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MILITARY INTERVENTION IN IDENTITY GROUP CONFLICTS

by

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December 2000

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This thesis studies military intervention in identity group conflicts. Building on the concepts of conflict entrepreneurship, I argue that military commanders must coopt, confront, accommodate or compete with existing identity groups to be successful during intervention operations. I argue that the local military commander is relatively autonomous and therefore can and should aid the community in rebuilding durable, long-term institutions such as police, judiciary and local councils in areas torn by identity group conflicts.

Israel's 1982 intervention in Lebanon, Operation Peace for Galilee, and the United State's intervention in Somalia, Operation Restore Hope, are used to highlight the common elements of intervention and the types of activities that encourage and discourage cooperation with the intervention force. The paradox of intervention is that it often solves a short-term problem at the same time it spawns a new threat. This arises in part from the effect of the intervention on the political economy of the target society.

The activities of local commanders in Lebanon are assessed based on the historical record and documentary evidence. The activities of commanders on the ground in Somalia are analyzed based on a number of personal interviews, a compilation of unpublished Lessons Learned and the unpublished history of the Marines in Somalia by Captain David Dawson. I argue that the official "lessons learned" are inaccurate and suggest a set of Lessons (Un)Learned that are both accurate and useful in planning and conducting intervention operations.

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MILITARY INTERVENTION IN IDENTITY GROUP CONFLICTS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Military intervention in identity group conflicts is a complex task. The term "military intervention" implies that an external power is taking a role in another party's conflict. The conflicts under consideration in this study are those in which the identity of the players is perceived to be under attack or being redefined in some way that threatens the power structure of the society affected. The post-Cold War era has loosened the restraints on third-party intervention. The Pax Americana, whether real or imagined, in the guise of economic globalization, free market capitalism or the third wave of democratization has put increased pressure on many identity groups to redefine who "we" are and who "they" might be. In combination, the loosening of restraint on the great powers and the rising insecurity felt by marginalized players create an environment in which the probability of military intervention is increased.

The central proposition for this study is that during intervention operations military commanders must choose to confront, coopt, accommodate or compete with the existing identity groups, and that how they do so is one of the critical factors that determines the level of mission success achievable. Good choices result in sustained cooperation from the majority of the populace and the local notables. Bad choices result in non-cooperation at best and active armed opposition at worst.

Mid-level commanders face a paradox. The problems they are called upon to solve are persistent and systemic while the solutions and forces allocated are limited in duration and scope. This study will not solve the paradox, but it will clarify the issues involved and offer a few tools for mid-level commanders to consider in negotiating their own solutions.

This analysis aggregates a variety of personal interviews, unpublished after-action reports and an unpublished detailed history of the Marines in Somalia. Military commanders from platoon commanders and company commanders to the general officer level offered their personal insights in lengthy and thoughtful interviews conducted during the summer of 2000. The unpublished after-action reports were written by members of Task Force Mogadishu during March of 1993 and have an immediacy and relevance that personal interviews conducted years later sometimes lack. The unpublished history written by Captain David Dawson in 1993, *The U.S. Marines In Somalia: With Marine Forces, Somalia During Operation Restore Hope,* relies on personal interviews he conducted at the time, his field historian notes and the voluminous administrative message traffic that the modern military machine produces. Taken together, these sources present a cogent picture of Operation Restore Hope that has been obscured by the fatal debacle in October of 1993.

Three basic premises undergird the conceptual framework for the intervention operational environment.

- Military intervention in another country requires institution-building operations to be efficacious.
- Military forces engaged in institution-building operations change the political economy/power structures within the target country.
- National authorities are unable or unwilling to anticipate or specify a desired "coalitional end-state" thus providing the operational space for autonomous actions by local military commanders.

These premises are validated in the comparative case studies of the Israeli intervention in Lebanon in 1982 and the United States intervention in Somalia in 1992.

The degree and nature of the local military commander's autonomy is highlighted in both Lebanon, where the proximity and self-interest of Israel might have indicated

more detailed control of commanders in the field and in Somalia where the intense media interest might have made a difference. This analysis shows that local military commanders, acting as autonomous players, significantly affected the degree of cooperation they received from the local population. Success or failure in local institution-building operations was contingent on the choices the local commander made to work with the competing identity groups and not on the magnitude of the forces deployed

I assert that the "lessons learned" from Somalia specifically and from both cases more generally are highly flawed. The real Lessons (Un)Learned are that during intervention operations military commanders should:

- Establish a pervasive security presence.
- Build a participatory process to work with local leaders.
- Institute the Rule of Law (and be bound by it).
- Utilize civic action programs as part of force protection.

These lessons suggest that the fortress mentality fostered by a justified concern for force protection is counter-productive. Additionally, this analysis indicates that it is just as important to train military commanders in institution-building skills, as it is to ensure that each Marine and soldier is highly trained in their individual combat tasks.

This study challenges the military commander involved in the next intervention to look beyond the conventional wisdom and use civic action and institution-building as standard tools of force protection and mission accomplishment. Military commanders must act for the long-term even when they believe they will only be in a particular area for a short time. It does not take a long time or an overwhelming armored force to make a difference.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States military has been tasked with "nation-building" operations where the U.S. national interests involved are peripheral. Most "nation-building" intervention operations have taken place under the banner of other missions, such as peacekeeping, peacemaking, war termination and civil action programs.[1] These operations often reflect well-meaning intentions "to make things better" with only the vaguest notions of the specific actions that will be required. Mid-level commanders face a paradox. The problems they are called upon to solve are persistent and systemic while the solutions and forces allocated are limited in duration and scope. This study will not solve the paradox. This study will clarify the issues involved and offer a few tools for mid-level commanders to use in negotiating their own solutions.

The central proposition for this study is that during intervention operations military commanders must choose to confront, coopt, accommodate or compete with the existing identity groups, and that this is one of the critical factors that determines the level of mission success achievable. Good choices result in sustained cooperation from the majority of the populace and the local notables. Bad choices result in non-cooperation at best and active armed opposition at worst. The proposition is not sufficient, because a commander could choose the correct groups and means of interaction and the outcome could still be skewed by actions from higher authority or subordinates. The proposition is necessary to the degree that the interactions of

[1] For this study, "institution-building" is used instead of "nation-building" as it encompasses activities down to the village level.

commanders with the competing identity groups can determine the degree of cooperation that is attained.

The level of interaction under investigation is between the local community and the company and battalion commanders of the intervention force. There is a substantial body of literature devoted to the strategic level of operations other than war that focuses on the National Command Authority, the role of Ambassadors and the highest military commanders in theater. A large portion of this literature focuses on whether or not the United States should get involved in institution-building operations. For those who do not believe the United States should intervene, the discussion is finished. For those who believe the United States should get involved, the literature focuses on how resources should be allocated and what command relationships vis-à-vis the United Nations should be utilized. The other extreme is the U.S. Army's doctrinal publications regarding institution-building operations. U.S. Army publications focus on logistics at the unit level and cultural sensitivity training at the individual soldier level. The cultural training advocated can be summarized by the Golden Rule: "Do unto others as you would have done unto you." There is a dangerous lack of literature devoted to what might confront the commander at the village or township level as he makes decisions about and interacts with local leaders. This study fills the gap between the two extremes of national policy and individual training.

According to Karin von Hippel, "Between 1990 and 1996, the world has witnessed a total of ninety-eight armed conflicts; of these only seven were between states, the rest were domestic."[2] The causes of the domestic conflicts include refugee flows, the

[2] Karin von Hippel, *Democracy By Force*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 3.

breakdown of civil society, the inability of the government to provide services and the breakdown of authority. In *Minorities at Risk*, Ted Gurr asserts, "ethnic and religious minorities and subordinate majorities... are contesting the terms of their incorporation into 'the world order'."[3] In the absence of strong effective government, or more broadly, whenever the status quo is in flux, people will fall back on their basic identity group. Shared membership, ethnicity, religious affiliation, or a combination of those factors commonly defines the basic identity group.

There is strong evidence that the causes of these conflicts will worsen in the Middle East and Africa. Rural to urban migration is projected to increase during the next decade and beyond. Modernization and increasing globalization create the impetus for people to leave subsistence agriculture for more lucrative employment in the cities. Many Middle Eastern and African states have implemented land reform and industrialization policies, which increase pressure on rural populations to migrate. Once in the city, governments often cannot provide the social services required to assimilate, house or feed the new urban migrant. The governments are often hamstrung by International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment policies that are beneficial for the long-term economy of the state, but may be detrimental in the short-term. The IMF structural adjustment programs require governments to cut spending, reducing the state's ability to provide social services. The states at risk often lack popular support or legitimacy derived from the will of the people. The failure to provide social services exacerbates the disassociation of the people from the government creating fertile ground for revolution, civil war or third party intervention. Refugee flows demand more services

[3] Ted Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993, 1.

from an already overwhelmed government making state disintegration all the more likely.[4] The litany of countries that have followed a variation of this pattern include Iran, Algeria, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Congo-Brazzaville. The countries currently at risk include Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Eritrea, and Zimbabwe.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has sent troops into Panama, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo with the stated or implied mission of conducting "nation-building" operations. The impetus for these missions is often the CNN-effect and domestic support to "Do Something." With no peer competitor, the United States will most likely continue to get involved where its interests are peripheral rather than vital. The proliferation of media outlets, increasing visibility of foreign troubles and the lack of a significant military challenger heightens the probability of future U.S. involvement.[5]

A. PARADOX OF MILITARY INTERVENTION

In the Post-Cold War world, the paradox of military intervention is that it most often exacerbates the long-term problems it is supposed to resolve. Military action usually appears to succeed in resolving the short-term problem. Unfortunately, the resolution of one problem generates another problem-set that the military intervention may worsen over time. Is this paradox true of all military interventions in the affairs of another state? The preliminary evidence suggests that in most situations, military

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[4] Colin Kahl, *States, Scarcity and Civil Strife in the Developing World,* Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, First Draft November 1997, Revised April 1999, Available online at wwwc.cc.ciao. Kahl notes connections between demographic/environmental stress and conflict. In his article, Kahl amalgamates the deprivation theory of conflict and the scarcity approach with an institutional response model to offer a nuanced understanding of the complex interactions that can spark conflict.

[5] Hippel, 169.

intervention creates a new problem-set that may be worse than the problem the intervention was meant to address.

The two most successful institution-building operations are Japan and Germany after World War II. Both countries had been decimated by war and both benefited from a sustained institution-building effort when the war was over. Japan and Germany differed from many other cases in that they had a nationalist tradition and a history of stable governance. They were not failed states. Both Japan and Germany quickly recovered from the ravages of war and are now major economic and political players. Within two decades, Japan had regained its position as the economic and political powerhouse of the Pacific Rim and Germany has resumed its preeminence in European affairs.

Institution-building operations in the aftermath of World War II were characterized by an availability of resources (the Marshall Plan), a long-term commitment and an integrated planning team. In terms of resources, 13 percent of the U.S. federal budget from 1945-49 was devoted to institution-building operations. The commitment to institution-building was identified by the National Command Authority as absolute and open-ended. The task had to be done and the United States was the only country that was willing and able to do it. The military led the effort with assistance by the other governmental organizations. The unity of effort provided by the military enhanced the ability of the other agencies to work in concert.[6]

Military interventions since that time have been remarkably less successful. Vietnam demonstrably failed to build sustainable institutions capable of providing law and order, security for its citizens and rejuvenating economic activity. The United States

[6] Ibid., 185-187.

experience in Vietnam suggests three problems pertinent to institution-building operations today. First, the intervention did not purposefully set out to create a new political order, but rather sought to bolster the pre-existing government and somewhat haphazardly fell into institution-building. Second, the commitment of significant resources, especially non-military resources, to rebuild the basic institutions was not made.[7] Third, there was no unity of effort from year to year or within organizations. Personnel turnover generated continuous institutional instability. Organizationally, the military, intelligence services and other governmental agencies were segregated into discrete areas, which precluded a coherent plan from being executed.

The post-Cold War interventions suggest that the example of Vietnam is repeated more often than are the examples of institution-building in the immediate aftermath of World War II. In Somalia, Lebanon, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, interventions have not been purposeful institution-building efforts implemented by a cohesive organization. These post-Cold War interventions exhibited an incremental recognition of the types of operations that would be required. The requirement to provide security, implement or alter legal institutions and re-establish basic commercial functions were accomplished in the field by military commanders out of necessity. These military commanders operated in the absence of clearly defined mandates or adequate resources. The most significant point for low-level military commanders is that the re-establishment of legal institutions

[7] The United States did build a significant military infrastructure comprised of airbases, port facilities and roads. Vietnamese local villages and civilian infrastructure did not receive the benefit of many material resources that were committed due to the security threat posed by the guerillas and the corruption of the South Vietnamese government. One program that was successful in building local institutions, the Civil Action Program (CAP), was shut down.

is most often regarded as an economy of force and force-protection issue rather than an institution-building issue.



Figure 1 Institution-Building Operational Model [8]

In the institution-building operational model depicted in Figure 1, operational success is correlated with the size of the mandate and the amount of resources dedicated to the enterprise. The mandate-resources nexus for *Reconstruction* can be characterized as whatever-it-takes-for-as-long-as-it-takes. The *Reconstruction* nexus is intuitive in that if the goal is to create a new political economy and the necessary resources are allocated, then the mission will usually be successful. Examples of *Reconstruction* include post-World War II Germany and Japan, Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti and the UNTAC mission to Cambodia in the mid-1990s. Where resources are limited, as in *Faint*

[8] Resources are defined broadly to include material, political and organizational components. Material resources are money, military force, weaponry and infrastructure. Political resources are the domestic will to complete the mission. Organizational resources are the degree of cohesion and unity of command enjoyed by the intervening organization. Data derived from Karin von Hippel's, *Democracy by Force: U.S. Military Intervention in the Post Cold-War World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Hopes and *Observation*, the mission is destined to founder in the face of opposition from the marginalized players. Examples of failure when the mandate and the resources were limited include Sierra Leone under the United Nations leadership and the French experience in Rwanda during Operation Turquoise. The second United Nations mission to Somalia (UNOSOM II) and the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mission to Bosnia typify the nexus of an extensive mandate coupled with limited resources.

Intervention is the most interesting nexus because it seems counter-intuitive. Common sense may suggest that an abundance of resources applied to a limited mandate should be more successful than the other nexus points. In fact, however, an abundance of resources creates its own problem-set. The Israeli intervention in Lebanon in 1982 and the United States intervention in Somalia in 1992 highlight this point. In both Somalia and Lebanon, the immediate problems were solved rather quickly. Ironically, the limited mandate constrained the interventionists, the Israelis and the Americans, from attempting or even considering a long-term strategy to solve the underlying issues. The creation of a new problem-set and the long-term failure it engendered, resulted from the constraints of the mandate rather than a lack of resources. One of the goals of this study is to gain a better appreciation for the constraints and opportunities the local commander will face in such intervention operations

The two *Interventions*, the Israeli intervention in Lebanon, Operation Peace for Galilee, and the United States intervention in Somalia, Operation Restore Hope, provide a unique opportunity for analysis. The two cases span the spectrum from mid-intensity conflict to armed humanitarian intervention. Operation Peace for Galilee was a

conventional mid-intensity conflict in which Israeli forces invaded Lebanon, allegedly, to eliminate the "Palestinian threat" to their north. The United States intervention in Somalia, Operation Restore Hope, was ostensibly a neutral humanitarian intervention to feed the famine victims of a failed state. The Israelis planned to cooperate with the Maronite Christians and establish them as the ruling coalition of Lebanon. The United States initially planned to be neutral in Somalia, and not get involved in "nation-building operations."[9] These divergent goals and aspirations represent the broad scope of intervention and its consequences, both purposeful and unintended. In both Lebanon and Somalia, the third-party intervention made conditions worse rather than better.

In both Operation Peace for Galilee and Operation Restore Hope, the same sequence of events unfolded. In Lebanon and Somalia, the initial intervention was widely acclaimed and greeted with euphoria by the local populace. In rapid fashion, the military stabilized the situation and began institution-building operations. In both cases, the institution-building operations were not planned and ordered by the highest political authorities, but were executed by local commanders in the course of accomplishing their explicit missions. Within months, local support for both Israel and the United States deteriorated significantly. In both cases, the mission failed to resolve the long-term problems the intervention sought to address.

Information about the competing identity groups can be gleaned from news articles written at the time of the event. The media scrutiny common to these interventions has produced an extensive library of interviews and man-on-the-street

[9] Zeev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984, 230-231. Jonathan Stevenson, *Losing Mogadishu: Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia*, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995, 51-52.

encounters that reveal the evolution from cooperation to conflict within the identity groups. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) is particularly valuable as a resource to gain insight into the motivations and reactions of local leaders during Operation Peace for Galilee and Operation Restore Hope.

Information on the actions of military commanders and their perspective is available from after-actions written at the time and interviews conducted years later. In the Lebanese case, I have relied on the extensive documentary and historical record of the broad spectrum of participants in the IDF, the media and political actors on all sides of the conflict. In the Somali case, I aggregated a variety of personal interviews, unpublished after-action reports and an unpublished detailed history of the Marines in Somalia. Interviews with military commanders involved at several levels, from platoon commanders and company commanders to the general officer level provided depth and texture that was only available to participants. The officers of Task Force Mogadishu wrote after-action reports during March of 1993. These unpublished reports present a bottom-up view that until now has been obscured. The unpublished history written by Captain David Dawson in 1993, *The U.S. Marines In Somalia: With Marine Forces, Somalia During Operation Restore Hope,* relies on personal interviews he conducted at the time, his field historian notes and the voluminous administrative message traffic that the modern military machine produces. Taken together, these sources present a cogent picture of Operation Restore Hope that has been masked by the subsequent folly of UNOSOM II and the fatal debacle in October of 1993.

