ABSTRACT

Although there is a substantial amount of work on formal requirements for two and three-party key distribution protocols, very little has been done on requirements for group protocols. However, since the latter have security requirements that can differ in important but subtle ways, we believe that a rigorous expression of these requirements can be useful in determining whether a given protocol can satisfy an application’s needs. In this paper we make a first step in providing a formal understanding of security requirements for group key distribution by using the NPATRL language, a temporal requirement specification language for use with the NRL Protocol Analyzer. We specify the requirements for GDOI, a protocol being proposed as an IETF standard, and verify that those requirements are correct.

1. INTRODUCTION

Before we can determine whether or not a security protocol satisfies its requirements, it is necessary to determine what those requirements are. Requirements are in general well understood for key distribution protocols involving two or three parties, and a number of formalizations of such requirements exist. But, they are not as well understood for group key distribution protocols, where keys may possibly be distributed among an arbitrarily large group of principals that may join or leave the group at any time. In this paper we attempt to fill this gap by developing a set of formal requirements for the GDOI group key management protocol [1], a protocol which we have formally specifying and verifying as part of a joint effort with the MSec working group.

Formalizing GDOI Group Key Management Requirements

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pals have no access to new keys. But keys may be updated for other reasons as well that have nothing to do with the composition of a group. Thus a freshness requirement that specifies a unique key per session will have no meaning here.

Likewise, the definition of ‘secrecy’ also needs to be reconsidered. In a pairwise protocol, all we require is that a session key only be known to the principals involved in that session. Whether or not one of the principals is dishonest and compromises the key is not usually a concern, as long as it is prevented from threatening the integrity of other sessions. However, in the case of group protocol, admitting a dishonest member into a group can introduce new risks. Not only can the member learn the group key while it is present, but depending upon how the protocol is designed, it may or may not be able to learn keys used before it joined the group, or keys generated after it left.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give an overview of the GDOI protocol. In Section 3 we give an overview of the NPATRL logic, and describe the normal form for NPATRL requirements for the NRL Protocol Analyzer. In Section 4 we present the NPATRL requirements for GDOI, and we also describe our system for building secrecy requirements. Section 5 concludes the paper. In Appendix A we show how we were able to use the logic to remove recursiveness from the secrecy requirements and reduce them to normal form.

2. AN OVERVIEW OF GDOI

The GDOI (for Group Domain Of Interpretation) protocol [1] is intended to be used with the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol [7, 5] to allow a Group Controller and Key Server (GCKS) to distribute keys to members of a group. Although it does not specify any mechanisms such as key hierarchies [2] for efficiently distributing keys to group members or for expelling or adding members, it is designed to be compatible with the use of such techniques. We have been working with the IETF MSec Working Group to develop a set of formal requirements, as well as a formal analysis, in order to demonstrate the usefulness of formal methods in the design or cryptographic protocols and in expediting the standardization process by providing formal evidence of soundness.

GDOI uses three categories of keys. Category 1 keys are the pairwise keys shared between the GCKS and potential members. Category 2 keys are key-encryption keys that are used to protect the Category 3, or traffic encryption keys.

For GDOI, the Category 1 (pairwise) keys are distributed via IKE Phase 1, which is described in [7, 5]. Key-encryption keys and traffic-encryption keys are created by the GCKS. The GCKS distributes these keys to the group as a whole by a groupkey-push message encrypted with the current key-encryption key. The GCKS maintains a sequence number SEQ that is incremented every time a new groupkey-push datagram is sent. The current value of the sequence number is included in the groupkey-push message. This allows group members to verify that a message is not a replay of one that they have already received. The groupkey-push datagram is also digitally signed by the GCKS using its private key so that receivers can verify that it was sent by the GCKS and not by another group member.

The groupkey-push message appears as follows in [1]:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiator (Member)</th>
<th>Responder (GCKS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HDR*, HASH(1), Ni, ID</td>
<td>HDR*, HASH(2), Nr, SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDR*, HASH(3), [KE_I], CERT, [POP_I]</td>
<td>HDR*, HASH(4), [KE_R], SEQ, KD, CERT, [POP_R]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

where Ni and Nr are the two nonces, SA is the security association, KE_I and KE_R are the optional Diffie-Hellman halves, CERT, POP_I, POP_R are the certificates and signatures used in the optional proof-of-possession exchange, and SEQ and KD are the sequence number and keying material (encrypted with the Diffie-Hellman key if that is used), respectively. The notation HDR* means, as before, that all information after the header is encrypted, this time with the shared Category 1 key. The hashes in the exchange are computed with the Diﬃe-Hellman key if that is used, respectively. The notation HDR* indicates that everything is encrypted after the header, in this case using the current key encryption key. SEQ is the sequence number, SA the security association for this key payload, which gives such information as algorithms used, key lifetimes, etc., and KD the new keying material. SIG is the digital signature of the message, and CERT is an optional certificate for the signature key.

When a principal wants to join a group, it takes part in a four-message groupkey-pull exchange with the GCKS. All messages are encrypted and authenticated with the pairwise key shared between the two principals. In the first message, the principal sends a request to join the group, including the group identifier and a nonce Ni to help in verifying freshness.

The GCKS responds with its own nonce Nr and with the group Security Association, which describes the mechanisms (e.g. encryption algorithms) and policies used by the group. It holds off on sending the keying material itself until it can verify that the request is recent. The group member responds with a hash (HASH(3)) taken over the two nonces. The GCKS sends the keying material and the current value of the sequence number in the last message.

There are also some optional fields in the last two messages. If it is required by the group policy, the member can send its own part of a Diffie-Hellman key exchange in the third message (KE_I), and the GCKS can respond with its part of the exchange in the fourth message (KE_R). The resulting Diﬃe-Hellman key is used to encrypt the group-keying material by use of exclusive-or. The purpose of this is to provide perfect forward secrecy: even if a pairwise key is compromised, the intruder can learn only keys distributed after the compromise, not those distributed before.

