Arms Control
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ARMS CONTROL

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SOVIET AIR DEFENSE FORCES CHIEF: SDI CAN BE COUNTERED

Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN in English No 7, Apr 87 pp 1-2

[Article by Chief Marshal of Aviation Aleksandr Koldunov, USSR Air Defense Forces commander-in-chief and deputy minister of defense: "Star Wars Programme Can Be Negated"]

[Text] Those who advocate the deployment of U.S. SDI systems in space claim that the USSR has ASAT weapons. But these assertions are not true to facts. In 1983 the USSR stopped the testing of the old ASAT system and is not developing a new one. The major firepower of its air defence are antiaircraft missile forces. They are equipped with combat systems which can destroy with antiaircraft guided missiles enemy planes, cruise missiles, helicopters, drifting balloons, and other weapons of airborne attack. Acting in cooperation with fighter planes air defence missile forces can reliably protect the country's major facilities.

Antiaircraft fighters equipped with new targeting and combat systems can destroy enemy airborne forces at a big distance, and can also engage in close combat in a wide range of altitudes and against targets flying at different speeds at any time of the day. The modern equipment of the air defence forces, and the high skill of their personnel guarantee that practically each missile hits its target. I'd like to recall here that up to 800 shells or about 10,000 large calibre machine-gun rounds were used on the average to destroy one enemy aircraft during WWII.

The Soviet Union is against the arms race and deployment of weapons in space. But we are bound to consider the U.S. plans to deploy in space SDI components which can hit ground targets on the territory of the USSR and its allies. We won't follow the same road as the United States, but our country would find an answer which would negate the Star Wars programme.

The scientific, technical and economic potential of the USSR enables it to develop the necessary new combat hardware. As for space SDI strike weapons, our response to the U.S. challenge will be effective, and, apparently, unexpected for the United States.

He has been with the Armed Forces of the USSR since 1941. A deputy commander, and then commander of aviation of the Baku Air Defence District since 1960. Commander of the forces of the Moscow Air Defence District, First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defence Forces since 1970. Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defence Forces of the USSR and Deputy Minister of Defence of the USSR since 1978.
Slightly less than four years ago, the US President officially announced that the United States was going to implement the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a programme more aptly dubbed Star Wars. And at the Soviet-US working summit in Reykjavik last autumn the US administration raised a barrier to the deliverance of humanity from nuclear arms by refusing to abandon its plan for a large-scale antiballistic missile (ABM) system with space-based elements, that is, SDI.

Its advocates say SDI is to assure the United States and eventually Western Europe reliable defence against offensive strategic weapons, with the result that humanity will be rid of nuclear arms, since such weapons will have become ineffective.

"ASSURED STRATEGIC STUPIDITY"

However, this glowing vision of the world to come offered by spokesmen of the White House failed to delight the overwhelming majority of mankind. The idea of SDI gave rise to numerous questions, doubts and misgivings among the public throughout the world.

Many scientists, politicians and other public figures, including some of those living overseas, point out in commenting on the US Star Wars programme that an impenetrable "space shield" is scientifically and technologically impracticable. Professor Francis Low of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has nothing against defence research but considers SDI "technologically hopeless, and almost a kind of joke being played on the country." Jack Ruina, the former director of the Defense Department's Advanced Research Projects Agency, and George Rathjens, who in the past held key posts in both the above said agency and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, affirm outright in the Daedalus magazine that they see no chance of developing and deploying an "ideal" defence system that would fulfil the security aims set by the US President. They describe the US administration's optimism in this respect, as "a triumph of wishful thinking and fantasy over reality". Former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, for his part, is of the opinion that SDI is neither an omnipotent nor invulnerable shield as the President holds it but merely an umbrella full of holes.
“Assured Strategic Stupidity: The Quest for Ballistic Missile Defense” is the title of an article published in the New York Journal of International Affairs by Professor Richard Lebow, a US authority on international relations, author of several books on Star Wars strategy, Director of the Peace Studies Program at Cornell University. “The unpalatable but inescapable truth”, he writes, “is that the vulnerability of the United States ... cannot be mitigated by any foreseeable defensive shield as long as nuclear weapons exist in their current numbers.” Lebow makes a detailed analysis of likely Soviet retaliation. Some of his conclusions regarding the problem of choosing optimum variants of responses to the deployment of a space ABM system by the United States are largely consonant with the results of research done by the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat. What are the means of countering SDI as experts see it?

Experts list the following components of SDI as particularly vulnerable: space communications, which may be disrupted, blocked or even put out of action; the operational control systems, in which the central computers, to be deployed on a limited scale because they are too sophisticated and expensive, would be the chief target; various power supply resources and systems (nuclear power installations, explosives, fuels, and flammables).

Retaliatory measures capable of neutralising a multilayer space ABM system could be passive or active. They would be easy to adopt, relatively inexpensive and highly effective.

What would passive retaliation be like? One of the main ideas of an in-depth space defence system is to destroy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the active sector of their trajectory. Immediately after leaving the atmosphere, a missile would be hit by chemical or x-ray lasers mounted on a space platform. Calculations have shown, however, that the “viability” of ICBMs could be substantially increased by reducing the length of the active sector of their path. Soviet and foreign experts estimate that it could be cut to 40 seconds and completed at altitudes not exceeding 80 km. This would create added difficulties for the spotting, tracking and targeting systems of SDI and, in brief, lower its effectiveness.

All other means of resisting the ABM system in the active sector of the flight path come down to measures complicating the targeting of anti-missile weapons and to stronger protection of the missile’s airframe.

The laser targeting system locates a missile in relation to the plume of its engine by infrared radiation. Experts believe, therefore, that it would not be so very hard to “misguide” the laser by complicating its targeting and focussing on the airframe of the missile. This would only require a change in the shape and brightness of the plume, which could easily be done by means of various additives to missile fuel.

The ways of defending missiles from laser beams are numerous too. It is possible, for example, to reinforce the airframe with a repelling or absorbing coating or to give the missile rotary motion around its longitudinal axis in order to prevent the laser beam from focussing on one point of the airframe. There are also many other possibilities, such as the launching of mock targets. In short, increased “viability” of ballistic missiles in this sector would largely complicate their interception by space systems in all the subsequent phases of the flight, during which, incidentally, a whole spectrum of passive retaliatory measures could likewise be taken.
In the case of a concentrated attack, the number of warheads and mock targets accompanying them could be raised to hundreds of thousands. In these circumstances, the tracking system would be hopelessly snarled and most of the warheads, which could be manoeuvrable and could move at high speed, would reach the target.

According to experts, small missiles of different types of deployment are the first among the active means of destroying space strike weapons making up SDI. The network of space combat stations geared to hitting strategic ballistic missiles could be an excellent target for them. Space mines, or satellites placed in orbits close to the enemy's combat complexes, would be effective too. If exploded by a command from the Earth, they could put numerous stations out of action simultaneously. Experts also describe the effectiveness of high-capacity ground laser and "space shrapnel" or "clouds" of small objects moving at high speed in the orbits of combat stations. Even a 30-gramme particle of such a "cloud" moving at a speed of up to 15 km per second could pierce a protective steel shield up to 15 cm thick, to say nothing of power systems, propellant tanks and reflecting mirrors.

Partisans of SDI believe the space structure of the ABM system to be stable enough. But they proceed from the false assumption that the layers forming the space ABM system would function independently. Actually the various echelons of the system would be interdependent, if only because they would be based on a common operational control system. This is SDI's Achilles heel, and should it be affected, the whole programme would greatly lose its effectiveness. Such conclusions are drawn not only by Richard Lebow but by Bernard Feld of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and many other American scientists.

The question may be asked: Why pierce the "space shield" at all since its purpose is purely defensive, according to US official propaganda?

STEP TOWARDS A NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST

One day the former US President Richard Nixon said that when two gladiators were fighting with swords but one of them had a shield, that shield was not merely a defensive weapon but a reinforcement of the offensive power of the gladiator who had it. Professor William French of Loyola University wrote in the Chicago Tribune early last November that the new weapons being developed under the Star Wars programme are not defensive. As soon as all those laser, computer and missile systems were brought into being, he stressed, it would hardly take any additional efforts to use them for attack.

SDI technology, Professor French writes, is described as humane, since it is intended to destroy missiles and not people. Yet SDI is to perform the same "defensive" functions as the armour of German tanks during the Second World War. The Soviet Union has every reason to fear that after setting up space weapons systems, the United States might be tempted to deliver a first strike, counting on its invulnerability and impunity. In opposing SDI, the Soviet Union rightly considers that the system could be used as a defence shield for a "strategic offensive initiative", Professor French concludes.

It is an obvious understatement, for even a cursory examination of the military-strategic doctrine propagated by the White House allows to draw quite plain conclusions: SDI is part and parcel of the US nuclear strike forces, preparations for US aggression against the Soviet Union, and a provision for its impunity. The US administration speaks a great deal about the amorality of a guaranteed mutual annihilation if a large-scale
conflict breaks out. However, it is not so much worried by moral considerations as by its inability to wage a nuclear war without risking its own survival. That is why SDI is an attempt to ensure victory for itself that would entail minimal losses.

The USA vigorously deploys MX missiles, adds new strategic bombers, develops other nuclear weapons carriers based on the Stealth technology, and preparations for the introduction of the Midgetman missile are in full swing. To put it briefly, the USA spares no effort to boost its SDI-camouflaged offensive potential. Therefore, it would be only appropriate to rename the Strategic Defense Initiative into a "Strategic Aggression Initiative" because it is intended to ensure impunity for the aggressor.

Let us go back to William French's reasoning. He warns that implementation of the Star Wars programme would logically result in upsetting the existing military strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States and open up a new stage in the arms race which would lead to the appearance of new formidable weapons. The opportunity for a far-reaching reduction of nuclear arsenals, French writes in conclusion, must not be sacrificed to the new US idol, SDI.

Former US Under Secretary of State George Ball holds a similar view. He considers that the President's obstinate refusal to give up SDI, a project which, moreover, misleads public opinion, will make it difficult to reach agreement on arms control and will escalate the arms race. It is obvious that the Soviet Union is not going to limit its nuclear arsenal without getting anything real in exchange. Ball is afraid the administration does not realise how much is at stake.

The Americans had been hoodwinked not by the Russians but by their own President, wrote Professor Walt of Princeton University, an expert in international politics, in an article he contributed to the Chicago Tribune. What Gorbachev wanted to get from the United States in exchange for substantial cuts in nuclear arms was only a promise to respect for another ten years the provisions of the ABM treaty, which the United States had signed and ratified and whose period of validity was unlimited. By rejecting that Soviet concession, Reagan and his team had shown that the whole array of their arguments to the effect that the build-up of armaments would make it easier to reduce them, was nothing but propaganda designed to justify an endless arms race, Walt concluded.

This explains why Washington's talk about the possibility of solving the problem of war and peace by technical means although it is not a technical problem in principle is received with distrust by sensible American scientists. Ronald Taylor, a biochemist at the University of Virginia, declared: "It does seem like a terrible tragedy that the two world leaders were so close to striking a very important agreement to reduce the risk of war and... SDI got in the way."

Both for this reason and because SDI would badly destabilise the international situation, adding to Soviet-US tensions and making it hard to arrive at a political settlement on the most burning issues of today. 7,000 US scientists, including 57 per cent of lecturers in physics in 20 major universities of the country, have emphatically declared against Star Wars. Some of them are Nobel Prize winners. In 110 US universities there was held a collection of signatures to a document protesting against SDI. The action was backed by, among others, over 80 per cent of the academic staff at Cornell University and over half of the lecturers in physics at Harvard. At Princeton University 73 per cent of physicists promised to reject funds for SDI research. Besides, an open letter from scientists to Congress expressing disagreement with the SDI programme
was circulated in 26 government laboratories and 70 industrial research centres in the United States.

The Star Wars plans caused serious concern and anxiety in Western Europe as well. People there no longer believe in the "defensive" character of SDI. And while most West European governments prefer to withhold comment and some of them, such as the British, West German and Italian governments, have gone as far as to allow private companies to participate in the building of a "space shield", numerous criticisms from politicians and scientists show that public resistance to SDI is growing in Western Europe as deployment of certain of the systems planned by Washington draws near.

"The reason why we are against the US SDI programme," Johannes Rau, one of the leaders of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, told a press conference in Bonn on October 16, 1986, "is not that it is rejected by the Soviet Union but that we consider it wrong on political, economic and military-strategic grounds." On March 15, 1985 British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Geoffrey Howe made a statement which gained widespread publicity. He questioned the "defence system" proposed by Washington because it might fail to ensure adequate political control, and the world would have to rely solely on computers and automated decision-making.

Many West European scientists have taken a negative stand on SDI. Their boycott of the Star Wars programme is taking organised forms as in the United States. For instance, 545 British physicists, including three Nobel Prize winners and 25 members of the Royal Society, signed what may be called a pledge not to work for Star Wars. Dr. Robin Nichols said that he had filled orders from various British and US military agencies but had refused to work for SDI since it was creating political and strategic instability in the world. He knew of no responsible scientist arguing anywhere in favour of SDI.

This view was seconded by Professor Hans-Peter Dürr, Director of the Max Planck Institute of Physics and Astrophysics in Munich. At a meeting of the Bundestag Commission for Foreign Affairs and Defence Problems he said that as a physicist he would never agree to engage in SDI and as a teacher he would never be reconciled to his students doing so. Over 3,500 West German scientists and engineers sent a message to Chancellor Helmut Kohl demanding that he should renounce cooperating with the Americans in preparations for Star Wars.

To gain complete certainty about whether SDI is "defensive" and "stabilising" and whether the United States has "peaceful" aspirations, let us turn to first-hand evidence, that is, the Defense Guidelines for 1984-1988, which underlies the ongoing "modernisation" of the US armed forces. The document states that the goal of the administration's measures in the military field is to achieve military "superiority", and to provide the US armed forces with a capability for defeating the Soviet armed forces in a short-term or protracted war. Indeed, the United States is expected not only to win the upper hand but to destroy the whole structure of the military and political power of the Soviet Union and its allies and guarantee the infliction of very great damage on Soviet industry.

In anticipation of future fighting, the document calls for economic, technological, and trade wars against the Soviet Union, to cause it to become involved in excessive spending in new spheres of the arms race, as well as for developing weapons systems and military technologies, including space-based ones, that would nullify all earlier Soviet defence expenditures. That is when the United States, operating from behind a
“space shield”, would be in a position to dictate its will to the world, with “Pax Americana”, which the White House so much longs for, being created as a result. The document is a classified one and therefore calls a spade a spade, without recourse to a “defence” vocabulary.

WASTED TRILLIONS

The Star Wars programme, as well as seeking US military strategic superiority, pursues another important objective for US politicians, who consider that SDI could economically bleed the Soviet Union white through the race in space, nuclear and conventional arms. However, the hope of “wearing out” the Soviet Union in this way is illusory. This is the opinion of not only Soviet but many Western scientists and experts, including the American. Visualising from an objective standpoint the situation that could shape up with the realisation of the Star Wars programme, they come to the conclusion that the Soviet Union has (as indicated above) a wide range of comparatively inexpensive feasible ways and means of countering a new threat to its security and to that of its allies.

Advocates of SDI in Washington, who are intent on weakening the Soviet Union economically, are rather reluctant to talk about what the programme would cost the American people. Experts set the overall cost of the system at several trillion dollars.

Last autumn Washington, scrambling about for more money to fund various other programmes, had to raise the national debt to the astronomic figure of $2.3 trillion. It follows that during the present administration’s term in office, the debt has more than doubled, with the deficit of the Federal Budget reaching a record high by topping $220 billion.

Now where is the administration going to get the money for SDI? Of course, it could pump money out of Western Europe, Japan and developing countries. But even in that case it would be unable to do without contributing its own share. Should it cut other strategic programmes? The White House would do no such thing, nor would it cut its conventional military programmes. This was exemplified by Washington’s renunciation of SALT-2. All that could be done is to slash federal appropriations for education, medicine, social insurance and other social programmes or to raise taxes. Either solution would mean putting the burden of SDI on the shoulders of ordinary Americans. “The massive costs of an arms race in space would sink the hopes for a decent future for millions of people”, says Victor Perlo, a US economist.

Defenders of SDI have lately been using the argument that implementation of the Star Wars programme would help create numerous new jobs. But while work on SDI implies new contracts, increased production and hence greater employment, this only applies to the arms industry, and is only part of the truth, which is often more dangerous than an outright lie. It has been calculated that the money invested in the civilian production could create three times more jobs than in case the same money is invested in the military sector.

A report published in Washington by the Employment Research Associates, a consultative firm, says that the war preparations, which the present administration is engaged in, have already deprived US economy of 1.5 million jobs in civilian industries. The West German magazine Der Spiegel writes with reference to research done by Professor Lloyd Dumas, an acknowledged US scholar, that unemployment and poverty in the United States have been growing because the country invests too much money in the arms race. By diverting the better part of scientists...
and engineers to military research and development, SDI would result in a further slowing down of the growth rate in civilian fields of the economy, which in turn would swell the ranks of "redundant" people.

The US military-industrial complex has the biggest stake in SDI. According to La guerre des étoiles, a book published in Paris, the military-industrial complex regards SDI even now as "the most fantastic source of future profits". No member of the complex bothers too much about the feasibility of a "space shield". Those who belong to it know full well that should the programme prove feasible, contracts worth hundreds of billions of dollars would pour in, making it the greatest "deal of the century". But even if the realisation of SDI turns out to be impossible, the programme would assure a number of military industries major and profitable contracts. At the same time, work on SDI would not affect very much trade or civilian production. The technology being evolved under the programme would be too specific to be used "in pure form" in civilian production.

The facts given above are evidence of the failure of recipes for "prosperity through armament". Victor Perlo estimated that if the money now being allocated for Star Wars were spent on socio-economic programmes, it would help provide 10 million families with homes in ten years, create about 14 million jobs, take effective steps towards ending poverty, improve the medical services, extend vocational training and effectively combat environmental pollution.

"STAR ATTACK" ON THE ENVIRONMENT

The US President says time and again that space arms are non-nuclear and could, indeed, make nuclear arms "powerless", which would mean delivering mankind from the fatal effects of nuclear arms. Yet the experiments being carried on within the framework of research under the Star Wars programme are likely, in the opinion of US experts, to cause an ecological disaster as enormous as an "ordinary" nuclear war.

The "star attack" against the environment has already commenced. During a regular flight under the Space Shuttle programme late in July 1985, an important experiment was conducted, as viewed by SDI sponsors. It consisted in developing a technology for making "windows" in the atmosphere, primarily in the ozone layer, for the passage of the beams of "interceptor" lasers to be based in near-earth space. Even in the course of research, the project is damaging nature by opening "experimental windows" in the atmosphere for lethal space beam weapons. Incidentally, there are plans for making such "windows" in the atmosphere both for and by means of a laser.

The maintenance of anti-missile combat space stations would be highly energy-intensive. Traditional power systems now used at man-made earth satellites would hardly be able to meet the demand. The stake is, therefore, on nuclear power stations. In October 1986 The San Francisco Examiner reported that the Sunnyvale facility of General Electric was designing an experimental model of a small space-based reactor. It described the reactor as "a forerunner of much larger nuclear-powered systems that would use lasers and particle beams to destroy nuclear missiles aimed at the United States".

It is a moot point whether those missiles would be destroyed, says Daniel Hirsch, head of the programme for nuclear policy studies at Stevenson College under the University of California in Santa Cruz, but the threat to the lives of millions of Americans would by no means be removed. "They've promised", he continues, "that star wars won't be nuclear
and it won't be in our backyard, but these reactors floating 100 miles above us will be closer than Diablo Canyon, and what is 100 miles above can quickly come down on your head."

Recently it became known, according to The San Francisco Examiner, that work had started under the Star Wars programme on designing a still more powerful reactor that could be “10,000 times more powerful than the GE prototype”.

The experimental systems which General Electric is developing are to be used for experiments to be carried out in 1993 from a military spaceship. These experiments involve enormous hazards and may well end up by the whole dangerous system crashing down on people's heads, as Daniel Hirsch puts it.

Some people are wondering what would happen if the reactor, having outlived its “service term”, began to stray away from its orbit and draw near the Earth, as the Skylab did.

Yet there are plans for orbiting hundreds of platforms with such reactors!

To top it all, US experts do not rule out the likelihood of an accident due to the attainment of a “supercritical mass”, which means that the capacity of the reactor begins mounting continously which leads to the melting, evaporating and finally exploding of nuclear fuel.

