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STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE: CHALLENGES IN ARMY TRANSFORMATION

BY

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Strategic Leadership and Organizational Change: Challenges in Army Transformation

by

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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The Chief of Staff of the Army has communicated his intent to transform the Army into a more viable, deployable force. This intent, and the guidance for the transformation, are contained in the Army's Transformation Campaign Plan. In this plan, the transformation is described as a complete systems and organization change, not only in the way the Army fights but in the way it operates on a daily basis. Organizational change and transformation is a much studied topic. The complexities of not only communicating such a change but in implementing it are vast, yet several bodies of works assist strategic leaders in attempting such transformation. Based on these studies, the likelihood of success of the current transformation plan as written and thus far in execution is slim and will fall well short of the Chief of Staff's stated endstate. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the Army's transformation efforts thus far in light of the theories and works regarding organizational change and transformation and to provided several recommendations that could enhance the efforts of the transformation plan.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thanks to the men and women of the Arrowhead Brigade at Fort Lewis who are at the point of the spear day in and day out leading Army transformation efforts to the best of their abilities. In addition, I must thank Dr. Bob Murphy for taking me under his wing for this project. His understanding of this complex arena of organizations and the difficulties in affecting change are unmatched. His dedication to making senior leaders appreciate the nuances of this field of study is commendable and he has made me realize the scope and limitations of our understanding.
If you don’t like change, you’re going to like irrelevance even less. The nay sayers and those who say we are going too fast endanger the Army’s relevance to national security. It’s not a debate. The Army must change because the nation cannot afford to have an Army that is irrelevant.

General Eric Shinseki

BACKGROUND

In the Fall of 1999, the Army Chief of Staff (CSA) General Shinseki began to communicate his intent to transform the Army to a more deployable, viable force. Shortly thereafter, the Army published a Transformation Campaign Plan (TCP) that outlined the plan for this transformation. The TCP included not only discussion on changing the doctrine and warfighting for the Army but also the institutional Army and supporting structures and policies. By January 2000, the initial steps had been taken to identify and transform existing units into an interim design force, one that would bridge the gap between legacy forces and the end state Objective Force. The initial two brigades designated were located at Fort Lewis, Washington. These brigades, titled Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs), would provide a living example of a transforming Army. The initial brigade selected was an armor brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division. The IBCT is an infantry centric organization. Both the Training and Doctrine and Forces Command Commanders agreed that the combination of an armor brigade commander and a former infantry battalion commander as the executive officer would provide a balanced experience level for the initial IBCT. The author served as the first executive officer of an IBCT.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the current state of Army transformation, compare critical aspects of the process to the vast body of knowledge available on corporate transformations, and provide recommendations to get transformation back on track. As mentioned, the author witnessed transformation efforts at the tactical and operational levels. Transformation from that viewpoint appeared on track. Having been exposed to a broader understanding of the change plan, witnessing the level of understanding of the change by a greater cross section of the Army, and studying the roles of strategic leaders in implementing change, the author concludes that the Army is not on track for a successful transformation and is at risk for merely developing a new, medium weight force that is more deployable than heavy forces yet more lethal than light infantry. Transforming the way the Army fights and operates on a daily basis, as communicated in the TCP and in the vision of the CSA, is a difficult and challenging process.
KEY DEFINITIONS

The analysis contained in this paper centers on the roles of strategic leaders, the strategic environment these leaders operate in during their efforts to transform organizations, and the impacts of the culture and subcultures of the organization. The definition of strategic leadership used by the Army War College is "the process used by a leader to affect the achievement of a desirable and clearly understood vision by influencing the organizational culture, allocating resources, directing through policy and directive, and building consensus..." The strategic leadership environment can be defined as "internal and external complexities that directly and indirectly affect resourcing, structuring, and operational performance of the organization." This includes coalitions, attitudes, impacts of technological advances, budgets, and changing threats and missions. Finally, strategic culture can be defined as "a set of institutional, stated, and operating values, beliefs, and assumptions that people have about their organization that are validated by experiences over time." In the case of large organizations, a myriad of powerful subcultures exist that warrant consideration during a transformation process. An example of an Army subculture would be heavy and light forces, Department of the Army civilians, and the Army Reserve.

These definitions provide a framework for examining the complexity of an organization, the crucial role of strategic leaders, and the difficulty in transforming the way an organization operates and views itself. All of these aspects require detailed review and consideration both prior to and during the transformation effort. The initial decision to transform, however, solely rests on the shoulders and communicated vision of the organizational leader.

