

**TEXT OF VADM MAYER'S (USJFCOM DEPUTY COMMANDER IN CHIEF)
KEYNOTE ADDRESS AT THE 4TH ANNUAL DPMO PERSONNEL RECOVERY
CONFERENCE
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OPENING:

Good morning.... I am most honored to speak to you this morning, about our business, the business of personnel recovery.

Just over a year ago, the United States Joint Forces Command stood up and we have had many new challenges, none more honorable or compelling than our responsibility as the Department of Defense Executive Agent for Personnel Recovery. With Department of Defense troops, civil servants, and contractors operating worldwide, the United States cannot afford to be held hostage by hostile foreign elements. Clearly within the context of this conference, which brings together both operators and policy makers from across the United States government, there has to be a keen awareness of Personnel Recovery goals and a correspondingly focused policy direction that will allow the military, civil, and political aspects of Personnel Recovery to operate synergistically. We have a moral and ethical obligation to those we put in harm's way, to clearly articulate Personnel Recovery policy, doctrine, and plans, and put the resources in place so that we can recover our isolated personnel safely and expeditiously.

I would like to share my thoughts in three areas concerning Personnel Recovery—I will begin with a historical look at personnel recovery successes and failures. Next, I want to review where we are today, a “State of the Union” if you will, of Personnel Recovery from a Joint

Forces Command perspective. And finally, a short look-ahead at the Personnel Recovery mission area challenges for the future.

THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE...

The desire of political leadership and military commanders to locate and recover their isolated troops is not new. The roots of Personnel Recovery were planted in 1942 with the creation of two organizations to handle Evasion and Escape activities in the European and Pacific theaters, and to support Prisoners of War in the German stalags and Japanese prison camps. These highly successful shadow groups worked with the Allies and the underground through the end of the war, to move over 47,000 Allies and Americans through Evasion and Escape nets back to friendly control. During the Korean Conflict, the Air Force managed to recover 254 aircrew members out of 1,690 shootdowns. In 1952, the Joint Chiefs decided there needed to be a service lead for Evasion and Escape activities. The Air Force was designated Executive Agent for E&E activities.

In 1955, analysis of Korean Prisoner of War experiences resulted in President Eisenhower establishing the Code of Conduct. It stated that “each member of the Armed Forces liable for capture shall be provided with specific training and instructions designed to better... counter and withstand all enemy efforts against him, and shall be fully instructed as to the behavior and obligations expected... during combat or captivity.” The Services instituted their own training, which varied based on service interpretation.

The shootdown of Francis Gary Powers in 1960 was the first of several events that highlighted a new problem for personnel operating in a peacetime environment, namely a need for specialized Code of Conduct training that highlighted the differences between wartime captivity as a POW and peacetime governmental detention by a hostile foreign government.

1964 saw the first publication of DoD Directive 1300.7, which contained specific policy guidance concerning “Training to Support the Code of Conduct.” With the advent of American involvement in Southeast Asia, the Services continued to train their personnel in the Code of Conduct in varying degrees. While there were standardization deficiencies concerning the Code of Conduct, recovery operations in Southeast Asia were a bright spot. Statistics show that over two-thirds of the 4120 total isolated personnel were recovered, while less than a third were captured and interned as POWs. An interesting footnote is that three quarters of these rescues were accomplished within two hours of the isolating event. Overall, history shows Personnel Recovery as a whole was very successful during the Vietnam War and although SERE training was not consistent or joint, POWs had enough training to protect sensitive information and return with honor.

By 1980 the Air Force had become the Executive Agent for Code of Conduct Training, which included responsibility for production of SERE guides and SERE planning products.

The Pueblo incident, the Iranian hostage crisis, and the continuing escalation of terrorism worldwide led to a DoD Directive 1300.7 revision in 1984. Guidance for peacetime captivity was added along with training programs developed to address the “highest-risk-of-capture” individuals within the Department of Defense, for both peacetime governmental and hostage detention. However, these courses were specifically focused and reserved for only the “highest” of the “high-risk-of-capture” personnel, with mainstream at-risk forces such as Service SOF and aviation remaining untrained.

The Air Force, as Executive Agent, restructured how it approached its duties in 1991, determining these mission areas belonged in an operational unit. The Joint Service SERE Agency (JSSA) was stood up to fulfill this decision. Also during this timeframe JSSA began

managing Operational POW/MIA affairs, including repatriation, debriefing activities, and the DoD's SERE psychology program.