A report submitted by the US Air Force to a Third Symposium on Space Nuclear Power Systems in Albuquerque one year ago pointed out that the likelihood of such an accident could not be ruled out for as long as the reactor was on the launching pad. Engineer Steven Aftergood, executive director of a Los Angeles non-governmental organisation monitoring the development of nuclear power industry, wrote in the October issue of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that after seven years of use in orbit a reactor of the SP-100 type, with a capacity of 300 kW, would leave in space much more durable radioactive waste than contamination caused by roughly 30 bombs like the one dropped on Hiroshima.

The auxiliary systems of the US ABM defence with space-based elements, in particular means of transportation, would pose a considerable threat for their part. The Challenger crash revealed their unreliability. However, according to the chiefs of the project, it is ships of this type that would have to place weapons in orbit, including nuclear weapons. An accident to a “space shuttle” on the take-off or at the stage of flight in the atmosphere would at best lead to a mechanical destruction of the charges. Experts estimate that this alone would contaminate vast areas with highly toxic substances comparable to arsenic. Yet the Pentagon wants to use for its spaceships also airfields outside the United States, in Spain, on Easter Island or in Brazil.

In short, the development and deployment of ABM systems with space-based elements would threaten mankind and the planet with the most powerful “ecocidal” weapon.
The Soviet Union has declared more than once that it is unafraid of the SDI programme as such. It has the scientific potential and material resources needed to counter the threat coming from Star Wars. But this is not the political opinion preferred by the Soviet leadership and people. Speaking on television on October 22, 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev said: "...We have been trying to dissuade the United States from that dangerous venture. We have been calling on the US administration to seek invulnerability and security on a different line, the line of eliminating all nuclear weapons and establishing a comprehensive international security system that would preclude all war, nuclear and conventional alike." Every effort must be made to use this historic chance and bring about a radical solution to the problem of war and peace.
SOVIET BOOKS ATTACKING SDI REVIEWED

Moscow POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE in Russian No 3, Mar 87 pp 133-138

[Review by A. Kireyev, candidate of economic sciences, of books "'Zvezdnuye voyny'--bezumiye i prestupleniye" ["Star Wars." Insanity and Crime] by V.S. Avduyevskiy and A.I. Rudev, Politizdat, Moscow, 1986, 222 pages; "Kosmicheskiye fantazii i zemnaya realnost" [Space Fantasies and Reality on Earth] by A. Bovin, Sovetskaya Rossiya, Moscow, 1986, 112 pages; "'Zvezdnuye voyny'. Illyuzii i opasnosti" ["Star Wars." Illusions and Dangers], Voyenizdat, Moscow, 1985, 56 pages]

[Text] The summit meeting in Reykjavik tore away the mask of virtue from the American administration, which is pretending to strive for arms control but in essence is striving to take weapons into space. The infamous "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI), which received the name "star wars," became the main obstacle on the way to a nuclear-free world and to freeing humanity from nuclear weapons. This military strategic program is constantly in the field of vision of Soviet authors. In particular, three notable books recently published are evidence of this.

The book of Academician V.S. Avduyevskiy, winner of Lenin and state prizes, and A.I. Rudev, candidate of juridical sciences reflects the point of view of Soviet scientists on the problem of the militarization of space. The well-known Soviet journalist and specialist in international affairs A. Bovin expresses his opinion on "star wars" in brilliant publicistic form. The destabilizing influence of the SDI program on the relationship of military strategic forces is revealed in a brochure written by specialists in the area of military science and technology.

Thus, before us are three works on a single problem, the problem of preventing the militarization of space. What is it that unites scientists, a publicist and military specialists in their analysis of the aggressive militaristic course of the current U.S. leadership, which is striving to spin the flywheel of the arms race--this time space arms--with new impetus?

It is primarily a feeling of responsibility for the fate of humanity, a sober view of the contemporary contradictory but independent and largely integral world, and a weighed and balanced approach to the resolution of the basic
political problems of the present day. The points of departure of all the authors are extremely clear. "Space can and must remain peaceful," write the scientists, "such is the demand of all peace-loving forces of the planet. This is the objective precondition for the progressive development of human civilization" (p 8).

The current stage in the scientific-technical revolution has established the preconditions for a gigantic increase in the material and spiritual potentials of man. But a qualitative leap has taken place not only in productive forces but also in military science and in destructive weapons capable of destroying all life on earth.

"Contemporary science and technology," we read in the book of the military specialists, "opens up possibilities for the creation of new types of weapons no less dangerous than nuclear arms, weapons based on different physical principles and stationed in space.... These are precisely the weapons on which the United States is pinning its hopes in the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" (p 5).

The SDI program represents an integral part of U.S. military doctrine, which recasts advanced scientific-technical thinking into weapons of mass destruction. And the publicist and international specialist reveals the essence of the problem. "Will the arms race reach near-earth space or will it be possible to prevent this--this is one of the most urgent political questions of the end of the 20th century" (p 3).

To answer this, it is enough simply to explain the relationship of forces in the world political arena. It is extremely important to reveal the roots of the great-power policies of the United States and to determine correctly the current stage of which military space preparations.

The authors of the indicated publications emphasize that for a long time Washington has been systematically preparing for the large-scale militarization of space. From the very start of the space age, it began to view the space around the earth as a theater for military operations.

Pentagon documents declassified because of their age, extracts of which are presented in the brochure from Voyenizdat, give evidence of the fact that the United States began to develop the concept for the use of antisatellite weapons as early as 1956. And in 1959, the American secretary of defense was presented a plan for the creation of the "Saint" antisatellite system. The United States was then the first to test such a weapon and in the 1960's it deployed two ground antisatellite systems on Pacific Ocean islands (see p 18).

V.S. Avduyevskiy and A.I. Rudev stress that the Pentagon viewed orbital stations as the basis for the creation of "space forces" and as an integral part of the American Army. Under an agreement between the Pentagon and NASA, these two agencies coordinated the work in the area of the development of orbital stations on which it would be possible to carry out civilian or military experiments. Somewhat later, the American space program was reoriented to the creation of the "Space Shuttle," a reusable space transport system that immediately began to be used actively by the Pentagon for military
purposes (see p 62). So beginning at the end of the 1950's, concludes another author, A. Bovin, the United States converted the space component into an organic part of military technical developments, whereby about one-third of the $150 billion invested in space activities since was spent for military purposes.

In America, they continue to argue about who it was who gave Reagan the idea of a "strategic defense" with elements of space basing. In this connection, they name E. Teller, the "father" of the hydrogen bomb, and G. Keyworth, former adviser to the president on scientific affairs, and several others. But the authors of the publications presented agree that the main lobbyist for "star wars" was the American military-industrial complex, which had converted the arms race into a lucrative business, into a means to obtain fabulous profits, and into the purpose for their existence and the reason behind their work. Precisely it pushed the President, who was completely under its power, into the proclamation of a program for a space arms race of unprecedented proportions.

Immediately after President Reagan's "star speech," notes A. Bovin, the stock prices of very large military industrial contractors jumped--Lockheed by 11 points, Martin Marietta by 8 points, and McDonnell Douglas by 7 points (see p 13). "Space fever" caught hold of literally all links of the military-industrial complex, who sensed that the realization of the new plans would give Californian, Texan and other industrial corporations and scientific organizations linked with arms development and production the possibility over decades of pumping more and more absolutely fantastic sums from the pockets of American taxpayers," write V.S. Avduyevskiy and A.I. Rudev (p 50).

The White House, as the materials in A. Bovin's book indicate, did not deceive the hopes of the union of the dollar, sword and state power. Even at the beginning of his first term in office, the President established cozy financial conditions for the manufacturers of death, reducing their tax payments to the treasury to the greatest extent possible, and, in some cases, returning them to them. The structure of the budgetary financing of space research was also subjected to substantial reorganization. Whereas previously the main share of expenditures in this area was borne by NASA, formally responsible for the utilization of space for civilian purposes but in reality participating in military projects as well, after 1982 the Pentagon was in first place in space expenditures (p 5).

As the Soviet military specialists showed in their brochure, colossal sums are being allocated directly to SDI, sums that are to amount to $26 billion for the first 5 years and up to $60 billion in the period 1984 through 1993. In this connection, it is worthwhile to recall that the United States spent $15 billion on the Manhattan Project to build the atomic bomb and $40 billion on all research work in the area of rocket technology from 1954 through 1983 (p 35). According to preliminary estimates, the scientists point out, the total cost just of the space echelon of the American SDI program will reach $500 billion and the taxpayers will have to pay out $1.5 to $2 trillion for the development and deployment of a fully echeloned system (p 51).
A natural question is whether such appropriations are needed if, as Washington asserts, it is merely a matter of "harmless" theoretical research, of "pure" science.

The answer of the authors of the books under review is unequivocal: under the pretext of "research work," the United States is creating space strike systems. The "Directives in the Defense Area for the Years 1984 through 1988" issued from the bowels of the Pentagon at the beginning of Reagan's presidency and still in effect today provide for the creation of a system of space basing, including for the delivery of strikes against ground targets from space. Electric power stations, oil storage tanks, grain elevators and other civilian facilities are named as targets. "All of this indicates that weapon systems that are called defensive and even 'not weapons at all', writes A. Bovin, "can in fact be viewed as space strike systems intended for defense as well as attack. They are meant for strikes against the facilities of a potential enemy in all areas" (p 47).

The realization of SDI will inevitably result in the creation of space arms systems that undermine strategic stability. This can lead to mankind going past that danger point beyond which there is no return. In the case of the deployment of the SDI system, Pentagon "hawks," hiding behind a "space shield," could be tempted to deliver a blow against the USSR and its allies with the help of the latest nuclear space sword. The purpose of the ABM defense system will be precisely to nullify a counterstrike by the Soviet Union and to allow nuclear aggression to go unpunished.

"The attempts of the United States to present its extremely dangerous plans in regard to space as defensive cannot deceive either the Soviet Union or other countries interested in strengthening peace and security," stress the military specialists (p 34). The Soviet leadership has repeatedly warned the American administration that the creation of space arms systems will inevitably lead to a diminished security both of the United States itself as well as of its allies, some of which are inclined to participate in the latest militaristic adventure.

In drawing its NATO partners, Japan and Israel into the "star wars" orbit, Washington is pursuing quite specific goals. It thereby wants to obtain an "insurance policy" against the possible establishment there of space ABM defense systems that would be alternatives to the American system. Nor is the United States averse to utilizing the latest technical achievements of its allies, thereby weakening their competitive positions in the world market for technologically large-scale production.

By involving cooperating foreign countries in SDI, the Pentagon intends to lower the cost of this extremely capital-intensive program, forcing its closest partners to pay for the creation of individual components of SDI. Finally, their participation in SDI would make it possible to sow the illusion of the "approval" of the adventuristic space plans by the entire Western community.

Having formulated the goal of the next stage in transatlantic military-industrial cooperation, Washington immediately began to implement it. All the
more so because in the 1970's, not without prompting from the other side of the ocean, many capitalist countries had already obtained a certain amount of experience in the utilization of space for military purposes. The book of V.S. Avduyevskiy and A.I. Rudev showed, in particular, that whereas in 1970 military satellites were launched only by the United States and the NATO organization, independent development of such devices is now being pursued in France, the FRG, Italy, Israel, Japan and a number of other countries (p 109). Almost all of them are linked through cooperative agreements to the military space programs of the United States.

At the end of March 1985, in a letter sent to the governments of 18 capitalist countries, U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger categorically demanded that the allies define their position toward SDI within 60 days and, if possible, specific areas of technical participation. A number of circumstances dictated such haste by the White House. Literally 1 month prior to the letter of the Pentagon chief, the United States became a net debtor for the first time, that is, its obligations to foreign creditors exceeded American assets abroad. High interest rates, acting as a pump to transfer funds from other Western countries, were carrying out their role as a mechanism for the external financing of economic development.

It was urgently necessary to find alternative and, if possible, cheaper sources for the stimulation of economic growth. Such a means could only be the most up-to-date technology, in some areas of which individual countries of Western Europe and Japan have moved substantially ahead of the United States.

To convince its intractable partners to adopt the new strategic program more quickly, the United States began to apply strong pressure in the entire foreign-policy field. The President himself acted as the "captain" of the American program. In his "attack," he was supported by Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger and Secretary of State G. Shultz. But even in this "splendid trio," it was often necessary to put a good face on a bad game. France, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Greece and a number of other countries had already disassociated themselves from the American project in the first stage. "Realizing the rather low popularity of their political and strategic arguments," writes A. Bovin, "the American authorities are concentrating on technical and economic arguments. Either you will help us and work with us, they say, or the technological gap between the United States and Western Europe will continue to grow wider" (p 70).

Having been caught on the "space" hook, England, the FRG, Italy and Israel signed agreements to participate in SDI. In principle, Japan agreed with it as well. It is also necessary to consider that the countries that rejected the possibility of their involvement in SDI at the state level did not prohibit private firms from participating in it. "In agreeing for reasons involving business conditions with the assertions that most of the work on the American "star wars" program will have civilian spin-offs, the supporters of this program are acting at least imprudently, not recognizing the full danger of the consequences of this step," write V.S. Avduyevskiy and A.I. Rudev (p 110).
It was not without justification that the West European critics of the American strategic plans pointed out the fact that their implementation will be a heavy burden not only on the U.S. economy but on that of its allies as well. In trying to find a way out of the scientific and technical lag of the Old World, France presented a project for the establishment of a "European technological community" on the basis of its proposed "Eureka" program.

Paris thinks that "Eureka" is SDI in reverse and is advertising it as the only means that can give its participants the possibility to avoid becoming the technological periphery of the United States. At the same time, the Western press is expressing quite well-founded fears to the effect that "Eureka," although conceived as a "response to the American challenge," will in time become an appendage of SDI. So as not to exacerbate transatlantic conflicts unnecessarily, Washington agreed to view "Eureka" as a project "parallel" to SDI but, in any case, it hurried to invite the largest aerospace companies of Western Europe to participate in the development of "star wars" weapons. "And it is difficult for representatives of firms and—especially—scientists to resist; for the first, to resist the promises of economic and technical advantages and, for the second group, to resist the generous financing," notes A. Bovin in this connection (p 76).

The initial results of transatlantic cooperation were discouraging, however. Not a single American ally was able to confirm on a definite contractual basis the volume of orders that the United States will award it under SDI. On the other hand, all "memoranda of mutual understanding" signed with the partners stipulate in detail the rules of secrecy that the direct producers and developers of space arms systems must observe. These rules verge on completely prohibiting the allies from utilizing the technological innovations that they develop.

But it is not just the economic and scientific-technical restrictions being imposed by the United States that are alarming West European and Japanese public opinion. The books that we are reviewing showed convincingly that U.S. attempts to undermine the agreed-upon legal mechanism of military strategic stability in the contemporary world are a very important subject of concern. And this is fraught with much more serious consequences than inadequate orders or technological prohibitions.

A central position in this mechanism is held by the termless Soviet-American Treaty on Limiting ABM Defense Systems signed in 1972. At the Reykjavik meeting, the American side declined to strengthen this treaty by accepting the Soviet proposal for the nonwithdrawal from it for a period of 10 years while all strategic arms are being destroyed. On the contrary, it is striving through its militaristic policy to undermine the ABM Treaty, inasmuch as it has become an obstacle on the way to transferring the arms race into space.

The very pronouncement of SDI was a violation of the treaty, for the treaty prohibits the creation of ABM defense systems covering the entire territory of the country, which is the aim of SDI. In addition, as the Soviet military specialists stress, "in the laboratories and test ranges of the United States,
they are refining and, for some types, testing experimental models of space
strike weapons; chemical and X-ray lasers, electromagnetic guns, interceptor
missiles, and antisatellite systems" (p 36).

As the reader can see, all these actions of the United States contradict
Article 5 of the treaty, which is presented as an addendum to the work of V.S.
Avduyevskiy and A.I. Rudev. This article prohibits the creation [sozdaniye],
testing and deployment of ABM defense systems and components with sea, air,
space or mobile ground basing (p 207). In addition, Article 9 of the same
treaty unequivocally prohibits the participants from transferring ABM defense
systems or components to other states or stationing them outside their own
national territory (p 208). The U.S. policy on including its allies in SDI is
in total conflict with the positions of this article. Nor is it difficult to
note other violations of this treaty by Washington.

Overseas they are trying to cover up such obvious discrepancies through
various propaganda tricks. They are claiming a so-called "broad"
interpretation of the ABM Treaty, which supposedly permits the development of
ABM systems based in fundamentally new territory. In so doing, the American
side cites, for example, the approved Declaration "D," which is not, however,
competent. "This declaration," explains A. Bovin, "does indeed make possible
the development of exotic ABM defense systems but--and this is the essence of
the matter!--only as applied to the limited regions permitted by the treaty
and only in stationary ground systems" (p 95).

The positions of the treaty (the reason it is a treaty!) must not be subjected
to unilateral reexamination or tendentious "interpretations." In this
connection, it is useful to remember that place in the preamble where the
sides declared their intention "to put an end to the nuclear arms race and to
take effective measures in the direction of reducing strategic arms, nuclear
disarmament and universal and complete disarmament as soon as possible" (V.S.
Avduyevskiy, A.I. Rudev, p 205).

Strictly adhering to the ABM Treaty, the Soviet Union is fighting consistently
to achieve this goal. Our country is providing an example of peaceful
cooperation in the resolution of the problems in the mastering and use of
space. Scientists are uncovering a wide panorama of possibilities for
cooperation in this area. There is experience already. It is sufficient to
name the "Intercosmos" program of the socialist countries, the joint Soviet-
American "Soyuz"-"Apollo" flight, the international investigations of Halley's
Comet, the experimental "KOSPAS-SARSAT" system to save ships in distress, etc.

The authors of the books stress: to have the huge and harsh cosmos serve man
instead of being to his detriment, it is necessary to come to an
understanding, to negotiate on the entire complex of contemporary arms,
inasmuch as it is impossible to resolve the problem of the limitation and
reduction of nuclear arms separately from the banning of space arms. "In the
event of the prohibition of an entire class of space strike weapons," states
the brochure from Voyenizdat, "the USSR is prepared for the most radical
reductions in nuclear systems (strategic and medium-range), including their
complete elimination, under the strict observance, of course, of the principle
of equality and equal security" (p 53).
In Reykjavik, the Soviet Union presented bold and far-reaching proposals that could prevent a new attack of militaristic fever. A peace based on the balance of fear is by no means the best variant of coexistence. The USSR is therefore proposing the gradual reduction of nuclear arms and their complete elimination by the end of this century.

As though he were formulating the concluding opinion of all the authors of the books under review, A. Bovin writes: "The space shield that the United States intends to create will actually turn out to be still another Damocles sword threatening all countries and all peoples. Therefore, the fight against the 'star wars' program is a universal task. And, I think, it is the main and most urgent international task for today and tomorrow" (p 108).

FOOTNOTES
1. V.S. Avduyevskiy and A.I. Rudev, "'Zvezdnuye voyny'--bezumiye i prestupleniye" ["Star Wars"--Insanity and Crime], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1986, 222 pages.

2. A. Bovin, "Kosmicheskiye fantazii i zemnaya realnost" [Space Fantasies and Reality on Earth], Moscow, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 1986, 112 pages.

3. "'Zvezdnuye voyny'. Illyuzii i opasnosti" ["Star Wars." Illusions and Dangers], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1985, 56 pages.


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SOVIET JOURNAL REVIEWS U.S. STUDY CRITICAL OF SDI

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 87 (signed to press 16 Dec 86) pp 146-149

[I. Akhtamzyan review: "Sober Judgment on 'Star Wars'"

[Text] A group of staffers of the International Security and Arms Control Center of Stanford University (California) has published a group monograph entitled "The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative" (*), which examines the main aspects of the SDI--the well-known "brainchild" of the U.S. president.

The authors of the book are no novices in this field. P. Farley, for example, served for over 10 years in U.S. Government establishments. In 1969-1973 he was deputy director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, while simultaneously deputy head of the American delegation during the first stage of the SALT negotiations. The permanent Treaty Between the USSR and the United States Limiting Antimissile Defense Systems (ABM), which is now the main barrier in international law in the way of militarization of outer space, was, in particular, formulated at that time.