STRATEGIC VISION

Given the events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent military actions in Afghanistan, the Department of Defense, and more specifically, the Department of the Army, have discussed accelerating the transformation process. The published timeline for transformation of the Interim Force to Objective Force includes an initial capabilities test in May of 2003. Should this test be successful, full production of the Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV) will follow with a goal of the entire Interim Force being fielded equipment by January of 2008. The first capable (certified for contingency use) Objective Force brigade is scheduled for 2010, but hinges on the completion of contracts dealing with objective design equipment and technology. The end state is five Objective Force divisions fielded by January of 2032. The terrorist acts and decision to use military force by the President simply confirmed a fear of Army leadership. The Army lacks a force that can respond within a short timeline and yield legitimate lethality. Major General Dubik, the initial officer charged with overseeing transformation, saw the Objective Force as being "flexible enough to accomplish any mission." But transformation of
the Interim Force is not yet at a point where an IBCT can be deployed. The unit uses surrogate equipment, does not have the proper skill Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs), and has not completed training on all new pieces of equipment. In addition, the supporting aspects of transformation, the institutional and legacy force Army, are behind. The Army, despite its deployment of Special Operations Forces to Afghanistan, is again without a force that can answer our Nation's call and does not match a changing threat across the globe. As one author notes "the Marines are flexible, agile, ready and deadly, while the Army remains configured to fight the Soviets." In the end, the Marines answered the call with ground forces, complete with the Army's interim combat vehicle.

Jablonsky (2001) describes the Army's transformation dilemma in the following manner. "The key to Army relevancy is an Army transformation process that rests on four foundations: the conduct of future war, the future operating environment, the increasing significance of full spectrum operations, and the diminished utility of a current force." But transformation goes beyond the building of a relevant force. It includes the transformation of the Army as an institution. Several experts who have studied organizational change warn about neglecting a systems approach to change. Murphy (2000) points out that strategic change involves both strategic leadership and strategic management. Redesign of supporting policies, organizational structures, and personnel are often required. Miles (1997) discusses the significance of major organizational changes and points out that without a complete change process, to include the minor aspects of organizational functions, the business tends toward chaos. He continues by stating that the change plan should proceed simultaneously along all fronts, and that sequential change is ill advised.

In concurrence with Murphy's (2000) and Miles' (1997) concepts of change, the Army TCP describes a change process that occurs simultaneously through every aspect of the Army. From installation renovations to leader training to manning the force to rewriting doctrine, the plan emphasizes synchronization of the change on every venue. To promote this change process, the CSA has communicated his vision at several points in past months. The mission paragraph of the TCP incorporates the CSA's vision in stating "transform The Army into a force that is strategically responsive and dominant at every point on the spectrum of operations." Whether in newspaper interviews, conventions, or testifying before Congress, General Shinseki is constantly reinforcing his vision of the end state of a transformed Army. Several experts on organizational change highlight this communication of vision as a critical factor in effecting change. However, most authors provide a more detailed framework for not only communicating the vision but turning the vision into reality. Although General Shinseki often communicates his vision, students of organizational change models indicate there is also a science or procedure for reinforcing vision and translating it into action. An example of this
science, described in the book Leading Corporate Transformation, is a framework that the corporate leader can follow. The steps include (1) generating energy for the transformation through resourcing, (2) modeling the vision of the future, (3) aligning the organization's culture and structures, and (4) creating a transformation process architecture through education, involvement, monitoring and collecting feedback, and using consultation support. Using this framework to evaluate the Army's transformation provides some keen insights.

First, the CSA continues to generate energy and momentum for transformation and his vision through the Department of Defense's budget process. Programs non-related to transformation continue to be at risk for little if any spending. Recently the CSA approved cuts to 19 programs while reducing the spending level of 12 others. The focus of these cuts is to move money from legacy systems, such as the M1 tank and M2 fighting vehicle, into programs like the IAV and supporting technologies. These measures will cause Legacy Force equipment to eventually be replaced by the Future Combat Vehicle of the Objective Force.

Second, the CSA has developed a living model of his vision through the IBCT structure. As this organization gains lessons learned and new equipment, it will serve as a temporary fix to the Army's issue of lacking a lethal, medium weight, deployable force. The third and fourth aspects of the change model described above indicate, according to Miles' work, that the Army transformation plan is shallow. Miles would argue that due to the Army's diverse culture and myriad of subcultures that interpret transformation in different ways, the leader must realign the organization through cultural changes. Involvement and support of the transformation, key aspects of the change process, are areas that Army leadership feels need emphasis. Secretary of the Army White observes that the attitude within the Army toward where the Army needs to go in transformation is far from unanimous.

