

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**A JOINT AND INTERAGENCY UNCONVENTIONAL  
WARFARE TRAINING STRATEGY FOR SPECIAL FORCES  
IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY**

by

Colonel David G. Fox  
United States Army

Colonel Joe Kilgore  
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

# Report Documentation Page

*Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188*

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE <b>18 MAR 2005</b>	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED -			
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>A Joint and Interagency Unconventional Warfare Training Strategy for Special Forces in the 21st Century</b>		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER			
		5b. GRANT NUMBER			
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER			
6. AUTHOR(S) <b>David Fox</b>		5d. PROJECT NUMBER			
		5e. TASK NUMBER			
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050</b>		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER			
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)			
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)			
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT <b>See attached.</b>					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>26</b>	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			



## ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel David G. Fox

TITLE: A Joint and Interagency Unconventional Warfare Training Strategy for Special Forces in the 21st Century

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 4 February 2005 PAGES: 26 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

In response to the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, the President, as Commander-in-Chief and as authorized by congress in a Joint Resolution 23, ordered our armed forces into combat to Afghanistan in order to defeat the al-Qaeda terror organization and the repressive Taliban regime that harbored them. The President wanted to execute this war in an unconventional manner. He turned to the experts in unconventional warfare, the Army Special Forces and tasked them to take the rag tag Northern Alliance and execute an unconventional warfare campaign the like that the world had never seen. In only 60 days the Special Forces units defeated both the al-Qaeda and the Taliban and for the first time in 23 years the Afghan people were free from oppression.

This strategy research paper explores the training deficiencies the Special Forces units identified while prosecuting the war in Afghanistan. This paper will discuss how we currently train our Special Forces officers and noncommissioned officers in unconventional warfare, identify new unconventional warfare training opportunities, and ultimately make recommendations on how to improve unconventional warfare training.

Operation Enduring Freedom was Special Forces' finest hour. To ensure that Special Forces remains the world's premiere unconventional war fighting force during the Global War on Terrorism today and in the future it must improve the way it trains its soldiers and units.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .....III

A JOINT AND INTERAGENCY UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE TRAINING STRATEGY FOR  
SPECIAL FORCES IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY ..... 1

**CURRENT UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE TRAINING** .....5

**NEW TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES** .....8

**RECOMMENDATIONS** ..... 11

**CONCLUSION** ..... 12

ENDNOTES .....15

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..... 19



## A JOINT AND INTERAGENCY UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE TRAINING STRATEGY FOR SPECIAL FORCES IN THE 21ST CENTURY

This paper will discuss the training shortfalls the 5<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group (Airborne) experienced while prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism against the al-Qaeda terrorist organization and the Taliban Regime in the country of Afghanistan from 14 September 2001 through 30 April 2002. It will further examine the unconventional warfare training that Special Forces officers and noncommissioned officers receive during their careers, identify new unconventional warfare training opportunities, and ultimately make some recommendations for future unconventional warfare training.

“The Commanding General, Special Operations Command, Central Command directed the 5<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group to serve as a Joint Special Operations Task Force in order to conduct Unconventional Warfare to topple the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The 5<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group (Airborne) was not manned, equipped or trained to execute this mission.”<sup>1</sup>

“President George W. Bush characterized the 9/11 attacks as “acts of mass murder” and pledged “to find those responsible and bring them to justice.” Unequivocally, he declared that the attacks were acts of war.”<sup>2</sup> “Within 24 hours intelligence reports had linked Usama bin Laden to the attacks, and congressmen and military officials were calling for retaliation.”<sup>3</sup> “On 14 September 2001, the Congress of the United States approved a joint resolution that authorized the use of United States armed forces against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States.”<sup>4</sup> “Islamic extremist Usama Bin Laden had become America’s “Public Enemy Number 1” and the focus of an unprecedented worldwide manhunt with Afghanistan the center of attention.”<sup>5</sup>

“On 15 September 2001 at Camp David, President Bush met with his national security team to review options to respond to the terrorists attack.”<sup>6</sup> “George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, proposed a plan to capitalize on the Northern Alliance opposition to the Taliban. United States ground forces would link-up with those fighters to attack terrorist supporters in and around [the] cities of northern Afghanistan.”<sup>7</sup> “Then, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry Shelton presented three military options: first, two consisted of cruise missile and bomber attacks; the third combined cruise missile and manned bomber attacks, with placing American “boots on the ground”—the insertion of Army Special Forces.”<sup>8</sup> President Bush directed the development of General Shelton’s third option. “According to national Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice, “probably the most important conclusion that President Bush came to was that this military action had to look different from what the United States had been

doing over the past ten years or so. There had to be boots on the ground. We had to have a ground presence to demonstrate our seriousness.”<sup>9</sup>