Another option allows the two principals to verify that each is authorized to act in their respective roles. This is the proof-of-possession (POP) option, where each party includes a public key certificate signed by a relevant authority, and proves his or her possession of the key by using it to sign the two nonces that were exchanged earlier in the protocol.

The four messages sent in the groupkey-pull exchange appear as follows in [1]:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member</th>
<th>GCKS or Delegate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HDR*, SEQ, SA, KD, [CERT,] SIG</td>
<td>HDR*, SEQ, SA, KD, [CERT,] SIG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The term HDR* indicates that everything is encrypted after the header, in this case using the current key encryption key. SEQ is the sequence number, SA the security association for this key payload, which gives such information as algorithms used, key lifetimes, etc., and KD the new keying material. SIG is the digital signature of the message, and CERT is an optional certificate for the signature key.
something called a key hierarchy. Basically, a key hierarchy is a tree, the root of which is the actual key used for encryption. Nodes of the tree encrypt and authenticate the nodes above it. When a principal is admitted to the group, it is assigned a leaf of the tree. When it leaves the group, only the (limited) portion of the tree it needs to compute the group key ought to be updated. This allows access control for both entering and leaving members to be enforced in an efficient way, as well as providing extra security beyond that provided by the key-encryption key used to encrypt the push message, since a new key will be protected by the keys below it in the hierarchy. See [2] for a discussion and overview of key hierarchies.

3. THE NPATRL LOGIC

3.1 The NRL Protocol Analyzer Model

The NRL Protocol Analyzer, or NPA for short, is a computer-assisted verification tool for security protocols which combines model checking and theorem-proving techniques to establish authentication and secrecy properties. We present merely a brief overview here. The interested reader is invited to consult [10, 11] for further details.

A protocol is modeled as a number of communicating state machines, each associated with a different role. Their transitions correspond to the actions that comprise the corresponding role. At runtime, roles are executed by honest principals who faithfully follow the protocol. Several instances can be executing at the same time, and they are distinguished by means of a unique round number. The intruder is modeled after the Dolev-Yao adversary [4]. Dishonest principals share their keys and other confidential information with the adversary.

The messages in transit, the information held by each principal and the intruder, the runs currently being executed, and the point that each of them has reached constitute the global state for the NPA. A protocol action implements a local transformation with global effects on the state. The initial state is implicit in the protocol specification.

In order to verify a protocol, a specification is fed into the run-time system of the NRL Protocol Analyzer together with the description of a family of states that correspond to attack situations. The system applies protocol actions backwards from these target states until it either reaches the initial state, or it exhausts all possibilities for doing so. As it regresses back towards the initial state, the NPA maintains a trace of the sequence of actions that, when executed, lead to the target state. If the initial state is ever reached, the resulting trace is a potential attack. If all possibilities are exhausted, there is no attack of the kind sought. Although the search space is in general infinite, the NPA incorporates techniques based on theorem proving that have the effect of soundly restricting the search to a finite abstraction, in most cases.

Traces are sequences of events of the following form:

\[ \text{event}(P, Q, T, L, N) \]

In general, any protocol or intruder state transition may be assigned an event. The arguments are interpreted as follows: \( P \) is the principal executing the transition, \( Q \) is the set of the other parties involved in it, \( T \) is a name that identifies the transition, \( L \) is a set of relevant words, and \( N \) is the local round number of the transition. Typical categories of events correspond to receiving a message, accepting data as valid as a result of performing certain checks and sending a message. For example:

\[ \text{event}(\text{user}(A, \text{honest}), [\text{user}(B, H)], \text{initiator_accept_key}, \{K\}, N) \]

This event describes the execution of a transition called “initiator_accept_key” by honest principal \( A \) that involves a key \( K \) and some other principal \( B \) who may or may not be honest.

3.2 The NPATRL Syntax

The NRL Protocol Analyzer has successfully analyzed a number of protocols, sometimes uncovering previously unknown flaws [10, 11]. But, secrecy and authentication goals are awkwardly expressed, as states that should not be reachable from the initial state. This unintuitive and occasionally error-prone way of writing requirements would have made it very difficult to use the NPA for large protocols.

The NRL Protocol Analyzer Temporal Requirements Language, better known as NPATRL (and pronounced “NP Patrol”), was designed to address these shortcomings [16]. This formalism makes available the abstract expressiveness of a logical language to specify requirements at a high enough level to capture intuitive goals precisely, and yet it can be interpreted in the NPA search engine.

NPATRL requirements are logical expressions whose atomic formulas are event statements, which mostly correspond to events in the NRL Protocol Analyzer; they include events denoting actions by honest principals that can be found in the trace of an NPA search, and the special learn event that indicates the acquisition of information by the adversary. NPATRL’s syntax for events is similar but not identical to the NPA’s. In NPATRL, the NPA accept event given above is written:

\[ \text{initiator_accept_key}(\text{user}(A, \text{honest}), \text{user}(B, H), K, N) \]

The logical infrastructure of NPATRL consists of the usual connectives \( \neg, \land, \rightarrow \), etc, and the temporal modality \( \diamond \) which is interpreted as “happened at some time before” or “previously”.

For example, we may have the following requirement:

\[ \text{If an honest principal } A \text{ accepts a key } K \text{ for communicating with another honest principal } B, \text{ then a server must have previously generated and sent this key with the idea that it should be used for communications between } A \text{ and } B, \text{ and that both are expected to be honest.} \]

We can use NRL Protocol Analyzer events to construct an NPATRL formula that expresses it:

\[ \text{initiator_accept_key}(\text{user}(A, \text{honest}), \text{user}(B, H), K, N) \rightarrow \diamond \text{srv_send_key}((\text{server}, (\text{user}(A, \text{honest}), \text{user}(B, \text{honest}))), K, N) \]

This formula is a simple expression of the above requirement.

