attention, and energy to his principal duties as diplomat in uniform.[24] If ever a conflict required a full-time "diplomat in uniform", ALLIED FORCE was that conflict. Instead, Clark elected to not only shoulder the diplomatic burden as NATO's supreme commander, but also to conduct the air war himself from Brussels, in the process circumventing not only his JTF Commander, ADM Ellis, but also his air component commander, LGEN Short, in making many decisions more

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[21] Lambeth, 222.

[22] John F. Harris and Bradley Graham, "Clinton Is Reassessing Sufficiency of Air War," Washington Post, 3 June 1999.

[23] William Drozdiak, "Allies Need Upgrade, General Says," Washington Post, 20 June, 1999.

appropriately made by his subordinates.[25] This is particularly befuddling as ADM Ellis is a naval aviator, former commanding officer of one of the Navy's first F/A-18 strike fighter squadrons, former commanding officer of a nuclear powered aircraft carrier, a graduate of the U.S. Naval Test Pilot School, and former Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of Joint Task Force FIVE. Certainly this man had the background to serve as the JTF Commander for a campaign almost entirely prosecuted from the air and more than capable of providing Clark relief from some of his burden. It's interesting to note that not much has been published about ADM Ellis, more than likely because he still serves as Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.

The differences of opinion that Clark had with Short were also evident with Ellis:

> I (Clark) was concerned when Admiral Jim Ellis and General John Jumper briefed me on their latest thoughts: ***they were focusing on the fixed Serb military infrastructure targets; they still hadn't worked in detail the techniques we would use to strike early against the Serb ground forces*** *emphasis added*. "That's got to be done now," I said. They would get right on it, they said.[26]

While GEN Clark fulfilled many of the roles for which ADM Ellis would have been better suited, ADM Ellis still had opportunities to display his operational leadership. For example, ADM Ellis performed commendably when faced with tough decisions. His toughness,

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[24] Lambeth, 193.

[25] Ibid., 193.

boldness, and uncompromising character were never tested more completely than after the conflict had terminated and NATO found itself in race with the Russians to get troops into Pristina Airfield.

> The row, reported by the US magazine Newsweek, erupted after General Jackson refused orders to send an air assault team into Pristina airport to block Russian forces who unexpectedly seized it when the NATO bombardment ended. "I'm not going to start the Third World War for you," Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Jackson reportedly told the US commander (Clark) during one heated exchange. When General Jackson refused, General Clark asked Admiral James Ellis, in charge of NATO's Southern Command, to position helicopters on the runways to prevent Russian Ilyushin transport aircraft from landing. ***However, Admiral Ellis also refused, reportedly saying General Jackson would not like it*** *emphasis added.*[27]

There are very few recorded cases of such near mutiny. For ADM Ellis to effectively side with LGEN Jackson is nearly unfathomable. Especially considering that, while the British LGEN Jackson existed only in Clark's NATO chain of command, Ellis existed in both the NATO and U.S. chains of command. Ellis had much to lose if Clark decided to utilize his CINCUSEUR hat vice his SCAEUR role. Why this decision was never pursued as disobedience of a direct order is a valid question and debatable. What is not open to question is the simple fact that ADM Ellis had the courage to make a grueling decision and the conviction to stand by it.

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[26] Clark, 171.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL SHORT, USAF

Early in this conflict it was no secret that Clark and Short did not agree on how to effect Milosevic's capitulation. VADM Daniel Murphy, commander of all naval forces aligned against Yugoslavia, states this point distinctly: "There was a fundamental difference of opinion at the outset between General Clark, who was applying a ground commander's perspective . . . and General Short as to the value of going after fielded forces."[28] This fact would obviously provide LGEN Short with many leadership challenges throughout the air war. It is important to realize, that while Short was older than Clark (Short was USAFA class of 1965. Clark was USMA class of 1966.), he was junior in rank. LGEN Short was, however, senior in warfighting experience:

> Short, a warrior's warrior who flew ***276 combat missions in Vietnam and led F-15E strikes in the Persian Gulf War*** *emphasis added*, seldom spoke to reporters during the Kosovo conflict. But his strongly expressed views became known through his colleagues. Topping the list was that it was a waste of time and resources to strike Milosevic's 3rd Army in Kosovo. "I never felt that the 3rd Army was a center of gravity," Short said in a rare interview published this month in Air Force magazine. "Body bags coming home from Kosovo didn't bother (Milosevic), and it didn't bother the (Yugoslav) leadership elite.[29]

Even before the conflict, friction existed. Short took heat from the press for his planning to keep his fliers above 15,000 feet while attacking Serb forces in Kosovo. Flying lower, it was thought, would speed the

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[27] "World: Europe Generals 'clashed over Kosovo raid'." BBC News Network Online, 2 August 1999. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/409576.stm> [14 January 2004].

