SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Lieutenant Colonel G. Scott McConnell

Title of Monograph: The Battlefield is not Empty, but It Did Change: Implications of the Treatment of Non-combatants in Post Modern Warfare

Approved by:

__________________________ Monograph Director
Robert Epstein, Ph.D.

__________________________ Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
COL Robin P. Swan, MMAS

__________________________ Director, Graduate Degree Program
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Accepted this 18th Day of May 2000

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release Distribution Unlimited

20000919 075
ABSTRACT

The Battlefield is not Empty, but It Did Change: Implications of the Treatment of Non-combatants in Post Modern Warfare

The 1999 National Security Strategy (NSS) defines significantly different roles and priorities for the U.S. military. One of the very obvious roles is the use of the military as intervention forces to secure national interests. As military and civilian leaders develop the National Military Strategy (NMS) that supports and achieves the NSS, they must fully understand the contemporary system of conflict and armed conflict. Civilian casualties in armed conflict in the last decade amounted to ninety percent of all casualties. Given that Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) are meant to prevent civilian casualties, there ought to be an explanation of the conduct of armed conflict in the Post-modern Warfare (PMW) era.

This monograph determines the basis of and purpose of LOAC in order to be able to identify when LOAC are violated. Using three criteria, political conditions, military, civilian casualties and refugees, and world interest, three historical case studies, the civil war in Sudan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo, are analyzed to investigate and identify trends in the treatment of non-combatants in armed conflict.

The trends that are identified suggest that when they conduct armed conflict, belligerents ignore LOAC. Trends also indicate that there are linkages between certain actors and circumstances that result in second- and third-order effects in armed conflict. These relationships suggest, among other things, that Clausewitz’ trinity, long used by military and government leaders to plan and conduct armed conflict, no longer explains the conduct of armed conflict LOAC. These trends have significant implications for U.S. military and are discussed. The discussion concludes that there must be greater linkages between the elements of national power in order for the NSS to be achieved and that the U.S. military has several shortcomings in its training, doctrine, planning and employment concepts.

The monograph concludes that the current NSS can be achieved, but only if national leadership recognizes that armed conflict does not respond to stimuli as before, rather, it responds to stimuli of stimuli. Once the recognition is made, the U.S. military must develop a rapid means to transform itself to meet the changed environment. Clausewitz’ trinity provides little in this regard as it can not predict the conduct of armed conflict as evidenced by the fact that PMW belligerents do not target military forces. Instead they target non-combatants in an attempt to achieve the same ends.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Background</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Armed Conflict Case Studies</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Post Modern Warfare Trends</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Implications For the U.S. Military</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Conclusion</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endnotes</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

In December 1999, the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) published the 1999 National Security Strategy (NSS). The military concepts espoused in that strategy reflect a significant departure from previous NSSs. Previous NSSs placed great and primary emphasis on the military's ability to deter armed conflict and if necessary fight and win. The 1999 NSS recognizes the potential for armed conflict but instead places greater emphasis on interventions and stability and support operations. Civilian and military leaders in the Department of Defense (DOD) must now develop and integrate, with the other elements of national power, the military means to achieve the NSS. The task is enormous.

The current NSS addresses one of the most dynamic periods in the history of the world. It is only appropriate that the means to achieve the national strategy be as dynamic if not more so. As part of an integrated system of applied national power, economic, political, informational, and military, DOD leadership must assess and change, if necessary, its National Military Strategy (NMS), its doctrine, training, and force structure to accomplish this. Accordingly, U.S. Army doctrine, training, and force structure must too be flexible and relevant.

U.S. Army competing groups exerted significant effort and energy on analysis to determine what the correct U.S. Army doctrine, force structure, and training ought to be in order to meet its Title 10 responsibilities as outlined in the NSS and NMS. These analyses share significant common traits.

The commonalties include discussions regarding budget constraints and type of force the U.S. Army can afford. They include discussions about investment in
technology, and as they discuss the impact of budgets and technology on future forces, they also recognize that, driven by technological changes, the conduct of future wars will change. This is not to say that the nature of wars is changing. Changes in the conduct of war bear closer examination.

Many authors write that future wars will no longer reflect close range military duels that characterized World Wars I and II. On the contrary, these same authors assert that longer ranges and increased lethality of future weapons systems will, in essence, empty the battlefield. Many of the articles written that advocate, in one way or another, changes in force structure, doctrine, or training, cite Karl von Clausewitz, the long deceased Prussian military philosopher to strengthen their arguments. Others attempt to show that Clausewitz' theory no longer applies, and use this premise to substantiate their arguments.

Major General Scales, the Commandant of the U.S. Army War College, wrote two articles recently that significantly challenge Clausewitz. GEN Scales may have a point. Similarly, two other authors, Edward Villacres and Christopher Basswood, question Clausewitz' theories in postmodern warfare (PMW). These authors and their analyses are incomplete, however, because they fail to view armed conflict as the system. As a result, they may be missing one of the most significant historical trends of PMW. That trend is the exponential increase in civilian casualties in warfare since World War II.

In wars that occurred between the First and Twentieth Centuries, there were approximately 43,000,000 casualties. Civilian casualties are estimated to have been approximately forty percent or 16,000,000. Civilian casualties during the Twentieth Century were three times that amount (between 41,000,000 and 54,000,000). During
the last twenty years, civilian casualties account for more than ninety percent of the total casualties of war. This occurred despite international laws and agreements designed to protect civilians in conflict, and it occurred despite significant increases in technology that makes modern weapons more accurate.

Clausewitz describes war as the continuation of diplomacy by other means. He explains the conduct of war using the analogy of a pendulum suspended between three magnets. The magnets represent government, military, and population. All three interact with each other. The resultant forces act to keep the pendulum in continual, relatively controlled and predictable motion.

By analyzing historical trends regarding the treatment of civilians in warfare this monograph will determine if there is a significant shift from traditional means and aims in wars. Any significant shift has far reaching effects on the U.S. military’s attempts to develop its doctrine, force structure, and training for current and future national security challenges.

**Background**

*It is necessary that he who is killed shall himself have done wrong.*

Hugo Grotius in *The Law of War and Peace*, circa 1650

The power and willingness of states to wield military force and inflict tremendous destruction is not new. For hundreds of years societies have tried to civilize warfare by controlling its conduct. There are over seventy such laws, agreements, and declarations in existence today. Agreement on and respect for these laws, agreements and declarations is understandably inconsistent.
There is no single, authoritative source for definitions of terms relating to armed conflict and war. The definitions and terms that follow represent a synthesis of definitions used by many scholars, U.S. military doctrine and texts, terms found in eight international and regional conventions, agreements, and declarations on human rights and laws of war, and other sources. These definitions, consistently applied, sufficiently support the discussions and analysis in this monograph.

**War**

The U.S. Army defines war in its *Law of Land Warfare* manual published in 1956. It states that war may be defined as a legal condition of armed hostility between states. While it is usually accompanied by the commission of acts of violence, a state of war may exist prior to or after the use of force. This definition appears adequate for the U.S. Army's purposes. However, joint U.S. military and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) doctrine currently does not define civilians, non-combatants, or belligerents. There is no shortage of opinion from others.

