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ABSTRACT

Operational Planning Issues for the Peaceful Reunification of the Korean Peninsula

by Major Albert C. Stahl, USA, 47 pages

This monograph examines if the US Army in Korea is trained, equipped, and staffed to move directly into the last phase of a campaign plan, post-hostilities. As the new millennium dawns over the Korean Peninsula, literally the world's hopes and expectations for peace are at an all time high.

This monograph will study current North and South Korean relationships, in order to glean information the US Army planner will need in the event of moving directly into post-hostilities. Additionally four well know scenarios for North Korean collapse and eventual reunification are studied. Within each scenario, the Army planner has to discern how to optimize the plan and allow for the innumerable branches or sequels that will be required.

In order to provide further background information to facilitate planning and assumptions, the interests of the four major powers are discussed. The common theme among the US, China, Japan, and Russia is to seek stability and prevent no one power from establishing a hegemonic influence or domination over northeast Asia. This will allow all the powers involved to freely focus on economic investment and trade in the region.

The monograph concludes by using a fictitious scenario of DPRK collapse and developing strategic and operational end states that will need to be accomplished in order to meet the 2000 National Security Strategy for northeast Asia. The operational end states are: establishment of security and stability, conduct of humanitarian relief operations, and security of WMD research, production, storage and delivery sites. In order for the US Army and more specifically the US Eighth Army in Korea to accomplish the operational end states, current training is discussed and recommendations to correct projected deficiencies are noted.

OPERATIONAL PLANNING ISSUES FOR THE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA

A Monograph

by

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

"The question is not if North Korea disintegrates but when it disintegrates will it be by implosion leading to catastrophic collapse or explosion leading to a desperation attack."[1]

General Gary E. Luck, 1996
Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC)

Since the Armistice was signed in 1953, the Korean peninsula has become the most militarized area on the face of the earth. North Korea has 1.1 million troops under arms and South Korea has 680,000. Additionally, the United States has nearly 40,000 military personnel in Korea.[2] The sheer number of military personnel, plus North Korea's ballistic missile, artillery, and weapons of mass destruction capabilities make Korea, according to many experts, one of the most volatile places on earth. Korea is the final Cold War frontier, starkly reminiscent of the East/West conflict on the European continent.

The stability of the North Korean government is subject to much debate. Many "hawks" in the new George W. Bush Administration and hard liners in the South Korean government still expect a massive cross-border invasion from the North.[3] As such, the military planning and training that occurs is for armed

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[1] Bill Gertz, "US Commander in Korea Sees North Near Disintegration," *Washington Times,* (16 March 1996), 7.

[2] Jonathan D. Pollack, Chung Min Lee, "Preparing for Korean Unification Scenarios and Implications," (Rand, 1999), 1.

[3] Howard W. French, "Seoul Fears U.S. Is Chilly About Detent With North," *New York Times,* (March 25, 2001), available from http://ebird.dtic.mil/apr2001/e2000029south.htm; Internet accessed 5 April 2001.

conflict. At the tactical end of the US military's spear is the US Army's 2nd Infantry Division, consisting of two brigade combat teams. This division is undoubtedly trained and ready for war with North Korea.[4] However, should North Korea simply collapse or, on its own volition choose to assimilate with South Korea, the US Army must be able to deal with the ramifications. The monograph addresses issues such as these and identify likely operational end states should the US Army be used in an immediate post-hostility phase.[5] In order to dissect the ever-changing North/South Korea relationship and potential for unification, it is necessary to address the current positions of North and South Korea.

NORTH KOREA

In the last several years, there has been much debate on whether or not North Korea is on the verge of collapse. Until the mid 1980s, North Korea had enjoyed an economic edge over South Korea. However, by the end of the eighties, the North's per capita GNP of $1150 was half that of South Korea's.[6] The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been spiraling downward ever since. North Korea essentially exists on an economy designed by its "Great Leader," the late Kim Il Sung. Kim Il Sung designed an economy with an

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[4] Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee by General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander in Chief United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command and Commander United States Forces Korea, available from http://www.korea.army.mil/pao/news/CINC, Internet accessed 27 March 2001.

[5] Post hostilities is the last phase of a campaign plan. Example of phases: 1) Pre-hostilities phase 2) lodgment phase 3) decisive combat and stabilization phase 4) follow-through phase and 5) posthostilities and redeployment phase. Joint Pub 3.0 states that JFCs should identify posthostilities requirements as early as possible. Joint Publication 3.0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," 1 February 1995.

[6] John K Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig, East Asia, *Tradition and Transformation*, (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993), 921.

emphasis on self-reliance or "juche." Juche is a program of command economy that emphasizes independence and deplores outside interference. This juche ideology was extremely important to Kim Il Sung in maintaining the legitimacy of his regime and his image as a nationalist leader.[7] His son Kim Jong Il, the ascended leader of the DPRK upon his father's death in 1996, has seen the error of the juche philosophy and has recently made moves to engage the South and other countries economically. Kim Jong Il realized that juche was a self-defeating philosophy for a country with underdeveloped technology, aging infrastructure, inefficiency and little or no foreign investment capitol.[8]

During the mid-1990s a series of ecological disasters put North Korea on the verge of collapse. Facing severe flooding in 1995, followed by severe drought for years afterward, the country is still attempting to recover. The United Nations had reported that since 1995 North Korea has had an annual food shortage of two million tons of grain and that up to ten percent of the population has died of starvation.[9] Another indicator is the large number of defections that have occurred, to include Kim Jong Il's first wife, and the North Korean ambassador to China.[10]

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[7] Institute for National Strategic Studies, *US Strategic Objectives in East Asia,* available from http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforun/

[8] Christopher M. Centner, "The Cult that is North Korea," *Strategic Review,*, Spring 2000, vol. XXVIII, No. 2.

[9] Marcus Nolad, *The Summit and the Economic Future of the Korean Peninsula;* available from http://www.iie.com/TESTIMONY/kosummit.htm: Internet; accessed 3/11/2000.

[10] Kevin Sullivan, "Missing Ex-Wife Adds to North Korean Leader's Woes," *Washington Post,* (February 14, 1996), 17.

Other constraints on North Korea's economy have been caused by two of its former staunchest allies, Russia and the Peoples Republic of China. Both countries have markedly curtailed providing subsidies and both now demand hard currency for trades. This has greatly suppressed economic growth and significantly strained their relationship with China, the only other Asian nation still ruled by first generation communist revolutionary leaders. Since 1990, the DPRK has experienced negative economic growth, but so far this has not led to the downfall of the Kim Jong Il regime and might not. Kim Jong Il is a survivor and his country may not be as close to catastrophic collapse as numerous subject matter experts have written about.