Intuitively, the protocol verification process changes from what we discussed in the previous section by using NPATRL requirements where the final state appeared. More precisely, we first need to map every NPATRL event statement to an actual event in the NPA specification of the protocol. Then, we take the negation of each NPATRL requirement as a way to characterize the states that should be unreachable if and only if that requirement is satisfied. At this point, we perform the analysis as in the previous section: if the NPA proves that this goal is unreachable, the protocol satisfies the original requirement. Otherwise, it returns a trace.
corresponding to an attack on the protocol that potentially invalidates the requirement.

A couple of particular points about NPATRL expressions: Events occur exactly once. This means that atomic formulas are true at exactly one point in a trace (if at all). There is nothing in NPATRL syntax to automatically guarantee this uniqueness; it is assumed that event statements contain enough individuating information in their arguments or predicate to enforce this. Note that NPA guarantees this uniqueness, in part by having all events indexed both by local runs and timestamps. Second, “∃φ” is a strict operator; it includes times prior to the present time but does not include the present time. It is also convenient, especially when stating axioms, to have the dual operator in our language, “□”, read as “at all previous times” or “always previously”. It can be defined logically by, □φ ↔ ¬∃¬φ, where φ is an atomic event.

NPATRL has been extensively used in the last few years to analyze protocols with various characteristics. Among these, generic requirements have been given for two-party key distribution protocols [14, 15] and two-party key agreement protocols [16]. The most ambitious specification undertaken using NPATRL has involved the requirements of the credit card payment transaction protocol SET (Secure Electronic Transactions) [9]. SET proved particularly difficult to specify for several reasons. One of these was that the objects to be authenticated are dynamic: unlike keys, the objects to be authenticated are dynamic. Unlike keys, the objects to be authenticated are dynamic.

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3.3 NPATRL Axioms

We give axioms of a normal modal logic adequate to capture the needed temporal reasoning. Readers are referred to standard texts for details on systems of modal and temporal logic [3, 6, 8].

Our logic has two inference rules:

Modus Ponens: From φ and φ → ψ infer ψ.

Necssitation: From ⊨ φ infer ⊨ □φ.

‘⊨’ is a metalinguistic symbol. ‘Γ ⊨ φ’ means that φ is derivable from the set of formulae Γ (and the axioms as stated below). ‘⊨ □φ’ means that φ is a theorem, i.e., derivable from axioms alone. Axioms are all instances of tautologies of classical propositional logic, and all instances of the following axiom schemata

K  □(φ → ψ) → (□φ → □ψ)
4  □φ → □□φ
W  □(□φ → φ) → □φ
L  □((φ ∧ □φ) → φ) → □(ψ ∧ □ψ) → ψ

The first axiom guarantees that our temporal operators respect the non-temporal part of the logic. The second one guarantees that temporal reasoning is transitive. The third guarantees that sets of events are always finite and strictly-ordered. The last guarantees that events are weakly-connected (comparable). Note that in the presence of K and W, the 4 axiom becomes redundant. We have explicitly included it because we specifically use transitivity in our arguments in appendix A. There is some discussion of logics containing these axioms in [6] and [8]. In [8], axiom L is called “Lem₍” after Lemmon. Space limitations preclude a more detailed presentation here.

3.4 NPA Acceptable Expressions

Although NPATRL was originally designed to be used with the NRL Protocol Analyzer, it is actually much more expressive than the set of specifications accepted by the tool. Thus, in order to make NPATRL usable with NPA, it is necessary to identify a subset of NPATRL requirements that are acceptable by NPA, and to put them into a normal form that is parsable by NPA.

An NRL Protocol Analyzer query can be specified in terms of three things: terms known by the intruder, values of local state variables, and sequences of events that did or did not occur. The part of the query concerning sequences of events corresponds most closely to the NPATRL events. However, these events only correspond to user actions, and do not include learn events, which correspond to intruder actions. In order to capture intruder learn events, we will need to make use of the part of the query that specifies terms known by the intruder. This can cause some difficulties, since an NPA query does not specify when the terms were learned by the intruder. However, we can simplify matters by limiting ourselves to queries which specify the learning of only one term. This is usually adequate, and when it is not, we can usually transform the NPATRL requirement using our logic so that the restriction is satisfied.

Given that, we specify a normal form R for NPA acceptable expressions in a BNF grammar as follows. We let w stand for any learn event, a stand for any atomic event that is not a learn event, and let b stand for any atomic event.

E ::= □a | □(a ∧ E)
F ::= E | E ∨ F | E ∧ F
G ::= ¬E | ¬E ∧ G
R ::= ¬b | a → G | b → F | a → G ∨ F | a → G ∧ F

| □w → G | □w → G ∨ F | □w → G ∧ F

4. REQUIREMENTS FOR GDOI

4.1 Assumptions

We assume that each group is managed by one GCKS (it is possible to have more, but the means for doing this are not specified in the GDOI document). We assume that a GCKS may manage more than one group, and that a member may belong to more than one group. We assume that members may both join and leave a group, and a member may have concurrent and/or overlapping memberships in the same group.

We assume the usual Dolev-Yao style intruder, who can read, alter, destroy, and create traffic, and is in league with any dishonest principals, who share all data with it. We assume that all GCKS are honest, but that some members may be dishonest. Note that as a result of this assumption we make no distinction between the intruder’s learning a
key and a principal learning a key to which it is not entitled. Only dishonest principals will attempt to gain access to keys to which they are not entitled, and dishonest principals are assumed to share all information with the intruder.

We assume that there are two ways in which a key can be compromised that cannot be prevented by the protocol. One is by stealing: the intruder may learn the key by cryptanalysis, theft, etc. even if all possessors of the key are honest. The other is by having a dishonest member join the group.

Finally, in order to simplify matters, we only define events and requirements for key encryption keys, not traffic encryption keys. Since traffic encryption keys are protected by key encryption keys and distributed via the same mechanisms, it should be relatively straightforward to derive their requirements from the requirements for key encryption keys.

4.2 GDOI Events

In general, events map to actual messages and vice versa. However, since the central messages of the groupkey-pull exchange simply defer computation in order to resist forms of denial-of-service attacks [12] and the NPA does not currently support reasoning about denial-of-service, we behave as if their information load were compounded with the outer messages of this exchange.