LEADER'S ROLE IN ADDRESSING CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND RESISTANCE

The apparent leadership tactic that the CSA has adopted for implementing his change appears to focus on dollars affecting the IAV production line, and the creation of the six IBCTs. Although his method is unconfirmed, one can assume this technique will result in confrontation with those aspects of the organizational culture, to include key leadership, that disagree with his vision. The CSA has used the term irreversible momentum as a point in transformation where it is no longer viable to move from the Objective Force design back to legacy type forces. In other words, after six IBCTs have been fully fielded and the production lines are geared toward fielding the remaining brigades, it will be too late to reverse the process based on sheer dollars and amount of Objective Force equipment added to the Army's inventory.
Kotter (1996) describes the selection of a sufficiently powerful guiding coalition as a critical step to successful transformation.\textsuperscript{18} The TCP specifies that the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is responsible as the change agent. In addition, the TRADOC leadership is further delineated by appointing a Deputy Commander for Transformation, assigned at Fort Lewis, Washington as the director of transformation efforts. This appointment forms two chains of command that either have a direct command relationship with the unit (I Corps from Forces Command) or a supervisory/support relationship (TRADOC). Although the concern for successful transformation is shared by each command, the final say on training and activities within the IBCTs falls to the legal chain of command, FORSCOM. As Kotter explains, a guiding coalition that is not recognized as part of the line leadership is seldom successful in overcoming sources of conflict and inertia.\textsuperscript{19} The current situation at Fort Lewis with the IBCTs is that transformation decisions rest with I Corps, not the TRADOC agent assigned responsibility in the TCP by the CSA.

In addition to the dangers of a weak guiding coalition, several authors discuss time as a barrier to transformation. As Jablonsky observes, the challenge is not so much the change to a new way of fighting with advanced technology, it is overcoming mindsets and institutional obstacles.\textsuperscript{20} This phenomena is not unique to the Army. The CSA also faces the challenge of time. The initial capabilities test scheduled in the Spring of 2003 coincides with his departure as the Army’s Chief of Staff. His efforts to instill a change process and structure prior to his departure are paramount to the success of transformation. Those entrenched in the bureaucracy of the Army and opposing his views simply have to wait until the next CSA and a predictably new vision. Former General Electric CEO Jack Welch faced the same dynamics when trying to transform his organization. He observed that new ideas and structures were often met with low enthusiasm and faint praise. Old allegiances were often difficult to break, to the point where some top level managers needed to be replaced.\textsuperscript{21} Without attacking the non-supportive or anti-transformation subcultures within the Army, with the GE situation as a model, it becomes possible that the transformation plan risks a slow death over time should the new leadership in the Army change direction.

Changing an organization’s culture to support and foster change toward a new vision is clearly the task of strategic leadership in an organization. Changing culture is a difficult task and management theories fall into two schools of thought on when and how to change organizational cultures. According to Tony Eccles in Succeeding with Change, the culture must be changed up front, prior to transformation.\textsuperscript{22} Others, like John Kotter, feel that if organizational priorities and resourcing changes happen first, the cultural change will follow.\textsuperscript{23} Advocates of a culture change first mentality would argue that values and policies need to change first, gaining buy in and acceptance by key leaders in the organization.\textsuperscript{24} If the change
of culture is not addressed first, the result is that the old culture overrides the organization change effort to a point where the embedded assumptions that drive the organization will cause little if any success in transformation. An example of a dysfunctional subculture impeding the Army's transformation would be the advocates of a mechanized force; the one that won Desert Storm. This group includes officers, Congressmen, and soldiers who openly comment that this force should not be replaced.

**STRATEGIC LEADERS AND MONITORING CHANGE**

An important aspect of transformation is the ability of the senior leader to monitor and adjust the change effort. The TCP addresses several critical aspects of the change plan where the CSA has asked for feedback. In the information requirements portion of the plan, the CSA has asked several questions. These include the impact of a new National Military Strategy, sustainment in conflict, estimated costs for Interim and Objective Force equipment, risks of funding Objective Force requirements vice Legacy Force equipment, and information flow to subordinates. The attacks of September 11th have directly impacted on several of these areas in question. The Department of Defense has received additional funding, some earmarked as transformation dollars. As transformation continues, with some barriers overcome and new ones imposed, the complexity of ensuring the Army's leadership at all levels understands the plan and vision becomes more difficult. Strategic leaders must have a mechanism to monitor dissemination of information.