Unlike his father, Kim Jong Il has allowed a limited amount of capitalism in his country since the famine of 1995-96. The famine of 1995-96 provided a catalyst for the first embryonic development of capitalism. During the famine, the governments food procurement and distribution system totally failed while private farm markets (i.e. "capitalism") blossomed in the rural areas. Instead of shutting them down, Kim Jong Il has looked the other way.[11] By condoning this act, Kim has aligned himself with reform-minded officials who realize that this is the first step in an unofficial market economy. To avoid alienating his father's cronies and their orthodox ideologies, Kim has quietly promoted this significant change in North Korean economic life without formally acknowledging or legitimizing it.[12]

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[11] Selig S. Harrison, "Time to Leave Korea?," *Foreign Affairs,* (March/April 2001) Volume 80, number 2, 68.

[12] Ibid.

These welcome economic changes, when combined with the historic June 2000 summit between himself and South Korean President, Kim Dae Jung, and US Secretary of State, Madeline Albright provides dramatic evidence that Kim does not share the characteristics of the elders in the Workers Party. During Secretary of State Madeline Albright's October 2000 visit to Pyongyang, Kim told her that he has been studying alternative economic systems for North Korea.[13] He realizes that economic reform and foreign investment are key to his regimes survival. Kim obviously does not fear the world's change, however, he believes he can harness change to see his purpose. If he miscalculates, an extremely volatile political, economic, and military collage of issues may erupt, which could easily draw US Army forces into a scenario they are unprepared for. Kim Jong Il is not his father and just as a chameleon changes colors to survive, so does Kim Jong Il to increase the likelihood of his regime's survival and prosperity.

Kim Jong Il has formed an alliance with key military leaders to strengthen their mutual position in the Pyongyang power structure. This collaboration with the armed forces has created a symbiotic relationship for both players and has essentially created a new constitutional structure in which the military "supplements the Workers Party as the focus of political authority and provided Kim his personal power base."[14]

> Kim has rewarded his loyal military supporters by giving them profitable positions in his personal network of conglomerates and trading companies. Powerful generals now control the Mabong, Rungra 888, and Kungung trading firms, which handle most of North Korea's illicit opium

[13] Ibid.

[14] Harrison, 70.

> trade as well as commercial exports of zinc, anthracite, gold and other mineral sources. If the danger of a collapse exists; it lies in the possibility of conflicts within the armed forces over the spoils of power, lending to destructive factionalism.[15]

Mr. Harrison's last paragraph should be of great value to future US Army planners focusing on the Korean Peninsula. No country has ever existed peacefully with itself or its neighbors when its political and military leaders flagrantly violated international law. Narcotics trafficking, corruption, and jealousy are now prevalent in a country that has the known capability to produce chemical and biological weapons and also the means to deliver them to virtually any continent on the planet. There is no doubt North Korea has arrived into the 21st century.

There are many experts who believe the demise of the DPRK is imminent, even with Kim's hybridization of juche and capitalism and massive foreign aid. George Tenet, Central Intelligence Agency director, warns of a "sudden, radical, and possible dangerous change that could come at any time."[16] General Thomas A. Schwartz, the commander of US forces in Korea predicts "social chaos threatening the existence of the regime itself, lending to the devastation of civil war.[17]

Others dismiss this view. Eason Jordon, president of CNN International Networks, toured North Korea recently and later spoke to a Harvard audience saying "when you hear about starvation in the North, a lot of very level headed

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[15] Ibid.

[16] Thomas A. Schwartz.

[17] Ibid.

people think, there is no way that a country like that can survive.... Well, I'm here to tell you with absolute certainty those guys will tough it out for centuries just the way they are."[18] So which side is correct; will there remain a status quo on the peninsula, or are epic, catastrophic, and rapid changes going to occur? Recent history provides a template with the domino-like fall of the former Warsaw Pact governments in Europe. As with any totalitarian system, change is usually very, very slow and will always meet great resistance from the ruling elite and corrupt bureaucracy whose life and livelihood would be threatened by a radical change such as democracy, or in this case unification.

Despite the various opinions of the experts as they attempt to predict North Korea's future, conventional wisdom would say that the status quo on the peninsula is not likely in the coming decade and rapid change will be the flavor de jour! The relevancy to the US Army military planner should be in the flexibility of the operation plan produced and the ability to restructure force flow into theater should force on force hostilities never occur, yet some variation of a Support or Stability Operation arise. To better prepare for the future the planner must not only understand his adversary, but also his ally.

South Korea

Much like North Korea, South Korea faces many challenges in its quest for reunification. Some immediate issues are: (a) as time passes, they have fewer ties to their former countrymen in North Korea; (b) if the economy does not continue its recovery from the 1997 financial crisis, it will be difficult to pay for

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[18] Selig, 69.

reunification; (c) many South Koreans will seek compensation for personal property taken by North Korea in the past; (d) negotiations for currency conversion and wage rates will be necessary; (e) justice for criminals in the North, including government officials; (f) de-mining operations; and (g) disarming and assimilating the parts of two militaries.[19]

Kim Dae Jung, current president of South Korea, is leading major changes in the Republic of Korea (ROK) strategy and is energetically pursuing closer ties with Pyongyang.[20] His unilateral policy of engagement towards the North is a three-pronged method of approachment and appeasement to the North Koreans.

In his February 1998 inaugural address, President Kim Dae Jung put forward three basic principals that are designed to promote peace, reconciliation, and cooperation in South versus North relations: (1) armed provocation by North Korea will not be tolerated; (2) no takeover or absorption of North Korea will be attempted; and (3) reconciliation and cooperation will be expanded.[21] This strategy was designed to shape North Korea's policies over the long term by providing aid and cooperation without any strings attached, such as not requiring short-term policy changes in the North.

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[19] The North Korea Policy of the Kim Dae Jung Administration (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, 1998.

[20] President Kim Dae Jung was awarded the 2000 Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to peaceably reunite the Koreas.

[21] Kongdan Oh Hassig, "Post Unification Korea and America's Place in It," *Institute for Defense Analysis,* 2000, 13.

Kim's policy was initially nicknamed the "sunshine policy" after the Aesop fable, but has since been called the Comprehensive Engagement Policy.[22] Guidelines for the implementation of the policy include separating politics from business approaches to North Korea, pursuing engagement at a pace consistent with popular consensus, and encouraging the international community, especially the United States and Japan, to pursue their own engagement policies towards the DPRK. President Kim is a visionary, and knows that the two countries will someday unite, but he knows that the fiscal cost of reunification will be staggering, with some estimates ranging from $0.25 to $3 trillion over a ten-year period. This is a cost that the South cannot currently afford.[23] Consequently, in the short term the sunshine policy seeks cooperative engagement with the DPRK.