B. ORGANIZATION

This study is divided into six chapters. The Introduction, Chapter I, has introduced the paradox of intervention. Chapter II defines the specific terms and theory for understanding intervention operations in detail. It specifically addresses the theoretical underpinnings of identity group formation, cooperation and intervention. The general proposition for the second chapter is that the military will continue to conduct institution-building operations as part of peace-making, peace-keeping, and war termination operations.

In Chapter III and Chapter IV, Operation Peace for Galilee and Operation Restore Hope are analyzed at the state level and the local level. The third chapter focuses on the coalitional structure affected by the military intervention. The two propositions involved are: (1) institution-building operations are necessary for any military intervention to be efficacious and (2) institution-building operations alter the coalitional structure of the affected society. The fourth chapter focuses on the specific actions of the mid-level military commander as they affect the coalitional structure, generally, and the local community, specifically. The proposition for the fourth chapter is that local commanders interact with whomever they meet first, often based on incomplete or erroneous information. The first group to gain cooperation from the intervention force then attempts to use the military to eliminate opposition groups to accrue greater power.

In Chapter V, I offer a framework for the mid-level commander to consider when thrust into the institution-building role. The premise of this chapter is that the "lessons learned" from many of these operations are flawed. The conventional wisdom and the official "lessons learned" are often subject to organizational desires or political

requirements that may be incompatible with tactical realities. Many "lessons learned" appear to be attempts to fit tactical problems to the desired tool rather than a straightforward analysis of the situation. For example, an armor officer might suggest that the problems encountered in Somalia were due to a lack firepower and tactical mobility, which to no one's surprise can only be rectified by investing in more armored forces. The Lessons (Un)Learned analysis suggests that local commanders must use a range of strategies in order to maximize cooperation from the majority of the people within their area of influence. Cooperation must be generated between the military and the local identity groups and among opposing identity groups. It is just as dangerous for the military to be caught in the crossfire between two hostile identity groups as it is for the military to be engaged by an identity group. The counterintuitive decision may be for military commanders to forego a cooperative opportunity in one case in order to facilitate cooperation between opposing identity groups.

In Chapter VI, the fabric of the thesis is tied together in a short set of concluding remarks. If this thesis has any merit at all, then military commanders at all levels and the civilian decision makers that command and support the armed forces should reevaluate how the military should prepare for intervention operations. In the broader policy debate, the civilian leadership should contemplate the paradox of intervention prior to dispatching military forces abroad.

II. CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS

The Department of Defense does not define "intervention" or "identity groups" in the Joint Publication 1-02, the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.* This oversight suggests a lack of awareness on the part of the military about the types of activities that it will execute and the operational environment in which it will work. "Intervention" has been replaced by "peacekeeping" and "peacemaking." In an uncertain world, people will rely on the basic identity group, e.g. the tribe, religion, or ethnic group, to provide a sense of security and balance. In terms of theory, there is no discussion in military conferences about conflict entrepreneurship or identity group formation. The experience of the United States in Lebanon, Somalia and the Balkans indicates that this is an important oversight. Irregardless of one's view on "nation-building," the military will be required to rebuild the basic institutions of local governance in the wake of identity-based conflicts. The terms "identity group", "intervention" and "institution-building" focus the debate on the potential military responses to such conflicts.[10]

For academia, the need to define terms and lay out the theoretical foundations is obvious. The military professional is often more concerned with practice than theory and just wants to "know-what-works." Unlike "conventional war", where *knowing* the facts and training reigns supreme, the nature of intervention operations require a commander to *understand* the secondary and tertiary consequences of his actions. This chapter lays the conceptual foundation for understanding intervention in identity-based conflicts in two

[10] According to Webster's II Dictionary, "intervention" means "to enter or come between so as to modify, or to interfere, often with force in a foreign dispute or conflict." Webster's parsimonious definition provides more clarity about intervention operations than all of the current military publications on "peace operations."

parts. First, critical terms such as "institution-building" and "identity group" are defined. Second, the theoretical arguments about identity group formation, intervention operations and cooperation are analyzed.

A. DEFINITIONS

The terms "nation-building", "intervention" and "identity group" are so laden with possible meanings and emotive impact that their use threatens to obscure more than to illuminate. Many in the media, military and academia have used "ethnicity" and "tribe" as code words for any problem that seems insoluble. Accordingly, these terms are defined to limit the scope of the discussion and regain their explanatory value.

"Institution-building" is the process of forming or establishing the basic civil institutions of a society to include law enforcement, judiciary, prisons, local governments and economic markets. The military has a role to play in fostering the development of these institutions during intervention operations. The Geneva Convention mandates that the Occupying Force has an obligation to provide "security, law and order and to provide for the reestablishment of economic activity" in the area it controls. The intervention force by its nature maintains a monopoly on the use of force in the areas it controls, therefore it is *de facto* an occupying force. The military commander has a moral and a legal obligation to begin the institution-building process. As will be apparent in Chapter IV, the more rapidly the process is begun, the more rapidly the area will be secure for other players to come to help and the more likely the institution-building process will succeed.

"Intervention" is the introduction of significant military force into a region or country to achieve objectives, which are limited by time, resources, mandate or any

combination thereof. The term implies the transfer of authority to indigenous institutions that may or may not already exist. It is distinguished from a takeover or a conquest in that the long-term responsibility for governance is not contemplated by an external power. The relationship is somewhat analogous to the difference between a raid and an amphibious assault. The raid has a limited objective and planned withdrawal, while the amphibious assault is a forcible entry with a longer duration, more assets and broader scope. The key element of "intervention" is the planned transfer of authority to indigenous institutions.

An "identity group" is any set of people bounded by a "shared perception of otherness" that sets them apart. An identity group can be bounded by national, genealogical, linguistic, religious, shared cultural values or other ascriptive ties.[11] Most people are members of multiple identity groups. Individuals can emphasize the group identification that best serves their needs for security, identity and material good. The strength of their identification with a particular group is often proportional to the level of threat levied against that group by the outsider. "Ethnicity" is what distinguishes a particular group on the basis of an ascriptive trait whether imagined or real, which limits the outermost boundary for the group. "Tribe" implies a social network often on the basis of blood or marriage relationships. African scholars and Middle East scholars disagree on the specific definitions of ethnicity, tribe and clan. For this paper, ethnicity, tribe and clan will only be used when the identity-group refers to itself by one of those labels.

[11] Ted Gurr asserts that the key to identifying communal groups is... the shared perception that the defining traits... set apart. (Gurr, 3.)

The notable exception from the list of terms is "nation-building." Both sides of the intervention debate have abused the term "nation-building." Those in favor of intervention, define "nation-building" narrowly to advocate a specific range of activities. Those who oppose "nation-building" define the term broadly to encompass all activities that build a sense of nationalism. The critics who oppose American interventionism state that the United States cannot build nations nor should it try. This thesis limits the scope of its analysis to institution-building during intervention operations and leaves the broader debate on "nation-building" and American interventionism to other writers.

B. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Three general areas of study form the theoretical foundation for this analysis. The three areas are: 1) identity group theory; 2) intervention theory; and 3) cooperation theory. Each theoretical area has divergent points of view that lead to remarkably different solutions. There is a large body of scholarly work and literature devoted to each, therefore the theoretical arguments presented are not comprehensive assessments of the subject areas. For the purposes of this study, I will review the highlights of the key schools of thought and identify which arguments and approaches appear most useful to military commanders. The objective of this examination is to find theoretical arguments that lend themselves to practical solutions on the ground.

Identity group theory can be generally divided into two general schools of thought: the primordial and the constructivist. The primordial school asserts that group identity is an ancient phenomenon founded in an ageless past and is thus relatively impervious to change. The common connotation of a "tribal identity" is represented by

this school of thought. One of the earliest and best known theoreticians of this school is Clifford Geertz. More recently, Walker Connor articulated that:

> Explanation of behavior in terms of pressure groups, elite ambitions, and rational choice theory hint not at all the passions that motivate Kurdish, Tamil, and Tigre guerillas or Basque, Corsican, Irish, and Palestinian terrorists. Nor at the passions leading to the massacre of Bengalis by Asssamec or Punjabis by Sikhs. In short, these explanations are a poor guide to ethnonationally inspired behavior.[12]

The constructivist school of thought asserts that identity is relatively elastic and susceptible to the machinations of elites or other actors. The idea of an identity as a constructed phenomenon emphasizes that people choose to emphasize the group identity that best serves their needs. Political economists, rational-choice theorists and neo-realists support this concept of identity. The constructivist school suggests that identity is susceptible to change and that the actions of local commanders can have an effect.

One of the most articulate and powerful examples of the elastic concept of identity is found in Gerard Prunier's book, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide.* Many Americans believe the Rwandan genocide was a continuation of some ancient conflict between primordial tribal identities, which have existed for millennia. A highly educated and intelligent acquaintance of mine asserted "the Hutus and Tutsis have been killing each other for hundreds of years." He continued, "Why should we get involved?" Gerard Prunier disputes that characterization of the Rwandan identity groups, asserting that:

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[12] Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1994, 74. As quoted by Hans Melberg, "Is Ethnic Conflict the Outcome of Individually Rational Actions?" May 1998, Available online at http://home.sol.no/~hmelberg/papers/980522.htm

> Although Rwanda was definitely not a land of peace and bucolic harmony before the arrival of the Europeans, *there is no trace in its pre-colonial history of systematic violence between Tutsi and Hutu* as such. There were plenty of wars... but they either pitted the Banyarwanda as a group against foreign tribes or kingdoms; or saw chiefly lineages fighting each other to control some seat of local power, with all the *abagaragu* at their *shebuja's* (patron or chief) side, whether Tutsi, Hutu or Twa.[13]

The idea of tribe in Rwanda was warped and codified by the Belgian colonialists. The Belgians issued identity cards distinguishing Tutsi from the Hutu in order to facilitate indirect rule. The Rwandan example suggests that tribal identity is very malleable and does not have the inexorable qualities often associated with it. If "tribal" identity is not an immutable concept, then identity based on other forms of shared membership is likely to be just as malleable.

This concept of identity does not suggest that group identity is unimportant. It does suggest that identity is not a sacrosanct subject and therefore can be influenced by outside forces, both positively and negatively. The commander should not feel incapacitated by the acknowledgement of identity groups. Most people have multiple possible identities. For example, the Shi'a in southern Iraq could identify themselves as Iraqi, as Shi'a, as a member of a family group or as a member of a geographic area. Janet Stein asserts that, "identities are socially constructed, and hence are open to

[13] The Banyarwanda are all those who speak Kinyarwandan, which includes the Tutsis, the Hutus and Twa. The distinctions between Tutsi and Hutu are more directly related to their occupational category than their racial features. The Tutsi were pastoral nomads, where the Hutu were agriculturalists. The Twa are the pygmies. Prunier's book is one of the best sources for information on Rwanda and the genocide. It gives the reader a good "feel" about this part of Africa. I highly recommend it as professional reading for military commanders. Gerard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide,* New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, 39.

reconstruction and reinterpretation over time."[14] This concept of identity provides a balanced approach for military commander to understand identity group interactions.

Espen Barth Eide's work on ethnic conflict and "conflict entrepreneurship" offers a compelling theoretical argument for dealing with identity group issues. Eide argues that "modern 'civil wars' are not expressions of 'ancient hatred' but rather the end product of deliberate, manipulative activities conducted by political actors for specific purposes." [15] Where groups have long histories of interaction there are often as many periods of cooperation as there are of conflict. Any student of Middle East history could point out that in early Islam the Jews were a protected people and that, during much of the last thousand years, Jews were better off in the Muslim world than they were in the Christian communities of Western Europe. Only in the last hundred years have the Jews fared worse in the Middle East than elsewhere. It is a deliberate choice to focus the identity group's aggression or fear on the period of conflict rather than emphasizing the periods of cooperation and harmony.

According to Eide, the mechanism for identity group mobilization has three units: the referent object, the securitizing actor and the functional actor. The referent object is the element that is being "existentially threatened and (has) a legitimate claim for survival." The referent object can be the nation as in Serbia, the tribe as in Rwanda, or the religious community as in the Sudan. The securitizing actor is the conflict entrepreneur who attempts to gain or maintain dominance within the identity group by

[14] Janet Gross Stein, "Image, Identity and Conflict Resolution," in *Managing Global Chaos*, eds. Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson and Pamela Aall, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996, 105-106.

[15] Espen Barth Eide, "'Conflict Entrepreneurship': On the 'Art' of Waging Civil War," PRIO Report 4:41-69, 1997, Available online at www.nupi.no/UN/Chapter2.html.

"declaring the referent object as existentially threatened." The obvious examples of conflict entrepreneurs include Milosevic in the former Yugoslavia, Aidid in Somalia and Aliev in Azerbaijan. The third unit is comprised of the functional actors who are the opinion leaders, "significantly influence decision-making" and choose whether to follow the lead of the securitizing actor.[16] In Lebanon and Somalia, the functional actors were predominantly the village elders. In Lebanon, the Shi'a *ulama* (the Muslim clergy) should also be considered among the functional actors. All communities have referent objects, which form the basis of membership in the community. There will always be conflict entrepreneurs who will attempt to move an issue from a political category to the security category by claiming a threat to a referent object. The functional actors are the key to dealing with identity group issues.

Intervention theory has grown into its own area of study since 1990. The most interesting work in intervention theory has focused on the impact of humanitarian intervention by NGOs on the societies they purport to help. International aid organizations change the power structure, and even the ruling coalition of a country by creating new economic winners and losers. Fred Cuny, a renowned humanitarian relief worker and scholar, noted that aid impacts the economics, politics and societal structure of the state. In the introduction to Cuny's book, *Famine, Conflict and Response: A Basic Guide*, John Hammock notes, "For Fred (Cuny), emergencies were opportunities to help people… to change the social, economic and political context of their lives."[17] Another author who has chronicled the practical effects of humanitarian intervention is Michael

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[16]Ibid.

[17] John Hammock and Andrew Natsios, "Introduction", Fred Cuny with Richard Hill, *Famine, Conflict and Response: A Basic Guide*, West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1999, xiv.

Maren, author of *The Road to Hell.* Maren focused on aid to Somalia in the 1980s and 1990s. He details how NGOs undermined the society they sought to help, both purposefully and unintentionally.[18] By providing resources, ostensibly for humanitarian purposes, the NGOs funded the competing factions and made Somalia less stable rather than more stable. The NGOs pushed aid through Mogadishu which made it a prize worth fighting to control and inadvertently spawned the growth of shanty towns on its outskirts as Somalis crowded in to get their share of the pie. The inspiration for the *Paradox of Intervention* grew out of Maren's scathing commentary on the ironic effects of international aid in Somalia. This study extends these authors' work by analyzing the military's role during intervention operations.

Cooperation theory underpins the study of identity groups and interventions. It seeks to explain why individuals cooperate within a group or "defect" from the group. One of the most cogent and well-known analysis of cooperation is Robert Axelrod's, *The Evolution of Cooperation.* Axelrod begins with the question: "Under what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority?"[19] He assumes that people are rational and self-interested actors. The vehicle for investigating cooperation is a game called the Prisoner's Dilemma. The police bring two prisoners into separate rooms for interrogation. The Prisoner's Dilemma is to decide whether to "cooperate" with his accomplice or "defect" from his accomplice. The structure of the game provides distinct iterations in which the history of the interaction is known. The simplest Prisoner's Dilemma game has two players who have the choice to cooperate or

[18] Michael Maren, *The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity*, New York: The Free Press, 1997, 11-12.
[19] Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, USA: Basic Books, 1984, 3.

defect. Each chooses without knowing what the other person will do. This theoretical construct highlights the considerations for promoting cooperation.

Axelrod identifies five ways in which the probability for cooperation can be enhanced. For the purposes of this thesis, I will highlight only the three, which appear most salient to intervention operations. First, "enlarge the shadow of the future." If the current iteration is the only one I expect to play, the only rational action is to defect. This is demonstrated in the real world by the random violence perpetrated by the Cobras and other militia groups in Congo-Brazzaville or the RUF in Sierra Leone. If an intervention force effectively provides a secure environment, then the probability of a future interaction is enhanced and the "shadow of the future" enlarged. The second way to promote cooperation is to "change the payoffs" by making it profitable for people to cross identity-group boundaries. The third possibility is to "improve the recognition abilities" of the players. In order to make good choices, each player needs to recognize the other players and defection when it occurs. Many times in the real world people are not aware of the exact moment in which the defection or cooperation occur. These methods of enhancing cooperation will be highlighted in Chapter V.

The definitions and theoretical structure presented frame a better and more useful paradigm for understanding intervention operations. The problems of identity and intervention are not unknowable or insoluble, but instead are rational and respond to action based on a nuanced understanding of what is happening on the ground. One of the considerations for the policy maker and the local military commander is that the further from the "ground truth" one is, the more black and white the issues may appear.

III. INTERVENTION CREATES NEW WINNERS AND LOSERS

The traditional conception of the operational environment emphasizes the terrain, weather, and enemy forces in the area. For many missions, this structural concept has proven to be effective in facilitating the commander's decision process and, by extension, his operational effectiveness. This traditional conception fails to address the needs of local commanders in intervention operations, because it focuses the commander's options on the threatened or actual use of force. The military commander must be aware of the coalitional structure of the target society and the likely effects the intervention will have on that structure. In simplest terms, the commander must know who wins and who loses by having the intervention force present. Understanding the effect of the intervention on the coalitional structure increases the commander's range of permissible strategies beyond simple force.

