

DEMILITARIZATION: IS IT WORTH IT?

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DAVID A. CUMMINGS, MAJOR
Jamaica Defence Force

Bachelor of Engineering (Honors), Cranfield University, UK, 1995
Masters in Defence Administration, Cranfield University, UK, 2004

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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major David A. Cummings

Thesis Title: Demilitarization: Is It Worth It?

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Jack D. Kem, Ph.D.

_____, Member
Mr. Phillip G. Pattee, M.M.A.S.

_____, Member
Mr. Gregory T. Beck, M.A.

Accepted this 15th day of December 2006 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

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ABSTRACT

DEMILITARIZATION: IS IT WORTH IT? by Major David A. Cummings, 100 pages.

There are twenty-seven countries in the world with no military forces, with seven of them having undergone a process of demilitarization. Against the background of trying to justify the continued allocation of scarce resources to a standing military force in a country that faces little or no external threat, this study examined the concept of demilitarization and sought to determine if it is worth it. The study utilizes a systems approach through a series of case studies of two countries that have demilitarized (Costa Rica and Panama), and two other countries that might consider it (Jamaica and New Zealand). The analysis focuses on the political, economic, military and social systems in each of these four countries. In the final analysis, no country should undertake demilitarization in isolation, but at the same time, a military force must not exist in an atmosphere of impunity, and command a disproportionate share of national resources. Though questions remain about the completeness of the demilitarization process in some of these countries, the main conclusions are that to Costa Rica and Panama, demilitarization was worth it in order to end a cycle of military interference in their domestic political affairs, but to Jamaica and New Zealand, demilitarization would not be worth it.

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ACRONYMS

ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, and the United States
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CARL	Combined Arms Research Library
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DCS	Department of Corrections
DGDP	Directorate of Graduate Degree Programs
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
GDP	Graduate Degree Programs
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JCF	Jamaica Constabulary Force
JDF	Jamaica Defence Force
MNS	Ministry of National Security
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAS	Organization of American States
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PDF	Panamanian Defense Force
PEMS	Political, Economic, Military, and Social
PLA	Peoples Liberation Army
PMESII	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information
PPF	Panamanian Public Force

SAS	Special Air Service
US	United States
US FAA	United States Foreign Assistance Act
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
WB	World Bank
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

A temporary lack of fires does not remove the need for a fire brigade.¹

The Economist, 22 April 2006

Introduction

There are twenty-seven countries in the world with no military forces, as shown in table 1.

1.	Andorra
2.	Costa Rica
3.	Cook Islands
4.	Dominica
5.	Grenada
6.	Haiti
7.	Iceland
8.	Kiribati
9.	Liechtenstein
10.	Maldives
11.	Marshall Islands
12.	Mauritius
13.	Micronesia
14.	Monaco
15..	Nauru
16.	Niue
17.	Palau
18.	Panama
19.	Samoa
20.	San-Marino
21.	Solomon Islands
22.	St. Kitts and Nevis
23.	St. Lucia
24.	St. Vincent and the Grenadines
25	Tuvalu
26.	Vanuatu
27	Vatican

While this represents 14 percent of the countries in the world, these demilitarized countries are home to less than 0.3 percent of the world's population.² The World Bank argues that the worldwide expenditure on national defense activity is the single and most massive obstacle to development.³ Central governments constantly perform a delicate balancing act between the provision of social services and the maintenance of a military. For small developing countries, like Jamaica, with no significant internal or external sovereignty threats, the maintenance of a military force has been called into question.⁴ This argument takes on additional fervor when viewed in the context of a country with a large external debt burden, high inflation, low economic growth, and a government under internal and external pressure to balance its budget.⁵

If a growing crime situation and other social problems are also features of the operational environment, then there will be additional pressure to make sacrifices aimed at channeling limited national resources into areas having the most adverse effect on the country. In this operational environment, it therefore appears logical that nonessential public goods will be sacrificial candidates, meaning that demilitarizing may be seen as a means of reducing the public expenditure burden by transferring the resources consumed by the military to the police force in order to combat the aforementioned growing crime problem.

Countries, such as Costa Rica, that have "demilitarized" are quoted often as having created the precedence, but it is quite possible that there may be a lack of understanding of the situation in that country that led to their demilitarization. Of the twenty-seven countries in the world with no standing military forces, seven of them underwent a process of demilitarization.⁶ What is arguably good for one country may not

necessarily be good for another. It is relatively easy to disband a military force by the mere stroke of a pen in Parliament, but it is hard to create one if the need suddenly arises. The scope of such an undertaking is apparent in the US military efforts to create a new Army in Iraq. So the general question arises, Is demilitarizing really worth it?

This study will therefore examine the concept of demilitarization in order to make a determination of the potential benefits or pitfalls, and by extension, if it will lead to the more efficient use of Jamaica's national security resources. The primary research question is: In small developing countries, like Jamaica, with no major internal or external threats, is it worth demilitarizing in order to assist in channeling defense resources into other public goods such as law enforcement? There are two secondary questions:

1. What are the implications of demilitarization?
2. What other options exist?

This study assumes that there will be no significant change to the current operational environment for most small developing countries. Although the Government of Jamaica recently published its first ever *National Security Strategy* that expresses a distinct role for the military, a looming general election, and subsequent change of administration may render this document null and void. Additionally, it is assumed that Jamaica's fiscal constraints will not change in the short term. Finally, in the event of Jamaica electing to demilitarize, it is assumed that the entire existing defense budget would be reallocated to the police.

The Operational Environment

Though this study discusses developing countries, it focuses primarily on Jamaica. Jamaica's (national security) operational environment consists of a Ministry of National Security under which the Jamaica Defense Force (JDF), the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), and the Department of Corrections (DCS) are organized. The JDF is essentially a Light Infantry Brigade, augmented with air, engineer, maritime, intelligence, and logistics elements. The total strength is approximately 3,500 men and women. The roles of the JDF include defending Jamaica against external aggressors; aid to the civil authorities in the maintenance of law and order, assistance in the maintenance of essential services, assistance and protection of the population in the event of disasters, security of Jamaica's Exclusive Economic Zone (25 times the size of the island), support of government-sponsored projects and programs, search and rescue (land, air, and sea); and military ceremonial duties.

The JCF is the principal law enforcement department and has approximately 8,500 men and women. Jamaica has a serious crime problem, which is not helped by the institutionalized level of corruption in the JCF, thereby creating a cycle of distrust among the police, the public, and the media.⁷ The JCF is also suffering from a lack of resources, which results from both national fiscal constraints, as well as the aforementioned mistrust.

Key Terms

The key term being used in this study is demilitarization, which is taken to be the reduction and final abolition of a military establishment.⁸ Other terms that are critical for this study include political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information.

According to *Webster's*, the term “political” means “relating to a government.”⁹ The term military is “relating to soldiers, arms and armed forces,” whereas the term economic is “relating to the production, distribution and consumption of (public) goods and services.”¹⁰ Social is “relating to human society, the interaction of the individual and the group, or the welfare of human beings as members of society.”¹¹ Infrastructure is “the system of public works of a country, including personnel building and equipment.”¹² This study will also include the permanent installations required for military purposes in this term. Information is the communication or reception of knowledge or intelligence. For further clarification, a second look at this term revealed that according to the *US Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, information is facts, data or instructions in any medium or form.¹³ The term paramilitary will also be used, which is taken to be a nonmilitary force that is organized and run in a similar manner to the military.

What this study will not do is provide a detailed quantitative analysis of the total financial and economic implications of demilitarization, as this is beyond the scope and time available for this study. Nevertheless, it is anticipated that the qualitative analysis will yield sufficient data to answer the main research question, “Is it worth it?” It is anticipated that the results of this study will provide an improved understanding of the military and its role in the national security framework, as well as develop an understanding of the consequences of demilitarization. Through case studies of other countries, other suitable options will be unearthed, thereby adding further value to this debate. For other developing countries, like Jamaica, facing the same challenge, it is hoped that this addition to the scholarly articles on demilitarization will help to answer a

few of the likely questions from those charged with the allocation of scarce national resources.

In order to end the cycle of anecdotal evidence and speculative arguments that have been used in this debate, it is important that an objective study be conducted to analyze the concept of demilitarization. In the final analysis, any study that assists in answering the question of scarce resource allocation is deemed worthwhile, particularly in light of the fiscal realities faced by many developing countries. Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature on demilitarization, which leads to chapter 3 which outlines the methodology utilized for this thesis. Chapter 4 analyzes the results of the research, before chapter 5 concludes the study with a set of recommendations.

¹“Reality Check at the IMF: The fund needs a gentle overhaul, not a fundamental rethink,” *The Economist*, 22 April 2006, 12-14.

²United Nations World Population Database; available from <http://esa.un.org/unpp/>; Internet; accessed on 19 September 2006.

³Hannah Galvin, “The Impact of Defence Spending on the Economic Growth of Developing Countries: A Cross-Section Study,” *Journal of Defence and Peace Economics* 14, no. 1 (2003): 51-59.

⁴Speech by the Leader of the Opposition, The Honorable Bruce Golding, “Getting Things Right,” Jamaica Labour Party Annual Conference, 20 February 2005, Internet; available from <http://www.jlpteam.com/conf1.htm>; accessed on 10 June 2006; Speech by Mr William Clarke, President, Jamaica Bankers Association, “Reforming the Security Forces,” 12 February 2005; Internet; available from http://www.scotiabank.com/images/jm/en/files_AboutScotiabank/275.pdf#search=%22William%20clarke%20speech%20jdf%20%22; and Mark Wignall, “Garth White and the News – Good Combination,” *The Jamaica Observer*, 27 February 2005.

⁵Sanjaya Panth et al., 2006 International Monetary Fund Country Report No. 06/158 (Jamaica), May 2006; [document on-line]; available from www.imf.org; Internet; accessed on 12 June 2006.

⁶Wikipedia, database on-line; available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_without_an_army; Internet; accessed on 10 June 2006. The other countries have simply never established a standing military force.

⁷Trevor McMillan et al., *Road Map to a Safe and Secure Jamaica*, Report of the Special Task Force on Crime, May 2006; [document on-line]; available from http://www.jamaicansforjustice.org/news_details.php?page=news&id=45§ion1=newslink Internet; accessed on 25 June 2006, 1.

⁸Tord Hoivik and Solveig Aas, "Demilitarization in Costa Rica: A Farewell to Arms?" *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 18, no. 4. (1981): 333-351; [journal on-line] available from <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3433%281981%2918%3A4%3C333%3ADICRAF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8>; Internet; accessed on 9 March 2006.

⁹*Webster's Dictionary*, available from The Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at: <http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/gateway/reference.asp>; Internet; accessed on 9 March 2006.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

¹³US Department of Defense, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*; Joint Publication 1-02, Washington D.C. Government Printing Office, 12 April 2001, document on-line; available from <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddic>; Internet; accessed on 12 March 2006, 260.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

There are twenty-seven countries in the world with no military forces with seven of them having gone through a process of demilitarization. Those countries are Costa Rica, Dominica, Grenada, Haiti, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and Panama. In order to assess the potential value of demilitarizing, it is important to understand the reasons why a country would undergo this process in the first instance. Surprisingly, there is not an abundance of scholarly works on this phenomenon. What literature exists focuses on one particular region or country, with little treatment of the overall virtues of demilitarization. It is this gap that this study intends to fill, as this will assist in answering the primary question of whether or not demilitarization is worth it.