“Russian military analyst, Aleksandr Golts, who studied Soviet involvement in Afghanistan concluded that our armed forces came prepared for the Cold War, for general battle, and they were completely ineffective. Lieutenant General Boris Gromov, who commanded the soviet 40<sup>th</sup> Army, agreed with Golts. For the Americans, introducing land forces would not lead to anything good, he predicted. General Tommy Franks, who commanded the United States Central Command, knew full well the history of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and made it clear that he did not intend to repeat their mistakes. The Soviets introduced 650,000 troops, he said. We took that as instructive as a way not to do it.”<sup>10</sup>

“It would not be done that way. On 15 September 2001, when President Bush, as Commander in Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces, told everybody who wears the uniform to get ready, *Washington Post* reporters had already speculated that Special Forces were certain to be at the center of action.”<sup>11</sup> “Rumsfeld acknowledged that when the war against terrorism began, “a lot of the effort will be special operations.” Army Secretary Thomas White seconded that acknowledgement. He warned America’s adversaries “to watch carefully”, for you are about to see our finest hour.”<sup>12</sup> At a joint session of Congress on 20 September 2001, [President] Bush spoke passionately about grief, anger, resolution, and justice. “The Taliban is committing murder,” he declared, and as “heirs of the murderous ideologies of the 20<sup>th</sup> century...they will follow that path all the way to where it ends in history’s unmarked grave of discarded lies.”<sup>13</sup> “U.S. Army Special Operations would push the Taliban into that grave.”<sup>14</sup>

The Army views Special Forces as economy of force units. Small elements of highly trained officers and noncommissioned officers that link-up with insurgent forces, train, and ultimately lead them in combat operations. Thus, they provided the Commanding General, Central Command with the ideal course of action that limited the number of American forces on the ground, but were able to take advantage of the United States’ Technological superiority.

“The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff designated United States Central Command as the supported combatant command.”<sup>15</sup> “U.S. Central Command was to “fight the war” and General Tommy Franks was in charge.”<sup>16</sup> All other defense commands would furnish what U.S. Central Command requested. “General Franks’ mission was to destroy the al-Qaeda terrorist organization and its infrastructure and then provide military support to humanitarian operations.”<sup>17</sup>

“The Special Operations Central commander, Rear Admiral Bert Calland, knew instinctively that special operations forces, across the spectrum, would be needed. Since

unconventional warfare would be a major part, Army Special Forces, those with the most training and experience would play a major role. Admiral Calland recognized that his command had to get Special Forces with their unique capabilities into Afghanistan to destroy al-Qaeda.”<sup>18</sup>

“On 8 October 2001 President Bush announced to the American Public in a nationally televised address that during the previous night U.S.-led air strikes struck targets near Kabul and Kandahar.”<sup>19</sup> The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized that to wage a military campaign effectively in the remoteness of Afghanistan the use of regional bases was critical, in particular the country of Uzbekistan because it was a direct line of supply down into the area of the Northern Alliance.<sup>20</sup> “In negotiations with the State Department the Uzbeks granted airspace clearance and permitted coalition support and search-and-rescue forces to be based at Karshi Kanabad (K2).”<sup>21</sup>

The 5<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group (Airborne) now had a base of operations to conduct an unconventional warfare campaign. “With the potential of coalition aircraft being shot down during the initial air campaign, Admiral Calland established the Joint Special Operations Task Force-North to recover downed aircrews.”<sup>22</sup> “Anticipating that ground operations...unconventional warfare would follow the air campaign he tasked the 5<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group to serve as the JSOTF-North.”<sup>23</sup> Colonel John Mulholland, Commander 5<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group (Airborne) had a problem. “When the attack on the World Trade Center occurred Colonel Mulholland had only been in command for two months, and had not had the opportunity to practice Group-level operations in the field nor participate in a large-scale unconventional warfare exercise. The Army designed Special Forces Groups to serve as the Army Special Operations Forces component command assigned to a JSOTF. Doctrinally a Special Forces Group is organized to operate as a Special Forces Operating Base (SFOB) and command and control three Special Forces battalions. The 5<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group had not trained for this expanded role and did not have the personnel and equipment necessary to perform as a joint field headquarters.”<sup>24</sup>

