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THE SOVIET UNION AND THE THIRD WORLD

PART II

AGENDA FOR THE 1980s

by

Walter Laqueur and Others

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THE SOVIET UNION AND THE THIRD WORLD

PART II

AGENDA FOR THE 1980s

1. How Far are the Soviets Willing to Go? Some Lessons of Recent Years
2. Irreversibility in Theory and Practice
3. Trends in U.S. Security Assistance Resources.
4. Improving U.S. Response to Military Threats in the Third World
5. Active Measures in the Third World: Some Comments and Proposals
6. Soviet Third World Literature as a Source for the Understanding of Soviet Policy

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THE SOVIET UNION AND THE THIRD WORLD

PART II

Overall Summary:

This study deals with current and upcoming problems following the basic investigation into Soviet conduct in the Third World submitted two years ago. It is divided into three sections and deals specifically with the questions of how far the Soviet Union is likely to go in its forward policy and to what extent Soviet gains are considered irreversible in Moscow (section one, prepared by Professor Peter Wiles and Professor Galia Golan).

The second section deals with trends in U.S. security assistance, ways to improve the U.S. response to military threats in the Third World, trends in treating such programs in Congress and the outlook for the mid-eighties. It was prepared with the assistance of Lieutenant General Ernest Graves and Mr. Frances J. West, Jr.

The third section comments on the vexing issue of "active measures" (in the broadest sense) in the Third World. It deals with the question of countering Soviet proxy operations and discusses recent changes in Soviet views and policies in the Third World. This section was prepared by Professor Walter Laqueur and Ambassador Arieh Eilan.

HOW FAR ARE THE SOVIETS WILLING TO GO?: SOME LESSONS OF RECENT YEARS

The Soviet Union views the Third World as the stage upon which the superpower competition is enacted. While Western Europe constitutes the primary target and prize in any such competition, the Soviets do not place very high hopes on the possibility of significantly changing the status quo in Europe. The Third World thus remains that prize which is still obtainable and worth competing over. In this sense, Soviet interest in the Third World is a political one, seen within the context of the superpower relationship. Although political benefits ultimately serve Moscow's ideological interest, the latter is not a primary determining factor in Soviet decision-making in the Third World. Realism dictates ideological accommodation and compromise. Beyond the political interest -- and often served by political gains -- are increasing military-strategic interests. These interests have risen in importance with the development of the Soviet air force and fleet, the forward deployment configuration, and the resultant need for services and facilities in Third World countries. There has also been an increase in the Soviets' economic interest in the Third World, dictated less by the pursuit of natural resources than by the pursuit of profits, generally through trade and specifically through the increased sale of arms. On the whole, however, the Soviet pursuit of all of these interests has been, in Soviet eyes, an uphill battle with many setbacks and disappointments, limited to some degree by economic constraints. The Soviets have for the most part been

cautious, particularly with regard to committing troops or direct military involvement, seeking more to exploit opportunities rather than to force events.

By the late 1960s the Soviet Union realized that it was failing in what it apparently had hitherto perceived as a relatively easy task of gaining influence in the Third World. The optimistic and costly years of Khrushchev's efforts to drive the West from the former colonial areas underwent a serious re-thinking; Brezhnev's approach was a more cautious one both on the practical and theoretical level. An extensive debate emerged in the Soviet theoretical literature in the late 1960s, continuing and resuming more intense proportions again in the late 1970s. The issue was not how and whom to support in order to drive the West out, but, rather, how and whom to support in order to gain a foothold and, most important of all, to keep it. Parallel with this were the underlying questions: what priority should Moscow's Third World efforts assume? What cost and what risk would be necessary, sufficient and desirable to achieve Moscow's ends?

Three basic schools of thought emerged from this set of questions: (1) those who believed the Third World effort to be a failure, not worth the risks and, primarily, the costs involved, demanding a more modest approach bordering on Russian isolationism or, at best, a totally pragmatic approach; (2) those who believed the failures to be due to insufficient control and ideological purity, i.e. an approach which saw the investment in the Third World as essential, but to be guaranteed by demanding

ideological purity rather than pragmatically supporting any anti-colonialist movement or regime in sight; (3) those who took a pragmatic middle road, arguing for the importance of the Third World, but advocating reservations and modesty as to expectations, while supporting even those elements in the Third World whose ideological purity offered little but vague hopes for the future.

Much of the Soviet explanation for its failures in the Third World -- as well as in areas of thinking used by each of the above schools of thought for its own purposes -- was based on what was described as the composition and social structure of the national liberation movements which came to power in the newly independent countries, as they were called. Four to five main social groups were delineated in the societies: the national bourgeoisie, the petite bourgeoisie, the workers, the peasants and the traditional tribal chiefs. Despite this categorization, it was clearly stated that these were basically preclass societies, i.e. that the classes -- even as listed above -- were not yet clearly differentiated: they were not fully formed classes inasmuch as family, tribe, caste, religion -- all considered "archaic" notions -- tended to obscure the picture of class relations as well as determine social behavior. Therefore, bearing in mind that the subject is not classes as such, the following were the explanations provided by the Soviet theoreticians for each social grouping.

<u>The national bourgeoisie</u> does not consist of the classical bourgeois businessman, but, rather, in the developing countries

this category refers mainly to traders, money exchangers and lenders, i.e., not owners of capital as such, the "exploiters" of workers. They are not perceived by the workers as exploiters, for exploitation of the workers fails within the realm of foreign employers. The national bourgeoisie is a rudimentary class -- little more than what could be called petit bourgeois tradesmen. Indeed, they themselves were held down by the colonial system, which brought with it foreign entrepreneurs at the expense of the national bourgeoisie, which had little capital of its own. The domestic market is narrow, dominated by foreign investors favored by the colonial administration, while the local tradesman often has to compete with other bourgeois rivals such as the Chinese in Indonesia, the Lebanese in Liberia, the Asians in Kenya, Indians and so forth. This situation, generally perceived as oppression, brought the national bourgeoisie into the national liberation movement, but as such they are not a very stable element in any such movement after independence. In addition to the fact that they can be bought off, their only interest is independence; their alliance with the forces of national liberation does not extend beyond the pursuit of their own narrow interests of improving their financial lot through gaining independence.

Just what the importance of the national bourgeoisie is, what influence it has on other classes and its role vis a vis the other social groupings is an issue still debated. To some degree, they were weakened by the strength of the traditional, tribal or patriarchal structure of society, though some

theoreticians claim that they have significant influence over the rank and file masses of petite bourgeoisie and peasants. Just how active -- and therefore strong politically -- this group is varies from country to country; in some places they were covered by the colonialists, given no opportunity for political activity or experience, while in other countries, they actually had political parties and gained significant experience. In any case, however, they are favored by the Third World precolonial situation in which there is little class differentiation and virtually no class conflict. Whatever the debate on the ultimate influence of the national bourgeoisie, it is generally recognized that it plays a powerful role in the struggle for independence: "The profound contradiction between the urge of the national bourgeoisie to enhance its material and political condition to rise to dominance in the country, set up a national state and national economy, to create and control a national market, etc."[1] stands in such sharp contradiction to the colonialist's interests that the national bourgeoisie becomes part of the anti-colonialist struggle. But it is just this contradiction which marks the short-lived nature of the national bourgeoisie's alliance with the other anti-colonialist forces, terminating with independence.

The petite bourgeoisie, or what Soviet theoreticians call the "middle strata" or urban "middle section" comprises some 65 percent of the urban population in the Third World. It is a temporary, ah hoc grouping, rather than a class. It includes the intellectuals, the students, the native element of the

bureaucracy, the military, and -- its mainstay -- the small tradesmen, artisans and small producers. The most important point about this grouping is its dual nature. As small producers, they possess characteristics of two future classes: insofar as they are proprietors, they have the "bourgeois nature" associated with private property, but insofar as they are producers, they have the attributes associated with laborers directly involved in the work process. Thus they have affinity with both owners and laborers, and therefore can go either way once classes begin fully to form. Even more than the national bourgeoisie, these petite bourgeoisie are not to be ignored or denigrated for they are not exploiters; indeed, they are not necessarily bourgeoisie, for they tend to be ex-peasants turned tradesmen, artisans and the like. But as such, they still have strong tribal, religious, caste and other traditional ties. They have preconceptions, "reactionary fantasies", weaknesses and erroneous views. Their leaders are a mixed bag of radicals, revolutionary nationalists and democrats, but clearly not Marxist-Leninists with socialist ideology and party. They join the anti-colonialist forces out of feelings of nationalism, but their dualistic nature ordains continued internal division and instability regarding their ideological direction, which could take an entire historical epoch to overcome.

The intelligentsia, while part of this middle strata, is seen as something of a separate category, though as such it has no class base. Nor does it need any one class or another; it is seen as an independent socio-political entity, whose social (i.e.

ultimately ideological) orientation will be formulated as it sees fit, with no natural tendencies in the direction of bourgeois or laborer as such. This is an extremely important group insofar as it possesses a monopoly on education and culture amongst the generally illiterate public at large. It includes many wage earners, such as professionals, technicians and employees in the colonial administration. This last provides them with no small degree of political experience or at the very least links with the state apparatus. The intellectuals are nonetheless close to the masses, for many of them came from the tribal elites and the peasantry thus having some influence with them. On the other hand, they are close to the bourgeoisie to the extent that they themselves come from the well-to-do sections of society. Yet they are also close to the petite bourgeoisie, at least theoretically, because, like them, they are a divided transitional group. There is no equation, however, between the views of the intellectuals, those of the petit bourgeois tradesmen or the national bourgeoisie. The intellectuals are not affected by the profit-seeking motivation of the last two categories -- they are believed to be closer to the masses, more understanding of their suffering and therefore more likely to adopt the laborer's point of view. They have links with both the traditional, tribal structures and with the modern institutions through the bureaucracy and the military. They have the additional advantage in that they have a longer record of political activity than other groupings due to the needs of the colonialist regimes; they were picked by the colonialist

administration as helpers, but this backfired: they became exposed to political ideas, they gained first-hand knowledge of the injustices of the colonial administration. They were often sent abroad for education or training and there were exposed to political ideologies, and finally their own national pride was hurt by the ultimately limited role or advancement they could expect in the colonial bureaucracy. All of these factors make the intellectuals politically aware and active in the struggle for independence.

Much the same can be said of the military, also a part of this middle strata -- indeed the Third World military are often referred to as the military intelligentsia. Thus they too may have been trained in the city or sent abroad for training or even to fight -- and like the civilian intellectuals, became exposed to ideas and ideologies. This political awareness is sharpened by their being used against their fellow countrymen in putting down local civil disorder. At the same time, their own suffering, the inborn discrimination of having to serve under colonial (foreign) officers and, like the civilian intellectuals, being limited in ultimate advancement, turn this political awareness into support and activity for independence. Thus the military have a positive role to play.

The peasantry are, of course, the main force in the anti-colonialist struggle by virtue of their sheer numbers, despite the fact that they are not a politically active group as such. The countryside is the base of the social pyramid in the underdeveloped countries; hence the peasants feel the brunt of

colonialist rule most directly: they are deprived of land, exploited by foreign landowners, local landowners, the tribal elites, the money-lenders of the towns (i.e. the petite bourgeoisie), and even by the rich peasantry. Like Karl Marx's workers, the landless peasantry of the Third World has nothing to lose and joins the independence struggle purely in hopes of changing their desperate situation. In some cases, this has meant peasant uprisings or peasant wars, as for example in Algeria or Vietnam or various Latin American countries, where over eighty percent of those fighting are peasants. But while the peasants can be mobilized along tribal, caste or religious lines, the Third World peasants do not possess political experience, usually have no party of their own, and do not act on their own. The political weakness of the peasantry is due to the fact that it is scattered and splintered amongst different forms of farming units, including parcel holdings or patriarchal plots; it has a low educational level and is often swayed by patriarchal or small-proprietor tendencies; it is inclined to spontaneous action and is unaccustomed to organization and discipline, planning and structured activity, to say nothing of ideological thinking. Indeed, it is usually illiterate, superstitious, open to prejudices and primitive customs. If at all active, the peasants merely follow the other social groupings such as the intellectuals or the national bourgeoisie. Because of their numbers, however, their allegiance determines which group will in fact lead, thus determining, to a large extent, much of the future path. Because of the importance of the peasantry, which

is seen much the way Lenin perceived the Russian masses -- as basically ignorant, lazy, and anarchic -- something positive must nonetheless be discerned. That positive quality is that they can be changed, their ignorance can be manipulated or, in more positive terms, they can be made to perceive their oppressed state and can be activated politically by outside forces, as indeed they were in the cases cited above (Algeria, Vietnam and so forth).

The workers are admittedly the smallest group, and the "realistic" school of theoreticians even argues that it is a mistake to try to cover up this fact by trying to include civil servants, engineers, technicians, i.e. the petit bourgeois intellectuals, in this category. The actual wage-labor sector in Third World societies is miniscule: one to two percent of the population at most, and most of these are agricultural wage-laborers. In other words, only nine percent of the total labor force can be considered what Marxists call the proletariat (wage laborers in productions). And many of these are nothing but converted peasants with continued family, tribal, traditional community ties to the countryside. Or, they are tied to the petit bourgeois "proprietary" ideology of small factories, handicrafts, and the like. Even the latter are influenced by traditional tribal ties (e.g. the "boss" may be related by tribal membership or patriarchal class) rather than determined by the outlook of a social class or group. In addition, large numbers of this miniscule proletariat are illiterate, unskilled migrant labor, no more than Marx's detested lumpenproletariat. For

ideological reasons, the workers must obviously be given a greater role in society and thus the Soviet explanation is that this group, albeit small, can play an important political role. The workers are said to develop an anti-colonialist awareness faster than the other groups because they are concentrated in the factories of foreign owners and therefore come into direct contact with their exploitation. For this reason, purely work-connected demands quickly take on political tones, i.e. against the owner, which happens to be foreign, therefore giving the demands anti-imperialist overtones. Moreover, the concentration of the workers in factories provides them with mutual contact, mutual loyalty and the possibility to organize. They are aided in this by outside forces -- such as foreign or local Communists and trade unions.