Clausewitz generally defines war as an extension of politics. General Bernard Law Montgomery wrote that war is any prolonged conflict between rival political groups by force of arms. In its most simplistic sense, war is a breakdown of international and national order. In his book, *A Study of War*, Quincy Wright identifies that the level of sophistication of belligerents in war is moot. He states that war can be hostilities between two primitive tribes or two modern nations. Wright's definition helps to recognize that wars can be either inter- or intra-state hostilities. The recognition by world governments that wars did not always have to be between states is the likely impetus for the UN
General Assembly's departure from use of the word *war* and use of the words *armed conflict* instead in its 1970 Resolution 2675, “Basic Principles for the Protection of Civilian Populations in Armed Conflicts.” None of these definitions are wrong, and the ongoing debate to define war and armed conflict is indicative of the varying characteristics armed conflict can possess.

For example, the participants in armed conflict, can be nation-states, nations, states, parties, and other organizations like mercenaries, terrorists, and guerrillas. The definitions below enable the subsequent development of important concepts regarding the treatment of civilians in armed conflict.

Armed conflict can take place in the form of a revolution, insurrection, civil war, interstate war, or intervention. The origin and purpose of the armed conflict can be political, religious, economic, or ethnicity based or a combination of these. Regardless of its type, armed conflict is a system that responds to very complex network of stimuli. Arguably, one of the most significant stimuli is that of the rules of law. Rules of law and other like agreements seek to ensure the conduct of armed conflict meets societal expectations. The following paragraphs illustrate how international laws, treaties, and agreements attempt to accomplish this complex task, especially in light of the fact that not all parties to armed conflict find themselves bound to comply.

**Laws, Conventions, and Agreements**
There are eight key international and regional conventions, agreements, and declarations on human rights and laws of war. It is more useful, however, to recognize the general principles involved with laws of land warfare and armed conflict. \(^{20}\) Generally, the Hague Conventions provide for the protection and rights of persons. The Geneva Conventions focus on the conduct of war.

The Hague Conventions (II and IV) specifically prohibit attacks on or bombardments of towns, villages, habitations, or buildings that are not defended. They also prohibit use of poison or poison weapons to kill or wound individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army. \(^{22}\)

The Geneva Convention (IV) specifically states that populations are to be protected against certain consequences of war. It further states that such protections apply regardless of race, nationality, religion, or political opinion and are intended to alleviate the sufferings caused by war. \(^{23}\) In 1968, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 2444, which amplified basic humanitarian principles in all armed conflicts.

In addition to prohibiting attacks against civilian populations, Resolution 2444 states that “Distinction must be made at all times between person taking part in the hostilities and members of the civilian population as to the effect that the later be spared as much as possible.” \(^{24}\) The expression “spared as much” is dubious in that the contemporary interpretation of that expression is that the concept of “military necessity” satisfies this requirement. But, “military necessity” is not defined by international law. Rather it is defined by nations who attempt to abide by international laws of armed conflict. \(^{25}\)
There are ample prohibitions codified by law and otherwise that specifically prohibit the targeting and killing of civilians. One common and significant term used by both the Geneva and Hague conventions is the term “parties” to reference the belligerent entity or entities. The Conventions make no specific reference, accommodations or distinctions for the political situation within a country. According to international law, it does not matter if the parties are engaged in civil war or revolution. This lack of a distinction is critical in light of the emergence of failing states, the increased presence of mercenaries, guerrillas, and interventionism, especially in light of the issues of enforcement.

In an effort to ensure its members comply with the U.S. understanding of the laws of armed conflict (LOAC), the U.S. Air Force conducts law of land warfare training. According to the U.S. Air Force, laws of armed conflict (LOAC) are based on three basic principles. These principles are military necessity, avoidance of unnecessary suffering, and proportionality.

Military necessity is defined as taking only those actions necessary to achieve a legitimate military objective. Unnecessary suffering means that the U.S. Air Force will not hurt people or destroy their property for the sake of doing so. Proportionality is a balancing act between military necessity and avoiding unnecessary suffering.

The U.S. Air Force views these principles simplistically. It states that in targeting during armed conflict, combatants can target three things, certain people (combatants and those directly supporting armed conflict), places (military facilities and areas which directly support combatant operations), and things (military equipment or other equipment in direct support of combatants). The U.S. Air Force’s interpretation of
existing laws is not necessarily the same as other combatants, and it is certainly a
service’s perspective and attempt to ensure U.S. Air Force compliance with a U.S.
perspective. However, it does provide a baseline from which to discuss international
ttempts to enforce laws.

Since 1945, there have been one hundred armed conflicts in the world. In this
period, several alleged violations of laws, treaties, and agreements occurred. Yet, only a
small percentage of violations of these agreements resulted in sanctions of some sort.
Explanations for this are not too difficult to understand.

The first reason is outcome. Nations and nation-states conduct and participate in
armed conflict because of the expected outcome. If the nation-state, nation, or state
succeeds in armed conflict, its position in the controversy is likely vindicated. The adage
"Might means right" applies. If a belligerent’s survival is at stake, it is likely to ignore
those rules of law that can contribute to its defeat. This is especially true in the case of
intrastate armed conflict.

Another issue regarding enforcement deals with the willingness of other nation-
states to attempt to enforce laws on a belligerent thereby establishing a precedent of
enforcement. Enforcement of rules of law regarding armed conflict requires
international participation not only in the act of judging the conduct of another nation-
state, but also requires participation in the punishment.

In light of the relatively poor track record of enforcing laws of war and armed
conflict, the international community enacted several international agencies that are
charged with enforcing international laws. These organizations are the International
Criminal Court (ICC), the World Court (WC), and the Hague. Statistics for them are also not very impressive.

Some of the disadvantages of the ICC are that states can reject the court’s jurisdiction over war crimes for seven years. The potential lag time between the criminal act and judgment violate a principle of punishment. This principle states that punishment designed to prevent undesirable behavior must occur soon after the undesirable act occurs. Delays between unlawful acts and punishment occur because of lack of cooperation. States can also withhold cooperation on national security grounds. There are several other disadvantages to include the fact that several states do not accept the ICC’s ability to be police, prosecutor, judge, jury, and jailer all in one.

The issue of enforcing laws regarding armed conflict interconnects with national economic, political, and military power and potentially describes behavior previously described and explained by Clausewitz’ trinity.

Clausewitz’ trinity is subject to broad interpretation. The prevailing thought in the U. S. Army is that the trinity is comprised of the people, military, and the government. Another argument is that the war (the remarkable trinity) is comprised of violent emotion, chance, and policy (rational, non-rational, and irrational). Villacres and Bassford write that Clausewitz wrote of two trinities in *On War*. The first was the remarkable trinity and the second was a social trinity comprised of the people, military and government. He then linked them as a means to determine the conduct of war.

The recent, February 1999, statement by the President of the Security Council to the UN General Assembly is evidence that the conduct of wars is in fact changing. In his statement the Security Council President references increased attacks on women and
children, humanitarian aid workers, and refugees as well as destruction of humanitarian assistance items.35

Dynamics such as those discussed in and about *On War*, the nature of armed conflict, and its conduct are the subject of the next chapter, which is a discussion of the conduct of the armed conflicts in Sudan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo.