The first pages of the work state clearly and definitely that it would be wrong to reduce the question of the creation of antimissile defenses to a technical assignment, discussion of the "dimensions of the battle stations" in space and so forth, as certain apologists for the notorious "initiative" would like. Political problems affecting the strategic mutual relations of the two great powers should be at the center of attention. This idea would seem to be of fundamental importance. The ABM Treaty and R. Reagan's "initiative" are essentially two diametrically opposite approaches to the problem of ensuring security: the first represents the path of joint efforts, primarily of the nuclear powers, for the elimination of arms, the second, a most dangerous prospect of a continued race.

Analyzing the SDI together with the Pentagon's specific program for its implementation (1984), the scientists conclude that it is a question of a minimum of two purposes here. The beguiling ideas of "making nuclear weapons unusable" and "defending people and not exacting vengeance" (pp 102, 103) are intended for indoctrinating public opinion. However, in practice, as the
monograph shows, the policy of military developments in this sphere is aimed at supplementing and reinforcing with space-based weapons that same nuclear "deterrence by intimidation," at least in the foreseeable future.

The important, key concept of defense has recently been inundated in a mass of speculation across the Atlantic. The authors of the book recall in this connection that, as was ascertained during the preparations of SALT I even, "defensive" strategic weapons may be of an offensive nature, if they make it possible to inflict an unanswered first strike (p 32). It was at that time, on the frontier of the 1970's, that the delegations of the USSR and the United States jointly determined the existence of an inseparable strategic connection between nuclear missiles and antimissile defenses. This was recorded in the preambles to the agreements of the first stage of strategic arms limitation pertaining to offensive and defensive arms which were signed and which took effect simultaneously.

Under present conditions, when the Washington administration has openly adopted a policy of violation of the strategic offensive arms limitation agreements, the positive evaluation of the SALT accords contained in the work sounds as a particularly pertinent warning. Compliance with the provisions of the 1972 Interim Agreement, the American specialists believe, creates "a fragile, but irreplaceable bearing on which the current limitations on separating warheads... and the upgrading of arms are based" (p 34). They saw in advance, as it were, the subsequent destructive steps of the White House, emphasizing in their work that without compilable limitations on the number of launchers, the quantity of warheads on each missile and modernization the negotiating process would run into even greater difficulties (p 88).

The monograph gives the ABM Treaty the highest marks. In the authors' opinion, it was "carefully compiled" and based on preservation of its effectiveness under conditions of technological change. In accordance with this document, they observe, "exotic" novelties "are not removed from the list of the treaty's restrictions, although separate mention is not made of them" (p 10).

As the work emphasizes, the significance of the 1972 treaty is far broader than simply the determination of limitations on the arms race. The policy of the USSR and the United States in the ABM sphere reflected therein, we read, "is the basis of the present narrowing of the approaches to problems of strategic stability, the prevention of nuclear war and arms control and reductions" (p 29). This document determines the general prerequisites of the strategic mutual relations of the two great powers and facilitates the search for political measures to prevent a military cataclysm. The authors call the treaty "a charter of recognition of the consequences of nuclear war" and of the need for joint steps in the matter of deliverance from the nuclear threat (p 6).

To believe Washington strategists, the SDI by no means goes beyond the framework of the limitations established for antimissile defenses. The work in question definitely expresses a different viewpoint. It notes, inter alia, the obvious discrepancy between the ABM systems envisaged in R. Reagan's well-known speech (23 March 1983) and paragraph 1, article V of the treaty. In a broader context the entire strategic concept contained in the SDI is contrary
to the initial premises of Soviet-American relations in the military sphere and negotiations, the main result of which remains the ABM Treaty (pp 5, 8).

The SDI runs counter to other documents in international law also. Implementation of individual components of this program could, the authors warn, violate the 1963 treaty banning nuclear tests in three spheres and the 1967 treaty on the principles of states' activity in the sphere of space exploration. They reach the important conclusion that the terms of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons would have nothing to gain in this case either (p 29). And the SDI by no means facilitates the task of a reduction in strategic offensive arms—it is simpler to conjecture on the high extent to which its accomplishment would be made more difficult (pp 5, 84, 85).

Revealing the military-strategic and technical aspects of "star wars," the authors turn once again to the period of the end of the 1960's-start of the 1970's and highlight three circumstances which prompted the USSR and the United States to conclude the ABM Treaty. These were the technical unreliability of the attempts to create a full-scale antimissile defense, the destabilizing impact of the offensive and defensive arms race, particularly in crisis situations, and also the colossal cost of antimissile defenses given the relative cheapness of the means of breaching them. The reasonable question arises: has there been a radical change in these factors in the 15 years which have elapsed since the treaty was formulated? The analysis made in the book leads the reader to answer in the negative.

The part of the study which deals with the state and prospects of the development of military technology in the most important areas defined by the SDI program appears stronger than the others. The latter include the creation of lasers with a varying power supply and basing, beam weapons and operational systems based on the use of kinetic energy.

As the work observes, there has been a considerable increase in recent years in the possibilities of generating, focusing and targeting high-energy laser and radiant fluxes. Simultaneously there has been an appreciable augmentation of the capacity for the collection, processing and transmission of large amounts of information. The possibilities of computer technology and radar systems and the mobility of sensors have grown (pp 39, 88). Certain shortcomings of the ABM systems which preceded the SDI have thereby been removed. However, is all this sufficient for advancement, albeit in the future, of the task of the creation of a full-scale antimissile defense?

The considered evaluation of the technological prospects of "star weapons" made in the book persuades us as certainly as can be that neither in the phase of guidance of the delivery rockets into space nor during the flight of the warheads to the targets are existing or future types of antimissile defenses capable of tackling the task of intercepting all operational components (pp 50, 55, 60). The specialists allow of reservations merely in respect of the possibility of the antimissile defense of individual areas with fortified facilities. Full-scale antimissile defense of a country's territory, on the other hand, is impracticable. In all cases here the calculations have been made with an "at best" orientation and one geared to the most efficient of future types of antimissile defenses.
The option of the deployment in space of a chemical laser is examined by way of illustration (pp 44-50). Inasmuch as in a geostationary position (orbital altitude of tens of thousands of kilometers) the latter is ineffective a manifold duplication would be necessary—in view of the Earth's rotation—of the battle stations, whose number would have to amount to many dozens and hundreds even. The weight of each of them would run to hundreds of tons, which would require a large number of refueling launches. From a distance of the order of 1,500 km the laser would have to "hold" a spot of an area of approximately 0.5 km for 1 second (in this time a rocket covers a distance of 7 km). And, furthermore, this would be "possible" only given the practically unattainable, minimum dispersion of the beam combined with a power of the laser hundreds of thousands of times higher than exists today.... And a multitude of no less complex unsolved tasks still remains to be tackled.

The work also expresses a negative attitude toward the proposition concerning the alleged "stabilizing role" of the SDI. The experts emphatically state that a simultaneous nuclear arms race and the SDI "promises nothing good" for strategic stability. The mixed offensive-defensive makeup of strategic arms, they emphasize, would in itself look like a position for administering a "first strike," which is particularly correct for an antimissile defense with space-based components (pp 69, 70).

A highly costly antimissile defense would be a manifest loser compared with the relatively less expensive breaching or counteracting weapons. If we take as a basis the data adduced in the monograph (see p 50), the creation of an antimissile defense for combating the other side's existing arsenal would take $500 billion and more, while a simple doubling of this arsenal would be many times cheaper.

The authors are convinced that, as in the past, the latest transatlantic challenge will lead to retaliatory steps by the Soviet side, whose concern they fully understand. If U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger has declared that he could not imagine "a more destabilizing factor" than the appearance of a reliable Soviet antimissile defense, why should the USSR's leaders think differently about the American SDI? (p 23). The book calls the administration's ostentatious promise to "share" with the Soviet Union ABM information and technology "the height of improbability" (p 90).

As a result of the monograph's analysis the "strategic defense initiative" objectively appears to be the fruit and embodiment of an aggressive aspiration to military superiority hastily concealed by the propaganda "dream" of deliverance from "amoral nuclear intimidation". There inevitably arises in this connection the key question of politicians' special responsibility in the nuclear age. "Responsible leaders determining policy and programs should give thought not simply to their own hopes but also the real consequences of the decisions they make," the Stanford University specialists reasonably declare (p 31).

The work has managed to show that the ABM Treaty recognizes "deterrence" merely as the existing reality, outlining a prospect of gradual deliverance from nuclear weapons. In addition, the authors believe, it is not deterrence
in itself but its combination with "strict and uncompromising confrontation" which represents an ominous threat to the future of Soviet-American relations (pp 96-97).

The permeating key proposition of the study is confirmed by scientific analysis: no one knows how to create an impenetrable antimissile defense (pp VII, 63, 69). The defense of civilization against nuclear war by any method other than its prevention is an illusion, the specialists emphasize. An attempt to create an antimissile defense under current conditions is dangerous and disruptive of strategic stability.

Not confining themselves to criticism of the SDI, the scientists counterpose to the arms race a positive alternative, many elements of which parallel Soviet initiatives. They advocate the continued effectiveness of the ABM Treaty, which has clearly shown the possibility of a way out of total confrontation and the search for areas of cooperation, primarily in the business of disarmament. "In this context mutual deterrence assumes the form not simply of a mutual threat but rather of mutual abstention from any inclination to be the first to use nuclear weapons," the authors forecast (p 97). They advance specific proposals pertaining to the achievement of a situation conducive to peace: renunciation of the testing of components of an antimissile defense, reduced spending on the SDI program and negotiations with the Soviet Union on the ABM problem linked with discussion of strategic arms limitation and reduction.

Of course, we cannot agree with all the propositions and evaluations of the Stanford University specialists. Nor is their work free of certain cliches (inventions concerning the possibility of "nuclear threats" on the part of the USSR, attribution thereto of some "aggressive intentions" in respect of West Europe and the Far East and such) which are, unfortunately, customary for the majority of bourgeois authors.

There is no doubt, however, that the basically realistic initial premises combined with sober analysis have enabled the scholars to present the whole true picture of the prospects and disastrous consequences of the implementation of Reagan's "star wars" program.

FOOTNOTE


8850
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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

MOSCOW ON U.S. EFFORTS TO 'DRAG' ASIA INTO SDI

SK290951 Moscow International Service in Korean 1330 GMT 26 Apr 87

[Text] We now present a (Bleskov) commentary. [Begin recording in Russian fading into Korean translation]

The Reagan Administration is accelerating work in SDI, known as the Star Wars plan. Some time ago, U.S. Defense Weinberger stated that the first (?)unit) of this system would be deployed in the early 1990's.

Washington is attempting to drag its allies, including those in Asia, into implementing SDI. Last September, the Japanese Government decided to join the United States' SDI. The Pentagon has great expectations of Japan's modern technological processes in electronics, computers, and laser technology.

Japan will play a vanguard role in the United States' complicated space weapons system. The U.S. Defense Department dragged the Seoul regime into SDI. What will the Seoul regime pursue in SDI? Even if a special research institute is established in South Korea to undertake projects in this sector, how can one think that the Pentagon can obtain important scientific results from the work of South Korean technicians? This will only serve as a subsidiary project for the United States.

What is important is to obtain places to deploy its facilities to prepare the Star Wars plan in this area under its (?)control). Such facilities are already being built in the Taegu area. (?)Observers) regard SDI as a space weapons system that has elements on the ground.

U.S. experts indicate that the effect of this plan depends on where the components of the plan are deployed. The antimissile missiles, with the mission of attacking ballistic missiles, are a good example of such an effect. The firing range of these missiles is 2,000 to 3,000 km.

To effectively smash the ballistic missiles of an imaginary enemy, the antimissile missiles will be deployed somewhere in South Korea or Japan. This reveals the interest Washington has in attempting to drag South Korea into SDI.

Undoubtedly, Seoul is ready to join the United States' SDI. South Korea was already reduced to an advanced nuclear missile base for the Pentagon. Approximately 1,000 U.S. nuclear warheads and means of nuclear delivery, including nuclear Lance missiles, have been deployed in South Korea.

It is not (?)wise) for the pro-U.S. Chon Tu-hwan regime to have the security of its own people depend on being the victim of Washington's nuclear strategy.

/9604
CSO: 5200/1467
SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET COMMENTARIES ON JAPAN'S SDI INVOLVEMENT

'Not in Japan's Interest'

OW020800 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1000 GMT 1 May 87

[Dmitriyev commentary]

[Excerpts] Japan's participation in the SDI program is again being widely discussed in Japanese newspapers. In this regard, commentator Dmitriyev writes as follows:

We have frequently heard the argument that the SDI program, otherwise called the Star Wars program, is Washington's trump card in negotiations with the Soviet Union. Now it seems the program has become one of Prime Minister Nakasone's cards in his negotiations with the U.S. leadership.

ASAHI SHIMBUN writes that during Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to Washington an agreement will be reached on the early signing of an accord concerning terms of Japan's participation in the SDI program and that the signing is expected before the Venice summit in mid-May.

The Japanese Government is expected to announce its (view) on the SDI participation issue. The announcement will undoubtedly seek to appease the increasing anti-Japanese feelings in the U.S. Congress over the increasing trade friction.

A personal approach to the U.S. leadership concerning recent trade sanctions imposed on Japan is one of the most important tasks for Prime Minister Nakasone in his Washington visit. NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN obtained the text of a speech the prime minister will deliver at the end of his U.S. visit. Judging from an article about it, (the prime minister) will likely state that participation in the Star Wars program is completely in Japan's interest as a peaceful nation because the program is ultimately aimed at scrapping nuclear arms. Whether he will actually say that will soon be known. For now, we will confine our comment to a previously made remark.

The remark in question is by U.S. physicist Edward Teller, who is called father of hydrogen bomb and [word indistinct] of SDI. He said the fairy tale that SDI can be used for nuclear disarmament (on earth) has been concocted for domestic use to hurt antinuclear movements in the United States. If the antinuclear nature of SDI is a fairy tale, where does the true lie? SDI has many aspects, the most dangerous one that it destroys strategic stability. If SDI materializes, the destruction of this stability would be unavoidable. [passage omitted]
Judging from the present circumstances, the Japanese Government is prepared to take part in the militarization of space. Does it really believe doing so is in the interest of Japan's security? It is not in Japan's interest. On the contrary, Japan will be weakening its security by taking part in a new step of the arms race. Or does the Japanese Government believe SDI participation is in the interest of the Japanese economy? Because the U.S. Pentagon controls all patents relating to the SDI program under terms of agreements, it is impossible to expect such a thing.

Why then is Japan going participate in the militarization of space? An answer is suggested by the circumstances surrounding Prime Minister Nakasone's latest visit to Washington — that is, [words indistinct] the Japan-U.S. trade friction. Needless to say, the trade friction is indeed a serious problem for Japan. Does it mean, however, that world stability and collective security, for which Japan is responsible like all other countries, are not so important for Japan?

Tokyo Stand 'Illogical'

LD301749 Moscow TASS in English 1605 GMT 30 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 30 TASS — Political News Analyst Askold Biryukov writes:

The Japanese press writes with reference to sources in the government delegation now on an official visit in Washington that during his talks with the American President Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone intends to express consent with the formula of reducing medium-range missiles that was reached in Reykjavik last October.

At the same time, the newspaper YOMIURI writes, Nakasone intends to suggest the idea of establishing a concrete timeframe for the total elimination of this class of armaments. While urging the United States to attain a "global zero option" on medium-range missiles as the ultimate goal, the paper writes, the premier wants at the same time the signing of the agreement on Japan's participation in SDI to precede the opening of the June conference of the leaders of the seven leading capitalist countries in Venice.

A correspondent of the newspaper NIHON KEIZAI managed to get the text of Nakasone's forthcoming speech at the National Press Club and writes that the prime minister will declare for Japan's accession to SDI on the claim that the "Star Wars" programme "fully accords with the peaceful nature of the Japanese state because in the final analysis it is directed at eliminating nuclear arms". Thereby, the paper concludes, Nakasone "intends to give the Reagan administration support on the flank at the nuclear disarmament talks with the USSR".

Of course one can understand the desire of the Japanese head of government to resort once again to a display of "Western solidarity" and give Washington support in the fulfillment of the "Star Wars" programme and thus find a way out of the difficult situation in which his country has found itself as a result of the drastic aggravation of trade and economic contradictions with the United States. But while understanding this one cannot help noting that Tokyo's stand is both illogical and remote from the genuine aims of disarmament.
For by championing the elimination of nuclear arms on earth and at the same time joining SDI the Japanese Government, whether it wants it or not, gives a helping hand to spreading the arms race to the boundless expanses of outer space. The implementation of SDI will create an insurmountable barrier in the way of eliminating nuclear arms.

While busying itself with SDI the United States simultaneously is stepping up the production and perfection of missiles, aircraft and new nuclear warheads that are intended not for defence but for penetrating defences. More than that, SDI implies the deployment in outer space of new more advanced weapons, including nuclear ones, which will force the other side to look for an adequate response, not necessarily one that is symmetrical to the American effort.

The implementation of the "Star Wars" programme will make impossible agreements in the field of reducing and liquidating strategic offensive arms. It will destabilise the entire system of security, deal an irreparable blow to international trust that it is so difficult to build. Does all this accord with the peaceful nature of the Japanese state, with the aims proclaimed by its constitution, with the universally known three non-nuclear principles? Is not the price of "cohesion" that the Japanese premier intends to pay for a settlement of differences with its "senior partner" far too high?

/9604
CSO: 5200/1467
TASS ON 'PROMETHEUS PROJECT'--Washington, 22 Apr (TASS)--Under the "Strategic Defense Initiative" programme the United States accelerates the development of a sophisticated nuclear system, capable of destroying mockup targets in space. The newspaper WASHINGTON TIMES reports that top secret investigations condemned "Prometheus Project" whose aim is to resolve the difficult problem of identifying real targets, have been conducted in the United States for several years now. However, they were drastically stepped up in the past few months. According to Pentagon plans, the newspaper writes, new weapons will be fitted out with nuclear warheads. When they explode, they will spray with great velocity several hundred thousands of small metallic pellets which will destroy mockup targets by a direct hit. Real warheads will be destroyed with other SDI components.
TASS; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES URGES SALT, ABM OBSERVANCE

LD071005 Moscow TASS in English 0930 GMT 7 May 87

[Text] Washington May 7 TASS -- TASS correspondent Andrey Fedyashin reports:

On Wednesday the U.S. House of Representatives by a majority of votes endorsed a number of Democrats-advanced important amendments to their version of a military spending bill for the 1988 fiscal year.

The documents urge the Reagan administration strictly to observe the provisions of the SALT-2 Treaty and to adhere to the narrow interpretation of the 1972 Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty.

An amendment to the SALT-2 Treaty introduces a ban on the allocation of funds for the administration next fiscal year for the deployment or material and technical support of any weapon systems which would exceed the quantitative limits set by the treaty.

The document specially emphasizes that the ban may be removed only if the U.S. President provides Congress with evidence that the Soviet Union exceeds the limits.

This move by the U.S. House of Representatives is an overt challenge to the Reagan administration and is intended, first of all, to stop the strategic delivery vehicles' build-up being effected by the administration in breach of the SALT-2 Treaty.

Edward Markey, member of the House of Representatives, said that the crocodile tears being shed by representatives of the Republican minority in Congress now served to hide smiles in connection with the SALT process frustrated by them.

He said it was time to drop such hypocrisy and honestly to admit that they had always opposed the SALT process and arms control, and had favoured the arms race.

Congressman Norman Dicks said the point was not simply the SALT-2 Treaty but whether the USA would or would not allow the uncontrolled strategic nuclear arms race to continue.

The U.S. House of Representatives turned down the Republicans' amendment to the bill which would enable the Administration to resort to the so-called "broad interpretation" of the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty.
Congressman Dave McCurdy said the Administration's new broad interpretation of the accord was an "amateurism, inept and dangerous effort to undermine the bedrock of arms control."

Barney Frank emphasized that the present U.S. Administration had not done anything at all to curb the nuclear arms race.
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG LEADERS MEET TO DISCUSS USSR ARMS PROPOSAL

Ost Announcement

LD271336 Hamburg DPA in German 1253 GMT 27 Apr 87

[Text] Bonn (DPA) — According to government spokesman Friedhelm Ost, the Federal Government will work out its viewpoint on the proposal by Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev for the complete removal of intermediate missiles, including shorter-range missiles (500 to 1,000 km), and put that viewpoint to the alliance as soon as the USSR puts forth a draft treaty in Geneva.

Ost announced this to the press in Bonn today following the meeting between Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Defense Minister Manfred Woerner, Chancellery Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble, and Interior Minister Friedrich Zimmermann. The meeting was held to put an end to the differences of opinion on Gorbachev's proposal within the coalition.