What of the leadership of all these social groupings in the struggle for power? The peasants clearly represent only the army, the masses; because of the characteristics described above, they can only function if under competent command from one of the other social groupings. In different terms --but terms more acceptable to classical Marxist-Soviet thinking -- even in the Third World the town must lead the countryside. However small a proportion of the population it represents, the town is nonetheless the center of all cultural activity, of economic and political life. Albeit a small unit, the town is nonetheless the unifying factor for the whole country, providing the market, the administration, the money system, services and the like. Therefore, the struggle for power will always be won or lost in

the town. And it will naturally be fought there, where crowded conditions, close quarters, and deprivation are most clearly felt, leading to a rise in political awareness and activity in the towns. The peasantry therefore must simply accept the leadership of those more organized, united, aware and experienced segments of society in the town. But which segment?

Theoretically, the national bourgeoisie is unacceptable, not just on ideological grounds (or at least the explanation must be found not just on ideological grounds), but because it is unstable, it vacillates and can be bought off by foreign powers or simply cowed by foreign powers because it has little political initiative. In most places, it is poorly organized politically and lacks political influence because of the predominance of tribal, patriarchal, religious, i.e. traditional relationship systems. The national bourgeoisie is simply too weak to lead the struggle for power. The petite bourgeoisie, by virtue of its dualism, is also unacceptable. It can be too easily swayed in one or the other direction. The military is an unlikely candidate, according to the theoretical literature, because it is too exclusive, lacks contact with the masses and is therefore too weak and lacking in support to lead. The intellectuals seek basically abstract solutions, tend toward short-sightedness in the political sphere, or conversely, tend to extremism, what is called voluntarism (i.e. adventurism, spontaneity, violence).

The logical candidate for leadership is, not surprisingly according to the foregoing logic, the workers. Theoretically, the workers are considered to be the only group which places

general interests above self-interest because they combine both social and national demands (as could the peasants, presumably). Furthermore they have no private property or proprietary psychology to interfere with an uncompromising stand; they have nothing to protect or to lose; they are concentrated, leading to organizational facility and solidarity and, because of peasant origins, have contacts with the peasant masses. They are ahead of the national bourgeoisie in terms of awareness and consolidation and have had the advantage of the assistance of two importants factors: (1) outside help, specifically the Soviet Union and its allies; and (2) local trade unions and Communist parties.

Even Soviet theorists, however, recognize that the above is just theory or perhaps even wishful thinking. They are forced to admit, however reluctantly, that in some places there is no working class at all, or if there is one, it is too small or too new in terms of experience or competence to play this role. Instead, Soviet thinking on the Third World recognizes that the leadership must fall to the intelligentsia, the national bourgeoisie or the military. The military has the advantage of the system of military organization which suits them to tight organization and conspiratorial activity. It can be most effectively organized and possesses motivation. The Soviets do not necessarily recommend leadership by the military, but they recognize the value of a military coup and the obvious fact that it can happen with positive, i.e. anti-Western results, for example in Burma, Mali, the Congo, Ethiopia and other countries.

The unawareness of the peasants and the weakness of the workers can create a situation, according to Soviet theorists, in which the national bourgeoisie actually leads the anti-colonialist or revolutionary struggle -- despite its own weaknesses and negative aspects pointed out above. Its self-interest is so strong, its conflict with foreign competitors so great that it can be galvanized into action. Given their superior position in society, they can have influence over the petit bourgeois middle strata and the peasants -- and even parts of the working class since the foreigner, not the national bourgeoisie, is perceived as the exploiter. The lack of clear class differentiation in society favors the bourgeoisie. And being more politically active than the peasants, more experienced and with greater cadres than the petite bourgeoisie, it can take the leadership, despite its unreliability.

The basic unreliability of this group has, however, often led to a situation where the group which can offer a program takes the leadership: the intellectuals. The Soviets explain the obvious fact that most Third World movements have been and are led by intellectuals in the following way. The national intellegentsia developed faster than the working class because of the needs of the colonial administration; its own awareness is accelerated by its personal experiences. It can act as initiator and organizer to raise the national consciousness by virtue of its education, talent and experience, as well as its contacts. It is the most capable of comprehending scientific-technological developments and modern culture and to use these in the

populations's interests; it is capable of expressing the people's aspirations. Moreover, it is a "supra-class" -- it can create a truly national culture. For these reasons, it can and usually does assume the leadership. But the intelligentsia, as part of the "middle strata," which is essentially petit bourgeois, can go in any direction: the bourgeois or the socialist. Therefore, it is best to assure the direction to be taken and that can be done by allying the intellectuals with the workers in leading the peasant masses and the national bourgeoisie. Hence it would appear that Soviet theorists are not yet ready to abandon the idea of proletarian leadership. In fact, the literature varies as to the importance of the workers' role; many argue that it is a question of local conditions. Yet the disappointments of the 1960s and 1970s have led authoritative theoreticians to claim that the fact that so few nations actually have chosen the socialist path is because they were <u>not led</u> by the workers. Karen Brutents, deputy chief of the Central Committee Department for International Relations, claims that of seventy former colonies, only thirty were led by either the proletariat and its allies or the national bourgeoisie and its allies. (These statistics leave vague the fact that very few of even these thirty were in fact led by the proletariat and its allies). Forty of the battles were led by the middle strata (the intelligentsia, the military) or coalitions, especially in Africa. In Vietnam, Korea and the Philippines, the workers joined and led basically peasant movements (a claim which ignores that fact that the leadership was, in fact, the intellectuals);

in India, Syria, Algeria, Guinea and Ghana, the Soviets claim the workers were in the vanguard, the shock forces, but not the leadership; in still others, the Soviets admit that the workers were too small and poorly organized even to be considered a vanguard. In yet other cases they admit there was no proletariat at all.

If the solution cannot be achieved at the stage of the struggle for independence or revolution, that is, if, as experience has shown, the proletariat simply cannot take the leadership in Third World struggles, the answer to insuring a country's adherence to the socialist bloc must be achieved after the assumption of power.

The form of statehood which the Soviets see as offering them any hope at all of future socialist alignment falls into the category of <u>non-capitalist</u> <u>development</u>. Almost a catchall phrase, it excludes only those states which have directly aligned with the West on a path of capitalist development -- and even these the Soviets try to explain in some way so as to justify attempts to sway them into another pattern. This non-capitalist development for a country is considered a transitional society which, according to Soviet theory, peacefully creates the conditions necessary for the passage to a socialist society (by peaceful, the idea is to avoid violent revolution). This is clearly a pre=, but also a non=, socialist society, though it may have a socialist orientation. The latter would be defined by the country's attitude towards imperialism, i.e. the West, and towards feudalism, i.e. private property. The form of government

in this stage of non-capitalist development is termed a "national democracy." Theoretically, this means a government which expresses the will of "a single national democratic front of all the patriotic forces," that is to say, all the forces which fought against the colonial power. This corresponds roughly to Lenin's two-stage theory of a national bourgeois revolution, to be followed by a broad coalition which satisfies the nationalist aspirations for independence of the people while creating the conditions (especially so-called bourgeois freedoms and socio-economic bases) for an organized working class which can then assume dominance and lead a socialist revolution.[2]

In modern Soviet theory, this transitional stage, that of national democracy, has the task of preparing the material (economic, scientific-technological) prerequisites for the later building of socialist society; therefore its basic content is non-socialist but democratic. Specifically, this means that it must truly break the hold of the former colonialist or what is called neo-colonialism, i.e. the influence of foreign investors, multinationals, dependency and natural resource exploitation. It must gradually nationalize local as well as foreign capital and create a large public sector in production. This is to include, in time, regulation of limitations on the development of medium- and small-scale enterprises as well. It must undertake agrarian reform generally meant to distribute lands to the peasants so as to break the hold of the landowners. It is to improve working conditions in labor legislation and develop educational and health services. It is to broaden the influence of the masses on

state policy, which, while not spelled out, presumably means Communist cooperation or alliance with the ruling party. Finally, the national democratic state on the non-capitalist path of development is to maintain relations of cooperation with the socialist (Soviet) bloc.

Pravda on August 26, 1978 defined these tasks thus:

1. strengthening of political independence against imperialism,
2. establishment of people's state power,
3. development of the economy,
4. improvement of workers' social, material and cultural standards,
5. elimination of feudal exploitation,
6. restriction of local capitalists,
7. growth in employment,
8. strengthening the public sector in industry and the cooperative movement in agriculture,
9. introduction of scientific principles of economic planning, and
10. alliance with the socialist state.

Both descriptions allow for or at least admit the fact of the continued presence of private production and the economic link with the non-socialist world economic system. What is described is therefore only a pre-socialist -- albeit not capitalist -- national democracy with a socialist orientation.

Indeed, the above listed tasks are more indications of direction rather than actual expectations or established facts.

This national democracy is theoretically headed by revolutionary democrats leading a broad, united front of classes and social strata. The idea was that this group would, as stated, permit legal political activity for the Communists as part of the political freedoms implied by the term "democratic"; it would strengthen the proletariat by the attention granted to production and the break-down of the feudal system, and it would implement the socialist-type measures already outlined -- all this setting the stage for peaceful change to socialism. But it has not worked out that way. The examples, first of Algeria in the case of Ben Bella, then later of Ghana and Egypt, were but samples of the difficulties for three aspects of these plans -- the legal work of the Communist parties; the building of socialist (public) economies; and the alliance with the Soviet Union. One of the first Soviet concessions was to admit that some national democracies even under revolutionary democrats need not institute united front-type rule. If a national or united front could not be established, it would be enough simply to tolerate the Communist party or, if necessary, the Communists might disband and join the ranks of the leading party. This last step was never fully elaborated theoretically -- except for the general Leninist dictum of united-front politics -- but it was born of necessity and imposed on local Communists when Soviet state interests dictated. It in part precipitated the debate of the 1960s, the realization that non-capitalist development could

lead in either direction -- socialist or capitalist, and the refinement of the theory of revolutionary democracy.

When in fact the two conditions of public sector and alliance with the Soviet bloc, were repeatedly whittled away by states enlarging their economic and political ties with the West, a serious debate ensued over the whole issue of revolutionary democracies. A major argument in the debate was that national liberation movements (before and in power) have no inherent social content. The "anti-imperialist" orientation of the new governments by no means automatically dictates internal development of an anti-capitalist nature. Therefore, a clear distinction must be made between simple national liberation movements and revolutionary national liberation movements. The national liberation movement after reaching power remains basically bourgeois in nature; there is no shift to socialist content or to the above listed characteristics. The revolutionary national liberation movement is one which does in fact make this shift. And the factor which determines whether or not this will be the case, the factor which makes for "revolution," is the existence of what is called a vanguard party. In other words, a national democracy, by definition ruled by revolutionary democrats, must organize a vanguard party, that is an elitist group, rather than the mass united-front type party or mass organization which included heterogeneous socio-political forces and was encouraged for the stage of seizure of power, even without proletarian hegemony. Here is the distinction between the two sets of tasks outlined above, for it will be noted that

Pravda spoke of "establishment of people's state power" -- something a bit more specific than "the influence of the masses on state policy." The tasks of such a party are twofold: to introduce and institutionalize revolutionary/socialist policies and to conduct ideological work amongst the masses. The overall task of the vanguard party is to ensure and direct a non-capitalist path of development along the basic lines of scientific or "real" socialism. Interestingly -- presumably reflecting a fairly realistic view of things -- this argument admits that local conditions such as religion and other traditional ideological forces may mitigate against the vanguard party actually being a Marxist-Leninist Communist party. All that is demanded is that this party be socialist in orientation, that is, socialist in terms of its socio-economic platform, and that it favor the workers. But the same argument contends, nonetheless, that socialist development is inconceivable without such a vanguard party. Even with such a party, there may be "zigzags" in the road taken, inasmuch as the revolutionary democrats cannot easily rid themselves of purely nationalist sentiments. For this reason, some theoreticians have gone further and argued that socialist development is inconceivable without proletarian leadership of the new state. In other words -- and the catalysts may well have been the Ghanaian and Egyptian experiences -- revolutionary democrats are a necessary but not sufficient element; there must be a proletarian-led government. The reasoning behind this is that there can be no policy of "class peace" -- class distinctions grow in the new state and

therefore a class view of society is necessary. Given a class view, and the abandonment of the class harmony approach of the united-front national liberation party, then as classes emerge, the proletariat must do battle (politically, not literally) and it must rule if there is to be true development in the socialist direction.

Thus one can find Soviet theoreticians arguing two different views today: those who say that nationalism (with its attitude of class cooperation) and bourgeois nationalists (even if petit bourgeois-middle strata) cannot breed scientific socialism. Against them are those who argue that national liberation as such is revolutionary, a necessary historical stage which progresses, as it did in Russia, towards socialism. In both cases, it is clear that in the new state, nationalism as a basic ideology must give way to a socialist view; the question, not an entirely new one even in Marxist-Leninist thinking, is whether this will be the result of spontaneous, historical development or of the efforts of a vanguard party with the proletariat assumption of political power in the state. There is no argument over the requirement that the state's orientation be socialist; the disagreement revolves around how this will happen: does the non-capitalist path, by definition, lead to scientific socialism or does it need help by means of a party and proletarian leadership?

The predominance of the advocates of a vanguard party become clear not only in the Soviet press and literature, but in the actual pressure the Soviets placed on their new allies such as Ethiopia, for example. As distinct from the pressures of the

sixties and primarily to gain broad national fronts which would include the Communists, namely the efforts in Iraq and Syria (even when the local Communists did not feel that immersion in such fronts was to their advantage because of the limitations this would place on their activities), the call by the late seventies was for a genuine proletariat vanguard party. It must be added that the Soviets did not achieve this goal in any place beyond South Yemen and Afghanistan, though in the latter case, they can only maintain power by force of their Soviet arms.