In the early 1990s South Korea undertook its most serious step in an attempt to end the two countries' animosity towards each other. The ROK government conceived and issued the "Korea National Community Unification Formula" (KNCUF), which outlined guidelines and policies for unification and inter-Korea relations.[24] The KNCUF has been the baseline document concerning unification and has been revised by each of the South Korean administrations during the 1990s.

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[22] Ministry of National Unification, Peace and Cooperation: White Paper of Korean unification, (Korea: Ministry of National Unification of Korea, 1998), 20.

[23] Ibid.

[24] David S. Maxwell, *Catastrophe Collapse of North Korea: Implications for the US Military*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1996),

In 1992, North and South Korea opened a series of diplomatic talks that resulted in the two most important documents in the history of North/South relations: (1) The Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Peninsula and (2) The Agreement on Reconciliation, normally referred to as the Basic Agreement.[25] Those two documents converged to form the foundation for a potentially peaceful reunification.

In June 1994, then ROK President Kim Young Sam delivered the first viable unification policy that Pyongyang deemed palatable. The policy consisted of a phased process of unification designed on a cornerstone of building a single Korean national community based on freedom and democracy. The three principals were:

1. Independence: Unification must be achieved on Korea's own, according to the wishes of the Korean people and on the strength of its inherent national capabilities.
2. Peace: Unification must be achieved peacefully, not through war or the overthrow of the other side.
3. Democracy: Unification must be achieved democratically on the strength of the freedom and rights of all Koreans.[26]

Despite an "olive branch" offered to the DPRK in the early and mid 1990s, there have been several very publicized setbacks in progress due to North Korea's abuse of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Early in 1996 after the death of the DPRKs "Great Leader" Kim Il Sung, his successor and son, Kim Jong Il, announced that North Korea would nullify the

[25] Ministry of Nation Unification, Peace and Cooperation, 23

[26] Kongdan Oh Hassig, 15.

Armistice Agreement that ended the fighting in 1953.[27] Additionally in 1996, the North resumed its offensive campaign against the ROK. This debacle resulted in creating a ROK national emergency and manhunt for North Korean commandos when their submarine inadvertently beached itself on the eastern coast of South Korea. The international community condemned the incident and it also galvanized opinion that North Korea was the aggressor. For these reasons, little was accomplished towards reunification in the next two years.

Since his inauguration Kim Dae Jung has vigorously lobbied for his sunshine policy by visiting other countries to ask them to issue their own engagement strategy for North Korea. The Kim administration since 1998 has made more positive strides with its sunshine policy than any other ROK administration. Examples are increased number of tourist visits to the DPRK, increased business contacts and the fact that the two countries have greatly reduced the rhetoric towards one another and have remained at peace.[28]

The crowning achievement of Kim's sunshine policy was the first-ever inter-Korean summit, held in Pyongyang from 13-15 June 2000. The two leaders, Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il signed a South-North Joint Declaration in which they agreed to achieve unification "independently." Traditionally this was a DPRK code word for expelling US forces from the peninsula, but Kim Jong Il has slackened his hard-line approach calling for the expulsion of US forces. He realizes he must engage the US in bi-lateral talks in order to shore up his regime by receiving millions of dollars in humanitarian aid. This is completely 180

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[27] Ibid.
[28] Jonathan D. Pollack, Chung Min Lee, 45.

degrees from the Workers Party of 1996 and the regime of Kim Il Sung. Additionally the two leaders have allowed exchange visits of separated families, permitted some economic cooperation, and allowed some social, cultural and sports exchanges.[29] During the 2000 summer Olympic games in Sydney, Australia the two Koreas marched as a united Korea and under the same flag during the opening ceremonies.

Kim's sunshine strategy may also provide a very destabilizing by-product and that is capitalism and a free market economy. It remains to be seen how the North Korean masses will handle their first taste of westernization. North Korea is one of the most reclusive, closed and isolated societies on the planet. They have been taught from cradle to grave that the ROK is nothing more than a puppet of the US and that capitalism is evil. How these prejudices are influenced by the information revolution may very well block South Korean initiatives or exponentially increase the speed of assimilation of western culture and values.

Of equal importance will be the reaction of the North Korean military. Under Kim Jong Il, the military has been given a greater role in North Korean society than under his father. One out of every twenty North Koreans is in uniform.[30] If the military unilaterally decides that unification will leave them out, they have the ways and means to disrupt the desired end state of a peaceful reunification.

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[29] Ibid., 51.

[30] Armed Forces Structure of North Korea, http://www.periscope.ucg.com/nations/asia/northkor/organzn/index.html, Internet accessed 5 April 2001.

CHAPTER TWO

UNIFICATION SCENARIOS

To contemplate North Korea is to stare into the abyss. There are those who argue that if North Korea fails to reform, its regime will collapse. Others retort that, on the contrary, collapse will follow directly from reform. Probably both are right.[31]

Much has been written discussing how the North will collapse and unification will take place. Overall there are four prevailing scenarios that remain valid in the year 2001. They are Integration and Peaceful Unification, Collapse and Absorption, Unification through Conflict, and Sustained Disequilibrium and Potential External Intervention.[32]

The conundrum for the US Army planner studying the potential unification scenarios and US Army roles is mind- boggling. Depending on the context in which various political, economic, and military events occur, unification could happen with little warning or it could be postponed for years. It is obvious that most academics are writing and placing considerable attention on how unification should be achieved, rather than on the process and on major problems that could arise during the process. The Army planner must envision the process, then conduct a troop to task analysis. Even more difficult to calculate are the different permutations and variations that could alter each of the scenarios. The goal in

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[31] Kongdan Oh Hassig, 126.

[32] Jonathan D. Pollack, 58.

examining and studying the contrasting unification scenarios is to understand the process of the scenarios, and the complex issues that could arise for the US Army.

Scenario One: Peaceful Integration and Negotiation

For the ROK and the four major powers (US, China, Japan, Russia), this would be the preferred unification option producing the long sought national integration without a resort to force. In order for this scenario to unfold, two assumptions must be proffered: "(1) that both governments (and public opinion in the South) will undertake profound changes in attitudes and assumptions about each other and (2) that a series of interim steps can be instituted that ultimately allow the far larger changes posted under this model."[33] Peaceful unification presumes the cessation of military threat, armed hostilities and the ability to overcome forty-eight years of hatred and bitterness. To set conditions both states would have to create and agree upon an integrated military system. Of note would be the likelihood of a unified Korea to unilaterally conduct massive force reduction, WMD destruction and come to a common understanding on the status of North Korea's extensive intercontinental ballistic missile stockpile.[34]

The 1953 Armistice agreement needs to be replaced and a permanent peace treaty established and signed. Concurrently, the future of the United Nations Command, the Combined Forces Command, and the subordinate command roles and future missions analyzed and restructured. Undoubtedly a

[33] Ibid., 73.