**THE CHANGE PLAN IN REVIEW**

The TCP states "the level of detail required to synchronize Army wide transformation efforts and maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of those efforts" is contained in the plan. The plan describes how the Army will transition not only forces and doctrine but the institutional Army. In theory, this concept would agree with the theories already discussed, a change effort conducted simultaneously along all fronts. Efforts in the 1980's to create a new, highly mobile motorized force failed to address these institutional changes. Dunn notes that the failure of the Army to transform the institutional Army that supports the transformation resulted in that change effort's failure. In addition, key staff members charged with transition actions emphasize that the change is more than just equipment, it also includes leader development, installations, and all aspects of doctrine, training, leadership, organizations, material, and soldier systems (DTLOMS). Most authors, like Eccles, Miles, Murphy, and Schein, when addressing transformation
of organizations, agree that this systems approach to change is the only method that will ensure success. For example, *The Challenge of Organizational Change* describes eight elements involved in a systems approach to change. These elements include shared vision, backers and supporters, symbols/signals/rewards, standards and feedback, local participation and innovations, policy and systems review, communicating, educating and training, and a guiding structure and process. Changes to existing, antiquated policies are one example of the detail required to effect change. A review of personnel management systems shows they have yet to evolve in support of Army transformation efforts. Soldiers with newly gained proficiency in digital, high technology tasks are not managed by skill identifiers, similar to those that receive airborne and ranger training. Stabilization of key personnel involved in the change is not enforced. Battalion Commanders, staff and even the IBCT Commander are permitted to change station to attend military schooling and other assignments. In addition, selection of new IBCT commanders is not reflective of consideration of past IBCT experience.

Another aspect of not supporting the transformation at the execution level is with budgeting. The initial IBCT was an armor brigade with a budget in excess of $23 million dollars. During its first year of transition, the budget was cut by I Corps to $6 million dollars. This was largely due to no existing resource model to budget the brigade from, as is done by allocating dollars based on number of vehicles and mileage in mechanized units. The Corps used the brigade as a bill payer for other inadequately funded projects. The result, as the brigade dealt with a multitude of obsolete vehicles and equipment requiring maintenance for transfer and turn-in, was a lose in training dollars. Each battalion commander was forced to prioritize and cut transformation related training because of no dollars. The point here is that no guidance or intent of implementation was in the TCP or other supporting documents.

A final anecdote that reflects the non-support to the IBCTs as a priority in transformation centers on infrastructure and manning. As an installation, Fort Lewis was not prepared to transition support for two IBCTs. From barracks to motor pool capabilities, the installation was forced to revise the brigade areas which resulted in breaking teams and displacing soldiers. Undermanned military occupational skills (MOSs) were taken from existing Corps units as bill payers. In addition, the IBCT doctrine involves taking the majority of the maintenance personnel out of the organization, to include sections that conduct vehicle services. By the new doctrine, these services are contracted. No one had thought through this requirement and Director of Logistics took on this mission, being forced to hire contract help and submit a notable unfinanced requirement to pay the workers. The result was a back log of hundreds of vehicles over due services and unavailable for training.

In a detailed study of these initial transformation efforts, faculty members of the Army War College noted that without an entire system of systems change, the costs and resistance
were incredibly high. The effect on transition was not only delay and loss of momentum, but bitterness and resistance to the entire transformation effort.\(^3\) Thus, unlike the plan described by the Army's leadership in the Campaign Plan, the Army lacked support of key policies, organizations, and principle players in conducting a simultaneous transformation. The study by the Army War College concludes by stating "...the corresponding emerging proponent parochialism may eventually dampen, dilute, or even derail the dramatic organizational changes envisioned within the limited IBCT Organizational+Operational concept."\(^4\)

**IMPLEMENTING THE CHANGE PLAN IN RETROSPECT**

**Identifying and Negotiating Obstacles**

In a study of successful military transformations during the Inter-war years of the 1930's, authors Millet and Murray describe the importance of gaining acceptance by the officers in the organization. Without redesigning and redefining successful career paths, attracting bright and innovative junior officers, and addressing the senior military leader bureaucracy, the imbedding of change is near impossible.\(^5\) Several authors of transformational change in organizations describe the typical barriers presented to senior leadership during change efforts. Below is a table using Eccles' barriers to change.\(^6\)