**Armed Conflict Case Studies**

Since the end of World War II, over ninety-five open armed conflicts occurred in the world. These conflicts are categorized as interstate war (thirty-five), civil war (forty-eight), civil war with intervention (nine), and anti-colonial/colonial war (two).36 Each of these conflicts presents an opportunity for analysis to identify trends regarding the treatment of non-combatants in armed conflict. The Sudanese Civil War (1983-Present) and the most recent Balkans War (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo) represent a continual spectrum of armed conflict whose circumstances provide a sound basis of analysis of how non-combatants were treated.37 These factors and influences comprising the circumstances are the criteria applied to determine any trends that exist regarding how parties conduct armed conflict.

The criteria are:

**Political Conditions.** What is the political state of the area in conflict? This includes national sovereignty, third country involvement, and the country’s ability to govern and provide for its people and whether the population experienced war previously. Included in this discussion will be the type of armed conflict that occurred.
Military. This criteria pertains to the strength and viability of the military, its stated strategy and well as its command and control structure. The discussion will include the conduct of the war.

Civilian Casualties and Refugees. How many civilians were killed during the armed conflict? Were they overtly targeted? What was the number and nature of refugees? \[38\]

World Interest. What was the international community’s reaction to the armed conflict? How many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IO) were involved? What was the nature of their involvement? Were third country nationals working within the area of the conflict targeted? What was the impact of the NGOs and IOs?

Sudan

Sudan is accustomed to armed conflict. Since Great Britain granted Sudan its independence in 1956, it experienced civil wars spanning over forty years. \[39\] When the current war broke out in 1983, the Sudanese military enjoyed a reputation for being non-partisan and provided a great deal of stability to a nation with an unstable economy and population. \[40\] On two occasions, military led coups-de-tats served to effectively transition the national government and achieve internal stability. \[41\] In the last seventeen years, the military’s reputation and actions achieved a contrary effect as civilian deaths related directly to the conduct of the civil war number approximately two million. \[42\]

In 1983, Sudan’s population was approximately twenty-six million people. \[43\] Civil war broke-out when the Muslim majority government, predominately residing in the
Northern two-thirds of Sudan, subdivided the country into three regions and imposed Islamic law on the entire country and dissolved the Southern Sudan regional Government.\textsuperscript{44} The Christian minority in the south, representing approximately fifteen percent of the total Sudanese population, began fighting the Khartoum government.\textsuperscript{45} The political opposition, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military arm the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and splinter factions continue to fight today in a considerably changed environment.

The Sudanese government no longer controls all of Sudan. Nor can it provide for its population in terms of security and food and shelter. Much of this is due to the fact that the civil war has all but vanquished the agricultural output of the country. Despite this, the government of Sudan effectively controls Sudanese media and restricts access of international media. It does so in an apparent attempt to ensure the civil war remains an internal security matter by denying objective and therefore credible reporting. Another factor effecting the changed environment is the involvement of third countries in the conflict.\textsuperscript{46} Sudanese border countries and other Middle Eastern countries directly influence the belligerents in the civil war in an attempt to support or hinder it.

Middle Eastern countries desire to see the Islamic government succeed for both political and economic reasons. Earlier economic ties included agriculture products like grain and beef. Prior to the civil war, eighty percent of Sudan’s economy was agriculture based.\textsuperscript{47} Today they must purchase more expensive products from other (non-Islamic) countries. They also desire to see Islamic influence grow in Sub-Saharan Africa. Third country economic and political goals emerge in the form of military assistance and humanitarian aid. Sudan has a history of receiving military aid from third countries, and
this aid fuels rather than acts to arrest the armed conflict.\textsuperscript{48} It is no surprise then, that the SPLA and its ally the National Democratic Association (NDA) sought and receive aid from neighboring Ethiopia and Eritrea.\textsuperscript{49}

The military conduct of the Sudanese civil war is significant. In 1990, the Sudanese military numbered just 71,000 members, and it was responsible for both internal and external security.\textsuperscript{50} The SPLA, a uniformed force, numbered significantly fewer. Despite or because of this, Sudanese armed forces and the SPLA rarely fought each other. There are few accounts of Government and insurgent forces fighting each other in unit strengths greater than one hundred soldiers.

Instead, the two military forces targeted civilians and other non-military targets. The Sudanese military receives its instructions and missions from the national government, but it does not state or publish its military strategy. Actions over the last fifteen years indicate that the Sudanese government wants to eliminate any insurgency including its social and political roots. To this end, the military conducts a war of attrition against the entire South Sudanese population. There are numerous newspaper, periodical, and governmental reports that document the Sudanese military actions against insurgents and civilians. Similarly, there are numerous accounts of the SPLA’s actions against civilians as well.\textsuperscript{51} The SPLA appears to follow the SPLM’s goals of securing regional autonomy at any cost. Both belligerent’s actions reflect these strategies; both belligerents display a proclivity to ignore LOAC.

Sudanese government forces employ land mines, aircraft, artillery, and military (army) units against civilian settlements and camps throughout South Sudan. The U.S. Department of State (U.S. DOS) cites credible reports that the Sudanese government
pursued a scorched earth policy in South Sudan. Aid worker accounts indicate that Sudanese government forces attack villages and force the inhabitants to move to resettlement camps. Known as “combing operations” government forces encircle villages, shoot or apprehend its inhabitants, including men, women, and children, confiscate livestock, and burn crops and dwellings.

In what is recognized by many as reprisal operations, the SPLA, and other insurgent groups, employed land mines and infantry type forces against civilians and other groups. Given its disadvantages in size and equipment, the SPLA’s desire to avoid military-on-military fighting, it attacks the Sudanese government indirectly through its population. To an understandable and lesser degree, insurgent forces targeted and fought government forces.

Both the insurgent and the government forces killed thousands of non-combatants, stole and looted civilian property, stole relief supplies, forced resettlement, forced men and children into military service, and raped women and children. The Sudanese government supports a Ugandan opposition group in South Sudan that forced approximately 3000 Ugandan children to be soldiers or sex slaves. The direct effects achieved by the Sudanese government and insurgent forces when they targeted civilians appear to be intentional.

The two million civilian death figure belies these effects. The civil war in Sudan forced the external displacement of 375,000 refugees and internal displacement of more than four million. According to the U.S. DOS, credible sources indicate that neither belligerent is innocent regarding these actions. By displacing South Sudanese civilians to other countries or to North Sudan, the government decreases the minority representation
in the South and diffuses their numbers in the North. In essence, though its armed forces, the government eliminates their political power and opposition. Besides use of direct force against civilians, the Sudanese military creates refugees by targeting agriculture, villages, aid programs, and settlements.

When belligerents burned or destroyed crops, burned and destroyed villages, and denied access to food and water, targeted civilians moved from their homes. While the government's achievement of desired effects of refugee movement to majority population centers in northern Sudan or outside its borders, where they are a burden to other countries, second and third order effects of refugee movement create other problems for the government of Sudan. The economic drain on countries like Eritrea and Ethiopia caused those countries to support the insurgency.