“The 5<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group needed considerable augmentation, an additional 120 personnel, from the other services [and the interagency] in order to accommodate the different requirements of the other services, and a “cram course” on joint staff functions...”<sup>25</sup> “The Special Operations Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command sent training teams to the 5<sup>th</sup> Group to help the 5<sup>th</sup> Group Staff identify other service augmentees, to coach joint task force operations procedures, and to provide experienced joint staff officers to facilitate the necessary rapid standup of the joint special operations task force headquarters.”<sup>26</sup> “In addition to the

military, numerous U.S. government departments [interagency] and activities were called on to support the war and 5<sup>th</sup> Group soldiers were called on to coordinate with those staff elements.”<sup>27</sup>

While Colonel Mulholland and the 5<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group was having difficulties in standing up as a JSOTF the Special Operations Command, Central was experiencing problems of its own. “Doctrinally, in time of war, Special Operations Command, Central Command was to turn its headquarters into a joint special operations task force headquarters to direct attached special operations forces units from the Army, Navy, and Air Force in combat.”<sup>28</sup> “Admiral Calland called Colonel Findley, Commander, Special Operations Command, Joint Forces Command and also asked for assistance in converting his headquarters from a peacetime to a wartime footing.”<sup>29</sup> “The Special Operations Command, Joint Forces Command trainers ascertained that “they [the Special Operations Command, Central Command staff] had a problem” in that key SOCENT staff positions were predominantly filled by Navy SEALs who had little experience with other service operations and staff procedures.”<sup>30</sup> The Special Operations Command, Joint Forces Command trainers determined that the Special Operations Command, Central Command staff was more focused on getting into theater than in preparing plans or requesting additional personnel to meet their staffing requirements.<sup>31</sup> Due to the Special Operations Command, Central Command staff’s inexperience, the Special Operations Command, Joint Forces Command trainers assisted the staff in developing a phased [SOF] implementation plan that supported the Central Command’s guidance and then accompanied the Special Operations Command, Central Command into theater to round out its staff. <sup>32</sup> “The Special Operations Command, Joint Forces Command trainers departed for the Persian Gulf staging base quite frustrated with the situation.”<sup>33</sup>

The Special Operations Command, Joint Forces Command trainers assigned to support the 5<sup>th</sup> Group was experiencing an entirely different set of frustrations. “The trainers immediately identified three problems. First, was the 5<sup>th</sup> Group did not possess the local area network it would need to function as a JSOTF. Second, was a shortcoming of personnel. To function as a JSOTF the 5<sup>th</sup> Group would require an additional 120 individuals. These people came from a variety of sources from across the services and governmental agencies. But unless these “drafted” soldiers and government employees have trained and worked with that particular JSOTF, basic issues such as SOPs and familiarity with staff principals would delay actions. Third, there was the lack of joint staff training and just a lack of understanding of exactly what it meant to be a joint headquarters.”<sup>34</sup> Because of the professionalism of all involved Special Operations Command, Central Command and the 5<sup>th</sup> Group were both able to overcome adversity and operate as a Joint Special Operations Task Force.

After extensive after action review process the special operations participants of operation Enduring Freedom identified the following areas in need of improvement. "Not the least of is determining whether Special Forces Groups should be prepared to become Joint Special Operations Task Forces."<sup>35</sup> "Second, all levels of command must understand that a JSOTF is not a Special Forces Operational Base with a "J" for "Joint" inserted in front of it."<sup>36</sup> "The SF Group must be trained, equipped, and organized to perform the mission. The higher headquarters must ensure that the additional personnel required for a SF Group to perform the JSOTF mission are not only identified, but also that those personnel are integrated into training exercises."<sup>37</sup> "The Special Forces Group staff must be prepared to accept the additional burdens of function as joint headquarters with all the added responsibilities."<sup>38</sup> "Finally, the Group must have the equipment necessary---particularly the communications equipment---essential to facilitating its increased span of control."<sup>39</sup>

There currently exists no training requirement for Special Forces Groups to task organize themselves as Joint Special Operations Task Force. ARTEP 31-805, Mission Training Plan for the Special Forces Group and Battalion, dated October 2004 coincidentally published after the 5<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group returned from Afghanistan, has no such training task in it.<sup>40</sup>

#### **CURRENT UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE TRAINING**

To gain an appreciation of the difficulties and growing pains that the 5<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group and its interagency partners experienced while conducting an unconventional warfare campaign during Operation Enduring Freedom. This portion of the paper will review the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and Schools' definition of unconventional warfare, guerilla warfare, the phasing of a United States sponsored insurgency, and how our Special Forces officers and non-commissioned officers are currently trained to execute unconventional warfare.