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<th>Eccles' Barriers</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Army Example</th>
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<tr>
<td>Entrenched interest</td>
<td>&quot;My specialty is at risk&quot;</td>
<td>Heavy/mechanized forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myopia</td>
<td>&quot;Can't see why&quot;</td>
<td>Veteran of recent success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-deception</td>
<td>&quot;If it's not broke, don't fix it&quot;</td>
<td>Senior Generals Retiring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immobility</td>
<td>&quot;The bureaucracy...&quot;</td>
<td>Someone else's project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weariness</td>
<td>&quot;This will fail&quot;</td>
<td>9th ID failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>&quot;We can't afford this&quot;</td>
<td>Legacy Force, Benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disinterest</td>
<td>&quot;I won't be here&quot;</td>
<td>I'm retiring, CSA changing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutiny</td>
<td>&quot;Heard it but ain't buying it&quot;</td>
<td>Covert Distrust</td>
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Just as enemy actions are considered when devising plans, obstacles that may block, delay, or derail change efforts must be wargammed and counter-actions planned. These strategies, just like contingency plans, will assist the leader in ensuring the plan keeps on track.
Training and Educating

Army doctrine on changing force structure and integrating new forces is contained in FM 100-11 Force Integration. In this manual it states "commanders and leaders must be educated to understand the nature of organizational change to execute planned and programmed force integration actions." Most officers are likely to never read this manual unless they are assigned to a staff position dealing with force integration. The military education system of the typical officer includes little if any training on the force development/force integration process. In addition, organizational change, change leadership, and transformation are topics not covered until 19-22 years into an officer's career, and then only during attendance (if selected) at the Senior Service Colleges. In addition to training officers, the force integration process is designed to train entry level personnel on new doctrine, policies, and equipment in order to fill units with proficient personnel. Aside from the new equipment training being conducted by soldiers in the IBCTs, there apparently are no specialized schooling programs that assist to fill this shortcoming.

Communicating the Change - Proactively Avoiding Obstacles

The Army Transformation Case Study, used in classes at the Army War College, accurately describes the flow of information in the Army regarding transformation. "Army leaders at all levels are faced with supporting an undefined concept that depends upon a yet-to-be-developed technology with an unknown impact on most of the Army's organizations. Establishing support on faith and loyalty alone does not provide the lasting impetus for change...". A possible barrier to the new warfighting concepts of the Objective Force design is a lack of disseminating information throughout the Army prior to embarking on the transformation journey. The majority of the Army realized the need for a medium weight brigade yet failed to comprehend the rationale for transitioning the entire force. Now, as the transition of brigades occurs to an IBCT configuration and lessons are added to lesson plans in school houses, the Army is slowly trying to understand what transformation means to them.

Reducing Barriers Through Proving Success of the New Design

The final and perhaps most important way to reduce resistance is to prove that the new concept works. The IBCTs have several evaluations or decision points they must negotiate until they are deemed fully capable. These include field training exercises, deployments, warfighter exercises, and joint operations. However, the selection of units to transition appears to detract from any effort to highlight success of the concept. The brigades selected thus far have been brigades that are seen as separate, with no existing Division headquarters. The initial brigade
selected was the brigade from the 2nd Infantry Division located at Fort Lewis, apart from the division headquarters in Korea. The second unit selected, also at Fort Lewis, was a brigade of the 25th Infantry Division, whose headquarters is in Hawaii. Subsequent brigades include the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Polk, Louisiana, a brigade of the Pennsylvania National Guard, and a brigade in Alaska. Without an entire division transitioning to an Interim Division concept, success will be limited to independent brigades. In essence, proving the success of one of these divisions in a warfighting scenario will occur years from now, perhaps as late as 2010. Several authors, like Miles, argue that the organization needs to model the vision of the future and demonstrate its success. Without some example of profound success and demonstration of advanced capabilities, the Army will continue to be slow in accepting the concept of the new units.

SUMMARY - WHERE ARE WE IN ARMY TRANSFORMATION?