This chapter will first examine the existing scholarly works and thereafter seeks to identify if there are any trends in the process, thereby allowing for an informed prediction to be made on the potential value of demilitarization. This result will help in developing a methodology framework for this study.

The main criteria used to filter the literature considered for this review are those that go beyond just a theoretical treatment of the subject and that actually analyze an example of the phenomena. A somewhat dated *Journal of Peace Research* article by Tord Hoivik and Solveig Aas argued that there are four aspects of demilitarization, namely:

1. Reduction and final abolition of a separate military establishment (using the defense budget as the final indicator)

2. The behavioral component (abstaining from the use of, or threat of using force in international politics)

3. The role of military within society (civil or military leader, and what type of government exists?)

4. The ideological component¹

They concluded that Costa Rica's demilitarization process was a response to an internal conflict, rather than a deliberate international policy. They also argued that Costa Rica only scores highly in the ideological arena, suggesting that a country needs to go beyond just passing an act in order to complete the demilitarization process, inferring that the demilitarization process in Costa Rica is incomplete.²

In a survey-driven *International Studies Quarterly* article, Jon Hurwitz, Mark Peffley, and Mitchell Seligson also discussed Costa Rica and its isolationist, antimilitary posture and argued that this has served to isolate the country from some aspects of national security issues that dominate political dialogue with countries, such as the United States.³ They argued that not only does this result in Costa Rica having little experience with national security matters, but that this has an adverse effect, particularly in confronting the transnational challenges affecting the region (narcotics trafficking being the most notable).⁴ Nevertheless, Connie Veillette, a US Congress Latin American affairs analyst, argued that Costa Rica is one of the most politically stable and economically developed nations in Central America.⁵ Andrew Bounds supported Veillette when he argued that Costa Rica abandoned its national army half a century ago and has not looked back since.⁶

Interestingly, Andrew Reding discussed a US attempt to “gradually accustom the Costa Rican people to an army they did not want.”⁷ He spoke of Civil Guards having “special units” with mortars, grenade launchers, and helicopters.⁸ In other words, he insinuated that Costa Rica has a military in all but name. One could therefore argue that the scholars are not unanimous in their verdict on the completeness and effectiveness of Costa Rica’s demilitarization process.

A Regional Perspective

One of the key works in the field of demilitarization is by Patrice Franko, writing in a 1994 edition of the *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*. In an article entitled “De-Facto Demilitarization: Budget-Driven Downsizing in Latin America,” she studied the Latin American area from an economics perspective. Her methodology involved an analysis of military spending trends, as well as an exploration of the geopolitical factors.⁹ She also examined the inherent dangers of demilitarizing in some of the larger nations in the region such as Brazil and Argentina.¹⁰

Franko postulated that there is a relationship between military expenditure and economic growth. With the decline in spending due to the end of the Cold War, the existence of fewer threats, increasing economic integration, and improved (Latin American) regional relations, sheer economics dictate the need for smaller, stronger, and more technologically capable forces. Franko concluded that rather than demilitarization, efficiency is the new watchword. She pointed out that the officer corps are particularly challenging, as their removal or disbandment is not reversible in the short run due to their “years of schooling and specialized instruction.”¹¹ The real danger, however, is that without a clear mission, the military will be increasingly deployed in police and nation-

building roles. Another general trend she highlighted was the severe lack of defense expertise in legislative and civil executive branches, which simply means that the military is poorly understood, thereby making it that much more difficult for armed forces to legitimize their claim on national resources.¹²

Continuing her clearly well-researched work, she pointed out that a common security regime could be considered, but this is hampered by a lack of incentives to do so, as well as the fact that “Latin nations harbor a deep distrust of the geo-strategic ambitions of their neighbors.”¹³ She concluded that whilst there is room for a more rational use of resources to achieve long-standing peace in the region, force restructuring must come from within. Importantly, her study also noted that the US and multilateral organizations, such as the Organization of American States (OAS), can lend much technical expertise to this debate.¹⁴

Professor Malcolm Chalmers argued that “security sector reform does not take place in a vacuum, but in the context of wider national reform efforts,”¹⁵ suggesting that demilitarization should not take place in isolation, but rather as a part of a larger series of strategic national reforms. In other words, demilitarization should only take place where there is a clear strategic framework that articulates the resulting national security apparatus.

The Jamaican Connection

Since the primary research question focuses on Jamaica, an important part of this review was an assessment of the existing works about the security of this nation. One of the more eminent writers on the Jamaican security landscape is Professor Anthony Harriott. In the 2002 summer edition of the *Security and Defense Studies Review*, he

argued that there is a “clear case for structural/organizational change,” and postulated that though the reconfiguration may be costly, it is worth giving consideration to transforming the current military in Jamaica to that of a less costly National Guard.¹⁶ His argument emphasized the altered nature of security threats to the states and peoples of the region, which he argued is now typified by some states being confronted with more complicated internal security problems. He stated that his National Guard approach is the “best choice between national defense on one hand and internal security and public safety on the other hand.”¹⁷

Harriott discussed the urgent need to rationalize and reform the security forces in Jamaica due to the much documented chronic and growing crime problem.¹⁸ He noted the “ineffectiveness of the JCF, manifested through their inability to reduce the high levels of violent crime, and their inefficiency in utilizing their resources to achieve credible public safety levels.”¹⁹ His methodology involved analyzing both the military and police under one “security forces umbrella,” though this method begins to blur the lines between the police and the military very early in his study. Having laid this foundation, he then focused on architecture and structural changes to the military, rather than on alternative solutions to his obvious bias towards demilitarization.

Harriott noted the high cost of reforming the JCF, which has stalled previous attempts at doing so. Citing Samuel Huntington’s 1957 work (*Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*), Harriott argued that a country with external threats should develop a relatively strong military, but a country with no such external threat and with a difficult crime problem should develop a strong and effective police service.²⁰ In fairness to Harriott, his study was completed before Jamaica

commenced its first ever national security strategy, so he would not be aware of the threat analysis included in that recent (2005) *Jamaican Parliamentary Green Paper*.

Nevertheless, he does commence suggesting that Jamaica does not really need a military.

Harriott discussed that though Jamaica's Army is now held in high regard, there were considerable reservations about its initial establishment, as many argued there was no need for one. He noted that the JDF has never been a threat to the form of government, but at the same time it does not have the capability to deter any serious external aggressor.²¹ Essentially, Harriott argued that because of Jamaica's limited military capability, the growing crime problem with an underresourced JCF, the military ends up being utilized to perform many policing functions, particularly in the intelligence and patrolling domains. He noted that the military are conducting policing functions, and the police "militarized."²² It is upon this platform that he concludes that Jamaica needs to improve the capabilities of the police force at the expense of the military, arguing that "to maintain a standing army to fulfill these and other existing functions is a lavish solution for a poor, developing country."²³

The main contention this author has with this study is that it appears to "blame" the military for the lack of resources in the police, as if the reduction or abolition of JDF would suddenly result in the requisite effectiveness and efficiency that the JCF requires. In other words, demilitarize due to fiscal constraints, with little quantitative analysis to show what his thesis would translate into. He also concluded that a more cost effective National Guard (on such a small scale, is it really?) is the ideal solution and argued that this would result in considerable savings. What he does not do is outline what these savings would be, which therefore begs the question, "Why make the military a

scapegoat for a public resource constraint?” The question that therefore arises is, What happens if Jamaica demilitarizes, and the crime problem is still not solved? What other entity will therefore be up for emasculation!

Lieutenant Colonel Rocky Meade argued that Harriott was misinformed of the size of the JDF (50 percent more than actual), and as such this led him to conclude that the JDF is too large for Jamaica.²⁴ This author, in his previous master’s thesis “Strategic Capital Sourcing Options for the Jamaica Defense Force” examined a Kings College (London) study by Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Roper which looked at the viability of combining police and military forces in small developing states in light of harsh economic realities and low external threats. Roper concluded that though there may be economic gains through amalgamation, there is much potential for stability to be lost by such a move, as the current separation of powers gives flexibility to governments in times of national crisis and upheaval.²⁵

Meade also cited the case of the lack of US homeland defense prior to 11 September 2001, concluding that there was never any perceived threat (hence the postevent scramble), arguing that Jamaica should avoid complacency and be prepared for the unexpected. His analysis is correct, in that the absence of a threat today does not mean there will not be one tomorrow. A successive series of good annual physicals at the doctor do not mean you can cancel your health insurance (or life insurance policy for that matter). Meade conducted a series of interviews and case studies, concluding that Jamaica should not fall into the homeland security complacency trap, like the US, and if it does, it will be at its own peril.²⁶ He argued, though there are economic considerations

there should be separate military and police organizations in Jamaica, outlining how the existing military force structure could be further optimized.

In examining the literary works in this field, several themes become apparent. The first is that there is a predominantly Latin-American theme, as interestingly, five of the seven countries that have demilitarized are from the Latin American and the Caribbean region. The relatively small size of these countries has probably led to only a few scholarly works about them, particularly since most of them demilitarized due to a failed military coup. Most of the works also deal exclusively with Costa Rica. More importantly, though they are all relevant works, they all fail to agree on the effectiveness of the demilitarization process in Costa Rica and in some instances even leave it up to the reader to make that determination.

Another interesting contrast is between the arguments of Franko and Harriott. Franko highlighted the poorly understood military having a difficult time making their claim on national resources, whereas Harriott demonstrated his misunderstanding and thereby basically advocates demilitarization. What this literature indicates is that an initial analysis of the phenomena would lead one to categorize demilitarization as being undertaken for one of the following four major reasons:

1. Political and Ideological (“we come in peace”)
2. Fiscal Constraints (“we cannot afford it”)
3. Imposed (Punitive Treaty or to prevent the recurrence of a coup)
4. Never actually established a military (possibly “outsourced”)

The third interesting construct is the Jamaican context. It is very interesting to note that there are several good scholarly pieces on the military and police in Jamaica and

that the argument always seems to revolve around reducing the military in order to bolster the police. This author's previous work on strategic capital sources for the JDF yielded several interesting concepts of how defense as a public good could be made more affordable. In the final analysis, though demilitarization is not a widely practiced concept, there does appear to be adequate scholarly works in the field, with the main gap being no discussion on the virtues of demilitarization, other than just to provide more resources for the police.

The final theme that this review highlights is that demilitarization appears not to be an absolute process and as such, it is implemented to varying degrees depending on which scholar does the interpretation. If the military is abolished, but its capabilities are merely transferred to another organization, or the defense budget remains largely intact to fund a special reserve or paramilitary force, then that is not really demilitarization. So there are varying degrees of demilitarization, which is the focus of the analysis in chapter 4. This literature review highlights the fact that the methodology for this study will have to examine the various aspects of demilitarization, including the political, economic, and military framework, in order to further explore of the virtues, implications, and alternatives of demilitarization, all subjects in the next chapter.

¹Tord Hoivik and Solveig Aas, "Demilitarization in Costa Rica: A Farewell to Arms?" *Journal of Peace Research* 18, no. 4 (1981): 333-351; available from <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=00223433%281981%2918%3A4%3C333%3ADICRAF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8>; Internet; accessed 9 March 2006.