The international community's response to the Sudan Civil War is not easy to explain. The civil war created economic and humanitarian disasters that are today largely ignored. The international community was not always so calloused. As the political, economic, and military environment of Sudan changed, so did the international community's response.

Initial international reaction to the fighting in Sudan was one of humanitarian concern. The United Nations (UN) and its subordinate programs such as UNICEF attempted to provide humanitarian relief to the victims of the fighting. NGOs, both Islamic and non-Islamic, achieved initial success. However, the Sudanese government soon realized that humanitarian relief supplied to the South Sudanese people does nothing more than lengthen the amount of time the people can withstand fighting. Since the government was fighting a war of attrition, relief supplies provided to the South Sudanese
were contrary to the long-term military and political goals. Conversely, the SPLA realized that by controlling relief supplies, it could meter its existence and resistance in the civil war.

Beginning in the 1990’s, the Sudanese government began denying NGOs permits and access to South Sudan. Additionally, it did not provide security for relief workers and supplies. Many NGOs quit their efforts altogether in the country and diverted efforts to neighboring countries. The Sudanese government viewed this too as contrary to its long-term goals.

Soon relief workers and NGO efforts became targets of both the SPLA and the Sudanese government. An obvious violation of LOAC, IOs, NGOs, and to a much lesser extent, other countries such as France and the U.S. protested the looting, abuse, and murder of relief workers in Sudan. At one time Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), a UN orchestrated relief effort, brought seventeen tons of relief supplies into Sudan on a daily basis. Today, total monthly relief supplies fall are less than that, and given the expansive depth of the relief requirements, many countries and NGOs believe providing humanitarian relief to Sudanese people is a lost cause.

Another factor creating this perception of the Sudan problem is the belligerent’s total disregard for LOAC. The International Committee of the Red Cross attempted to address this matter in January of 1999. The ICRC conducted training seminars for thirty-one senior SPLA officers. At the same time, it provided training for two hundred-thirty members of the Sudanese government and its armed forces. The ICRC conducted numerous other programs throughout Sudan to both government and military officials.
There is no feedback available regarding the effectiveness of the ICRC training, but it is clear that the conduct of the armed conflict was not because SPLA leadership and the Sudanese government did not understand them. During the 1970s and 1980s, many Sudanese military officers received training in Western military schools. Another fact that can not be ignored that that the belligerents knew the LOAC. The failed peace treaty ratified on the 21st of April 1997 contained a provision for “general and unconditional amnesty” covering the period from 16 May 1983 until 21 April 1997 for any persons who may have committed violations of the LOAC. The fact that the ICRC was compelled to conduct the training and the treaty contained the amnesty provision speaks volumes to the conduct of the Sudanese Civil War. The armed conflict fought in the Balkans, in Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H) and later Kosovo shows that the belligerents conducted their conflict in similar manner, but the international community’s response differed significantly.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

The Bosnian government, which was predominantly Muslim, did not enjoy effective control of the population in B-H. The Muslims occupied thirty-three percent of B-H, and Bosnian Serbs fifty percent, and Croats sixteen percent.\textsuperscript{65} At issue was the amount of land each of these ethnic groups occupied. The Muslims occupied fifty one percent of B-H, and Bosnian Serbs thirty percent.

Bosnian Serb opposition emerged as both a political and a military force. Bosnian Serb political goals were national security. It attempted to secure these goals through its military and in alliance with Serbia. It is important to recognize that when Serbia conducted its operations to seize the cities of Dubrovnik and Vukovar in 1991 the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) committed numerous atrocities against non-combatants yet elicited minimal international response.\textsuperscript{66} The Yugoslav government provided both political and military support to the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA). Military support came in the form of JNA forces fighting as Bosnian Serb Soldiers in B-H. Yugoslav willingness to assist Bosnian Serbs stemmed from its attempts to arrest the disintegration of Yugoslavia and regain some of its economic, political and military power. It began this with the siege of Sarajevo in April 1992. Throughout the next four years, B-H political factions and Yugoslav Serbs simultaneously participated in negotiations to end the fighting while they fought a war of attrition.\textsuperscript{67}

The B-H population, had not experienced war since World War II, but was accustomed to military service. Yugoslavia exercised universal military conscription throughout the Cold War, and its military expenditures were moderate.\textsuperscript{68} This was apparent in the conduct of the war as many Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims volunteered for service in the military after the fighting began.
Neither the BSA nor Bosnian Army possessed overwhelming military power. Nor could they afford to replace any lost soldiers or equipment. A UN arms embargo ensured this. In addition, the Bosnian Muslim economy and its lack of third country support prevented it from being able to replace equipment as well. As a result, the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim armies rarely sought battles of annihilation. Instead, they targeted the civilian population.

In May 1992, the Serbs began ethnic cleansing of Muslims and Croats. By August, Bosnian Serbs controlled seventy percent of B-H. BSA efforts to cleanse B-H of Croats and Muslims resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians. Many were forced to move to refugee camps like Srebrinica, Zepe, and Gorazde. There, men were separated from women and children and most were murdered. In spring of 1993, Serb artillery and mortars fired into the Muslim enclave of Srebrinica killing sixty-four people and wounding over one hundred. Many of them were children.

The BSA was not the only belligerent to violate the LOAC. Three months earlier, on January 7th 1992, a Muslim force of 3000 soldiers and civilians attacked the Serb town of Kravica killing forty-five soldiers, women, and children. A week later, the same force seized a bridge near Skelani and killed fleeing women and children. Srebrinica remains an infamous name in the Balkans. In July 1995, it fell to the BSA. In the ensuing few days, over 4000 Muslim men and boys were murdered by the BSA.

When the General Framework for Peace (Dayton Accords) was signed in December 1995, the B-H conflict had killed more than 400,000 civilians, displaced more than two million persons, and destroyed over eighty percent of its infrastructure and caused its economy to contract more than sixty percent. More than a million of these
refugees were displaced externally. The conduct of B-H conflict did not go unnoticed by the international community.

International responses ranged from attempts to end the fighting to attempts to assist the belligerents. Many countries attempted to provide humanitarian relief. Attempts to end the fighting ultimately resulted in the failure of the UN mission in B-H. Attempts to assist belligerents occurred at local levels, and they resulted in continued fighting. One exception to this was the successful Bosnian-Croat Federation’s offensive, *Operation Storm*, which regained control of Krajina in 1995. Attempts to provide humanitarian relief also largely failed.

Beginning in 1991, NGOs under leadership of the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) attempted to provide relief to refugees in the Balkans. As the fighting continued, and UN sanctions took hold, relief supplies were targeted more frequently. In 1992, the UN passed resolution 452. It required the UN Protective Force (UNPROFOR) to provide security to humanitarian relief efforts in B-H. International political, military, and economic responses intensified.

In 1993, a military tribunal convened in order to investigate and try persons for crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The UN eventually authorized NATO to conduct air attacks against the BSA in order to protect Bosnian Muslims because the UNPROFOR could not. Local and limited support by third country nationals such as Islamic fundamentalists from Iran probably prolonged the conflict and continued violations of the LOAC. The consortium of retired U.S. Army general officers that trained and planned *Operation Storm* likely curtailed it. The successful offensive forced the BSA to negotiate in earnest. However, allegations of LOAC violations
allegedly still occurred during the offensive by Bosnian Croats and Muslims. Unlike the Sudanese Treaty, the GFAP included provisions for pursuing justice for alleged violations of LOAC through the ICTY. Its success to date is debatable.