In the recently published Quadrennial Defense Review Report, the Secretary of the Army is tasked to accelerate transformation. The addition of forward stationed IBCTs, to include possible locations in Europe and the Arabian Gulf, are seen as enhancement to the United States' deterrent capability and responsiveness. Several high ranking General Officers have indicated the need for IBCTs in various regions, to include not only Europe but in Korea. Budget increases since the terrorist attacks support Army transformation. According to key leaders in the transitioning brigades, real world requirements such as supporting external training requirements and limited budgets still impact on transitioning. Finally, the development and procurement of new technologies that support the Objective Force remains an unknown. If former research and development efforts are any indication, fielding, testing, and validation of this equipment will continue to cause transformation to slip to the out years.

Using line item cuts of systems related to legacy force equipment, the Chief of Staff has energized new opposition to transformation. Those Congressmen with production lines of legacy equipment and/or short term developments are building a strong alliance of opposition to these cuts. In addition, the mounting perspective that the Marine Corps and not the Army provides a viable, rapidly deployable force creates more concern for transformation efforts and dollars.

Listed below are recommendations based on sound organizational change models that will help enhance the Army's transformation effort.
RECOMMENDATIONS - GETTING TRANSFORMATION BACK ON TRACK

Communicating the Vision...Again

The CSA should conduct in progress reviews with commanders down to and including all brigade level commanders. These periodic feedback sessions should serve as updates on what the CSA expects from the force and feedback to the CSA from the field on how the transformation is progressing. A detailed briefing of the TCP should be conducted by the CSA’s deputy for operations for every battalion and brigade commander select at the Pre-Command Course. In addition, school house curriculums should add entire blocks of instruction and study, not just individual lessons, on Army Transformation. Personnel rotating from IBCTs and transformation cells to schoolhouses should be used to augment faculty in an effort to explain these new concepts. Additionally, the CSA should conduct periodic updates beyond the appointed action groups. Transformation, as mentioned, is a systems change. Therefore, every General Officer in the Total Army owns some piece of the process. The CSA should require all General Officers, in a collective gathering that benefits the entire group, to periodically back brief him on the transformation efforts in their units/sections. These meetings should include objective standards, measures of effectiveness, and any adjustments to timelines. Finally, the CSA should take a visible role in embedding the proper terminology of the transformation effort. Many have heard him say that transformation, and the IBCTs, are not an experiment. He, and the Army, has made the decision to transition, and the IBCTs are a short term fix for a deployable medium weight brigade. This is not an experiment that can succeed or fail, it is the future. However, even at a four star level, the language continues to be inconsistent with the CSA’s intent. As an example, in the Army Green Book, one four star commander states that the IBCTs are an experiment. Although the CSA may deal with these incidents privately, publicly these key leaders need to speak the same language as the CSA. If those in command of the Army’s largest organizations fail to understand the efforts of the CSA or fail to support him, how will other soldiers and civilians every work toward a common endstate?

Create an Interim Division

One of the positive lessons learned from the 9th Infantry Division’s experiment in designing a motorized force was that the Division Commander had direct control on the transformation effort. In addition, he answered directly to the CSA. The current plan of transitioning individual brigades from different parent organizations does not work. With a division designated to act as an Interim Division (IDIV) design, the commander would have the resources, control, and visibility to make the transformation more effective and expedient. Instead of a TRADOC Cell overseeing the transformation effort, TRADOC doctrine writers and
force designers should work directly for the new IDIV Commander on his staff. This system would allow for timely and accurate feedback to the school houses that are proponents for branch equipment and doctrine. A detailed study of training areas, to include live fire and urban training facilities, deployability platforms, maintenance facilities, environmental impacts, digital infrastructure, and logistics support, both military and contracted, need to be considered before selecting a location for the Interim Division.

Hire a Consultant Group

As mentioned early, standard military schooling does not prepare officers for the complexities of managing organizational change. Although some specialized schooling opportunities exist, such as the Force Development Course and Organizational Change Course, not enough officers or non-commissioned officers involved with the management of the transformation process attend. Even for those that do attend, gaining an expert understanding in organizational change and organizational culture is difficult based on the complexity of this field. The business world has proven experts in this complicated field. The Army should hire, for the remainder of the transition period, a group of proven consultants who monitor, advise, and evaluate the change efforts. Hiring of retired officers or giving the mission to one of the habitual contract organizations used by the Army is ill advised, based on all the barriers to change discussed previously in this essay. The head of this consultant group should have direct access to the CSA and participate in his periodic in process reviews. Select personnel being assigned to IBCTs and staffs responsible for executing the Army's TCP should attend what few courses are offered by the Army and supporting agencies prior to their assignments. These schools at a minimum will enhance their awareness as to the complexities of organizational change. Finally, several authors on organizational change mention workshops that they conduct for organizations. Regardless of the cost, these type workshops seem to be a cost effective way to assist in the Army's transformation efforts.