Over the years there have been a number of attempts to define unconventional warfare. For the purpose of this paper the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School definition will serve as the foundation. This seems only appropriate because the school conducts the only formal unconventional warfare training that a Special Forces officer or non-commissioned officer will receive during their entire career. "The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School defines unconventional warfare as a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. Unconventional warfare includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, sabotage, subversion, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery."<sup>41</sup>

“The intent of United States unconventional warfare operations is to exploit a hostile power’s political, military, economic, and psychological vulnerability by developing and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish U.S. strategic objectives.”<sup>42</sup> By advising the warlords of the Northern Alliance and using guerrilla warfare techniques as the means to defeat the Taliban the 5<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group was able to exploit the Taliban’s military weaknesses. The 5<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group would have had fewer challenges in executing the combat employment of the resistance forces in Afghanistan if there existed advanced unconventional warfare collective training in the Army, joint, or interagency community. “The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and school defines guerrilla warfare as military and paramilitary operations conducted by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces against superior forces in enemy-held or hostile territory. It is the overt military aspect of an insurgency.”<sup>43</sup>

“There are seven phases to a United States sponsored insurgency. Phase one preparation; the resistance and its external partners conduct psychological operations to unify a population against an established government or occupying power and prepare the population to accept U.S. support. Phase two initial contact; U.S. government agencies coordinate with allied, government-in-exile, or resistance leadership for desired U.S. support. Phase three infiltration; A Special Forces team infiltrates the operational area, establishes communications with its base, and contacts the resistance organization. Phase four organization; A Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha organizes, trains, and equips a resistance cadre. Emphasis is on developing infrastructure. Phase five buildup; a Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha assists a cadre with the expansion into an effective resistance organization. Limited combat operations may be conducted but emphasis remains on development. Phase six combat employment; unconventional warfare forces conduct combat operations until linkup with conventional forces or end of hostilities. Phase seven demobilization; unconventional warfare forces revert to national control, shifting to regular forces or demobilizing.”<sup>44</sup> Except for phase one, preparation the 5<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group either supported or executed the other six phases in Afghanistan.

The culminating training event for Special Forces candidates is the Robin Sage exercise. Robin Sage is a simulated unconventional warfare exercise executed in the forests of North Carolina. A Special Forces candidate as part of a training Special Forces Operational Detachment using guerrilla warfare techniques, taught in the Special Forces Qualification Course, takes an insurgent force from Phase three, Infiltration thru Phase seven demobilization.<sup>45</sup> Robin Sage is a 36-day multi-echelon training event, focused at the Operational Detachment/ level, but is graded on an individual basis.<sup>46</sup> It is the only formal multi-

echelon unconventional training event that Special Forces officers and non-commissioned officers receive during their entire career.

The Robin Sage exercise has no interagency involvement and only minimal Air Force participation. The officers and non-commissioned officers receive no instruction on the government agencies that can play a significant role during an unconventional warfare campaign.<sup>47</sup> The exercise focus is at the tactical level, there are only minor attempts to instruct the students on the operational and strategic significance of unconventional warfare and how it can support U.S. government objectives. Currently there exists no formal advanced unconventional warfare training that incorporates Special Forces Battalion or Group functions at the operational or strategic levels. Because the community lacks formalized advanced training for senior officers and non-commissioned officers this caused difficulties during the initial planning stages and linkup with the interagency elements during Operation Enduring Freedom.

One of the first problems encountered was a lack of understanding of the 5<sup>th</sup> Group's legal constraints while conducting unconventional warfare. "Within days of the attacks on New York and the Pentagon the Central Intelligence Agency had covert paramilitary teams on the ground in Afghanistan."<sup>48</sup> The 5<sup>th</sup> Special Forces group received a request from Special Operations Command, Central Command to detail two Operational Detachment-Alphas to the Central Intelligence Agency in order to assist the covert Agency elements already in Afghanistan.<sup>49</sup> Not since Vietnam had Special Forces soldiers been detailed to the Central Intelligence Agency during a time of war. No one in the Group knew what the procedures were to accomplish this request.<sup>50</sup> There was a lack of understanding concerning support to covert actions and the legal authority and limitations as outlined in the National Security Act of 1947, Titles 10, 32, and 50 of the United States Code.