In 1997, of the seventy-eight men indicted for war crimes by the Hague Tribunal, sixty-eight remained at large. In 1997, enforcement of LOAC received greater political attention. It was the result of the realization that continued Bosnian peace depended on enforcement of LOAC. It is important to recognize that this reasoning (logic) stems from political motives rather than moral. To date, apprehension and trials of alleged Serb criminals trails those of Croats and Muslims.

UN judges sentenced a Croat general to forty-five years in prison for atrocities committed by soldiers during the Bosnia war. In February, 2000, the Yugoslav Tribunal found Croatian militia commander, General Tihomir Blaskic, guilty of crimes against humanity, and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the protection of noncombatants during the period 1992-1995. Blaskic is the fourteenth suspect convicted at the Yugoslav Tribunal located in The Hague, Netherlands. He is the first top military commander to be convicted. Others convicted of similar crimes were prison camp commanders, camp guards, and paramilitary fighters.

Blaskic defended his actions stating that he never ordered the atrocities. He was dealing with "poorly trained recruits in a new army with an inchoate command structure." Three judges found him guilty of ordering an ethnic cleansing campaign. Blaskic' conviction is important, but the circumstances surrounding his apprehension, trial, and conviction are also important. Blaskic was captured in 1995. His trial took
over five years to conduct. In essence, the international jury was still out when the Kosovo war began four years after the GFAP was signed.

Kosovo

Kosovo was not included in the GFAP, yet probably should have been. In the 1980’s, Slobodan Milosovic rose to power by promising to provide minority Serbs in Kosovo protection from the majority Albanians there. Milosovic’s opponent in Kosovo, was Ibrahim Rugova. Rugova and his Kosovar Albanian followers seek an autonomous Kosovo. The Yugoslav Army’s opponent was the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). He repressed the Albanians there consistently. To Milosovic (and his Russian ally) the Kosovo situation was an internal Yugoslav matter.

Kosovar Albanians were increasingly subjected to economic, political, and social discrimination after the signing of the GFAP in 1995. Kosovar Albanian schools, churches, and municipalities received no funding and its economy began to contract. Kosovar discontent increased and the KLA’s strength increased. As the KLA’s strength grew, it began killing Serb policemen and others within Kosovo.

The KLA had a large population from which to build its army. More than two-thirds of the male population was under age thirty, and unemployment was seventy percent. What it lacked in equipment it made up for in numbers. The Serb Army was a much more capable and worthy opponent. However, the KLA, much like the Muslims in B-H, avoided military confrontations with the Serbs.

The Serbs and KLA targeted civilians. In January 1999, Serb military forces allegedly killed forty-five Kosovar villagers including three women and a child. This
alleged atrocity occurred despite the presence of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) observers interposed between the belligerents and the threat of NATO airstrikes. In May 1999, the American Forces Press Service reported that Serbians in Kosovo had taken the war crime of using human shields to new extremes. During fighting against KLA forces, Serbian forces used five hundred Kosovar men as shields forcing them to stand in front of Serb tanks as they fought against the KLA. The same article cites two other LOAC violations. The Serbs moved their forces among refugee convoys and dressed in Red Cross and Red Crescent uniforms in order to avoid attack. Allegations of violations of the LOAC were not limited to just the belligerents but to third country interventionists as well.

There are allegations by Serbia and other states that NATO airpower, as it sought to prevent Serb attacks against Kosovar civilians and punish attacks into Kosovo, violated the LOAC and supported the KLA. There is merit to these allegations. KLA ground operations apparently took advantage of the fact that Serb forces could not maneuver during daylight hours or mass conventional forces to fight it.

Either intentionally or unintentionally, NATO was duplicitous as it conducted its air campaign, Operation Allied Force. Regardless, the Serb position is that NATO and the KLA worked in concert. The NATO-KLA relationship increased worldwide attention. Especially when NATO airstrikes destroyed civilian infrastructure, the Chinese embassy, and killed many non-combatants.

International interest in Kosovo was more focused than in B-H. Many countries viewed the Kosovo issue as an internal matter, much like the ongoing Russian issue with
Chechnya. As a result, these countries sought to control external influences on Kosovo. Some countries viewed the matter as a European security issue. They viewed it as a powder keg that could destabilize the Balkans, again, and eventually Europe. Europe could not absorb the significant humanitarian and economic problems that would be associated with another Balkans conflict. As a result, the focused international attention, was not always working in concert.

NATO cobbled together a coalition and attempted diplomatic means, backed up by the threat of force, to end the fighting and atrocities. Because of its ad-hoc nature, and the widely differing attitudes and capabilities, coalition members had a veto vote. If a country did not support the targeting process of NATO, it could stop the mission.

Another factor influencing the conduct of the air war was risk management. NATO leaders bombed targets from 15,000 feet in order to protect its aircrews. Bombing from 15,000 feet indeed protected NATO aircrews, but introduced greater risk for the population it sought to protect. Conrad Crane wrote recently in the "Washington Post Weekly Addition," that stated that in NATO's air campaign civilian casualties exceeded military casualties. Operation Allied Force, killed 1600 civilians and 1000 Serbian military personnel. Little public opinion decrying the statistics exists. This fact no doubt reflects public opinion regarding participation in intervention and who must bear the costs...either the belligerents, non-combatants, or the interventionists.

It seems to say that outcome is not as important as are friendly casualties. For example, President Clinton required aircrews to fly at 15,000 feet, above enemy air defense systems, in order to avert friendly casualties. Allegedly this was because of "...the heat he would take in the event of casualties." This is likely also reflected in
French reluctance to fully cooperate during ground operations in Kosovo. General Reinhart NATO commander in Kosovo ordered active patrols; Paris ordered the French Sector commander, General de Sannes, not to. Analysts are convinced the French governments orders not to comply were a result of wanting to avoid putting its soldiers in harms way.94

Post Modern Warfare Trends

The Sudanese Civil War, B-H, and Kosovo present many trends in how non-combatants are treated in PMW. These trends indicate numerous relationships that exist and serve to meter the conduct of armed conflict. They also indicate relationships that are non-linear and are interconnected by systems that function within and outside of the systems of armed conflict regardless or in spite of the type of armed conflict (interstate or internal). These key systems appear to be information, economics, and politics.

Interstate wars are becoming rare, and internal armed conflict is increasing. Since 1945, only six out of one hundred-three armed conflicts were inter-state. This growing trend is likely the impetus behind the ratification in 1977 of the “Second Protocol of the Geneva Convention.95 This protocol does not differentiate between types of conflict. The significance of this trend is that intervention in internal conflicts is likely. Kosovo shows that not every country will agree on an accepted course of action or concept of what is legitimate. Legitimacy determines how LOAC are enforced.