Slay a Sacred Cow

Many authors and experts of transformation recommend sending a clear message about change by slaying a sacred cow. In other words, in what is perceived as an untouchable group or unit, the CSA could task as the lead for transforming. For example, if the CSA would designate the 82nd Airborne Division or the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division to transform, he would leave little doubt in nay sayers minds that transformation is a reality. The CSA, when he initially announced transformation, said every unit was on the table for possible
transformation. Unfortunately the culture and history of these two organizations, built on battle streamers won long ago, will likely result in them not being transformed. Designating one of these two divisions as the IDIV would result in as much turmoil and disagreement as changing the Army’s head gear to black berets. The strong opposition this decision would receive is unfortunate given the current World situation. Either of these divisions seems a logical choice for transformation. The cost alone to run either of these divisions in their current structure warrants a cost/benefit review of their role on the battlefields of the 21st Century. Transitioning either of these divisions would send a message to every soldier, Department of the Army civilian, and politician that the Army is serious about meeting the demands of a very complex and chaotic future.

Policy Changes

As mentioned earlier, transformation involves system wide changes. For example, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel should stabilize soldiers involved in IBCT training. In almost every case, to include deferments for military schooling, soldiers and their leaders should remain in the unit until it validates the operational design and capabilities in May of 2003. Allowing these soldiers to transition to new assignments prior to this critical gate in Army transformation is similar to the disastrous personnel rotation policies used during the Vietnam War. Should the initial evaluation of the IBCT result in unsatisfactory performance, the Army’s transformation timeline faces great setbacks. Blaming a mediocre result on personnel turnover and turbulence is an outcome the Army can proactively avoid. After a successful test, the officers and non-commissioned officers of the IBCT can be assigned to school houses, doctrine writer assignments, and positions of responsibility in newly forming brigades. Every soldier at some point assigned to and trained in these unique brigades should be also managed by skill identifiers that allow them to be tracked in specialty areas related to the Objective Force design. As a short term fix, the Army should screen personnel records of every soldier to ascertain the experience they already have in digital or futuristic system capabilities, such as the soldiers in the digital force at Fort Hood and the soldiers that have participated in Advance Warfighter Experiments. Tracking these soldiers and building their expertise through assignments in the IBCTs seems to be an effective way to expedite change.

Information Campaign and Coalition Building

The CSA and those directly responsible for the implementation of the Army’s TCP need to readdress the process of educating and informing the Army and supporting organizations as to the objectives, process, and outcomes of Army transformation. Unlike recent examples of disseminating new information, the Army has relied on the published campaign plan and sheer
happenstance of assignment in a transformation related job to inform the Army of transformation. Normally, when new policies or programs are implemented, the Army directs a thorough and monitored chain teaching program. The Consideration of Others training and the Homosexual policy changes are good examples of this method. Why not the same process of education for transformation? Beginning at the very top, General Officers should have been given a detailed appreciation and supporting program of instruction for teaching the plan for Army transformation. Instead, transformation information has relied on speeches, Army Time’s articles, and a few classes in Army school houses. This effort appears unsynchronized and ineffective.

Symbols and artifacts of the transformation, similar to the posters used to reinforce the Army’s core values, can be created and posted throughout unit headquarters, barracks, and work places that reinforce the transformation end state. From pictures to surveys on key transformation issues, the entire Army workforce can be brought closer to transformation. More Internet web sites relating to Army transformation should be created and maintained with current information. During research for this essay, several Army transformation sites were visited. Most were incomplete, outdated, and insufficient. An Internet chat room for concerns and replies by the CSA or his spoke’s person seem like viable, effective options. Finally, an anti-opposition information campaign plan would assist in dispelling inaccurate and unjust criticism to transformation and the Army. When editorials by transformation opponents or comments by politicians appear that counter transformation efforts, the CSA, through the Army Public Affairs Officer, should aggressively and visibly, through major newspaper, magazine, and television networks, counter this information.