This chapter confirms three basic premises that undergird the conceptual framework for the intervention operational environment. First, military intervention in another country requires institution-building operations to be efficacious. The need to conduct institution-building operations spans the spectrum of conflict from mid-intensity conflict to armed humanitarian intervention. Second, military forces engaged in institution-building operations change the existing power structure/coalitions within the target country. In mid-intensity conflicts, this seems intuitive, but the proposition is just as valid, if not as obvious, for humanitarian operations. The third premise is that national authorities are unable or unwilling to anticipate or specify a desired "coalitional end-state" thus providing the operational space for autonomous actions by local military commanders. In some cases, the national authorities do not consider the unintended

consequences of the intervention. In other cases, the national authorities do not articulate a specific end-state in order to retain sufficient ambiguity to deal with domestic political concerns.

The central argument of this chapter is that military intervention is never neutral in its effects on existing power structures within the affected society. The dependent variable for this analysis is the coalitional structure of the target country. The independent variable is the military intervention. Intervention is not necessary to explain new or altered coalitional structures as coalitions may change based on individual perceptions of the strength and durability of existing alliances. Additionally, other factors such as inflation, unemployment or rural to urban migration may cause new coalitions to form and old coalitions to dissolve. Military intervention is sufficient to cause new coalitions to form in that there are new winners and losers created by the presence of a third party. These new winners and losers often respond by forming new coalitions that were either non-existent or significantly different before the military intervention occurred.

Operation Peace for Galilee and Operation Restore Hope highlight the impact of military intervention on existing identity groups. While it is beyond the scope of this study to address each identity group in detail, the basis for identity group membership, their agenda and primary leadership will be delineated for both Lebanon and Somalia. The military intervention will be dissected in sufficient detail to reveal how it destabilized the coalitional structure of the affected society. Secondarily, this chapter explains why the local military commander has the operational space for autonomous action and the factors that constrain the definition of a clear coalitional end-state.

A. OPERATION PEACE FOR GALILEE

On 6 June 1982, Israeli forces crossed the Lebanese frontier and struck northward toward Beirut. The stated mission for the Israeli Defense Forces was to drive Palestinian terrorists out of southern Lebanon and to create a cordon-sanitaire forty kilometers deep in order to prevent the shelling of Israeli villages by Palestinian artillery forces.[20] Prior to crossing the line of departure, the military commander, General Amir Drori, pushed the limits of the operation further north by ordering the supporting force's amphibious landing to come ashore at the Awali River estuary. Drori told the amphibious commander, "As I see it, we'll get approval to land farther north, by the Awali...(and) then you'll probably get the order to move up toward Danour."[21] It is apparent that before commencing combat operations the military objectives had expanded beyond the stated mission given by the civilian leadership.

The military assessment of the operational environment precipitated the disjuncture between the stated mission and the operational plans. Three factors affected the military's assessment of the operational environment. The first factor was the position of the Palestinians in the Lebanese coalitional structure. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had created a "state within a state" disrupting the indigenous Lebanese population in the south. The second factor was the implicit requirement to conduct institution-building operations in the cordon sanitaire once the PLO had been eliminated from the area. The military assumed that Israeli public opinion

[20] Chaim Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East from the War of Independence through Lebanon*, New York: Random House, 1984, 343.
[21] Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984, 111.

would not countenance an indefinite presence in Lebanon.[22] In order to maintain a secure northern border, Israel would need to empower a friendly Lebanese government. The third factor affecting the military's assessment was the failure to account for the change in power structures arising from the displacement of the PLO and the impact of institution-building operations on Lebanon. These factors built upon each other to widen the chasm between the objectives of national civil authorities and the requirements of on-scene military commanders.

The displacement of the PLO to Lebanon in 1970 destabilized the coalitional framework enshrined in the 1943 National Covenant. The National Covenant had codified a Maronite-Sunni alliance that governed Lebanon from 1943 to 1970. King Hussein of Jordan had forced the PLO to displace its operations to Lebanon after bitter conflict in 1970, culminating in the Black September massacres. The Lebanese government had allowed the PLO to base its operations in Lebanon with the proviso that they would not fire into Israeli territory from Lebanese territory. Unfortunately, the PLO never honored this agreement or the "over 100 other agreements with the government in Lebanon."[23] During the 1970's, the PLO created a "state within a state" exercising relative autonomy over southern Lebanon. According to Rashid Khalidi, over 300,000

[22] It is obvious in hindsight that the military's assessment of public opinion was wrong. The intervention lasted until May 2000. The "48 hour operation" proposed by Ariel Sharon took almost 3 years to end officially and 18 years to completely withdraw. If the 1978 intervention is included the Israeli occupation of Lebanon lasted almost 22 years.

[23] Herzog, 361. The Cairo Agreement in November 1969 purportedly sanctioned the Palestinians right to attack Israel and rearm at bases in Lebanon.

Palestinians established themselves in Lebanon with autonomous government, security, social, and cultural institutions.[24]

The identity groups in Lebanon are differentiated primarily by their confessional orientation. The confessional groups include the Sunni-Muslim, the Maronite-Christian, the Druze and the Shi'a-Muslim. As already noted, a Maronite-Sunni alliance dominated Lebanese politics until 1970. With the coming of the PLO, the Maronite-Sunni alliance fell apart. The Sunnis allied themselves with the Palestinians and "made demands that the Maronites refused to accept."[25] The PLO-Sunni alliance demanded that the Lebanese State become an active participant in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Maronites understood that such an action would erode their already tenuous position in the political structure. By 1982, the PLO-Sunni alliance, organized under the umbrella of the *al-Quwat al-Mushtarika,* posed a significant challenge to Lebanon's confessional coalition.[26]

Yassir Arafat led the PLO-Sunni alliance. As a means of building up the necessary combat power to confront Israel, the PLO exercised significant influence over Lebanese politics. The military build-up necessarily entailed transforming the PLO from a "guerrilla movement into a semi-regular army with permanent bases and infrastructure."[27] The long-term goal of the PLO was the creation of a Palestinian state. The short-term objective of the PLO-Sunni alliance was the defense of the organization

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[24] Most scholars agree that the Palestinians organized autonomous security and social service institutions in Lebanon in the early 1970s. However, perceptions about the value of the organizational capacity of the Palestinians in Lebanon vary greatly.
[25] Leonard Binder, "Foreword," *Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon,* Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987, x.
[26] Syria actually dominated the political landscape of Lebanon through the Arab Deterrent Forces introduced in 1976 to quell the civil war. The *Quwat Mushtarika* was the dominant indigenous group.
[27] Schiff, 79-80.

and infrastructure the PLO had built up in southern Lebanon. The effect of the PLO-Sunni alliance was to suppress the other competing identity groups.



Figure 2 Lebanon's Coalition Structure before Operation Peace for Galilee

Figure 2 illustrates the coalitional framework prior to the Israeli intervention. The Shi'a within Harakat Amal were implicit allies of the Lebanese Front, a.k.a. the Maronite-Christians, due to their common opposition to the PLO. Hizbollah was not an organized player before 1982. Walid Jumblatt, leader of the Druze in Lebanon, explicitly refused to join any coalition or government unless he dictated the terms. It is important to note the basic agenda and leadership of each confessional group in the Lebanese coalitional structure. For a more detailed understanding of confessional politics in Lebanon during this period, one should read Augustus Norton's *Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon.*

By 1982, the Shi'a were the most numerous single confessional group in Lebanon. Harakat Amal had been founded by the Imam Musa al-Sadr in the early 1960s. In the 1970s, Musa al-Sadr's "fiery speeches" and superb use of Shi'a symbolism had

politically mobilized the Shi'a community. The Amal agenda centered on the betterment of the Shi'a community in Lebanon. Their agenda did not seek to form a Lebanese Islamic State on a par with Khomeini's Iran. According to the Charter of the Amal Movement, the membership supported equal rights for all Lebanese in a non-sectarian state. Musa al-Sadr disappeared in 1978 while on a trip to Libya. His disappearance raised his stature to that of a national martyr. In 1980, Nabih Berri assumed nominal control of the Amal organization. Berri had to balance several factions within the Amal organization to retain his leadership role. Immediately prior to the Israeli intervention, the dominant concern of the Harakat Amal was security. In broad terms, the Amal wanted the PLO out, Lebanon to be free of foreign forces and the rights of the individual to be respected.[28]

The Druze were demographically small, but politically powerful. At the time, they represented only 6-7 percent of Lebanon's population. The majority of the Druze lived in the Shuf mountains, an area that was difficult for invaders to control. The Palestinians did not make inroads in the Druze community or attempt to control the Shuf. The independence allowed by favorable geography permitted the Druze to balance against multiple players simultaneously. Walid Jumblatt led the Druze community within Lebanon in 1982. Jumblatt formed coalitions of convenience as the circumstances warranted without tying himself, or the Druze community, to any single player. The Druze agenda was to retain the relative independence they had traditionally enjoyed.[29]

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[28] Augustus Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon,* Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987, 77, 145. Fouad Ajami, *The Vanished Imam: Musa al-Sadr and the Shi'a of Lebanon*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986.
[29] Ibid., 133-136.

The Maronites were in an extended period of decline in the seventies and early eighties. In the 1943 National Pact, the Maronite Christians had been allocated the presidency based on their alleged proportion of the population. The Maronites desired to maintain their status in Lebanese society and government. By 1982, the Shi'a had surpassed them demographically and were becoming politically active. The forces fielded by the PLO-Sunni alliance, *al-Quwat al-Mushtarika*, and the Druze were each militarily superior to the Maronite-Christian-based Lebanese Forces, (*al-Quwat al-Lubnaiya*). Bashir Gemayel, the leader of the Phalangists (aka the Lebanese forces), needed external support to retain the Maronite's political position in the Lebanese confessional system.[30]

A Maronite-Shi'a alliance could have competed with the PLO-Sunni alliance. Both the Maronites and the Shi'a would have benefited from such an alliance, but each had internal problems, which precluded such an arrangement. According to Leonard Binder, there were "competitive factions within each community that resist(ed) such an agreement."[31] The relative cohesion of the PLO-Sunni alliance dominated the disorganized, contentious grouping of Maronites, Amal and Druze.

The competition for influence over the resources and people of southern Lebanon generated a coalitional framework that depended on the PLO for its stability. The form of PLO "occupation" in Lebanon had military, political and economic components.[32] The

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[30] Ibid., 129-130. Meir Zamir, "From Hegemony to Marginalism: The Maronites of Lebanon," *Minorities and the State in the Arab World*, Gabriel Ben-Dor and Ofra Bengio eds. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999.

[31] Ibid.

[32] The view of the PLO in southern Lebanon as an "occupying force" was held by many of the local Shi'a whose lives were disrupted by the influx of several hundred thousand Palestinian refugees from 1967 to 1970. The Palestinian point of view is passionately and articulately argued by Tabitha Petran in her book, *The Struggle Over Lebanon*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987.

military component included three infantry brigades and their supporting artillery and tank units. The political component included a revolutionary court system, tax collection system and municipal government system. The economic component was facilitated by the political and military components. The military used its power to collect customs and extract protection fees from local merchants. The political component gave legal cover to extortion. From the local Shia's point of view, the PLO's hegemonic influence was characterized by the "exercise of naked power" and the "tyranny of local commanders."[33]

Israel's stated rationale for launching Operation Peace for Galilee was to secure its northern frontier from future PLO aggression.[34] According to Prime Minister Begin, Operation Peace for Galilee was "to put all settlements in Galilee out of reach of terrorist artillery... and to repulse the terrorists so that all the inhabitants of Galilee should be delivered from the constant threat to their lives."[35] The political goal of security for the settlements in Galilee translated into three military tasks. The first task was to destroy the PLO infrastructure. The second task was to establish a cordon-sanitaire so that the PLO could not reoccupy southern Lebanon. The third task was to re-establish the legal and political institutions of southern Lebanon. Each of these tasks destabilized the old coalition and sowed the seeds for a new coalition to form.

By destroying the PLO infrastructure in southern Lebanon, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) destroyed the PLO-led coalition in Lebanon. In combat operations, IDF units decimated the PLO's forces. The PLO brigades were destroyed, the refugee camps

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[33] Schiff, 79-80.
[34] The year prior to Operation Peace for Galilee was very quiet. There were no cross-border incursions since the cease-fire was signed in 1981. I am stating the Israeli position without commenting on its validity in order to present the operational environment as a military commander in the IDF might have seen it.
[35] As Quoted by Mordechai Gordon, "Peace for Galilee: The Campaign," *IDF Journal* Vol. 1 No. 2, December 1982, 11.

scattered and their checkpoints dismantled. The displacement of the PLO liberated the other identity groups from the threat of extortion, arbitrary taxation and "revolutionary justice." For this reason, the Amal Shi'a in southern Lebanon cheered the Israelis as they moved north and drove the PLO out of the south. In the moment of liberation, the Shi'a believed they might control their own destiny.[36]

The maintenance of a cordon sanitaire forced the IDF to engage in institution-building operations. According to the IDF's Judge Advocate General, the IDF was legally and morally required to maintain public law and order and assure the well-being of the local inhabitants. In a 1982 interview, Brigadier General Shefi argued that "Article 43 of the Hague Regulations... and from the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War" mandates that the occupying force is responsible for public order. The injunctions of international law required the IDF to ensure the security of the people, establish legal institutions and provide humanitarian assistance.[37] It is conceivable that the Israeli Cabinet did not realize that institution-building operations were inextricably linked to the accomplishment of the stated mission.

The IDF established three Civilian Assistance Units to reestablish basic services including health services, local government, courts, and banking. These institutions were set up in coordination with local officials and Lebanese judges "who were willing to work with the IDF."[38] Who was willing to work with the IDF? The Maronite Christians under Bashir Gemayel and the Southern Lebanese Army under Sa'ad Haddad were co-opted before Israel intervened. The Amal were not integrated into the institution-building

[36] Norton, 86.
[37] Yair Ben David, "Peace for Galilee Morality and Legality: Interview with Brigadier General Dov Shefi, Judge Advocate General," *IDF Journal* Vol. 1 No. 2, December 1982, 33.
[38] Ibid.

process, because they were hesitant about appearing to be pawns of Israel. Amal's hesitancy is understandable in light of the uncertain environment they faced externally and the need to balance internal factions. No one knew how long the IDF would stay. The political operators in Israel emphasized the limited duration of the intervention daily, while military institution-building operations suggested a more long-term presence.[39] In order to preserve their constituency, the Amal needed to proceed slowly to build a consensus. Everyone was discussing the potential for cooperation with the IDF. Walid Jumblatt, leader of the Druze, discussed it secretly while Gemayel, leader of the Phalangists, discussed it openly.[40] Nabih Berri had to balance the requirement for an inter-group coalition with the need to maintain a coherent internal group.[41]



Figure 3 Lebanon's Coalition Structure after Operation Peace for Galilee (1985)

The Israeli intervention created a new coalitional structure in Lebanon. In Figure 3, the new structure has two players in significantly different positions. The PLO is no

[39] According to Ariel Sharon and Prime Minister Begin, the operation was planned to last for only 48 hours.
[40] Schiff, 242-243.
[41] As an opportunity for additional research, the interplay between external and internal actors and between internal actors suggests a three-level game. This case may offer fertile ground for developing a more nuanced understanding of cooperation with an intervention force using game-theory.

longer a major player in Lebanese society. Their position was replaced with the emergence of Hizbollah as the major player. Iran emerged as a new player due to the deployment of their Iranian Revolutionary Guards or *Pasdaran* and the logistical support Iran provided to Hizbollah. The Harakat Amal lost a large portion of its constituency to the more militant Hizbollah. The extreme positions and obvious success of Hizbollah in confronting the IDF pushed the moderate Amal to take positions that were more militant vis-à-vis Israel and the United States. The Maronites lost the benefit of an implicit alliance with Amal. The overt support the Maronites received from Israel undermined their ability to form an inter-confessional coalition with either the Druze or the Shi'a populations.[42]

The Hizbollah movement emerged as the dominant player in response to the Israeli intervention. Its goal was to create an Islamic State modeled on Khomeini's Iran. Hizbollah's growth and militancy were unintended consequences of Operation Peace for Galilee. Hizbollah received training, funding and personnel augmentation from the *Pasdaran.* The virulence of Hizbollah's opposition toward Israel is evident in its 1985 Open Letter that stated, " This entity (Israel) is a great danger to the destiny of our nation... [it is] built on usurped land... [and this conflict] must end with its obliteration from existence."[43] The Hizbollah took membership away from the more moderate Amal. The training and support provided by Iran and Syria allowed Hizbollah to provide security and social services to the Shi'a in southern Lebanon. According to P.R. Rajeswari, "the Iranian presence was a key factor in Hizbollah's transformation from a loose network into a well-organized and highly disciplined movement with a

[42] Norton, 128-140.
[43] Ibid.

sophisticated guerilla force."[44] The radicalization of the Shi'a community in Lebanon after 1982 was precipitated by the Israeli intervention.

Israel succeeded in Operation Peace for Galilee by displacing the PLO, but failed to establish a friendly government capable of policing Israel's northern border. Almost two decades after the intervention, it is possible to assess its long-term impact. The rise of Hizbollah is inextricably linked to Operation Peace for Galilee.[45] While the exact costs of the operation for Israel are difficult to calculate in the numbers of dead and amount of treasure spent, it is certain that Israel stayed longer than intended. The Israelis living in Galilee did not feel safer as a result of the intervention. The year prior to the invasion had been casualty-free for the settlers in Galilee. After Operation Peace for Galilee, the settlers in Galilee did not enjoy another year free from incursions, terrorist bombings or rocket attacks. In May 2000, Israel pulled its forces out of southern Lebanon. Upon completion of the Israeli withdrawal, Hizbollah announced that they would cease their attacks on Israeli settlements.

B. OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

On 4 December 1992, President Bush informed the American public that troops would be deployed to Somalia to conduct humanitarian relief operations. The intervention of U.S. forces to feed the hungry was to be the beginning of a "new world order" in which the United States and the United Nations would proactively solve the world's problems. The mission to Somalia was dubbed "Operation Restore Hope." The

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[44] P.R. Rajeswari, "US Policy on Terrorism- Part II: Cases of Hizbollah and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam," *Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the IDSA*, Vol. XXII, No. 8, November 1998, Available online at https://wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/olj/sa/sa_98rap02.html.