Another problem experienced at the battalion level was working with the Central Intelligence Agency elements collocated with the battalion headquarters after infiltration into Afghanistan. Having never worked with agency personnel the commanders and the respective staffs had to quickly build rapport and come to an understanding on capabilities and support relationships.<sup>51</sup> It became necessary for the battalion commanders to sit down with their agency counterparts to ensure that there was an equal sharing of information/intelligence between elements.<sup>52</sup> Once the ground commanders established the ground rules and trust was quickly built, the information began to flow. The problems experienced were not insurmountable but were due to lack of understanding on how the Special Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency teams operated. If there were a mechanism to include interagency elements into training scenarios or events these problems could have been avoided.

One more issue experienced by all the ground elements was the paying of the insurgents. In the Robin Sage exercise one of the tasks is to develop the administrative procedures for an insurgent force. One of the sub tasks is to pay the insurgents and establish pay records.<sup>53</sup> Once in Afghanistan the Operational Detachments attempted to pay their Afghan counterparts and found out, contrary to their Robin Sage training, that it was illegal to do so. The funds that Operational Detachments had access to were Title 10 funds. The United States Code does not authorize these funds to be used to pay insurgent forces. U.S. Code Title 50/5 authorizes the use of funds that fall into this category to pay insurgents.<sup>54</sup> But the Central Intelligence Agency elements were the only personnel in Afghanistan that had access to these funds.

### **NEW TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES**

Currently the Special Forces Groups are fully engaged in the Combatant Commanders Joint Exercise Schedule and the Army's Combat Training Centers and Battle Command Training Post Exercises. The problem is that rarely have they been able to train on their primary mission of unconventional warfare. Due to changes directed by the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Schoomaker, the Special Forces community has an opportunity to shape the training environment that will support their unconventional warfare training needs.

During joint exercises the Combatant Commanders tend to use Special Forces units to further their engagement plan and not dedicating the time to train on unit mission essential tasks, additionally allowing very little opportunity to train with the conventional force participants. When Groups and Battalions participate in these exercises they normally execute their doctrinal mission as an Army Special Operations Task Force subordinate to the geographical Special Operations Commander. On rare occasions, as part of these joint exercises, Special Forces Groups have stood up as Joint Special Operations Task Force headquarters, they have not received the necessary augmentation or equipment in order to execute the required command and control responsibilities of a joint headquarters. This was a problem the 5<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group identified in Afghanistan.

The Battle Command Training Program is a computer-assisted exercise that allows both Division and Corps Commanders and their staffs to train on their mission essential task without troops. The Special Forces contribution to this exercise is limited to a Company Headquarters that performs the Special Operations Command and Control Element Mission. Currently there is no opportunity for Special Forces groups or battalions to exercise their staff and command and control functions using a computer simulation.

The Combat Training Centers, the National Training Center and The Joint Readiness Training Center, primary role has been to train Infantry Brigade Combat Teams to fight as part of a combined arms team.<sup>55</sup> The Brigade Combat Team faced a conventional opposing force modeled after the former Soviet Union military. Special Forces Battalions have been participating at the Combat Training Centers since 1988. There have only been three cases of Special Forces Group level participation since the inception of the Combat Training Centers. The normal level of participation is one Battalion, six operational detachments-alphas, and two company headquarters one to perform the duties as an Isolation facility and the other to perform the Special Operations Command and Control Element mission. Due to the training focus and type of opposing force at both the Combat Training Centers the Special Forces missions were limited to direct action or special reconnaissance. The special reconnaissance mission was normally an integrated mission with the Brigade Combat Team with the Special Operations Command and Control Element passing the intelligence gathered and deconflicting the Infantry and Special Forces missions. In the Special Forces community, there has been a love hate relationship with the Combat Training Centers. Because of the exercise rules of engagement, the operational detachment-alphas were limited on where they could go and in some instances the observers/controllers censored their reports because the information they contained gave the blue forces too much of an advantage.<sup>56</sup>

At the Joint Readiness Training Center there are 65 Special Operations soldiers permanently assigned, divided between the Special Operations Training Detachment and Special Operations Forces Plans. The Special Operations Training Detachment is commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel, former battalion commander, and is task organized to observe and control one Special Forces battalion, six operational detachment-alphas, two company headquarters, and a special operations aviation company.<sup>57</sup> The Special Operations Forces Plans element, both plans a rotation and provides the higher headquarters for the participating battalion. These soldiers also provide the planning and observer/controllers to the National Training Center when a Special Forces unit participates in a rotation there.<sup>58</sup>

Because of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom both the Battle Command Training Program and the Combat Training Centers are going through a training transformation.<sup>59</sup> This is a prime opportunity for the Special Forces community to shape these training centers so that it no longer trains on the fringes, is fully integrated into a rotation, and can train to its primary mission of unconventional warfare.