²Ibid.

³Jon Hurwitz et al., "Foreign Policy Belief Systems in Comparative Perspective: The United States and Costa Rica." *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 3 (September 1993): 245-270; available from <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8833>.

percent28199309 percent2937 percent3A3 percent3C245 percent3AFPBSIC
percent3E2.0.CO percent3B2-3; Internet; accessed 9 March 2006.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Connie Veillette, "Costa Rica: Background and US Relations" (CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, February 2005).

⁶Andrew Bounds, "Bull by the Horns," *New Internationalist*, (2000), available from <http://www.newint.org/issue330/bull.htm>; Internet; accessed 9 March 2006.

⁷Andrew Reding, "Costa Rica: Democratic Model in Jeopardy," *World Policy Journal*, 3, 2, (spring 1986): 301-315.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Patrice Franko, "De Facto Demilitarization: Budget-Driven Downsizing in Latin America," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 36, no. 1 (spring 1994): 37-74; available from <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=00221937%28199421%2936%3A1%3C37%3ADFDDBDI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2>; Internet; accessed 9 March 2006.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Malcolm Chalmers, "Learning from Case Studies," Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Working Paper No. 92 (Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford and International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), London, 2002).

¹⁶Anthony Harriott, "Mission Effectiveness, Environmental Change and the Reconfiguration of the Jamaican Security Forces," *Security and Defense Studies Review* 2 (summer 2002): 19-45.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Rocky Meade, “The Relevance and Optimal Structure of the Military in Jamaica in the Current and Emerging Geo-Security Environment” (Master’s thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2003), 63.

²⁵David Cummings, “Strategic Capital Sourcing Options for the Jamaica Defence Force” (Master’s dissertation, Cranfield University, UK, 2004), 92.

²⁶Meade, 57.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Demilitarization has occurred in Costa Rica, Dominica, Grenada, Haiti, Panama, Monaco, and Liechtenstein. In analyzing nation-states, the framework must allow the investigation of the various elements of a state in order to measure the effects of demilitarization. The US military has developed a systems approach to analyzing the operational environment through the use of PMESII, which is an acronym for political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information.¹ These critical interrelated elements constitute most states, and provide a good starting point to find a suitable framework for this study (see figure 1).




Figure 1. The US Military PMESII Model

Source: US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 17 September 2006), II-22

The nodes in figure 1 represent the physical elements, such as people, places, or things, and the links represent the behavioral or functional relationship between the nodes.² It is this interconnectivity that makes the system function as a whole, and it is precisely this interconnectivity (or lack thereof) that chapter 4 examines to determine if demilitarization is worth it.

This study utilizes a document-based, qualitative analysis of a series of case studies. Since it is not possible to discuss all of the demilitarized countries in detail, it will be prudent to select only a few of them. It is through the analysis of these case studies that the worth of demilitarization will be established, which is the overall aim of this study. This chapter firstly outlines the scope and limitations of the study. Thereafter, the PMESII model is explained in more detail, after which the actual model derived as the framework for the case studies is introduced. The final part of this chapter discusses the selection criteria for the countries used in the case studies, to include the countries finally selected.

Scope and Limitations

This study discusses demilitarization as it relates to nation-states and does not take nonstate groups or actors into account. This study is constrained by time, and the author's location at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This limited the possibility of interviews being conducted with individuals in any of the seven countries that have demilitarized, as well as potential access to key government libraries. It is likely that the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at Fort Leavenworth will significantly mitigate these limitations. This approach will provide the foundation for the aforementioned document-based, qualitative method to examine the selected demilitarized countries. It will also

look at what other options exist, at varying degrees of demilitarization, and at how a demilitarized country conducts its national security and foreign policy affairs, particularly in relation to interactions with traditional partners who rely on the military as an instrument of their foreign policy.

PMESII Explained

There are certain critical variables in any operational environment, and as outlined earlier, use of the PMESII model allows a systems approach for this analysis. Since the PMESII model is a term derived by the US military, this study will use its definition of a system which is “a functionally related group of elements forming a complex whole.”³ Although in the most strict military sense, a typical operational environment includes air, land, sea, and space factors, as well as an adversary, friendly force components and neutral systems, the intention here is to focus only on the neutral (nonkinetic) systems represented by the PMESII model. Though it is recognized that these are all closely integrated elements of a dynamic system, for the sake of simplicity, this is the best way.⁴ A quick analysis of the various elements of the PMESII system allows one to make a determination of its suitability for use as the framework for this study. The introductory chapter already defined demilitarization as the reduction and final abolition of a military establishment.⁵ For the PMESII system component definitions, the *Webster’s Dictionary* meanings outlined in chapter 1 will be utilized.

Will PMESII Work?

In trying to measure the worth of demilitarization to a nation-state, it is therefore logical to utilize the PMESII systems model to analyze the effect on the nodes and links

of these critical components. However, it may not be necessary to use each and every one of the components of this typology, for reasons now explored. In most democratic countries, since there is civilian control over the military, the political systems are analyzed during each case study. Likewise, the “outlawed” or existing military body (or its replacement) must be analyzed, as does the economic support system in place. For this study, the economic nodes will also include the financial issues. Since the topic is predominantly military, the infrastructure most likely to be discussed will be military, and as such, this can be included with the military system analysis. Likewise, the information system analysis is included in either the political or military systems, depending on what the research reveals. Finally, the social nodes are analyzed as a separate system, in order to establish the effects of demilitarization on a society.

One is therefore left to model a system involving only the political, economic, military, and social systems, to which this study assigns the acronym “PEMS.” One can also draw a new model to represent this typology, as depicted in figure 2. What the model shows is that for demilitarization to be worth it, there needs to be a convergence of certain conditions (nodes) in all four of these systems as depicted by the box in the center of figure 2. Conversely, it can be argued that if there is no convergence of such conditions, then whichever nodes fall outside of the intersection of the four systems, may theoretically be the reason why demilitarization may not be worth it.




Figure 2. The PEMS Demilitarization Analysis Typology
(Adapted from the PMESII Model)

The systems of the PEMS operational environment discussed above will form the framework for this study. The logic is that for each case study, this framework will be applied to ascertain what the conditions were both prior to and after the demilitarization process, so that sensible deductions can be made about the usefulness of the process. Ideally, a set of conditions may emerge that lay the path for or against demilitarization, which in theory will be the convergence of events or conditions at the intersection of all areas as depicted in figure 2.

Case Study Selection

Of the seven demilitarized countries, Costa Rica, Dominica, Grenada, Haiti, and Panama did so as a result of a failed military coup or through overseas intervention.

When Monaco became a protectorate of France (in the seventeenth century), it abolished its military, and only Liechtenstein demilitarized due to budgetary constraints, though this was more than a century ago (in 1868). Liechtenstein is now a protectorate of Switzerland. To remove any bias towards only historical cases, only two of the countries that demilitarized are studied. The criteria for selecting these countries will be those countries that are the closest match to Jamaica in terms of size of economy, population, land mass, and status of development. Jamaica is a small island developing state with a population of 2.7 million, and 4,400 square miles of territory. Iceland, one of the twenty-five countries with no military forces, is a first world country and a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 39,000 square miles of territory; and as such, it would not make sense to consider it, since there are NATO forces permanently stationed there for its strategic security.

On the other hand, Costa Rica makes an ideal candidate with its developing nation status, a population of 4 million, and 19,700 square miles and was demilitarized relatively recently. Dominica and Grenada, though they are small island developing states, like Jamaica, have populations of only 69,000 and 89,000, respectively, and can barely muster a total of 434 square miles between them. Therefore, they do not make good candidates for a comparative case study due to their lack of adequate comparative scale. Panama has a population of 3.2 million and apart from Haiti, is the most recent country to have demilitarized. These, coupled with its developing nation status, make Panama an ideal candidate for a case study.

Jamaica will form another case study, as will one other country with minimal external threats and a military force so that the analysis can be performed on another

similarly challenged country. The country selected for this other “test case” is New Zealand, due to the fact that it is in the Commonwealth, just like Jamaica, but is far removed from the Latin American and Caribbean region and has very few external threats, thus making it a good potential candidate for demilitarization. Chapter 4 will therefore systematically analyze Costa Rica, Panama, Jamaica, and New Zealand in case studies aimed at establishing the worth of demilitarization in Costa Rica and Panama which have completed the process, and Jamaica and New Zealand which could or should be contemplating the process.

¹Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations*, Revision Final Coordination (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 23 December 200) hereafter referred to as JP 3-0.

²Ibid., IV-7.

³Ibid., IV-6.

⁴JP 3-0.

⁵Tord Hoivik and Solveig Aas, “Demilitarization in Costa Rica: A Farewell to Arms?” *Journal of Peace Research* 18, no. 4 (1981): 333-351; available from <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=00223433%281981%2918%3A4%3C333%3ADICRAF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8>; Internet; accessed 9 March 2006.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

This chapter examines case studies of two countries that have already demilitarized (Costa Rica and Panama) and thereafter examines the conditions in two other countries (Jamaica and New Zealand) in order to make a determination if demilitarization may be worth it. The chapter utilizes the PEMS systems approach derived in chapter 3, and the analysis of each country is conducted utilizing data from existing documents. The chapter concludes with an assessment of each country, at which point the worth of demilitarization for each case is discussed. Three of the countries analyzed are in the Latin American and Caribbean region, and one is in the Oceania region. The Latin American region is particularly suited to this study on demilitarization since it is historically one of the least-armed areas of the world, with no large standing military forces or nuclear weapons. There was also a period from 1950 to the 1970s in which several countries in this region witnessed the emergence of a series of military authoritarian regimes. Finally, the case study of New Zealand provides a different perspective in that it is far removed from the conditions found in Latin America.

An important fact to understand is that many of the military forces in Latin America began their service as public security institutions with little sense of “appropriate institutional boundaries.”¹ The US helped in the establishment of such organizations in countries, like Panama, Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic, and they were part army and part police and were intended to fill the security void created by the withdrawal of US troops. These “hybrid multifunctional entities had no inherent

concept of their legitimate historical roles, functions, or natural limitations.”² This trend has largely been reversed, but in attempting to study any particular country in the region, it is important to understand the genesis of the security landscape in the region. The map in figure 3 shows three of the countries used as case studies for this thesis. With this foundation, the first case examined is Costa Rica.



Figure 3. Central America and the Caribbean Region
Source: University of Texas website [document online]; available from www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas.html; Internet; accessed on 17 March 2006.

Costa Rica

Costa Rica is nestled among Nicaragua, Panama, the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean (see figures 3 and 4). Costa Rica has a very strong democracy and enjoys a free press with no government censorship.³ The country also has a good system of constitutional checks and balances, and Costa Rica is seen as a model for the rest of Latin America. Some of the factors contributing to this state of affairs include a strong commitment to democracy and a comprehensive education system, all supported by positive economic development. Costa Rica also prides itself on being a country without an army, but as one writer emphasized, “to hear Costa Ricans tell it, you would imagine that this singular state of affairs had blossomed spontaneously from their national character.”⁴ A question that arises is, What part did demilitarization play in achieving this current state of affairs?