Enforcement of LOAC is inconsistent. In some cases, political expedience, such as concessions made to ensure agreement on a treaty, may mean that enforcement of LOAC will not occur at all. This approach is dangerous as it sets a standard that dilutes
or diminishes the aims of LOAC. It also serves to sensitize belligerents and non-combatants to use of force.

In Sudan, B-H, and Kosovo belligerents displayed a propensity to target civilians rather than military forces. Amnesty granted in the 1997 Sudan Treaty and lethargic enforcement in B-H and Kosovo do little to dissuade illegal conduct of armed conflict. B-H apparently began a trend that alleged crimes that occur early on in armed conflict might not be adjudicated for years. This may empower military and political leaders and their subordinates with a feeling of invincibility and a proclivity to ignore LOAC.

Trends indicate that violations of LOAC include targeting women and children. In Sudan’s fifteen-year-old war, targeting children could be viewed as legitimate. In 1983, every three year old child represented a potential eighteen year old soldier or a farmer who could feed 1000 soldiers in 1998. Civil wars tend to last years, not months. Given this, there is, unfortunately, merit to this approach.

Another factor influencing enforcement trends is economics. Direct and indirect external participation, as evidenced by Sudan, (its neighboring countries), Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo (former Eastern Bloc countries and others) are parties, including corporations, that achieve great economic gains by not enforcing laws of armed conflict. There is strong evidence that corporations and states foment conflict in order to contract mercenaries, weapons sales, and ammunition.

For belligerents who can not afford arms and weapons or are prevented from obtaining them, indications are that they elect to avoid military on military fighting. Instead, they target the opposing political and military indirectly—through its non-
combatant population. This approach is made more effective by the notion that precision and modern weapons empty the battlefield (of combatants).

Sudan, B-H, and Kosovo show that the battlefield is not empty. There may not be any combatants on the battlefield, but it is not empty. As the battlefield grows, through the introduction of even more lethal weapons with greater ranges, the propensity to find more non-combatants than combatants on the battlefield increases. Greater lethality causes greater dispersal of combatants. Under protections of LOAC, non-combatants have no reason to disperse. Nor, as economics or politics may dictate, do they have the means.

Trends indicate that employment of PGMs will not always be combatants or interventionist’s response to a dispersed enemy. Rather belligerents and interventionists will employ PGMs as an expedient means to minimize risk to employed forces. The air campaign in Kosovo is the example for this.

Kosovo also shows that PGMs are not precise. They are more precise than iron or dumb bombs, but their employment as precision munitions and a means to avoid risk for aircrews resulted in far greater casualties in Kosovo. The unintended consequences of PGMs going astray and striking non-combatants rapidly become an issue of legitimacy for members of the Allied Force Coalition. The issue of legitimacy rapidly became an issue of information operations, and it indicates another PMW trend.

Belligerent or interventionist application of information systems and political power will determine what is legitimate in the conduct of war. If civilian casualties occur, in the name of military necessity or “vital national interests” as they were argued in Kosovo and B-H, the opponent is likely to seek one or two courses of action. In the first
case, he may elect to ignore all LOAC. In these cases one could argue that each party
violated the laws of armed conflict. Though not a sound legal defense, the international
community appears to be reluctant to put itself in the position of being called a hypocrite.

The other alternative is for the opponent to seek, through aggressive information
operations, the opportunity to degrade national prestige and will. Analysis reveals that
intentional targeting of civilian populations is designed to reduce and ultimately eliminate
public support of popular movements, governments, and regimes. This same targeting
can have both positive and negative second- and third-order effects on participants to and
other parties.

For example, targeting a civilian population can cause it to flee to a neighboring
country or refugee camps. Large movements of populations overload NGO and IO relief
efforts and contribute the complex humanitarian disaster (CHD) that inevitably evolves.

Political, economic, and social response to CHD can have a positive or negative
effect on the conduct and outcome of the armed conflict. The refugee crisis in Kosovo is
an example where Serb targeting of Kosovar Albanians caused a mass exodus that
resulted in the public outcry and visibility. The circumstances would have served Serbia
better had its conflict with Kosovar Albanians remained an internal security matter.

Another trend seen in post-modern armed conflict is that attacks against
populations portend a greater impact for a smaller amount of resources committed.
Sudan, B-H, and Kosovo all indicate that soft, quasi-military targets are easier to access
and susceptible to greater casualties. Greater non-combatant casualties appear to achieve
greater effects from the international community and belligerents, than military casualties
do. NGOs directly and indirectly influence these effects.
NGO conduct in armed conflict also impacts the treatment of civilians. Since World War II, NGOs have increased from one hundred-thirty to well over 20,000 in 1996.6 NGO increased presence mitigates what would otherwise be siege warfare. When belligerents target civilian populations, it reduces their access to health care, food, water and shelter. Rather than the government absorbing the burden to provide for its people, it passes the task off to NGOs and IOs. By doing so, NGOs and IOs prolong rather than hasten the outcome of armed conflict. As a result, NGOs frequently become targets and enjoy less and less an acceptance by belligerents. In the Balkans, since 1995, more NGOs and UN personnel were killed in the line of duty than military peace keeping forces.7

When NGOs and IOs become targets they become a security task for intervention forces. This creates security requirements that often act to drain military power from commanders. NGOs are much more political today as well. The international community recognizes this by requesting NGO participation; because of their influence on armed conflict, in UN and other international decision making body processes.8

Throughout this decade UN and other aid officials have become more vulnerable. They used to be ‘off-limits’; in the new wars, they are often targets. In 1998, for the first time in history, more UN civilian workers were killed in the line of duty, twenty-four, than peacekeeping soldiers.9 Peace keeping policies and goals are seldom developed now without input NGOs and IOs. This introduces even greater complexities when intervention forces attempt to build coalitions.

Coalition effectiveness is subject to economic, informational, and political influences. Kosovo shows that coalitions are more effective at achieving legitimacy in
intervention operations. But by their nature they are difficult to maintain. B-H provides an interesting trend regarding coalition warfare. In Kosovo, coalition response (both NATO and non-NATO members) reflected national moods (public opinion) and capabilities found only at the least common level of consensus.

It appears that in stable nation-states, public opinion regarding the costs to intervention versus the costs to civilian populations allows greater latitude for civilian casualties so long as they are militarily necessary. For example in the U.S. and other NATO countries, the fact that high altitude bombing resulted in civilian casualties but spared the lives of NATO aircrew members was acceptable.

Humanitarian interventions have a human cost both to the interventionists, who apparently have a tolerance level and are willing to overlook human costs associated with them, but they also have a cost to the intended beneficiaries. Senator Tom McCain states that in taking greater care of soldiers than those they are sent to protect, we made Kosovo one of the more immoral conflicts in history. Clinton Administration officials deny the existence of a casualty aversion policy. They argue that, at least in the case of the U. S., the American public is willing to accept casualties as long as the mission is in the national interest. National leadership must then convince voters that intervention is in the national interest. This requires extensive use and control of information systems.