Within the past three years the Combat Training Centers have reinvented themselves. The scenarios are no longer focused on a Cold War threat. The opposing force now operates in

what the Army has coined as the contemporary operational environment. The opposing force is now a freethinking and an adaptive enemy that more replicates what U.S. Forces are now facing in Iraq and Afghanistan. Gone are the days when the intelligence officer could template what the combat units were likely to see. The opposing force is now organized into an insurgent force, criminal elements, and free-lancers. This is the type of environment Special Forces thrives in. The opposing force soldiers are on relaxed grooming standards so that they blend in with the population [role players] requiring the blue force units to use their human intelligence skills in order to ferret these individuals out.<sup>60</sup> Both the Combat Training Centers have contracted for Arab linguists that are used as role players in the numerous towns and villages in their respective training areas. It is now possible for the training centers to replicate, in a Continental United States training environment, any area of the world that a unit may be about to deploy to. Right now Forces Command is using the training centers as the final mission readiness exercise prior to units deploying to support either Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Iraqi Freedom.

At the direction of the General Schoomaker, in October of 2003, he stood up Combat Training Center/Battle Command Training Program focus group at Leavenworth, Kansas.<sup>65</sup> General Schoomaker's guidance to the focus group was "rescope the Combat Training Center program to train in a joint context."<sup>61</sup> This condition must be present at the maneuver combat Training Centers and in the Battle Command Training Program constructive simulation and applied to the tactical unit's rotational experience just as we have applied the contemporary operational environment.<sup>62</sup> As a result of General Schoomaker's guidance the focus group developed the following mission statement and essential tasks:

- Develop a strategy to refocus the roles and missions of the Combat Training Centers under conditions of a realistic joint, interagency, or multinational/joint operational environment to produce decisive self-aware, adaptive units, and leaders.<sup>63</sup>
- Develop self-aware and adaptive leaders for full-spectrum joint, interagency, and multinational operations.<sup>64</sup>
- Recommend strategies focused on execution of simultaneous, noncontiguous, distributed, and continuous full-spectrum operations in a joint, interagency, and multinational context.<sup>65</sup>
- Integrate contemporary operating environments/joint operating environments into the Combat Training Centers.<sup>66</sup>

The most recent improvement to joint, interagency, and multinational training to the Combat Training Centers is the Joint National Training Capability. The Joint National Training

Capability is designed to increase joint warfighting proficiency. It is an integrated global network of live-virtual-constructive training enablers [that] will create a seamless environment to support a broad range of joint and service training requirements.<sup>67</sup> To date there have been two Joint National Training Capability Exercises, one at both of the combat Training Centers. The National Training Center hosted one in January of 2004 in which the 3<sup>rd</sup> of the 5<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group's participated in. The other was held at the Joint Readiness Training Center in August of 2004 with the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division and the 2<sup>nd</sup> of the 10<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group as the major ground elements. Additionally, 2/10 and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division worked together during Operation Iraqi Freedom and are on the next rotation back to Iraq. Air Warrior stood up the Air Operations Center and there was a Carrier Battle Group off the coast of California and Louisiana to support the respective exercises.<sup>68</sup> In both training events there was no Special Forces Group participation and there was no thought to include one. However, in defense of Special Forces, this is primarily due to the operational tempo of both the 10<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Group's headquarters.

The transforming of the Combat Training Centers and the training opportunities of the Joint National Training concept provides Special Forces with a window to mold the training centers to include Special Forces Group participation in order to, for the first time, to stand up the Groups and receive meaningful feedback on training strengths and weaknesses.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Centers and School: First, incorporate into The Special Forces Qualification course program of instruction the contributions that the interagency and the joint community provide during an unconventional warfare campaign. Second, that when describing and instructing on the phases of an unconventional warfare operation, the duties and responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense, as prescribed by law, be thoroughly discussed and what actions must be taken if Special Forces units are to be subordinate to the Central Intelligence Agency. Third, that the exercise Robin Sage be updated to include scenarios and ethical situations that our Special Forces soldiers are now facing in Afghanistan and Iraq. Finally, that we assign only the best Special Forces officers and non-commissioned officers to the school as instructors in order to ensure that the course remains relevant and on the leading edge of what missions the students will be required to execute upon graduation.