[45] The international political system impacted on Iranian support for Hizbollah. It is doubtful that Hizbollah would have been as successful without external support. For the purposes of this study, I focus on Lebanon's internal factors that affected the rise of Hizbollah.

execute order from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) required the Central Command to:

> Conduct joint and combined military operations in Somalia, under U.N. auspices, to secure major airports and sea ports, ground routes, and major relief centers; provide a secure environment; disarm, as necessary, forces which interfere with humanitarian relief operations; and protect and assist U.N. and nongovernment humanitarian relief operations. [46]

On 9 December, forces from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) landed at the port in Mogadishu. Throughout the day, sporadic firing from Somali gunmen harassed the Marines as they moved to takeover the port, airfield and embassy compound. In spite of the gunfire, most Somalis "seemed happy to see the Marines."[47]

As the Somali venture progressed, the myth of "mission creep" entered the United States lexicon due to misperceptions held by the National Command Authority and the highest military commanders about the operational environment they faced.[48] Three assumptions about the operational environment precipitated the disjuncture between policy and execution. The first assumption was that the existing coalitional framework was not affected by the on-going humanitarian relief operations. As is now well-known, the NGOs provided the warlords substantial rents that financed the civil war. The rents took the form of direct payments for security and transportation and indirect taxes and looting by bandits. The second assumption was that the intervention force would not engage in institution-building and thereby, destabilize the balance of power among the

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[46] David Dawson, *The U.S. Marines In Somalia: With Marine Forces, Somalia During Operation Restore Hope.* Unpublished Comment Edition. 1-20.
[47] Ibid., 2-14.
[48] "Mission Creep" is a term used to denote increasing mission requirements in piecemeal fashion. In an interview with General Zinni, he acknowledged that as the mission continued beyond the original six – weeks envisioned by the planners, it was necessary to take on other tasks to maintain a secure operating environment. These locally generated tasks, when combined with changing external requirements, produced the perception of mission creep.

clans in Somalia. The senior military commanders of the operation articulated this assumption, and the Marines engaging in day-to-day operations believed it. Only the military commanders who interacted with local elders, NGOs and the warlords saw the interplay of forces, which belied this assumption. The third assumption, which proved the most problematic, was that the warlords could control their subordinates effectively. By engaging in top-down national reconciliation conferences, the U.S. and U.N. political and military leaders demonstrated their belief that each clan-based political party was cohesive and hierarchical. To be precise, they believed that the clan leaders could speak for their constituency in signing peace agreements. Each of these assumptions was based on a flawed understanding of Somali culture and history.

The coalitional framework in Somalia has been popularized as one based on clan membership. Clan membership connotates a significant degree of cohesion and cooperation among all its parts. As Anna Simons has noted, Somali society really exemplifies segmentary lineage opposition. The concept of segmentary lineage opposition is "enscapulated in 'I against my brother, my brother and I against our cousin, our cousins and us against the world.'"[49] Clan membership is important in defining the legitimate targets for violence.[50]

[49] Anna Simons, "Somalia: A Regional Security Dilemma," *Perspectives on State Disintegration,* 74-75.
[50] According to Mohamed Sahnoun, "Even Aidid... had trouble controlling his fighters and ensuring public safety in the areas he controlled." Mohamed Sahnoun, *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994, 17.



Figure 4 Somali Clan Structure Prior to Operation Restore Hope[51]

The relationship between parties, clans and leaders is illustrated in Figure 4. The most significant aspect it reveals is that by 1992, most of the fighting took place between members of the same clan. For example, Colonel Jess killed 100 elders within his sub-clan before the U.S. forces arrived in Kismayu. Ali Mahdi and Aidid were both from the Hawiye clan and were fighting each other for control of Mogadishu. Both Ali Mahdi and Aidid formed ad hoc alliances with members of other clans and sub-clans based on the level of rewards they expected to receive by joining and *not according to genealogical affiliation.*

One popular misconception that arises from the idea of clan-based coalitions is that leaders from different clans are more likely to cooperate with members of their own clan than they are to cooperate with leaders of different clans. This is not true in the Somali case. Aidid's Somali National Alliance party brought together members of the Habr Gedr, the Ogadeni and the Majerteen clans. Aidid's coalition was opposed by fellow Hawiye clan member Ali Mahdi's Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA), also known

[51] Data compiled from Saadia Touval, Terrence Lyons and Mohamed Sahnoun.

as the "Group of 12."[52] The SSA brought together members from all of the other clan sub-groups. Clan membership and genealogical ties did not guarantee personal security.

The coalitional framework of Somalia in the period immediately before Operation Restore Hope depended almost entirely upon strategic rents from international aid. The United Nations and most of the NGOs based their operations out of Mogadishu. Control of Mogadishu was, therefore, equivalent to control of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Somalia. NGOs paid significant sums of money for "security." The guard forces that ensured the safety and security of the NGOs during the day were the same bandits who looted storehouses and raided convoys at night.[53] Estimates of aid losses due to theft ranged from 15 to 80 percent in the months preceding Operation Restore Hope. The warlords were paid directly from the aid agencies with monies characterized as "technical support." Each armed leader at the sub-clan level and lower maximized his profit by providing protection services or looting depending on the perceived probability of risk for each. The greater the level of insecurity, the more the NGOs paid for security. The more they paid for security, the more weapons the Somalis could buy to loot unprotected convoys, increasing the level of insecurity. As Khalil Dale, a Red Cross worker indicated, "These people were trying to loot food, because they could use food to buy weapons... some of the faction leaders could use food to pay their fighters... food literally was power."[54] This vicious circle benefited Aidid more than most of the other players, because he controlled the areas in Mogadishu around the airfield and port through which the preponderance of aid arrived.

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[52] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 25.
[53] Sahnoun, 29-34.
[54] Khalil Dale, "Ambush in Mogadishu: Tapes and Transcripts," *Frontline*, Air date 28 September 1998, Available online at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/etc/script.html.

All of the warlords were attempting to secure power and rents for themselves. Aidid had power based on the strength of his militia and his position on the ground in Mogadishu. In 1990, Aidid had been elected Chairman of the United Somali Congress (USC) in a conference held on the Ethiopia-Somali border. Ali Mahdi attempted to accrue power by having his Mogadishu-based faction of the USC appoint him as Provisional President in 1991. Each player sought to create the illusion of legitimacy in order to gain international recognition and support. Each player in Somalia manipulated the clan structure to marshal the force required to control territory and resources.[55] Cooperation among players depended upon the balance of power at the time.

The intervention by the United States, ironically named Operation Restore Hope, changed the coalitional structure of Somalia.[56] The military was tasked to provide security for relief operations, disarm the bandits and create a secure environment in order to prevent the return of famine. Each task undermined the power of the warlords. The warlords had made significant sums of money from the NGOs for "protection." The United States' armed intervention undermined their ability to extract exorbitant sums, although it did not stop the payment for protection services completely. Additionally, the U.S. forces issued cards to the NGOs' guards authorizing them to carry weapons. This limited the expansion of security services for hire. The unintended consequence was to facilitate the consolidation of protection under Aidid's control by eliminating free-lance security competition from other groups. On one hand, the intervention decreased the

[55] Terrence Lyons and Ahmed Samatar, *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction,* Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995, 21.
[56] It is ironic because it "restored hope" to the UN and the NGOs, but did not restore hope to Somalis who were benefiting from current system.

absolute gains for the warlords. On the other hand, the intervention increased the relative gains of Aidid by eliminating the growth of competition for security services.

In 1993, Aidid's forces killed 24 Pakistanis in June and 18 Americans in October. The two incidents precipitated the end of UNOSOM II. By November, President Clinton had announced that the United States would withdraw its forces by March 1994. The last of the United Nation's forces withdrew in March of 1995. The irony is that Aidid was strengthened by his opposition to the United States and the United Nations. The withdrawal of multinational forces from Somalia in 1995 weakened Aidid's faction. Operation Restore Hope provided Aidid with legitimacy, national stature and a source of revenue. The end of the intervention deprived Aidid and the other warlords of a national audience and a significant income stream.

Local sovereignty and political administration has become the dominant adaptation of Somali society. As will be elaborated in the next chapter, some elements of UNITAF set up local police, judiciary and conflict resolution arrangements. These localized institution-building efforts created the necessary organization to exercise control over local affairs. The lack of access to strategic resources in Mogadishu encouraged local leaders to cooperate. The growth of local commerce and markets enhanced the durability of the institutions set up by UNITAF. In the rural areas, the local communities became practically autonomous.

Mogadishu, the prize of the civil war, has lost much of its allure since the end of the United States intervention. When the last forces pulled out of Mogadishu, most of the strategic rents dried up. Without international aid organizations providing both direct payments and profits from looting, Aidid lost much of his power. Upon his death,

Aidid's son took over the Somali National Alliance. Since 1997, regional competitors have supplied warlords and clans with arms and money. The regional competitors include Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Egypt, Yemen and somewhat further afield, Libya. The absence of a single point of entry for strategic rents exacerbates the decentralization process and devolves more power to the local communities, which are capable of providing social services and protection for their sub-clan identity group. The success of local sovereignty is augmented by the fact that clan membership seems to be coterminous with the limit of the local organization's control. Karin von Hippel affirms this observation in her book, *Democracy by Force: U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World.*[57]

Operation Restore Hope changed the coalitional structure of Somalia. The Somali National Alliance and the Somali Salvation Alliance lost what cohesiveness they might have had before the intervention. A Somali proverb explains, "O thou beautiful cut of meat, either I will eat you all by myself or I will ensure to soil you in the dirt so that no other can have you."[58] In the absence of institutions to guarantee the security of a negotiated solution, the only rational action was for each player to adopt a winner-take-all strategy. The coalitional structure resulting from Operation Restore Hope was the dissolution of the coalitions.

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[57] Karin von Hippel was the project manager for the London School of Economics (LSE) report on decentralized political organization in Somalia in 1995 and was responsible for organizing power-sharing seminars for Somali civil society in Kenya in 1996. Hippel, 88-89.

[58] As quoted in Karin von Hippel, *Democracy by Force: U.S. Military Intervention in the Post Cold-War World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 87.



Figure 5 Somali Coalitional Structure after 1995

In Figure 5, the lack of cohesion and interaction among the warlords suggests that the winners have been the local leaders. The smaller players such as the Rahanweyn, the Somali Islamic Union and the Somali National Movement are now the equals of all the other factions. The new losers are the warlords, especially in Aidid's organization, who have been deprived of their primary source of income, international aid. If the intervention legitimated the power and control of the warlords, then the end of intervention removed the endorsement of the international community.

The end of the intervention in 1995 stimulated the growth of local institutions. The levels of violence have declined as the availability of foreign goods has declined. Local communities have had to cooperate in order to survive. Many communities now have relatively low levels of violence and surprisingly high amounts of locally generated

commercial activity.[59] Life is not great in Somalia, but it may be better with too little than too much.

C. CONCLUSION

Operation Peace for Galilee and Operation Restore Hope highlight the impact of military intervention on the coalitional structure of the target society. In both cases, the national authorities failed to specify a coalitional end-state, i.e. who the preferred winners should be. Institution-building operations were required by the situation on the ground and carried out by local commanders. The nature of the intervention created a new problem-set for the military based on a changed political economy. In the case of Lebanon, the displacement of the PLO created the impetus for the Hizbollah to become the dominant power in southern Lebanon. In the case of Somalia, the end of the famine gave the warlords more power by increasing the value of Mogadishu. In Lebanon and Somalia, the identity-group coalitions changed as a direct result of the intervention.

Operation Peace for Galilee and Operation Restore Hope highlight the impact of military intervention on the coalitional structure of the target society. The national authorities failed to specify a coalitional end-state, i.e. who the preferred winners should be. The nature of the intervention created a new problem-set for the military based on a changed political economy. In the case of Lebanon, the intervention mobilized the Shi'a to fill the vacuum created by the displacement of the PLO. In Somalia, the intervention gave the warlords more power by increasing the value of Mogadishu. Identity-group coalitions changed as a direct result of the intervention. The uncomfortable truth that

[59] UNICEF continues to show concern about food availability because so many Somalis live in areas at risk of starvation on a continuing basis. *UNICEF SOMALIA Review*, information for January 2000, available online at http://unicef.org/somalia/inforsect/00janrev.html, downloaded 1 June 2000.

American-military-can-do officers and concerned political leaders do not want to hear or consider is that their good intentions may do more harm than good.

In the next chapter, I will present some ideas about how the local military commander can make the best of a bad situation. The military commander has been given a vague mandate and limited tools with which to work. The local identity groups are alternately friendly or menacing for no apparent reason. How does the commander find out who the local leaders are? How does he decide with whom to cooperate and how to prevent that act of cooperation from causing unintended consequences? Once the commander understands his operational environment, the real work of local institution building can occur.

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IV. ACTIONS DURING INTERVENTION OPERATIONS

As we have seen, the intervention will change the political economy and coalitional structure of the affected society; therefore the local military commander has a role in smoothing the transition. The military commander has a high degree of autonomy in deciding how to interact with local leaders. This chapter reveals the specific activities of local military commanders as they interacted with identity groups in Lebanon and Somalia. What acts of commission or omission led to a higher degree of success for the local commander? Success is defined as any approach that generates the highest degree of cooperation from the majority of the local populace with the least expenditure of force.

The central argument of this chapter is that successful commanders ensure strict adherence to the rule of law and support the formation of grassroots institutions. The corollary to the argument is that the sooner these activities begin, the more likely the mission will succeed. Strict adherence to the rule of law, both by the local population *and* the intervention force, is a prerequisite for successful institution formation. Grassroots institutions such as, local councils for self-governance, police for security, judiciary for administering justice and schools for educating the youth enhance force protection for the military unit and form the basis for an enduring social order once the intervention force leaves. The local military commander should not impose a set of institutions on the area he controls, but rather should enable those institutions to form through the provision of security, material support, training and most importantly as a mediator for contending groups. Grassroots institutions are not sufficient to guarantee success, but are absolutely necessary for mission success.

For both Lebanon and Somalia, there were numerous examples of local successes and local failures. In Lebanon, some local IDF commanders ensured the rapid re-establishment of local institutions while others did not and were compelled to use military force to interfere in local matters. The direct interference of the military in local matters, unmediated by a local council, usually alienated the population. Non-interference, e.g. the failure to prevent massacres or other acts of lawlessness, proved just as problematic in those areas where local institutions were not re-established. A few significant events highlight the impact of the local military commander in Lebanon. In Somalia, Baidoa and Bardera highlight the contrasting impact of the local military commander. In Baidoa, the military commander purposefully and quickly set about rebuilding the institutions of local governance. In Bardera, the military commander did not focus on building durable local institutions that would continue beyond the immediate intervention. The experiences of Baidoa and Bardera offer a comparison of equivalent situations where the variable is clearly the local military commander.

Before getting into the detailed accounts, it should be noted that the military commanders involved in both Lebanon and Somalia were trying to do the best they could with what they had. Any critical analysis of past military operations has the advantage of hindsight to say, "This is what should have been done." Most of the military commanders examined in this study continued to rise within their respective military structures. Most were and are generally well regarded by their peers. They made the best decisions they could with the information they had at the time. This study critically examines their activities so that the next group of officers will not make the same

mistakes and can instead benefit from the positive role models offered by military commanders who were successful at the local level.

A. LEBANON

Operation Peace for Galilee yields a myriad of lessons regarding the difficulties an intervention force faces when thrust into a cauldron of competing identities. The focus for this analysis is not on the armored and combined arms operations of June 1982. Those operations have been painstakingly examined in numerous books and journal articles. Those analyses attempt to piece together the tactics, techniques and procedures for conducting everything from armored attacks to electronic warfare operations to offensive air mission command and control.[60] Almost every commentator and military observer has noted the skill of the IDF in these operations. Instead, the focal point for this analysis is the consolidation, occupation and subsequent, counter-insurgency operation conducted in Lebanon after the IDF "won."

There is no definitive beginning for the IDF's counter-insurgency operation in Lebanon. The death of Bashir Gemayel on 14 September 1982 appears to be the most likely point to begin the analysis. Bashir had been elected President of Lebanon in accordance with agreements reached with Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Minister of Defense, before Operation Peace for Galilee began.[61] There are at least four theories about who killed him and why, but they are irrelevant for this study. What is important is that the plan to install a friendly government in Lebanon by Israel failed. Israel desired to

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[60] Yezid Sayigh, "Israel's Military Performance in Lebanon, June 1982," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 13, 1983, 24-65. James Bloom, "The Six-Days-Plus-Ten-Weeks-War," *Middle East Insight*, Vol. 2, 1982, 45-55.

[61] Martin Van Creveld, *The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Forces*, New York: Public Affairs, 1998, 297. Van Creveld does not view the death of Bashir as a critical turning point but notes that Israeli officials tried to portray it as the pivotal event.

establish a friendly, or at least non-hostile, and effective government in Lebanon.[62] Unfortunately, the activities of local military commanders involved in the counter-insurgency operations hindered the development of any identity beyond the village or clan.

In the following pages, the local military commanders are criticized for increasing the fragmentation of the Lebanese identity. Some scholars may argue that the fragmentation was there before the IDF intervened or that the military commanders were merely following orders, which led to predictable results. Both of those arguments are valid and partially explain the failure of the counter-insurgency operation from 1982 to 1985. Even if the arguments are true, the local military commanders could have decreased the social fragmentation that existed as a result of the civil war in Lebanon, which began in 1975. One mechanism for healing the deep divisions would have been the provision of consistent security in the local villages. This concept will be analyzed in some depth. As for the argument that the military was merely carrying out orders, this is a disingenuous means of escaping responsibility. Local military commanders are relatively autonomous. Carrying out reprisals, allowing the execution of non-combatants and conducting arbitrary arrests are activities in direct contravention of the Law of War, the Geneva Conventions and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. If an order is given to the military, which violates these standards of law, military personnel have both a legal and a moral obligation to refuse to follow those orders. There were a number of IDF personnel who refused to follow illegal or immoral orders. Therefore, the military-as-mindless-automatons argument does not pass the test of logic, law or reality. My own

[62] Schiff and Ya'ari, 248-249.

belief is that the military officer is especially obligated as a moral agent to control the violence at his command against only legitimate targets.