We divide the possible GDOI events according to the principals that engage in them. There are four types of principals: the intruder, the GCKS, the group member, and an authorization server responsible for issuing credentials. Since a group member may be honest or dishonest, we represent a general group member as member(M, H), an honest member as member(M, honest), and a dishonest group member as member(M, dishonest).

4.2.1 Intruder Events

There is only one intruder event of interest to us here: the event in which the intruder P learns a word W. We represent that as follows:

\[ \text{learn}(P; (), W, N) \]

4.2.2 Authorization Server Event

The authorization server is responsible only for issuing credentials to principals. In order to simplify matters, we assume that each group has its own set of credentials appropriate to it. This action is represented by

\[ \text{auth_issuecreds} (AUTH, X, (C, G), N) \]

where X is the principal to whom the credentials are issued, C stands for the credentials, and G is the group to which the credentials apply.

4.2.3 The GCKS

The GCKS performs a number of actions of interest. It can create a key encryption key. It can admit and expel members. It can also cause a key to become current, and cause a key to expire. It can send a key, either in response to a member’s request, or as part of a group-key push data gram. We represent these as follows:

Creating a key:

\[ \text{gcks_createkey}(GCKS, (), (G, KG), N) \]

where G is the group for which GCKS is creating the key encryption key, KG.

Sending a key as a result of a pull exchange:

\[ \text{gcks_sendpullkey}(GCKS, M, (KG, NM, NGM, G, KGM), N) \]

where M is the member, KG is the key, G is the group, KGM is the pairwise key, NM is the nonce M uses in initiating the exchange and NGM is the nonce G uses in responding. We also use the gcks_sendpullkey event to cover the GCKS’s admitting M to the group, since M requests membership by initiating a pull protocol. We use NGM to identify M’s particular membership in the group. Note that this may not be the identifier used in a real application (as a matter of fact, GDOI does not specify any kind of membership identifier); however it is useful from a requirements point of view in that it allows us to distinguish between different and possibly overlapping memberships on the part of the same individual.

Sending a key in a push message:

\[ \text{gcks_sendpushkey}(GCKS, (), (G, KG, KG'), N) \]

The event gcks_sendpushkey causes one key, KG', to expire for group G and causes the next one KG to become current. The initial key created for a group is first sent in a pull-key message. Except for such initial keys, we assume for convenience that a push-key message making KG current is sent immediately after the create event that produced KG (without the possibility of an intervening distribution in a pull-key message). We also assume that the initial key is sent in at least one pull-key response that takes place immediately after its creation. We say the initial key becomes current when that first pull-key response containing it is sent.

We note that neither gcks_sendpushkey nor gcks_sendpushkey tell the whole story about the keying material passed in these two messages. In actual fact, the pull-key message will contain, not only the current key, but also the relevant part of the key hierarchy that the member M needs to access the key. Likewise the gcks_sendpushkey message will also contain the portion of the key hierarchy that needs to be changed to give members access to the new key and prevent former members from accessing the new key, if this is desired.

Canceling a membership:

\[ \text{gcks_cancel}(GCKS, M, (G, NGM), N) \]

where M is the member, G is the group, and NGM identifies the membership. Note that expulsion cancels only the membership with identifier NGM, not all memberships of that member. In order to truly expel the member, all its memberships would have to be canceled.

We note that gcks_cancel would be achieved in GDOI by having the GCKS send out a push message containing a new key hierarchy from which M is excluded. We choose to specify gcks_cancel separately from gcks_sendpushkey since this allows us to avoid issues such as canceling multiple memberships in one message, etc.

Sending a POP:

\[ \text{gcks_sendpop}(GCKS, M, (NGM, NGM, NGM, C), N) \]

This event describes a GCKS sending a POP in response to a members request. CG stands for G’s credentials.
Stealing a Key:

Finally, we need to specify the stealing of a key. We think of this not as something done by the intruder, but as something done by the GCKS. In other words, the action of stealing a key needs to be precipitated by the GCKS “losing” a key. This appears paradoxical, but it is a result of our model's assumption that actions involving a piece of data can only be initiated by those in possession of it. Note that we could also include actions describing members losing keys, but that this would be redundant.

We have two event statements, one describing the loss of a key-encryption key, and one describing the loss of a pairwise key:

\[
gcks\_\text{losegroupkey}(GCKS, (), (G, K_G), N)
\]

where \(G\) is the group and \(K_G\) is the key.

\[
gcks\_\text{losepairwisekey}(GCKS, (), (GCKS, M, K_{GM}), N)
\]

where \(K_{GM}\) is the pairwise key and \(M\) is the member who shares the key with the GCKS.

4.2.4 Member Actions

The relevant member actions involve accepting a key and requesting a key. A member can only request a key by initiating a group-key pull exchange, but it may accept a key as a result of receiving the final message of a group-key pull exchange or as a result of receiving a group-key push message.

The events are specified as follows.

Requesting a Key:

\[
\text{member\_requestkey}(M, GCKS, (G, N_M, K_{GM}), N)
\]

where \(GCKS\) is the GCKS, \(G\) is the group, \(N_M\) is the nonce \(M\) uses in initiating the request (to distinguish it from other requests), and \(K_{GM}\) is the pairwise key shared between \(GCKS\) and \(M\). This corresponds to \(M\) sending the first message in a group-key pull exchange.

Accepting a Key From a Group-key Pull Exchange:

\[
\text{member\_acceptpullkey}(M, GCKS, (G, K_G, N_{MG}, N_M, K_{GM}), N)
\]

where \(GCKS\) is the GCKS, \(G\) is the group, \(K_G\) is the key, and \(K_{GM}\) is the pairwise key shared between \(M\) and the GCKS. Again, this does not give the whole picture, as it leaves out the portion of the key hierarchy that the GCKS sends to \(M\).

Accepting a Key From a Group-key Push Message:

\[
\text{member\_acceptpushkey}(M, GCKS, (G, K_G, K'_G), N)
\]

where \(GCKS\) is the GCKS, \(G\) is the group, \(K_G\) is the new key, and \(K'_G\) is the current key encryption key. Again, we leave out the portion of the key hierarchy that \(M\) uses to authenticate the message and decrypt \(K'_G\).