Ost stressed that the Federal Government welcomes the fact that an agreement on longer-range intermediate weapons is within reach "above all because of its security policy." The Federal Government affirmed once again the attitude expressed in the government statement of 18 March that the Geneva negotiations on a worldwide ban on chemical weapons and the Vienna negotiations on conventional stability in Europe must be pushed forward with the greatest urgency.

Kohl, Genscher Said To Disagree

DW281015 Hamburg BILD in German 28 Apr 87 pp 1, 4

[W. Kenntemich report: "Missiles: Kohl, Genscher Still Not in Agreement"]

[Text] There is another missiles quarrel in the coalition. Disarmament expert Todenhoefer (CDU), in a letter to his group colleagues, opposes an "isolated zero solution" in regard to intermediate-range missiles with a range of more than 1,000 km. Chancellor Kohl wants it. An open disputed erupted in the chancellery between Kohl and FDP Foreign Minister Genscher.

Yesterday the chancellor negotiated for 3 hours with Ministers Woerner and Schaeuble (both CDU), Zimmermann (CSU), and
Genscher. The foreign minister supports Gorbachev's proposal to scrap all intermediate-range missiles with a range of more than 500 km, saying: "The protective nuclear umbrella will suffice even then."

Kohl insisted that first missiles with a range of 1,000 km or more be dismantled, and that then negotiations on shorter-range missiles of between 150 and 1,000 km be initiated. "We need a pawn so that the East will disarm, including conventionally, and that all chemical weapons be eliminated."

Government spokesman Ost: "We will respond to the Soviet proposal only when the draft of the treaty is submitted in Geneva."

Todenhoefer asked his group colleagues in the letter not to agree to the zero solution in parliament. Remaining in the East and West: 100-200 longer-range intermediate-range missiles, as long as the East's conventional preponderance has not been eliminated and chemical weapons have not been eliminated worldwide.

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CSO: 5200/2528
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG GOVERNMENT ASSUMES U.S. WILL INFORM ABOUT TREATY

LD281208 Hamburg DPA in German 1020 GMT 28 Apr 87

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA) — The Federal Government assumes that it will be informed by the United States about the contents of the draft treaty on the withdrawal of all intermediate-range missiles from Europe submitted by the Soviet Union in Geneva. Government circles said today that the information would probably be conveyed through diplomatic channels. According to government spokesman Friedhelm Ost the zero option is not on the agenda of the first cabinet session following the Easter recess. [passage omitted]

FDP Chairman Martin Bangemann, who will be in the United States until Thursday, said on Deutschlandfunk that he has assured Secretary of State Shultz that Bonn will support all efforts by the United States at reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union. The Federal Government is in favor of a common position within the alliance. Disarmament would not founder on the Federal Government. However, Bonn would not like to see the creation of a new imbalance. [passage omitted]

According to a report in Frankfurter Allgemeine, Genscher yesterday spoke of the "government's most difficult situation" since establishing the coalition in 1982. The chancellor's office claimed that such a remark was not made during Genscher's talk with Kohl. [passage omitted]
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG'S RUEHE INTERVIEWED ON ZERO OPTION

DW271300 Hamburg BILD AM SONNTAG in German 26 Apr 87 p 2

[Telephone interview with Volker Ruehe, deputy chairman of the Bundestag CDU/CSU Group, by reporter Wolfgang Kenteich; date and place not given]

[Text] Bild Am Sonntag: The SPD and FDP are accusing you of stabbing Foreign Minister Genscher in the back by advocating new counterarmament [nachruestung] with shorter-range nuclear missiles....

Ruehe: That is nonsense. I represent the opinion of the CDU/CSU group as expressed in Chancellor Kohl's government statement: a zero solution for longer range intermediate-range missiles (above 1,000 km). Whoever is now calling for a second zero solution for missiles with a 500-1,000 km range is changing the current government position. By the way, it is not a zero solution or counterarmament choice. There are other possibilities. Both sides should have the right to a limited number of shorter-range systems, which does not automatically mean counterarmament and deployment of new missiles in the West. It means recognition of West European security interests by the Soviet Union. Specific Western steps could then be made dependent on further Soviet disarmament, particularly in rectifying the conventional imbalance in Europe.

Bild Am Sonntag: However, Reagan is — like Gorbachev and Genscher — for a zero solution in the over-500 km range. How can you prevail?

Ruehe: All my discussion partners in Washington are grateful that it is a frank discussion. It was made expressly clear to me that no decision has been made. In addition, complete preparedness to do nothing against the will of the Europeans was indicated. It is now important to incorporate German and European security interests in the western alliance discussion. We will respond constructively to the Soviet proposal.

Bild Am Sonntag: As to Moscow's zero option, there would still be 4,600 nuclear warheads remaining in Europe. Does that not suffice for deterrence?

Ruehe: With the exception of planes and ships, they are all very short-range nuclear weapons that could only be used on German soil. It is an exclusive threat — to Germans only. That must be taken into consideration by German politicians.

Bild Am Sonntag: Are you counting on a zero solution agreement this year?

Ruehe: Yes. We will, as in the past, agree on a common position in the Western alliance. I am optimistic about a zero solution agreement on longer range intermediate-range missiles (over 1,000 km) this year. Then negotiations will continue on shorter-range systems and rectifying the conventional imbalance.
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG'S RUEHE INTERVIEWED ON U.S. REACTION TO PROPOSAL

DW282201 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 1945 GMT 28 Apr 87

[Interview with Volker Ruehe, Deputy CDU/CSU party group chairman by moderator Dieter Kronzucker on the “Heute-Journal!” program on 28 Apr -- recorded]

[Kronzucker] I asked Volker Ruehe 2 hours ago about the American reaction following the news that the Soviets now want those 72 missiles in the FRG to be scrapped.

[Ruehe] I have already heard first reactions from the American side. It proves that our fears that the Soviets were also aiming to remove the Pershings that the Bundeswehr has were justified. The first reactions by the Americans are very clear — that is, unacceptable. That is an important system for deterrence and an important symbol for German-American cooperation in maintaining peace in Europe. Therefore, the recent definite Soviet proposals contributed to it that NATO will react with special care and great unity to that Soviet offer.

[Kronzucker] The inclusion of the Pershing-1 weapons that the Bundeswehr possesses, forming the actual sole counterpart to the Soviets' shorter range intermediate-range weapons — did it trigger American qualms?

[Ruehe] It increased the qualms. Those systems were not discussed in Moscow.


[Ruehe] So far I have only heard that American qualms have been increased.

[Kronzucker] How do you assess the future now? I mean, do the Americans want to reach a quick agreement? Would they do so even if the Europeans delayed because of their respective local political and national reasons? Would the United States accept such a delay, or would it consider the reasons?

[Ruehe] We all want an agreement, a good agreement that will bring us at least the same security with reduced weapons systems on both sides. We would keep our promises then. We do not want delays, but it is not a question of just some days. I proceed from the fact that the alliance will officially work out its position during May, with subsequent time spent at the negotiating table. The Americans are well aware that we want a negotiation success.

Concerning the shorter-range systems, we want to reach disarmament and then take the first steps to then remove tanks, soldiers, and artillery from Europe — especially on the side of those having three times as many as we do. The U.S Congress also wants this to happen. Any agreement must in the end be confirmed by the U.S Senate.

[Kronzucker] But the U.S. Government clearly wants to reach a quick agreement. The arms control expert, Adelman, said that whatever we do, we will never please the Europeans: If we want to withdraw weapons, they reject it. If we want to deploy weapons, they will also reject this. Can you imagine the Americans trying to do all this on their own?

[Ruehe] No. We hold to the position we have had in recent years — the zero-option concerning the longer-range systems, and no zero-option below it. To this hour that is the official NATO position.

/9274
CSO: 5200/2528
FRG: CSU'S BIEHLE COMMENTS ON DISARMAMENT POSITION

LD280847 Hamburg DPA in German 0803 GMT 28 Apr 87

[Text] Cologne (DPA) --- One day after the postponement of a decision by the Federal Government on the missile issue, Alfred Biehle (CSU), chairman of the Bundestag Defense Committee, affirmed Bonn's present position. The government is interested first of all in agreements on intermediate-range missiles of a range over 1,000 km. Afterward, negotiations on the total nuclear potential of intermediate-range and short-range missiles still left in Europe linked to conventional arms control in Europe should follow, Biehle said on Deutschlandfunk (Cologne) on Tuesday. Only through the clear conceptual linkage of the nuclear and conventional sectors can the European security problem, the Soviet ability to invade with conventional arms, be solved. "In an emergency the battlefield would be Europe and that would mean Germany." This would have to be spelled out clearly to U.S. friends, he said.

Asked about new missiles United States intends to deploy in the Federal Republic in case of a zero option only for longer-range systems, Biehle said: "That would be a logical result, if nothing else could be done...." Concerning the Gorbachev proposal, he said that the problems were those of detail, such as, for instance, verification. The cabinet would have to tackle these issues now, "and very quickly." He also admitted that the Gorbachev proposal took Bonn politicians by surprise. The surprising thing initially was "that there was a whole range of proposals one would not have expected to come from the Soviet Union," Biehle said.

The SPD defense expert Andreas von Buelow expects concrete Soviet proposals for the "drastic reduction of conventional armed forces in the near future." In an interview with Neue Osnabruecker Zeitung, Von Buelow said on Tuesday that there are many indications that Gorbachev sought to substantially reduce above all the aggressive elements of armaments capable of invasion, such as tank weapons. Moscow is prepared to respect the fears of the Europeans. At the same time, the SPD politician warned the Federal Government against trying to outplay the United States in the present disarmament discussion, because after all, U.S. weapons are at stake.

/9274
CSO: 5200/2528
[Excerpt] Cologne/Hamburg (DPA) — The discussion in Bonn about the future disarmament course of the West continues: The chairman of the SPD group in the Bundestag, Hans-Jochen Vogel, today appealed to Chancellor Helmut Kohl not to stay the hand of U.S. President Ronald Reagan in his readiness to disarm.

Speaking on Deutschlandfunk, the SPD politician said that reason demanded that we use the historic opportunity that arose from the latest disarmament proposals of the Soviet Union. The Social Democrats were in favor of the zero solution "with no if's, and's, or but's". [passage omitted]
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG PRESS COMMENTS ON APPROACHES TO ZERO OPTION

DW281155 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0505 GMT 28 Apr 87

[From the Press Review]

[Excerpts] One of today’s issues is the Bonn coalition approach to a double zero option in the disarmament debate.

The daily Die Welt has the following to say: The Federal Government does not want to be put under time pressure over the ticklish zero option to shorter-range missiles. Therefore, the ministerial meeting with the chancellor yesterday postponed a reaction until a specific Soviet proposal is on the Geneva disarmament table and could be examined in detail. That is a legitimate negotiation tactic and is justified. More could not be expected with a view to internal peace in the Bonn coalition. The differences that have come up between politicians of the CDU/CSU and the FDP in the assessment of Gorbachev’s recent proposals, could not simply be eliminated through Kohl’s putting his foot down. What is involved is not the much-quoted competence of the chancellor to issue guidelines, but harmony in the discussion. Yesterday’s round seems to have been a good beginning.

Frankfurter Allgemeine writes: The statement by the federal chancellor on the missiles talk with Ministers Genscher, Schaeuble, and Woerner reflects a temporizing attitude. The Federal Government is restating its agreement to a zero solution on longer range intermediate-range missiles. As to Gorbachev’s proposal to eliminate shorter-range weapons, Bonn wants to wait and see what the Soviet negotiators will propose in Geneva. That is the formula for the cabinet quarrel about a zero option and its consequences. Within the CDU the matter is not clear either. Geisler, the party’s secretary general, calls the CDU a disarmament party, stating that disarmament is the most important foreign policy goal. It is hard to believe that in Konrad Adenauer’s party, security can be discussed in such a way today. Waiting for the Soviet proposals in Geneva will give the Federal Government a short break. Will it think better of it? It believes it cannot on principle say no to the zero solutions, instead of keeping the country’s security interests in mind as a responsible government should. The FRG’s security would be worsened by nuclear zero solutions, because remaining imbalances, particularly conventional ones, would be strengthened. [passage omitted]

Sueddeutsche Zeitung maintains: Kohl says no to the incorporation of 500-1,000 km range missiles in the zero option. So he must run a number of risks. Domestically he is endangering the coalition with the FDP, which virtually sides with its old partner, the SPD, on this issue, and he might possibly revive the peace movement. In foreign policy, he would endanger the new beginning of Ostpolitik and simultaneously irritate the United States without winning much among Europeans. Shorter-range missiles could reach France and Great Britain, but since both of them have their own missiles, they could cover that field with their longer-range weapons. A quick European agreement on that issue is not to be expected. The Federal Government would end up as the European troublemaker who interfered with the beginning of a new disarmament and detente policy. [passage omitted]

Frankfurter Rundschau is of the following opinion: To the various zero solutions that have been discussed lately — zero solutions for longer and shorter range intermediate-range nuclear weapons — the Federal Government added a new variant on monday. It is the zero solution to making decisions. The Federal Government, which enjoyed hearing the sound of its voice in the big powers disarmament dialogue, has no voice. Two schools of thinking — those of the Defense Ministry and the Foreign Ministry — block each other.

/9274
CSO: 5200/2528
"WHAT are you afraid of?" are the words with which Mr. Gorbachev is reported to have bade farewell to Mr. George Shultz, the American Secretary of State, in Moscow this week. A truthful, if not the diplomatic, answer to this question is that Mr. Shultz, both as an American patriot and a friend of Western Europe, has a great deal to fear from the latest Soviet arms control offers. He is suddenly confronted by the apparent reality of a Soviet willingness to eliminate all categories of non-strategic nuclear missiles from Europe.

The ramifications of that offer are both dangerous and unpleasant. They are dangerous because its acceptance would leave the Warsaw Pact with its preponderance of conventional and chemical forces intact and Nato therefore at a disadvantage which could be offset only by directly "coupling" America's intercontinental missiles to the defence of Europe. They are unpleasant because the task of justifying any qualified diplomatic response to Mr. Gorbachev's seeming open handedness will make the Nato leadership look like the warrior party to a public which is hungry for peace.

Yet it is a qualified response that the West must be obliged to make. The question is exactly what qualifications to enter. There will be a strong temptation to follow Mr. Gorbachev in the game of trumps. If he is prepared to surrender his superiority in non-strategic nuclear missiles, why not then, the West might demand, also his superiority in conventional forces? By that line of approach, he might be challenged to disband divisions and junk tanks and aircraft until the Warsaw Pact armies were no more than the equal of Nato's. It is an unpromising approach none the less, because such concessions would not only be represented by the
Russians as irrelevant but, even if eventually made, would be difficult for the West to verify and easy to reverse. Better that the Nato leadership harden itself for a "difficult" passage of relations with its own public — as it did during the period of Cruise and Pershing 2 deployment — and play a mathematically calculated hand.

Large numbers of non-strategic missiles are not essential to the security and integrity of Nato. Small numbers are. Mr Shultz and his Nato colleagues should decide immediately on what the minima are, why and refuse to budge from their chosen sticking point. Just because Mr Gorbachev has decided to institute a thaw is no reason for the West to let its resolution melt away.
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

DUTCH OFFICIAL VIEWS CHANCES FOR ZERO OPTION

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 7 Apr 87 p 8

[Article by B.J. van Renennaam, attached to the Dutch Embassy in Washington: "The Zero Option Could Be a Great Success—Firm Approach Has Produced Positive Results for the West"]

[Text] You have to be careful with predictions, but the prospects for a "zero option," the mutual elimination of a whole category of nuclear weapons, are better than ever. If a few important problems could also be solved, such as verification and the question of short-range missiles (SRINF), then with some good will—which seems to be present currently on both sides—a regional zero option could be achieved in the not too distant future.

In addition to raising the objection that the zero option would not be negotiable, opponents primarily argue that this option would undermine the coupling of American and West European security. And, it is argued, it was precisely this coupling which was supposed to be strengthened by the deployment decision.

Estimate

This coupling includes the assurance that the United States would come to the aid of its West European partners in case the latter were attacked. Whether this coupling is really functional can be ascertained only in case of war. In peace time it is primarily of question of an estimate.

In the first place, what is important is how the West European partners assess the American willingness to provide support, but ultimately it is the Soviet perception which determines the credibility of the coupling. What is at stake is for Moscow to consider the probability of direct American military involvement so great that on the basis of that it rejects the risks of aggression.

Two aspects are important in this regard. The United States should not only be militarily willing to come to our aid if necessary, it should also under all circumstances—visible to the Soviet Union—be militarily capable of doing so.
The political willingness of our largest partner is firm. Not only in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, but also in numerous public statements made by American presidents. The United States military might in Europe with substantial infrastructure and weaponry, together with the enormous financial, economic, political and strategic interests of the United States in Europe, guarantee the assurance of aid.

But are the Americans also capable in all circumstances of providing a credible military response to possible Soviet aggression? It is a fact that the United States wants this, but is it always able to? In other words: would a military power relationship be imaginable whereby it would be possible in Moscow's perception to limit a conflict to the European territory, because the United States simply does not have the appropriate military resources available to provide an adjusted credible response?

It is this question which led to a great deal of concern in Western Europe in the seventies. The prevailing perception at that time was that the intercontinental strategic nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union were tied to equal ceilings within the SALT II treaty, that the West did not have enough credible means at its disposal to react to the quickly growing Soviet nuclear superiority. Thus it became once again clear that in a military sense the coupling is not a constant element. It is simply impossible to see it as separate from important developments in the actual military power relationships.

Double Decision

Some people say that it was the SS-20 which led to the NATO double decision in 1979; others mention the fact that SALT II increased the necessity to strengthen the coupling. However, it is virtually certain that SALT II alone, without SS-20s, would not have led to the double decision and even though the strategic stalemate strongly increased the threat of the SS-20s, those SS-20s were the crucial factor in the decision.

That is also why the zero option is not in conflict with coupling. As a matter of fact, if the threat changes then the military instruments will also have to be adjusted. More threat, then also more military coupling geared to that threat. Consequently, with a declining threat one could do with relatively fewer weapons. More concretely: if the SS-20 threat were to disappear again, then the security of Western Europe and coupling with the United States could also be ensured without the NATO modernization program of land based cruise and Pershing II missiles.

Aside from the above, other objections were also raised to the zero option but in and of themselves they are not convincing enough either to justify rejection of the proposal. The reasoning, for example, that the strongly improved Soviet air defense makes the introduction of cruise missiles necessary anyhow, sidesteps developments in the so-called Stealth technology and the fact that numerous cruise missiles would remain available within the Western arsenal.
Furthermore, with an LRINF zero option the maintenance of dual capable aircraft such as the F-16 would be of particular importance. In addition, the vulnerability of airfields and storage facilities in Western Europe would be considerably reduced with the dismantling of the SS-20 missiles. And what could have been an acceptable alternative to the zero option? Should the Netherlands have submitted or supported an arms control proposal in which an LRINF would ultimately always be deployed in Western Europe anyhow?

Last Straws

As we said, important questions still remain to be solved before an LRINF zero option—in the first place probably only at the regional level—can be achieved. Compliance with such a treaty must be verifiable and from that point of view also it would be preferable if the Soviet Union were to agree at once to the worldwide zero option proposed by the West. Furthermore, agreements will have to be made about the shorter range missiles (SRINF) to prevent the undermining effect, which took place when under SALT II the unlimited medium range weapons were expanded, from recurring with the SRINF.

That means that the USSR cannot deploy any new SRINFs, and that the right to equal numbers for both sides must also be determined here. And this with the stipulation that substantive follow up negotiations on the SRINF, of which the Soviet Union also possesses a significantly superior number, will be held as soon as possible.

Something had to be done about the new threat of the SS-20 missiles and from the very beginning arms control has been given strong preference by the Netherlands. The Soviet Union walked away from the negotiating table when the NATO deployment started, but later returned to Geneva. As far as Europe is concerned, the zero option, which was originally considered not negotiable by so many people, has in principle been accepted by Gorbachev. At first conditionally in Reykjavik, but unconditionally since February 28.

Public Support

So far, unanimity and a consistent sticking to a businesslike and firm approach have produced positive results for the West. The LRINF is a good thing, to which the Netherlands has provided a relatively major contribution. Continuing broad public support for that solution is justified and would undoubtedly benefit the rapid conclusion of an agreement. Thus the zero option could become the greatest success in the history of arms control.
Western Europe's leaders will long remember the spring of 1987 as one of anxiety and suspense, when the United States and the Soviet Union sat down to negotiate the fate of Europe's security.