Figure 4. Map of Costa Rica

Source: *CIA World Factbook Maps* [document online]; available from <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/docs/refmaps.html>; Internet; accessed on 17 March 2006.

Political

It is important to establish some historical political context for this analysis. In response to electoral fraud in 1948, Jose Pepe Figueres led a bloody revolution that cost more than 2,000 lives. This revolution overthrew the government and outlawed the Communist Party that wanted to convert Costa Rica into a welfare state. Figueres then abolished the army in order to assure that he would not be overthrown by a military coup when he became president. This abolition ended an organization that repeatedly threatened or destabilized Costa Rica's democracy and effectively meant that Costa Rica had become demilitarized. The International Peace Research Institute concluded that "Costa Rican demilitarization was a response to an internal conflict rather than a deliberate international policy."⁵

Also of note is the fact that the commission appointed by the government to modernize Costa Rica concluded that "in our opinion, war, being banished as an instrument in national and international politics . . . and observing the grave damages militarism has caused in all our countries, we have come to the conclusion that there exists no reason to maintain an army."⁶ What must be made clear is that Costa Rica has not completely closed the door on having a military, since the actual wording of its legislation stated that "military forces may be organized only through continental agreement or for national defense purposes and in either case they shall always be subordinate to civilian power . . . may request from the National Assembly a declaration of a state of national defense and authorization to order military recruitment, organize the army and negotiate peace."⁷

Within Costa Rica, there exists a competitive multiparty environment, and more importantly, all parties accept and respect the rule of law. Demilitarization has also served to reassure its neighbors that it has no designs on their territory and relies on diplomacy and the rule of law to maintain their country's sovereignty and independence.⁸ Costa Rica has signed all major human rights treaties and is confident that any external aggression is unlikely. The late Senator Alan Cranston, a California Democrat, argued that Costa Rican political and economic development has been strengthened by its decision to demilitarize, noting that "demilitarization is not the only pillar upon which Costa Rican democracy rests."⁹ He claimed that "one thing worse than an army of the unemployed is an unemployed army--an army that is still in uniform but has no justification for its existence."¹⁰

Interestingly, Costa Rica is the only country in the region in which US troops have never actually been stationed.¹¹ At one point in 1981, the US actually stated that Costa Rica must accept US security assistance as a precondition and tied the delivery of economic aid to it.¹² When Costa Rica refused these conditions, it proceeded to languish in an economic crisis, eventually relenting and accepting this assistance for its police force. This standoff shows that the lack of a military in Costa Rica has presented challenges in how (donor) countries, like the US, are able to administer security assistance. Chapter 2 already established that the Civil Guards that replaced the military have specially equipped and trained units, which essentially means that Costa Rica still has a military in all but name.

More recently, a failure to reach certain political agreements is an indication that all is not well in Costa Rica. A ban on presidents from seeking immediate reelection has

dealt a blow to their capacity to effect critical changes and results in a constant and consuming struggle for the top spot in each political party.¹³ One example of this is the fact that Costa Rica had declared its support for the current war in Iraq, but in 2004, Costa Rica's Constitutional Court ruled that this violated its constitution and that Costa Rica had to withdraw from the "coalition of the willing" even though it had not actually contributed any troops.¹⁴ There have also been a few recent corruption scandals, and to further complicate the domestic political situation in October 2005, the dispute over the San Juan River that runs along the border with Nicaragua flared up. Nicaragua claimed that the river falls within its border, and as a result, it restricted the passage of Costa Rican police boats. Nicaragua actually deployed troops along its border and recalled its Ambassador from Costa Rica. Though this case is now before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague, this is likely to be a major test for the Costa Rican political hierarchy, particularly with the military instrument of national power no longer at its disposal. One cannot help but ask the question if Nicaragua would readily be deploying troops along the border and engaging in its current rhetoric if Costa Rica had a capable military force at its disposal.

Overall, in analyzing its political system, Costa Rica appears to be a country fairly committed to the maintenance of its demilitarization status. One former president (Oscar Arias) even won the Nobel Peace prize for his attempts to end conflicts in Nicaragua and El Salvador, but based on events currently happening with Nicaragua, the jury is still out if Costa Rican politicians have left themselves short of a full deck of playing cards. The outcome of this particular event will go a long way in determining if demilitarization has been politically worth it for Costa Rica.

Economic

Since 1948, when Costa Rica underwent demilitarization, it is inherently difficult to judge the extent to which demilitarization may or may not have influenced, or added value to its economic development. The fact is Costa Rica has one of the strongest economies and is viewed as having one of the most attractive investment environments in Central America.¹⁵ The economy is relatively diversified between tourism and agriculture, and wealth is generally more evenly distributed than its neighbors (per capita income is \$4,200).¹⁶ Unemployment is currently 6.7 percent and annual inflation is approximately 9.4 percent.¹⁷ Just how much of this economic fortune can be attributed to demilitarization is unknown, since demilitarization took place in 1948, and there is no simple method of modeling the path Costa Rica's economy would have taken had it maintained a military. There is also considerable narcotics transshipment through the country due to its geographical location, and its economy is still vulnerable to external shocks as evidenced by the considerable damage caused by Hurricane Mitch in 1998, which also drove more than one-half million Nicaraguan refugees into Costa Rica (though some were there before).

An Intel chip-manufacturing plant has helped to transform the Costa Rican economy, providing more than one-third of Costa Rica's total exports, thereby contributing significantly to its gross domestic product (GDP).¹⁸ A question that arises is, Whether or not Intel selected Costa Rica due to its status as a demilitarized country? There was no immediate evidence found to suggest that this was the basis of Intel's selection. Having considered Mexico, Brazil, and Chile as possibilities, the reasons for Intel's investment in Costa Rica were a high literacy rate, good daily flight connections to

export the manufactured chips, skilled English speaking workers (which explains the selection over the other contenders), respect for the rule of law, and political stability.¹⁹ One could argue that Costa Rica's political stability is a direct result of their demilitarization, but at the same time, there are many politically stable countries in the world that are not demilitarized.

Currently, the Costa Rican government budget deficit is its biggest economic challenge, particularly since in the past it borrowed heavily to the point that it defaulted on its debt in 1983.²⁰ The main economic issue is therefore limiting this fiscal deficit in order to prevent government domestic borrowing which keeps its interest rates high. This means that should the need arise, there exists little economic capacity in Costa Rica to start a new military force or to upgrade its Civil Guard into a military force. Such a move would most likely have to be achieved through assistance from the international community. It is also important to note that Costa Rica has not found it possible to reduce expenditure on its Civil Guard due to rising crime and other threats, which leads to a discussion on its military (before it was demilitarized) and its replacement.²¹

Military

The Costa Rican military force abolished in 1948 was not a robust, professional outfit, but moreover a repressive institution, which conducted such acts as violently halting a banana workers strike in 1934.²² This weak institution only had 1,000 men, equipped only with a few light combat vehicles. The officers had very little military background or training, having being drawn from the local elites. This weak officer corps was in no position to guide the force, and as a result, the military was poorly trained, undisciplined, and badly organized. Each time there was a change of (political)

administration, the officers were all promoted and fired, and thereafter given lucrative liquor production contracts.²³ In the final analysis, the “lack of military tradition in Costa Rica and the damaging effects of militarism later became the most popular explanations for the no-army policy.”²⁴ A mere ten days after Costa Rica’s demilitarization, a group of 800 men invaded the country from Nicaragua. This excursion lasted only a short time, mainly because the invaders anticipated a great deal of local support, which did not materialize. The Organization of American States (OAS) intervened, and eventually the invading force retreated into Nicaragua after which both countries signed a peace agreement.²⁵

Costa Rica might not have a military force, but it is not defenseless. The current Costa Rican Public Security Forces consists of a robust 12,000 man police force which is well organized and has a clear and distinct military significance. It is actually a paramilitary force and is one of the best trained paramilitary forces in Latin America, using military ranks up until the 2001 reforms aimed at reducing its military character. There are “Lightning Battalions” (Batallones Relampagos), which are essentially 750 Civil Guards transformed into “special army units” equipped with full combat gear, helicopters, and mortars.²⁶ A 1996 major weapons purchase from Israel led to media accusations of the militarization of the Civil Guard and of it being a “shadow army;”²⁷ however, the Costa Rican government justified this on the basis of threats from narcotraffickers.²⁸ Precautions still remain in place against future coups, mainly through the police not being placed under a single command (they are divided between the Ministries of Rural and Urban Security, respectively).

The US Congress has made a special exception for Costa Rica to the US Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) that prohibits financial and training advice to foreign police forces. This exception is due to the fact that the US Congress viewed the Costa Rican police as having military responsibilities. Several hundred Costa Rican Officers train in the US (at military institutions, not police academies), and they also purchase US military equipment through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program.²⁹ Additionally, in 2000, Costa Rica signed an accord with the US allowing the deployment of its troops there.

While the military ruled Costa Rica between 1871 and 1889, it contributed significantly to the development (particularly infrastructure) of the country, and at one time comprised 10 percent of the population.³⁰ Concerning the former military infrastructure, the grandest building in San Jose is the former army barracks, which now houses the National Museum, whilst most other military barracks were converted into schools. At the time of demilitarization, the defense budget was transferred in its entirety to the Education Ministry.³¹ What should be recalled, however, is that recent rising internal crime has meant high expenditure on the Civil Guards.

Social

Costa Rica has a highly educated and informed, mostly urban population of four million. A recent poll revealed that all but 6 percent of Costa Ricans watched a daily TV news program and 82 percent read a daily newspaper.³² Most Costa Ricans believe that their security lies in the hands of their allies, rather than in their own paramilitary forces.³³ Many of them have isolationist views, preferring to avoid involvement with other nations, and there are only a few Costa Ricans who believe that they would be

better off with an Army.³⁴ Nearly unanimously, they reject military strength as a means of keeping the peace, with 99.3 percent of the poll sample favoring negotiations instead.³⁵ In other words, rather than maintaining a strong military force to deter potential aggressors, they would prefer to work out their disagreements around a table. Not surprisingly, only 37 percent of Costa Ricans think that it is acceptable to kill their enemies in order to defend their country.³⁶

Costa Ricans have the longest life expectancy (74 years) and the lowest infant mortality rate (less than 19 per 1,000) in the region.³⁷ There has been heavy investment in health and education, and with 6.9 percent of GDP invested in public health between 1990 and 1998, making it one of the highest such rates in the developing world.³⁸ Also of note is the fact that the illiteracy rate was 6.1 percent by 1990, down from as much as 21.2 percent in 1953, and the average life expectancy rose from 55.6 to 74 over the same period.³⁹ Costa Rica also scores highly based on the *UN Human Development Report* placing 45th out of 175 countries based on life expectancy, education, and income levels.⁴⁰ Once again, exactly how much of this is attributable to demilitarization is difficult to say with much authority (the scholars are not all in agreement as discussed in chapter 2), but Costa Rica is far ahead of its neighbors in this regard. Though it does have a problem with rising crime, it is clear that Costa Rica commands great prestige in the area of human rights and the rule of law.⁴¹

In the final analysis, one scholar (Tord Hoivik) argued that “the reality of demilitarization is better than the rhetoric of demilitarization. But the rhetoric is better than open commitment to military power. And, for all its weaknesses, Costa Rica is a more open, a more peaceful, and a less violent country than nearly all of its neighbors.”⁴²

Though there continues to be debate among the scholars regarding the completeness of the demilitarization process in Costa Rica, the fact is that the Costa Rican military has been abolished (though not irreversibly so). Politically and socially, the behavioral component would suggest that Costa Rica is on its way towards becoming the ideal demilitarized state, and what “paramilitary” forces exist are under strict civil control, as they should be. Not far to the South of Costa Rica lies Panama, another demilitarized Latin American nation, which is the subject of the next case study.