Belligerent economic strength also affects the conduct of armed conflict. In armed conflicts, economic factors of the population that provides belligerents can be linked to the conduct of the warring parties. In a non-armed conflict situation or peacetime, the lawless conduct of many would be criminal. High unemployment and poverty contributes to and is linked to criminal behavior. When that civilian criminal
dons a uniform or becomes a member of a large social group such as an armed force, the lawless behavior can continue unabated and masked. It can remain criminal, but enjoy pseudo protections under ill-enforced laws.

In summary, Sudan and the Balkans show that armed conflict is no longer the military duel described by Clausewitz. Instead, belligerents appear inclined to pursue the indirect approach to destroying governments. Attacks against women and children, actions that create thousands of refugees, and attacks against humanitarian operations all describe relationships that indicate no direct means of achieving the purpose of war (armed conflict) as described by Clausewitz.

He states that the purpose of war is to force the opponent to submit one’s will. The relationships described above no longer allow the application of a simple cause and effect model such as the trinity to explain the conduct of armed conflict. What Sudan and the Balkans show is that non-linear relationships, that is causes and second- and third-order effects, do. For the U.S. military implications are significant.

Implications for the U.S. Military

The treatment of civilians in armed conflict is important to the military commander who may be called upon to either intervene and subsequently conduct post-conflict operations or conduct post-conflict operations after a peace settlement. As this study shows, other actors and factors and their interrelationships have far reaching implications. These implications cover a broad spectrum of areas from training, doctrine and force structure, to planning, forces employment, and military objectives, and these implications are not just a military concern.
Currently, U.S. military training remains entrenched in training its military members for environments that include LOAC abiding actors. Part of the problem resides in the fact that international laws have not changed yet largely go un- or ill-enforced. Despite its prevalence, training on what happens when LOAC are violated does not occur. Consequently, U.S. military personnel, and their civilian leaders, face the inevitable task of rethinking how they will conduct their missions in environments where LOAC are simply ignored or selectively recognized. This too has implications for the commander.

As the commander plans to fight the next war or conduct stability and support operations, he must recognize that his overmatch in combat capability and intelligence may cause his opponent to select the indirect approach—through non-combatants, or quasi non-combatants such as contractor personnel or NGOs. In short, he must recognize that LOAC, to many, can mean nothing. He therefore should not rely on them to clarify the boundaries between combat and non-combat. Conversely, he must also be trained to recognize that un- or ill-enforced LOAC effect the behavior of belligerents, populations, and organizations.

Military training must also include the growing role and influence of NGOs and similar organizations regarding the conduct of armed conflict. U.S. doctrine and training must indicate that NGOs can be three things at once to different parties. They can be opponents, neutral, or allies in the conduct of armed conflict or intervention operations. NGOs can, if allowed and supported, mitigate the suffering of populations. They can provide a base of support for belligerents, and can create an environment that supports attrition conflict. Training must enable military commanders to discern what role(s) the
NGOs perform, understand their effects, and anticipate military requirements. Integrated NGO and military training can only partially address this area.

Training in humanitarian intervention operations is the other element. Military support to humanitarian assistance operations can also mean direct intervention by military forces in unstable and hostile environments. The problem is often public expectation that something can and must be done to reduce or solve complex humanitarian emergencies or CHD, especially those brought about by armed conflict. Air drops of humanitarian assistance supplies into Sarajevo put U.S. military personnel and equipment in harms way not because it was the most effective means of delivering supplies to the city, but rather because the U.S. military could rapidly respond to the crisis.

Military forces will remain the first organization called upon to respond to CHD. Military leadership must be trained to be able to determine whether use of military capability to respond to a CHD is appropriate (feasible, acceptable, and suitable). There is a related requirement for national and international leadership to recognize that humanitarian relief does not address organizational, political, or economic relationships that cause CHD.¹⁰²

U.S. military leaders must also be able to recognize that economics drive, directly and indirectly, the conduct of armed conflict. Isolation of external economic factors requires an integrated approach from the national level. The military can address symptoms, but can not orchestrate and coordinate the efforts of all elements of national power in order to shape the conduct of armed conflict through global, regional, or national economic systems.
The same holds true with the use of information operations to shape and guide the conduct of armed conflict. Achieving international legitimacy through military operations alone is not possible. Targeting failures, equipment failures, and the like, as shown in Kosovo, enable international parties to effectively question military actions and erode legitimacy. Information operations, again orchestrated at the national level and executed at strategic and theater levels, must be employed to ensure the military commander has freedom of action, and his actions remain perceived as legitimate. Perceived or actual illegitimate actions open inroads to reprisals.

U.S. military force structure must recognize that in armed conflict, opponents will not make the distinction between contract personnel and combatants. Current reliance on contractor personnel and host nation personnel for base support operations support, maintenance, and transportation presents a critical vulnerability to potential U.S. opponents. U.S. military defense expenditures currently force this reliance on contractor and host nation personnel. Nonetheless, trends indicate that LOAC will do little to dissuade an opponent from targeting them. This has implications for the type of military force structure the military has.

Regardless of the type of mission, intervention or war, the opponent may elect not to fight U.S. high technology and rapid deployment capable forces. On the contrary, he may elect to target the equipment or non-combatants working at key sea and airports and deny our operational and strategic maneuver. Barring that, he likely will not present U.S. forces a force against which it can maneuver, close, and destroy. This implication leads to other planning considerations and implications.
When military commanders plan the employment of military forces, they must also account for these trends in PMW. Today, the National Command Authority, through the NSS, relies considerably on the use of coalition forces to accomplish military objectives. Effective force employment requires a shared common understanding of the LOAC, its influence on the operational environment, and how the coalition force will be employed. Employment planning must encompass the ability to adjust military objectives to the least common national perspective.

Military objectives must be tempered with an understanding that political expediency may result in rapid and differing interpretation of LOAC and its subsequent enforcement. In the future, warlords may or may not limit their atrocities for fear of international prosecution. Amnesty granted in treaties and lack of aggressive and coherent attempts to bring about justice will determine the feasibility of military objectives.

Conclusion

Clausewitz could never have envisioned it, but the forces of globalization and international cooperation (this includes economic, political, and informational interdependence and cooperation) are redefining state sovereignty and power. As a result, how states conduct themselves in conflict today and how they will in the future is not simple. As history shows, conflict will evolve into the extreme case, armed conflict, that influences a national security. The U.S. NSS clearly defines the conditions that prescribe use of military forces, but apparently fails to recognize why and how PMW armed
conflict occurs. This act of omission in the NSS is irresponsible. It is also irresponsible for the U.S. DOD to follow that same faulty logic.

Armed conflict today is ragged and messy, ambiguous, and less controllable than fifty years ago. With these facts comes the recognition that when states rely on international laws and codes such as the LOAC to prevent inhumane acts and other atrocities, they fail. LOAC are ineffective; they are ineffective because they are either inconsistently enforced, not enforced at all, or are enforced in politically advantageous manner for certain actors. Potential U.S. adversaries must know this. They conduct analyses to determine the limits of breaking LOAC and getting away with it in order to secure their own political, economic, and military goals.

Regardless of how idealistic U.S. military personnel may be, regardless of how benevolent their intentions, the U.S. DOD can not legislate morality. Nor can it reverse the social and historical impact of immoral acts committed by others. Recognition of these facts would serve to further bind the problem presented by the current NSS to the U.S. military. That problem is a failure to recognize and act on a need to change.