West European countries fear that if the United States and the Soviet Union reach an accord on eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe, they will be exposed to the threat posed by the numerically superior Soviet chemical and conventional arms. They see the present state of peace in Europe as maintained by a nuclear balance which also serves as a deterrent to Soviet conventional weapons.

They also fear that the pulling-out of the 316 U.S. medium-range Pershing 2 and Cruise missiles already in place in Europe would lead to a sapping, or a "decoupling," of the long-standing European-U.S. defense.

What has added to their misgivings is the favorable U.S. reaction to the Soviet initiative, with President Ronald Reagan describing its prospects as "optimistic and realistic."

U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz travelled to Moscow earlier this month to press the U.S. case. He then went to Europe to brief U.S. allies on his talks with Soviet leaders. Their reception of his report was mixed.

The U.S.-Soviet talks have triggered intense diplomatic activity in Western Europe, whose leaders are meeting to work out a unified response to the Soviet move.

Last Sunday, French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac went to London to exchange views on the new Soviet proposal concerning shorter-range missiles with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who was fresh from a visit to Moscow. In a statement after the meeting, Chirac voiced his misgivings about a possible U.S.-Soviet accord on Euromissiles.

He told reporters the denuclearization of Europe is unacceptable, and that given Soviet superiority in chemical and conventional weapons, there is no option open to Western Europe but to retain its independent nuclear deterrent. He also said he and Thatcher agreed that the nuclear defense of their two countries is negotiable.
French Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond, in a recent interview with a Federal German periodical, said he is dubious about Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's new nuclear disarmament proposal, and said the Soviet intentions remain unchanged, and its new nuclear disarmament offer amounts to nothing but greater flexibility in dealing with the United States.

Raimond is travelling to Washington today to elaborate France's stand on the Soviet proposal to his U.S. counterpart.

British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe, after being briefed by Shultz about his Moscow visit, said in Brussels the nuclear deterrent and the strategy of "flexible response" are indispensable for West Europe in the foreseeable future.

Federal German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, in a meeting with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Defense Minister Manfred Woerner on Monday, said he shared his French and British counterparts' opposition to the denuclearization of Europe and to the so-called "supra-zero option" (calling for removal of both medium- and shorter-range missiles from Europe). He however indicated that he would not dismiss the Soviet leader's proposal in initial reactions to his offer. Kohl will go to Strasbourg next week to meet French Prime Minister Chirac for consultations on the Soviet offer.

Over the past two days, defense and foreign ministers of Federal Germany, Belgium, France, Britain, the Netherlands, Italy and Luxembourg — members of the Western European Union — met in Luxembourg to work out a coordinated stand in answer to the Soviet nuclear disarmament proposal.

Addressing European worries, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle said recently that the envisaged U.S.-Soviet accord on Euromissiles would not lead to the denuclearization of Europe, nor a "decoupling" of U.S.-European defense. He said the United States will work out an accord with the Soviet Union which will be in the best interests of the West.

Kenneth Adelman, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, also promised that the United States will not do anything at the expense of its European allies.

Knowing the United States counts on their support in its dealings with the Soviet Union, West European nations will not readily agree to any U.S.-Soviet accord unless tangible guarantees are made for their security.

/8309
CSO: 5200/4097
Luxembourg, April 29 (XINHUA) — The foreign ministers and defense ministers of the countries of Western European Union (WEU) expressed their satisfaction Tuesday with disarmament efforts while debating their own security.

This indicates the WEU's desire to get removed the danger of nuclear conflict from Europe, while maintaining an adequate defense against the Soviet Union's powerful non-nuclear threat.

Meeting Tuesday in Luxembourg, the officials of the WEU nations — Federal Germany, Britain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Belgium — hailed the Soviet offers to remove nuclear missiles from Europe.

The ministers issued a joint statement after their meeting giving full support to U.S. efforts to conclude an arms agreement provided it maintains the balance of power and effective provisions to check it is being obeyed.

But the statement also contains grains of doubt about European security in the face of superior Soviet conventional and chemical forces once INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] missiles are gone.

The ministers demanded cuts in conventional and chemical forces along with nuclear reductions.

It is necessary for Western Europe to have a NATO defense based on an "appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear forces which together provide a credible deterrent against all forms of aggression" for the "foreseeable future," the statement said.

The WEU, set up in 1954, is primarily a military forum coordinating the security of Western Europe.

Since the Second World War, peace has been maintained in Europe but with the threat of growing superpower nuclear arsenals race, the ministers noted.

Luxembourg's Foreign Minister Jacques Poos said after the WEU meeting that the peace between East and West is "fragile."
The WEU nations, hoping to see intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) removed from Europe are pleased with the possibilities of the "zero option."

The meeting also reflected the wishes of the WEU nations to strengthen their defenses before a possible slackening of U.S. commitment there.

Early sessions saw debate on a report on Europe's role in NATO, a proposal to design a European security charter and an expansion of the WEU.

This shows that the WEU hopes to play a bigger role in face of any changes, particularly a reduced American presence, in the strategic military balance of Europe.
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PEOPLE'S DAILY NOTES FRG RESPONSE TO SOVIET PROPOSAL

HK300815 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 29 Apr 87 p 6

[Commentary by RENMIN RIBAO reporter Jiang Jianguo (3068 1696 0948): "A Difficult Choice"—dispatched from Bonn on 27 April]

[Text] On 10 April, during his visit to Prague, Soviet leader Gorbachev put forth a proposal on reducing medium-range and short-range missiles, and now 20 days have passed without an official response from the Western countries. It is so difficult to make this response, because this issue concerns the future of the Western allies' strategy and the question of whether Western Europe should be turned into a "non-nuclear" zone. Because the new Soviet proposal has a special bearing on the security interests of West Germany, the West German Government is still hesitant, and there are two different opinions and no consensus has been reached.

At present, the Soviet Union has absolute superiority in the field of nuclear missiles with a range of 500 to 1,000 kilometers. As for the tactical missiles with a range of less than 500 kilometers, the Soviet Union and its allies also hold the upper hand. Among the NATO countries, West Germany is most concerned with the issue of the medium-range and short-range missiles, because its territory is all exposed within the range of these missiles. During the preparation for the U.S.-Soviet talks on medium-range missiles, West Germany has repeatedly and strongly called for including the issue of short-range missiles in the talks, because it fears that its security interests may be harmed if the issue of the medium-range missiles is solved but the issue of short-range missiles is left over. Since the U.S.-Soviet summit in Iceland last October, the West German demands have become even stronger.

According to Gorbachev's proposal, the Soviet Union will first reduce its missiles in large numbers. According to ordinary logic, West Germany should welcome such a proposal. However, facts show that West Germany has quite a few misgivings about the consequences of this proposal. First, if it accepts the Soviet proposal, the West will have to undertake the commitment of not deploying and developing similar nuclear weapons. However, if both medium-range and short-range missiles are brought under control on the basis of the "zero option," NATO countries will no longer possess any major nuclear weapons (not including the independent nuclear arms of Britain and France). Then, the Soviet Union will no longer be threatened by the nuclear weapons deployed in Western Europe; in other words, the "nuclear deterrent strategy" and the "flexible response strategy" which have long been pursued by NATO will become ineffective. Second, if the West loses the support of nuclear weapons, its conventional forces will have to face the three-fold strong conventional forces of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. Then, West Germany, which is situated in the forefront, will be completely exposed to the threats from the East.
Inside the West German Government, heated controversy has arisen around the above two issues. Some officials represented by Foreign Minister Genscher hold that the West "should not reject the Soviet proposal in haste," although they have not clearly indicated that they support the Soviet proposal. The mass media generally hold that Genscher is obviously inclined to accept the Soviet proposal. His reason is that Gorbachev proposed reducing the Soviet Union's exclusive weapons which the West does not have, so the West has no reason to oppose such arms reduction. [paragraph continues]

As for the "nuclear deterrent strategy," Genscher held that the aircraft-launched and sea-based nuclear weapons of the United States can still play a deterring role, and Britain and France will still possess their nuclear forces, so Western Europe will not become a "non-nuclear zone." However, Genscher's opinion is opposed by Defense Minister Woerner and some statesmen of the Union Party. Woerner held that if the West is subject to the commitment of not deploying and not developing short-range missiles, its reaction capability will just be gradually disintegrated. Finally, the West will just have some tactical nuclear weapons with West Germany as the battlefield, and this will be the "worst state of affairs." So Woerner maintained that Gorbachev's proposal must be considered in connection with the Soviet Union's superiority in conventional weapons. (Deligner), chairman of the parliamentary group of the Union Party, put it more bluntly. He said that West Germany must not allow the appearance of such a situation in which only West Germany may become the battlefield of the future nuclear war, so the West should not accept the "zero option" for short-range missiles, but should insist on maintaining the right to deploy a certain number of short-range missiles which is equal to the ceiling of the Soviet Union's similar missiles at a low level. Lueben, vice chairman of the Union Party's parliamentary group, went to Washington on 22 April to warn the United States not to accept the Soviet proposal. He said that if the Soviet Union does not reduce its advantages in conventional weapons, the West must not accept a "zero option" which may harm West Germany's security interests.

After his visit to Moscow, U.S. Secretary of State Shultz said in Brussels that West Europe is now facing three options: First, accept the Soviet proposal; second, insist on the right to deploy a limited and equal number of short-range missiles, but Western Europe must openly state that it will make up for the shortage of the short-range missiles; and third, agree with the Soviet proposal, but link it with the talks on conventional armament controls.

However, all the three options will cause some difficulties to West Germany. People have noticed that Chancellor Kohl has not yet expressed his opinion in the past 20 days or more. According to some reports, Kohl convened a cabinet meeting on 27 April on this matter. NATO and the West European alliance will also hold meetings to discuss the issue of short-range missile later this month or early next month. Now West Germany is situated at the crossroads.

/8309
CS0: 5200/4098
CD: USSR SUPPORTS UK ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS INSPECTION

LD051347 Moscow TASS in English 1343 GMT 5 May 87

[Text] Moscow May 5 TASS -- "A substantial headway at the Geneva negotiations on banning chemical weapons, starting with the last year, has become possible as a result of several new Soviet proposals," said today Yuriy Nazarkin, head of the Soviet delegation at the disarmament conference in Geneva. Speaking at a briefing here, he noted that it was too early as yet to say that all obstacles were removed on the way towards concluding a convention. They exist, regrettably. It is, above all, the so-called challenge inspection. Every state has definite sensitive points and the access of inspectors to them could put its supreme interests into jeopardy. The Soviet Union believes that the solution of the problem can be found on the basis of a proposal put forth by Britain.

It is of a compromise character and provides for using the so-called alternative measures. Regrettably, the USA is against this proposal.

Yuriy Nazarkin pointed out that the disarmament conference in Geneva spends too much effort on procedure issues, and little time left for substantive work. Despite the fact that the conference, according to its status, is an organ of multilateral negotiations on disarmament, the negotiations are conducted, in real fact, only on one issue -- prohibition of chemical weapons. No progress was registered during the winter session on other issues being discussed at the conference, for instance, on the prohibition of nuclear tests and radiological weapons.

/9274
CSO: 5200/1463
The French National Assembly adopted a government programme of rearmament, promised by Jacques Chirac in 1986 immediately upon coming to power. The programme provides not only for a considerable buildup of the country's nuclear potential, but also for the development of a new generation of chemical weapons - binary weapons.

Significantly enough, official French spokesmen link the buildup of chemical weapons arsenals with the alleged edge of the Warsaw Pact countries in chemical armaments and the supposedly continuing spread of this kind of arms among states that did not possess it before.

President Francois Mitterrand of France spoke in the same vein, saying that the French "chemical deterrence" is a "reply" to the possible achievement of a Soviet-American agreement on medium-range missiles, a "compensation" for the reduction of nuclear potentials in Europe.

The French side is creating an impression that its chemical arms programme is something new. The facts tell a different story.

France began preparing for the manufacture of its own binary weapons long before American cruise and Pershing-2
missiles appeared in Europe. Paris and Washington have agreed plans for cooperation in binary ammunition since the middle 70s.

France is planning to produce in binary configuration two types of 155 mm artillery shells, 142 mm non-guided jet projectile with independently targetable warheads, four types of low-calibre air bombs, aviation cluster ammunition, spray tanks of 300 and 450 litres, and also ammunition for the marine 357 mm jet bomb thrower. These kinds of ammunition will be filled with nerve gases of the sarin, soman and amiton types (the latter is similar to American VX).

France has an up-to-date scientific and industrial base for the development and mass production both of unitary and binary chemical ammunition. Binary toxic agents were developed in military laboratories situated in Le Bouchet (near Paris), in Tarbes (Hautes-Pyrenees department) and Lyons. The military department runs 13 specialised plants, one of which is situated at Pont-de-Claix and designed to produce only chemical arms.

French ammunition is tested on ranges situated in France itself and in its overseas territories. Filled with imitation formulas, they are tested on a range at Entressen (Bouches-du-Rhone). Before the 70s France possessed a chemical test site with an area of 5,000 square kilometres at Beni-Ounif (Algerian Sahara). France secured the right to use the site even after the liberation of Algeria. According to some data, this range served to test binary ammunition in military form.

A lot of attention is given to preparing the French army for chemical warfare. Large exercises are carried out in situations as close to combat as possible. Thus, in May 1983 the English Channel was the scene of Franco-British exercises Manchex-83 to drill transportation of chemical weapons by sea and to train ship personnel in operating in emergencies, including a shipwreck. During the visit to France of Karl
Carstens, Federal President of the FRG, the 2nd French Corps conducted exercises. One of the tasks set was for the 5th tank division to train to operate in conditions of chemical warfare. Similar exercises were attended by French President Francois Mitterrand and the then Defence Minister Charles Hernu.

/9274
CSO: 5200/1463
SOVIET CD DELEGATE COMMENTS ON END OF SPRING SESSION

OW041421 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 2 May 87

[From the Vremya newscast, interview with Nazarkin, head of the Soviet delegation at the Geneva Disarmament Conference]


[Nazarkin] The attention of the participants in the session was naturally attracted, first of all, to such questions as a ban on nuclear tests, nuclear disarmament, and prevention of the arms race in space. Our delegation, together with the delegations of fraternal socialist states and with the support from nonaligned countries, worked toward beginning talks on all these questions and aimed at reaching international agreements on these problems.

Unfortunately, it was not possible to do this. Talks of this kind were not initiated at this session due to the resistance, first of all, of the United States. Nevertheless, talks were conducted on another problem, that is on the problem of banning chemical weapons. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's recent Prague declaration, in which he announced that the Soviet Union had ceased manufacturing of chemical weapons outside of its national borders, had a tremendous stimulating effect on the course of the talks. Now delegates are returning to their capitals with the aim of assessing the work done at the spring session.

/9274
CSO: 5200/1464
Following a brief interval the Vienna meeting of representatives of the states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe resumed its deliberations today.

It entered a crucial stage of the drafting of a final document that should reflect accords acceptable to all and outline new joint measures in the military, political, commercial, economic and humanitarian fields called upon to promote the further development of the Helsinki process.

There exists a foundation for such accords — the delegates submitted about 140 proposals dealing with different aspects of European cooperation.

Yuriy Kashlev, the head of the Soviet delegation, called the attention of the participants to a concrete program set forth by the Soviet leadership with the aim of demilitarizing Europe and called for intensified efforts at the Vienna meeting and in the current consultations of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO representatives in Vienna on new talks concerning the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.
The Vienna meeting of representatives of the 35 CSCE participant states is resuming its work on 5 May.

When it opened at foreign minister level last November a spirit of optimism prevailed in the Vienna Hofburg Palace. It was said that this, the third all-European forum since Helsinki (the previous two were held in Belgrade and Madrid) was taking place in a more favorable international atmosphere, that the horizons that opened up in Reykjavik could contribute to the strengthening of military security in Europe and give a boost to a fuller and more dynamic continuation of the Helsinki process.

Two stages of the Vienna meeting have passed. In the course of 4 months of "net time" (not counting the breaks) some 400 diplomats from 35 countries discussed the progress of the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act and the results of the all-European meetings held between Madrid and Vienna and introduced and discussed proposals for future action. Intensive work is under way in parallel at plenary sessions and in the five commissions in accordance with the structure of the Helsinki document, while bilateral and multilateral consultations are also taking place.

How can the situation taking shape at these major current collective talks between socialist and capitalist countries and, in a broader sense, in the all-European process as a whole, be assessed?

The main asset clearly consists in the fact that this process, begun on the initiative of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, has become an integral and positive factor of European and world politics. We have never heard anyone in the Hofburg claiming that this process is unnecessary or useless, and we have never seen anyone trying to disregard the accumulated experience of cooperation. Yet there had been some very pessimistic voices in the past, and in the United States there were even calls to cancel the U.S. signature on the Final Act. Even today Washington views this document without enthusiasm, and that is putting it mildly; however, it does not dare to oppose it openly.

The Europeans' interest in the continuation of the all-European process is borne out not just by the East-West political dialogue, which has intensified of late and in the course of which the importance of Helsinki is invariably mentioned, and not just in the speeches delivered at the Vienna meeting. Almost 140 proposals have already been
introduced by the delegations of all the participant countries, including proposals for forums, conferences, and meetings of experts to be held within the next few years with a view to developing cooperation under all the sections of the Final Act. Metaphorically speaking, the tree planted in Helsinki is growing new branches, its crown is getting thicker, and its roots are holding the European soil together.

The current situation in Europe prompts another conclusion in respect of the work of the Vienna meeting. Objective conditions are taking shape for "breathing new life" into the cause of security and cooperation on the continent and imparting a new dynamism and a new scale to it.

The program for the reduction of all types of arms -- nuclear missile arms, chemical arms, and conventional arms -- put forward by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries makes it possible to overcome the disarmament impasse in Europe and to fill the biggest gap in the Helsinki process, created by the absence of real military detente.

The opportunity is arising to give new substance to the humanitarian aspect of European cooperation. Broad prospects are opening up for the development of trade and economic cooperation. In these spheres too the impulses come from the socialist part of Europe. Being here in Vienna means that one can see for oneself with what interest our partners are viewing the profound changes taking place in the USSR in democratization, openness, safeguarding human rights, and improving foreign economic relations. Each of our steps in these areas is projected into the future of Europe and East-West relations.

The question currently being asked is: Will the European countries be able to avail themselves of the opportunities that have emerged to enrich the Helsinki process, or will these opportunities be lost? It must be admitted that the latter cannot be ruled out if the political thinking of our Western partners continues to lag behind the emerging trends and to hamper and thwart their translation into reality.

Let us take the topic with which the Helsinki process began -- security in Europe -- and see how it is interpreted at the Vienna meeting. The first proposal introduced there by Poland last December after coordination with the other Warsaw Pact countries makes provision for the continuation, after Vienna, of the Stockholm conference at which confidence-building measures in the military sphere are to be discussed simultaneously with practical steps in disarmament. The socialist countries have introduced a dozen other proposals on various aspects of European security. And the West? To date it has not put forward a single proposal, a single document in this field. Furthermore, the United States and some of its NATO allies are passing over in complete silence at the Vienna meeting the whole range of problems pertaining to security and disarmament, trying to amputate this key element of the all-European process.

"In exchange" so to speak, they have agreed in Vienna to separate consultations in respect to new talks on armed forces and conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. However, at the same time, the NATO countries and primarily the United States are, for one thing, opposing the participation in these consultations of all the 35 states, high-handedly trying to exclude neutral and nonaligned countries from them; and, second, rather than discuss reductions of armed forces and conventional armaments, they are proposing to discuss the elimination of military "imbalance"s and "asymmetries" in Europe, not necessarily by means of arms reduction but possible also by "arms upgrading." It is clear that in view of these points of reference it will be very difficult to come to an agreement on new talks.
To what end are artificial difficulties created and barriers erected in the path of European disarmament? Why is NATO trying so hard to avoid answering the Warsaw Pact countries' clear proposal put forward in Budapest last year for mutual 25-percent cuts in the armed forces and conventional arms of the two military-political alliances in Europe in the early nineties and the subsequent continuation of this process? To make matters worse, this specific problem is being tightly entangled with the question of nuclear missile weapons. In Geneva they are telling us that the United States and its NATO allies cannot agree to the elimination of missiles in Europe because of the Warsaw Pact's "superiority" in conventional arms and armed forces, and in Vienna they refuse to engage in businesslike talk on these armaments.