Panama

Panama is bordered on one side by Colombia (through a dense, uninhabited, and roadless jungle) and the just-discussed “armyless” Costa Rica on the other side, so there is an argument that Panama has no need to defend its land borders (see figure 5). Panama, however, occupies a critical strategic position on the Central American isthmus connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. It occupies some 29,000 square miles ceded from Colombia with the help of the US in 1903, and in exchange the Panama Canal Treaty was established. The US Army Corps of Engineers built the Canal, which was transferred subsequently to Panamanian control in 1999, along with all of the US military bases.



Figure 5. Map of Panama

Source: *CIA World Factbook Maps* [document online]; available from <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/docs/refmaps.html>; Internet; accessed 17 March 2006.

Political

Panama has a history of civilian elites against the military since the 1950s.⁴³ It is one of the Latin American countries referred to at the start of this chapter with a history of a military with no inherent concept of appropriate institutional boundaries. During the 1950s the Panamanian military began challenging the political hegemony and ousted several elected presidents. On the third such occasion, the military commander (General Torrijos) emerged as the main holder of Panamanian political power, and he established a military government. Panama's military governments were full of corruption, even though those who remember the civilian governments prior to the commencement of military rule in 1968 know that the military did not have a monopoly on corruption.⁴⁴

After General Torrijos came General Manuel Noriega as Commander of the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF), who was also in firm control of the country. When he lost the 1989 election to Guillermo Endara, General Noriega annulled the results that would have ended 21 years of military rule and held onto power. Despite more than two years of intense pressure from the US on Noriega to remove himself and curb military power, he did not relent since giving in to US demands would mean losing face and actual power.⁴⁵ General Noriega used his paramilitary units to help hold onto power, and as conditions deteriorated, the US intervened in order to “safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend democracy in Panama, to combat drug trafficking, and to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaty.”⁴⁶

After General Noriega’s removal and Endara’s swearing into office, Panama’s demilitarization process started by the government abolishing the military and reforming the security apparatus into the Panamanian Public Force (PPF). At first glance, the catalyst for Panama’s demilitarization was similar to Costa Rica. What had started out as a military coup in 1968 somehow transformed itself from a desire to defend privileges and working conditions, into a political project with a life of its own.⁴⁷ Panama’s 1994 Legislative Assembly approved a constitutional amendment prohibiting the creation of a standing military force (after a similar bid in 1992 was defeated).⁴⁸ Interestingly (and similar to Costa Rica), the amendment allows for the temporary establishment of special police units to counter acts of external aggression. Panama is now a constitutional democracy and by most accounts has made good progress in establishing functioning political institutions since the end of military rule. As a testament to this progress, it has

had four successive democratically elected governments since the US military intervention to oust General Noriega in 1989.

Panama has always enjoyed a privileged relationship with the US, from its canal links and the presence of major US military installations. Panama's internal politics have caused negotiations to break down over a continued US military presence beyond the end of the treaty. The US provided significant training and equipment for the new Panamanian Public Force (PPF), with the interests of course centered on Canal security due to its strategic as well as commercial value to the United States. Much like Costa Rica, Panama was also a public supporter of the US war in Iraq (coalition of the willing). Despite attempts to break Panama's dependency on the US and establish its own national identity, there have been several US congressional attempts to reestablish a military presence there to help deal with border security issues with Colombia (drug-traffickers, guerillas, and paramilitary groups in the Darien Jungle area).⁴⁹ Although Panama has undergone demilitarization, there is still a perceived requirement for a military presence in that country. It is also interesting to note that concerns have also been raised over the arrival of the Chinese to take control over the Canal's global transportation hub. Several Chinese companies with connections to the People's Liberation Army (PLA) have control over the Pacific and Atlantic entrances to the canal, though the Pentagon has concluded that this does not pose a threat.⁵⁰

Economic

The World Bank classifies Panama as an upper-middle-income developing country, with a service-based economy backed mainly by Canal, shipping, and container port operations, as well as banking.⁵¹ Per capita income in Panama at \$7,100 is the

highest in Central America, although unemployment (at 12 percent) remains a fundamental problem.⁵² Its public debt amounts to 73 percent of GDP, making it one of the highest in the world, and its slow economic growth has caused poverty to worsen.⁵³ One major issue currently under debate is the widening of the Panama Canal, with a recent sharp increase in canal fees to help pay for \$8 billion expansion project, but at the same time there have been increases in security spending due to crime, narco-trafficking, and extortion, the illegal arms trade and terrorism. Of the more than 5,200 ships registered in Panama, only 905 are locally owned, showing the extent of foreign interests in Panama.⁵⁴ The business and banking community in Panama believe that having an assertive neutrality benefits Panama's role in the international economy.⁵⁵

US economic sanctions prior to the invasion in 1993 were damaging, and the withdrawal of US forces in 1999 actually held back economic growth.⁵⁶ Sections of Panama City were also heavily damaged in the US intervention, though the US has approved substantial amounts of assistance to revive the economy, making Panama one of the largest recipients of US aid in the world.⁵⁷ It could therefore be argued that at first glance, demilitarization appears to have suited Panama economically.

Military

The PDF played a historically significant destabilizing role in Panama, always being caught in the middle of its domestic political life, openly intervening in elections on behalf of its favored candidates, and even forcing one election winner to resign.⁵⁸ On another occasion, one National Guard commander announced his intentions to run for president and use the military to further this ambition.⁵⁹ The PDF began its life in 1983 as "an army for the defense of the Canal."⁶⁰ The military monopolized considerable

wealth through its illicit service activities, extracting profits from a huge variety of sources and becoming deeply involved in supplies to various armies with contraband arms, liquor, and electrical appliances.⁶¹ Some former military members were at times plotting to destabilize or overthrow the government.⁶² The military assumed control of the country's infrastructure, including the entire national transportation network (airports, seaports, and railways), as well as the customs and immigration services.⁶³ Essentially, much like in Costa Rica, the military appeared not to have understood where its institutional boundaries rested.

Soldiers from Noriega's defense forces (the PDF) were used to create the new PPF, mainly to prevent the more than 15,000 unemployed troops from causing trouble, and also to hasten the departure of US troops.⁶⁴ The demilitarized PDF became the PPF on 10 February 1990, with the president as the supreme chief. The forces include the Panamanian National Police, a National Maritime Service, and the National Air Service. The current "Security Budget" of \$150 million equates to 1 percent of GDP, placing it 131st out of 167 countries in the world in terms of military expenditure (as a percent of GDP).⁶⁵ The PPF budget is under firm control of the executive, and in contrast to its PDF predecessor, its budget is a matter of public record.

The US military relies on the Panama Canal to move its naval vessels between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, and the US troops previously stationed there were primarily for defense of the canal (the US Southern Command was also based there). Though the US provides military assistance and defense equipment to Panama to help strengthen the security of the Colombian border, the PPF, however, lacks adequate maintenance, basic communications gear, and transportation resources.⁶⁶ As is the case with Costa Rica,

Panama is another demilitarized country receiving outside military assistance. Furthermore, although such agreement has never been reached, there have been numerous discussions regarding the continued presence of US troops in Panama. When the US forces left, significant infrastructure was turned over to Panama, including ten major military installations, 70,000 acres, and more than 5,000 buildings.⁶⁷ Panama has sought to convert much of its former military property to tourism use, including restaurants, hotels, and shopping centers.

Whilst there is always the possibility of a spillover into Panama of Colombian rebels in flight from authorities, from a military perspective, defense of the canal is the main issue even though it has long been argued that the Panama Canal is largely indefensible.⁶⁸ On their own, Panamanians can do little to stop air or missile attacks, and as is seen more each day, terrorists can potentially attack the canal locks or even ships. This would render insurance coverage unaffordable, thus effectively removing the use of the canal as the economic pearl it has been for Panama.⁶⁹

Social

One of the main demilitarization aims for Panamanians was the establishment of a public security force that would not constitute a threat to the civilian democratic rule. If ever there was a justification for demilitarization, this was it. Panama's mainly Roman Catholic (84 percent) population of 3.2 million enjoys a literacy rate of 93 percent, and their main issues are social security, poverty (currently 40 percent), unemployment, and official corruption.⁷⁰ Some 6,000 Panamanians worked directly for the US military (thousands more indirectly), and the US bases contributed more than \$360 million annually to the Panamanian economy.⁷¹ The majority of Panamanians (60-80 percent)

recognizes that their government is unable to defend the canal, and as such actually favors continued US troop presence in their country.⁷² Panamanian public opinion polls alluded to considerable support for continued US military presence in their country after the canal handover in 1999.⁷³

Although Panama is now demilitarized and trying to define a new security relationship with the US, it still faces several challenges, such as border control and ultimately defense of the Canal. Many Panamanians argue that the best defense for the Canal is a neutral, stable Panama, and for the time being at least, Panama is generally viewed as successfully managing to safeguard the Canal. The bottom line is that Panama needed a force that would no longer be a challenge to democratic norms, and in demilitarizing, it appears to have achieved this aim. The focus now turns to countries that might be considering demilitarization and starts by examining conditions in Jamaica to determine its potential worth.

Jamaica

Jamaica is a 4,244 square mile island in the Caribbean Sea, with a long, unprotected coastline (see figure 6). There is a certain paradox in Jamaica, whereby the country is world famous for its natural beauty, sun, sea, coffee, rum, Reggae music made famous by the late Bob Marley, and its international track and field prowess. On the other hand, one journalist describes Jamaica's economy as debt ridden, small, import-dependent, structurally fragile, and hazard-prone (mainly hurricanes).⁷⁴ Whilst this description is not unique, Jamaica is not involved in any international disputes and has no external threats to her sovereignty. It is, however, plagued with an internal security

problem (mainly crime), although that does not necessarily require a military solution. Jamaica's annual homicide total increased from 484 to 1,450 in a twenty-year period ending in 2004.⁷⁵ So the question that arises is would it be worth demilitarization in Jamaica in order to transfer resources to help the fight to curb crime.



Figure 6. Map of Jamaica

Source: *CIA World Factbook* [document online]; available from <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/docs/refmaps.html>; Internet; accessed on 17 March 2006.

Political

Jamaica is a constitutional parliamentary democracy based on the United Kingdom model. As a former British colony, Jamaica is a member of the Commonwealth, as well as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the OAS. Close political ties are maintained between Jamaica, the US, the UK, and Canada; and most of Jamaica's UN votes on Cold War issues were pro-West.⁷⁶ Jamaica also held a seat on the UN Security Council from 1999 to 2001, during one of the most challenging times for

world security. Jamaica's democracy is stable, with a well established two party system. Executive power is vested in a cabinet led by a prime minister, and elections are constitutionally conducted every five years, with elections due in 2007. A Governor General represents Her Majesty the Queen of England in Jamaica, though mostly in a ceremonial role.