Social fragmentation and strong identity group formation in Lebanon have deep historical roots. Many observers noted that there were multitudes of overlapping possible identities for each Lebanese. One scholar, Samir Khalaf noted that:

> Strong endogamous ties, continuities in the patterns of residence and land ownership... along with geographic isolation from other communities all tended to reinforce village loyalties and make the villager more conscious of communal interests. So strong were these loyalties that village identity often superseded kinship, religious, or class attachments.[63]

From the quote, it is apparent that in addition to the identities based on kinship, tribe, religion and class, village identity exerted a powerful influence. Village identity was enhanced by the ability of village-based patrons to "provide services, goods and values that no other group [had been able] to provide effectively." The chief services provided by the *mukhtars*, the village-based patrons, were security and basic social services. [64]

Groups of people choose the identity group which best satisfies their basic needs on a continuing basis. Espen Barth Eide's argument about conflict entrepreneurship is salient on this point. The conflict entrepreneur designates the existential threat to the referent object, for example the village, the Amal movement or Islam. The more insecure or uncertain the environment is, the more easily the existential threat can be proven. The functional actors have to accept the conflict entrepreneur's logic in order for the identity group to mobilize effectively. Therefore, the performance of the IDF should be judged on how effective they were in providing a consistently secure environment that would keep the functional actors from "buying in" to the conflict entrepreneur's logic.

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[63] Samir, Khalaf, *Lebanon's Predicament*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, 81.
[64] Khalaf, 99-100.

The Sabra and Shatilla massacres significantly increased the level of insecurity in Israeli-occupied Lebanon. From 16 to 18 September 1982, the IDF cordoned off the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps while Phalangist forces swept through the camps to clear any Palestinian forces hiding among the refugees. According to the Kahan Commission Report conducted in the aftermath of the massacres, "the number of victims of the massacre is between 700 and 800."[65] The commission found that the Phalangists had a history of conducting mass killings, that the IDF leadership knew their record, and that the senior leadership of the IDF should have foreseen the massacre. The commission assigned culpability for the massacre to the highest levels of the IDF, intelligence community and specifically to the Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon. The Israeli military leadership denied that they knew the massacre was occurring and asserted that they stopped the operation when they heard about it on 18 September. What role did the local military commander have in allowing the massacre to occur?

Lieutenant Grabowsky, a deputy commander of a tank company, testified to the Kahan Commission that he knew atrocities were occurring as early as 0800 on 17 September. His tank company was positioned on an embankment approximately 200 meters from the camp. For perspective, the "Sabra camp was in an area approximately 300 X 200 meters and Shatilla over an area of about 500 X 500 meters.[66] Lieutenant Grabowsky stated that:

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[65] Yitzhak Kahan, Aharon Barak and Yona Efrat, *The Beirut Massacre: The Complete Kahan Commission Report*, New York: Karz-Cohl Publishing, 1983, 45.
[66] Ibid., 14.

> He saw Phalangist soldiers taking men, women and children out of the area of the camps and leading them to the area of the stadium. Between 8:00 and 9:00 A.M. he saw two Phalangist soldiers hitting two young men. The soldiers led the men back into the camp, after a short time he heard a few shots and saw the two Phalangist soldiers coming out. At a later hour, he went up the embankment with the tank and then saw that Phalangist soldiers had killed a group of five women and children.[67]

He had very good evidence that illegal activities were taking place within the camp. Unfortunately, he continued to sit on the information until a Phalangist came over to his position and told his men that they were killing civilians because, "pregnant women will give birth to terrorists and children will grow up to be terrorists." At 1600 hours, he informed his battalion commander and at 2000 he related the information to his brigade commander. Officers and soldiers from adjacent IDF units corroborated Lieutenant Grabowsky's observations.[68]

Should Lieutenant Grabowsky have done something to mitigate or stop the continued massacre of Palestinians in the refugee camps? Some may argue that by informing his higher command he fulfilled his responsibility for taking action. One mitigating factor in Lieutenant Grabowsky's favor is that clause 2 of operational order No. 6 expressly forbade the IDF from entering the camps.[69] Regardless, Lieutenant Grabowsky and all those officers who corroborated his information had both a moral and a legal obligation to stop the massacre. According to Article 43 of the First Geneva Convention and the Fourth Geneva Convention, the occupying force is obligated to

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[67] Ibid., 35

[68] Ibid. No action was taken to stop the massacre until 0530, 18 September. In the intervening period, the Phalangists requested engineer support, a bulldozer, to cover the evidence. The Kahan report asserts no such support was given, but that the Phalangists were able to use a bulldozer of their own. Robert Fisk reports walking on a "barricade...12 feet high" made of body parts and dirt. From his position, Fisk could see Israeli soldiers in their fighting positions. Robert Fisk, *Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon*, New York: Atheneum Press, 1990, 362.

[69] Kahan, 14.

protect the lives of non-combatants. The Kahan Commission admitted that Israel was de facto the occupying force, although it maintained that Israel was not a de jure occupation force.

What could those officers who witnessed the atrocities have done? Lieutenant Grabowsky was a deputy commander of a tank company. He could have taken charge of any detainees in custody of Phalangist soldiers within his sector and prevented any Phalangist reinforcements from moving into the camps. Taking charge of detainees within his sector would have posed a relatively low risk. His men who spoke Arabic could have intervened with Phalangist elements that were escorting the detainees and created a safe area for the civilians. This would have forced his higher commanders to more quickly respond to the situation, because they would have assumed a direct responsibility to care for the detainees. The detainees would need to be interviewed by military police or intelligence personnel, thus creating a greater awareness of the scale of the atrocities. Limiting the movement of Phalangists through his sector would not have stopped the massacre, but would have brought him to the attention of commanders who were directly responsible for controlling the Phalangists. The higher command would have been forced to take action to stop the massacre. A combination of these methods would have entailed a risk to Lieutenant Grabowsky personally but posed very little risk to the soldiers under his command. Being concerned about the risk to his career is not only venal, but short-sighted as well. In the long-term, Lieutenant Grabowsky suffered more penalties from not taking action than he would have from acting swiftly.[70] Alternatively, Lieutenant Grabowsky could have taken over the stadium and stopped the

[70] The Kahan Commission Report refers to the junior officers on the scene being held accountable by the military justice system, but does not go into specifics.

massacre directly. This aggressive action would have stopped the massacre by forcing the Phalangists to cease their activities against the refugees. Moving into the refugee camp would have posed the highest risk to Lieutenant Grabowsky and his company, because it would have increased the possibility of being hit by fire from both the Phalangists and the Palestinians. There were options available to the officers on the ground that were aware of what was happening.

The Sabra and Shatilla massacres were the pivotal event in fashioning the counter-insurgency environment in Lebanon from 1982-1985. The acquiescence, if not outright support, of the IDF for the Phalangists actions heightened the sense of insecurity among all other identity groups. The Shi'a leadership identified the Sabra and Shatilla massacres as a threat to all Lebanese. Nabih Berri and Sheikh Shams al-Din addressed their constituents on 19 September 1982 and identified the Israelis as the primary threat to the Shi'a. Many young Shi'a males fled Beirut because of security concerns based on the Israeli-Palestinian confrontations. They returned to their villages only to find a worse security environment than that which they had left in Beirut.[71]

In the latter part of 1982 and all of 1983, local IDF commanders did not halt the fighting between the Druze and Phalange, Shiites and Palestinians or one village and another.[72] In an anarchic environment, each identity group was forced to resort to self-

[71] Thomas Friedman asserts that up to 25 percent of the people that lived in Sabra and Shatilla were Shi'a. This factor is uncorroborated by other sources, but if true explains why the massacre increased the level of insecurity perceived by Shi'a in southern Lebanon. Thomas Friedman, *From Beirut to Jerusalem*, New York: Anchor Books by Doubleday, 1989, 164. FBIS, "Amal Leader Condemns Israel's Barbaric Actions," "Islamic Council Condemns Beirut Massacre," and "Shiite hold US Responsible for Massacres," Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic as translated and disseminated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 20 September 1982, G12-G14. Eric Hammel, *The Root: The Marines in Beirut August 1982 - February 1984*, San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1985, 46.

[72] Tabitha Petran, *The Struggle Over Lebanon*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987, 318-319. Edgar O'Ballance, *Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-92*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998, 120-135.

help and form its own militia. It became a downward spiral as the Israelis then attempted to tighten security by isolating the local communities. This exaggerated the geographic isolation of the villages in the south and increased their economic vulnerability. Restrictions on travel were equivalent to restrictions on trade. The conditions of life in most communities grew worse during the Israeli occupation than they had been prior to June 1982.

The actions of local IDF commanders appeared arbitrary to the villagers in southern Lebanon. This arbitrariness was underscored on 28 June 1983 when, "40 Shiite prisoners were released by the IDF... but on the same day 100 Shiites were arrested in Marrakeh after an IDF soldier was shot dead."[73] On 3 September 1983, the IDF withdrew south of the Awali River. In southern Lebanon, local military commanders increased the checkpoints and patrols on roads, thereby further restricting travel between villages. Local Shiite groups increasingly conducted sniping and other guerilla attacks against IDF forces. Some of these attacks were by units that infiltrated from Syrian-held territory, but most were by indigenous groups. Israeli commanders conducted reprisals for these attacks, such as the "destruction of houses belonging to (alleged) members of anti-Israel militias" and arbitrarily incarcerated "a number of Shiites in the Ansar prison camp (still containing some 7,000 inmates)."[74] The reciprocity of attack and reprisal did not encourage cooperation. Instead, these actions exacerbated the uncertainty and insecurity felt by the existing identity groups. The uncertain environment affected the IDF commanders as much as it affected the local identity groups.

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[73] George Solley, *The Israeli Experience in Lebanon, 1982-1985*, Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Research Report ADB115282, 6 May 1987, 117. His sources refer to his personal experiences in Lebanon and interviews with IDF commanders such as General Yaron.
[74] Ibid., 119.

The local IDF commanders appeared to lash out in frustration. On 16 October 1983, "an IDF convoy tried to force its way through a Shiite religious procession." When confronted by the hostile crowd, the convoy opened fire on the civilians.[75] There is nothing in the documentary record that indicated there was any urgency to the convoy's movement. The decision to force the convoy through the procession could be reasonably expected to start a riot, which would precipitate a violent response. The convoy commander was responsible for controlling his unit and for anticipating the likely outcome of his actions. By his negligent disregard for the outcome of the confrontation, the convoy commander alienated the population of that town. To bring theory and practice together, the incident supported the belief of the functional actors, the Shi'a, that the IDF desired to destroy the referent object, their lives and religion. Conflict entrepreneurs used such incidents to build their identity groups, e.g. Hizbollah.

This sterile account of the incident at Nabatiyeh covers the basic facts. What the account fails to convey is the outrage the incident generated and the fact that it was completely predictable and thus avoidable. The Shi'a religious procession was being held to observe *Ashura*, the tenth day of the Muslim month of *Moharram*. *Ashura* commemorates the martyrdom of Hussein. *Ashura* is to the Shi'a community as Easter is to the Christian community, or Passover is to the Jewish community. Nabatiyeh is "the spiritual center of Shiism in Lebanon" and the procession is an annual occurrence. The scale of the parade can be likened to the Saint Patrick's Day parade in Boston. With over 50,000 people in attendance, every Shi'a in Lebanon was either there or personally knew someone that was. The local IDF commander should reasonably have known the

[75] Ibid.

procession was going to occur. He should have ensured that the procession route was clear of any IDF units. For the convoy commander, his best decision would have been to remove his men from the area by the most expeditious means possible, even if it meant leaving vehicles behind. The result of the Nabatiyeh fiasco was the condemnation by the Shi'a *ulama* (clergy) of all those who collaborated with the Israelis.[76] The condemnation by the Shi'a *ulama* can be likened to excommunication by the Catholic Church. The IDF commander in Nabatiyeh was responsible in significant measure for "losing" the support of the Shi'a in southern Lebanon.

As existing groups failed to provide security and stability, more Shi'a turned to Hizbollah. Hizbollah told Shi'a in southern Lebanon what caused their problems and what the solution should be. The problem was that the Lebanese government was not Islamic. The solution was to support Hizbollah in order to create an Islamic Republic of Lebanon. Even the relatively moderate Amal movement, led by Nabih Berri, became increasingly active militarily as Hizbollah garnered more support in southern Lebanon. Each punitive action by Israel increased support for the more militant Shi'a forces.[77]

On 12 November 1983, the Economist reported that Israel was reassessing its relations with the Shi'a in southern Lebanon. According to the article, in 1982 Israel had attempted to establish a "civil guard" in the Shi'a villages. These civil guards were to collaborate with Major Haddad's South Lebanon Army (SLA) and provide an institution that could assure Israel's security as they protected the villages. The "guards" were established to protect and support the newly created civilian administrative units in the

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[76] Fisk, 556.
[77] Ian Black and Benny Morris, *Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services*, New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, 394-395.

villages. The IDF had also begun to impose and collect taxes to support Haddad's militia. During the latter half of 1982 and 1983, the local IDF commanders and Haddad's forces alienated the local Shi'as. Local dissatisfaction with Israeli occupation was demonstrated in November 1983, when the local Shi'a commander for the Israeli-trained civil guard in Nabatiyeh was killed and three days later, another local commander was badly injured. [78] Civic action must be coupled with responsible actions on the part of the commanders of the intervening force. The failure of local IDF commanders to provide a secure environment and establish the rule of law decreased the chances for the civic action program to be successful. It is not coincidental that the local Shi'as became more hostile as reprisals and arbitrary arrests became more pervasive.

In February 1985, the IDF declared an "Iron Fist" policy over the security zone in southern Lebanon. The policy called for "preventive raids on Shiite villages, dusk to dawn curfews and severe travel restrictions."[79] In one preventive raid, the IDF had occupied Marrakeh village on 3 March. "On 4 March, a bomb destroyed a Shiite mosque in Marrakeh, killing 15 people including two Amal leaders."[80] The bomb was blamed on the Israelis although there is no conclusive proof. The local leaders were willing to believe that the IDF bombed the mosque because from their point of view, the IDF had already shown a blatant disregard for the rule of law and the sanctity of Islam. In retaliation, a suicide bomber drove a truck into an Israeli convoy killing twelve and injuring fourteen. The IDF commander in the area attacked the town of Zrariyah killing "some 40 Amal fighters" capturing most of the male population and destroying eleven

[78] "Israel sorts out friends and foes," *The Economist*, 12 November 1983, page 44, US edition, Available from Lexis-Nexis.
[79] Solley, 121.
[80] Ibid.

houses. The IDF commander also captured a large store of weapons. The presence of weapons does not mean the town of Zrariyah was responsible for or supported the suicide bombing. Every village had to protect itself from the depredations of the IDF, other villages and other identity groups, therefore almost all villages had a store of weapons. By this point, all of the Shi'a supported or sympathized with either Amal or Hizbollah activists.

On 10 June 1985, the IDF withdrew the last large combat unit from Lebanon. The quick "victory" that Israel's 85,000-man armored formations had achieved in less than three weeks had been lost. The consolidation, occupation and counterinsurgency operations were all attempts to reach a satisfactory war termination. None of the institution-building goals, from establishing a stable government to removing the Syrian military forces, had been achieved. The security of the northern settlements in Israel, the raison d'etre for Operation Peace for Galilee, was more precarious in 1985 than it had been in 1982. There are a myriad of reasons that can account for the IDF's failure. The evidence indicates that the local military commanders made successful war termination less likely by their failure to institute the rule of law in their zone of occupation and their willingness to allow atrocities to happen.

Israeli attempts at institution-building in southern Lebanon failed because the local *mukhtars* (elders) believed that the PLO had merely been replaced by another group of thugs supported by the Israelis. From the viewpoint of the Shi'a, the removal of the PLO freed them from the fear of arbitrary punishment, random taxation and the ever-present fear of reprisals by the PLO and the Israelis. That is why many of the Shi'a villagers cooperated when the Israelis began their push to Beirut in June of 1982. Things

fell apart during the counterinsurgency phase when the Israelis accommodated Haddad's "Christian" militia group. His militia had a reputation for employing the same brutal methods as the PLO. Haddad's men extended their depredations in coordination with the Israeli counterinsurgency efforts. The Israeli-Haddad accommodation alienated the local Shi'a villagers who realized that they had merely traded masters. The Shi'a who were co-opted by the Israelis adopted many of the same methods as Haddad's militia. Many of the Shi'a who cooperated with Israeli forces were blackmailed while in Ansar prison or were the same criminal element that had cooperated with the Palestinians for profit. The Israeli local commanders did not try to build community support for the Shi'a recruited into the "civil guard," electing instead to force their will on the local *mukhtars*. The Israelis failed to gain cooperation in southern Lebanon because they refused to confront their "partners" when they committed offenses against the local population.

The Israelis rarely tried to compete with organizations such as Hizbollah and Amal in providing basic services such as health care and food. When food was brought in to feed the southern Lebanese, the Israeli humanitarian effort was viewed as economic warfare designed to edge out Lebanese products because humanitarian aid did not match the actions of local commanders.[81] The local IDF commanders failed to establish the rule of law or otherwise provide the Shi'a of southern Lebanon the freedom from the threat of arbitrary arrest and taxation. The local IDF commander's failure to create a secure environment in southern Lebanon was the proximate cause for the mission's failure overall.