The Combat Training Centers: First, that Special Forces take full advantage of the changes that have occurred over the past two years. Second, that the battalions and groups

become involved in the planning early and work with their conventional counterparts to ensure that the Special Forces training events are linked with the Infantry. Gone are the days when the only mission that Special Forces executed was special reconnaissance. The Combat Training Centers now have the ability to tie in the noncontiguous missions into the overall scenario. With the emphasis on counterinsurgency operations the Combat Training Centers are now doing everything they can to ensure that the Special Forces Training Objectives are met. Because of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq the conventional commanders know that the human intelligence that Special Forces are able to provide equates to mission success. The conventional commanders now ask which Special Forces unit is participating in the rotation when prior to 911 it was an afterthought. Third, every two years the United States Army Special Operations Command gets a rotation that normally goes to the Rangers. Why not give it to a Special Forces Group? What an opportunity to have an entirely unconventional warfare rotation with the full backing of Forces Command and Training and Doctrine Command.

The Joint National Training Concept: Finally an opportunity for Special Forces Groups to execute their mission essential tasks and receive honest and professional feedback on how well they perform. This is truly a joint and interagency training event just the type of environment that Special Forces will find themselves in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. But up to this point in time there has been zero Group participation. Special Forces must take advantage of the Joint National Training Concept.

## **CONCLUSION**

The intent of this paper has been to provide training solutions not to find fault with anyone in the chain of command. To open a dialogue with other professionals on how Special Forces officers and non-commissioned officers are trained to conduct Unconventional Warfare and how that training, to include deficiencies, was the basis for the entire Operation Enduring Freedom campaign. That the only formal training that Special Forces Officers and Noncommissioned officers receive is in the Special Forces Qualification Course. There currently does not exist an advanced Unconventional Warfare training for the senior officer or noncommissioned officer that incorporates the Joint and Interagency capabilities that are necessary for an Unconventional Warfare Campaign to be successful.

Now that the Combat Training Centers are going through a training transformation Special Forces has a great training opportunity to perfect its unconventional warfare skills. For the first time in our history the Army has training venues that allow Special Forces to train in a multi-echelon event from the operational detachment-alpha through group level. The community

needs to take advantage of these new opportunities to ensure it remains relevant in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

WORD COUNT= 5155



## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Charles H. Briscoe et al., *Weapons of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press), 41.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 41.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 34.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 36.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, "At Camp David Advise and Consent" *Washington Post*, 31 January 2002, A,O1; quoted in Charles H. Briscoe et al., *Weapons of choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press), 36.

<sup>9</sup> PBS's *Frontline: Campaign Against Terror*; quoted in Charles H. Briscoe et al., *Weapons of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press), 36.

<sup>10</sup> Susan Glasser, "Soviet Generals War Of: Sea of Bloodshed," *Washington Post*, 19 September 2001, 13; PBS's *Frontline: Campaign Against Terror*; quoted in Charles H. Briscoe et al., *Weapons of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press), 37.

<sup>11</sup> Elaine Sciolino, "Bush Tells the Military to 'Get Ready'; Broader Spy Powers Gaining support," *New York Times*, 16 September 2001, 1; Dana Priest, "Special Forces may Play a Key Role," *Washington Post*, 15 September 2001,1; quoted in Charles H. Briscoe et al., *Weapons of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press), 38.

<sup>12</sup> Michael R. Gordon, Eric Schmitt, and Thomas Shanker, Scarcity of Afghan Targets leads U.S. To Revise Strategy, *New York Times*, 19 September 2001; Rowan Scarborough, Pentagon Prepares Variety Of Responses, *Washington Times*, 12 September 2110, 1; Anne Plummer, Army Secretary Vows U.S. Adversaries About To See Our Finest Hour, *Inside the Army*, 17 September 2001, 1; quoted in Charles H. Briscoe et al., *Weapons of choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press), 38.

<sup>13</sup> "Transcript of President Bush's address", [www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/gen.bush.transcript/](http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/gen.bush.transcript/); as quoted in Charles H. Briscoe et al., *Weapons of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan* (FT. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute), 38.

<sup>14</sup> Briscoe et al., 38.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 41.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 41.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Patrick E. Taylor, U.S. and Britain Strike Afghanistan, Aiming at Bases and Terrorist Camps; Bush Warns Taliban Will Pay A Price, *New York Times*, 8 October 2001, 1; Peter Baker, Kabul and Kandahar Hit In Attacks Through The Night, *Washington Post*, 8 October 2001; quoted in Charles H. Briscoe et al., *Weapons of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press), 44.

<sup>20</sup> Briscoe et al., 44.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 41.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Carl Hooper (pseudonym), *letter to Kalev Sepp*, 5 December 2002, (Ft. Campbell, KY, USASOC Classified Archives, Fort Bragg); quoted in Charles H. Briscoe et al., *Weapons of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan* (Ft. Leavenworth KS: Combat Studies Institute Press), 42.