For conciseness, we set

\[
\text{member\_acceptkey}(M, GCKS, (G, K_G), N) \\
\text{member\_acceptpullkey}(M, GCKS, (G, K_G, K'_G), N) \\
\text{member\_acceptpushkey}(M, GCKS, (G, K_G, K'_G), N)
\]

Here and in the rest of this paper, we write “\(\_\)” for an argument whose actual value is irrelevant. Each occurrence can be thought of as a distinct variable.

Sending a POP:

\[
\text{member\_sendpop}(M, GCKS, (G, N_M, N_{GM}, C_M), N)
\]

This event describes a member \(M\) sending a POP in response to a GCKS’s request. \(C_M\) stands for \(M\)’s credentials.

4.3 Authentication Requirements

Since GDOI is only intended to address the problem of secure distribution of group keys, not the authentication of group members to each other, its authentication requirements are simple and rather similar to those for two-party protocols. Thus we give them first. There are authentication requirements for both the group member and the GCKS.

The group member will want to know, if it accepts a key, that that key was generated by the GCKS for that group. The GCKS will want to know that, if it sends a key to a group member, then that group member requested a key. Finally, there are authentication requirements on the proof of possession (POP) algorithm. If the GCKS accepts a proof of possession from a group member, then the group member should have obtained the appropriate authorizations and the group member should have responded to the GCKS’s request for a POP. A similar requirement holds for the group member accepting a POP from the GCKS. We consider the three types of authentication below.

4.3.1 Authentication of a Key to a Group Member

Since there are two different ways a group member can receive a key, we have two different sets of requirement. In the case of the group member \(M\) accepting a key \(K_G\) for group \(G\) as a result of the pull protocol, we require that one of two things must have happened; either the pairwise key shared between the member and the GCKS was lost, or the GCKS did send \(K_G\) to \(M\) for use in \(G\):

\[
\text{member\_acceptpullkey}(M, GCKS, (G, K_G, N_{MG}, N_M, K_{GM}), N) \\
\text{gcksw\_losepairwisekey}(GCKS, (), (M, K_{GM}), N)
\]

In the case of the member \(M\) accepting the key \(K_G\) for group \(G\) as the result of receiving a push datagram, we again require that the GCKS has sent \(K_G\) for use in \(G\) in a push datagram protected by key \(K'_G\):

\[
\text{member\_acceptpushkey}(M, GCKS, (G, K_G, K'_G), N) \\
\text{gcksw\_sendpushkey}(GCKS, (G, K_G, K'_G), N)
\]

Observe that this requirement does not make any provision for losing an old group key \(K'_G\) since \(gcksw\_sendpushkey\) messages are authenticated with the signature of the GCKS.

4.3.2 Authentication of a Group Member’s Request

Although the GCKS has two ways of sending keys, it has only one way of sending a key to a specific group member: via a pull protocol. Thus we need only one requirement here, saying that if the GCKS sent a key to a group member in response to a pull protocol request, then either the pairwise key between the GCKS and group member was lost, or the group member actually sent that request. We need a unique way of identifying the group member’s request, and so we will use the nonce the group member sends in the first message of the pull protocol:

\[
gcksw\_sendpullkey(GCKS, (G, N_{MG}, N_M, K_{GM}, G, K_G), N) \\
\text{gcksw\_losepairwisekey}(GCKS, (), (G, K_{GM}), N) \\
\text{member\_requestkey}(M, GCKS, (G, N_{MG}, N_M, K_{GM}), N)
\]

4.3.3 Authentication of a Proof of Possession

For proofs of possession, we want to show that, for either the GCKS or a member, if \(A\) accepts a key requiring a proof of possession from \(B\), then \(B\) sent the POP in response to
4.4 Freshness Requirements

For GDOI, we can identify two types of freshness. One, we call recency freshness. This is the requirement that, if a principal receives a piece of information, such as a key, then it must have been current at some specified point in time according to the principal’s local clock, for example when the principal requested it. The other, we call sequential freshness. This is the requirement that, if a principal accepts a key \( K_G \), then it could not have previously accepted a key that became current after \( K_G \).

### 4.4.1 Recency Freshness for Pull Protocol

\[
gcks_{sendpullkey}(GCKS, M, (K_G, N_M, N_{GM}, G, K_{GM}), )
\]

\[
\rightarrow \phi (\text{member}_{sendpop}(M, GCKS, (G, N_{GM}, N_M, M, C_M), )
\wedge \varnothing \text{auth}_{issuercerts}(AUTH, M, (C_G, G), ))
\]

### 4.4.2 Sequential Freshness for Push Protocol

\[
\text{member}_{acceptpullkey}(M, GCKS, (K_G, N_{GM}, N_M, G, K_{GM}), )
\]

\[
\rightarrow \phi (\text{gcks}_{sendpop}(GCKS, M, (N_M, N_{GM}, G, C_M, )
\wedge \varnothing \text{auth}_{issuercerts}(AUTH, M, (C_G, G), )))
\]

4.4.3 Sequential Freshness for Push Protocol

\[
\text{member}_{acceptpullkey}(M, GCKS, (G, N_{GM}, N_M, G, K_{GM}), )
\]

\[
\rightarrow \neg \phi (\text{member}_{acceptkey}(M, GCKS, (G, K_{GM}'), )
\wedge \neg \phi \text{gcks}_{createkey}(GCKS, (G, K_{GM}'), )
\wedge \text{gcks}_{createkey}(GCKS, (G, (K_{GM}'), )))
\]

4.4.4 Freshness of a Member’s Key Request

We now consider a freshness requirement from the GCKS’s point of view. When the GCKS responds to a member’s request with a key, it must be sure that this is a new request, not a reply of some old request. Since a member’s request contains a nonce which is intended to be unique, we make this into a requirement that a GCKS should not have previously distributed a key to that member using that nonce.