Jamaica has adopted Western models for its development and foreign policy perspectives. Although Henke argues that Jamaica's foreign policy experiences shifts between "restricted autonomy" to "no autonomy,"⁷⁷ one Jamaican prime minister actually declared "the irrevocable decision that Jamaica stands with the West and the United States."⁷⁸ Though more than 27 countries have diplomatic missions on the island, Jamaica maintains only a modest diplomatic presence in other countries, with even the mission in the US, Canada, and UK being small most likely for reasons of affordability.

The principle of civil control of the military is widely accepted in Jamaica. More importantly, Jamaica's military, the JDF, has never been a threat to the form of government or Jamaica's democracy.⁷⁹ This differs from the previous countries discussed (Costa Rica and Panama), in that the Jamaica's military has steered clear of the political interference and blurred institutional boundaries that defined the two previous case studies. It therefore stands to reason that from a political standpoint, there is very little that could be used to justify demilitarization on the basis that the military has ever been a threat to Jamaica's internal political stability.

The US has long been a Jamaican supporter, with the current US Ambassador to Jamaica, Brenda LaGrange Johnson, recently outlining that Jamaica is "close to meeting the UN Millennium challenge account indicators but just falls short in certain categories."

She indicated that Jamaica needs to invest in citizen's health and education and encourage more economic freedom. She pointed out that Jamaica does many of these things well, but noted areas where the country can improve.⁸⁰ Based on this, Jamaica is eligible for a grant of up to \$500 million from the US. At the same time, however, Venezuela is also courting Jamaica with cheap oil, low interest loans, and other programs, all arguably aimed at winning Jamaica's vote for a UN Security Council seat that becomes vacant in December 2006 (the vote takes place in October 2006). The other country eligible for the seat is Guatemala, which is supported by the US. This is evidence of the constant foreign policy balancing act that the government of Jamaica must perform in order to obtain the best opportunities and value for the country.

On the matter of crime, some argue that the state response has been weakened by corruption, with much debate as to whether or not it has become "institutionalized."⁸¹ The British government is currently providing much needed assistance to the police, including the assignment of several senior British policemen in an effort to help reform and modernize the JCF. A recent statement from the British High Commission in Kingston noted that "the British Government remains committed to . . . ensuring that supporting the JCF to become a more professional, highly regarded and transparent organization."⁸² This initiative is already bearing fruit, with a 21 percent reduction in murders already being registered to date in 2006. Other factors cited for the recent successes include better use of intelligence and the success of the Operation Kingfish multinational military and police taskforce that has led to the arrest and conviction of several previously "untouchable" high profile individuals long thought to be sponsors of crime. Though the crime situation is still a major issue, it would appear that measures are

already being undertaken to bring the situation under control without resorting to measures such as demilitarization.

Economic

Professor Anthony Harriott argued that to maintain a standing army simply to fulfill “these and all of its other existing functions” is a rather lavish solution for a poor, developing country.⁸³ He claimed that Jamaica’s military “is often justified as an insurance policy against unlikely threats.”⁸⁴ Though one might think otherwise from Professor Harriott’s words, the World Bank actually described Jamaica as a middle income developing country, with one of the largest economies in the Caribbean region. The main natural resource is bauxite, with tourism and agriculture (sugar, bananas, and coffee) also being major contributors to the economy. The government economic policies encourage foreign investments, particularly in the services industry. Much like Costa Rica, the economy is vulnerable to external shocks, as was recently demonstrated by the passage of a few devastating hurricanes in 2004 and 2005. The economy has been fairly stagnant with inflationary pressure due to the agricultural sector decline in the aftermath of the aforementioned hurricanes, as well as increasing world oil prices. The government has missed several key fiscal targets, and unemployment remains uncomfortably high at 15 percent.

One of the main economic challenges for Jamaica is its public debt, which is now 135 percent of GDP.⁸⁵ By way of contrast, the US Federal debt is 63 percent of GDP.⁸⁶ The significance of this high debt is that it contributes to high inflation and low economic growth and places severe constraints on the flexibility of the government macroeconomic policy.⁸⁷ This translates to more than 60 cents out of every tax dollar being used to make

debt payments, thereby leaving little else for other essential public goods and services. The main thrust for the government has been to balance the budget, thereby resulting in expenditure constraints. Though there has been much success here, the infrastructure damage associated with the recent hurricane required some unavoidable expenditure. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) notes that Jamaica has the potential for growth and modernization, but too many resources are eroded through repetitive economic shocks. Overall, the economic situation is not very encouraging, and it is precisely these conditions that have led to calls for Jamaica to demilitarize as a means of channeling the scarce resources into the police force to combat the crime problem.

Along with widening revenue shortfalls and tax compliance challenges, there is also a virtual wage freeze in the public sector. Taxation in Jamaica is already high, so raising taxes is not really a feasible option. There is also a sizable underground economy, fueled mainly by the illegal drug trade, estimated to be some \$10 billion of the worldwide \$500 billion trade.⁸⁸ The Jamaican Economy Project researchers note that the burgeoning underground economy is largely outside of the tax net, and thereby contributes to Jamaica's chronic revenue shortage.⁸⁹ The tax compliance rate is estimated to be a mere 58 percent.⁹⁰ One journalist noted that there are a lot of complaints about the size and cost of government, when two fifths of Jamaicans are not paying the cost of government in the first instance.⁹¹ The property tax compliance rate is 35 percent, coupled with a mere 65 percent for traffic tickets.⁹²

The real problem therefore is that of state capacity to legislate, investigate, and enforce the tax system in order to achieve the targeted and much needed revenues to combat the deficit problem. There is no other miraculous solution, as the existing fiscal

policies are consistent with those recommended by the multilateral financial institutions like the IMF. Spending on public services and infrastructure is low, and the government is trying to curb public spending to offset the revenue shortfalls. What all this amounts to is a capacity challenge that the government should seek to overcome without resorting to the emasculation of public organizations (like the military) that can serve as key enablers in times of crises. A rather simple analogy would be if you suddenly realized that your employer was not paying you your full salary, would you simply cut your family budget, or would you not seek to obtain your hard earned, contractual entitlements? The answer is undoubtedly, yes to the latter.

Another argument raised was to the effect that the British imposed the establishment of a military force as a precondition for Jamaica being granted independence in 1962, and that much of the initial capital outlay was provided by the British.⁹³ After much argument over the affordability of a military, all parties apparently settled on a figure of 0.75 percent of the budget to finance recurrent military expenditure.⁹⁴ In other words, Jamaica became militarized not out of desire or necessity, but more so to expedite the independence process. Jamaica's military spending (as a percent of GDP) does not vary significantly from other countries of similar size, and in fact at its current rate of 0.69 percent is ranked 159th out of 167 countries, placing it below Panama (131st), New Zealand (132nd), and Costa Rica (158th) out of countries ranked by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).⁹⁵ Jamaica's military budget is also substantially augmented through military aid from the US, Canada, UK, China, and Holland, and most of the funding from the government (89.2 percent in fiscal year 2004-2005) went towards personnel expenses.⁹⁶ What is clear is that Jamaica does not spend a

great deal on its military, and in fact it does not bear the true economic cost of having a military. One conclusion here is that demilitarization would not exactly allow for the transfer of a large amount of resources to the police (other than sheer manpower). Furthermore, the existing military aid may well disappear, as a significant part of the military aid for Jamaica is in the form of military training and equipment, not necessarily transferable to the police, or any other public sector entity.

Military

As noted above, one of the conditions of Jamaica being granted its independence from the UK was the formation of a military. Prior to this, Jamaican soldiers had taken part in World War I and World War II as a part of the British West India Regiment, the predecessor of the present Jamaica Regiment. The JDF is an all-volunteer force of approximately 3,500, with operational control vested in a Chief of Staff. Most officer training takes place in the UK, and the infantry dominated force is not equipped for full-scale conventional war, but mainly with light weapons for small-scale internal operations to include counterinsurgency, border enforcement, and counternarcotics. The mostly Canadian trained Air Wing has no armed or combat aircraft--only transport and observation aircraft. The JDF has a significant disaster management role, and the military provides the only (and heavily utilized) air ambulance service in the entire country. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) protection against the many maritime infringements, narcotics transshipment, illegal fishing, and counterterrorism operations constitutes some of the other main tasks undertaken by the JDF.

The JDF has long been engaged in law enforcement activities, and some would argue that the military is performing too many policing functions. It is often used

internally to supplement a JCF overstretched to face the internationally linked narco-trafficking challenge, and violent crime. In modern time, there has never been a significant threat against Jamaica, apart from a 1962 US military proposal to secretly attack Jamaica, blame Cuba for the attack in the hopes of luring the UK into a war with Fidel Castro.⁹⁷ This idea was of course abandoned, and the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was replaced.⁹⁸

Jamaica is not a member of any significant security alliance (the Commonwealth offers no such umbrella). The JDF has participated in the international operations in Haiti (Operation ANVIL, 1994-96), in Trinidad (Operation CARIB, 1990), and in Grenada in coalition with the US (Operation URGENT FURY 1983-85). The JDF is not resourced for full-scale international conflict, though a limited capacity exists with a well educated officer corps and disciplined soldiers. JDF officers are also being increasingly requested and provided for UN peacekeeping missions. Professor Harriott argued that the JDF was never seen as capable of providing a credible national defense and would merely fight a delaying battle until international allies intervene.⁹⁹

Out of the Jamaican central government payroll of 90,000 persons, there are 12,000 security force members, of which 8,500 are police and 3,500 are military. As one highly regarded journalist (Mark Wignall) wrote of the military, “I cannot see the sense in keeping these men fit, fed, housed and paid.”¹⁰⁰ He further noted that “I suspect that those who would protest the loudest should the government decide to untrain, retrain and disband the JDF would be the officer corps. I wish someone from the JDF could mount a good argument for keeping it in its present dispensation. I wait with bated breath.”¹⁰¹ The McMillan report on making Jamaica more safe recommended a downsized, highly

trained, well paid JDF with all the skills that could be required in an emergency.¹⁰² It is important to note how much most arguments have ignored the regional component. What of the regional security challenges, the transnational nature of today's threats, and the several international disputes in progress in Guyana and Belize? And with Cuba being only 90 miles away, there is always the potential for challenges from disaffected groups creating refugee flows during a post-Castro democracy transitional period.

As far as infrastructure is concerned, the JDF currently occupies some 255 acres of prime real estate in the middle of the Jamaica's capital city (Kingston), which leads to a critical question regarding the opportunity cost of having a military base in the middle of a capital city.¹⁰³ This subject was explored in some depth in a separate study by this author on ways of sourcing much needed capital for the JDF within the context of scarce resources.