The above indeed raises the question as to how far the Soviets are willing to go in their pressures for such a party or proletariat regime; and secondly, what will their response be to crises and setbacks amongst the independent Third World states. In answer to the first question, one cannot ignore the fact that despite the preponderance in the theoretical literature of the call for a vanguard party and the demands placed on Ethiopia, for example, to implement this objective, Moscow has done little to enforce this demand. It has in fact continued to maintain perfectly cordial, even close, alliances with such states as Libya, which are far from responding to this demand. Moreover, no real pressures (of an economic/military nature, for example) have been brought upon Ethiopia to bring about the necessary political changes. Aside from the South Yemen and Afghanistan coups of 1978, no Marxist-Leninist party has, in fact, come to power in the countries favored by Moscow in the Third World. And there exists much doubt as to just how great a role, if any, Moscow played in the 1978 events of South Yemen and

Afghanistan. With an ally such as Syria or Iraq, we do not even see pressures to achieve the kind of proletariat leadership advocated above, and there is no case in which implementation of such a demand has become a sine qua non for Soviet aid or even alliance. This is not to say that the Soviets do not encourage the creation and/or legalization of Communist parties, but their major push remains to have these parties included in national or united fronts, despite all the rhetoric around the vanguard party idea. Nor is this to say that the rhetoric is a sterile academic debate -- on the contrary, it is apparently a very serious debate as to the value of investments (economic and political as well as other) in new states, given the uncertainty of their future path. The vanguard party school may be winning on the theoretical side, but the policy winner remains that group which argues the middle, most realistic line: scientific socialism will not come "naturally," spontaneously through historical development; but at the same time, a vanguard party with proletariat leadership cannot yet be expected. Therefore, one must limit one's expectations, work within the uncertain framework which exists while striving to gain economic and political advantage for the Soviet Union on an immediate basis, with few illusions as to the permanence or certainty of the future orientation. This means:

(1) planning Soviet-Third World relations on a pragmatic, profit-seeking basis, i.e. an effort to gain a return on one's economic and political investment rather than blindly pouring in

money, easy credits, moratoria on payments and the like. This shift in Soviet policy was amply pointed out by Elizabeth Valkenier in the early 1970s, and further research in the trade and aid figures has substantiated her thesis.

(2) It has meant an effort to gain formal Friendship and Mutual Assistance Treaties in hopes of protecting Soviet interests (bases, naval facilities, and so forth) through formal commitments with the understanding that proletariat-led regimes to protect these interests are simply not a realistic objective.

(3) This has meant, as already stated, continued relations with regimes of varied political/ideological colorings, often ignoring their negative policies towards their local Communists. With the rise in fundamentalist Islam and its revolutionary dimensions, the Soviets even found a way of reconciling their theoretical positions with this purely religious movement. Thus, they speak of progressive as well as the usual religious reactionary trends in Islam. The progressive aspects can be helpful and are to be encouraged. Warning that the movement, like the petit bourgeois and the bourgeois-led movements, can go in either direction, the overall emphasis has been on supporting them in the hope that the progressive element (read: anti-Western) will dominate. It must be added, however, that in the past two years, as Iran became increasingly anti-Soviet (or significantly less forthcoming to the Soviet Union), Soviet literature on Islam has become a bit more cautionary regarding the "reactionary" elements of the religious movement.

(4) It has not meant abandonment of a propaganda effort to wean these states from involvement in the Western world economy, emphasis of late being placed not only o the classical arguments of neo-colonialism, but on the arms race as being costly and dangerous -- an argument which can be read to mean: do not buy arms from the West (and this despite the fact that the Soviets would also like to expand their arms sales in the Third World).

(5) Similarly, it has not meant discontinuation of parallel activities to organize and of propaganda to cultivate alternative forces to the less ideologically acceptable governments, but rather (except in the case of Sudan in 1971), Moscow has been very careful in weighing the relative potential of such forces and when to support an actual takeover attempt. Even Sudan was a case of a Soviet miscalculation, possibly influenced by fear of Chinese pressures within the Sudanese Communist party regarding the success of a coup attempt. Moscow's policies have maintained their post-Brest-Litovsk dualism: government-to-government (ruling party-to-ruling party) relations, parallel to and simultaneously with cultivation of revolutionary forces to be encouraged towards action apparently only when two conditions exist: propitious circumstances for success and absence of Western interest of an intervention-producing nature. Barring these two conditions, local Communists (Egyptians, Syrians, Iraqis, even Iranians) must subordinate their plans to Moscow's interest in maintaining relatively positive relations with the ruling powers.

As to the second set of questions: how far are the Soviets willing to go when they do consider the situation ripe and risks low? What kind of assistance are they willing to render and how involved are they willing to get in Third World crises? For these questions there is less theoretical discussion. The estimate presumably prepared by the Soviets prior to specific acts on the international scene encompasses much more than the local situation in a specific Third World country or region. In terms of priorities, the most important consideration, which takes precedence over all others, is the risk of military confrontation with the United States. This has been the overriding consideration determining Soviet behavior in the Middle East and undoubtedly is the major factor in Soviet calculations regarding most parts of the world. Whether the Soviet estimate of U.S. willingness to act has changed over the past several years, therefore altering the restrictiveness of this criterion, is a point open to debate. In the Middle East crises from 1967 on and including the Yom Kippur War, the Soviets were restrained in their behavior by the concern over confrontation with the United States, in view of America's clear commitment to Israel and interest in the area. It was this concern that led to the Soviet-Egyptian rift, when the Soviets persisted in their opposition to what was called a "military" rather than a "political" solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. And it was this concern that led to Soviet efforts, from the first day of the 1973 war, to achieve a cease-fire, despite the damage these efforts caused the Soviet-Arab

relationship.[3] Even greater restraint was displayed in the Lebanese war of 1982, when the Soviets, despite the cost to their relations with Syria and the PLO, were unwilling in any way to get involved, lest escalation lead to confrontation with the United States.

In Angola and the Horn of Africa, the combination of the use of a proxy (which nonetheless was something of an independent policy in both, but especially the Angolan case) and the absence of a clear American commitment probably satisfied the requirements of the criterion of avoiding military confrontation with the United States. It is possible, however, that the post-Vietnam syndrome was operative in Soviet decision-making in these two crises, i.e. the Soviets estimated that U.S. public opinion and the Congress would effectively prevent any American attempt to intervene militarily, at least in these areas. Presumably, the failure of the Carter Administration to respond decisively to the overthrow of the Shah, to the 1978 Marxist coup in Afghanistan, or to Soviet involvement in the Horn of Africa, or even Washington's behavior in the Cuban mini-crisis, fortified Soviet estimates of American "immobilism." On the basis of these experiences, the Soviets could move into Afghanistan in 1979. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the Soviet Union, even in that period, felt free to operate without concern for the American response. Even if the Soviet estimate of American willingness to act was influenced by the post-Vietnam syndrome, there is little reason to believe that Moscow concluded that the United States no longer had any firm commitments that it was

willing to meet with force, even in the Carter era. Turkey, Israel, and Saudi Arabia in the Third World, to mention but the three most likely, remained and still remain beyond the red line perceived by the Soviet Union as the threshold of American willingness to act militarily. Central and Latin America are probably also part of this picture, for despite Cuban involvement, the Soviets have demonstrated signs of concern over provoking the United States so close to home. The Reagan Administration, with its apparent undoing of the post-Vietnam syndrome, its action in Grenada, as well as dispatch of forces to Lebanon, has changed Soviet perceptions still again. Even with the failure of American policy in Lebanon and the withdrawal of the Marines, the Soviet estimate of American willingness to act appears to be high, dictating a relatively cautious policy about Soviet involvement in Third World crises.

After the primary consideration -- the American response -- the second consideration is the estimate of possible success or failure. The possibility of Soviet action in support of a local Marxist coup or revolution having negative ramifications for Soviet interests in the region, i.e. beyond the state directly involved, does not appear to have been a limiting factor on Soviet behavior in recent years. Support of the Sudanese Communist coup attempt in 1970, despite the risk to relations with Egypt; support of Ethiopia, despite the risk to relations with Somalia (and the Arab states behind the Eritrean rebels), and support of the Afghan coup, despite the risk to relations with the Islamic world, particularly Iran, and the risk of a

strengthening Chinese-Pakistani-U.S. friendship, all attested to the fact that the only overriding Soviet considerations were the possible U.S. response and the likelihood of local success. One may argue that the regional consideration was not totally ignored, for a Marxist regime in the Sudan, in Ethiopia, in Afghanistan or in South Yemen may have been perceived as a long-term advantage whose value would far outweigh the short-run damage to Soviet interests in Egypt, Somalia or elsewhere in the region. Ethiopia, for example, was undoubtedly perceived as the much larger and important prize than Somalia, at a time when the USSR-Somalia alliance appeared to be waning in any case. Less likely, Sudan may have been perceived as more important than the increasingly unstable alliance with Sadat, in view of the shift of Soviet priorities to the Indian Ocean area, and particularly, considering the role of the Chinese Communists in the coup attempt -- though in both cases, the Soviets probably thought they could quickly repair the damage done to Soviet-Somalian and Soviet-Egyptian relations.

Yet, to a large degree, exploitation of opportunities for success -- in the Angolan, Sudanese, Ethiopian, South Yemeni and 1978 Afghan cases -- and the estimate that confrontation with the United States would not endure, explain the Soviet behavior. Conversely, in other states, where both these criteria do not exist (e.g. in Iran where the Communists had long had little chance of success), the ruling regime was still favored, often purely wishfully as the Soviets hoped to gain significant benefits from state-to-state relations.

Just what type of Soviet action can be expected in a case of local crises is a question yet to be finally answered. Looking at the following charts, one can see gradations of Soviet aid to movements seeking power and actual Soviet behavior during a series of crises over the past fifteen years.

SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN THIRD WORLD CRISES 1969-1984*
Inter-state Conflicts

	Direct military intervention	Threat of direct intervention	Intervention by proxy	Naval activity	Participation of military advisors	Military Supplies	Diplomatic Political Activity	Political Involvement (clandestine or otherwise)	Propaganda activity	No Activity
Greece-Turkey (1974)				x					x	
Guatemala-Belize(1975)									x	
E. Timor-Indonesia (1975-76)										x
Syria-Lebanon(1976)				x				x	x	
Greece-Turkey)1976)										x
Guatemala-Belize(1976)									x	
Zaire-Angola (1977)								x(?)	x	
Egypt-Libya(1977)				x					x	
Ethiopia-Somalia (1977-8)			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Vietnam-Cambodia (1977-78)							x	x	x	
Zaire-Angola(1978)								x(?)	x	
Libya-Chad(1978)										x
Israel-Lebanon(1978)									x	
China-Vietnam(1978-9)				x			x	x	x	
North-South Yemen(1979)				x					x	
Uganda-Tazania (1979)										
Iran-Iraq(1980 --)						x(late)				
U.S.-Libya (1981)				x					x	
Israel-Lebanon(1982)				x			x	x	x	
USSR-S. Korea(1983)*					x	x	x	x		

SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN THIRD WORLD CRISES 1969-1984*

Inter-state Conflicts*

	Direct military intervention	Threat of direct intervention	Intervention by proxy	Naval activity	Participation of military advisors	Military Supplies	Diplomatic Political Activity	Political Involvement (clandestine or otherwise)	Propaganda activity	No Activity
U.S.-N. Korea(1969)				x			x		x	
Vietnam(1954-75)				x	x	x	x	x	x	
Iraq-Iran(1969)										x
Honduras-El Salvador (1969)										x
Israel-Egypt(1970)				x	x	x	x	x	x	
U.S.-U.S.S.R.-Cuba				x			x	x	x	
Syria-Jordan (1970)				x				x	x	
Portugal-Guinea(1970)							x	x	x	
S. Vietnam-Laos(1971)								x	x	
Uganda-Tazania(1971)									x	
India-Pakistan(1971)				x		x			x	
North-South Yemen(1972)									x	
Israel-Egypt-Syria (1973)		x	**	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Iraq-Kuwait(1973)										x
Yemen-Oman(1973-6)				x		x	x	x	x	

* Much of the data for this table was taken from Michael Breecher's Data Bank of International Crises, Jerusalem(forthcoming).

** Non-Soviet advisors (Cubans, North Koreans) participated

SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN THIRD WORLD CRISES 1969-1984*

Internal Conflicts

	Direct military intervention	Threat of direct intervention	Intervention by proxy	Naval activity	Participation of military advisors	Military Supplies	Diplomatic Political Activity	Political Involvement (clandestine or otherwise)	Propaganda activity	No Activity
Nigeria(1965-69)						x			x	
Jordan (1970)				x						
Somalia (1970)				x				x	x	
Chad(1971)										x
Sudan(1971)							x	x	x	
Afghanistan (1973)								x(?)	x	
Chile(1973)									x	
Ethiopia(1974)									x	
Angola(1975)			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Lebanon (1976)				x				x	x	
South Yemen(1978)								x	x	
Afghanistan(1978)								x(?)	x	
Iran(1978-9)									x	
Nicaragua (1978-9)			x						x	
El Salvador(1980--)			x						x	
Afghanistan(1979)	x				x	x	x	x	x	
Liberia(1980)									x	
Ghana(1981)										x
Lebanon(1983)								x	x	
Grenada(1983)				x					x	

SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN THIRD WORLD CRISES 1969-1984*

Protracted Crises of National Liberation Movements

	Direct Military Intervention	Proxy Military Intervention	Military Advisors	Training in Bloc or Third Country	Direct Arms Supplies	Indirect Arms Supplies	Political Activity	No Support
Anyanya								x
Khuzistan								x
ELF-EPLF (Ethiopia-Eritrea)				x(pre-1974)		x(pre-1974)		x(post-1974)
Kurds (Iran;Iraq)				x' (pre-1971-1972)	x(pre-1971-72)		x(pre1971 1972)	x(post-1972)**
Frolinat(Chad)				x(?)		x(?)		x(?)
ANC (South Africa)				x	x		x	
PLO (Palestine)				x	x		x	
Polisario (Western Sahara)				x		x	x	
FRELIMO (Mozambique)				x(?)			x	
MPLA (Angola)		x	x	x	x		x	
PAIGC(Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde		x		x	x		x	
ZAPU (Zimbabwe)				x	x		x	
Vietcong(Vietnam)		x	x	x	x			
SWAPO (Namibia)				x	x		x	
Dhofar(Oman)				x	x		x	
Moros(Philippines)***								x

x The following tables cover the more significant crises; they are not intended as an exhaustive list. Some cases fall into more than one category, i.e. both internal and inter-state upon occasion; thus, for example, the Moroccan march into the Western Sahara is subsumed under the Polisario, Rhodesia's raids on its neighbors under ZAPU, and S. African raids into Angola under Angola's internal conflicts.