Note that this freshness requirement can only be guaranteed for an honest member, since there is nothing preventing a dishonest member from replaying an old request and then participating in the protocol to obtain a key. Since honest members are the only ones we are interested in protecting anyway, this is not a problem for us. However, we need a way of distinguishing between honest and dishonest members. We do this by borrowing a trick from the NRL Protocol Analyzer specification language, and referring to principals as \( \text{member}(M, H) \) where \( H \) is a variable that can be instantiated to honest or dishonest. At this point we are only interested in \( \text{member}(M, \text{honest}) \).

\[
gcks_{sendpullkey}(GCKS, M_h, (K_G, N_{GM}, N_M, G, K_{GM}), )
\]

\[
\rightarrow \neg \text{gcks}_{losepairwisekey}(GCKS, (G, N_{GM}, N_M, G, K_{GM}, ), )
\wedge \neg \text{gcks}_{sendpullkey}(GCKS, M_h, (K_G', N_{GM}, N_M, G, K_{GM}, ), )
\]

where \( M_h = \text{member}(M, \text{honest}) \).

4.4.5 Freshness of Proof of Possession

Freshness requirements for Proof of Possession are more similar to two-party freshness requirements than some of the others we have visited. Since POPs are computed on nonces supplied by sender and receiver we require that, if a principal accepts a POP for two nonces, then it should not have accepted it previously. Since the POP is computed on the sender’s and receiver’s nonces, this can be enforced by requiring that the GCKS does not engage in a sendpullkey event based on the same nonces twice, and that a member does not engage in an member_{acceptpullkey} event based on the same nonces twice. Note that the GCKS’s freshness requirement is similar, but somewhat stronger than, the requirement for freshness of a member’s key request; it is not dependent on the pairwise key being uncompromised.

\[
gcks_{sendpullkey}(GCKS, M_h, (K_G, N_{GM}, N_M, G, K_{GM}), )
\]

\[
\rightarrow \neg \text{gcks}_{sendpullkey}(GCKS, M_h, (K_G', N_{GM}, N_M, G, K_{GM}, ), )
\wedge \text{member}_{acceptpullkey}(M, GCKS, (K_G', N_{GM}, N_M, G, K_{GM}, ), )
\]

where again \( M_h = \text{member}(M, \text{honest}) \).

4.5 Secrecy Requirements

GDOI has one basic secrecy requirement, that keys should only be learned by members of the group. However, we may want to put other conditions on this requirement. For example, we may require that new members should not have access to old keys (backward access control), and that expelled members will not have access to any keys generated after they were expelled (forward access control). GDOI also allows for an option that provides a degree of protection against compromise of pairwise keys; it allows for the optional use of Diffie-Hellman to assure perfect forward secrecy: if a pairwise key is stolen, then the intruder should only be able to learn key encryption keys distributed after the event.

As we can see, the different secrecy requirements are not quite orthogonal, and they can interact with each other in different ways. For example, one would not want to waste time with perfect forward secrecy if one did not also have backwards access control. In general, it is assumed that it is more likely that a dishonest member will join the group than that a pairwise key shared between only two principals will be stolen. So it makes little sense to use perfect forward secrecy to protect old keys, if they could be compromised.
by having a group key distributed to a dishonest principal. Likewise, requirements such as forward and backward access control should not only govern the effects of the distribution of keys, but other events such as the stealing of keys. For example, if members should no longer have access to new keys after leaving the group, then an intruder’s stealing a key should not give it access to subsequent keys either.

Our solution to this problem is to define a number of conditions describing sequences of events that define the situation under which an intruder might learn a key. These conditions can then be mixed and matched to put together the appropriate requirement. We can then use the NPA-TRL logic to reduce the requirements to normal form, when necessary.

In the remainder of this section, we describe the various sequences. These include five “base cases” that describe some simple sequences of events that could lead to key compromise, as well as two recursively defined cases that describe forward access control without backward access control, and vice versa. We also give several examples showing how the various cases can be combined to produce different types of requirements.

4.5.1 The Base Cases

The five base cases are as follows:

BC1($K_G, G$):

\[ gcks\_losegroupkey(GCKS, \_1, (G, K_G), \_2) \]

This describes the a group key-encryption key being stolen.

BC2a($K_G$):

\[ \Phi( gcks\_sendpushkey(GCKS, \_1, (G, K_G, K'_G), N) \]
\[ \wedge \Phi( gcks\_sendpullkey(GCKS, M, (G, M, N_{GM}, K'_G, K_{GM}), \_2)) \]
\[ \wedge \sim \Phi( gcks\_cancel(GCKS, M, (G, N_{GM}), \_2)) \]

where $M_a = member(M, dishonest)$. This describes a group key being distributed while a dishonest member is in the group. Note that it is in two parts. The first says that the dishonest member has joined the group; the second says that the member has not left it yet. In order to take care of the possibility of multiple joinings and leavings, we give both join and leave the same index $N_{GM}$, which uniquely identifies M’s joining the group.

BC2b($K_G$):

\[ \Phi( gcks\_sendpushkey(GCKS, M, (G, M, N_{GM}, K_G, K_{GM}), \_2) \]

for $M_a = member(M, dishonest)$. This describes a group key $K_G$ being distributed to a dishonest member via a pull protocol, that is, the dishonest member is being admitted to the group.

BC3a($K_G$):

\[ \Phi( gcks\_losepairwisekey(GCKS, \_1, (M, K_{GM}), \_2) \]
\[ \wedge \Phi( gcks\_sendpullkey(GCKS, M, (G, M, K_G, K_{GM}), \_2) \]

This describes the result of a pairwise key being lost and a key being sent using that pairwise key.

BC3b($K_G, G$):

\[ \Phi( \neg gcks\_sendpullkey(GCKS, M, (G, M, K_G, K_{GM}), \_2) \]
\[ \wedge \Phi( gcks\_cancel(GCKS, M, (G, M, K_G, K_{GM}), \_2)) \]
\[ \wedge \Phi( gcks\_losepairwisekey(GCKS, \_1, (M, K_{GM}), \_2) \]

This describes a pairwise key being lost and a key being sent using that pairwise key after the pairwise key is lost.