[34] David S. Maxwell, 31.

portion of US forces would withdraw and a new security mechanism emplaced. It is quite obvious in this scenario that agreement and compliance must be in place before, during and after unification and that agreement must be reached at all levels of both systems to create a functioning unified government.

SCENARIO TWO: COLLAPSE AND ABSORPTION

Collapse and absorption is much along the lines of an East/West Germany scenario with one glaring issue. North Korea has an extraordinary arsenal of weapons and military forces under the control of leaders in Pyongyang who may not abdicate quietly. For the Army planner this would be the hardest of all scenarios to plan for. Any loss of centralized control in the North would create a potential spectrum of conflict from stability and/or support operations to high-intensity conflict and the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). There is little doubt that US Army units would play a pivotal role in helping stabilize the peninsula, and it would be prudent to prepare for this potentiality now.

For example if the Korean People's Army (KPA) leadership fractured and left no effective central control, the North Korean military could divide into rival units, each having political and territorial control over specific areas of the country, and each with control over particular weapons systems.[35] For these reasons, a military planner could create a base operations plan that could have a dozen branches and or sequels. Each of these could require entirely different force structures to accomplish the tasks. Misidentification of the operational end

[35] "Korea's Twin Crisis," *The Economist,* February 22 and 28, 1997, 45.

state could be catastrophic in this scenario. This scenario would likely be precipitated by the regime in power failing to maintain effective social, political, economic and military control, leading to an insolvent situation creating chaos and the end of North Korea as it is now.

Currently North Korea is undergoing atrophy except in its military. If this trend reaches epidemic levels and the North Koreans finally realize they are a society of "have-nots," conditions are set for far reaching change. Crisis management for all US and ROK forces would have to immediately commence should the citizens of the North Korea decide they have had enough and force change in their government.

SCENARIO THREE: UNIFICATION AND CONFLICT

This is what all military planners and leaders dream of or fear. It has been the single focus of US and ROK forces since 1953 and quite naturally they are prepared to absorb a North Korean attack and then launch a combined counteroffensive. The current commander of US forces in Korea believes the North Koreans are at an all time high of military preparedness. "I think the threat is more serious today that it was last year when I briefed you," said US Army General Thomas A. Schwartz in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. He further explained that he sees "an enemy that is bigger, better, closer, and deadlier; he is very capable and we have got to keep our eye on him."[36] It would be safe to assume that the preponderance of General Schwartz'

[36] Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee by General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander In Chief United Nations Command/combined Forces Command and Commander, United States Forces Korea, available from http://www.korea.army.mil/pao/news/CINC, internet accessed 14 April 200l.

staff is preparing for this scenario based on his comments!

There is validity to General Schwartz's demagoguery of the DPRK. The North Koreans maintain a standing army of more than one million soldiers. Current published North Korean objectives are: (1) maintain the military capabilities needed to achieve strategic and operational surprise in wartime and to sustain strategic momentum so that breakthrough operations can be successfully concluded before arrival of major US reinforcements; (2) utilize massive firepower against CFC forces through its artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and surface to surface missiles; (3) isolate Seoul and capture all air and naval facilities capable of supporting US reinforcement and re-supply efforts; (4) neutralize ROK and US air power; and (5) foster widespread internal confusion and panic in the population of the South, thereby creating domestic pressures in the ROK for a settlement on terms advantageous to the DPRK.[37]

It is little wonder that General Schwartz is entirely justified in using such strong rhetoric when stating North Korea's strengths, intentions and capabilities to members of congress, when a potential adversary has such blatant and overt military goals. An issue that should be addressed by congress to General Schwartz is how US forces will facilitate a reunification if conflict does occur? However, research indicates little training is occurring on the peninsula by US and ROK forces to facilitate or react to a peaceful reunification.

The most drastic and real danger in this scenario would be the option of North Korea using WMD capabilities. If Pyongyang were to assume that the

[37]Jonathan D. Pollack, Young Koo Cha, "A New Alliance for the Next Century," (RAND, 1996), 17.

operational center of gravity were the airports and seaports, rather than Seoul, the rationalization for the employment of WMD would be critical to the North's campaign plan.

In order to bring this scenario to fruition, the North would invariably compromise surprise, due to the US/ROK intelligence gathering capability embedded on the peninsula and through strategic assets. Examples or indicators would be: increased training frequency for spearhead units, employment of special operating forces, increased activities around missile sites, activation of reserves, and increased military traffic south of Pyongyang. Nonetheless, execution of this war plan by North Korea would mean extraordinary risk is being accepted by the regime in power. What matters are the calculations of Kim Jong Il and his personal assessment of gains, risks, and consequences.[38] As history proves, war is not always rational and those in power who initiate full-scale war are the antithesis of rationality. For this North Korea and Kim Jong Il fit the mold. The leader of a country of which 250,000 of his people starved to death in 2000, yet still puts thirty-three percent of his gross national product into his military cannot be rational.[39]

SCENARIO FOUR: DISEQUILIBRIUM AND POTENTIAL FOR EXTERNAL INTERVENTION

The possible paths to Korean unification are highly varied and potentially

[38] Institute for Strategic Studies: "The Military Balance," 1998-1999, (London, UK, Oxford University Press, 1999), 183.

[39] Stratfor, "How Korea's New Railroad will Change Northeast Asia," available from http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu2000/080100.asp, Internet; accessed 5 April 2000.

discontinuous. Even among the three scenarios reviewed so far, variations could produce different outcomes. No matter the path to unification, the US Army planner should not be taken completely by surprise. However, the fourth scenario, characterized by prolonged disequilibrium, but absent of chaos or collapse, could be extremely difficult and challenging for the US Army.[40] A likely case would be the collapse of the Kim Jong Il regime, but is replaced by a regime unable to provide for its citizens, resulting in an impending humanitarian disaster on the horizon. It would be tremendously difficult for the US and ROK to establish diplomatic ties, with a weak, but not failing DPRK. Numerous gray areas are now prevalent that the Army planner must synthesize to predict possible outcomes and potentials for involvement by the US Army. If the US/ROK were to not intervene, China might appropriately provide military, political, and economic assistance to its neighbor.