Social

Jamaica has a population of 2.65 million, and as its newly devised National Security Strategy Vision Statement (2006) places a premium on democratic values. The vision states:

Jamaica aims to establish a safe and secure environment on which it can focus on achieving a prosperous, democratic, peaceful and dynamic society which upholds the fulfillment of human rights, dignity for all persons, and builds continual social progress based on shared values and principles of partnership. It aims to provide an environment in which Jamaicans can experience freedom and the other benefits guaranteed by the Constitution.¹⁰⁴

Though the high crime levels have persisted for more than thirty years, the 2005 murder rate was 63 murders per 100,000, the highest among reporting countries in the

world.¹⁰⁵ Exactly how Jamaica grew to have this high crime rate has long been the subject of many scholarly studies. One concluded that there appears to be an “institutionalization or entrenchment of that violent culture (which) has translated into this massive crime rate we are seeing now.”¹⁰⁶ This violence is not ingrained in the typical Jamaican, but was developed. Other roots of the problem include high unemployment, historical levels of social inequality, and an ineffective criminal justice system.¹⁰⁷ Understandably, the most current opinion polls identify crime as the number one issue affecting Jamaicans.¹⁰⁸

To compound the situation, over the decades, the relationship between the police and communities has been eroded mainly due to mutual disrespect. Other concerns have been expressed over police corruption, police excesses, and alleged extra-judicial killings, as well as poor prison conditions.¹⁰⁹ The JDF on the other hand is held in high regard and has an excellent record in its respect for the constitution and human rights.¹¹⁰ It has been recognized that law enforcement by itself cannot solve the problem of crime and violence.¹¹¹ Solving crime requires a partnership between the government (legislation and resources), police (professional service and integrity), and the people (information and support).¹¹² Other strategies that are being emphasized are community policing and social programs aimed at aiding citizens to solve their problems without a resort to violence.¹¹³

The bottom line, however, is that no one universal policing model will address everything.¹¹⁴ The solution to crime cannot be simply just to catch and prosecute criminals, detect apprehend and convict, but moreso how to deter or prevent them in the first place. It is always expensive to be reactive, so the solution must be to find the roots

and kill them (do not just mow the lawn). Simply to increase police resources through a program of demilitarization will not necessarily yield a solution to the problem. It should be noted that other options exist to get more police resources including outsourcing or civilianizing some (administrative) posts in order to make more uniformed cops available. A recent government opposition initiated paper “Road Map to a Safe and Secure Jamaica” does not identify any resource issues in order to make the police more effective, and concluded that they are management and policy related issues.¹¹⁵ As previously noted, the JDF is under firm civilian control as one would expect in a stable democracy. The military has never constituted a threat to Jamaica’s democracy and there is much evidence to support the fact that a demilitarized Jamaica would not yield much additional resources to transfer and help solve the crime problem. Another country with little or no external threat in another region of the world may reveal another perspective, which leads us to an examination of New Zealand.

New Zealand

New Zealand is geographically isolated by almost 1,400 miles from its nearest neighbor (see figures 7 and 8). It has no land borders, is a historically stable country, and has very few external security threats. It is one of the smallest of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, which is a group countries committed to democratic governance and a market economy including the US, UK, France, Germany, and Japan. It has been noted that the likelihood of a terrorist attack in New Zealand is seen as low, since analysts theorize that a terrorist may be more attracted to Australia.¹¹⁶



Figure 7. The Oceania Region

Source: World Countries Information and maps [document online], available from <http://www.worldcountries.info/Maps/Region/oceania.jpg>; Internet; accessed on 17 March 2006.



Figure 8. Map of New Zealand

Source: CIA World Factbook Maps [document online]; available from <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/docs/refmaps.html>; Internet; accessed on 17 March 2006.

Political

New Zealand is a democratic country within the Commonwealth (like Jamaica), and enjoys good political relations with all neighboring and South Pacific states. The government believes that New Zealand is so geopolitically secure that it has virtually ruled out the possibility of direct involvement in any interstate conflict for the medium term.¹¹⁷ Executive power rests with a Governor General (so New Zealand is technically a monarchy), but most governance is undertaken by a team of “Ministers of the Crown.” New Zealand has a robust political system, with no recognized threats to its democracy, and it consistently has seamless changes of government as a testament to this.

There are no current or envisioned maritime disputes between New Zealand and any other state, and as with several other countries, transnational nonstate factors are seen as the most likely source of conflict or instability. The country has only ever faced the threat of invasion once in the past 60 years (by Japan in the 1940s). It is also far from any current war zones and is protected by some “large friends” and the Tasman Sea. Already there begins to emerge a strong sense of whether or not there is a need for the defense of a country with no known enemies. New Zealand has no obvious external threat and in the actual words of the Prime Minister, New Zealand is situated in an “incredibly benign region.”¹¹⁸ What is immediately clear is that New Zealand is a politically stable nation and is under no immediate pressure to change their status quo. New Zealand also abandoned the ANZUS alliance in 1986 with Australia and the US when it outlawed nuclear armed or powered ships from entering its waters. Furthermore, New Zealand was “vehemently opposed as a nation to the Iraq war.”¹¹⁹

In June 2001, Prime Minister Helen Clark announced a comprehensive plan to rebuild New Zealand's military into a modern, efficient and high quality defense force after an inherited legacy of underfunding and neglect of their armed forces.¹²⁰ Included in this plan was the complete disbandment of the combat component of its air force that previous administrations has jealously maintained since World War II, and redefined roles for their army, navy, and air force, with the new emphasis being on peacekeeping in the Pacific region. The plan centered on comprehensive reviews of New Zealand's strategic position and its requirements, allowing for them to contribute usefully to international operations whenever it decides to engage.¹²¹ Political commentators in New Zealand have expressed concerns over its "disengagement from alliances and security arrangements has emphasized our smallness and separateness . . . a virtual spectator to the political maneuverings of the major power blocs."¹²² Additionally, the plan to downsize the military has been likened to an attempt at freeloading.¹²³ By whittling down its armed capabilities, New Zealand may find itself more dependent on outside help. This argument shows that the decision for a country to demilitarize cannot be taken in isolation, without due consideration of the regional implications of such a disengagement.

But the door has not been closed, as New Zealand actually sees itself in a special regional role that may require some military muscle. New Zealand is actively committed to regional cooperation with Singapore, Malaysia, and the UK, and has participated in NATO and US-led coalition operations, as well as UN peacekeeping and peacemaking operations. The stability of states in its vicinity, such as the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, New Caledonia, and Fiji, are also a primary concern. The main issue in these islands is weak governance which can provide opportunities for transnational criminal or

even terrorist organizations. This drives New Zealand's increasing interventionist policy of deploying troops to assist during periods of instability in the Solomon Islands and Fiji, since there is a risk that continued problems could trigger refugee flows to New Zealand.¹²⁴

Economic

New Zealand is a mixed economy with manufacturing, services, and a highly efficient export-oriented agricultural sector. It is very competitive and performs very well for a developed country. Per capita income is \$25,200, and economic growth is fueled by strong consumer expenditure and a history of low interest rates.¹²⁵ New Zealand enjoys global trading links and access to essential markets for their agricultural products. The main restraint on the country's long-term growth prospects is seen as its continuing dependence on commodities, most of them agriculture or forestry related.¹²⁶ For 2006, it expects a modest real GDP growth of 2.2 percent.¹²⁷ Defense expenditure is higher than might be expected given the country's low interest in defense matters and the small tax base from which to draw funds.¹²⁸ Total military spending is expected to stay comparatively low at 1.1 percent of GDP.¹²⁹ The bottom line is that New Zealand has a very healthy economy and should the need arise, it appears more than capable of adequately resourcing a military force. As such, there is simply no argument for New Zealand to demilitarize on the grounds of not being able to afford a military.

Military

The New Zealand military consists of a Navy, Army, and an Air Force and is one of the most well-trained, professional services in the region.¹³⁰ It is established for 10,970

soldiers, but is currently undermanned at 8,670, a shortfall it hopes to make up over the next ten years.¹³¹ The government openly acknowledges that it is challenged to attract and retain members of the armed forces, particularly since the above-mentioned reductions were announced. It has sought to increase pay, training and conditions to compensate for this. The New Zealand military is currently redefining its role into an army-led peacekeeping and interventionist force. The goal is to achieve a strong Army supported by a practical Navy and a noncombat but updated Air Force.¹³² The New Zealand Army has now been elevated to a leadership position with the new peacekeeping emphasis with the Navy and Air Force in support. Its main defense capability policy centers on the ability to deploy up to a 900-man battalion for a year, or a 1,200-man battalion for six months.¹³³ It has two light infantry battalions, a Special Air Service (SAS), engineers, and logistics units.

New Zealand deployed a battalion to East Timor in 1999 and contributes to peacekeeping in the Balkans, Middle East, and the Pacific. Their SAS has also been deployed in Afghanistan, and it has also deployed a P3K Orion surveillance aircraft in the Gulf of Oman in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Prime Minister Clark cancelled an order for 28 bargain priced F-16 jets from the US thereby disbanding three operational squadrons with effect from December 2001. Critics claim that the Air Force is mostly employed to rescue stricken sailors, to protect fishing fleets and to entertain crowds at airshows.¹³⁴ Their blue water navy capability has also been downgraded, but it should be noted that the sheer length of its coastline would make New Zealand an extremely difficult island to blockade.¹³⁵

There is currently a US presidential ban on joint military exercises between the two countries as a result of New Zealand's ban on foreign nuclear-powered ships or weapons entering its waters.¹³⁶ This port denial is what essentially caused Washington to exclude New Zealand from the aforementioned ANZUS alliance.

Social

New Zealand enjoys a high standard of living and enjoys one of the safest domestic security landscapes in the world.¹³⁷ Their police force is also among the best trained in the world with the three largest crime categories being fraud, burglary, and theft.¹³⁸ Crime levels are currently at their lowest in 24 years, and though the potential always exists, there is little friction between the ethnic and immigrant communities (i.e., Maori vs. European).¹³⁹ The greatest threat to its people is geological events like earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions.¹⁴⁰ In a World Values survey, more than 62 percent of New Zealanders had significant levels of confidence in their military.¹⁴¹ Nevertheless, 78 percent of them believe that it would be very bad for their country to fall under military rule, which can be interpreted to mean that they have no desire to see their military involved in the political arena.¹⁴² Even though 47 percent of New Zealanders indicated that they would willingly fight for their country if the need arose, 60 percent of them indicate that their biggest concerns remain the maintenance of a high level of economic growth, and maintaining the ability to have a say about the way things are done in the country.¹⁴³ This means that the government could not adopt an isolationist posture unless New Zealanders as a whole were to determine that such a move would secure sustained economic growth. Any government doing otherwise would not be likely to last long in this democracy.

Overall Assessment

The decision to demilitarize is not one that any country would or should take lightly. Not only does it remove an instrument of national power from a particular nation, but moreso from a region. At the same time, neither should any military force exist within an atmosphere where it acts with impunity or commands a disproportionate share of scarce national resources. If a military's primary use is to support arrogant despots, who use their military to maintain their position of power, support their selfish political intentions, isolate their nations from the free world, and create blurred lines between military force and democratic virtues, then there is a strong argument for demilitarization along political lines. If, as in the case of Haiti, most citizens view their army not as one to protect them from aggression, but more as a threat to their personal security, with over 80 percent of them wishing for it to be abolished, then once again, there is strong support for demilitarization along social lines.¹⁴⁴ In Haiti's case, they actually undertook an extensive externally funded national poll, which revealed that 62 percent of them wanted to abolish the army, with only 12 percent wanting to keep it, and so it was abolished.¹⁴⁵ In such an environment, then demilitarization is absolutely worth it.