Even assuming that a "superiority" exists, would not the elimination of medium-range and operational and tactical missiles and a reduction of conventional arms including battlefield nuclear facilities -- as proposed by the Soviet Union -- reduce military confrontation and enhance the level of security in Europe?

Political thinking manifests itself in approaches to specific matters. "God exists in details," a classical author once said. "In the specifics," we would say today. We are able to see in a concrete example how, with the help of old, bankrupt political thinking, they are trying to prune the Helsinki process and to "outwit" the opponent at the expense of his security interests, avoiding real disarmament themselves, while trying at the same time to deceive the broad public. Who would want to play games like these?

Speaking in Prague recently, M.S. Gorbachev suggested that the foreign ministers of the 35 Helsinki process participant states should meet in Vienna in order to get large-scale talks on European disarmament off the ground. Both the structure of the forums at which it is proposed to discuss all the components of nuclear missile and conventional arms and the nature of the measures put forward by our country are now clear. Reach higher in your thinking in order to take in the whole picture of the opportunities that have opened up, and together let us make the most of Europe's historic chance.

A similar appeal could be issued also in another area to which increasing importance is being attached in recent years. I have in mind human rights and humanitarian contacts. It is no secret that for many years this served as a kind of "irritant" in East-West relations and human rights were, as a rule, discussed in a confrontational spirit. This is also applied to the initial stage of the Vienna meeting.

However, restructuring and democratization in the Soviet Union -- our internal process which stems from the natural laws and requirements of communist building -- have removed many questions on which anti-Soviet propaganda was based for years. We have proposed at the Vienna meeting that a representative conference be convened in Moscow to discuss the whole range of humanitarian cooperation among all the states taking part in the all-European process in the broad context of human rights -- civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights.

And what answer did we get? To begin with -- amazement, then nervousness and attempts to bargain, to stake out some kind of claims. Are they trying to repeat last year's experience in Bern, when a document on the development of contacts between people agreed upon with the active participation of the socialist countries was not adopted because of U.S. obstruction? Here too there is evidence of a clear deficit of new thinking, of unwillingness to cast off ideological blinders, of fear of losing ground in this (the humanitarian) sector which some people in the West, and in particular across the ocean, consider -- through inertia -- as their trump card.
Nonetheless, the times are changing. New approaches to European and world affairs are emerging, albeit slowly and timidly, in West Europe. Most of the states taking part in the Helsinki process are sincerely interested in progress toward arms reduction, including reduction of the arms that are the subject of consultations in the Austrian capital. Both socialist and capitalist countries have put forward many proposals in Vienna pertaining to trade, economic, scientific, and technical cooperation and environmental protection. These include a Czechoslovak proposal for the convocation of an all-European economic forum, an FRG proposal for the holding of a conference on East-West economic cooperation, an Italian proposal to hold a science forum, and a Bulgarian and Nordic countries' proposal on cooperation in environmental protection.

However, most proposals have been put forward in the area of human rights and humanitarian contacts, and here too they have come from virtually all countries. Apart from certain maximalist, unrealistic NATO schemes, the proposals submitted could provide a basis for generally acceptable accords.

The Vienna meeting is embarking on the crucial stage of the elaboration of accords and compilation of the final document. Therefore it is particularly important that the West should take steps toward the new thinking displayed by the socialist countries. Without efforts to meet each other half-way it is difficult to imagine a Europe of the future, a Europe of peace and cooperation. This is the thrust of the statement entitled "For the development of the all-European process and the successful conclusion of the Vienna meeting" recently adopted in Moscow by the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers.
On December 11, 1986 the treaty to make the South Pacific a de-nuclearised zone entered into force. This major international accord, known as the Rarotonga Treaty, excluded a vast territory of the world from the sphere of the nuclear arms race.

The countries in the South Pacific, which signed the treaty came to agreement the hard way. In the early 1960s, the Labour parties of Australia and New Zealand were in opposition yet both advocated the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. As they came to power late in 1972, the Labour governments in these countries attempted to carry out this idea with the backing of the countries of Oceania, which displayed deep concern over France's nuclear explosions on the Polynesian Mururoa Atoll, over the stepped up activity of the US nuclear-capable fleet in the Pacific, and over the search by the Americans and Japanese for an "appropriate" place in that region where to dump nuclear waste.

The proposal on establishing a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific was drafted in general terms and tabled at the session of the ANZUS Council in 1974 by Norman Kirk, the Prime Minister of New Zealand. The proposal was backed up by Australians. This move by Australia and New Zealand was preceded by the decision of their governments to prohibit US nuclear-capable ships from calling at their ports and entering their territorial waters.

The USA has reacted sharply negatively to the actions by the two countries, because it believed this heavily undermined the basic principles of the USA's military-political alliance with these countries, restricted the activities of the US Navy in the region, which is part of the ANZUS zone of action, and actually led to a revision of the commitments of the ANZUS countries and to winding down the bloc's activities. All of this ran counter to the Pentagon's strategic plans in the Pacific.

The idea, formulated in general terms and proposed by New Zealand, was approved in June 1975 by the South Pacific Forum, a regional political and economic organisation comprising 13 countries and the self-governing territories in the South Pacific.  

1 Founded in 1971, the South Pacific Forum includes Australia, New Zealand, Papua-New Guinea, Fiji, Vanuatu, Kiribati, Western Samoa, Tonga, the Solomon Islands, Nauru, Tuvalu, the Cook Islands, and Niue.
At the 30th Session of the UN General Assembly in the autumn of 1975, New Zealand, Fiji and Papua-New Guinea submitted a proposal on establishing a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. The General Assembly adopted a resolution backing the idea and suggested that the countries concerned should hold consultations on the ways and means to put it into effect.

At the parliamentary elections in Australia and New Zealand late in 1975 the Labourites lost. The new conservative governments wasted no time in restoring political and military ties with Washington, and lifted the ban on the entry of US ships with nuclear weapons on board into their ports. They opposed any measures which would contradict the ANZUS goals in the Pacific. Australia and New Zealand refused to establish a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific and pressurised the insular states in the region to follow suit. This question was not put on the agenda of the subsequent sessions of the UN General Assembly.

But in the first half of the 1980s, the newly elected Labour governments of Australia and New Zealand made nuclear problems the central theme of their foreign policy. Their statements on that score became more consonant with the stance of the non-aligned movement than with that of the other US allies.

Due to the persistent efforts, above all of Australia and New Zealand, the treaty on the nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific was drafted and signed. It was approved on August 6, 1985, at the 16th Session of the South Pacific Forum, held in Avarua, an administrative centre on Rarotonga, one of the Cook Islands.

The chief purpose of the Rarotonga Treaty, stated in its preamble and the main articles, is to ban the presence in any form of nuclear weapons on the territories and in the region as a whole of the signatories to the treaty, namely, the countries participating in the South Pacific Forum.

The main provisions of the treaty are as follows:

- neither to produce nor acquire in any other way nuclear explosive devices; not to possess a nuclear explosive device and not to exercise control over it;
- not to seek or accept any aid in the manufacture or acquisition of a nuclear explosive device;
- neither to help nor encourage in any way a state to produce or acquire nuclear explosive device of any kind;
- not to provide fissionable material, or equipment for using or producing such material to any state for peaceful purposes unless that state is a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or unless it has signed agreements on control with the IAEA;
- not to deploy nuclear explosive devices on their territory;
- not to test nuclear devices on their territory, nor to help or encourage any state to conduct such tests;
- to refrain from burying radioactive waste and other radioactive material in the territorial waters and in the high seas.

The procedure of verifying compliance with the treaty envisages an exchange of information, consultations, and inspection of peaceful nuclear activities by the IAEA, as well as a consideration of complaints.

The treaty has four supplements. The first one defines the geographic boundaries of the zone which covers the territories of the states participating in the South Pacific Forum, their territorial waters and a large part of the Pacific Ocean: in the north the boundary runs almost along the Equator, in the west, along the western border of Australia and the border between Papua-New Guinea and Indonesia; in the east it coincides with the border fixed under the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and in the south it stretches to the area of operation of the Antarctic Treaty. Supplement 2 provides
for IAEA control. And Supplements 3 and 4 determine the procedure of setting up a consultative committee and its functions as well as the procedures of lodging and considering complaints of violation of the treaty.

The treaty has three protocols open for signing by nuclear powers and providing for their obligation to observe the nuclear-free status of the zone. Protocol 1 provides for an obligation of the USA, Britain and France to apply the relevant provisions of the treaty in regard to the territories they control in the zone. Protocol 2 contains an obligation to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against the signatories to the Treaty. Protocol 3 makes it binding for the signatories to refrain from testing any nuclear explosive devices in the zone specified by the Treaty.

Thus, the Rarotonga Treaty provides a sound basis for making the South Pacific a denuclearised zone. But, as is the case with any other nuclear-free zone, a good deal depends on the attitude towards this treaty on the part of all nuclear states, and this attitude is far from unanimous in this case.

The Soviet Union, a consistent advocate of creating nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world as an important measure in the struggle to eliminate nuclear weapons, wishes to assist the countries participating in the South Pacific Forum in their efforts towards this end. It has assumed a positive stance with regard to the treaty, and already on August 6, 1985—the day the treaty was signed—Mikhail Gorbachev stated that, in the opinion of the USSR, "the efforts of South Pacific states to create a nuclear-free zone in the region are praise-worthy".

It is only natural that the USSR backed up the idea of creating a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific, for this move by the states participating in the South Pacific Forum is fully in accord with the main task the USSR has set itself in the international arena—the task of ending the arms race on the Earth and preventing its spilling over into outer space. These are precisely the goals of the bold but practicable programme proposed by the USSR at the Soviet-American summit in Reykjavik, which, if implemented, would help deliver the world from nuclear weapons by the end of this century.

In the opinion of the USSR, the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific will greatly contribute to the building of a reliable security system in Asia and the Pacific, consolidate the international regime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and help accomplish the task of eliminating nuclear arms on the Earth once and for all.

The Soviet Ambassador to Australia signed on behalf of the Soviet government Protocols 2 and 3 to the Rarotonga Treaty on December 15, 1986, in Suva, the capital of Fiji, where the headquarters of the South Pacific Forum is located.

During the signing ceremony the Soviet representative announced the statement by the Soviet government, which pointed out the following:

The Soviet Union proceeds from the fact that transportation of nuclear explosive devices by the parties to the treaty in any place within and outside the nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific is prohibited under the treaty whose signatories have pledged themselves "not to exercise control over any nuclear explosive devices in any form anywhere in the nuclear-free zone and outside it".

It is stipulated in the treaty that each its signatory may itself decide whether to allow foreign vessels or aircraft carrying nuclear explosive devices to call at its ports or land at its airfields or pass through its territorial waters, archipelago waters or the air space. Therefore the Soviet Union has reaffirmed its view that to allow transit passage of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in any form, and also to allow
foreign warships and aircraft with nuclear explosive devices on board to
call at ports or to land on airfields within the nuclear-free zone would
contradict the goals of the treaty and be incompatible with the zone's de-
nuclearised status.

In the event any state or group of states that are signatories to the
Rarotonga Treaty take any action in violation of their main commitments
under the treaty related with the zone's denuclearised status, or if any
state or group of states members of the treaty commit an act of aggression
with the support of a country possessing nuclear weapons, or jointly
with it, and if such a country uses the territory, the air space, territorial
or archipelago waters of these countries for the entry of its warships
and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons or for transit passage of nuclear
weapons, the Soviet Union will consider itself free from the commitments
assumed under Protocol 2 to the treaty. In case of any other actions by
the signatories to the treaty incompatible with their non-nuclear status,
the USSR reserves the right to revise the commitments assumed under
the above-mentioned Protocol.

The Soviet Union is of the opinion that the obligations it assumed
under Protocol 2 to the Rarotonga Treaty extend also to the territories
to which the status of the nuclear-free zone is applied in accordance with
Protocol 1. At the same time, the Soviet Union confirmed its position on
granting independence to colonial countries and peoples in keeping with
the relevant UN Declaration (UN General Assembly Resolution 1514/XV
adopted on December 14, 1960).

The Soviet Union is confident that if other nuclear powers approach
this initiative like itself with due responsibility and do everything they
can to ensure the nuclear-free status of the declared zone, then the secu-
ritv of the entire Pacific area will be greatly consolidated.

Working for the creation of a comprehensive system of world peace
and security, the USSR believes that Asia and the Pacific should be an
integral part of such a system. Moreover, the USSR has come up with
a series of concrete proposals on reducing naval activities in the Pacific
Ocean, and devising measures guaranteeing the security of sea transporta-
tion in the region.

The signing of the protocols to the Rarotonga Treaty by the Soviet
Union is a good example of cooperation between the USSR and the South
Pacific states in the interest of peace and security in the region. The USSR
is prepared to continue such cooperation to jointly solve the problems com-
ton to them.

In connection with the signing of the Rarotonga Treaty, China has
made a statement, saying it respects and supports the common desire
of the South Pacific states to create a denuclearised zone to maintain peace
and stability in the region. Proceeding from its "main position", China
will study the treaty and "consider positively" the commitments assumed
by the nuclear powers under the protocols to it.

The decision to create a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific was re-
ceived in Washington with open hostility. The wish of the peoples to be
masters of their fate does not suit Washington. Once the South Pacific
was a peaceful back-water for Western powers, but today many of the
smaller countries in the Pacific are extremely nationalist-minded, the US
Newsweek magazine lamented in June 1986, when US Secretary of State
George Shultz made a tour of the countries in the region. Speaking in Sin-
gapore, Shultz declared then that the USA was strongly opposed to the
position of the South Pacific Forum countries. A creation of a nuclear-free
zone in the region, would be a mistake, he snapped out. "The US military
have objections," declared Ronald Hays, Commander-in-Chief of the US
Armed Forces in the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean, in a peremptory
tone. Although official Washington has stated that the USA is still studying the text of the treaty and will commit itself later, the Americans immediately set out to condition a number of Pacific states, inducing them to refuse to sign the treaty. But these efforts had been in vain, the Rarotonga Treaty entered into force.

France, too, is strongly opposed to creating a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. The French government said it was not going to end nuclear testing on the Mururoa Atoll.

The treaty has caused concern in Britain as well. The British went out of their way to obstruct the coming of the treaty into force through political and economic pressure on the smaller insular states of Oceania. As it always happens whenever it comes to arms limitation, this time, too, the British Tories toe the line of their senior partner in Washington.

Having declared their region nuclear-free, the countries of the South Pacific Forum have again demonstrated that all states, big and small, can all contribute to the deliverance of mankind from the nuclear burden. What is even more important is the fact that the decision to create such a nuclear-free zone reflects the significant process going on in the world today—the all-round upsurge of the struggle against the preparations for a nuclear war conducted by the West.

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET-U.S. TALKS ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION END

Joint Draft Agreement

LD042241 Moscow TASS in English 2230 GMT 4 May 87

[Text] Geneva May 5 TASS -- By TASS correspondent Vladislav Shishlo:

Soviet-American talks on establishing nuclear risk reduction centres came to a close here Monday. As a result of the deliberations the delegations prepared a joint draft agreement between the USSR and the United States on setting up nuclear risk reduction centres and two draft protocols. The texts of the agreed upon documents will be submitted for confirmation to the governments of the two countries.

A practical step has been made towards implementing the agreement reached during the Geneva meeting in November 1985 between Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan on studying at expert level the question of nuclear risk reduction centres.

The delegations to the talks were headed: From the Soviet side -- by ambassador at large Aleksey Obukhov, from the American side -- by Assistant Defence Secretary Richard Perle and the President's special assistant for national security Robert Linhard.

'First Tangible Step'

LD052034 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 5 May 87

[Viktor Levin commentary]

[Text] In Geneva the Soviet-U.S. talks on establishing centers to reduce the nuclear threat have ended.

A joint draft agreement between the USSR and the United States and two protocols to it have been prepared. TASS reports the documents will be submitted for consideration by the governments of the two countries. Here is a latest-news commentary by Viktor Levin:

[Levin] There was talk of such centers as long ago as the Soviet-U.S. summit in Geneva 1985. There CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan agreed that experts would hold talks. Here is the result: According to the information available, a reliable link should exist between
the centers for the reduction of the nuclear threat, similar to the hot line between
Moscow and Washington. The task lies in ensuring that information about any phenomena
that might provoke a nuclear incident flows round the clock.

What is it, in my view, that attracts the most attention? The very fact that agreement
was reached. Of course one could say that, compared, for instance, with steps to limit
nuclear weapons, accords on establishing centers to reduce the nuclear threat seem of
secondary importance. It is beyond dispute that here is no better way to remove the
nuclear threat, and do so radically and reliably, than to eliminate nuclear weapons.
But as long as they remain, every step toward reducing the danger of an involuntary
outbreak of nuclear conflict is important and significant. Furthermore, the political
significance of the conclusion of talks between Soviet and U.S. experts is obvious.
After all, the agreement prepared is the first tangible step taken jointly by our
country and the present U.S. Administration, and this fact cannot help but inspire
confidence.

I would very much like to conclude this commentary on precisely this note, but today a
report came from Washington of a speech by President Reagan again calling into question
the Reykjavik accords on strategic arms and the antimissile defense treaty, and
questions of verification are again brought up with regard to the elimination of
medium-range missiles, questions one might think were fully removed by the Soviet
proposals. This statement does not so much fail to inspire optimism as reduce the
already modest stockpile of it.

So difficulties remain in the development of relations with the United States. There
are many dark clouds on the horizon one can not help seeing. But nor can one help
noticing the ray of light that began to shine as a result of the Soviet-U.S. talks on
establishing centers to reduce the nuclear threat.

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CSO. 5200/1466
Moscow, 4 May (TASS) -- The role of the press in the struggle for progress, social justice, and the peaceful future of the planet was discussed in Moscow at a meeting of editors of the communist and democratic press.

A.F. Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, today addressed the participants. Today's meeting of representatives of the communist and democratic press, he said, is taking place at an interesting, complex, and -- it can be said -- unusual time: in the year of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, and at a time when the Land of the Soviets has entered upon a qualitatively new stage of its development associated with the radical restructuring of all social relations.

The speaker expounded in detail the principled foundations of the international course of the CPSU and of Soviet foreign policy. M.S. Gorbachev, he said, has defined the foreign-political program of the CPSU that was put forward at its 27th congress as an amalgam of the philosophy of forming a secure world in the nuclear space age together with a platform of concrete actions.

The modern Soviet philosophy of foreign policy has already found weighty expression in the brief words: "New thinking in the nuclear age." For us Soviet Communists, the new thinking is a creative development and application of Marxist teaching to modern conditions. It involves a restructuring of interstate relations, too. Our foreign policy purpose, which is aimed toward bringing about a radical change for the better in the international situation, means seeking and finding ways of correctly applying these principles to the new situation, and waging the struggle for our ideals on a new scale, using new methods. This gives reliable guidelines for understanding initiatives of whatever kind in our foreign policy, and for understanding the motives for all its present pace and further development.

We live in an epoch where the objective contradictions between the exploiters and the exploited have not been removed in the greater part of the world, and, consequently, where the struggle between diverse social and political forces for one social order or another is both inevitable and rightful. But Marx and Engels did not separate the fundamental interests of the working class for the interests of mankind as a whole. The uniqueness of the present stage of historical development is such that in the
nuclear age it is essential to win the struggle for the survival of mankind, even before removing the aforementioned contradictions. This has become the essential prerequisite for resolving all other political, social, economic, and cultural tasks.

At the moment, A.F. Dobrynin went on to note, the most important postulate of a responsible foreign policy must be the realization of a simple fact: Nuclear means cannot be used to achieve any reasonable goals whatsoever in the international arena. Another similar postulate is that it is no longer possible to win an arms race, just as it is impossible to win a nuclear war itself. Moreover, this race reduces the likelihood of halting mankind from slipping toward nuclear catastrophe. This means that taking into account the critical factor of time becomes one of the important elements of new thinking.

The machinery of nuclear deterrence is not reliable. "The balance of fear" is already ceasing to be a factor of military and political restraint, all the more so as the temptation may arise on one side to "forestall" the other. More weaponry at the moment does not mean more security, but rather less. In present conditions, only political means are fit to guarantee it. To act by political methods means to take into account, to take into consideration the interests of the other side. The security of each state is unthinkable without equal security for all.

Guided namely by all this philosophical conception of peace, the CPSU has elaborated the foundations of an all-embracing system of international security, which constitutes the most generalized expression of our new approaches in international politics.