4.5.2 The Recursive Cases

There are two recursive cases. The first describes an intruder learning an old key after a later key has become current. The second describes the intruder learning a key before another key expires. We call these two cases “backward inference” and “forward inference.”

\[ BI(K_{G}', G) \]

\[ \Phi( learn(P, (\_1, K_G, G), \_2) \]
\[ \wedge \Phi( gcks\_createkey(GCKS, \_1, (G, K_G), \_2) \]
\[ \wedge \Phi( gcks\_createkey(GCKS, \_1, (G, K_{G'}), \_2)) \]

Note that when a new key is sent, the old key expires. And, we assume any (non-initial) key is sent in a push-key message as soon as it is created. Thus $BI$ for $K'_G$ describes an intruder learning a key $K_G$ that became current after a key $K'_G$ was current.

\[ FI(K_G, G) \]

\[ \Phi( learn(P, (\_1, K_G, G), \_2) \]
\[ \wedge \Phi( gcks\_sendpushkey(GCKS, \_1, (G, M_{GM}, K_G), \_2) \]
\[ \wedge \Phi( gcks\_sendpullkey(GCKS, \_1, (G, M_{GM}, K_G), \_2)) \]

$FI$ describes an intruder learning a key $K'_G$ that expired before a later key $K_G$ was generated.

Backward Inference will be used to specify forward access control without backward access control: If an intruder learns a key $K_G$, then $BI(K_G, G)$ will be listed among the set of possible paths to that event, but not $FI(K_G, G)$, that is, the intruder may have learned $K_G$ as a result of learning a key $K'_G$ that expired previously to $K_G$, but not a key $K_G$ that was generated after $K_G$ expired. Similarly, Forward Inference will be used to specify backward access control without forward access control: if an intruder learns a key $K_G$, then $FI(K_G, G)$ will be listed among the set of possible paths to that event, but not $BI(K_G, G)$.

We note that there appear to be some major changes from the original, informal, definition of forward and backward access control. The original definition put the requirement on the knowledge of any group member, not on the intruder. Also, the original requirement discussed a member learning a key as a result of joining the group, while we simply consider the results of the intruder learning a key without specifying how it was learned.

Our rationale for changing the focus from member to intruder can be expressed in two steps. In the NRL Protocol Analyzer model, we assume that dishonest group members can do everything honest group members do and more, since honest members can only obey the rules of the protocol. Thus any conditions on a dishonest member’s learning a key should also hold for an honest member. Secondly, we assume that all dishonest members share information with the intruder, so that any conditions on the intruder’s learning a key would imply the same condition for a dishonest member learning that information.
4.5.3 Sample Requirements

In this section, we show how the various “cases” can be combined into requirements.

Weak Secrecy

The weakest form of secrecy requirement simply requires that the protocol should protect against key compromise given the most benign assumptions possible: that is, that neither pairwise or key encryption keys have been lost, and no dishonest members have ever joined the group. This can be described in terms of three separate conditions:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{learn}(P, (G, G), \_ ) & \rightarrow BC1(K_G, G) \lor BC2a(K_G, G) \lor BC3a(K_G, G) \\
\end{align*}
\]

In other words, the intruder should not learn a key \( K_G \) for \( G \) unless some group key has previously been lost, a dishonest member joined the group, or a pairwise key was stolen.

Strong Secrecy

We can also use the base cases to formulate the strongest type of secrecy possible. In strong secrecy, the intruder learns a key \( K_G \) only if \( K_G \) is lost, a dishonest member received \( K_G \), either when it joined the group or while it was a member of the group, or if a pairwise key was stolen and used to distribute a group key. We may or may not wish to require perfect forward secrecy.

Here, for example, is strong secrecy with perfect forward secrecy:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{learn}(P, (G, G), \_ ) & \rightarrow BC1(K_G, G) \lor BC2a(K_G, G) \lor BC2b(K_G, G) \lor BC3b(K_G, G) \\
\end{align*}
\]

Forward Access Control

Forward access control (without backward access control) can be thought of as strong secrecy together with added condition of backward inference: An intruder can learn a key, not only if the key was lost, distributed to a dishonest member, or distributed using a lost pairwise key, but if the key became current before the intruder learned a later key, e.g., because a dishonest member joined the group. We do not include perfect forward secrecy, since protecting against old keys being compromised is a result of a stolen pairwise key makes no sense if the keys could be learned as a result of a dishonest member joining the group at any point:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{learn}(P, (G, G), \_ ) & \rightarrow BC1(K_G, G) \lor BC2a(K_G, G) \lor BC2b(K_G, G) \lor BC3a(K_G, G) \lor F(K_G, G) \\
\end{align*}
\]

Backward Access Control

Backward access control (without forward access control) can be specified similarly to forward access control, except that we replace backward with forward inference. We can require perfect forward secrecy or not. Here, for example, is backward access control without forward access control but with perfect forward secrecy:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{learn}(P, (G, G), \_ ) & \rightarrow BC1(K_G, G) \lor BC2a(K_G, G) \lor BC2b(K_G, G) \lor BC3b(K_G, G) \lor F(K_G, G) \\
\end{align*}
\]

If we wanted to omit the perfect forward secrecy requirement we would substitute BC3a\((K_G, G)\) for BC3b\((K_G, G)\).

In appendix A we show how to put the requirements for Forward and Backward Access Control into normal form.

5. CONCLUSIONS

We have presented a set of formal security requirements for the group protocol GDOI. In developing these requirements we learned much, not only about GDOI itself, but about the nature of requirements for open-ended cryptographic protocols. This has motivated us to develop the NPATRL requirements language into a full-scale logic that can be used to reason about and simplify requirements as well as specify them.

As this paper is being written, we are currently using the NRL Protocol Analyzer to verify that GDOI satisfies these requirements. This in turn may lead to a revision or improvement of the requirements as we discover more by our analysis. We have also been able to use our formalization of the requirements to discover and suggest improvements to GDOI. These suggestions have been incorporated into later versions of the draft. Thus, we have already found these requirements to be useful.