In 1991 Operation DESERT STORM highlighted several PR deficiencies. Out of the 38 aircraft lost, the coalition forces had 63 personnel isolated during the war. Only seven PR missions were launched and only three personnel recovered by PR forces. Twenty-five became POWs, one self-recovered by walking out, and the rest were killed in action. Not one rescue was accomplished inside the two-hour window used with great success during Vietnam. Even with the lessons learned from Vietnam, the foremost being how vital Code of Conduct training is, 12 of the 25 POWs did not have proper training. Other significant problems included a lack of dedicated Combat Search and Rescue assets, a lack of deliberate PR planning, and location and identification problems.

The events of October 1993 in Mogadishu chillingly remind us of the ramifications of not being able to recover isolated personnel. In 1994 JSSA was assigned as the Personnel Recovery focal point, and was heavily involved with CENTCOM in the revitalization of Unconventional Assisted Recovery. In June of 1995, the shutdown of Capt O'Grady again highlighted deficiencies in our ability to locate and identify isolated personnel, but also showcased Marine TRAP as an effective recovery option, and it precipitated an NRO-NSA CONOPs which was used very effectively during the Kosovo recoveries. Also, in 1995 OSD chartered Joint CSAR Joint Test and Evaluation for a three-year effort to analyze Joint CSAR, provide solutions, and make recommendations on the conduct of Joint CSAR operations. The final piece of PR evolution was in 1996 when SecAF was assigned Executive Agent responsibility for Joint Combat Search and Rescue, resulting in the creation of the Joint Combat Rescue Agency.

TODAY

All this brings us to October 1999 when USACOM was redesignated USJFCOM.

October 1999 marked another significant event for this Command. On this date, Defense Reorganization Initiative Directive #29 transferred the OPCON and COCOM of DoD's Executive Agent responsibilities for Personnel Recovery, from the Secretary of the Air Force, to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command. This transfer of Executive Agent responsibilities represented senior DoD leadership recognition of the growing importance and the need for Jointness and renewed emphasis in the PR mission area. Along with the PR mission, the flag was also raised for another new USJFCOM organization—the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency. JPRA brought together the Joint Services SERE Agency, the Joint Combat Rescue Agency and the Joint CSAR Joint Test and Evaluation legacy products into a single entity. As the “Principle DoD Office of Primary Responsibility for Personnel Recovery,” JPRA represents one stop shopping for Personnel Recovery expertise. Now partnered with USJFCOM, JPRA is where it can best support the Warfighter.

In operations, Joint Forces Command and JPRA have worked together to support CINC and service component customers. We submitted a recommendation to include PR in the Unified Command Plan. In another key initiative, JPRA and JFCOM submitted a revised single PR Appendix for inclusion in JOPES Volume II, to consolidate PR in one area and provide a more comprehensive guide to planning PR operations. JFCOM and JPRA worked very closely with DPMO to assist in the publication of five key PR-related DoD Directives. We have submitted recommendations to include PR information in 17 Joint Publications and have supported changes to rewrite and add PR portions to the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) to place CINC's training focus squarely on combat recovery.

JFCOM, through JPRA, is making strides to better support the theaters. In the past year, JPRA has added Theater Representatives in EUCOM and PACOM to complement those already

in CENTCOM and SOCOM. We are also responding to a request for similar support for SOUTHCOM. We have also made it our goal to try to fully support at least one CINC exercise annually from end to end. This includes JPRA planning support to all exercise conferences, academics, and assistance during the Execution Phase. Currently, JPRA is on tap to support INTERNAL LOOK, UNIFIED ENDEAVOR, and TANDEM THRUST.

Another keystone is the high priority placed on developing academic courses to provide PR education to every level of command. Several courses are already fielded. The Joint Personnel Recovery Plans and Operations Course, a 10-day comprehensive Personnel Recovery planning course, targets CINC and Service component staff planners and those personnel targeted for Joint Search and Rescue Center, Recovery Coordination Center, or Unconventional Assisted Recovery Coordination Center operations. As we meet, a PR elective course at the Joint Forces Staff College is being taught and a course targeting Allied and Coalition personnel that plan or participate in Personnel Recovery activities is in development.

From a SERE training perspective, JPRA is working with the Services to ensure that peacetime Code of Conduct TTP's are integrated into their training programs, either as stand-alone courses or add-ons to existing courses. For the first time, exportable level B training courses have been produced, which the Services can use to train their "moderate-risk-of-capture" personnel. These new courses can also be used as a stop-gap for those Level C high-risk-of-capture personnel who have not yet made it through one of the Service SERE schools. JPRA is currently involved in assisting Canada, Australia, and New Zealand in setting up Code of Conduct courses for their "at-risk" personnel.