**Reports of renewed support after 1978 Iraq and 1979 Iran

***It is difficult to determine the Soviet relationship with the Moros.

While a longer study could draw many analytic conclusions from these charts, the subjects of primary interest are the military-interventionist ones, i.e. military supplies, participation of military advisors, fleet movements, intervention by proxy, threat of direct intervention and direct intervention. First, it can be noted that during relatively protracted national liberation struggles, the Soviets have almost always been willing to provide arms (in 12 out of 15 cases even to non-Marxist movements, although in the case of the secessionists -- Eritrea and the Kurds - the arms supplies were either only indirect or limited to certain periods). The POLISARIO appears to be receiving only indirect arms supplies as well, presumably because of the complexities of Soviet interests in the areas, which include trade with Morocco. Similarly, training of the insurgents in Soviet-sponsored centers is a common factor in almost every case. Both arms supplies and training are low-risk investments for the Soviet Union, undoubtedly designed to gain future influence and credit in the eyes of the movements. No ideological distinctions appear to be made at this stage, and it may be assumed that Chinese involvement with rival groups makes the investment all the more important to the Soviets. The only exceptions are the secessionist cases such as post-1974 Eritrea, Southern Sudan, Khuzistan, post 1971-72 Kurdish movements and the Frolinat of Chad. The Soviets refrained from supporting secessionist movements and in the cases of the Eritreans, the Anyanya and the Kurds, have even been involved in their suppression at various

times, presumably because of the interest in strengthening their relationship with the ruling central regime. It has been argued, however, that this restraint regarding secessionist movements, apparent in the case of Biafra as well, may be due to the Soviet fear of the frailty of their own federal system. Whatever the reason, the Soviets have been consistent in the Third World in recognizing the status quo as to demands for independence by secessionists. They have, however, been willing to support the more limited demand of autonomy and on occasion to support secessionist movements, temporarily and in a limited fashion (pre-1974 Eritrea, in Iraq, pre-1971-72 Kurds, possibly again post-1978; and during various periods, Kurds in Iran) when Moscow stands in conflict with the ruling government. The limited and sporadic nature of such support suggests that it is employed for tactical reasons as leverage on the ruling states (Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq), but full support is withheld so as not to disrupt the state-to-state relationship. In these cases, the efforts for improved relations with the state takes precedence. While the Soviets have been relatively generous in their supplying and training of national liberation movements, they have been exceedingly careful about involvement, direct or by proxy, in the struggles themselves -- only in three cases out of 15 was a proxy used (in Angola, Guinea Bissau and North Vietnam) -- and even in these it is arguable as to how accurate the term "proxy" may be, inasmuch as Cubans, for example, maintained an independent policy towards the support for national liberation movements well before and often more actively than the Soviets, and North Vietnam

certainly had its own interests in the Vietnam War. Nonetheless, the Soviets clearly and fully supported these efforts by their allies and reaped the benefits; nor could either of them have acted as fully as they did without this Soviet aid. This having been said, we are still dealing with only three cases, and there are no cases of direct Soviet military involvement in a national liberation struggle.

The same relative caution may be perceived regarding Soviet behavior during crises in the Third World of an interstate nature. The Soviets were not particularly hesitant to take a propaganda stand (though in some cases, such as the conflict between the two Yemens or Cyprus, this is minimal so as not to alienate the other party). Indeed, they refrain (in eight out of 34 cases) only when they are hesitant to alienate either of the parties involved (e.g. Iran and Iraq) or presumably find the conflict of too little interest to warrant taking a position (e.g. Honduras-El Salvador). Becoming politically involved, in the sense of advising, encouraging or conversely of trying to restrain at a critical point, is a less frequent pattern of Soviet behavior. In only 16 of 34 cases did the Soviets become politically involved; in two (Shaba I and Shaba II) the degree of their involvement is, to this day, unclear, and in three (Syria-Jordan, 1970; Syria-Lebanon 1976; U.S.-North Korea) the role was negative, i.e. a restraining role on Syria to remove its troops from a confrontation from Jordan and Lebanon respectively, and a restraining role on North Korea in the incident of the shooting down of a U.S. aircraft. It is possible that in an additional

case, Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, the Soviet position may not have been one of fulsome support because of the risks involved, despite Moscow's interest in eliminating Chinese influence in Cambodia. And some Soviet restraining influence may have been invoked in its conflict with Kuwait in 1973.

In 12 of these 16 cases of political involvement, a close Soviet ally was involved (Vietnam, the Arab States), and, in the case of Ethiopia-Somalia it was a matter of the Soviets seizing an opportunity for gaining influence in Ethiopia. This was also the case, to a lesser degree, concerning the Portuguese raid on Craley, though most of the Soviet activity came after the crisis. In all of these cases, (with the possible exception of Yemen-Oman, Iraq-Kuwait, Portugal-Guinea) serious strategic Soviet interests with global implications were at stake, and Soviet support was crucial to maintaining the alliance. Even the, in the Arab-Israeli conflicts, Soviet support was mixed with restraining efforts.

The question of importance is the degree to which political support dictated some sort of military activity on the Soviets' part. Generally speaking, where there was political involvement, there were also military supplies, and a demonstrative movement of the Soviet fleet to provide the client state with the appearance of protection or a signal to the United States not to get involved. Fleet movements were much more frequent than arms supplies; indeed, the showing of the flag is apparently considered a rapid, low-cost, low-risk means of fulfilling Soviet commitments and supporting Soviet pursuit of interests. In rare

cases, these measures came even when political involvement was probably not requested (India-Pakistan) or not rendered, so as not to antagonize the adversary (Iraq-Iran, in which renewed arms supplies to Iraq were nonetheless provided to prevent total alienation of one side).[4] In some cases, the navy was deployed after the crisis (U.S.-Libya; Portugal-Guinea, Iraq-Kuwait). The higher risk actions of the involvement of Soviet advisors or even the use of a proxy (Cuba) came on only four occasions: the Vietnam War, to a very limited degree; the Egyptian-Israel War of Attrition in 1970; the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the 1977-78 Ethiopian-Somalian War. Only in the second case was the threat of direct Soviet intervention used and on no occasion was full-scale direct Soviet military intervention employed. Inasmuch as this one case of greatest Soviet activity was also one of high global risk, one can only conclude that the stakes (the salvaging of the Soviets' strategic and political interests in the Middle East) were sufficiently high as to be overriding. Even then, the Soviet intention of implementing its threat is open to question. This does not pertain to the conflict on the Horn, in which no global risk was involved, nor was direct Soviet military intervention -- or a threat thereof -- necessary to maintain Soviet interests.

A similar, even more cautious picture emerges regarding Soviet behavior in internal conflicts (civil war, coup d'etat, attempted coup). Propaganda activity is no problem and indeed is employed almost indiscriminately to gain whatever political points possible, usually at the expense of the United States and/or China, no matter what the conflict. Only on three out of

20 occasions did the Soviets refrain from some propaganda comment except of the neutral, objective type of reporting. These were the civil war in Jordan, 1970, the attempted coup in Chad in 1971 and the Ghanaian coup of 1981. Presumably the Soviets refrained from taking a position so as not to alienate any of the forces involved, in the first two cases, in the belief that the status quo would triumph; in the third presumably out of uncertainty as to the potential for change. Propaganda support does not mean actual political involvement or support. While the Soviets had interests in most of the crises for which they gave propaganda support to one side or the other, they do not appear to have actually been involved politically in 11 out of the 20 cases -- for example they do not appear to have been involved directly in trying to save Allende's government, in the Ethiopian revolution of 1974, in the overthrow of the Shah,[5] in the overthrow of Talbert in Liberia, or even in El Salvador and Nicaragua. Even in the cases of the South Yemen and Afghanistan coups of 1978, direct Soviet political involvement is not certain, though rumors tend enough in the direction of some, albeit slight, Soviet assistance as to warrant their placement in the category of political support. But in almost all of the cases this is where Soviet activity stopped. Only in three instances did Soviet involvement take the form of political activity; in the case of Sudan, for the reasons already outlined, and in those of Angola and Afghanistan (which will be dealt with separately). Soviet activity did not go beyond the political in the Sudanese case probably because the stakes were not high enough to warrant it --

the political support given was in itself limited and probably motivated more by competition with the Chinese than the belief that a significant strategic gain was in the offing. Aside from the Angola and Afghanistan cases, arms supplies were sent during the crisis only to Nigeria, presumably to maintain a relationship with Nigeria and in keeping with Soviet reservations regarding secessionist movements.

As in the previous categories, Soviet naval activity is more frequent than military supplies or use of military advisors, but still not employed in every case of even political involvement. In some cases, such as Jordan and Lebanon, the fleet movement presumably was intended purely as a signal to the United States that the Soviet Union would become involved should the U.S. decide to intervene. Only in the case of Yemen did the movement come in support of a group seeking to overthrow the existing government. On all other occasions, when the Soviet fleet was invoked, it was in support of the existing government.

The use of a proxy in four cases is highly questionable. There is no evidence that Cuba did or does in fact act as a Soviet proxy in Latin America. While Cuba is closely allied with Moscow, its Latin American activities have always been beyond the purview of Moscow. There have even been cases, such as El Salvador, in which the Soviets have cautioned the Cubans to limit their efforts. Even in the case of Angola, after independence, one cannot fully accept Cuba as merely a proxy, and there have been signs of policy disagreement. Nonetheless, in the case of Angola, the Soviets have been happy to have the pro-American and pro-Chinese elements embattled, and have been willing to engage

limited numbers of Soviet advisors in the task.

Only in the case of Afghanistan -- of all the 19 internal crises and indeed all cases of any type of crisis in the Third World -- do we have actual Soviet military intervention with its own armed forces. That Afghanistan represented a deviation from previous Soviet policy is indisputable. Only in recent years have the Soviets had the actual military-logistic capabilities for such an intervention. Therefore, the question is, did Afghanistan mark a precedent for an actual change in Soviet policy? In a recent book, Mark Katz argues that there has been a progression in Soviet Third World military activity, seeing a trend in the Angolan, then Ethiopian, then Afghanistan interventions. He notes that, after the fact, Soviet theoretical materials about military intervention have also changed, at least to the point of justifying wars in the Third World connected with states in which Marxist forces have come to power: Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan.[6]

I would contend that while the invasion of Afghanistan did fit this category of supporting Marxist regimes, there are two elements in the Afghanistan criss which may mark it as "special," rather than necessarily as a precedent. The first of these elements is indeed the Marxist nature of the regime. The 1978 coup had brought to power a Marxist party which switfly linked the country to the Soviet Union in virtually every form of contact, cooperation, and subordination. The reasons for the Soviet invasion were that those elements directly linked to the Soviet Union had been gradually eased out or purged (taking

refuge in Eastern Europe), leaving in power persons, ultimately Amin, who were less interested in or bound to Moscow. This coincided with the increasingly apparent lack of ability of the regime to put down the rebellion within the country so that a situation of acute instability existed for the Marxist regime in particular, and Soviet interests in general. In this sense, the Brezhnev Doctrine was specifically invoked to justify the invasion. Does this mean that the Brezhnev Doctrine will henceforth be extended to all Marxist Third World regimes or even those calling themselves socialist?

The presence of a second element may further delineate Soviet future activities. The second element in the Afghanistan case was the fact that Afghanistan was not only a Marxist-led state, but it was also a state directly contiguous to the Soviet Union, demonstrating perhaps the priority of Soviet interests in stability on its own borders. But doesn't this mean that all of Moscow's neighbors, such as Iran are now in danger? All that the Afghanistan case demonstrates is something we have seen before, the combination of both elements: the threat to a Marxist regime in a state directly bordering on the Soviet Union. This is not to say that there will be no precedent in the future of direct Soviet military intervention in a Third World crisis. But I do suggest that Afghanistan did not necessarily mark a new direction in Soviet Third World behavior. Indeed, there have been crises since the invasion in which the Soviets have taken far from active roles. Iran itself is a case in point, but there have been other internal crises such as Liberia, Ghana, Lebanon and Grenada, and inter-state crises such as the Iran-Iraq war and the

Israeli invasion of Lebanon, as well as the ongoing national liberation struggles in southern Africa and the Western Sahara, the Kurds, the Eritreans and the conflicts in Central America. In all of these, the more cautious pattern demonstrated by the Soviet Union has prevailed, with Moscow's usual disdain for impetuous guerrilla warfare as a preferred tactic still in evidence, as well as the propaganda and theoretical proscriptions to Third World states such as Syria that they must fight their battles themselves. Moreover, the Afghanistan case does not tell us if the Soviets would be willing to directly intervene militarily if a firm commitment on the part of the U.S. were perceived. While there were risks in the Afghanistan invasion (regional, in alienating the Islamic world, alarming India, drawing Pakistan and the U.S. and China together), the global consideration was probably dominant -- and that indicated low risk.

There is another type of Soviet involvement not included in Soviet behavior in actual crises which is nonetheless indicative of Soviet interests in the Third World. This is the dispatch of military advisors or the display of the flag in efforts to gain influence and/or protect client regimes following a crisis, i.e. Soviet moves to exploit a threatening situation to a Third World client. The Stephen Kaplan collection has amply analyzed such activities by the Soviets, including such moves as the dispatch of Soviet ships to Guinean waters after the attack on Conakry in 1970, Soviet fleet movements after the 1973 Israeli-Arab war and the like. One may add to this the increased dispatch of Soviet

military advisors to Syria after the Lebanese war of 1982. Here too, proxies such as North Koreans, as well as Cubans, have been used. This type of Soviet involvement, which accompanied the Soviet effort to gain friendship and mutual assistance treaties to provide formal frameworks and protection for Soviet interests, has become an increasingly frequent form of Soviet involvement, implying greater commitment over the past fifteen years. The Soviets had eleven such treaties (the treaties with Egypt and Somalia were abrogated; one is believed pending with Libya) and military advisors in seven states (Ethiopia, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Mauritania and Syria) plus over 100,000 troops fighting in Afghanistan (and advisors in Communist Cuba and Vietnam). These commitments are, to a large degree, designed not only to gain and maintain influence, but also to obtain and maintain bases, naval facilities and the like as part of the forward deployment characteristic of the 1970s.