This scenario would be difficult to gauge the precise moment when outside countries may wish to intervene, with the challenge being to determine "ground truth" conditions inside North Korea. This scenario could have far-fetched alternatives such as trilateral employment of forces by the US, ROK, and China to prevent or alleviate a humanitarian crisis. For the military planner defining end state would be difficult at best. With NCA guidance that could be as potentially ambiguous as that issued by then President George Bush in December of 1992, when he deployed US forces to Somalia to "stop the dying."[41]

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[40] Jonathan D. Pollack, Chung Min Lee, 16.

[41] During November 1992, then President George Bush and his wife, watched a TV newscast showing starving Somali children in Mogadishu, Somalia. The graphic scenes caused the Bush

This scenario would provide a unique challenge in command and control, areas of operations, air space control measures, and repatriation of refugees.

Since 1950 both North and South Korea have been attempting to reunite the peninsula. So far they have failed because their political and economic systems are, or more precisely, were diametrically opposed. Both want unification, but only under their own terms. Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Sung Il are making overtures towards a peaceful unification, but when the veneer is sanded away, neither side is willing to give up their own system so real unification cannot occur until one side concedes or collapses. There is little doubt that reunification will occur, but it is hard to predict when it will happen. On 11 December 1996, while testifying before the Senate Intelligence Committee, the outgoing director of the CIA, John Deutch, said that "within the next two or three years, North Korea will either make war, make peace, or implode."[42] Although it is possible that the status quo will remain for sometime, it is likely that within the next few years there will be some amorphous form of rapid change diminishing the status quo and Mr. Deutch will finally be correct in his statement.

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administration to conduct a unilateral humanitarian mission to Somalia in December 1992, with the intent of "stop the dying."

[42] Ming Lu, "An Obsessed Task: Prospects, Models, and Impact of Korean Unification," *East Asia International Quarterly,* (Brunswick, 17, 4 Winter 1999), 36.

CHAPTER THREE

STRATEGIC INTERESTS OF THE FOUR MAJOR POWERS

The Korean Peninsula is at the heart of northeast Asia and its strategic importance is obvious. To control the peninsula is to tightly grasp hold of northeast Asia.[43]

The Korean Peninsula is the only region in the world where the security interests of four major powers; the United States, Russia, China, and Japan intersects.[44] All four major powers are acutely aware of the possibility of destabilizing change in the North, each sharing a common interest in maintaining stability and peace. However, all four of the powers' interests and potential response options to chaos on the peninsula vary uniquely and warrant discussion.

JAPAN

Japan is the pivotal US ally in the region. Of all the countries in the region, Japan likely fears a reunified Korea more than any other. A reunified Korea with its military capability and economic potential would quite undoubtedly create fear for the Japanese, due to past grievances and a belief of retribution on Korea's part. Therefore it is no surprise that strategically Japan needs stability in the region to sustain and create economic prosperity.

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[43] Editorial from the Peoples Liberation Army, 10 July 2000.

[44] Stratfor, 36.

As of March 2001, Japan has not publicly stated its position on whether its interests would be better served by a unified Korea; this is done in order to avoid the appearance of interfering in Korean affairs.[45] Japan speaks openly about the potential use and development of WMD and intercontinental ballistic missiles, occurring in North Korea. While the US is focused on the spread of WMD, Japan is focused on the production, because of their proximity to North Korea and the North's ability to deliver WMD on Japanese soil. The fixation on WMD will also carry over to reunification. Stability is the key to Japan's future and they will want positive proof of the disposal of the North's WMD arsenal and production facilities.

The Japanese government has been adept at manipulating the real and perceived DPRK WMD threat to increase its military spending and strengthen its US alliance. The 1997 revised *Guidelines for US/Japan Defense Cooperation* created the foundation for more effective and credible US/Japan cooperation in the event of an "armed attack on Japan and in situations in areas around Japan."[46] Japan/US bi-lateral security cooperation has also encompassed joint research and development on the theater missile defense systems.

During the late 1990s Japan has provided humanitarian aid and economic assistance to North Korea in a spirit of friendship to promote stability. Japan has always sought a relationship with Korea(s) that works to Japan's security advantage in the region; additionally Japan has always seen Korean policy

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[45] Henry D. Sokolski, "Planning For A Peaceful Korea," (Carlisle, PA: The US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, February 2001), 183.

[46] Ibid., 187.

embedded or congruent inside the larger context of the region's balance of power.[47] What has changed is the mode by which Japan has sought these objectives. In the past, this was based on unilateral military domination of the peninsula; today it is based on alignment and cooperation between the United States, Japan, and the two Koreas. Japan is not prejudiced against unification, but in the future will influence conditions that work to their advantage in the regional distribution of power. This is exactly the reason Tokyo has allowed economic and humanitarian aid to the DPRK, in order to shape a stable unification direction that will benefit Japan. Conversely, Japan will seek more political and military cooperation with the ROK, because in the long term they realize Korea will be unified and their assistance will be immediately needed. Japan could then expand markets and conduct an economic exploitation. There has even been speculation of building an undersea railroad tunnel from Korea to Japan.[48] Japan has indeed a very realistic perspective in physical security in the region and economic fiscal security for its people.

Russia

Russia still aspires to restore much of its previous history as a superpower, but the Kremlin's capacity to shape events on the Korean peninsula has been markedly curtailed. The disintegration of Russia's military and presence in East Asia has greatly reduced the country's stature and capabilities. Russia is simply not able to compete in the military, economic or political

[47] David S. Maxwell, 22.

[48] Ming Lu

discourse now taking place on the peninsula. However, it is still important to determine whether and how Russia could be credibly involved in future peninsula crises and outcomes.

Unlike the 1961 Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, signed by the then Soviet Union and North Korea, a new treaty was initiated in March 1999 which commits Russia to "consultations" with the North in the event of crisis. However, the new treaty fails to obligate Russia to automatic military involvement.[49] With the new treaty in place, it becomes apparent that Russia realizes their ability to power-project military force into the region is minimal. Instead, its primary long-term objective is most likely the improvement of its domestic economy by expanding export markets and exploiting its natural resources. A stable northeast Asia would be the closest and largest venue to market Russian products and resources.

Russia stands to benefit if it can engage Korea and Japan as trade partners. Equally important would be the ability to attract investment dollars from Japan and Korea to develop and exploit natural resources, especially in Siberia. If the Koreans were to reconcile, it is possible a Trans-Siberian railroad could be developed, that could be linked to the peninsula as well as provide low-cost economic potential.[50] Another by-product of unification would be the opening of interstate highways that could be exploited by Russia as well as China.

Russian leadership recognized as early as 1994 that they must have a

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[49] Stephen J. Banks, "The New Russia in the New Asia, (Carlisle, PA: The US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Jully 22, 2000), 13.