In 1995 when discussions about the revolution in military affairs (RMA) were frequent and common, Dr. Jacob Kipp wrote an article entitled *The Revolution in Military Affairs and Its Interpreters: Implications for National and International Security Policy.* In his article, Kipp states that if others can find the means to leverage their initial backwardness to an advantage, initial military superiority does not necessarily translate into long-term military superiority. Then he cites Alvin and Heidi Toffler and describes that the challenge facing societies and other institutions such as the military is adaptation to change. He proposes that in an environment of change military institutions,
which seek to adapt and evolve gradually, will find their response inadequate, untimely, and possibly fatal. He suggests that successful adaptation of elements of national power must entail a larger systemic adaptation to change.  

Recent armed conflicts indicate that warfare has changed rapidly and significantly since World War II. The implications for all national leaders, but most importantly U.S. leadership, are that rapid change is necessary for the military institution lest it fail. This monograph shows that this change must come about through the recognition that increasingly interdependent socio-economic and political systems can no longer be modeled by obsolete and linear Clausewitzian concepts regarding the conduct of armed conflict and the treatment of non-combatants.

Success of the U.S. NSS hinges upon this recognition. U.S. military civilian and military leaders can not ignore or disregard decisions to employ the military in support of U.S. national interests. Because of this, the U.S. military must aggressively lead the other elements of national power in this recognition. It must change its doctrine, training, force structure and employment and strategy to effectively address new trends in armed conflict. When analyzing and seeking solutions, leaders must realize that Clausewitz does not apply, but complexity and chaos theory, perhaps, do.
ENDNOTES


2 The number of armed conflicts in the world increased by a factor of 6 in the last decade. The cause of these wars is related to the high number of failed and failing states in the world. Many link the failure of states to the disappearance of the bi-polar world associated with the Cold War.

3 See for example, GEN Charles Krulak's article, Operational Maneuver from the Sea” in *Proceedings*, January 1997. GEN Krulak provides a concise discussion of the interrelationships of U.S. elements of national power and how they relate to the NSS.

4 The nature of war remains constant throughout history. Wars and armed conflict are characterized by intense emotions towards the opponent(s).

5 See for example, Dr. James Schneider's article, “Theory of the Empty Battlefield,” in *Journal of Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)*, September 1987. In this article, Schneider makes a sound and factual argument that shows the density of soldiers on the battlefield is steadily decreasing.

6 See for example, numerous articles since 1992 published by the National Defense University (NDU) as well as articles published in *Parameters*, the U.S. Army War college periodical.


9 Ibid., White

Accessed 12 February 2000. Casualty figures presented by Renner were 109.7 million up to 1995.

11 Ibid.


14 Ibid., Renner, World Watch Paper 146, “Peace and Disarmament in the Twentieth Century.” This book contains several statements reported as facts. See discussion summaries of these discussions, conventions and declarations. Admittedly, some are very liberal and Utopian. Many are substantive. p 21 and Table 5.


16 Ibid., Clausewitz, 11.


20 Ibid., Fury for summary of these discussions, conventions and declarations. Admittedly, some are very liberal and Utopian. Many are substantive. p 21 and Table 5.

20 Ibid., International Law on the Bombing of Civilians.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.
Chapter 2 states "The prohibitory effect of the law of war is not minimized by "military necessity" which has been defined as that principle which justifies those measures not forbidden by international law which are indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible. Military necessity has been generally rejected as a defense for acts forbidden by the customary and conventional laws of war inasmuch as the latter have been developed and framed with consideration for the concept of military necessity."


Ibid., New. Also see current U.S. joint and U.S. Army doctrinal manuals.


See for example, Edward Villacres’ and Christopher Bassford’s essay, Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity. Available at


37 The author does not differentiate the type of armed conflict he analyzes. International law does not differentiate between the types of armed conflict. Laws of armed conflict apply to equally to wars of religion, ethnicity, revolution, etc. The Sudanese Civil War and Balkans conflict are chosen because they present an extreme in world interest, extremes alleged violations of LOAC, and likely present the two extremes into which U.S. military personnel, as defined by the NSS, will be introduced.


41 See for example, various sources to include the U.S. DOS Sudan Country Study, World Book Millennium 2000, 1999.


44 Ibid., U.S. Department of State, Sudan country Study, “Military.”


Ibid., The Economist.

Ibid., U.S. DOS Sudan Country Study, “Military”


Ibid.

Ibid.


See for example several articles on The Sudan Foundation Website. At http://www.sufo.demon.co.uk/media001.htm. Internet This site accessed on 21 April acknowledges the acts cited. The author, Sean Gabb, is obviously biased, but he does not refute the acts of violence and violations of the LOAC occurring in Sudan.


Ibid.


See, for example, the U.S. DOS Report, Babb, and The Economist.

See, for example, William Shawcross’s Deliver Us From Evil, (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2000), 423. In his book, Shawcross cites several experts who state that the enormity of the Complex Humanitarian Disaster in Sudan is one better left alone.
There are several sources for the ethnic composition of B-H prior to 1994. The Dayton Accords ultimately reflected in territory, the pre-conflict ethnic composition.

Ibid., Shawcross, 60-63. Shawcross' account indicates that world attention was focused on the Gulf War.

Ibid., The Economist, "Bosnia's Bitter Peace," 27.

Ibid., Fury, 211. During the 1980s Russian military expenditures were $400/person/year compared to Yugoslavia's which were $50.00.

Ibid., Shawcross, 69.

Ibid., 97.

Ibid., 162,176.

Ibid., Shawcross, 69.

Ibid., Renner, World Watch Paper 146, 27.

Ibid., Isenberg.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., Shawcross, 191.

Ibid., 211.

Ibid., Renner, World Watch Paper 146, 38.

Ibid., Shawcross, 37.

Ibid., 36.


Ibid., 2.


Ibid., Shawcross, 384.

In recent testimony to Congress, Lieutenant General Short, the U.S. Airforce Commander responsible for executing Allied Force stated that for obvious political reasons, many Allied Force sorties were cancelled because of coalition member non-support of selected targets.

See for example, Gwynne Dyer’s article, “Peace keeping by Avoiding Military Casualties,” part of a CBC miniseries entitled Millennium. Gwynne Dyer is a native of Newfoundland and writes for numerous international newspapers.


94 Ibid, Dyer.


96 Ibid., 32.

97 Ibid., Shawcross, 197.


99 Ibid., Shawcross, 403.

100 Ibid., Bowman.

101 Ibid.

102 Ibid., Shawcross, 409.

103 Ibid., NSS.


105 Ibid., 3.
Bibliography

Books


**Articles and Periodicals**


Dyer, Gwynne. "Peace keeping by Avoiding Military Casualties," part of a CBC miniseries entitled *Millennium*


48


U.S. Department of State, "Sudan country Study, "Military." Available at

U.S. Department of State, "Sudan country Study, "Military," available on line at
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/ssdv:@field('DOCID+sd0134). Data

February 2000. Available at

Doctrinal Manuals

U.S. DOD. JP 1-02, Approved Joint Terminology, Dictionary of Military and
1999.