6. REFERENCES

APPENDIX

A. REMOVING RECURSION

In this appendix we show how we use the NPATRL logic to remove recursion from the requirements for forward and backwards access control. Removing recursion is not only desirable from the point of view of the NRL Protocol Analyzer, but also because a recursively defined condition may cause an infinite regression in other model checkers and theorem provers.

We present only the proof for backward access control; that for forward access control is similar.

Lemma 1.
The backward access control condition $BAC(K,G) =$

$\text{learn}(P, \cdot, (K,G), \_ )$

$\rightarrow \phi BC1(K,G) \lor BC2a(K,G) \lor BC2b(K,G) \lor BC3a(K,G) \lor \phi FI(K,G)$

is equivalent to the conditions $\text{NRFAC}(K,G) =$

$\text{learn}(P, \cdot, (K,G), \_ )$

$\rightarrow \phi BC1(K,G) \lor BC2a(K,G) \lor BC2b(K,G) \lor BC3a(K,G) \lor \phi NRFI(K,G)$,

where $\text{NRFI}(K,G) =$

$(BC1(K,G) \lor BC2b(K,G) \lor BC2a(K,G) \lor BC2b(K,G) \lor BC3a(K,G) \lor \phi GCKS(K,G, K') \land gcks_{sendpushkey}(GCKS, \cdot, (G,G', K), \_) \land \phi gcks_{sendpushkey}(GCKS, \cdot, (G,G', K'), \_))$

Proof. We make use of the following facts that follow from the NPATRL axioms. For reasons of space, we leave the proofs as an exercise to the reader:

1. $\phi (A \land B) \rightarrow \phi A \land \phi B$;
2. $\phi \phi A \rightarrow \phi A$, and;
3. $(A \land \phi B) \land (C \land \phi A) \rightarrow C \land \phi B$.

For purposes of of this proof, let $BC(K,G) =$

$\phi BC1(K,G) \lor BC2a(K,G) \lor BC2b(K,G) \lor BC3a(K,G)$.

We need to show that “$\text{learn}(P, \cdot, (K,G), \_ ) \rightarrow BC(K,G) \lor \phi NRFI(K,G)$” is logically equivalent to “$\text{learn}(P, \cdot, (K,G), \_ ) \rightarrow BC(K,G) \lor \phi FI(K,G)$”.

It is clear that “$\phi BC(K,G) \lor \phi NRFI(K,G)$” implies “$\phi BC(K,G) \lor \phi FI(K,G)$”, since “(BC1(K1,G) \lor BC2a(K1,G) \lor BC2b(K1,G) \lor BC3a(K1,G)” implies “$\text{learn}(P, \cdot, (K1,G), \_ )$”.

We prove the implication in the other direction by induction on the age of K1. Suppose that K is the first key used by the GCKS for G. Then, since there is no K1 that was distributed before K, neither “$FI(K,G)$” nor “$NRFI(K,G)$” holds, and so “$BC(K,G) \lor FI(K,G)$” is trivially equivalent to “$BC(K,G) \lor NRFI(K,G)$”.

Suppose now that the result holds for the k-th key $K_k$ used by the GCKS, for all k < n. Let $K_n$ by the n-th key. Then

$\text{learn}(P, \cdot, (K_n,G), \_ )$

$\rightarrow \phi BC(K_n,G)$

$\lor (BC2b(K_n,G) \land gcks_{sendpushkey}(GCKS, \cdot, (G,K_n,K2), \_ ) \land gcks_{sendpushkey}(GCKS, \cdot, (G,K_n,K3), \_ ))$

for some k. Since $K_k$ was used before $K_n$, we have k < n, and by the induction hypothesis we get

$\text{learn}(P, \cdot, (K_k,G), \_ )$

$\rightarrow BC(K_k,G)$

$\lor (BC2b(K_k,G) \land gcks_{sendpushkey}(GCKS, \cdot, (G,K_k,K'''), \_ ) \land gcks_{sendpushkey}(GCKS, \cdot, (G,K_k,K'''), \_ ))$

Using the facts “$\phi (A \land B) \rightarrow \phi A \land \phi B$”, that “$\phi \phi A \rightarrow \phi A$”, and that “$(A \land \phi B) \land (C \land \phi A) \rightarrow C \land \phi B$”, we have

$\text{learn}(P, \cdot, (K_n,G), \_ )$

$\rightarrow BC(K_n,G)$

$\lor (BC2b(K_n,G) \land gcks_{sendpushkey}(GCKS, \cdot, (G,K_n,K'''), \_ ) \land gcks_{sendpushkey}(GCKS, \cdot, (G,K_n,K'''), \_ ))$,

which is the result we need. □

Lemma 2.
The forward access control condition $FAC(K,G) =$

$\text{learn}(P, \cdot, (K,G), \_ )$

$\rightarrow \phi BC1(K,G) \lor BC2a(K,G) \lor BC2b(K,G) \lor BC3a(K,G) \lor \phi BI(K,G)$

is equivalent to the conditions $\text{NRBAC}(K,G) =$

$\text{learn}(P, \cdot, (K,G), \_ )$

$\rightarrow \phi BC1(K,G) \lor BC2a(K,G) \lor BC2b(K,G) \lor BC3a(K,G) \lor \phi NRBI(K,G)$,

where $\text{NRBI}(K'',G) =$

$(BC1(K'',G) \lor BC2b(K'',G) \lor BC2a(K'',G) \lor BC2b(K'',G) \lor BC3a(K'',G) \lor \phi GCKS(K,G, K') \land gcks_{sendpushkey}(GCKS, \cdot, (G,G', K), \_) \land \phi gcks_{sendpushkey}(GCKS, \cdot, (G,G', K'), \_))$

Proof. The proof is the same as for backward access control, except the base induction case is the most recent key instead of the first key, and the induction is on distance from the most recent key instead of on distance from the earliest key. □