There is nothing to suggest that the Soviet Union has in any way given up its interest in the Third World, nor can one even speak of reduced interest. Economic constraints may have somewhat limited Soviet expansionism. But in turn there appears to be an increased economic interest in the Third World, not only in increased profit-seeking in balance of payments and trade, but also in the sale of Soviet arms. The Third World is still seen by Soviet leaders as the stage for superpower competition; it may not be the most intrinsically important prize (Western Europe remains the main prize), but it is in the Third World that the competition is taking place and where the balance can be tipped in one direction or another. There are, of course, strategic and

economic (in terms of natural resources) gains to be made in the Third World, but the strategic, together with political factors appear to be Moscow's main objective, viewed continuously within a global context.

Notes

1. V. Solodovnikov, W. Bogoslovsky, Non-Capitalist Development, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 107.

2. The term "national democracy" rather than national bourgeois or bourgeois democracy comes to distinguish between the bourgeois revolution of Europe and the phenomenon in the Third World, in which internal and external forces other than the bourgeoisie play a central role.

3. The cease-fire was objected to by the PLO, Iraq, Libya and even Syria, which by the end of the war claimed it was preparing a counter-offensive. Libya in particular condemned Soviet cooperation with the U.S., while Iraq and the PLO argued that the cease-fire had been limited to UNSC resolution 242.

4. Arms supplies resumed when Iran moved into Iraqi soil, and Soviet-Iranian relations were not progressing in any case.

5. Brezhnev's November 1978 warning against outside military intervention in Iran's internal conflict is the only move which could be construed as political support, and this relatively late in the conflict.

6. Mark Katz, The Third World in Soviet Military Thought, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982.

IRREVERSIBILITY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

I will teach those Mexicans to elect good men.

Woodrow Wilson, 1912

How dare you break into my house to pull my child out of the fire?

"M" in Encounter, Jan. 1984 on British attitude to Grenada.

We will never let go the reins of power

Trotsky, to the Kronstadt Soviet, 1921

I. The pre-Soviet History of Irreversibility

The concept of irreversible political change, recently much discussed because of the spread of the Soviet empire in the Third World, is on reflection one of deep importance and wide ramification, which has received far too little explicit attention. Soviet imperialism has made us think about it, but to discover its essence it is best to begin with some non-Soviet considerations. We shall in any case discover nothing we did not already know, merely a new and hopefully useful way of looking at many old things.

Personal power is always reversed by death, but in ancient and modern times alike rulers have sought irreversible fame or glory, notably in stone, like Ozymandias, beneath whose fallen statue Shelley tells us there stood on the pedestal:

"Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair[1]"

But Ozymandias, we may presume, knew that he was mortal.

This, and perhaps only this, is a "pre-irreversibility" phenomenon. But beyond the self-glorifying individual lies the biological dynasty. This is an institution seeking

irreversibility, and so comes much nearer to our Soviet subject. For a dynasty can in theory be immortal. Well, that is, will die, but there will still be the institution of hereditary kingship and my family will provide all the kings. Thus Macbeth (Act. IV Scene 2):

[The three witches put on] a show of eight Kings, the last with a glass in his hand; Banquo's Ghost following

> Thou art too like the spirit of Banquo;
> down!
> Thy crown does sear mine eye-balls: and thy
> hair,
> Thou other gold-bound brow, is like the
> first:
> A third is like the former. Filthy hags!
> Why do you show me this? A fourth! Start,
> eyes!
> What! will the line stretch out to the crack
> of doom?
> Another yet! A seventh! I'll see no more;
> And yet the eight appears, who bears a glass
> Which shows me many more; and some I see
> That two-fold balls and treble sceptres
> carry.
> Horrible sight. Now, I see, 'tis true;
> For the blood-bolter'd Banquo smiles upon me,
> And points at them for his.

But after all dynastic power is but the succession of personal power from father to son, and sons are different and, on succession, independent people who introduce their own ideas. So even Banquo's endless line of descendants did not constitute an irreversible detailed plan of society, nor was it meant to. For that, we must await the coming of other institutions: the organised religions and the states with closed, self-conscious <u>ideologies</u>.

The Roman Empire was perhaps the first near-instance of this phenomenon. Already Augustus was "into" irreversibility with his

custom-made epic, in which his paid propagandist, Vergil, puts these words into Jove's mouth:

> His ego nec metas rerum tempora pono;
> imperium sine fine dedi. (Aeneid, I, 278-9)

(To these things I set no bounds or times; I have given empire without end.) Had Augustus an ideology? I would call him a marginal case. But compulsory emperor-worship, introduced shortly after his death, indicates that at any rate his successors had an ideology. They did, too, persecute such sects as the Jews and the Christians, who refused the official sacrifices.

It would take us too far afield to discuss organised dogmatic religions, without direct state power. All of them, however, make obvious claims to irreversibility, since their creeds purport to be infallible and unchangeable. It is the mono-religious, or mono-ideological, <u>state</u> that is our concern. Until the religion crumbles the state will defend it by force, since it moves nearly all servants of the state. Indeed in many cases it is difficult to distinguish church from state at all. It is no accident that Tsarist Russia was a perfect case of that, with its priest-Tsar ruling in and radiating from the Third Rome, to which there would be no Fourth.

Such states then, as opposed to mere secular dynasties, present irreversible forms of rule. They yield only to external military defeat or to exceptional intellectual "reformations". Such reformations usually represent external intellectual defeats: ideas incompatible with the religion, but seemingly superior to its own ideas, seep in and undermine it.

A mono-religious state may not, if it is non-self-conscious, intend to be irreversible. It may just happen to be there, a fairly natural product of human history. But the Nazi state and the Tsarist state and all the Communist states and Khomeini's Iran and indeed the Papal states were or are self-conscious about it, and it is with that self-consciousness that we put aside Banquo's moderate ghost to face a more modern and formidable reality.

For irreversibility is incompatible with parliamentary democracy. The latter permits all parties to arise and all policies to be tried, including the maddest reversions to previous states of society and the wildest forms of extreme experiment. So long as its rules are obeyed - which of course by no means always happens - the people can always vote themselves back out of whatever unpleasantness they have wandered into. It is for this reason, and I think only for this reason, that even those "moderate extremists" who are not philosophical determinists or dedicated to a priori reasoning, still commonly reject parliamentary democracy. It is difficult of course to get a majority, and they may admit that the ignorance of the electorate is insuperable, even to the extent that they will never get in: "Most of the people may be wrong", said the Nazis. But they find it in anticipation easy to keep a majority once in power: how could the people desert Paradise once it has been revealed? Opposition to Paradise is by definition immoral, therefore reversibility is no longer necessary, nay it encourages immorality.

If people are to be governed in basic general accordance with their wishes (note that I avoid the overloaded word "will") they must have institutions guaranteeing reversibility, since their wishes may change, or their elected government may change against their wishes. Reversibility is the essence of human freedom, and it is the main thing that parliamentary democracy exists to guarantee.

Doctrines of historical inevitability are *a fortiori* doctrines of irreversibility. Historical determinists are more convinced than the less philosophical extremists of the previous paragraph, and particularly likely to condemn institutions guaranteeing reversibility. For they do hold that history is a sort of moral process, they do vest fate with a kind of desirability, or at least condemn heartily those who kick against its pricks, so that attempts to reverse its course - a course that has been revealed to the believers in some detail - are not only stupid but in some sense sinful. Such believers, then, hold that parliamentary democracy should be destroyed.

International irreversibility follows at once: the strong, or pioneering, country must help the weak or threatened or laggard. This is a very strong form of imperialism. Now quite apart from ideology, when one nation conquers another it quite usually claims an irreversible victory, and nationalism, irrelevant to domestic conflict, stiffens resistance to any reversal of the verdict. But without a domestic dedication to irreversibility it is difficult to maintain a foreign one. Sweet reason replaces the sense of mission, and conquered nations which

continue to resist usually regain their freedom, though seldom without bloodshed.

We are bound to mention here a pre-ideological form of irreversibility: genocide. Genocide has the advantage over all other forms of irreversibility in that it has no maintenance costs. There is no one left resist, and that really is that. Genocide was a common ancient tactic in war, and before there was a proper ideology of racism the white man practiced genocide throughout the Americas. Genocide however cannot be committed by the state against the nation of which it is the expression.[2] So it is by definition an imperialist, not a domestic issue.

But genocide was never a Leninist-Stalinist doctrine or - despite some near-misses - practice. And so we are brought face to face with our real problem: the existence in the modern world of a strong imperialistt power professing both domestic and international irreversibility, and having a mission to <u>convert</u>, not murder, the world.

II. <u>The USSR and Irreversibility</u>

First, how do these problems seem to them? There is a curious absence of the word, but not the concept of irreversibility ('neobratimost') in their ideological pronouncements. It is as if this obvious deduction from dialectical materialism had never formally been made, or, better, was too ontologically self-evident to make. But several other pronouncements came very close to it. It is best to start with the "irreversibility case-law" - for it really is case-law - pertaining to the East European satellites. They key document is

the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine of August 1968, justifying the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Surely the most official version is the Pravda leader (we have nothing from Brezhnev's own lips) of 22 August, p. 3 (our italics):

> the decisions of the C.C.P. Central Committee aimed at *correcting errors and shortcomings, perfecting party guidance* of every sphere of public life and developing socialist democracy. We regarded and continue to regard these decisions as the exclusive internal affair of Czechoslovak Communists and all the working people in the C.S.R.
>
> Second, the C.P.S.U. Central Committee has constantly emphasized that successful implementation of the decisions adopted can be guaranteed only through realization of the party's leading role and preservation of full party control over developments. In this connection attention was repeatedly called to the fact that a weakening of party leadership creates favorable conditions for the increased activity of rightists and even overtly counterrevolutionary forces, which make it their task to discredit the Czechoslovak Communist Party and remove it from power, to wrest the C.S.R. from the socialist commonwealth and ultimately to change the social system in Czechoslovakia.
>
> Third, the C.P.S.U. Central Committee contended and still contends that the fate of the Czechoslovak people's socialist gains and of Czechoslovakia as a socialist state linked by alliance commitments to our country and the other fraternal countries *is not merely the C.C.P.'s internal affair. It is the common affair of the entire commonwealth of socialist countries and the entire Communist movement.* This is why the C.P.S.U. Central Committee believes its international duty lies in taking every measure to promote the strengthening of the C.C.P., the preservation and consolidation of socialism in the C.S.R. and the defense of Czechoslovakia against imperialism's intrigues. It is our international duty and the international duty of all the fraternal parties to do so, and we would cease to be Communists if we refuse to discharge it.
>
> Such is the principled stand of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union - a stand based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.
>
> II. - The first and foremost point arousing serious alarm and concern is the position in which the Czechoslovak Communist Party has found itself - especially because *without strengthening the Communist Party and without materially ensuring its leadership role* in all spheres of

public life, any talk of "perfecting" socialism inevitably becomes fraudulent.

> In past months the counterrevolutionary forces in Czechoslovakia have been steadfastly waging a campaign to discredit the Communist Party. As a result, a real threat has been created that it will lose its leading position in society. The activation of anticommunist forces was promoted by the incorrect stand taken by a segment of the C.C.P. leadership and its deviation in a number of questions from Marxist-Leninist principles. It was precisely the repeated calls by certain C.C.P. leaders "to put an end to the Communists' monopoly of power", "to separate the party from the government" and to establish "equality" between the C.C.P. and other political parties, calls to repudiate party leadership of the state, the economy, culture, etc., that served as the original impetus for the unbridled campaign led by forces seeking to wreck the C.C.P. and deprive it of its leading role in society.

What Pravda is saying is that minor matters are for national choice, but no country that goes Communist may ever overthrow its government or change its mind, or indeed make major changes without Soviet permission. In other words, its citizens may never recover their internal freedom. This arises directly from the determinism or Marxist dialectical materialism: "Socialism" is historically inevitable, but the course of inevitability cannot be predicted in every detail. Therefore countries go "socialist" in no certain order - notably Lenin's genius was necessary to make the first revolution in Russia instead of Germany or the U.S.A. But once you have gone, there is no turning back.

Note the weasel-word "may" in the sentence underlined. The laws of the dialectic are both normative and positive at the same time. The confusion between these two terms in Marxism is both deliberate and complete, and the word "historical" is used to express it. It is the "historical" duty of each of us to help mankind along its path, which, however it will travel in any

case. A historical duty is not quite a moral duty. For to press the latter is to argue for free will and against determinism. Yet despite their contempt for moral appeals Communists are most creditably passionate and self-sacrificing for the sake of their mysterious historical duty.

It almost looks as if 1968 had been the year of the final assertion of irreversibility. Let us look first backwards. There was an obvious temporary retreat from it on 30th October 1956, when the Soviet withdrawal from Hungary was promised (Pravda 31 Oct.):

> "Declaration of the Government of USSR [N.B. Party not mentioned] on the basis of the development and further strengthening of friendship and co-operation between the Soviet Union and other socialist states.
>
> [One whole column of generalities not mentioning Hungary. One concrete item: they will discuss the further presence of Soviet advisers in Eastern Europe. We reproduce about one half the second column].
>
> "It is known that in consequence of the Warsaw Pact and of interstate agreements Soviet units are in the Hungarian and Romanian Republics. Units of the Soviet forces are in Poland on the basis of the four-power Potsdam Declaration and the Warsaw Pact. In the other people's democracies there are no Soviet units....
> The Soviet government stands on the principle that the location of the forces of this or that member-state of the Warsaw Pact on the territory of another such state occurs by agreement between all member-states of the Pact, and only with the agreement of the state on the territory of which they have at its request been located or it is intended to locate them.
>
> "[The situation in Hungary....] But to that just and progressive movement of the toilers there joined themselves quickly the forces of black reaction, which are trying to use the dissatisfaction of a part of the toilers....
>
> "[At the Hungarian government's request we entered Budapest to restore order in the city] Bearing in mind that the further presence of Soviet military units in Hungary could serve as the occasion of further tension the Soviet government has ordered the military commander to remove

> Soviet military units from the city of Budapest as soon as that is held to be necessary by the Hungarian government. At the same time the Soviet government is ready to enter into discussions with the government of the Hungarian People's Republic and other members of the Warsaw Pact on the question of the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Hungary.
>
> "The defence of the Socialist conquests of People's Democratic Hungary is at this moment the main and sacred obligation of the workers, peasants and intellectuals, of the whole Hungarian toiling people. The Soviet government expresses its confidence that the peoples of the socialist states will not allow external and internal reactionary forces to...."
>
> 30 Oct 1956.

