

# Canadian CBRN PPE Standards and Guidance

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# The project objectives

- To provide guidance to first responders in the use and selection of protective equipment in order to enhance preparation for response to a CB incident
  - ✿ To drive the development of equipment guidelines and standards in this area for Canada

# The approach

- **R&D and guidance development in concert**
  - ✿ Specialists and responders participate in program
- **Determining what's needed**
  - ✿ Model scenarios
  - ✿ Understand responder roles, requirements and response procedures
  - ✿ Research toxicology of C,B,R agents

# The approach


- **Determining what's possible**
  - ✦ Model protective performance of clothing and respirators
  - ✦ Measure protection under realistic (workplace) conditions
  - ✦ Examine a variety of styles of protective equipment
  - ✦ Measure performance using a wide variety of appropriate agent simulants, toxic industrial chemicals

# The approach

- **Setting and meeting new requirements**
  - ✿ Develop standard assessment methods
  - ✿ Set requirements
  - ✿ Drive PPE standard development
  - ✿ Assist industry in understanding, assessing and meeting new performance requirements


# Standards development and guidance

- Systematic approach to advice based on all-hazards approach, operational requirements and reasonable maximum exposures
- Initial emphasis is on practical advice for managing the situation in combination with PPE selection



# Scenario development and release modeling

- A variety of C, B, R scenarios have been developed and evaluated consistent with the Canadian environment
  - ✿ Include indoor, outdoor release and contagious events
  - ✿ Modeling of release events has been performed




# Scenario development and release modeling

- **Some basic initial assumptions:**
  - ✿ Scenarios can be divided into those where a limited release volume is likely, and those where large volume release is possible
    - Use ERG 2004 small vs large release guidelines for chemicals to assist in defining perimeters
  - ✿ Vast overkill is unlikely
  - ✿ Agents are most likely to be chosen for lethality potential

# FR working zones

- Based on ERG 2004 with some modifications



# Roles and responsibilities in a CBRN event

Developed with assistance of FR working groups

| <b>Service</b>                        | <b>Type of event</b>                       | <b>Duties: Rad</b>    | <b>Duties: Chem</b> | <b>Duties: Bio</b>        | <b>Location of ops</b>   | <b>Work rate<sup>1</sup></b> |
|---------------------------------------|--|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------------|--|------------------------------|
| Hospital first receivers - Decon Team | R, B, C indoor release or outdoor release  | decon                 | decon               | decon                     | outside hospital; hospital located in cold zone; exposure to contaminated casualties | Moderate                     |
| Hospital first receivers              | R, B, C, indoor release or outdoor release | treatment             | treatment           | treatment                 | inside hospital: hospital located in cold zone                                       | Moderate                     |
| Hospital first receivers              | R, B, C, indoor release or outdoor release | treatment             | treatment           | treatment                 | inside hospital: hospital located in protective action zone                          | Moderate                     |
| Hospital first receivers              | Bio, contagious                            |                       |                     | high volume normal duties | protective action zone   | Moderate                     |
| EMS, general duty                     | R, B, C, indoor release                    | T, T & T <sup>2</sup> | T, T & T            | T, T & T                  | cold zone perimeter of event   | Moderate                     |
| EMS, specialists                      | R, B, C, indoor release                    | Rescue and T, T & T   | Rescue and T, T & T | Rescue and T, T & T       | isolation, support   | Heavy                        |
| EMS, general duty                     | R, B, C, outdoor release                   | T, T & T              | T, T & T            | T, T & T                  | protective action zone   | Moderate                     |
| EMS, specialists                      | R, B, C, outdoor release                   | treatment & rescue    | treatment & rescue  | treatment & rescue        | isolation, support, protective action zone   | Heavy                        |
| EMS, general duty                     | Bio, contagious                            |                       |                     | high volume normal        | protective action zone   | Moderate                     |

- also performed for police, fire

# Guidance on PPE use during release event

# Major issues identified


- **Recognize differences between Hazmat and CBRN terrorism events**

| <b>Hazmat release event</b>  | <b>CBRN terrorism event</b>   |
|--|---|
| Known substances, known amounts  | Unknown substances, unknown amounts (all hazards approach)                                |
| Toxicity variable, usually low to moderate<br>Primarily chemical, may include radiological | Toxicity likely to be high<br>Biological agents, including infectious materials, included |
| Often outdoor release with relatively small area of effect                                 | More likely to be either indoor release or covering very large outdoor area               |
| Specific emergency plan in place   | Planning must be generic  |
| Not targeted   | Targeted location and timing, may be weaponized for efficient delivery                    |
| Usually not criminal event   | Criminal event  |
| Event may last hours to days   | Event may last hours to months  |

**Initial approach to event must be all-hazards**

# Major issues identified: approach to scene


- Approach to suspected unknown event from up to 3 km distance must include good respiratory protection for all responders
  - ✦ Protective action zone and support zone may contain concentrations well above IDLH
  - ✦ Support zone at sufficient distance



# Major issues identified: characterization of event

- **Important to recognize scale/nature of event as soon as possible in order to choose appropriate protective levels**
  - Use appropriate indicators
  - Look for vehicles, reservoirs, ground-level air intakes which might indicate release of amounts larger than man-portable (200 kg)
  - Number of serious casualties relative to number exposed
  - Bio or rad dissemination devices