[50] Stratfor.

sound economic strategy to secure their future. Viktor Chernmychin said "the gateway to the Asian, if not the world, economies is through the Far East, and failure to stake an economic claim there is likely to prevent Russia from regaining super power status".[51] The current Russian president, Vladimir Putin made his first official head of state visit to none other than North Korea.[52] Besides paying court to the DPRK, Putin has appreciably enlarged its political and economic links with South Korea; however Russia still remains the weakest political and economic player of the four powers involved.

A future Russian military role that could be possible would be one as a supporting contributor of forces to stabilize the North should it collapse. A US Army planner could use as a valid assumption that there are still some old Soviet/NKPA ties that remain and could be used as a fulcrum to allow the entry of a combined ROK/US/Russian force into a collapsing DPRK. Is this an unlikely scenario? Perhaps not since two Russian and one American officer published an article in the Journal of Slavic Military Studies in 1994 which discussed a future United Nations peace operation in a fictional scenario in northeast Asia, where regionally stability is endangered. The map in the article looks amazingly similar to the Korean Peninsula.[53] This fictional US/ROK/Russian mission is even more valid today because of the numerous Partnership for Peace exercises that have

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[51] Henry D. Sokolski, 94

[52] Stratfor.

[53] A.V. Demunenko, V. K. Kolpanov, and Timothy L. Thomas, "Peacekeeping: A Joint Russian-US Operational Scenario," *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies,* Volume 7, Number 3, September 1994, 522.

been conducted between Russia and the US. Should a peacekeeping situation become apparent in a collapsing DPRK, the US Army planner should take into consideration a Russian force for employment in the area of operations.

China

Of all the powers in the region, China has the most at stake in the status quo on the peninsula. A recent PLA article stated: The Korean Peninsula is at the heart of northeast Asia and its strategic importance is obvious, to control the peninsula is to tightly grasp hold of northeast Asia.[54] A unified Korea would leave China an 800-mile contiguous assailable flank, one with a competing ideological and social system. This would be a trifecta of security issues along Beijing's border: Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam. Coupled with internal ethnic strife, this will cause a heightened security posture and a potentially volatile situation, both politically and militarily.

Historically, China has always maintained good relations with Korea and they believe a unified Korea will be a willing ally that would be cooperative in both the diplomatic and economic arena. In the long-term, China is uneasy about potential threats to its interests from a unified Korea. Economically, Beijing is wary of cooperation from a consolidated economic powerhouse with the potential to become an economic dynasty. China continues to expand its economic and political ties with the ROK. As of April 2000 the two-way trade between the countries is estimated at twenty-five to thirty billion dollars, with China being the

[54] Henry D. Sokolski, 215.

ROK's third largest trading partner.[55] Politically, China worries about the form of government that would be installed along their common 800-mile border and the potential for political spillover. This would be especially true if the two countries started a cross-cultural exchange of college students.[56] For the present China continues to adhere to its policy of not interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.

For the US Army planner China is a complexity to an exponential degree. The prospect of a reunified Korea with a potential nuclear capability, and a still visible and perceived hegemonic US presence would cause great apprehension to the political and military leadership of China. History has often shown that states with long contiguous borders often lapse into competition driven by security fears! The US relationship with China is truly ambiguous and the situation as of April 2000 continues to erode.[57]

Adding to the military planner's frustrations when addressing China is their flippant attitude toward the DPRK. Prior to the 1990s, Beijing and Pyongyang were strong allies, with China being a major supplier of essentially free military and economic aid. This relationship ebbed with North Korea during the mid

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[55] Jonathan D. Pollack, Chung Min Lee, 37.

[56] Protests by ROK university students are an accepted practice to voice disgruntlement with national, political and economic issues. Chinese students tried this method in Beijing 1989 and their demonstration was crushed by the PRC and is now called the Tianeman Square Massacre.

[57] Political relations between the China/US governments have been stretched thin because of the issue of Taiwan's independence, the accidental US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia in 1999 and the 3 April 2001mid-air collision between a PRC jet fighter and US P-3 surveillance aircraft off the coast of China in international airspace.

1990's. However, in June of 2000, Kim Jong Il made a historic visit to Beijing. This thaw in relationship resulted in a marked increase in humanitarian assistance, sale of raw materials and economic investment. China realizes the untapped potential of the synergy of the two Koreas if united and has built relationships with each.

It remains to be answered if China would allow a coalition to permissively enter the DPRK should the Kim Jong Il regime need assistance and would they want to be part of the coalition and offer military and economic aid to help stabilize the situation. Conversely are the Chinese willing to invade the North in order to establish a Chinese surrogate leader in Pyongyang? This is the conundrum found by an Army planner in 2001. China will be a power to be reckoned with and the United States has only cultivated one instrument of power, that being economic. If North Korea were to implode today, US envoys seeking Chinese assistance would repeat ancient history.

The US/China situation is analogous to what Thucydides recorded in 435 B.C. when delegates from Corcyra approached the Athenians; two people with no history of alliance or friendship:

> We come to ask you for help, but cannot claim that this help is due to us because of any great services we have done to you in the past or on the basis of any existing alliance. We therefore convince you first that by giving us this help you will be acting in your own interest, or certainly not against your own interests; and then we must show that our gratitude can be depended on."[58]

[58] Thucydides, "History of the Peloponnesian War," trans. by Rex Warner (Penquin Books, Harmondsworth,England. 1972 Book One: 32), 54.

It is as if Thucydides is writing about the current United States and Chinese relationship.

UNITED STATES

According to the December 2000 National Security Strategy the US "seeks a peaceful resolution of the Korean conflict with a democratic, non-nuclear, reunified peninsula that will enhance peace and security in the East Asian region".[59] The US strongly relies upon allies and friends in the region who all share the same common goals that would allow regional stability. The US, ROK, and Japan are all committed to a three-pillared concept for security. These pillars are: promoting democracy and human rights, advancing economic integration and rules based trade, and enhancing security. [60]

The US security strategy in the region has the following priorities: deterring aggression and promoting peaceful resolution of crisis; promoting access to and the security of sea lines of communication in cooperation with our allies and partners and actively promoting nonproliferation goals.[61] Notice the number one priority is deterring aggression! On the Korean peninsula the US Army is responsible for the preponderance of the deterrence mission and accomplishes this by having a highly trained force capable of executing its wartime mission. This will be of interest and discussion later in the monograph as SASO is contemplated on the Korean Peninsula.

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[59] A National Security Strategy for A Global Age, (US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, December 2000), 49.

[60] Ibid., 48.

[61] Ibid., 49.