To be sure, within one week the Kremlin, reversed itself, but it _had_ declared, if in very guarded language, that it would get out. Since on 30 October Hungarian Communist rule was plainly dead, the declaration _did_ signify the end of Communism in Hungary. Statements after 6 November do not clarify this position.

Let us go back yet again, to 10 March 1952. The great note of this date, commonly ascribed to Beria's influence, certainly said that Communism in East Germany was negotiable. It, and several that followed it, was a total volte-face over East Germany: it offered reunification; a sovereign Germany with its own forces, but pledged to join no alliance; the "free functioning of democratic parties and organizations". However suspiciously we read the small print, the probability of the loss of West Germany to democracy was very small, that of East Germany to Communism overwhelming; and this even without the hindsight that the Revolution of 17 June 1953 gives us. The historian is certainly free to take the view, favoured by Kurt Schumacher at the time and by the West German left today, that here the West

missed an opportunity. But the Western occupying powers, prompted by Konrad Adenauer, refused to exploit the opportunity, leaving a permanent wound on the West German psyche.

There was no such hesitation on 17 June 1953, when Stalin's successors put down the East German uprising with tanks. But that is no clear case of irreversibility. The USSR was still formally the occupying power. It had set up an East German administration, and the conquered population had been so unwise as to revolt against it. There was no treaty: the new East German administration was not a sovereign government.

As to the Communication of the Third World, I have elsewhere pointed out that all these new Communist countries have been denied membership of the CMEA. The most independent of them, Mozambique, has twice directly applied (Wiles et al. 1982, p. 364). Since it has proved impossible to admit the CMEA member, Vietnam, into the Warsaw Pact, under whose aegis the USSR conducts most oher formal political cooperation with her allies, CMEA membership remains nevertheless the touchstone of formal allied status. This I take to be, not an abandonment of the irreversibility claim or an intention to permit internal counter-revolution, but a bow to the only serious flaw in the whole irreversibility doctrine: the possibility of an American (or South African, or what not) invasion. We must not declare irreversible the revolutions we cannot protect.

Indeed Somalia achieved reversal all by herself in late 1977, when, having invaded Ethiopia in order to annex her *irredentra*, the Ogaden, she saw the USSR take the Ethiopian side.

The Russians were already deeply established in Somalia, and of course, as usual this penetration was mainly military. But the Somali "revolution" retained pronouncedly Moslem elements, and a typically Communist attempt to liberate women had already failed. So when the Russians supported the enemy the Somalis threw them out and they could not resist.[3]

> As Barry Lynch says, "It must not be thought that Somalia's history has been happy since the expulsion of the Russians - though there was at that moment the proverbial dancing in the streets. The weight of the Ogadeni refugees upon the economy is enormous, and international aid to them is of course channelled through President Barre. He supports them and his power rests on them, causing much domestic resentment. Foreign policy is frozen in an anti-Ethiopian stance, and the economy stagnates. Somalia's external relations will necessarily be affected by the fact that it has fought a war with another socialist country receiving Soviet assistance. It is the quintessential 'one that got away', joining the select but disparate group of eastern Austria, Persian Azerbaijan and possibly Finland.
>
> (Wiles et al. 1982. p. 293)

Despite the continuing misery of these unfortunate people, the Americans and Saudi Arabians were not involved, when the Russians were thrown out, so left-wingers, are generally content with what happened. If ever there was an exception to the doctrine of Soviet irreversibility it is Somalia in 1977; but as the reader can see there were very special features.

It is obvious that the Kremlin is guided in practice by a "historical" duty to keep the "socialist" revolution irreversible all over the world. Apart from Somalia only the following ever got away:

- Persian Azerbaijan in March 1946. Iran having been occupied by the UK and the USSR during the war, Stalin set up a virtual satellite in Azerbaijan. He refused

to withdraw his troops by 2 March 1946, the date specified in the Three-Power Declaration of December 1943, although the UK did so. But the Persian, British and U.S. governments were all extremely firm, and Stalin did not yet have the atom bomb. He began to withdraw on 4 April,[4] and the fledgling satellite reverted to Iranian rule - which we shall not call better!

- The Soviet-occupied zone of Austria. Stalin clearly hankered after the creation of an "East Germany" here. But he had already recognized the existence of an Austrian government, so that he could not legally do as he liked, as in East Germany. A treaty between the occupying powers and Austria was nearly signed in 1949 but the Russians dragged out its signature, after which they had to withdraw their troops, until 1955.[5]
- The failure, despite a glorious opportunity, to establish a People's Democracy in Finland in 1946 is often mentioned. The failure was indeed striking, but it cannot be called an exception to irreversibility.

Somalia, though the most convincing case, is also a bad one. The countries of the so-called New Communist Third World (Laos, Afghanistan, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola), to which Somalia used to belong, are not formally members of the "Socialist Commonwealth" or of the CMEA. Though they are liberally supplied with Soviet arms, East German security police and Cuban troops, the Brezhnev Doctrine has never been formally extended to them. They live in an ideological limbo, and their

desired irreversibility may turn out, as in the Somali case, not to be worth the intervention of Soviet ground troops. We must not, to repeat, declare irreversible the revolutions we cannot protect.

Then consider what happens if one does try to get away. Mere defiance of Soviet foreign policy is grudgingly accepted. Yugoslavia (1948), China (1959), Albania (1960), North Korea (1958) and even Romania (1960) have all liberated themselves from following the USSR's diplomatic twists and turns. China of course is too large to conquer, and Albania and Yugoslavia are informally protected by NATO. North Korea is doubtfully protected by China, but Romania is quite unprotected, and so forms a living monument to Soviet tolerance in matters considered inessential.

It is when a country changes its form of government from a Marxist-Leninist one that invasion follows: East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and now Afghanistan (1980).[6] Note that it makes no difference whether the people rise against the government (East Germany and Afghanistan) or the government reforms itself at the head of the people (Czechoslovakia) or both together (Hungary). <u>The important thing is not to go Communist: then you will not be invaded when you change your mind</u>.

III. <u>The Grenadian Case History</u>

Grenada has, of course, also undergone reversal, thereby inspiring this chapter. This time the population played only a

passive role - unless we count Sir Paul Scoon's still unrevealed letter to the Organization of East Caribbean States, demanding (or not demanding) an invasion. Let us first examine the case historically.

An unusually full and intimate history of Communism in Grenada is available to us from the many captured documents the Americans have made available, and the interviews given after the liberation to a sceptical West European press by "all sorts and conditions of persons". It is not our purpose here to recite that history. We simply pull out the salient points, particularly those that illustrate irreversibility and the spread of the Soviet empire.

Examining these documents one is again impressed by the capacity for self-deception of the left-wing Western intellectual. For him, one great principle must be adhered to: the internal enemy is worse than the external enemy, therefore the latter is not doing what he is plainly seen to be doing. There is of course in the documents nothing to indicate that Grenada was not a Communist country and armed to the teeth. On the contrary Party life was extensively Sovietized and everyone hoped - with Soviet help - to make it more so; and the actual military treaties with Moscow are there in black and white.

We begin with the background to the events of October 1983.

- The New Jewel Movement was, since it took power on 13th March 1979, a straight Marxist-Leninist party. It had criticism and self-criticism, democratic centralism, a Central Committee, Secretariat and Politburo, and was trying to set up a Higher Party School (meanwhile it used one in

Moscow). There were even the beginnings of the usual Party versus State quarrel: Coard versus Bishop during the period of "joint leadership" at the end.

- The main influence was Cuba, a Soviet surrogate with a good deal of independence. Although the island was awash with Soviet arms the military advisers and the para-military help were Cubans. But direct Soviet-Grenadian relations were lively and intimate.
- The freedom of the press and all other civil rights were abolished. But there was not torture, no were there long political sentences or executions.
- Militarism, not originally a Leninist trait, was very pronounced indeed, as in modern USSR, GDR and Cuba.
- Following the Cuban and not the less sensible Soviet model, no quarrel was picked with religion. But needless to say Party members were quite irreligious and some were militantly aggressive about it in private.
- The economy was fully of the NEP type: little nationalization (and all of that newly-founded state enterprises), full tolerance of small business, peasants and artisans, free markets, foreign capitalist enterprises. Their days were of course numbered, but the matter was discussed in Party cicles only in an academic long-term manner. It cannot be sufficiently stressed, at the risk of boring the reader, that Lenin himself invented the NEP, and that it is fully alive in Soviet specialist publications for

the Third World; a failure to have one in Grenada would have gone to show that the New Jewel Movement was not Communist.

- But even in economics it was possible to be too moderate. Coard held it against Bishop that he had recourse to the IMF. The rights and wrongs of this need not be discussed. But the IMF is by now a byword for monetarist imperialism in the Third World; many of its leaders would have, if asked, taken Coard's side.

The Communist world or rather the Soviet bloc, was exceedingly helpful to its new baby. Arms, advice, trade, experts, came pouring in. Grenada was added to the list of "countries of socialist orientation", the current official phrase that haunts the captured documents. The phrase merits a short excursus. In 1962 its equivalent was "countries of national democracy": at that time Cuba, Ghana, Guinea, Mali. Note that "national" (natsionalnoi) is not the same as "people's" (narodnoi). The 1962 phrase, like the current one, connotes more doubt, more reversibility than the original "countries of people's democracy", which in 1946 referred to Eastern Europe, Mongolia and North Korea.

These countries were militarily secure from the start. When expansion outside the contiguous land mass began a new and less committal phrase was need. Indeed Ghana, Guinea and Mali all deserted the Soviet ship[7], teaching the USSR a firm lesson in the reversibility of the Communist hold where the Red Army cannot get. Tainted with Khrushchevism and failure; the phrase "national democracy" dropped out of use. But the Portuguese Revolution (1974) washed up two new orphans at the Soviet door,

and certain internal events in South Yemen in 1978 firmed that country up, so that we now have a new wave, and a phrase.

The full list of "Countries of Socialist Orientation", from an East European source (May 1984) runs as follows:

Afghaninstan	T
Angola	T
Benin	-
Cambodia	T
Congo Brazzaville	-
Ethiopia	T
(Grenada)	-
Laos	T
Mozambique	T
Nicaragua	-
Yemeni Arab Republic	-
PDR Yemen	T

The letter T marks the "Tikhonov list" which Prime Minister Tikhonov gave at the council meeting of the CMEA in July 1981 (Pravda 2-6 July): "Three developing countries have chosen the path of socialist construction - Mongolia, Cuba, Vietnam - have become members of the CMEA .... The countries of the CMEA are also trying continuously to widen economic relations with [the "T's"] in their relations with all developing countries....".

In the writer's own New Communist Third World the "T" countries (and no others) all appear as core members of the NCTW, while Congo Brazzaville and Benin are discussed as "marginals", along with Madagascar. Our team would, space permitting, have

further included as "marginals" Guayana but not, in summer 1981, either Nicaragua or the Y.A.R. Clearly there is much fluctuation among marginals; and the informality and infrequency of the use of the phrase "countries of socialist orientation" are precisely there to guard against loss of prestige when a marginal fluctuates away - or Grenada is invaded. It is however my strong opinion that the "T list" of 1981 is of countries internally irreversible.

We end this excursus with a linguistic footnote. The phrase, "People's Democratic Republic" has been chosen as a state name by at least two governments: the Korean PDR and the PDR of Yemen. Words are important in theocracies, but where the Red Army's writ does not run, the locals are free to play fast and loose with them. For that matter Ethiopia now calls itself Socialist Ethiopia, and this even grosser solecism must be swallowed and even printed in Pravda. The word "Socialist" crops up also in the titles of the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, , China and Mongolia. Further afield, indeed, there are many "Democratic Republics" (a good gauchisant title for a Third World Regime) such as Vietnam and the GDR!.

We now turn, more briefly, to the deposition of Maurice Bishop. This happened because the whole situation of Grenadian Communism was unravelling. The economy to be sure, was doing better than Mr. Seaga's Jamaica. We cannot but reflect again that the NEP, thought of by orthodox Communists as a mere political way station - or in Lenin's case an actual reculer pour mieux sauter - is per se an excellent way of conducting a backward economy: the strong government, reasonably honest by

capitalist standards and fully able to enforce fiscal discipline, keeps the trade unions and the multinationals in their place - down but not out - and leaves the magic of the market and private property to do its beneficent work.

But there is no perfect economic system, and to do better than Jamaica is not to do well. This caused much discontent, especially when people contrasted the promises that had been made. The militarization of life was particularly unpopular, and contributed to the economic stagnation. Very young boys were being conscripted and indoctrinated - surely a gross error, if it was not a wise reaction to the regime's unpopularity with adults. No other Communist government - except Pol Pot's - had ever conscripted people so young in peace-time.

The Party looked at its failures and the people's mounting hostility in near despair. Many - and Bishop must almost be included here - lost their nerve. They were of course ignorant and unfledged Communists: their spelling left much to be desired and they were very modest themselves in their internal documents about their degree of preparation. Possibly more experienced people would have done better or at least looked less ridiculous. But this alters the facts little. Their situation was desperate and either they did not know what to do or they, like Bishop, wanted to take a step back into free elections, i.e., <u>to abandon irreversibility</u>. Flirtation with the IMF can be tolerated in a leader, but not that; nor the long and friendly conversations with Mr. William Clark, the U.S. National Security Adviser, in June 1983.

Bernard Coard was certainly a far better Leninist than Bishop. Always interested in Party matters, particularly those of Party discipline and nomenklatura, he simply carried on with his duties, while others tore their hair. He presents an honourable parallel indeed to Stalin in the mid-1920s. At one point nearly exiled to Moscow on health grounds (the documents touchingly allow for his family to accompany him), he stayed on, fulminating against indiscipline, until the great explosion when Bishop was arrested on October 13.