Currently, the issue of the urgent resolution of security matters in the military sphere is most acute. The first and the main demand of the new thinking is the recognition of both the necessity and the possibility of a nuclear-free world. A practical expression of this requirement is the statement by M.S. Gorbachev on 15 January 1986 containing a program for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the 20th century. The reality of nuclear disarmament was clearly demonstrated in Reykjavik.

The Soviet Union, the speaker recalled, proceeds from the position that the level of armaments must be reduced to the limit of reasonable sufficiency, that is, to the limit necessary for the resolution of only defensive tasks. In recent years a number of opposition social-democratic parties in Western Europe have been putting forward various concepts of "nonoffensive defense."

This is a step in the right direction. Here is a topic for the comparison of views and exchanges of opinions.

Through the efforts of the Soviet Union, the complex of nuclear disarmament issues has been placed on a new, radical level for which the West has proven to be unprepared. The emphasis on eliminating nuclear arms by whole categories of weapons, and not on limiting them quantitatively, has overturned NATO's traditional ideas, and has posed with even greater acuteness the question of the need for new thinking in its approach to nuclear disarmament issues. In precisely this way also, the USSR has shown initiative in formulating a conceptual approach to the parameters and principles of reducing conventional forces and defining the balance of these forces.

Steps that exclude the possibility of a sudden attack are of great significance. Monitoring disarmament [kontrol za razoruzenieym] is a becoming one of the most important forms of ensuring security, and will lead to a qualitative change in the very nature of international relations.
A vitally important element in preventing a nuclear catastrophe is ensuring political security. In this task the most important thing is the assertion of international trust. Trust and disarmament are, of course, closely interconnected problems. One is impossible without the other. Such are the dialectics of world politics today. In our view, however, it is in principle wrong to say that first there should be trust, then everything else will follow — disarmament, cooperation and joint projects. The reverse would hardly be right, either: first disarmament, then trust some time later. We believe that movement must be made through common efforts toward strengthening trust, and that this will help achieve further progress in disarmament and cooperation, too.

In advocating the peaceful coexistence of states, A.F. Dobrynin stressed, the Soviet Union is naturally of the opinion that this does not negate, but presupposes the right of every nation to choose with sovereignty the paths and forms of its development.

The Soviet Union sharply condemns the policy of "neoglobalism." We believe that regional conflicts must not be turned into arenas of deliberate confrontation or a policy of confrontation between the two systems. The settlement of regional conflicts is for us a task dictated by the logic of the interdependent and integral nature of the world.

The new thinking must also find expression in economic relations. The concept of economic security is one of the components of the foundations of an all-embracing international security system put forward at the 27th CPSU Congress.

Soviet foreign policy philosophy includes as one of its integral elements the humanization of international relations. The CPSU sees a real path toward this in sharply raising the level of contacts between people and organizations, parties and public movements: in other words, in transforming interstate relations into genuinely international relations. We regard making things public, openness [glasnost, otkrytost] in international affairs as a method of asserting diplomacy genuinely of the people. Work that has unfolded in our country to strengthen socialist legality and law and order and that is aimed at guaranteeing basic civil freedoms and rights for Soviet citizens even more reliably is placing a good foundation beneath the extension of international humanitarian cooperation.

On the eve of the 21st century the struggle for human rights is being placed upon the international agenda more and more insistently. We Soviet Communists believe that freedom from the exploitation of one man by another is a most important prerequisite for ensuring all human rights and freedoms in a real way. We are in favor of implementing in reality the whole set of rights and freedoms that have been put forward by the struggle and the political demands of the workers' and the democratic movement. The USSR has proposed that a conference on humanitarian cooperation be held in Moscow. Such a conference could mark a new stage in humanitarian cooperation.

From the very nature of our foreign-political philosophy, said the speaker, from the aims and methods inherent in it, flows the idea of a composition of the efforts of all states, regardless of their social systems, in the struggle for lasting peace and international security. It is natural that for us this presupposes above all a strengthening of the cooperation of the socialist countries. Today a major factor in the formation of the new thinking and in the struggle against war, militarism and imperialism is the Nonaligned Movement. Mass democratic movements of many kinds offer great and ever-growing opportunities for establishing the new thinking in world politics, as has been confirmed by the forum 'For a Nuclear-Free World, for Human Survival' which was held in Moscow. In the struggle against the danger of world war
and for disarmament, dialogue is possible and necessary between forces of various, and even opposite, sociopolitical and ideological orientation. But such dialogue is especially important in the framework of the communist movement and of all the working class, revolutionary-democratic and national-democratic movements.

Today, when PRAVDA is celebrating its 75th anniversary, it is apposite to recall the great importance its founder, V.I. Lenin, attributed to the press. In his view, the advanced democratic press not only educate, but also facilitates the organization of the masses' struggle against the forces of reaction and militarism. In our time, this means knowing how to find psychologically accurate approaches to the mass reader, how to emancipate his consciousness from the dogmas and stereotypes imposed upon him by imperialist propaganda, above all from the "image of the enemy," by conducting an honest and committed dialogue with people.

The foreign policy philosophy worked out by our party, A.F. Dobrynin said in conclusion, rests upon the Soviet Union's 70 years of experience in conducting a peace-loving course in the international arena. It illuminates in a concentrated way the link between the times -- from Lenin's decree on peace, which proclaimed the task of establishing a general democratic peace on "conditions just for all ethnic groups without exception," to the program put forward by the 27th CPSU Congress for creating an all-embracing system of international security and building a nonnuclear, nonviolent world.

Our party will be true to the Leninist tradition and to Leninist innovation in its approach to the critically important problems of international politics that have emerged so acutely at the end of the second millennium of our era.

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CSO: 5200/1466
The Pentagon's vocabulary includes the "window of vulnerability" concept. It is used whenever the U.S. military-industrial complex, on the pretext that it "lags behind the USSR," tries to obtain billions of dollars more to escalate the arms race. That is what has happened with various types of missiles, warships, tanks, and so forth.

The United States recently discovered one more "window" -- the suitcase window. Congressman Stephen Neal lays claim to its authorship. This gentleman has decided to notify the military department of a new type of weapon in which the United States has lagged hopelessly behind the USSR. Neal has sent two personal messages to Defense Secretary C. Weinberger, asking for an assessment of the degree of danger presented to the United States by "the powerful miniature atom bombs secretly brought onto U.S. territory by Soviet agents," because in Neal's opinion, the Soviet Union's only dream is to flood the United States with nuclear devices of enormous yield but small enough to be contained in a suitcase.

The Pentagon has treated Neal's messages very seriously. Weinberger has personally answered the congressman, launching into lengthy explanations about "the Soviets' possible seizure" of U.S. territory with the aid of the "nuclear suitcases." True, he did cast doubt on the probability of the Soviet Union carrying out an operation involving the mass use of miniature nuclear devices, but he did not rule out the possibility of "individual acts of sabotage."

So it looks as though a new initiative is being born within the depths of Congress -- the "antisuitcase initiative." After all, practice shows that across the ocean any means are good to fuel anti-Soviet hysteria.
Washington April 29 TASS — TASS correspondent Igor Ignatyev reports:

"The continuing arms buildup in the United States and the Soviet Union is increasing the risk of nuclear war and reducing the security of both nations. A positive programme of cooperative actions is necessary to reverse the arms build up," says joint statement adopted at the recently concluded conference of Soviet and U.S. retired generals and admirals in Washington.

The document suggests seven specific measures the realisation of which would contribute to easing international tensions and preventing nuclear war.

"It is for the first time that Soviet generals and admirals have met with American retired military officers to discuss new problems of the present day situation, particularly those in the field of arms control," said the leader of the Soviet delegation, retired Lieutenant General Mikhail Milshstein.

He voiced hope that the conference in Washington would help to broaden mutual understanding and strengthen relations between the two countries, the relations "the state of which is of immense importance for the entire international situation."

The leader of the Soviet delegation pointed out that the Soviet Union suggested a new approach to the arms limitation process, seeking a stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear arsenals.

"The signing of an agreement on medium-range nuclear systems as soon as possible would become a considerable step in the right direction," he emphasized.

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RELATED ISSUES

RETIRED PACT, NATO GENERALS MEET IN VIENNA

Soviet, Dutch Generals Speak

LD041952 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1548 GMT 4 May 87

[Text] Vienna, 4 May (TASS) -- TASS correspondent Anatoliy Tyupayev reports:

The issues of putting an end to the arms race on earth and in space and eliminating the threat of a nuclear war are among those on the agenda of a meeting of retired generals and admirals of Warsaw Pact and NATO member states that has opened here. The Soviet Union is represented by a delegation of the public group attached to the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, Soviet Generals and Admirals for Peace and Disarmament.

In his address, the head of the Soviet delegation, Colonel General of Aviation A.N. Ponomarev, retired, spoke about the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union directed toward eliminating the nuclear danger hanging over mankind. He underlined that we have to make a worthy contribution to the cause of real disarmament.

Major General M. Van Meyenfeldt, retired, (Netherlands) appealed to the participants to speak against militarizing space and creating new types of nuclear weapons. It is necessary, he said, for leaders of Western countries to evaluate correctly the USSR's initiatives. Soviet proposals are an expression of new thinking, not only in politics but also in the military sphere. The policy of confrontation has to be replaced by policy-based accords and agreements in all spheres -- political, economic, and military.

Discuss Disarmament

LD051245 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0925 GMT 5 May 87

[Text] Vienna 5 May (TASS) -- Former top officers from the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries continue their meeting here today. Retired generals and admirals from Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, the USSR, and Czechoslovakia, as well as from Great Britain, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal are taking part in this international forum, which now bears a traditional stamp and is being held in the Austrian capital for the fourth time. They are discussing issues connected with the ever greater deployment of the efforts of peace champions from various countries being made now to protect mankind from the threat of nuclear annihilation. The speeches of the meeting's participants note the need to make a fitting contribution to the worldwide campaign for disarmament now being conducted by the international public.

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CSO: 5200/1466
RELATED ISSUES

USSR DELEGATE SPEAKS AT UN DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

LD061854 Moscow TASS in English 1800 GMT 6 May 87

[Text] New York May 6 TASS — The Soviet Union is striving towards mutually acceptable solutions on the entire complex of nuclear disarmament, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh told the annual session of the U.N. Commission on Disarmament today.

This was confirmed by the latest Soviet constructive initiatives, including on the reduction of medium-range missiles in Europe, directed at overcoming stagnation in the process of disarmament and resolving problems that until recently seemed impossible to resolve.

broad exchange of views at the commission on principal questions of peace and security could be useful for elaborating specific measures in the field of nuclear disarmament and in preventing an arms race in outer space, said the Soviet delegate.

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CSO: 5200/1466
RELATED ISSUES

GERMAN CP CLAIMS NEUTRON SHELL DEPLOYMENT IN FRG

PM061203 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Apr 87 Second Edition p 5

[Correspondent Yu. Yakhontov dispatch: "Kept From the Public"]

[Text] Bonn, 29 Apr -- It has become known here that the U.S. command embarked on the secret placing of neutron charges in the FRG as long ago as last year. Documents to bear this out were presented at a press conference held in Mainz by the leadership of the German Communist Party local organization in Rhineland-Palatinate. Dieter Doerflinger, chairman of the board, and Wolfgang Bartels, member of the secretariat -- both candidates in the local Landtag elections scheduled for 17 May -- have thus thwarted the ruling Christian Democratic Union leadership's plan to keep this alarming information from the public.

According to British sources, the newspaper UNSERE ZEIT writes, there are already 300 neutron charges for howitzer artillery in the FRG. The U.S. Air Force has delivered these lethal munitions to the USAF base at Ramstein. Subsequently they were taken to the depot at Weilerbach and from there distributed to U.S. and Bundeswehr military units.

Neutron weapons are stationed in at least four places in Rhineland-Palatinate. At Landstein, where the 155th self-propelled artillery division is stationed; at Idar-Oberstein with the 6th U.S. Field Artillery Division and the Bundeswehr field artillery college; and in Baumholder and Kusel.

At the same time modernized U.S. Lance missiles in the arsenal of the 350th Bundeswehr rocket and artillery division deployed in Montabaur are being equipped with neutron warheads.

It was noted at the press conference that, whereas Soviet initiatives offer a truly historic chance to end the arms race, the United States and the FRG are secretly building up their nuclear aggression potential. Since Bundeswehr units too are being equipped with the neutron weapons, the full responsibility for this falls on the Bonn government.
Interview with Heinz Kessler, SED Central Committee Politburo member and GDR national defense minister, by TRUD special correspondents Yu. Dmitriyev and Yu. Mayorov under the rubric "Pulse of the Planet", "Watching Over Peaceful Labor"—date and place not given

[Excerpt]

[Reporter] The Soviet peace initiatives have aroused a great deal of interest everywhere. What is your assessment of the world situation?

[Kessler] It is evident that the detailed peace initiatives and proposals of the Soviet Union and our socialist community on disarmament and the proposals by individual parties, such as the SED initiative on creating in Central Europe a zone free from chemical weapons and a nuclear-free corridor as well, are encountering increasing worldwide approval. Leading politicians of the NATO states are finding it increasingly difficult to reject the proposals or avoid them. At the same time, people of various political beliefs and nationalities are coming together to implement mankind's great ideal of "peace on earth," which was expressed both at the Moscow forum "For a Nuclear-Free World and for Mankind's Survival" and at the Berlin international youth forum. All these inspiring actions give grounds for an optimistic prognosis — through radical disarmament, including disarmament in the conventional weapons sphere, "an age of peace" could be opened up, as SED Central Committee General Secretary E. Honecker said in this speech to leading SED personnel.

But every step forward in this area, we have no illusions about it, has to be wrung from the enemies of detente, who still determine policy to a decisive extent in the United States and the other NATO states. As yet there have been no marked cuts in the U.S. and NATO arms buildup programs. The militarization of space is still seen by the Reagan administration as an essential step toward achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union.

The military policy of the major European states, for all their differences with the United States, amounts to support for its "neoglobalism."

These and many other dangerous facts make it incumbent on the Warsaw Pact states and their armed forces to do all they can to prevent a war, to do everything to ensure that socialism, as the most important force of peace in our area, is able to maintain military equilibrium at the lowest possible level, so that our countries can continue
The world public is extensively discussing the USSR's proposals on eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe. What can you say about this?

The leadership of our party and state, the entire GDR people, and their Army unconditionally and wholeheartedly support CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev's proposal on an agreement on eliminating U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe. Erich Honecker, SED Central Committee general secretary and GDR State Council chairman, immediately proposed to FRG Federal Chancellor H. Kohl on a meeting between representatives of the two German states to effectively carry out their special duty to promote the process of disarmament in central Europe. Moreover, the first conversations have already taken place with a representative of the FRG federal chancellor. Now the GDR, together with the CSSR and the other fraternal countries, is taking steps to make the proposals by the SED, CPCZ, and Social Democratic Party of Germany on establishing a nuclear-free corridor in central Europe the subject of talks between governments.

But, at the same time, we see in the NATO states and also in the FRG attempts by reactionary and revanchist circles to pile up obstacles in the way of the achievement of an agreement. These attempts, as well as certain official FRG Government pronouncements, patently contradict the repeated pledge that never again will the threat of war emanate from Germany.

We note with the same concern and attention all that is being done in the FRG to spread anticommunist sentiments among the population and in the armed forces, to maintain the lie about the "threat from the East," and to spread fear of the socialist states and their armies. All this reminds us of our special responsibility here, in the center of Europe, for safeguarding peace and for the collective defense of socialism.

Tell us about the military collaboration between troops of the GDR National People's Army and Soviet troops.

Joint exercises between the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the National People's Army ended recently on GDR territory. These exercises, which were observed by numerous invited foreign military men in line with the Stockholm accords, demonstrated the high level of unity and cohesion of actions between the leadership staffs and the two armies' participating units. Somewhat earlier there was the Brotherhood-in-Arms Week which we hold every year between 23 February and 1 March, the anniversaries of our two armies, which is accompanied by numerous events attended by a large number of working people and youth representatives.

Indeed, when we talk about relations between our armies, we are talking about a genuine alliance in terms of class and arms, that is, about more than well-oiled military collaboration. This military collaboration has deep historical roots. For us German Communists, it embodies the behests of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, Ernst Thaelmann and Wilhelm Pieck. This brotherhood-in-arms is part of our alliance with the USSR, which, as Comrade Erich Honecker said, "has always been for us a question of class stance." Therefore, German-Soviet friendship and brotherhood-in-arms will always be for us the key question in the education and combat training of our servicemen and permeate all aspects of our army's life.

The plans for cooperation between the GDR National Defense Ministry and staff of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, which have been signed and reported on for many years now, fill many pages in the book of friendship. This year too the comparison of
indicators figures prominently in the program, together with political and military measures. Our soldiers and seamen are competing with their class brothers in military training, in sport and games. The 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the 70th anniversary of the Soviet Army in 1988 are landmarks in cooperation between our peoples and armies. We will use these anniversaries to make every National People's Army serviceman even more conscious of the influence of Great October on the course of world history and of its significance as the start of a new era in world history and of the victory of Marxism-Leninism.

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CSO:  5200/1466
It is a year since the accident occurred at the No 4 unit of the Chernobyl nuclear power station. On the night of April 25-26, 1986, the reactor of the generating unit suffered destruction, accompanied by the burning of graphite and radioactive release. To assess the aftermath of this accident it is essential to distinguish between its mechanical (explosion) and radiation aspects. While in mechanical terms the effect can be classed as moderate and limited only to the reactor building (window-glass remained intact within a radius of several dozen metres), in radiation terms this cannot be said. What happened at Chernobyl assumed disaster proportions for one reason only: over its service life the reactor had accumulated about a ton of radioactive fission fragments. Their partial release led to a considerable pollution of the locality.

Such is the story. After one year it is safe to say that the accident on a civilian reactor has been instructive in many ways, including the military. Its lessons can show what may happen if nuclear weapons are put to use.

The Chernobyl accident can in a certain sense and for one parameter only—radioactive contamination—be compared to the impact of a very small atom bomb. The comparison is tentative, for there was no destructive blast, thermal pulse and many other factors. Besides in nuclear warfare conditions it would have been impossible to evacuate the population in a planned way and to decontaminate the terrain.

It will be recalled that the power of the atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima was 12.5 kilotons. Now the nuclear states have in their arsenals warheads as powerful as 20 and more megatons. The explosion of such a warhead would simply raze off the face of the earth a city with a million inhabitants and an area of 250 square kilometres. Buildings and communications would be destroyed over an area of up to 500 square kilometres. The zone affected in the direction of prevailing winds would stretch for hundreds of kilometres. Such would
be the scale of disaster following the explosion of one warhead. And such warheads now number over 50,000.

Another Chernobyl lesson is that since there are more than 370 atomic reactors in the world, each of them is a source of grave danger even in the event of a non-nuclear war. Their destruction by conventional means should be equated with the use of atomic weapons, because radioactive contamination would be as extensive as after a thermonuclear explosion.

A quantitative measure of assessing the additional danger from nuclear power in any war may be the total generating capacity of nuclear power stations related to the area of the region where they are situated (in the USSR it is the European part, in NATO countries, the territory of mainly Britain, France and the FRG, in the U.S., its own territory except Alaska).

Data given in the following table need no special comment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Area of the Region in Millions of Square Km</th>
<th>Total Capacity of Nuclear Power Stations in Gigawatts</th>
<th>Average Capacity in Kilowatts Per Sq.Km.</th>
<th>Average Polluted Area at 2 Rem Level a Year, as Percentage of Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR (European part)</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. (Except Alaska)</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1984</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO (Except U.S.)</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
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<td></td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In West European countries the threat of potential damage (according to medical standards) in the event of war and destruction of nuclear power stations already now exceeds the total area of the region.

So the Chernobyl accident, apart from other lessons, has taught one—and probably most important—lesson concerning both the Old and the New World. Even a conventional war is fraught with a nuclear catastrophe. In this context a principled question arises: is it right in conditions of scientific and technological progress to retain power doctrines in general and doctrines that admit the use of nuclear weapons in particular?

/9274
CSO: 5200/1466
The Soviet peace "offensive", "the first comprehensive peace programme for Asia and the Pacific"—assessments of this kind prevail in the comments on Mikhail Gorbachev's speech on July 28, 1986, in Vladivostok, which are still made by political and public circles and the media in various countries the world over. This could well be expected: in that speech the Soviet leader formulated a detailed long-term concept for strengthening peace and security in Asia and the Pacific, a concept which can be carried into effect through relentless daily efforts.