During the late 1990's the Clinton administration and the Kim Jong Il regime established remarkably close diplomatic ties. In October of 2000, then Secretary of State Madeline Albright conducted an official state visit to the DPRK under the auspices of arranging the first ever visit of a US president to North Korea. However, this did not come to fruition in the final weeks of Mr. Clinton's term. Under President Clinton the US used an engagement strategy towards Pyongyang, designed to curtail WMD and long-range missile development, as well as the exportation of weapons and technology. Additionally, in 1994, the US, ROK, and Japan signed an agreement to help North Korea build nuclear reactors in order to alleviate severe power shortages in the country and of course the reactors would not be capable of producing the plutonium isotope used in nuclear weapons production. The DPRK leadership was frankly using extortion on the world in order to feed and power their country and the Clinton administration was willing to call this "engagement."

This has all changed with the newly elected Bush administration. A high-ranking administration official said in March 2000, "North Korea is Washington's number 1 enemy in the pacific region and has to prove otherwise with its actions."[62] Earlier that month, President Bush told South Korean President, Kim Dae Jung, that he harbored "some skepticism" about the DPRK and said the US would not immediately resume talks with the North on their missile program.[63]

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[62] From *Korea Herald*, March 22, 2001 – "U.S. Pacific Military Commander Labels North Korea No. 1 Enemy

[63] Christopher Marquis, "Experts Urge Bush to Resume North Korean Talks," *New York Times*, March 27, 2001, available from http://www,ebird.dtic.mil/mar2001/: Internet accessed 27 Mar 01.

What the Bush administration wants is quantifiable action from the North that it is reducing its conventional weapons and forces. When this occurs, the DPRK will not be perceived as such an overt threat to stability in the region.

On 27 March 2001, US General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander in Chief United Nations Command/Combined Forced Command and Commander, US Forces Korea told the Senate Armed Services Committee:

> "Training levels over the past two years have been record breaking, with the focus on improving the readiness of major offensive forces. Immediately following the June 2000 summit, the North Korean Peoples Army training cycle in the summer of 2000 was the most extensive ever recorded. It was preceded by the most ambitious winter training cycle of the past ten years High levels of training continue as we speak to you today."[64]

North Korea's recent plunge into diplomatic and economic outreach to the rest of the world is encouraging; and most of the world wants to believe Kim Jong Il is the next "Sam Walton" of northeast Asia. From January to March 2001, the countries of Greece, Brazil, Luxembourg, Germany, Spain, Canada, Netherlands and the United Kingdom established diplomatic relations with North Korea.[65] Change is occurring rapidly on the diplomatic and economic fronts to embrace the new North Korea. But militarily the US is still poised for high intensity conflict on the peninsula. As the speed of change collides with juche a process of compressed change could easily result in abrupt unification. This is an event that the US political leaders, and especially military leaders, should dissect and allocate planning for.

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[64] Thomas A. Schwartz.

[65] Statement by MOFAT Spokesman, available from http://www.mofat.go.kf/web/press.nsi/, Internet accessed 23 Apr 01.

CHAPTER FOUR

OPERATIONAL END STATES

Educate officers at the graduate level in military art and science in order to produce leaders with the flexibility to solve complex problems in peace, conflict and war.[66]

If the US Army planners in the Eighth Army G-3 section were to report to work tomorrow and the Kim Jong Il regime were to have collapsed, would those planners and the soldiers be prepared to conduct an immediate post-hostilities phase of a campaign? Or could this be a feasible mission? The answer to both these questions will be discussed in this chapter.

Imagine the G-3 planner on the Eighth Army Staff receiving a real time news report from vicinity Panmunjom that reads as follows:

> In the last forty-eight hours the regime of Chairman Kim Jong Il has completely unraveled and at 6 a.m. today the ruler of the fourth largest and quite possibly the most lethal and dangerous Army in the world committed suicide. North Korea has been in the midst of a humanitarian crisis of biblical proportions due to a prolonged severe drought and an outbreak of the deadly West Nile flu virus. The DPRK has admitted fifteen to twenty percent of its population dead or severely ill and malnourished. In recent days thousands of North Koreans, to include members of the NKPA, have attempted to flee North Korea into China and the ROK. China immediately sealed its border and it has been reported that gunfire has erupted between the PLA and members of the NKPA. The UNHCR reports at least 25,000 refugees in camps along the Chinese border, many of them women and infants. The weather forecast is for snow and thirty mph winds pushing the wind chill into the single digits. It is estimated that one North Korean is dying every five minutes in these camps. China refuses to allow reporters or NGOs into North Korea. Here at Panmunjom almost 50,000 North Koreans and members of the NKPA, to include soldiers driving BMP-2s and T-62s with their turrets

[66] Mission of the School of Advanced Military Studies

> reversed have poured into theSouth along the newly constructed Seoul-Sinuiju railway and Munsan-Kaesong highway which traverses the DMZ.. ROK President Kim Dae Jong has unilaterally activated the country's 350,000 man military reserve to assist in this crisis. On the diplomatic front, the Chinese issued a declaration that if US or ROK forces cross onto the soil of their sovereign brother (North Korea), they will move to secure Pyongyang. There are confirmed reports of one field army on the border between China and the DPRK and another field army crossing the Yalu river.An emergency meeting of the UN Security Council is currently underway to determine options to relieve suffering and provide stability to the government of North Korea. No one admits to knowing who is in charge of the DPRK, NKPA and the vast arsenals of ICBM equipment to deliver chemical and biological agents.

Although fictional, the above scenario provides for a point of departure to discuss a potential support or stability operation. This fictional training driver will be compared to the on the ground US forces and the missions they are currently prepared for.

It is obvious that changing events will undoubtedly create problems of enormous complexity that may have never occurred before. The answer to these complex issues will absolutely require a mix of Eighth Army capabilities that are not in country and some of these capabilities are in the National Guard and Reserve.

Some issues the planner must address would be: new rules of engagement and the myriad of missions that could occur with finding and dismantling the DPRKs WMD arsenal. All of these challenges beg the need for the Army to be prepared for a much wider array of contingencies; such as the fictional scenario above.

Likely strategic end states based on the 2000 NSS would be a non-nuclear peninsula, a reunified Korea without causing another Asia financial crisis,

continued economic access to the region, and continued political influence throughout the region. The US Army planner may then be able to perceive or develop operational end states. Operational end states that would need to be met are: 1) establishment of security and stability (2) humanitarian relief operations (3) security of WMD research, production, storage, and delivery sites. Once the crucial operational end states are approved, a troop to task analysis would need to occur. Additionally, a training assessment of Eighth Army's soldier's ability to execute these tasks would be necessary.