[81] Petran, 304.

B. SOMALIA

The most basic mission of Operation Restore Hope was to "provide a secure environment." All of the commanders understood that mission statement. Most of the commanders had a similar view of what would be required to "restore hope" materially and economically. What significantly differed among commanders was their view regarding the preferred outcome of a successful intervention. The more successful commanders focused on an end-state where the relief operations were no longer necessary. The less successful commanders focused on the immediate security needs and force protection, "bringing every one back alive."[82]

Commanders in Somalia appeared to be heavily influenced by two powerful experiences: the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut and the Combined Action Program (CAP) in Vietnam. The Beirut paradigm indicated that intervention was doomed to failure, neutrality had to be maintained at all costs and mission creep had to be avoided. The Vietnam paradigm suggested that local villages desired security and the chance for a better life. The Vietnam CAP experience indicated that security and civic action were interdependent activities. When commanders were guided by the Vietnam CAP paradigm, they engaged in a participatory, long-term approach. When commanders let themselves be caught up in the Beirut paradigm, they adopted a more directive, short-term approach.[83]

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[82] I do not deny that "force protection" is a concern for every commander, but it should not be the end state for the commander. The end-state desired should inform all of the commander's decisions and provide coherence for the myriad activities he must perform. "Force Protection" as an end-state fails to provide a unitary focus and worse undermines mission accomplishment.

[83] Captain David Dawson's, *The U.S. Marines In Somalia: With Marine Forces, Somalia During Operation Restore Hope*, provides the most detailed account about what commanders on the ground faced. His sources include detailed interviews with most of the key participants, situation reports, command

In both Baidoa and Bardera, the local military commanders for the intervention force had similar initial experiences with the local leaders. The "local" militia leader was one of the first people to meet the commander. The local elders of the town were the second group to meet with the commander. One of the important distinctions between the two commanders examined was how they handled the information from the meeting with the "local" militia leader. The other important distinction was the difference in how the commander interacted with the local elders. One commander encouraged participation and listened while the other commander dictated the way things would work.

The local military commander in Somalia faced a complex and demanding task. Not only did the commander have to deal with the local Somalis, he also had to work with several other groups simultaneously. The press corps, the NGOs, (or Humanitarian Relief Organizations as they were called), State Department personnel, the local militia leaders and the local elders each had their own agenda. Often the desires of these players were complementary, but they were just as often in conflict. The basis for conflict was usually competition for scarce resources. The successful local military commander attempted to mediate conflicts between the groups to facilitate mission accomplishment. The less successful commander refused to accept the role of or need for a mediator. Each group had the potential to positively impact the mission and no one group could be excluded without significantly degrading the mission. Excluding the press would have undercut support at home for the mission. Excluding the NGOs would have removed the raison d'etre for the military force. Excluding the militia leaders or local elders could

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chronologies and his own field historian notes. His documentation is superb. Where I have been able to conduct personal interviews with participants, they have corroborated his account. (4-16, 6-28)

create opposition to the mission. The local military commanders had to take on far more roles than those for which they were trained. To be successful the commander had to establish a self-sustaining process for resolving conflicting interests without resorting to violence.

1. Baidoa

Baidoa was the poster child of Somalia usually referred to as "the city of death" by reporters and relief workers. Task Force Hope was formed to facilitate relief efforts in the "city of death." Their mission was to secure the area in order to facilitate the restoration of humanitarian relief efforts. Comprised of Marines from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and legionnaires from Company C, 2d French Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment, Task Force Hope arrived in Baidoa at 0645, 16 December 1992. By early afternoon, the first relief convoy delivered food to an orphanage run by World Vision. Throngs of people cheered as Marines and Legionnaires moved through the town. The most important commodity Task Force Hope brought was security. "Before Task Force Hope arrived in Baidoa, bandits killed or wounded 30-40 people a day. On 16 December the local hospitals treated just seven casualties."[84]

The first local leader to approach the commander of Task Force Hope was Omar Elmi. Elmi was the local militia leader of Aidid's faction of the United Somali Congress (USC). He brought letters to the commander expressing the best wishes of the USC for the American mission in Baidoa. Elmi's letter also outlined the locations of the rival Somali National Alliance (SNA) forces in the area. Elmi's goal was to gain the backing of Task Force Hope in eliminating a rival group and ensuring his dominance in Baidoa.

[84] Ibid., 4-5.

The next day the local elders of Baidoa asked for a meeting in a secure location to find out what Task Force Hope's mission was and to express their concerns. The elders' primary concern for Baidoa was safety. At their request, the commander of Task Force Hope, Colonel Newbold, responded by adopting a more restrictive weapons policy than that mandated by UNITAF: "'no technicals, no visible display of weapons, no heavy weapons' were allowed in the town."[85] Later, other elders approached the Marines and told them that many of those claiming to be elders were not recognized as such by the community. The military commander did not choose who would be recognized as an elder. Instead, he established a "security council" made up of a broad cross-section of the Baidoan community that met in a secure and neutral location. This demonstrates the different roles a commander must play. As a military commander, he provided the security for an open forum. As a diplomat, he ensured that all groups could participate and become part of the process. As an institution-builder, he created a security council, which institutionalized the process of discussion and compromise.

One of the security council's first requests to Colonel Newbold was to help organize a local police force. He agreed to help because he believed that a local Somali police force could deal with minor disturbances without arousing the hostility of the Baidoans. The additional benefit of establishing a local police force was that it prevented UNITAF forces from having to deal with every local problem. Not only was this an economy of force measure, but it also created another institution that could (and did) continue after the intervention force was gone. The Baidoan security council elected the members of the local police force on 27 December 1992. Soon thereafter, Task Force

[85] Ibid., 4-10.

Hope "made photograph identification cards and personnel files for each new officer." On 1 January 1993, the local police force began patrolling the streets and maintaining public order.[86] From the conception of the police force as an idea to the first police on the beat took less than two weeks. It does not take a long time to make a difference.

The development of the security council and the police force were not done in isolation. During the same period, Task Force Hope was escorting relief convoys, patrolling the streets, disarming bandits and demining the roads around Baidoa. These activities created an environment that the local police could reasonably manage. Security-building activities and local governmental institutions stimulated the restoration of economic activity. With the bandits disarmed and the market areas secure, merchants were able to reopen their stalls for business generating tangible economic and social benefits. The security council spurred the creation of other councils forming the basis for effective local government. On 16 January 1993, "children returned to school for the first time since the civil war began."[87]

The creation or re-establishment of the basic institutions of local governance may seem like a common sense measure that would have been supported by everyone. This is not the case. Omar Elmi, the local militia representative of Aidid's USC faction, lost influence as the local security council became more effective. Elmi had failed in his initial attempts to manipulate Task Force Hope into confronting the rival SNA forces. Later, sniper fire had been directed against patrols from a roadblock that was associated with Elmi's forces. According to local informants, the roadblock had been used to "collect taxes" and otherwise extort money and supplies from relief convoys. Task Force

[86] Ibid., 4-18.
[87] Ibid., 4-24.

Hope planned and executed a raid on the USC compound near the roadblock to confiscate all weapons. The raid was very successful in disarming a significant threat to the welfare and security of Baidoa. The raid had two important effects. First, it removed a long-term threat from the community. Second, the raid inadvertently enhanced the status of the security council to get things done. The compound and roadblock had been brought up as a point of concern in the security council after the planning had already begun. From the perspective of the local elders, they had urged action against the roadblock and it was removed that afternoon. Task Force Hope effectively forced the militia associated with Aidid's faction to pull back from Baidoa.

2. Bardera

Bardera is located on the Juba River in southwest Somalia. It is a small town surrounded by relatively open countryside. When Task Force 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (Task Force 1/7) arrived on 25 December 1992, the fields were full of crops waiting to be harvested.[88] Local reports indicated that there was a significant mine threat, which prevented the Somalis from returning to their villages to harvest their crops. The area had been the battleground between Aidid's Hawiye forces and a combination of Rahanweyn and Majertain/Darod forces. In October of 1992, General Warsame, a Majertain/Darod clan leader, had expelled Aidid's Hawiye militia from Bardera

On 23 December, the commander of TASK FORCE 1/7 and his principal subordinates went over their plan for moving into Bardera. The plan was to enter Bardera with vehicle patrols to make their presence known, establish "NGO corner" (a

[88] The commander of Task Force 1/7 was then-Colonel Bedard, the commanding officer of the 7th Marines Regiment. The task force was a Regiment (-) Reinforced unit built around 1st Battalion, 7th Marines as the ground combat element with 7th Marines Regimental Headquarters as the command element.

secure area for warehousing relief supplies), interdict the flow of arms and then "get the market going."[89] The commander of TASK FORCE 1/7 had discussed the move into Bardera with the commander of Task Force Hope. Based on the experiences of Task Force Hope, he planned to meet with local leaders within 24 hours of arriving, implement the Baidoan weapons policy and bring some tangible benefit with the first convoy, two trucks of food.[90]

Since October 1992, General Warsame had consolidated his hold on Bardera. He had installed Colonel Barre as the "police chief" and forced the relief organizations to pay for the security force. The members of the security force were "outsiders... loyal to General Warsame" with no ties to the Barderan community. The security force had imposed a semblance of peace on the community, but there were no indications it had attempted to facilitate the regrowth of Bardera. Security was a for-profit business. The location of the mines in the area was purportedly known to a former lieutenant colonel in the Somali army who worked for General Warsame.[91] General Warsame's Faustian bargain was implicitly:

1) Task Force 1/7 needed to get the farmers to harvest their crops.
2) The farmers would go to harvest when the mines were cleared.
3) The mines had to be located in order to be removed.
4) Warsame's militiamen knew where the mines were.
5) Therefore, TASK FORCE 1/7 had to accommodate General Warsame in order to assure his cooperation with demining.

By providing a measure of security to Bardera and offering to help with the de-mining effort, General Warsame attempted to coopt TASK FORCE 1/7 into supporting his position.

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[89] Ibid., 6-9
[90] Ibid., 6-5.
[91] Ibid., 6-15, 6-16.

Later that first day, the commander of Task Force 1/7 met with local leaders from Bardera and the Juba River valley. At the meeting, over 1000 people showed up. Most claimed some right to represent their clan or community. The sheer size and structure of the meeting made it difficult to engage in a participatory process. The commander explained the weapons policy: no visible weapons allowed and all crew-served weapons should be turned in. He emphasized that the task force had no interest in interfering with Somalis' culture, but rather would help by establishing a supply of safe drinking water. The commander of Task Force 1/7 asked the gathering to form committees and come up with priorities for action. Additionally, he asked the elders how he could increase the security of the communities. Finally, the commander emphasized that he "would kill anyone who hurt one of my Marines."[92] The unspoken message for the community was that your security is important but our security comes first.

The commander of TASK FORCE 1/7 made two important decisions, which demonstrated to the community what his "real" priorities were. The two decisions were to accept and support Colonel Barre as the legitimate police chief for Bardera and to hire one of General Warsame's men, a lieutenant colonel, to help with the de-mining effort. The commander knew that Colonel Barre was Warsame's man and that he was "unreliable." According to the commander, "I felt as long as I had him under my thumb, it would be okay." It was self-admittedly focused on the short-term instead of the long-term. The decision to hire the lieutenant colonel occurred after he asked for help from the local elders and before they were able to make recommendations. The lieutenant colonel had claimed to "defuse the mines on the road traveled by the Marines on the

[92] Phone Interview with Lieutenant General Bedard. In the interview, LtGen Bedard stated, "I came up with the weapon's policy based on common sense and the experiences of Mogadishu and Baidoa."

previous day" and by extension, to know where the other mines were located. According to local Somali sources, there were no written records for where the mines were located. How then did the lieutenant colonel know where the mines were, unless he put them there? It seems highly probable that the lieutenant colonel hired to remove the mines was the same person who had emplaced them. The local elders would have known this. The actions of the task force commander did not match his requests for community involvement in setting priorities and increasing security. By using Colonel Barre as the police chief and hiring the lieutenant colonel for demining, the commander of Task Force 1/7 inadvertently undermined the efficacy of the committees almost before they began.[93]

According to the official historian, Captain Dawson, "the mine threat meant that Colonel Bedard could not afford to alienate General Warsame."[94] From the documentary evidence, it appears that General Warsame successfully manipulated the commander of TASK FORCE 1/7 into implicitly supporting his dominance over Bardera. The relief organizations realized that the presence of UNITAF forces did not mean they could stop paying protection money to General Warsame's security forces. The Barderan community did not increase its level of participation in the local institutions as their lives became more secure.

For Task Force 1/7, "nation-building" meant rebuilding infrastructure and other engineering operations. The demining effort was given first priority as a means of getting the farmers out to their fields in time for the harvest. In contradiction to General Warsame's assertion, the roads were not heavily mined. Task Force 1/7 began patrolling

[93] Bedard Interview. Additional information on local Somali sources from Dawson, 6-17. Analysis of the effect on the local elders is my own.
[94] Dawson, 6-17, 6-19.

the outlying areas and started the slow work of looking for and clearing the mines that were there. The demining effort recovered only 27 mines, "most of which had been removed by Somalis and placed on the side of the road."[95] Other efforts focused on clearing and repairing roads to facilitate the delivery of relief supplies.

One incident highlights the relationship Task Force 1/7 had with the local security council. An aircraft loaded with khat landed at the Barderan airfield without permission. Khat is the mild narcotic chewed by Somalis. Khat is to Somalis as tea is to the British. Chewing khat is a daily ritual engaged in by a majority of the population and it is only good for a few days after it is picked. The plane landed at the airfield without permission from the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines commander, Lieutenant Colonel Getz. "Lieutenant Colonel Getz ordered his men to burn the 'illicit cargo,'" because he wanted to "make the point that aircraft were not allowed to land at Bardera without his permission."[96] The destruction of the cargo needlessly generated ill will toward Task Force 1/7. The Barderan elders drew a line down the center of the city telling the Marines to stay out. According to the task force commander, "This one incident erased all the good we had done." Additionally, UNITAF was forced to pay the khat merchant reparations for his lost cargo. This arbitrary act highlights the impact of local commanders and their perception of the local institutions. If there had been an effective local institution empowered by the task force, the cargo could have been turned over to them. The council could then decide how best to encourage the khat merchant to cooperate with the

[95] Ibid., 6-31.
[96] Ibid. Corroborated during the interview with LtGen. Bedard. He stated that LtCol. Getz had recently been involved with the JTASK FORCE-6 Counter-drug mission on the United States-Mexico border and burned the khat based on his experiences there.

needs of the task force. It would have also enhanced the status of the local council in coordinating their affairs.

Task Force 1/7 was responsible for the outlying communities around Bardera. The experiences of the smaller units in some of the villages offer some tantalizing ideas about alternative approaches that could have been highly effective if adopted on a wider scale. Early relief efforts to the villages in the Juba river valley had delivered the food in cooperation with the NGOs. The UNITAF forces and NGOs soon realized that the food aid was being stolen after the convoys left and sold across the border in Kenya and Ethiopia. Subsequently, the security element for the convoy stayed while the food was being distributed to the individuals in order to make looting more difficult. In many cases, doctors and nutritionists would accompany the convoys to conduct medical civic action programs (MedCAPs). This improved the level of services available in the village, but did not alleviate the security concerns. Realizing that securing the distribution area merely delayed the bandits from stealing the food, the commander of Task Force 1/7 began leaving a reinforce rifle squad in the villages.[97] The squads were very effective in providing security for the village and cut down the amount of food aid lost to bandits. The squads were picked up the next day or on the next convoy through the village. The task force commander emphasized the effectiveness of the small unit and yet did not deploy squads as a part of a broader approach to the problems in Bardera and the Juba River villages.[98]

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[97] Bedard Interview. The reinforced rifle squad was composed of the basic 13-man rifle squad with a machinegun team of 3 personnel attached. Depending on the personnel available on a given day, the squads deployed actually ranged from 10-20 personnel.
[98] Bedard Interview.

The commander's dilemma was whether the costs to the unity of effort were worth the benefits of increased security. The task force commander's choice was to use the deployment of rifle squads in a very limited manner. The effectiveness of the squads suggests that a more pervasive presence continuously maintained throughout the area would have been more effective than the targeted reaction force that was sent to a village after its security had been violated. The commander risked being defeated in detail, i.e. each squad was individually more vulnerable than they were in larger formations. This commander's dilemma illustrates two critical points. First, the *commander learned as he went along* what was effective and what was not. Second, the commander was reluctant to "lose control" of his forces and therefore was unwilling to risk a course of action which seemed to offer a greater degree of success.

Task Force 1/7 turned over to Task Force Bardera on 22 January 1993. After over three weeks, there was no locally generated police force, nor a process begun to create one. There was no durable, institutionalized process for effective local governance and no organized judiciary. If anything, the intervention in Bardera legitimized the process of governance General Warsame had begun in October 1992. Colonel Barre's police force had been maintained and legitimized by the intervention force. For the purpose of this study, that is where the story ends.

3. Comparing Baidoa and Bardera

One of the critical features differentiating the experience of the commander in Baidoa from the commander in Bardera is the way decisions were made and disseminated. The commander in Baidoa used a bottom-up approach that encouraged local leaders to get involved in deciding how to run their community. The commander in

Bardera used a more top-down approach that issued final decisions to the community. The top-down approach meant that the primary means for adjusting the commander's decisions was through conflict rather than conversation. The irony is that the Barderan leaders would have probably asked for a weapons policy similar to the one implemented in Baidoa if given the opportunity. Unfortunately, the commander implemented policies from "lessons learned" in another town rather than understanding that the *process for arriving at the decision* was the most important element. By issuing decisions by fiat, the commander in Bardera legitimized General Warsame's leadership style and decision-making process.