From a military or economic standpoint, if there is clear evidence that money spent on the military would enhance social conditions and contribute significantly towards national development objectives, once again a case can be made along economic lines, providing of course that there is no threat to the nation that would require military intervention. However, given the fact that many of the current threats are transnational in nature, and include undergoverned sovereign territory, porous borders, drug trafficking, narcoterrorism and organized crime and corruption, it is difficult to pinpoint any nation

that is currently completely threat free.¹⁴⁶ History has shown that predicted contingencies rarely occur, which would suggest that demilitarization may simply be an idea ahead of its time for most. Also on economic grounds, those who argue that demilitarization is an investment in peace and harmony and is a major step towards reducing poverty need to also consider the fact that drug abuse, smoking, drinking, motor vehicle accidents, crime, and many other such activities also exact a very large toll on lives around the globe.

More specifically, the study now focuses on assessing the four case studies. No one speaks of military spending in Costa Rica, but if large amounts of money are still expended on national security, then these resources are not really available for development and social spending. From the outset, it was clear that the Costa Rican military was an unprofessional, destabilizing institution that never understood the concept of appropriate institutional boundaries. From this standpoint, demilitarization was certainly worth it for Costa Rica, and all indications are that Costa Ricans are politically committed to the process. Though it has not constitutionally completely closed the door on a military force, their new Civil Guard has been likened to a military in all but name, and it continues to receive security assistance military training from the US. Socially, they receive high marks based on the national opinion poll evidence of their international stance. Economically, though difficult to definitively measure just how much of their current stability is due to demilitarization, they can be credited with the fact that they are more developed than many of their “militarized” neighbors. Figure 9 graphically depicts the assessment of Costa Rica’s demilitarization.




Figure 9. An Overall Assessment of the Worth of Costa Rica’s Demilitarization

For Panama, the circumstances are not that dissimilar to Costa Rica, as once again the Panama military defeated and disbanded by the US was not a robust professional force and had clearly misunderstood the democratic concepts of civilian control and institutional boundaries. This case is another instance where demilitarization has been politically worth it in order to break the cycle of military-civilian “cross pollination.” Economically, Panama appears to be capitalizing on its neutrality in order to advance opportunities that their strategic geographic position and control of the Canal offer. From a military standpoint, the ability of the new PPF to defend the canal has often been debated, but with most of the members of Noriega’s original PDF included, one wonders if the cycle has truly been broken. The fact is if the US or some other nation has to have forces on standby to intervene to safeguard the canal operations, then it is very difficult to

declare that that country is truly demilitarized (hence the question sign in figure 10). One may not have the forces, but if somebody else has to have them for you, then the country remains militarized, just on somebody else's tab. Finally, from a social standpoint, many Panamanians witnessed a decline in their income after the US bases closed, and many still favor a return of US forces.




Figure 10. The Worth of Panama's Demilitarization

Politically, Jamaica's strong democracy has never been threatened by its military, and there is clear civilian control of the JDF as one would expect in a democracy. Moreover, its neutrality and current lack of involvement in international disputes must be mindful of the fact that most threats are transnational in nature, predicted contingencies rarely occur, and that the regional context must be taken into account before such a

decision could be made to demilitarize. It would be hard to support a collective security arrangement, if you have already removed a significant part of your capacity to contribute towards it. For those proponents of Jamaica demilitarizing on the grounds of its unaffordability and hoping to channel defense resources into the police to fight crime, the case is not very straightforward. Those proponents should note that Jamaica's military expenditure is among the lowest in the world, what little it is paying does not reflect the true economic cost of maintaining the JDF (due to substantial military aid inputs), and the fact that most of the identified challenges with the JCF and crime fighting are not resource related. Finally, from a social standpoint, with most Jamaicans viewing crime and police corruption as the major national issues, there would be little value in disbanding an organization that sets itself apart from the JCF, and if all else fails, has the capacity to give the government more security options. In other words, it would not be worth Jamaica demilitarizing at this time as depicted in figure 11.




Figure 11. The Potential Worth of Jamaica's Demilitarization

Turning to New Zealand, it is evident that its geographic isolation within a benign region of the world, its geopolitical security and robust and democratic political system has led to its government disengaging from security alliances with the US and Australia. This disengagement led to accusations of it attempting to “militarily freeload,” which basically means leaving other countries to take on most if not all of the regional conflicts that may require military intervention. So unless New Zealand would wish to completely isolate itself from world politics and face the potential consequences of its inaction, it risks having to reap “rewards,” such as accepting influxes of refugees. From an economic standpoint, New Zealand can afford to maintain a military force, and the only question appears to be just how much resources should be devoted to this endeavor, which its Prime Minister has basically answered by indicating that regional peacekeeping will be the main focus. Socially, New Zealand enjoys a safe and secure domestic landscape, and it is difficult to see what value there would be in removing a military force that most New Zealanders are happy with. The bottom line is that it would not be worth considering or undertaking demilitarization in New Zealand at this time, as figure 12 clearly depicts.




Figure 12. The Potential Worth of New Zealand's Demilitarization

Demilitarization appears to have been worth it to Costa Rica, and to some extent, Panama. For Jamaica and New Zealand, demilitarization would not be worth it. The fact is that the nature of today's world makes it difficult for a decision to demilitarize to be made in isolation, or on the basis of apparent pressure from just one part of a national system. What may appear to make sense economically due to a fiscal crisis may not make sense politically based on regional events or social conditions. If a country chooses to demilitarize, but then has to turn around to the international community for security assistance, or worse yet direct military intervention, then it is difficult to say that it is a demilitarized country, but more so one that has merely transferred its military capabilities to another nation, or is freeloading on the anticipated intervention of someone else.

However, one thing that is clear is that in instances where a military is one with a repressive nature, or its involvement in internal matters blurs the lines of its democratic boundaries, then demilitarization is certainly a welcome tool in the arsenal of all countries in order to break this vicious, undemocratic cycle.

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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Twenty-seven countries in the world have no military forces for varying reasons, ranging from their political ideology, fiscal constraints, a punitive imposition, or merely never having established a military in the first instance. The primary reason for this study was to establish whether or not demilitarization is worth it. The study utilized a PEMS model to conduct case studies of two of the demilitarized countries (Costa Rica and Panama), as well as a hypothetical examination of the conditions in two countries (Jamaica and New Zealand) that have military forces in order to establish if demilitarization would be worth it. This chapter summarizes some of the main findings and conclusions, before highlighting some of the challenges the study encountered. The chapter closes with a recommendation of areas for further study.

The primary research question was whether or not demilitarization was worth it, and the secondary questions were the implications of demilitarization, and what if any other options to demilitarization exist. This study arose due to the fact that in Jamaica, it has been argued that the resources consumed by the military should be given to the police force in order to combat a growing crime problem. One important point that surfaced was the severe lack of defense expertise in legislative and civil executive branches, particularly in Latin American countries, which means that the military is poorly understood, thereby making it that much more difficult for Armed Forces to legitimize their claim on national resources. Whilst there is nothing worse than an army that has not

justification for its existence, what must be borne in mind is that it is relatively easy to disband a military force, but it is very hard to create one if the need suddenly arises.

Some of the main findings of this study include the fact that:

1. Many of the military forces in Latin America began their service as public security institutions with little sense of “appropriate institutional boundaries, and these hybrid multifunctional entities had no inherent concept of their legitimate historical roles, functions, or natural limit.

2. Scholars are not unanimous in their verdict on the completeness and effectiveness of Costa Rica’s demilitarization.

3. None of the demilitarized countries in this study have completely closed the door on demilitarization, with appropriately worded legislation allowing for the build up of military forces if the need arises.

4. One of the main demilitarization aims for Panama was the establishment of a public security force that would not constitute a threat to the civilian democratic rule. Although Panama has undergone demilitarization, there is still a perceived requirement for a military presence in order to protect the Panama Canal.

5. Jamaica does not bear the true economic cost of having a military, therefore demilitarization would not allow for the transfer of a large amount of resources to the police. Furthermore, an increase in police resources through a program of demilitarization will not necessarily yield a solution to Jamaica’s crime problem. Resources are not the panacea in the quest for Jamaica’s crime reduction challenge.

6. New Zealand recent downgrading of their Air Force has led to accusations of its disengagement from alliances and security arrangements, making New Zealand a virtual spectator to the political maneuverings of the major power blocs.

The PEMS analysis revealed that there was no simple answer to the main research question, as each case was unique and had to be judged on the basis of the available evidence. Nevertheless, the assessments made in chapter 4 do give a good indication of the worth of demilitarization to these four countries. The main conclusions of the study are as follows:

1. The decision for a country to demilitarize should not be taken in isolation, without due consideration of the national and regional implications of such a disengagement. Not only does it remove an instrument of national power from a particular nation, but more so from a region, particularly in an era where many of the current threats are transnational in nature.

2. A military force must not exist within an atmosphere where it acts with impunity, or commands a disproportionate share of scarce national resources. In such an instance, demilitarization would be worth it.

3. In instances where there is clear evidence that money spent on the military would enhance social conditions, and contribute significantly towards national development objectives, then a case can be made along economic lines, providing of course that there is no threat to the nation that would require military intervention.

4. Demilitarization was certainly worth it politically for Costa Rica and Panama, but questions remain on the militaristic nature of their replacement Civil forces, and the resulting expenditure to maintain them.

5. For Jamaica and New Zealand, demilitarization would not be worth it based on the political and social conditions. Both countries have robust professional forces that add value to their sovereignty, and in both cases, do not represent a significant burden on their taxpayers.

6. If a country chooses to demilitarize, but then has to rely on the international community for security assistance, or direct military intervention, then it is difficult to say that it is a demilitarized country.

The main challenge encountered during this study was the inconsistency of comparative data for the various countries, such as the fact that a World Values Survey has been conducted in New Zealand, but not in Costa Rica, Panama or Jamaica. Furthermore, since Costa Rica underwent demilitarization in 1948, it was difficult to assess or extrapolate how their current level of economic success is attributable to an event (demilitarization) that took place more than half a century ago. There were no major anomalies encountered during the study. In terms of the implications, the main conclusion is that demilitarization is not a process that can be undertaken without due consideration of the international value of military forces in combating transnational threats.

Chapter 2 established the fact that none of the previous scholarly works addressed the worth of demilitarization, which is the gap which this study sought to fill. In the final analysis, there is no magic answer to the question of whether or not demilitarization is worth it. The worth of demilitarization is therefore a factor of the political, economic, social and military systems that exist in a given country, and each case has to be judged on its own merit. The idea of a completely demilitarized world may be a utopian dream,

but in some countries that have completed the process, it has been a welcome social and political relief from the grasp of despots. The answer to the main research question, as to whether or not demilitarization is worth it, is that in certain circumstances, it is absolutely worth it, but such a decision should not be taken lightly, without due consideration of its national, regional and international implications. Such a decision is not reversible in the short term.

Recommendations

Areas recommended for further study include:

1. The trend of security related expenditure in demilitarized countries.
2. How military spending impacts development.
3. The utility of regional security alliances in order to optimize defense resources and possible reduce the burden on individual nations.

Finally, it is hoped that this study has added some value to an important debate regarding the allocation of scarce national resources not only in Jamaica, but wherever such a challenge exists.

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