Hence the unabating interest in the general ideas and in the specific proposals announced in Vladivostok. The response to them has not been the same everywhere, of course. But actually everywhere Mikhail Gorbachev's speech is viewed as a logical development of the USSR's dynamic course in international affairs, as a reflection of the goals and tasks of Soviet foreign policy towards Asia and the Pacific, and as a new display of the Soviet governments' constructive approach to the urgent problems facing the world today. It evoked considerable interest in the search for ways of productive cooperation on the regional and continental level and gave fresh impetus to the forces working for peaceful coexistence and peaceful cooperation in the region.

Observers holding the most different views lay special stress on the long-term goals of the Soviet Union set forth in Vladivostok. One of them is to accelerate the social and economic development of Siberia and the Far East in keeping with the decisions of the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This region of the USSR has an active part to play in the Soviet economy, and its role in the division of labour in the Soviet Union and on the international scale is growing, too, which is of interest to the countries in Asia and the Pacific, for this offers additional opportunities for expanding economic ties among the countries in that region. The second strategic goal is to lessen confrontation and ensure international security and peaceful cooperation. To that end the Soviet Union is determined to proceed towards genuine detente in the Asian and Pacific area, and to consolidate the basis for good-neighbourly relations, trust and mutual benefit among the countries in the region. Yet another goal is to promote practical bilateral relations between the USSR and the countries of Asia and the Pacific.
The conclusion has been made in many countries, including those in the West, that the new Soviet initiatives are not the last word of Soviet diplomacy and it can therefore be expected that the constructive approach displayed in Vladivostok is not a temporary phenomenon but a reflection of the USSR's long-term course. The ideas and proposals formulated there have evoked a favourable response from many governments, political parties and public organisations of Asia and the Pacific.

The new Soviet programme has been actively backed by the socialist countries in Asia. "The Mongolian People's Republic," said the Statement of the Mongolian government issued on July 31, 1986, "regards the specific and thoroughly considered proposals made by the Soviet leaders as a solid and realistic basis for improving the political situation in Asia and the Pacific". In the opinion of the Mongolian government, "they reflect the coordinated line of the socialist countries". The Soviet initiatives were highly appraised in the communique of the 13th Conference of Foreign Ministers of three states of Indochina (August 1986). They were described as "extremely important", and as "the first all-embracing peace programme of all the programmes that have been at any time associated with Asia and the Pacific". The Soviet-Korean talks held in October 1986 reaffirmed the "mutual desire in every way to promote cooperation and exchange of experience in building socialism and to cooperate in improving the situation in Asia and the Pacific region".

The Vladivostok speech by the CPSU Central Committee General Secretary evoked a positive response and received full support in the European socialist countries and in Cuba, where the Soviet proposals were widely commented on.

The package of Soviet proposals on preventing the militarisation of Asia and the Pacific and ensuring cooperation there has attracted great attention. "The USSR's strategy", wrote Tokyo Shimbun, "is to preserve peace and stability in Asia". Commenting on the general outline of the Soviet initiatives, the observers point out that their implementation would take time and considerable effort, because too many real difficulties remain at present, but simultaneously they have noted that in the opinion of the Soviet leadership the problems confronting Asia can be resolved, with due patience, in future.

The French Le Matin wrote that the Soviet Union "is in a position to solve complex problems in international relations and in many cases prefers a political settlement of problems". The Japanese newspaper Asahi arrived at the significant conclusion that the Vladivostok speech "has reflected the concrete character of the Soviet policy which attaches great importance to the Asian region. Victor Flores Olea, Mexican Deputy Foreign Minister, said: "Mexico and the Soviet Union, which also are members of the Pacific community, bear quite a large share of responsibility for peace and security in this part of the globe."

The reaction of officials and the mass media in the countries of South and Southeast Asia and Oceania show that the general Soviet concept of promoting cooperation in Asia and the Pacific, the USSR's support for declaring the southern Pacific a nuclear-free zone—on December 15, 1986, the Soviet Union signed Protocols 2 and 3 to the Rarotonga Treaty—and for the Indonesian proposal on creating such a zone in Southeast Asia, and the idea of a priority settlement of conflicts in the region, and extension of bilateral relations with the states in the region appeal to these countries. The USSR's goodwill has evoked positive response. It was perhaps not a mere coincidence in time that the 17th session of the South Pacific forum, which ended by mid-August 1986, reaffirmed the determination of that organisation's members to create a nuclear-free zone in the southern Pacific. Many countries in the region approved of the
Soviet Union's decision to take part in the Conference on Pacific Economic Cooperation. Speaking at the opening of the fifth session of the conference on economic cooperation among the Pacific countries in Vancouver in November 1986, which for the first time was attended by delegates of the USSR and the People's Republic of China, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs Charles Joseph Clark remarked that Mikhail Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech had evoked exceptional interest among Canadians. The Soviet Union, he said, can effectively contribute to the growth of economic cooperation among the Pacific states.

This opinion is not accidental, because, as Professor R. R. Sharma, a well-known Indian public figure, wrote in November 1986, the new programme for ensuring international security and peaceful cooperation in Asia and the Pacific, advanced recently by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, meets the aspirations of the peoples who have long been striving for peace and good-neighbourly relations. The Soviet proposals are realistic and specific.

Broad public attention is focused on the idea of establishing open contacts among states within the Asian and Pacific region and outside it, on the need to seek ways of achieving concord, with due account of the inevitable growth of interdependence and the integrational requirements of the economy, and on starting, for that purpose, a free discussion without any discrimination. The Soviet leader, wrote the newspaper Aththaka of Sri Lanka, stressed the need for cooperation among all countries of Asia and the Pacific in the efforts to ensure peace and security. "As for Sri Lanka, we, too, should consider this to be our top priority... Only in the conditions of peace and security can these countries [in Asia—G. A.] chart their own course of economic development and follow that course independently".

The USSR's decision, agreed upon with the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), to withdraw six regiments of the Soviet limited military contingent from the country, which was announced in Vladivostok, was received with great satisfaction in various countries of the world (not, of course, by the reactionary or biased circles thinking in the old way). It has attracted great attention in Asian countries, many of which believe that the process of achieving international security and peaceful cooperation in Asia and the Pacific should be started by mending critical situations. It has been noted that regional settlement problems were given top priority among the five directions of advancing towards improving the situation in Asia and the Pacific proposed in Vladivostok, which meet precisely these hopes.

The withdrawal of the six regiments was completed by the end of October. That was a tangible reduction of the Soviet military contingent, but not a "symbolic" one, as someone had said it would be. At the same time, this was a sign of goodwill, of the USSR's preparedness for a complete withdrawal of the military contingent from Afghanistan. The main thing now is whether this sign of goodwill is answered effectively by the other side, on which totally depends if the situation around Afghanistan can be settled by political means, thereby defusing the crisis in that part of Asia. The Soviet Union, which proposed practical measures, offered an example of a novel mode of political thinking, of a new approach to international problems.

The considerations on a regional settlement in Southeast Asia, including questions concerning Kampuchea, aroused great interest, too. It has been noted that the Soviet leader had good reason to say that Kampuchea must not be plunged back into its tragic past, that the solution of many problems in Southeast Asia depend on the normalisation of rela-
tions between China and Vietnam, that unnecessary suspicions and distrust between the two socialist countries should be done away with through comradely dialogue.

The response in the Asian and Pacific countries, and also outside that region, is a sign of satisfaction with which the statement by Mikhail Gorbachev on the Soviet Union's desire to make its bilateral relations with all states in the region without exception more dynamic has been received in these areas. The USSR is prepared not only to expand its relations with the countries in the region, but to help promote relations among various states in that part of the world. The Soviet Union would never set some states against others, nor would it ever try to form any closed groupings. The very idea is alien to it.

The Soviet Union gives priority to promoting relations among socialist countries on principles of proletarian, socialist internationalism, equality and mutual responsibility, mutual benefit and mutual economic assistance, combining the initiative of each country with its coordinated course in international affairs, with the exchange of experience in building socialism on the largest possible scale and summarising it. The relations maintained by the USSR with Mongolia, North Korea, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, based on these principles, are part and parcel of the security system of the whole of Asia and the Pacific. The working meeting of the leaders of the fraternal parties of the socialist countries belonging to the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), held on November 10-11, 1986, in Moscow, reaffirmed the principles of internationalist solidarity and the intention of the European members of the CMEA to assist Vietnam, Mongolia and Cuba in accelerating the building up of their national economic potentials in order to even out the development levels of all the states in the socialist community.

The foreign-policy statements in the Vladivostok speech were acclaimed in India. The Indian news media noted the "very warm words" spoken about that country and cited in full the high assessment of Soviet-Indian relations as a stabilising factor of international significance and India's contribution to the efforts to establish the principles of equality and justice in the world, and its role in the United Nations and in the non-aligned movement. It was also stressed that the speech by the Soviet leader reflected the Soviet government's concern over the continuing plottings of the imperialist forces against India.

Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to India and his talks with Rajiv Gandhi once again showed the role and significance of the Soviet Union's relations with that country. To the USSR, said Mikhail Gorbachev, relations with India are a matter of principle. They are extremely valuable in themselves and are not affected by any changes and outside influences. The Soviet leadership will not make a single foreign-policy move which could harm the real interests of India. The results of the Soviet leader's visit to friendly India will help strengthen the many-sided Soviet-Indian ties even more, and give a powerful impetus for stepping up the efforts to ensure peace and stability in Asia and the Pacific.

Mikhail Gorbachev's statements on Soviet-Japanese relations were regarded in Tokyo as yet another confirmation of the Soviet course for improving relations with Japan and promoting cooperation with it on a sound and realistic basis. The Japanese business circles approved of Mikhail Gorbachev's statements in favour of a further growth of trade and economic relations between the USSR and Japan, though they did express irrelevant doubts as to the sincerity of the Soviet Union's intentions.
World attention focused on the part of the Vladivostok speech which concerned China and Soviet-Chinese relations, and their extreme importance at a time when history has entrusted the Soviet and Chinese peoples with a highly responsible mission. The press of Bulgaria, the GDR, Hungary, Romania and other socialist countries has said the Soviet proposals meet the wishes earlier expressed by the Chinese side that these moves, combined with the USSR's preparedness to discuss with China any additional measures to create a situation of good-neighbourliness at any time and at any level, may lead to an expansion of relations and contacts between the two socialist states. The 13th Conference of the Foreign Ministers of Indochinese Countries welcomed the improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations.

The press in many West European countries noted that the CPSU Central Committee General Secretary's speech "was friendly with regard to China". The press in Britain and other West European countries and Japan regarded the speech as proof of the Soviet leadership's determination to straighten out the relations with China and the Soviet proposals mentioned in it as being "concrete moves" to "work for a radical improvement of political relations with China". According to the Japanese *Nihon Keizai*, the implementation of the proposals concerning China "will possibly give rise to a development of East-West relations in a new direction".

The Chinese public was told, on the whole, what had been said in the Vladivostok speech about Soviet-Chinese relations, and, though to a smaller extent, about the Soviet concept of ensuring peace and security in Asia and the Pacific. Wu Xueqian, China's Minister of Foreign Affairs, received the Soviet charge d'affaires in the People's Republic of China and said that great significance was attached in China to the "new elements with regard to Soviet-Chinese relations" expressed in the speech, which were approved of. Similar assessments were also expressed in later statements made by Chinese leaders who referred to the statement by Mikhail Gorbachev when speaking of Sino-Soviet relations.

Contacts and relations between the USSR and China in practical areas have begun to expand steadily. Meetings between statesmen and public figures are becoming increasingly a practice in relations between the two countries. Of great significance in this respect was the visit to China by Nikolai Talyzin, Alternate Member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, his meetings and talks with Chinese leaders and the agreements signed during the visit. The meeting between Eduard Shevardnadze, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Wu Xueqian in New York on September 24, 1986, was a new step in the discussion of matters concerning bilateral relations and urgent international problems. During the ninth round of the Soviet-Chinese consultations, held in October in Peking, the Soviet side suggested some practical ways of implementing the ideas and proposals on the further development of relations between the USSR and the PRC mentioned by Mikhail Gorbachev in Vladivostok. The sides reached an understanding on resuming the Soviet-Chinese border talks in February 1987 in Moscow. Finally, both the Chinese trade and economic exhibition in Moscow and the Soviet trade and industrial exhibition in Peking were a great success.

The Soviet Union is expanding its relations not only with large countries like China or India. In an interview to Indian journalists on the eve of his visit to India Mikhail Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union is guided in its actions by the ideas and principles expressed in Vladi-
vostok. He said, in particular: “We have now vitalised political dialogue with a large number of Asian countries, smaller and medium-sized states included”.

In contrast to the positive response to Mikhail Gorbachev’s Vladivostok speech in many countries, the reaction of Washington and the rightist conservative circles in Western countries was openly negative. Some opposed the comprehensive approach to the problem of security for the countries in Asia and the Pacific and ostentatiously stressed the difference between the situations in Asia and in Europe. Others came up with flyblown arguments about a “Soviet threat” to Asia, a “build-up of Soviet military might”, and so on.

It was stated in Vladivostok that the Soviet Union is for peaceful, good-neighbourly and equal relations, for mutually beneficial cooperation with the United States, and that there exist ample opportunities for this in the Far East and in the Pacific. In many countries it was noted with satisfaction that the USSR wants to continue dialogue with the USA on the most burning problems of our time, that the door is still open for a new Soviet-American summit. The Reykjavik meeting confirmed this. It enhanced Soviet-American dialogue to a new level, as well as the East-West dialogue as a whole. But the meeting in Iceland also revealed an unfavourable image of the US leadership, a government which is quick to take destructive actions.

Contrary to the proposals made not only by the Soviet Union, but also by other states in Asia and the Pacific, the USA has taken measures in recent months to step up military-political activity in that vast region. It continues to bring pressure to bear on Japan to join the SDI programme. US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger made a tour of China, India and Pakistan with quite an obvious mission. Washington has mounted its opposition to creating a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia and made an attempt to secure US presence in the military bases in the Philippines, to bind the ASEAN countries to an economic pattern in Asia and the Pacific which would suit the USA and Japan. The US decision to deploy new launchers for nuclear and neutron missiles in South Korea would only build up tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

It is also significant that some circles in several countries in Asia and the Pacific, while demanding that the Vladivostok ideas be further specified, deliberately avoid making their own assessments, advancing proposals, conducting an exchange of opinion on ways of ensuring peace and security in their region. But it is perfectly clear that a concept of a comprehensive approach to the problem of security in Asia and the Pacific and the details of carrying it into effect can be elaborated only after an exchange of opinion, when general ideas and specific proposals are compared.

Far-fetched apprehensions that participation in measures to create a system of international security and peaceful cooperation in Asia and the Pacific will cause involvement of an individual country in Soviet-American or Soviet-Chinese “rivalry” are occasionally expressed, though not very often. Such delusions are very far from truth. Perhaps they are a result of the failure to see clearly that the idea of turning some states to others is alien to the policy of the USSR and other socialist countries in the region. The USSR’s policy towards Asia and the Pacific, and other regions of the world for that matter, is based on due consideration and respect for the opinion and legitimate interests of all states without excep-
tion. "No neoglobalism, no great-power attitude, and no coercion to make the peoples join military groupings—this, we are sure, is something in which the interests of all Asian states coincide", Mikhail Gorbachev stressed.

Evidently in the future, too, there will be efforts to turn the course of events in Asia and the Pacific towards militarisation. But the positive response to the ideas expressed in the Vladivostok speech, which does not abate for a single day, shows that there exist real conditions for Asia and the Pacific to become a region of peace and good-neighbourly relations.
Soviet-American relations form the core of the entire system of international ties. The state of these relations largely determines the destinies of the Soviet and American peoples and the rest of the world for that matter. Naturally, in analysing the current state and prospects of Soviet-US dialogue, many political scientists focus on the cardinal problem of Soviet-US relations, namely, arms limitation and disarmament. Many factors affect the course of the talks on this issue. Among them are the two powers' perceptions about each other's intentions drawn while studying the military doctrines, strategic objectives and ideology of a counterpart.

That was the point of departure of the study made by the Swiss political scientist Daniel Frei under the auspices of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). The objective of the book under review is "to find out to what extent and how the world outlooks or world views determine and affect the way in which policies related to security are formulated" (p. 11). Apart from the purely academic objective, Daniel Frei believes his book has practical implementation and will "contribute to the promotion of empathy on the part of all sides concerned" (p. 4). He is convinced that this would be achieved while assessing the sides' motivations without bias presenting them to the partners in the negotiations in a manner that would help overcome the prevailing stereotypes and prejudice. The author sees the problem of "perception" as a factor determining the relations between the two powers. That, in fact, is the conceptual basis of his study.

We cannot, of course, agree with this theoretical premise. Frei actually equates the Soviet Union with the United States, forgetting that the former has never identified the hegemonistic ambitions of US ruling quarters with the actual aspirations of the Americans, while the latter has deliberately cultivated the image of the "cunning and ruthless Russians", an image of the enemy always needed by the architects of aggressive policies. It is clear that it is not "faults in perception" but the interests of the military-industrial complex that have made the White House block the Soviet Union's latest peace initiatives: Washington has unambiguously staked on the arms race. This has been borne out by the SDI programme—the embodiment of the "great American dream" of space-bound imperialism, and Washington's refusal to observe the SALT-2 Treaty, a move aimed at upsetting the strategic military parity between the USSR and the United States. Such moves are fully consonant with the current priorities of the US leadership. Military rivalry with the USSR must be extended to new spheres so as to render all Soviet armaments obsolete, says the Defense Directive for 1984-1988 elaborated by the Pentagon. As we see it, the Pentagon is not at all concerned with perceiving the other side's motivations.
This interpretation of the issue stems from the author's incorrect methodological approach, rather than his ill intentions. Daniel Frei ignores the objective reality because, he maintains, it exists only in prevailing notions of this reality (p. 6). This overtly idealistic approach has certainly diminished the scientific value of the study.

At the same time, in analysing concrete problems Daniel Frei has tried to get to the heart of the matter and grasp the prevailing realities. His unbiased study shows who is actually whipping up the unbridled arms race.

He gives on the whole an objective analysis of Soviet foreign policy, stressing its fundamental consistency. He also refers to many Soviet sources and most importantly, cites them without distortion, while analysing the USSR's position in the world arena.

Daniel Frei is unbiased in presenting the notions and views which traditionally have been the object of speculation by the Western media. On the "balance of strength" for instance, he writes that Marxism has viewed it as "historical perspective", and it should not be interpreted primitively and more so as its desire to achieve military superiority. The USSR does not "consider armed force as the best means of achieving Soviet aims", it rather "would prefer disarmament" (p. 88).

He also emphasises the compatibility of the class struggle and the policy of peaceful coexistence, saying that, on the international plane, the struggle of classes does not imply any military confrontation. While peaceful coexistence does assume a continued class struggle, he says, Soviet foreign policy has always sought to exclude the military factor from the competition of the two systems.

Daniel Frei has analysed the Soviet military doctrine and inferred: the Soviet Union "not interested in achieving military superiority" (p. 101). These conclusions are of fundamental importance, though their theoretical foundations are far from being indisputable.

That the two powers approach the major issue of today quite differently, becomes particularly clear when the author gets down to analysing the US view of America's and the USSR's role in the world and the US stance at arms limitation talks. He remains loyal to his "theory of perception", but the objective logic of the concrete analysis inevitably leads to his exposing of the aggressive nature of US military doctrines and strategic guidelines, including the notorious "neoglobalism".

The study clearly shows how the worn-out idea of the "Soviet military threat" is used to manipulate public opinion though the writer does not accept it overtly. Many instances cited in the book leave no doubt whatever that the White House has focused on creating an atmosphere of fear and suspicion. Daniel Frei maintains that US ruling quarters have openly engaged in war preparations and are planning to use nuclear arms against the USSR (p. 175).

The author takes a level-headed view of things and is not pessimistic: he believes, that Soviet-US relations can improve, and suggests the only realistic way to this, namely, by settling differences via political means (p. 288).

Daniel Frei's simultaneous analysis of Soviet and US views on arms limitation and disarmament, and both sides' military doctrines clearly shows, whether he wanted it or not, who is sincerely working for disarmament and formulating a policy on the basis of peaceful philosophy, and who is whipping up war hysteria and world tensions so as to justify aggressive designs and an unwillingness to negotiate disarmament issues. In this respect, Daniel Frei has written a useful and very timely book.