Another key difference between Bardera and Baidoa is that the commander of Task Force 1/7 was concerned "that they were beginning to take on responsibilities that properly belonged to the State Department."[99] Unfortunately for the commander of Task Force 1/7, there was only one State Department representative in Bardera, Mr. Donald Teitelbaum. The lone State Department representative could not possibly deal with the myriad relief groups, press requests, and local Somalis. The commander of Task Force 1/7 concluded that he was "stuck with the job" of coordinating and interacting with local Somali groups. In Baidoa, the commander of Task Force Hope realized that dealing with the local Somalis and helping them build durable institutions was an integral part of his job. In Bardera, the commander viewed interaction with the local Somalis as a distraction from "'their real mission', beginning security patrols in town."[100]

In late January 1993, the commanders of Task Force Hope and Task Force 1/7 were brought back to Mogadishu and assigned new tasks. Both commanders sought to

[99] Dawson, 6-27.
[100] Ibid., 6-28.

implement the lessons they had learned in Baidoa and Bardera. Colonel Newbold and his staff "were frustrated by the limited use of UNITAF's medical and logistical capabilities for civic action programs to date (mid-January)."[101] Under Colonel Newbold's direction the 15th MEU planned and executed "Operation Renaissance", a security sweep combined with a medical and dental civic action program focused on Mogadishu. Colonel Bedard emphasized the need for a pervasive presence and aggressive patrolling by small units to extend security throughout the city. Smaller patrols could present a less threatening demeanor and cover areas not accessible by larger vehicle-mounted patrols. During February 1993, Colonel Bedard, now as commander of all Marine ground forces in Mogadishu, focused his efforts on "combining aggressive patrolling with civic action in an effort to make Mogadishu more peaceful."[102] Having learned from their earlier experiences in Baidoa and Bardera, both commanders implemented similar action plans.

C. COMPARING LEBANON AND SOMALIA

The long-term failure of intervention in Lebanon and Somalia should be taken as a warning not a predetermined sentence. The actions of the local military commander can increase the social cohesion of the local communities. Conversely, the local military commander can, by action or inaction, dilute or drain the reservoir of social cohesion undermining the long-term stability of the local community. Even where the overall mission fails, local communities will be stronger if the local military commander purposefully engages in institution-building and civic action.

[101] Ibid., 7-35.
[102] Ibid., 8-20.

Table 1 Comparing Interventions

	Establish Security	Participatory Process	Institute Rule of Law	Conduct Civic Action
Lebanon	No	No	No	No
Somalia	Mixed	Mixed	Mixed	Marginal
--Baidoa	Yes	Yes	Yes	Y[illegible]
--Bardera	Marginal	No	No	Marginal

Table 1 illustrates some of the key considerations identified in the case studies. In Lebanon, local IDF commanders did not extend security to the villages and in many cases increased the insecurity and fragmentation of local communities. In conjunction with not engaging local elders in a participatory process, the civic actions executed by the IDF, such as bringing in food and other supplies, were regarded with suspicion. Most damaging of all, the IDF failed to prevent their coalition partners from committing human rights abuses, which significantly contributed to the animosity of the Shi'a towards the Israelis. In Somalia, where commanders engaged in a participatory process with local leaders, cooperation and security were enhanced. The degree of success attained in Bardera and Baidoa correlated with each community's perception of security. Both the IDF and the United States commanders benefited from adherence to the rule of law and suffered when they were viewed as capricious or arbitrary. The next chapter capitalizes on these experiences to collate some useful lessons for future commanders.

V. LESSONS (UN)LEARNED

Many of the official "Lessons Learned" that were forwarded to the official clearinghouses of the Army, Marine Corps and even the United Nations do not correspond to the experiences outlined in this study. It is a truism that most people don't write lessons learned about what went right, but focus on what went wrong. Most people perceived that Operation Restore Hope went well and that UNOSOM II did poorly. In analyzing the failures of UNOSOM II, more attention is given to the lack of military hardware than is paid to what was done. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin was flayed for not sending tanks and yet no one has criticized General Bir for circling the wagons and withdrawing into a single isolated compound.[103] Admiral Howe has received well-earned criticism for creating an enemy in General Aidid. Few have criticized the local commanders for not maintaining a pervasive security presence and foregoing foot patrols in favor of mounted patrols. The experiences of the past create a conceptual framework for acting in the future. The difficulty is making sure the conceptual framework is correct.

The official "Lessons Learned" are compiled in the United States Army's *FM 100-23 Peace Operations* and the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) online. A brief overview of the official "lessons learned" include:

[103] The UNITAF experience during the February riots suggests that tanks would have been useless anyway. Somalis laid down in front of them in order to immobilize the tanks and amphibious tractors. In the interview with LtGen Bedard, he reported telling General Bir that it was critical to maintain a pervasive security presence throughout Mogadishu or the violence would return.

- Need Armor Support (CALL)
- Need Better Intelligence (CALL)
- Need more robust Rules of Engagement (CALL)
- Mediation "conducted by specially organized negotiation teams." (FM)
- "Force protection consists of operations security (OPSEC), deception, health and morale, safety, and avoidance of fratricide." (FM)
- Prevent "Mission creep", i.e. institution-building activities. (FM)[104]

The lessons outlined above represent the conventional wisdom. Force protection is focused internally, leading to a bunker mentality. The need for armor support has become an article of faith for many with respect to the abortive raid in October 1993, which led to the eventual withdrawal of U.S. Forces. The myth of "mission creep" limits the ability of local commanders to engage in the range of institution-building activities that can provide the long-term solution for the problems of the local community. These "Lessons Learned" are dangerous in that they do not adequately address the problems an intervention force will face and the conventional wisdom stifles the local commander from seeking fresh solutions through an engaged dialogue with local leaders. This study is designed to destroy the barricades conventional wisdom has built around the local military commander.

This analysis of Lessons (Un)Learned suggests that the official lessons learned are only partially valid, if not completely flawed. Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Scalard, USA warned against the dangers of assuming that "lessons learned imparts the notion of a transcendent, universal truth invoked to guide all future actions."[105] His warning is as valid for this analysis as it is for the lessons learned written in the immediate aftermath of

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[104] FM 100-23 *Peace Operations*, Washington, DC:Department of the Army, 30 December 1994 Available online at http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/100-23/fm100-23.htm. Center for Army Lessons Learned, March 1994, Available online at http://call.army.mil/call/nfTask Force/mar94/394ch1.htm.
[105] Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Scalard, "People of Whom We Know Nothing: When Doctrine Isn't Enough," *Military Review*, July/August 1997, Available online at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/English/julaug97/scalard.htm Accessed 04/20/2000.

the events. This chapter synthesizes theory, observation and experience to break out of the conceptual prison that has been erected by previous "lessons learned." Lessons (Un)Learned is calculated to stimulate discussion, controversy and debate, rather than be the final word on how to conduct intervention operations.

A. ENLARGE THE SHADOW OF THE FUTURE

Axelrod's work on cooperation theory suggests that players are more likely to cooperate if they believe there will be multiple iterations of the game and the duration of the game is indefinite.[106] The intervention force can "enlarge the shadow of the future" by extending security to all players, institutionalizing the process for conflict-resolution and obeying the rule of law. Security guarantees reduce the potential costs of cooperating if the other player defects, thus increasing the likelihood of cooperation early in the game. This makes it more likely that a tit-for-tat mutual cooperation strategy will emerge over the long-term. Another way of conceptualizing it is that enhanced security, both personally and communally, allows individual actors to emphasize the more universalistic identity over a more particularistic identity. In plain terms, people are more likely to cooperate when they do not fear that doing so will cost them their lives, their family or livelihood.

The ability of external players to directly affect the "shadow of the future" for internal players is vividly represented by the response of UNITAF to the February riots juxtaposed with the UNOSOM II response to the June riots. In February 1993, Aidid orchestrated a psychological operation to foment unrest in Mogadishu utilizing his radio station, loud speakers and mob agitators. Aidid used disinformation about events in

[106] Axelrod, 3.

Kismayu to instigate riots against UNITAF forces that culminated in the injury of a large number of Marines, sailors and soldiers. The riots also set off a wave of looting that swept through Mogadishu. The UNITAF response to the riots was a security sweep and reinforced presence to stop the rioting and looting. UNITAF *did not* attempt to shut down Aidid's radio station, arrest his lieutenants or brand him a criminal. Aidid was purposefully kept in the negotiation process and not targeted specifically. In June 1993, Aidid began "broadcasting anti-United Nations propaganda." The UNOSOM II response was to attack his radio station in order to shut it down. The loss of his radio station would have seriously inhibited Aidid's ability to mobilize his constituency. Aidid's forces ambushed the Pakistani peacekeepers sent to take the radio station. UNOSOM II responded by putting a price on Aidid's head and actively pursuing Aidid's organization.[107] The UNOSOM II action had two unintended effects. First, the shadow of the future for Aidid was reduced to single iterations of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. If Aidid lost an iteration, e.g. he cooperated with UNOSOM by meeting with Admiral Howe and Howe had him arrested, then the game for Aidid was effectively over. Second, the payoffs for defection increased as the payoffs for cooperation decreased. The existential threat to the Somalis posed by the United Nations forces was "proven" by the reprisals and continuing attacks on Somalis conducted by UNOSOM and United States forces. Each attack on Aidid increased Aidid's ability to mobilize an ever-widening mass of Somalis. UNITAF maintained and potentially enlarged the shadow of the future for Aidid by not targeting him or his radio station. General Wilhelm suggested that the (February) riots were damaging to Aidid because they reduced his credibility and

[107] Dawson, 8-14 thru 8-17, E-2.

demonstrated his "declining fortunes." Commanders at all levels must consider how their actions and policies change the structure of the payoffs for cooperation and change the perceived duration of the game by the other players.

1. Extend Security to Everyone

Conflict entrepreneurs use uncertainty and anarchy to polarize the local community. Chaotic conditions enhance their ability to establish the existential threat to the referent object and make the functional actors more receptive. The Nabatiyeh fiasco in Lebanon and the anarchic conditions in Somalia prior to Operation Restore Hope bear this out. The intervention force must establish a secure environment for all players in order to reduce the ability of the conflict entrepreneur to mobilize their constituency. In the wake of the Sabra and Shatilla massacres, even non-Palestinian identity groups felt less secure. The logic for the Shi'a was if the Israelis will allow the Phalangists to massacre the refugees, then the Israelis will allow Haddad or fill-in-the-blank to massacre us.[108] Security for one group is often taken as an indication of the security situation for non-affiliated identity groups.

An account of one Marine officer in Mogadishu highlights the need for consistent security. The officer's company manned a road junction between two communities. Each day the children of the two sub-clans would begin throwing rocks some time around mid-morning. One of the children would get hurt and go get his older brother. The older brother would get a bigger rock and hit a child on the other side of the road. That child would get his brother who would bring a gun or a hand grenade. By early afternoon, the rock throwing had escalated into a significant firefight. The manned checkpoint was

[108] "Israel, U.S. Held Responsible for 'Atrocities'," *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic, 1400 GMT 19 Sep 1982.

about one block away and the personnel manning it had to take cover every day to avoid becoming collateral damage. The commander stated that it was not his mission to stop "Somali-on-Somali violence."[109] The Somalis in this area had little to gain by cooperating with the U.S. forces because their lives were completely dependent on themselves for security.

"Extending security to everyone" does not necessitate using the intervention force for basic law enforcement. Initially, the intervention force may need to intervene directly to stop inter-personal violence. "Extending security" should lead commanders to establish (at a minimum) a locally organized neighborhood watch program or even better a grassroots police force to prevent violent incidents from occurring. A neighborhood watch in cooperation with a local council and backed by the power and oversight of the intervention force could significantly enhance the security of all members of the community. The intervention force must maintain oversight to ensure the neighborhood watch complies with the rule of law. General Zinni emphasized that police participation was more important than delivering food aid in accomplishing UNITAF's mission.

2. Institutionalize the Process For Resolving Conflicts

The local council provides a forum for conflicting interests to be resolved through discussion rather than violence. It is the necessary second step after a minimum level of security is established. Most villages, towns and neighborhoods have an indigenous mechanism for resolving issues between groups without resorting to violence. The goal is to revive the indigenous mechanism. In the United States, the mechanism is the town

[109] Interviews with Captain Chip McLean, Major John Calvert and Major Brad Hall, May 2000 at the Naval Postgraduate School, April/May 2000.

council or town hall meeting. In Lebanon, the *mukhtars* or village elders traditionally resolved local issues.

The process is more important than the institution. George Irani has written an article entitled, "Islamic Mediation Techniques for Middle East Conflicts."[110] Irani asserts that the "rituals of *sulh* (settlement) and *musalaha* (reconciliation)... are indigenous forms of conflict control and reduction." Village elders and notables lead the process. The process of fact-finding is not to punish the guilty so much as it is to preserve the good name of the families involved and preclude an escalation of reprisals. The rituals include an exchange of goods as substitutes for revenge and "usually ends in a public ceremony of reconciliation performed in the village square." There are different ways of resolving conflict and building a community. Just as the solutions in Baidoa may not immediately translate to Bardera, so the council format for one country will be different from another.

The council derives its power from the ability to bring people together voluntarily, rather than through purely coercive means. The local commander aids the re-establishment of the indigenous institution by providing security for its meetings and enabling its decisions. The local commander should not set up the institution based on a preconceived notion of what the council should look like. In Bardera, the commander of Task Force 1/7 attempted to impose the same type of organization that the Baidoans had formulated for their council. The local council in Bardera was not as potent as the local council in Baidoa in part because the local leaders were not inextricably involved in

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[110] George Irani, "Islamic Mediation Techniques for Middle East Conflicts," *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 3 No. 2, June 1999. Available online at wwwc.cc.Columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/olj/meria/ meria99_irg01.html

its formation. The process for establishing the local organization is as important as creating it in the first place.

Everyone must be included (as long as they obey the rules.) It is important for commanders to be patient with those who seem to oppose the intervention force. The first person that offers their assistance to the local commander is likely trying to curry favor or get a relative advantage by being first. "Traditional"[111] identity group leaders are more apt to adopt a wait-and-see approach.

In Lebanon, the "leaders" who cooperated with the Israelis were opportunists who were trying to get an advantage over the local notables. As with many marginalized groups, when they were given their first taste of authority they abused their power and alienated the traditional elders. Initially, the village elders believed that Israel would pull back after making the PLO withdraw from Lebanon. For an elder in a Shi'a village in southern Lebanon, there was no need to actively cooperate with the Israelis if they were going to leave in a matter of weeks. In fact, there were disincentives to active cooperation. The disincentives ranged from undermining existing local support, breaking ties with patrons in Beirut and appearing to collaborate with the Israelis or Haddad's militia. The Israelis would have been better served to support village councils that voiced the concerns of the community rather than eliminating opposition leaders in the middle of the night. The barrel of the gun became the only outlet for grievances the village leaders could employ.

[111] Traditional is a loaded term. I use it guardedly in referring to the individual that the community most often defers to based on the communal relationships. I referred to them in Chapter 1 as the "functional actors."

In Somalia, the first leaders to approach the intervention force were the local militia leaders. In Baidoa, the commander found out that the "leaders" he had met with initially were not the true leadership of the town. By expanding the participation in the council, he included everyone who followed the rules. Only when Elmi's force violated the "rules of the game" by firing weapons at the intervention force was he excluded. In Bardera, the local military commander made a Faustian bargain with General Warsame, which seems to have inhibited the growth of grassroots organizations. Including Warsame in the process was a good idea as long as he continued to play by the rules.

3. Obey the Rule of Law: Avoid Arbitrary Actions

The lesson of Lebanon and Somalia is that the appearance of arbitrary action generates uncertainty about the "rules of the game." Commanders should not use the might-makes-right rationale to justify their actions although it is an ever-present temptation. There will be many times where actions must be taken quickly and without regard to local sensibilities. During conflict termination and operations other than war, the commander should build support for his command's activities and consult locals to bring them into the process. It may force commander's to plan differently or change the plan that was made. The changes may not always make sense in terms of purely military efficiency, but will build community support.

The disarmament program has been and will continue to be a highly controversial topic. It is beyond the scope of this study to adjudicate the wisdom of the policy or detail its many iterations. What is interesting is how the disarmament policy became a vehicle for arbitrary action. Some platoon commanders understood the policy to include searches of any "suspicious dwellings." During interviews with platoon commanders, it became

apparent that "suspicious dwellings" were loosely defined as any door with a lock on it.[112] The arbitrariness of disarmament was as much a function of implementation as it was a matter of policy. Some platoon commanders reported breaking down doors, rousting people out of their houses and confiscating all weapons. By one account, weapons included the utility knives that people used for eating and working, as well as the guns they maintained to protect their possessions from banditry. According to Captain Chip McLean, an amphibious assault vehicle (AAV) platoon commander, his platoon confiscated all of the weapons from one house and when they returned to the area some days later it had been gutted by looters.[113] For many Somalis, the implementation of the disarmament policy was more onerous than the security concerns it was supposed to alleviate.

Arbitrary actions, such as blanket arrests in Lebanon or the destruction of a planeload of khat in Somalia, create distrust of the intervention force. The "rules of the game" should be clearly understood by all players, to include local elders, the media, NGOs and the intervention force. There will inevitably be opportunities to demonstrate to the community that the rule of law is enforced. The opportunity may be the need to discipline the newly established police who may try to abuse their office, as in Lebanon, or the punitive strike on a militia compound that has endangered the lives of locals or the intervention force, as in Baidoa. If there is a local leader who is causing problems that substantially threaten the mission or the lives of the intervention force, it is better to conduct such activities openly, rather than secretively as the Shin Bet did in Marrakeh.

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[112] Interviews with platoon commanders Major David Holahan, Captain Dwayne Cannion, Captain Chip McLean, and Major John Calvert.
[113] Interview with Captain Chip McLean.