The subsequent two weeks have struck in the memory of every newspaper reader. Stalin murdered his Party opponents in private, but Coard, less experienced and less wise, in public. The Russians were able to swallow this, but the Cubans, or at any rate that maverick among Leninists Fidel Castro, could not. By this action, unique in the annals of Communism, Coard cooked his own goose. But the Cuban reaction did not matter. The non-Communist and especially the Caribbean world was stunned. It is important that there is much inter-marriage and intermigration in the Caribbean: these islands are kissing, and often spitting, cousins. Also ther governing circles are very respectable: there are things that "one simply does not do". "One" leaves that to Africa and Latin America. There were no Caribbean troops but a U.S. fleet, by genuine coincidence, was available...

IV. A Moral and Political Conclusion

In all the following arguments I intentionally omit the other excuse for the Grenadian "reversal": states with very small population, say under 200,000 where Grenada has but 110,000, are

inherently unstable. For any band of armed thugs can take them over and establish itself forever. They need not be idealistic native Communists, they might as well be Mafiosi, a mad religious sect, a foreign power - anybody. Therefore, it seems to many, Reagan was right. But this is a non sequitur. The argument gives Cuba as a good a right as the U.S.A. to invade; indeed it does not define in any way which "international policeman" has the right. But my arguments is that the power believing in reversibility has the right. Grenada's small size argues only that Britain should never have given it freedom except under a strong federation.

The main object of politics is to make people happy and free. Communism fails utterly on this score, capitalism only now and then. This is the main political fact in the modern world.

President Reagan's decision to invade Grenada caused much unease among "liberal" circles in U.S.A. International law was broken, and violence used. Reagan humiliated the British government. He deeply angered black African governments, and Grenadian emigres in London. But all these people were as personally comfortable and free as before: it did not hit them hard. The Grenadian people however, as the European and American "liberal" press has freely and honestly confessed, no longer went in fear of their lives; they were reunited with their 16-year-old conscript sons; they left prison; they set up a free press. That is happiness and freedom: the objects of good government.

No doubt the Grenadian people will make a mess of their political affairs again: their track record is exceedingly poor.

But they will be able, if all goes well, to vote the idiots out; and if it does not go so well, to throw the tyrant out - as they threw Sir Eric Gairy out. They have regained reversibility. They are also, of course, personally free - though their country is clearly an American protectorate.

But what of international law? - the reader will very rightly object; of non-aggression (for I am unable to believe, in the continuing default of evidence, that Sir Paul Scoon ever demanded military intervention)? Of respect for sovereignty? What of the West's greatest weapon, its moral superiority? These are all principles I deeply respect, but they are, like even domestic law, not absolutes; they subserve greater aims, like human happiness.

For neither international law nor the received wisdom of foreign policy has digested the facts of Grenada or the importance of reversibility. The assumption that all states have limited interests, that we could all recover from a lost war, that no misfortune lasts forever, lies at the base of this law and wisdom. A genocidal government and a Leninist government, are both exceptional to these assumptions. The principles of international law subserve such more important aims as happiness, freedom and indeed survival, and may be rejected if these aims so require. Moreover, reversibility itself is just such an instrument, and a very "senior" one; indeed this is the main message of this piece, to be developed below. I am totally unsympathetic to extensive lists of absolute principles, and very content with the two great aims enumerated above.

Even so brief a passage must ask whether happiness and freedom might not conflict. My answer is that they might well in Mozambique, where a stable government of any complexion is very welcome and ideas of parliamentary democracy are light-years away from the present understanding or capacity of the people. But in Grenada there is no, or very little of, such conflict.

Means, again, affect ends. What if such means as were applied in Grenada were applied in the USSR, where most of the non-Russian citizens, and a good number of Russians would be rendered happy, and nearly everyone would be free? The absurd and extreme case must also be faced, and the answer is very simple; we and they would all die in the fighting, and this would violate the first principle of good government: survival. Or substitute Nicaragua for Grenada, what then? My answer is that there is no probable majority for a non-Communist government, and it would be evil to shed much blood merely on a bet. Grenada was a certainty.

A strong argument against my point of view, in the opinion of not a few Britons, is that it is shared by Mrs. Jeane Kirkpatrick. True, Mrs. Kirkpatrick surrounds the hard core - of dislike or irreversibility - with much irrelevant and untrue peripheral argument. Above all it is not the case that Marxist-Leninist governments always or even usually torture and murder as many of their citizens as the "traditional" tyrannies. The opposite is all too often the case, and governments teetering on the brink of Communism tend to be positively liberal, since Communists like to keep that pretense as long as possible. Thus Cuba's happiest year since at least the beginning of Batista's

reign was surely 1959, the year when Castro was in power but not yet a full-fledged Marxist-Leninist, and Felipe Pazos ran the economy. And after Costa Rica the most successfully liberal Central American government is, as this is written (April 1984), Nicaragua. Indeed with respect to civil freedoms Nicaragua is superior to most of the Latin American regimes Mrs. Kirkpatrick favours[8], and certainly to the Southern states of her own country before 1962.

But the point is a minor one, since Nicaragua's freedoms would surely not long survive a Communist victory in El Salvador and a U.S. withdrawal. It must yield to the great kernel of truth: Mrs. Kirkpatrick's "traditional" governments are all reversible, indeed, have often been and continue now to be reversed. The amount of long-term misery promised by Cuba is much greater than that promised by Chile, since Pinochet is mortal while the Cuban Communist Party is not. This being so, I must admit to standing on the same ground as Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Our preference for reversibility yokes us together.

There are of course some quite false American arguments for the invasion. In the excitement of the armed conflict and in genuinely bad conscience over the flat breach of international law - the alleged Scoon letter came later - U.S. spokesmen said many ridiculous things, and two above all: the new airport was military and the U.S. medical students were in physical danger. There was also a great deal of simple flag-wagging, and much harking back to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. Also, one entirely inappropriate motive played a part: revenge was sought on the

outside world in general for the recent slaughter of Marines in Beirut. This kind of "noise" is only, alas, to be expected even from well-intentioned human beings in a moment of crisis.

This writer is British, and an account of his own gut reactions may justly be demanded of him. This was, from the first moment on 25 October, that the invasion was morally justified; and that therefore Britain should have initiated it. But quite apart from British public opinion it is not fair to demand of a medium-sized power an instant availability of troops all over the world. So it acquiesced in the violation of the rules of the Commonwealth - which is not a uniquely valuable community anyway, and should no more have tolerated Communist Grenada within its brotherhood than it did South Africa.

British citizenship quite apart, there remain points of strong difference between the writer and Mrs. Kirkpatrick. Democracy is better than tyranny, and should be directly, not indirectly, supported. The immediate convenience to the U.S. military or the CIA of quasi-Fascist friends must be sacrificed to the direct long-term goal, the prevention of the spread of Communism. This goal is almost never served by supporting some other tyranny. The locally interested multi-national companies must be kept right away from policy-making, first because it is immoral to let the merely economic interests of anyone count in such important matters, secondly because the Third World is exceedingly passionate about the immorality of such actions, and it is very counter-productive to provoke it. The whole question of reversibility should be lifted out of its U.S. context, and

the excesses of U.S. nationalism that have been permitted to distort it, onto a higher plane.

Counsel of perfection, of course, but there are levels of discourse at which perfectionism is positively a requirement. Basically, the Kirkpatrick doctrine, suitably amended, is the mirror image of the Brezhnev doctrine, and the correct reply to it.

In conclusion, then, reversibility has a peculiar philosophical status. It is included in the great aim of freedom by definition, since voting out the government is a nuclear civil right. But simultaneously and more importantly it is a high-level instrument subserving that aim. For voting out the government is more than a civil right: it is a way to prevent the government's gross degeneration, as it had under Gairy and then again under Coard and Austin.

Now given some ultimate aim, clashes of respectable "senior" instruments are only to be expected. Nothing is less surprising. What I am saying is that it is right to commit aggression in support of happiness and freedom if it is safe and costs little, and that its specific aim should be to re-establish reversibility. We need to moralize reversibility more and state sovereignty less. The international lawyers must do some deep re-thinking.

Feis, Herbert, 1970 From Trust to Terror, London

Kolarz, Walter, 1953, Russia and her Colonies, London, Philip

Lynch, Barry, in Wiles 1982

Wiles, Peter, ed. 1982, The New Communist Third World, London Croom Helm.

Notes

1. Percy Bysshe Shelley, Ozymandias, 1817.

2. Thus Pol Pot was no racist. He simply killed an extremely large percentage of his people through malice, insanity and mismanagement. Eastern Europe, on the contrary, has been particularly careful not to commit Stalinist excesses in respect of the numbers killed.

3. The Soviet motive, incidentally, was a very respectable one: the Organization of African States permits no tampering with the boundaries drawn by the former colonial powers.

4. Feis 1970, pp. 63-87, esp. pp. 64, 84; Kolarz 1952, p. 247. The "Three Powers", were the UK, U.S.A. and the USSR.

5. Feis 1970, pp.

6. When Hafizulla Amin replaced Tarakki his regime so brutal that the Communist government's control over the country, never strong, virtually disappeared. The Subsequent invasion, then, counts as the suppression of a counter-revolution in the name of irreversibility. After all Tarakki's own original Communist revolution (1978) did, in a sense, establish Afghanistan as a Communist country.

7. Egypt, often quoted here, made no pretense to be Communist. She was a mere ally.

8. It is incidentally unclear that terroristic military governments, systematically killing off their opposition by means of off-duty policemen, are in any way "traditional" in Latin America. At least the relation between this and the really traditional <u>caciquismo</u> should be discussed at length before this insult is offered to a whole continent.

TRENDS IN U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE RESOURCES

Introduction

The intent of this chapter is to provide background information about a confusing subject. It has four sections. The various programs (I.) called "Security Assistance" are described and the trends in treating those programs in the Congress (II.) and in the Executive Branch (III.) are noted. The author then concludes with an outlook (IV.) for the mid-1980s.

Table One

1984 Foreign Assistance Funding Request

		$ Billion
1.	Military Assistance Program (MAP)	.7
2.	Military Aid to Egypt and Israel	1.0
3.	Military loans - FMSCR (Foreign Military Sales Credits)	(4.7)
4.	Economic Support Funds (ESF)	3.0
5.	Economic Development Assistance	1.9
6.	Public Law 480 Food	1.1
7.	Multilateral Development Banks	1.6
8.	Other	.8
9.	Offsetting receipts	.6
	Total (exceptng FMSCR loans)	$10.7

Military programs comprise about $1.7 billion of the $10.7 billion in U.S. grants and highly concessional aid for foreign assistance. However, for political reasons, a large amount ($3

billion) of U.S. economic assistance is called Economic Support Funds (ESF) and presented to Congress as part of the security/military assistance budget, while the remaining economic assistance (about $5 billion) is called Foreign Economic Assistance.

This paper will describe only the military programs and the ESF program -- (lines 1 through 4 of Table One).

I. Program

"Security Assistance" refers to a specific set of U.S. loans and grants "intended to assist other nations in meeting their security requirements... and to contribute to the U.S. worldwide defense posture through a stronger collective security framework."[1] The Secretary of State has policy responsibility for Security Assistance, with budgetary authorization provided by the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees and appropriations recommended by the Senate and House Appropriations Subcommittees on Foreign Operations.

The Department of Defense is responsible for the management and accounting of the military portions of security assistance. In essence, State and Defense are partners with about equal bargaining leverage in determining the military programs. The ESF fund is administered by the AID agency within the Department of State and Defense has little influence over the country allocations of that program, while State and AID officials have almost equal influence.

1. Foreign Military Sales Credits (FMSCR). FMSCR refers to credits for foreign military sales that are provided by Congressional authorization (but, through Fiscal Year 1984, without budgetary appropriation) through the Federal Financing Bank (FFB) at a loan rate slightly above the cost of money to the U.S. Treasury. The FMSCR program began on a large scale in 1971 and since 1976 has been larger than foreign military sales grants. FMS is analogous to the Export-Import Bank in that it charges interest slightly above the cost of money to the U.S. government. Until 1974 Congressional legislation prohibited it, the Ex-Im Bank did handle foreign military credit sales loans directly. For Fiscal Year 1985, the Administration has requested that all military sales and loans under the Security Assistance program be brought "on budget" and that Congress appropriate the funds. This would enable the Administration to determine, on a country-by-country basis, what interest rate, if any, to charge. FMSCR can also be converted to what amounts to grants by forgiving repayment; Congress does this only for Egypt and Israel.

FMSCR is not tobe confused with FMS (Foreign Military Sales). FMS is a technical term which refers to any purchase of U.S. defense articles or services by a foreign nation. Sales are conducted under the supervisory umbrella of the Department of Defense for a three percent administrative surcharge, or management fee. FMS is independent of foreign assistance. Japan and many of our wealthy NATO allies annually purchase U.S. weapon systems under FMS. In 1982, U.S. companies sold $24 billion in

weapons and military services abroad, about 60 percent being weapons. Of the $24 billion, $21 billion were FMS sales and $3 billion were commercial, or non-FMS sales. All major sales are subject to review on a case-by-case basis by the Congress. In 1982, less than $4 billion of the $24 billion in arms sales was financed with FMSCR through the Security Assistance program.

1.A. The Military Assistance Program (MAP). The MAP provides grant financing for the purchase of defense articles, services and training. Prior to FY 1980, MAP was an aid program which delivered U.S. government-owned equipment. With a change in the law enacted in 1981, the Department of Defense now handles the procurement of equipment with MAP funds in the same manner as the procurement for both FMS cash and FMS credit sales. Recipient countries may merge funds through all three sources in paying for their programs. MAP funds are appropriated by Congress.

Regardless of the mechanism chosen to give military grants, the long-term trend has been toward smaller grants. At the time of the 1959 Draper Commission on U.S. Foreign Aid, military grants were $8 billion; in 1982, they were $1 billion. The dollar ratio of U.S. foreign assistance economic to military grants in 1959 was one to one; in 1982 it was eight to one. Charts One and Two show the shift from grant to credit and the overall drop in military assistance. Chart Three shows that, while U.S. per capita income has risen significantly since 1950, the expenditures per capita for defense have remained constant and those for military assistance have fallen.

CHART ONE
Grant Program
(Constant FY 82 $: Billions)



Source: Department of Defense.