# Decision tree for selection of PPE for CBRN events



# Setting protection requirements

- **Model dispersion based on type, size of release**
- **Select various categories of worst-case agents, based on toxicity, ability to penetrate protective systems**
- **Establish acceptable exposure levels based on reasonable assumption of risk for single, acute exposure conditions**
- **Understand responder roles and locations**

# Guidance document

- **Selection and use of personal protective equipment for the Canadian first responder to a CBRN terrorism event: Interim Guidance Document (Oct. 2005)**
  - ✿ Found at  
[http://www.rmc.ca/academic/chem/research/crti/projectreports\\_e.html](http://www.rmc.ca/academic/chem/research/crti/projectreports_e.html)

**Table 2. Protection requirements for an unknown small-scale release event.**

| Event                       | PPE class | Zone/Protection requirement   | Suggested style                                   | Relevant standards   | Other comments  |
|-----------------------------|-----------|---|---|--|---|
| Unknown small-scale release | RPD       | Initial isolation zone: NIOSH SCBA CBRN equivalent protection, SWPF of > 20,000   | SCBA  | NIOSH CBRN approved SCBA   | 30 minute total time in isolation zone followed by immediate decontamination.   |
|                             | DPE       | Initial isolation zone: NFPA 1991 (2005 edn) protection   | Totally-encapsulating vapour tight (Level A) suit | NFPA 1991 (2005 edn)   | Full skin decontamination should be implemented on exit to support zone after 30 minutes.   |
|                             | RPD       | Support or protective action zone: SWPF of > 10,000 and protection against 40,000 mg.min.m <sup>-3</sup> of chemicals of most concern | SCBA<br><br>Other ASR<br>APR or PAPR              | NIOSH CBRN approved SCBA<br><br>None<br>None   | Use for several hours makes ASR/APR/PAPR use more practical<br>No ASR/APR/PAPR have been demonstrated to have required capability |
|                             | DPE       | Support or protective action zone: NFPA 1994 (2006 edn) class 2 equivalent protection; plus Class 2 shower test for decon role        | Class 2 or similar                                | NFPA 1994 (2006 edn), or NFPA 1971 (2006 edn), CBRN option, for firefighter turnout gear |   |

# Major issues identified: respiratory protection

- **CBRN-approved SCBA must be used in isolation zone until magnitude of event has been established**
- **If scale/nature of release can be estimated**
  - If large-scale chemical released, then APR cannot be used even in support/protective action zones
  - If small-scale rad, bio incident, APR use is possible in support zone/protective action zones
    - APR use may be possible in isolation zone if event identified as rad/bio

# Major issues identified: respiratory protection

- **Chemicals of concern have been identified against which NIOSH CBRN-approved or military air purifying respirators may not provide sufficient protection**
  - Canadian standard should include requirements for protection against these chemicals for small-scale events in support/protective action zones
  - Existing active carbon systems are being investigated for their performance
  - Modeling is being performed in order to assist in improved design
  - Plan to develop new APR cartridges

# Major issues identified: respiratory protection

- **Fitting of respirators and workplace protection factors have significant impact on ability of air-purifying respirators to provide adequate protection**
  - ✦ Procedure for rapid on-site fit-testing for fundamental fit of respirator using condensation nuclei counters has been developed
- **Appropriate individual fit-testing for high protection levels is a requirement**
  - ✦ NIOSH CBRN APR requires laboratory PF of 2,000
  - ✦ However higher PFs should be achievable/desirable during individual fit-testing


# Major issues identified: body protection

- Have provided input to *NFPA 1994 (2006 edn)* and *NFPA 1971 (2006 edn)* in order to bring standards requirements more closely in line with types of chemical hazards and updated toxicity estimates, using MIST assessments for certification
  - ✿ Focus on hazmat/fire requirements
  - ✿ Comfort/burden specifications have been improved
  - ✿ Still over-emphasis on “total” rather than “toxicologically relevant” protection
    - More information on dermally toxic chemicals needed



# Major issues identified: body protection

- A number of garments for hazmat response and turnout gear for CBRN rescue are under development by industry and US government teams
  - ✿ are being evaluated against NFPA 1994 and 1971 (2006 edn) requirements



# Major issues identified: body protection

- **Garments certified against standard will not be available till 2006**
- **Garments are particularly focused on isolation zone and decon team requirements**
- **Canadian standard is planned to include more classes of clothing**
  - To ensure match between functional requirements and minimal burden vs required protection for all categories
  - Need to understand performance and capabilities of air-permeable active carbon garments

# Major issues identified: systems integration


- **Systems should be certified with clothing and respirator worn together**
- **Integration between respirator, clothing, specialized helmets is critical**
  - Current NIOSH approval procedures do not measure respiratory protection of system

# The way ahead

- Continue to develop realistic performance evaluation methodologies for certification
- Continue to model and measure performance
- Work with CSA and CGSB to establish Canadian standards committee (summer 2006) for standards in 2008/9
- Work with industry to assist in development of appropriate systems to meet projected standards requirements (Canadian, NFPA 1994/1971)
- Assist in certification vs NFPA 1994, 1971 (2006 edn)



CANADIAN STANDARDS  
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The logo for CRTI-IRTC (Canadian Research Team in Incident Response) features the text 'CRTI-IRTC' in blue, with a stylized blue wave or swoosh above it, all set against a yellow background.

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