ESTABLISHMENT OF SECURITY AND STABILITY

This must be initiated first and as rapidly as possible to set conditions for the orderly flow of humanitarian relief supplies. The Eighth Army in conjunction with ROK forces have the forces on the peninsula to move and provide order on the major crossing sites between North and South Korea, vicinity the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The US has in place at the DMZ a battalion sized element called the Joint Security Area battalion, additionally the ROK Army has 560,000 soldiers in fifty divisions.[67]

The coalition would have to asses China's intent and likely participation, to include a Chinese area of operation. As a planning assumption, the introduction of coalition forces onto North Korean soil would initially be ROK only in conjunction with PLA forces. These forces could move into the country to

[67] Moo Boong Ryoo, *The Republic of Korea Army's Role in the Process of Unification,* (Fort Leavenworth, KS, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2000). 38-40.

reestablish law and order. The environment must be stabilized to allow the other operational end states to be met.

HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS

This will be the most visible operational end state. The world will be watching the progress, timeliness, and efficiency of the conduct of humanitarian assistance. The plight of refugees are the news agency's high-payoff target and the sooner the coalition begins the assistance to the population, the quicker the success can be exploited to the world alleviating any potential economic crisis. As a precursor to expected refugee related problems, the United Nations has uncharacteristically seized the initiative and agreed to establish a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Liaison Office in Seoul.[68]The office is currently scheduled to open in June 2001. Experience tells the Army planner that large-scale relief operations must be conducted simultaneously with the establishment of security and stability. By pacifying the civil population, the political outbreak of civil strife is curbed. Furthermore, by moving assistance to the regional population centers, or in this scenario the provinces, the desire for displacement of personnel is negated. Coupled with a psychological operation of "stay put" will allow for unfettered access to the interior of North Korea.[69] The Army planner must also consider accomplishing this end state by the rapid establishment of a joint and coalition Civil Military Operations Center. This would facilitate

[68] Statement by MOFAT spokesman

[69] David S. Maxwell, 34.

cooperation between the coalition, non-government agencies, private voluntary organizations, and the UNHCR.

Many of the Army personnel trained to staff and operate a CMOC reside in the Reserve and National Guard. In order to use these very important units, a Presidential Selection Reserve Call-up must be signed by the president. The units are then mobilized and deployed into the theater. As expected, this takes time; time that the planner may not have. If the Eighth Army chose to train and staff for a humanitarian crisis, it would severely degrade its combat capability. General Schwartz said:

> We are manned at about thirty-four percent of our wartime staff requirements. In addition, new mission areas such as force production, information assurance, information operations, and critical infrastructure protections are being established without any authorized billets. We cannot continue to handle new requirements without the manpower to do the job. This must change. Korea cannot go on at the thirty-four percent manning level.[70]

If the scenario used in this chapter were to become true, the Eighth Army would be expected to move rapidly and efficiently into the ever-crucial post-hostilities phase.

SECURITY OF WMD RESEARCH, PRODUCTION, STORAGE AND DELIVERY SITES

Two crucial issues must be addressed by the planner for this operational end state to be satisfactorily met. First what level of US involvement would the Japanese government demand in the cordoning, safeguarding, and dismantling

[70] General Thomas A. Schwartz.

of the WMD infrastructure. Research indicates this is the single most important factor to the Japanese government and citizens. Japan feels that a Korea with its WMD arsenal intact or, worse yet, uncontrolled, will eventually be used on mainland Japan in retribution for past grievances. Secondly, the control over and disposition of WMD assets is not necessarily an Army/ROK or PLA responsibility. It is conceivable that a "wide array of unprecedented, bilateral, and multilateral relationships may have to be diplomatically agreed upon by the four major powers and the International Atomic Energy Association.[71] However the Army planner will not have the leverage of waiting for these agreements to be reached, plans must be developed today in order to secure success tomorrow.

[71] Jonathan D. Pollack and Chung Min Lee, 95.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

> *We have been telling the USFK to get out all this time, but. . . the United States must first change its own thinking. . . . The United States must itself figure out the USFK problem and make a bold decision that should substantially assist the unification of the Korean people.*[72]

Not withstanding periodic military actions taken by the DPRK across the DMZ into South Korea, peace has been maintained on the peninsula for almost five decades. North Korea's increasing vulnerabilities and flirtations with capitalism create conditions for major change in the not to distant future. Though impossible to predict the timing and magnitude of such a change, it will create major strategic and operational consequences for the United States Army.[73] This will be further exacerbated if North Korea were to experience an internal collapse and the Eighth US Army be ordered by the National Command Authority to commence crisis action planning to execute the post-hostilities phase of its campaign plan.

The difficulty in planning post-hostilities is commensurate with the difficulty of training to execute post-hostilities. Eighth Army in Korea simply lacks the staff and command guidance on training for support or stability operations. All training in Korea by the US Army is based on the real "go to war" plan. Korea is the only

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[72] Harry D. Sokolski, 69.

[73] Jonathan D. Pollack and Chung Min Lee, 95.

theater in the world where real war plans drive all exercises.[74] This mind set or command philosophy coupled with the "fifty years of presence in Korea. . one year at a time," allows no flexibility to consider joint or coalition training to execute a support or stability operation should the need arise. The "need" may be in the next month or next year and when it does occur the flexibility of alert/train/deploy, that continental based Army divisions use is invalid.

During US Army involvement in past support or stability operations such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti or Macendonia, the deploying units have been allowed the luxury of time to train in skills that lead to successful accomplishment of the mission. Retired US Army General Crouch, the former commander of the mission in Bosnia said, "even a quality, conventionally trained force needs at least three weeks of training before being placed into a support or stability operation."[75] The US Army in Korea cannot afford three weeks when North Korea does collapse as it may occur very rapidly.

The US Army planner in time of peace must have the ability to develop flexible plans in support of post-hostilities and articulate them and the complexities described in this monograph to his superiors. Granted the Eighth Army forces in Korea must know their war plan in order to deter North Korea, it may be time to prepare for a joint, combined coalition to conduct a support or stability operation into North Korea.

Establishing closer linkages and lines of communication with China,

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[74] General Thomas A. Schwartz.

[75] Dinner conversation by the author with Retired US Army General Crouch on 27 April 2001.

including military to military contact, should be identified as a number one priority to determine the mindset of our potential coalition partner. Due to the growing possibility of instability and all of the major powers responses, it is critical that some form of communication and intent is in place before crisis erupts on the peninsula.[76] Without such means of communication, there is incentive for unilateral action on all sides with possible irreversible consequences.

[76] Jonathan D. Pollack and Chung Min Lee, 95.

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