Major headway has been made on the intelligence side of the house where Cold War evasion and recovery intelligence production is being replaced by a knowledge and web based

collaborative production effort called the Joint Personnel Recovery Support Product (JPRSP). Also, Joint Forces Command initiated a Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures publication project for intelligence support to joint operations. Within this publication there will be a section that articulates JTTPs that cover intelligence support to PR.

One final initiative being pursued by JFCOM is a 15-year Memorandum of Understanding allowing Research and Development efforts between the United States and United Kingdom.

CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE

So what are the challenges for the future? First, we will need to finish two Mission Area Analyses. The first, the JPRA Mission Area Analysis is validating the JPRA charter and will provide a baseline to pursue the proper resources to fulfill the PR mission. The second study, the Joint CSAR Mission Area Analysis, supported by lessons learned from CSAR operations in Kosovo, is studying weaknesses in Joint CSAR training, C2, and execution of PR missions. JFCOM hopes to use this study to compare service CSAR doctrine and forces against theater CINC CSAR requirements; report on the “State of CSAR” and baseline JCSAR integration challenges; and highlight CSAR capable forces in the JSCP to increase CINC fidelity on force packaging. This MAA will also support JROC items, OPLAN/CONPLAN tasking, JTF deployments, CSAR training and Defense Planning Guidance development.

One of the big challenges for the future is how to fix the technological shortfalls currently hindering Personnel Recovery. We still have problems with location and identification, poor communications (both non-secure and secure), lack of “state-of-the-art” tagging, tracking, and locating devices, and many other technological challenges requiring solutions necessary to enhance our PR capability. How do we fix this? We have secured placeholder funds in the

FY02 POM for the PR Battle Lab--but let me emphasize that placeholder means exactly that JFCOM requires support from the other CINCs and the policymakers in this room to make the lab a reality. We envision the lab as a center of Excellence dedicated to the advancement, exploitation, and integration of PR technologies and capabilities and the development and integration of effective Personnel Recovery Joint TTP's. The PR Battle Lab will address a list of SERE technologies, C4I Systems and technologies, and strategic programs.

Another major challenge will focus on Joint Pubs in 2001. There is a complete rewrite of several Joint publications necessary, due to the changes in doctrine in Personnel Recovery. We will create a single overarching Joint Pub for the full spectrum of military support to Personnel Recovery. This revision will also create two support Joint Publications covering Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTPs). One for the recovery force and one from the isolated personnel's perspective.

SERE training will present challenges for the future. JFCOM is committed to joint, adequate, consistent, and standardized SERE training that will prepare the operator going in harm's way in wartime or peacetime environments. There are other challenges here--as we move to using more civilians on deployments or place them in harm's way, there is a need for a complementary Code of Behavior to mirror the Code of Conduct. We know DPMO is already pursuing this as a policy issue and we fully support their initiatives. The concept of the civilian Code of Behavior needs to be expanded beyond the DoD by the policy makers, so that personnel from any US government organization get the training needed in order to not compromise themselves or others if they are held captive.

Our final challenge will be to develop a DoD Personnel Recovery Roadmap to compliment the DoD vision documents such as the Quadrennial Defense Review and Joint

Vision 2020. When developed, staffed, and accepted, Joint Forces Command will use the roadmap, partnering with the PR community at large, to remedy current PR deficiencies and meet PR challenges of the future.

CLOSING COMMENTS

In closing, the challenges of enhancing this Nation's ability to recover and bring our people home are numerous, but not insurmountable. Although the flags were raised on 1 October 1999 for US Joint Forces Command and JPRA, the work necessary to make Personnel Recovery an integral part of our daily thinking has just begun. I have heard people refer to PR as an insurance policy—like the spare tire in the trunk of your car—you use it only when you need it. I challenge everyone in this room to make it their goal to change that thinking. It can't just be an afterthought or an obscure appendix to an OPORDER. PR must be an integral part of Service and Operational culture just like Electronic Warfare or air-to-air refueling, or Mission Planning. This is my challenge to you! Personnel Recovery came to Joint Forces Command to break it out of the stovepipe environment it has been in. It will take the continued effort of each and every one of us, from policy maker, to operator in the trenches, to make this happen. Not only must we support the Warfighting CINCs, we must also never forget the individual soldier, sailor, airman, and Marine whose lives we have entrusted to keep this Nation great. For the policy makers at this conference, this is your opportunity to learn what policy is necessary to drive the deliberate planning process for safe and effective Personnel Recovery operations. For you operators out there, this is your opportunity to articulate, from your perspective in the trenches, how and why some policies work or don't work.

Each and every person's support is critical to accomplishing the conference's goals, and improving the PR community's commitment to the motto "These things we do, that other's may live and return with honor."

Thank You.