<sup>28</sup> Briscoe et al., 52.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 56.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 80 .

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Department of the Army, *ARTEP 31-805 Mission Training Plan For The Special Forces Group And Battalion*, (Ft. Bragg, NC United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center And School).

<sup>41</sup> Department of the Army, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations*, Field Manual 3-05.201 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 30 April 2003), 1-1.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. 1-12

<sup>45</sup> Department of the Army, *Phase IV Program of Instruction, Section IV*, (Ft. Bragg, NC: United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School). 1.

<sup>46</sup> Department of the Army, *Phase IV Program Of Instruction, Section I*, (Ft. Bragg, NC: United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School). 7,8,12.

<sup>47</sup> Department of the Army, *Phase IV Program of Instruction, Section IV*, (Ft. Bragg, NC: United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School). 1.

<sup>48</sup> Jim Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency, Text of Address to Duke University Law School Conference, 11 April 2002; available from [http://www.cia.gov/cia/public affairs speeches/archives/2002/pavitt 04262002.html](http://www.cia.gov/cia/public%20affairs%20speeches/archives/2002/pavitt%2004262002.html); Internet accessed 17 March 2003; quoted in Colonel Kathryn Stone, *All Necessary Means Employing CIA Operatives In A Warfighting Role Alongside Special Operations Forces*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College 7 April 2003), 2.

<sup>49</sup> Colonel David G. Fox, *Journal As Commander 2nd Battalion, 5th Special Force Group During Operation Enduring Freedom*.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Department of the Army, *Phase IV Program Of Instruction, Section II*, (Ft. Bragg, NC: United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School). 19.

<sup>54</sup> National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 235, 61 Stat. 496, July 1947, codified in various portions of titles 10, 32, and 50 of the U.S. Code.

<sup>55</sup> LTG William S. Wallace, U.S. Army, BG Timothy D. Livsey, U.S. Army, and LTC Richard A. Tottleben, U.S. Army, "A Joint Context for Training at the Combat Training Centers," *Military Review* (September-October 2004): 4.

<sup>56</sup> The author was the senior Special Operations Observer/Controller for both the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center from June 2002 through June 2004.

<sup>57</sup> The author was the senior Special Operations Observer/Controller for both the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center from June 2002 through June 2004.

<sup>58</sup> The author was the senior Special Operations Observer/Controller for both the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center from June 2002 through June 2004.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> LTG William S. Wallace, U.S. Army, BG Timothy D. Livsey, U.S. Army, and LTC Richard A. Tottleben, U.S. Army, "A Joint Context for Training at the Combat Training Centers," *Military Review* (September-October 2004): 4. The author was a member of this focus group.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid. 5.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> The author was the senior SOF Observer/Controller during the NTC exercise and oversaw the SOF specific planning for the JRTC training event.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Briscoe, Charles H., Richard L. Kipper, James A. Schroder, and Kalev I. Shepp. *Weapons of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2003.
- Department of the Army. *Mission Training Plan for the Special Forces Group and Battalion*. ARTEP 31-805. Fort Bragg, NC: John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 2003.
- Department of the Army. *Phase IV Program of Instruction, Section I*. Fort Bragg, NC: John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 2003.
- Department of the Army. *Phase IV Program of instruction, Section II*. Fort Bragg, NC: John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 2003.
- Department of the Army. *Phase IV Program of Instruction, Section III*. Fort Bragg, NC: John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 2003.
- Department of the Army. *Phase IV Program of instruction, Section IV*. Fort Bragg, NC: John F. Kennedy special Warfare Center and School, 2003.
- Department of the Army. *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations*. Field Manual 3-05.201. Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 30 April 2003.
- Fox, David G., Colonel U.S. Army. *Journal While as Commander 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion 5<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group During Operation Enduring Freedom*. Carlisle, PA, 2002.
- National Security Act of 1947. Public Law 235.61 Stat 496, July 1947. codified in various Portions of titles 10, 32, and 50 of the U.S. Code.
- Stone, Kathryn, Colonel U.S. Army. *"All Necessary Means" Employing CIA Operatives In A Warfighting Role Alongside Special Operations Forces*. Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 07 April 2003.
- Wallace William S., LTG U.S. Army, BD Timothy D. Livsey, U.S. Army, and LTC Richard Totleben, U.S. Army. "A Joint Context For Training at the Combat Training Centers." *Military Review* September-October 2004.