Political Team Building

The CSA continually takes action before totally understanding the political implications and resulting opposition to transformation efforts. Whether he is unconcerned with this opposition or ill advised is unknown. However, prior to taking measures such as cutting previously promised programs in an effort to gain transformation dollars is unsound political practice. At his level, the CSA must be constantly aware of the third and fourth order effects of his decision making, especially on Capital Hill. In a recent round of line item cuts, the CSA caused a great deal of unnecessary opposition to rally against his efforts. Specifically in one example, Congresswoman Landau of Louisiana stated her discontent with the Army’s cut of key vehicle programs in her district. In true Army fashion, the Chief delineated 19 cuts that all logically support his transformation effort, yet apparently failed to build support of these cuts prior to their announcement. With the amount of senior ranking Department of Defense and
Congressional representatives supporting the Army’s efforts, the CSA must use a coalition of Congressional supporters of transformation to assist him in these controversial decisions and programs.

FINAL THOUGHTS

The CSA’s vision and the intent of the Secretary of Defense are clear; the Army and the entire Department of Defense need to transform. The mission is a complicated one, involving the risk of being ready today yet preparing for future wars. The TCP lacks the dissemination, understanding, thoroughness, and support of the men and women in the Army. Organizational change, to include removing barriers created by years of success and parochial rice bowls, is a difficult yet achievable process. With the right structure, information campaign, and advise from experts in the business world, Army transformation can regain momentum and end in success. Without these considerations, the Army is at risk of another failed transformation effort, similar to the fate of the 9th Infantry Division. The terrorist attacks of September 11th have aided the Army’s transformation efforts in two respects. First, the Department of Defense and Congress have allocated more dollars toward Army transformation projects in an effort to expedite the process. In addition, as several authors relate in works on transformation, a crisis helps to validate the need for change. The acts of September 11th, and the corresponding need to deploy a highly mobile, agile, and lethal force reinforce the Army’s intent on transforming. Unfortunately, the Marine Corps stood ready with a force similar to the Army’s Interim Force. The Army is late in developing a legitimate force. Gaining irreversible momentum for change through forcing a quicker production schedule for the IAV and doing line item cuts to existing projects is one technique for instilling change. But will this technique result in further delays and opposition from Capital Hill?

In the end, General Shinseki may depart his position in May of 2003 without the Interim Force proving itself on battlefields or at Combat Training Centers. As projects and fielding delays continue, the production line will shift into the future. Perhaps the greatest lesson in the Army’s transformation effort will be identifying the lack of education of its officers and mid level managers with respect to how to change and transform organizations. Sheer will of mind and giving directives through the chain of command have proved thus far to be ineffective.
ENDNOTES


3Ibid., 11.

4Ibid., 29.

5Transformation Campaign Plan, 181.


8Jablonsky., 45.

9Robert Murphy, Ph. D., “Managing Strategic Change: An Executive Overview of Management”. Department of Command, Leadership, and Management (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College), 40-43.


12Ibid., 153.

13Miles, 6.

14Department of Defense Update, DFI International Services, 14 November 2001, 4-5.

15Miles, 46.

16Secretary of the Army Edward White in “We must transform...and do it faster”, Army Times, 14 November, 2001, 10.

17Transformation Campaign Plan, 169.

19 Ibid.

20 Jablonsky, 58.


23 Kotter, 145.

24 Miles, 53.

25 The IBCT was constantly receiving and briefing important visitors, which included members of the Senate and House Armed Services Committee. Several of these people, and other visiting high ranking officers, openly shared their displeasure with changing the legacy force Army.

26 Transformation Campaign Plan, 182-183.

27 Transformation Campaign Plan, 150.


30 Eccles, 15.

31 As Brigade Executive Officer, I personally managed the brigade’s budget and dealt directly with the 1 Corp’s Director of Resource Management and the Corp’s G3. These figures were commonly known and discussed at weekly updates to the 1 Corp’s Command Group.

32 The initial formation of the IBCT personnel came from within 1 Corps. Units with MOSs needed by the IBCT were directed to send some or all of these MOSs to the IBCT. Commanders, during monthly USRs and Commander’s lunches, openly displayed their displeasure in taking from their own to fill the IBCT. In addition, excess MOSs were sent from the IBCT to these units. It can be argued whether the soldiers sent were to standard.


34 Ibid., 14.

Miles, 32.


Ibid., 9-3.

Filiberti, 10-11.

Miles, 53.


The Army War College, as does most educational institutions, has a non-attribution policy so speakers can freely discuss sensitive issues. Three General Officers, all 4 stars, discussed employing the Interim Brigade Combat Teams in multiple regions.


Members of the IBCT maintain contact with me and I visited them in February of this year.


Dunn, 327.

Inside the Army, 3.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