[28] Dana Priest, "The Battle Inside Headquarters; Tension Grew With Divide Over Strategy," Washington Post, 21 September 1999, sec. A, p. 1.

process of destroying Serb armored vehicles and troops, while reducing the chance of hitting civilian targets. Short said Clark insisted, prior to the start of the conflict, that the pilots "get down amongst them."[30] Showing the profound moral courage to do the right thing, despite objections from superiors, LGEN Short did not budge on the matter. The surface-to-air threats within Kosovo would have proven extremely effective against NATO warplanes flying below 15,000 feet.[31] GEN Clark eventually recognized the wisdom of LGEN Short's policy and acquiesced. The NATO pilots prosecuted the entire air war from above 15,000, greatly reducing the potential for losses from surface-to-air threats. There is no way to calculate how many allied lives this decision saved.

LGEN Short also frequently displayed one of Clark's favorite traits – persistence. While he continued to execute GEN Clark's plan, Short did not discontinue his objections about the methods of application of airpower throughout the entire campaign. Unfortunately, Clark never deferred and the Serbian fielded forces remained on the target list and continued being methodically struck until the final days of the conflict. Fortunately, the campaign proved successful and on June 9, 1999,

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[29] Ibid.
[30] John Tirpak, "Short's View of the Air Campaign," Air Force Magazine (September 1999): 32.
[31] The Serbian integrated air defense system (IADS) was particularly high-grade. The IADS capability and MANPAD threat benefited from the exceptionally mountainous areas within Serbia: the Dinaric Alps in the west, the North Albanian Alps and Sar Mountains in the southwest, and the Balkan Mountains in the east, all which served to lower warplanes' above ground altitude (AGL) considerably.

Milosevic buckled. "I think it was the total weight of effort that finally got him," Short said.[32]

LESSONS LEARNED

As with nearly every campaign, there are lessons to take away from Operation ALLIED FORCE with regards to operational leadership. Some have been learned before, but merit reconsideration.

Operational art must be applied from the earliest stages of planning in order to give forces the best chance of effectively prosecuting a campaign. Without thinking a campaign through there is little chance that it will be sourced appropriately. By identifying the desired end state, a leader will be able to determine the strategic and operational objectives, form a coherent plan to accomplish those objectives, and create the best chance for victory. As previously discussed, GEN Clark failed to provide his CJTF, ADM Ellis, and JFACC, LGEN Short, thorough guidance before the hostilities began. Milosevic's will was underestimated and what was projected to be a quick operation dragged out for nearly three months. This led to "planning on the fly" – never a good idea in war.

A leader must resist the temptation to micromanage subordinates. It is crucial that the levels of command match the levels of war. SACEUR was charged with keeping a very delicate alliance moving forward through a complicated political situation. Instead of concentrating his efforts on maintaining vital cohesion within the alliance, GEN Clark

[32] Tirpak.

spent much of time working issues with which his subordinates were already engaged. This produced an unnecessary duplication effort as well as friction throughout the chain of command.

A leader must understand his professional strengths and weaknesses. Most military personnel spend their careers deeply involved in relatively few areas. In order to maximize employment of combat capabilities, a leader needs to understand when his advisors / subordinates are better suited to make decisions concerning specific methods with which the leader may not be as familiar. GEN Clark's expertise as an Army officer rested within the deployment of ground troops and armored tactics. While he was certainly exposed to nearly all methods of employing combat power over his career, LGEN Short, as the senior airman intimately involved, should have been given license to employ the aspect of warfighting of which he was a recognized expert.

CONCLUSION

Like most lessons learned, there is little "new" here. The traits and tenets of operational leadership should be common sense. Clearly, personalities and the dynamics of an unstable situation may play central roles as well. While I still believe that the truly remarkable leaders of history were born, not made, an individual would be imprudent to dismiss the operational leadership examples of history. There is much to glean from these instances and with which to hone personal leadership styles. My high school football coach once told me "Men follow leaders."

It made sense to me then, and after studying Montor, Vego, Clausewitz, Jomini, and Sun Tzu, I believe it even more today.

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