B. DEVELOP CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM

Civic Action has a long history for being both underutilized and highly effective. It is beyond the scope of this study to detail the origins and historical significance of civic action. The most well-known civic action program was the Combined Action Program in Vietnam, which was both underutilized and considered highly effective. Contrary to conventional wisdom, civic action is inexpensive, easily accomplished at the local level and enhances force protection. It should not be conceived of as a wispy, feel-good, well-intentioned ideal. Instead, civic action should be considered a hard-boiled, realistic, cost-effective, war-winning tactic. Civic action enhances the intelligence-gathering and operational capabilities for the unit that does it.

1. Employ Civic Action Programs to Build Cooperation

In Third World countries, Civic Action Programs offer tangible benefits to the local community. Medical services enhance the quality of life for both the individual and the family of the individual treated. The individual benefits by receiving care and getting well. The family benefits because most of the family members probably work together in agriculture or cottage industries. Veterinary services may even be more important as the life of a community may revolve around the life of the herd animals or working animals. MedCAPs and VetCAPs are often under utilized when the local military commander is focused on traditional military activities.

MedCAPs and VetCAPs can help identify the "real leaders" of a particular village or town. Colonel Lesnowicz, the commander of Task Force Mogadishu, stated that he would go to the site of the MedCAP and look for the leaders who controlled the line or took credit for bringing the service to their community. He would talk to them and build

a relationship with them. Colonel Lesnowicz would ask these local leaders to participate in one of the councils formed in Mogadishu. Each battery commander had a council that would meet and discuss issues on a regular basis. There was also a citywide council that met under the auspices of UNITAF. Most of the leaders identified through the MedCAPs were the lower level leaders who controlled particular street blocks. Interestingly, Colonel Lesnowicz used his experiences in Vietnam as his reference point and the Small Wars Manual as his guidebook.

2. Aid Local Institutions in Providing Community Services

The local institutions of police, judiciary, prisons and the town council will normally require the backing of the intervention force in order to be effective. The police will require uniforms, vetting and monitoring to foster a sense of professionalism within the force and respect from the local community. The judiciary will often need administrative supplies and protection until the bad actors are removed and normal governmental activities resume. The town council may need a mediator or arbitrator to resolve disputes within the council or provide resources to carry out the council's early efforts.[114] These activities can and should be started relatively quickly. In mid-intensity conflict, local institutions may need to be enabled after the active combat has been resolved or moved into a different area. In operations other than war, the intervention force can aid local institutions almost immediately.

Mine clearing, road construction, sanitation enhancement and minor construction projects can and should be supported by the intervention force. Mine clearing is clearly a

[114] Some participants recognized these ideas early in the intervention. These observations were confirmed in unpublished after-action reports by Major J.L. Caspers, *Military Government and Peacemaking* MCLLS Number 31905-92000 (00007), 03/19/93 and *Detention and Incarceration of Civilian NonCombatants in a LIC Environment,* MCLLS Number 31907-10400 (00008), 03/19/93.

military function, which allows goods and services to be traded. The local council should be involved with determining the priority of effort for mine clearing and subsequently road construction to facilitate the rehabilitation of market activities.[115] Sanitation enhancement generates both a military and a community benefit. The more hygienic the local area is the less likely disease will incapacitate the intervention force. The local community benefits from the improved sanitation with less disease and better quality of life. Minor construction projects can take many forms. The key to all of these services is that it meets the needs of the community, as they perceive them.

The experience of UNTAC in Cambodia offers an interesting case for civic action by military units at the local level. They found that civic action cost very little in terms of time, effort or material. It did not require an enormous central logistics or planning organization. Each unit engaged in a few activities that were individually minor, but that when aggregated significantly increased community support for the intervention force.

3. Eliminate the Need for Military Intervention

The "real mission" of the intervention force will almost never be the first explicitly assigned mission. The intervention force is sent in to change something about the target society. As Cuny asserts, intervention changes "the social, political, and economic context" of the local community. The patrols and the checkpoints are means to an end. In many war termination and operations other than war scenarios, the commander can save more lives by working with local institutions than he can by leading convoys or coordinating logistics. The traditional military tasks inevitably yield to more

[115] The local council should be brought into the decision early. The commander should be clear that their priorities will not be met until after the military requirements are accomplished. It may save time and effort as the local's may cooperate with locating mines even before work on their priorities is begun.

politically oriented activities. To the extent that the military lays a good institutional foundation, the more likely the intervention will not need to be repeated.

Commanders at all levels need to be grounded in the requisites of civic action as part of their training. Civic action broadly includes institution building, the re-establishment of basic services and the empowering of civil society. The first step in preparing commanders for civic action is to ensure they understand the tenets of the United States Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. Two benefits accrue from this emphasis. First, they will be reminded of their role in the United States and be better citizens. Second, the commanders of the intervention force will be better exemplars for the civil society they are creating. As one officer stated about Somalia, "Over there we took away their guns and protected their drugs (khat), but over here (in the United States) we let them keep their guns and take away their drugs."[116] The second step in preparing officers for civic action is to study cases where the military did a good job at the local level. Two works, which should be studied, are Brian Linn's, *U. S. Intervention in the Philippines* and Major Phillip Ridderhof's thesis, *Combined Action and U.S. Marine Experiences in Vietnam 1965-71.* Military commanders are obligated to understand the civic action aspects of intervention operations just as they require the machine gunner to understand his weapon and its employment.

C. THINK UNCONVENTIONALLY

Thinking unconventionally has a double meaning. In one sense, it means to think differently from what one may have thought in the past. To change one's mode of thought requires education not training. It requires reading broadly, discussing openly

[116] Interview with Major Holahan at Naval Postgraduate School, May 2000.

and admitting the possibility that there are more effective ways of thinking than the status quo. In another sense, the challenge to "think unconventionally" means adopting a mode of thought opposite to conventional military operations. The conventional military mindset focuses on breaking things and killing people. Conventional thought extols the better warrior as the one that most efficiently kills and breaks. According to that definition, robots could replace soldiers and become preeminent warriors. That is not my vision. The true warrior must not only master the destructive power of war, breaking and killing, but also the constructive power of building anew. Inherent in this vision is the requirement to think beyond the moment. How will what I do right now affect the long-term accomplishment of my mission? Unconventional thinking should not be relegated to the U.S. Army Special Forces. "Think Unconventionally" challenges all military leaders to do what needs to be done regardless of the job description in the doctrinal publications.

1. Take on the Role of Institution-Builder

The local military commander must help re-build local institutions, because there are not enough State Department representatives, U.S. Agency for International Development workers or United Nations officials to go around. The commander should not say, "It is not my job." There is no one else. Within the military structure, there are low density-high demand units who can help. These units range from Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Military Police detachments to Special Forces teams. These units may be tasked down to the task force level but rarely below that. The company commander and often the battalion commander have to execute the functions that those units offer at higher echelons. Instead of expecting others to do the work of

institution-building at the local level, military commanders at all echelons should prepare to deal with local institutions and local leaders. There won't be enough linguists. There won't be enough resources. There won't be anyone else.

One of the current mantras repeated in military circles is that institution-building activities are the special province of the NGO community. The most commonly cited reasons for NGOs to take the lead in institution-building are that they have the experience and they have the long-term commitment to see it through to completion. The question of experience is always suspect, because the experiences in one place may not transfer directly to another. The commitment aspect is salient but not without its own problems. The goal of institution-building is to eliminate the need for the intervention. Some critics of NGOs, such as Michael Maren, suggest the NGOs have a vested interest in extending the duration of the intervention rather than abbreviating it. On balance, the NGOs do bring experience and commitment to the table, but it should not preclude the military from aiding the re-establishment of institutions in their area. The intervention force must be involved with the local council, if for no other reason, but to ensure that it "does no harm."

2. The Best Means of Force Protection is to Accomplish the Mission

Force protection has become the paradigm for intervention operations in the Post-Cold War World. It seems that there are few reasons to risk the lives of our Marines and soldiers. When an intervention force is sent to a foreign land, there should be an implicit understanding that the task is worth doing. If it is not worth doing, the National Command Authority should not intervene. For the commander on the ground, mission accomplishment should be the overriding consideration. The considerations of casualty-

avoidance-at-all-costs and "when will we go home" should be ancillary considerations rather than the central focus. In Lebanon, casualty-avoidance led the IDF to implement disproportionate reprisals, arbitrary arrests and mounted patrols that substantially damaged the local population and the economy of southern Lebanon. In Bardera, Task Force 1/7 did not begin institution-building, in part because they were "looking at the clock."[117] To extend the argument, under UNOSOM II, the intervention force in Mogadishu pulled back into a single compound area. Where the forces under UNITAF had been dispersed throughout the city, UNOSOM II was so concerned about casualty avoidance that they failed to extend security to anyone including themselves.

Ironically, the emphasis on force protection makes the intervention force more vulnerable rather than less. The emphasis on force protection leads commanders to conduct vehicle-mounted patrols instead of foot patrols and leads to a "bunker mentality" instead of being present. Vehicle patrols seem safer than foot patrols. The reality is that more bodies are packed into a smaller area on vehicle patrols. The members of a vehicle mounted patrol have less situational awareness, are more vulnerable to RPGs and mines, and are restricted in maneuvering through built-up areas. The members of a foot-patrol are more likely to interact with the locals, a good source of information, and learn the area.[118] One of the reasons that the force going to rescue the Rangers had such difficulty was that the Somalis blocked off the main roads. The vehicle patrols of UNOSOM II did not go into the side streets, whereas foot patrols would have learned the alleyways and

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[117] The Operations Officer for 7th Marines had passed the word to the Task Force that they would be leaving within a couple of weeks of arriving in Somalia. The implied statement seems to have been, "we won't be here long enough to do any good anyway."

[118] Unpublished after-action reports by Captain Guzik, *Relations with Nationals during Humanitarian Operations,* MCLLS Number 31804-87800 (00002), 03/18/93, and Captain Lundstrom, *Patrolling,* MCLLS Number 31938-78300 (00002), 03/20/93.

side roads. This lack of knowledge about the side roads led to the irrational situation of a helicopter attempting to give directions to the rescue convoy.[119]

According to Colonel Lesnowicz, commander of Task Force Mogadishu under UNITAF, the intervention force needs to be deployed throughout the operational area to build relationships with locals, provide security and be in a better position to reinforce other units. By design, deploying company or platoon size outposts at checkpoints allowed units to reinforce other elements from three or four directions. If one unit was blocked off, the other three units could still get through and concentrate in the vulnerable area. Company and platoon officers reported that they were very familiar with their area after a short period of foot patrols. Some platoon commanders reported that they had Somalis they would contact on patrol to find out what was going to happen in their area. Deploying in smaller units dispersed throughout the operational area increased force protection. It had the added benefit of extending the security blanket to more areas and communities.

3. Remember: You Have the Guns

Fear and power are a deadly combination. Too often, circumstances spin out of control when the individual who wields power is afraid or frustrated. Bad things happen when the intervention force forgets that they have the predominant control of violence within an area. Worse things happen when they perceive themselves to be losing control of the violence within their area. The military commander can prevent his unit from losing control by taking action rather than letting the security situation gradually deteriorate. The unit is more apt to perceive themselves as being "in control" if they are

[119] *Ambush in Mogadishu,* Frontline episode #1704, Air date 28 September 1998.

active and engaged with the local people. On one level, this implies that foot patrols are better than mechanized patrols because it displays a degree of confidence. Foot patrols can also demonstrate the professional skills of the unit, thus deterring potential bad actors from violence. On another level, the more familiar the unit becomes with the operational environment, the more likely the unit will notice if anything is amiss.

The problem of fear and power has significant implications for the type of force that should be involved in intervention operations and the quality of the commanders who lead them. In thinking unconventionally, the resolution to fear is less reliance on power and increased reliance on presence and action. Conventional wisdom has led to a greater emphasis on heavily armored mounted patrols for force protection and to cow the local population into cooperation. The "lesson learned" from Somalia is that the Ranger incident occurred because then-Secretary of Defense Les Aspin failed to provide armor support for the reaction force. To believe that a piece of equipment would have changed the outcome is to miss the point. Armor may have been more successful in getting to the Rangers, but the presence of armor would not have prevented the incident nor would it have prevented the casualties that precipitated the need for the reaction force in the first place.[120] The lesson of Somalia is that leaders can encourage cooperation and prevent violent episodes from occurring through active engagement with local leaders and providing a secure environment. Security is an everyday thing, not a reaction force response to events already spinning out of control.

[120] During the February riots in Mogadishu, the armored vehicles of the Marines were immobilized by Somalis laying down in front of them. Additionally, because the vehicles could only use main thoroughfares, they were vulnerable to roadblocks and counter-armor ambushes.

D. EVALUATING LESSONS (UN)LEARNED

Lebanon and Somalia ingrained the military participants, national decision-makers and domestic opinion with "lessons" guaranteed to prevent a repetition of those events. Israel learned that occupation was too hard and morally corrupts the military force involved. The United States learned that intervention in Africa was too hard and failure too likely. The specific "lessons learned" by both the Israeli Defense Force and the United States armed forces were almost completely wrong.

Table 2 Lessons (Un)Learned

	Official Lessons Learned	Lessons (Un)Learned
Force deployment	Concentrated	Diffuse
Patrols	Armored	Dismounted
Security	Protect yourself	Protect everyone
Institution-building	Don't Do It!	Has To Be Done! Tag You Are It.
Civic Action	Don't if you can avoid it It is the NGOs job.	Do it. It is Your Job.
Interaction with Locals	Limit Contact	Encourage Daily Contact

In Table 2, the "lessons learned" by the IDF after Operation Peace for Galilee and the United States military after Operation Restore Hope are compared with this study's assessment of the "real" lessons that should be learned. The conventional wisdom represented by the first column emphasizes overwhelming force, concentration and focused military goals. The unconventional wisdom is that a more pervasive force, in smaller units, acting closely and continuously with local leaders can be more powerful than the sum of its individual parts. The diffuse force is more likely to have good

HUMINT, superior local knowledge and attain higher levels of cooperation with local leaders. The smaller elements are not individually powerful enough to be thoughtlessly arbitrary or carelessly destructive, as an armored force tends to be. The pervasive contact of small elements is powerful in the cumulative effect of a thousand daily interactions that cannot be replicated by the mounted force. There is a place for overwhelming concentrated force, but it is not the most effective tool for the daily work of operations other than war, war termination, low intensity conflict and similar intervention operations.

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VI. CONCLUSION

At the 2000 Central Region Symposium, then-CINCCENT General Zinni asked, "What do we do if containment works, and Iraq implodes?" In an interview the next day, General Zinni indicated that an imploding Iraq would require "nation-building operations" and that the United States military would be involved. The challenge he levied for the symposium and by extension to the United States military was to be ready to intervene. This study is one effort at beginning the process for conceptualizing, planning and executing intervention operations in Iraq or wherever the military may be tasked.

Identity-based conflicts will proliferate in the near-term. These conflicts will take the form of ethnic cleansing, genocide, civil wars or the "failed state." The global dominance of the United States means that those conflicts will more likely be local and regional rather than global in scale. Economic globalization and expanded communications technology increasingly binds the world together sparking new wars over identity, resources and position. Demographic changes caused by rural to urban migration, refugee flows and population growth will destabilize fragile identity group balances in some countries and exacerbate existing problems in others. People around the world will "contest the terms of their incorporation into the new global order."[121] Conflict entrepreneurs will mobilize their groups to defend against the "threat" to their identity and gain power for themselves in the process. If identity-based conflicts appear destined to proliferate, as I believe they are, what is to be done?

[121] Gurr, Kahl. Robert Kaplan articulates the most pessimistic case in his article "The Coming Anarchy" as published in the *Atlantic Monthly,* February 1994.

The practical arguments in favor of intervention are persuasive. In hindsight, the reason to intervene in Rwanda was that preventing or mitigating the Rwandan genocide could have prevented or mitigated the current continental-scale conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The reason to intervene in Somalia was to limit the spread of famine and conflict into Ethiopia and Kenya. The same types of arguments can and are made for intervening in the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia and Sierra Leone. In its simplest form, the practical argument for intervention is that conflict in one place exacerbates tensions elsewhere and in the absence of early intervention, the conflict will grow larger and more costly. The current war in the Congo seems to bear this out.

The intervention force that is sent will inevitably change the coalitional structure of the affected society. Raw inputs such as food, money and services will displace some leaders and elevate others. Thoughtful interactions such as institution-building and civic action will undermine conflict entrepreneurs and encourage the growth of civil society. The intervention will create new winners and losers.

The United States military will continue to conduct intervention operations. The plethora of "lessons learned" in the Post-Cold War era has led the United States down a false trail. The American mantra of "More is Better" fails to address the issues underlying identity conflicts and may exacerbate problems rather then ameliorate them. This study challenges the military commander involved in the next intervention to look beyond the conventional wisdom and use civic action and institution-building as standard tools of force protection and mission accomplishment. Lieutenant General Bedard posited that the more highly trained the individual and small unit elements are to fight a high-intensity conflict, the more capable they will be when sent on intervention

operations of a lower intensity. To the extent that the small units and individuals are more confident in their capabilities and therefore less prone to use indiscriminate force, he is correct. The challenge is educating the commanders of platoons, companies and battalions that they should focus externally on their interactions with local leaders rather than focus internally on their units and the holy grail of force protection.

There is a danger in reading too much into a narrow analysis of two cases. The danger is that you will end up fighting the last war, instead of the war at hand. The case problem has been partially addressed by drawing in analysis from the Combined Action Program in Vietnam and the United Nations' experience in Cambodia. There is a need for more study on this subject. Researchers could use this framework for analysis and investigate other intervention operations such as the Russian intervention in Chechnya, the NATO intervention in the former Yugoslavia or the United States intervention in El Salvador. The immediate benefit to any of these studies would be a broader understanding of the problems local military commanders face and the range of responses that seem to work best.

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