CHART TWO

FMS Credit Program
(Constant FY 82 $: Billions)



CHART THREE
Comparative Burden



2. Economic Support Funds: ESF. The purpose of ESF, which is administered by AID, is to promote economic and political stability through balance-of-payments support and short-term project assistance.[2] The basic determinant of ESF for U.S. foreign policy is how critical a nation is to U.S. interests, as distinct from the comparative level of poverty or economic need in a recipient country. These factors are considered under two other AID programs: Development Assistance ($1.9 billion in FY 84) and Food Aid (PL 480) ($1.1 billion in FY 84).[3]

While ESF is justified in terms of U.S. foreign policy and political goals, it meets related key security objectives as well. In a recent GAO report on ESF, State and AID officials were cited as being of the view that "promotion of regional stability" was the most important objective, with the "promotion of economic stability" in second place.[4]

But security does not mean that ESF finances military programs. In fact, the recipient's military expenditures are not the determining factor in setting an ESF level for a country. ESF is not a mechanism for underwriting a nation's defense budget. The State Department determines ESF levels on a country-by-country basis with little consultation with the Department of Defense about the military needs of any nation, and Congress expressively forbids the use of ESF funds for military purposes.

In FY 83, the ESF request was 36 percent larger than in FY 80. Eight nations (Pakistan, Turkey, Lebanon, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Jamaica) accounted for 80 percent of

the increase. Of total ESF in FY 83, 52 percent went to Egypt and Israel.[5]

These country increase appear to confirm the view of State and AID officials that regional stability is the dominant factor determining ESF levels. Turkey's aid is related to reinforcing NATO against the Soviet threat; ESF for the other seven nations relates to enhancing regional stability.

All funding for ESF is on-budget and may be designated as either grant or loan assistance. Table Two compares the grant portion of ESF with the grant portion of FMSCR from FY 79 through FY 83.

Table Two

Grant Portion: FMSCR and ESF

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
FMS	9%	26%	16%	23%	25%
ESF	66%	67%	88%	87%	85%

Source: AID Budget Office.

Repayment terms on ESF loans are comparable to Development Assistance (DA) loans and much softer than FMS loans. Interest charges are normally in the 2-3 percent range, with repayment periods of up to 40 years. By comparison, FMS loans are generally set at the cost of money to the U.S. Treasury and are to be repaid in ten years. In recent years, most of ESF has been earmarked, leaving little room for maneuver. In FY 81, for example, 87 percent of ESF was earmarked.

3. International Military Education and Training (IMET) is a grant program. Forty-two million dollars was appropriated by Congress in FY 82 for this program, while the FY 85 request was for $61 million. The money is used primarily to defray some of the costs for foreign officers and NCO's to attend U.S. military schools and war colleges. As with the MAP grant program, IMET was cut substantially, beginning in 1972, when 22,000 foreign military students trained or studied under the program; in 1982, the number was 3,000. (The Soviets in 1982 had 12,000 foreign military NCO's enrolled in their programs.) The IMET program is extremely popular with the U.S. military, foreign military establishments, State and Department of Defense officials and U.S. ambassadors. It has not been popular with the Congress, particularly the House.

4. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). Peacekeeping operations involve U.S. participation in the multilateral forces deployed to help avoid international conflict. These now include contributions to the Multinational Force and observers in the Sinai, and the UN force in Cyprus. The FY 85 request was for $49 million.

In terms of purchasing power for the military equipment, training, and logistic and economic support that it is intended to provide, the security assistance program in 1984 is at about one-fourth its peak level of the 1950s. More than half of the authorized program is in the form of loans, in contrast to the situation in the 1950s, when it was almost entirely grants.

II. Considerations Relating to Congress.

Since the early 1970s Congress has become extremely active in attempting to manage, through legislative restrictions and mandates, the security assistance program. The House has been particularly negative about military grant aid, and appropriations for MAP have decreased until recently (Attachment 1). So too has the number of U.S. military personnel overseas in security assistance organizations, as shown in Attachment 2.

The exception has been Israel (and Egypt once tied to Israel through the Camp David Accords). Israel has widespread Congressional support and receives the most military aid, as well as very high levels of economic aid.

Perceiving that funds for Egypt and Israel were preserved by specific "earmarking" by Congress, while the overall military aid requests were annually reduced, over the past several years more and more countries have hired Americans to act as lobbyists to influence the Congressional earmarking process. In FY 83, Congress appropriated $1150 million in forgiven loans to Egypt and Israel. In terms of other military grants for FY 83, Congress reduced the Administration's request from $502 million to $290 million and earmarked $172.5 million for Turkey, Portugal and Morocco. Thus, the main impact of the cut fell on the remaining 18 countries receiving military grants, a reduction of almost 70 percent. The earmarking system penalizes those countries with the least influence before the Congress. These tend to be the poorer, smaller countries who have not developed a U.S. domestic constituency or hired powerful lobbyists.

Because foreign aid, especially military aid, is popular neither with the American people nor with the Congress, no Foreign Aid Bill was passed in FY 83 or FY 84. Instead, funds less than the President's request were appropriated through use of the Continuing Resolution Authority. Congress spent much time accomplishing little and the result was that dozens of nations with security threats were unable to plan coherently, because they did not know within a 50 percent margin what military funding would be available to them.

The key to the levels of military aid is the bargaining process within the Congress, with many liberals supporting economic aid and many conservatives being ideologically opposed to foreign aid in general yet favoring military aid. Hence Congressional leadership tries to forge a compromise consensus to assemble enough conservative and liberal votes, together with supporters of Israel, to pass an aid bill. This process favors growth in economic aid, given the composition of the House. Through the compromise bargaining, economic aid pulls military aid. While the Reagan Administration has been intent upon increasing military aid, if Israel/Egypt are set aside as a special case, then Table Three shows that between FY 82 and FY 85 the military grant aid request rose from $200 million to $1.4 billion - a gain of $1.2 billion - while the economic request rose from $7.4 billion to $9.0 billion - a gain of $1.6 billion.

Table Three

Budget Authority Requested for Foreign Aid ($B)

	FY 82[6]	FY 85[7]
Economic		
PL 480 Food	1.0	1.0
ESF	2.6	3.4
Development Assistance	1.7	2.3
Multilateral Banks	1.3	1.2
Other	.8	1.1
	7.4	9.0
Military		
FMS Loans	(3.3)	(2.0)
IMET/other	.2	.1
Grant Aid Egypt/Israel	.7	2.6
All other grant aid	.2	1.4
	1.1	4.1

The amount of influence Congress and U.S. domestic political factors, irrespective of international security conditions, have upon shaping the level, content, and details of foreign aid is extraordinary. Certain congressional trends in treating the various foreign aid programs are apparent. Military aid requests receive the most careful scrutiny and are substantially reduced. Economic aid, which in FY 82 was allocated among 99 nations, is not treated by Congress at the same level of country-by-country detail as military aid. The PL 480 Food Program is actually treated outside the aid program as the special political preserve of the Department of Agriculture and the Congressional committees on agriculture. Congress has contained the growth of funding for multilateral institutions, being persuaded that such aid is not affected and that the U.S. has little control over how multilateral aid money is allocated. Development Assistance for

long-term projects has grown only moderately, because DA is an inflexible instrument which must be administered under a massive set of reporting controls. ESF has become the favored instrument of economic aid, because it can be allocated for political reasons to any country regardless of the level of income (e.g., Israel), because it is flexible and may be disbursed fairly quickly in a wide variety of uses. Although in other nations (e.g., France, the UK and Japan), economic aid is often tied to commercial projects, so far in the U.S. bureaucracy and in the Congress the belief has been strong that economic aid should have as its primary focus the economic development of the recipient nation and not trade expansion or business assistance for the U.S.

Attachment 4 shows the FY 82 disbursements of U.S. military and economic aid, including FMS loans at the cost of money to over 50 nations. The countries are ranked by the total military loans and grants received. They are also ranked by the amount of U.S. economic aid received and in terms of their comparative levels of poverty, with the nation with the lowest per capita GNP - Bangladesh with a GNP P/C of $140 - receiving the first ranking. The attachment shows that the U.S. government does not allocate either economic or military aid strictly according to the economic needs of a country. Instead, the U.S. aid program allocations can best be viewed as the result of long and tedious bargaining among many in the Executive Branch and in the Congress, a process which considers economic needs, international

security conditions, special interests, partisan politics and domestic constituencies.

In general, the trends in Congress in the past four years have been to increase modestly overall military and economic aid, to increase dramatically aid to Israel, to use military aid appropriations as a lever for directing or inhibiting U.S. foreign policy, to scrutinize the effectiveness of military aid more than that of economic aid and to favor ESF as the preferred instrument of economic aid.

III. Considerations Relating to the Executive Branch

The purposes of military aid are summarized in Table Four:

Table Four

Purposes of Military Aid FY'82

		Military Grants	Military Loans at Costs of Money
1.	Aid to Israel/Egypt	68%	51%
2.	Recompense for U.S. access and facilities (Spain, Greece, Portugal, Turkey, Philippines, Kenya, Oman)	9%	29%
3.	Support key regional balances (Korea, Thailand, Pakistan, Jordan, Sudan, Somalia, Tunisia, Morocco, Honduras, El Salvador)	14%	17%

Source: Congressional Presentation, Security Assistance, FY'84.

Israel and Egypt take most of the military aid. Many of the countries where the U.S. military has bases or facilities have signed agreements or implicit understandings relating to levels

of U.S. aid. Compared to Israel and Egypt and base rights countries, only a small percentage of military aid goes to support the balances of power in several different regions, although it is this support which makes the military aid program so controversial. Yet within the State Department, DOD, and the NSCstaff, in 1984 the determination was widespread to persuade Congress to appropriate funds to the regional balance countries listed in the Table Four. The reasons were to assist friends (e.g., the Tunisian and Moroccan cases) and to respond to crisis in order to prevent an erosion of stability or unchallenged military victories by radical regional powers. Attachment 5 illustrates these reasons on a region-by-region basis. The military aid funding profile is intended to provide modest support for over 30 nations rather than to provide a large level of support for a few nations. Since the consequence is that in only a few countries is U.S. aid a significant percentage of the defense budget, as shown in Attachment 6, military aid does not result in a large degree of political leverage.

U.S. military aid takes the total package approach, usually with DOD, for a three percent fee, overseeing the program for the recipient nation and dealing with the contractors to establish price, delivery times and quality control. FMS aid has the reputation overseas for extremely long lead times before delivery (often two to three years) and for excellent long-term service and support. American commercial interests (e.g., the desire of a corporation to sell aircraft or jeeps) play a very small role in determining military aid within the Executive Branch.

While the leaders of countries desire the high-tech equipment of the U.S., often they are equally or more desirous of consultations and joint planning and seek to deal directly with officials from the Department of Defense. These consultations, most frequently called "Joint Military Commissions (JMCs) have been institutionalized with a number of nations: Republic of Korea, Philippines, Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. One result is that, when a crisis occurs, the leaders of the affected nation call directly upon Defense as well as State. While this has blurred responsibilities between State and Defense, there is strong support for the JMCs among U.S. ambassadors and senior State officials because valuable information is exchanged.

Overall, within the Executive Branch under President Reagan, more attention has been paid to military than to economic aid; DOD has become more active in the military aid program and in foreign policy, and there is a strong and continuous effort to increase the concessional element of military aid.

IV. <u>Outlook for the mid-80s</u>. In the past few years, the standard planning scenario for U.S. conventional forces, given the strength and disposition of Soviet forces, has focused upon potential global conflicts, as distinct from a NATO war fought almost exclusively within the confines of Europe. Hence forces and missions outside Europe have received more attention. At the same time U.S. officials, seeking to prevent erosion at the edges, have been sensitive to security conditions in many Third World countries and have sought to maintain a geopolitical

balance of power worldwide. Partially this has reflected a military concern to prevent the establishment of de facto Soviet bases astride U.S. lines of communication to Eurasia. It is also a strategic concern for the preservation of an acceptable level of stability. As U.S. security contacts have grown with many nations outside Europe, so too has the level of U.S. awareness of the threats to those governments and of the need for U.S. military aid and training.

The attention paid to low order warfare outside Europe will grow in American defense circles. The Department of Defense has become a persistent advocate before Congress for economic and military assistance. However, security assistance is the single major instrumentality of the NATO Alliance for which there is no systematic mechanism of allied consultations and coordination. Given the security conditions in the Third World, NATO will probably establish some such coordinating groups, while within the U.S. military, grant aid will increase as a portion of foreign assistance.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM APPROPRIATIONS, FY 1959-FY 1982*

(Totals in millions of current & constant U.S. dollars)

Fiscal Year	Current	Constant
1959	2,237	8,834
1960	2,108	8,231
1961	2,014	7,635
1962	1,935	7,248
1963	1,766	6,499
1964	1,882	4,190
1965	1,280	4,406

1966	2,100	6,753
1967	2,364	7,299
1968	2,593	7,678
1969	3,091	8,731
1970	2,873	7,590
1971	4,248	10,499
1972	4,478	9,962
1973	5,205	10,994
1974	4,567	8,910
1975	1,961	3,540
1976	3,158	5,296
1977	2,178	3,388
1978	2,348	3,382
1979	5,925	7,951
1980	2,323	2,819
1981	3,244	3,535
1982 (est.)	4,268	4,268

*Includes total Grant (MAP, MAP Excess Program, MASF, MASF Excess Program, IMET, MASF Training, FMS credits waived [FY 1974-FY 1982 only] and FMS Credit Program (Direct and Guaranty Financing).

SOURCE: Defense Security Assistance Agency

Attachment 3

FY 1983 Foreign Military Sales Financing Program
(Millions of Dollars)

	PRESIDENT'S BUDGET	CONGRESSIONAL EARMARKS	CRA PLANNING LEVELS	TOTAL WITH SUPPLEMENTAL
		(See notes below on these columns)		
EAST ASIA & PACIFIC	$413.5		$271.00	$388.50
Indonesia	50.0		20.00	50.00
Korea	210.0		140.00	210.00
Malaysia	12.5		4.00	12.50
Philippines	50.0		50.00	50.00
Thailand	91.0		57.00	66.00
NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA	3660.0		3446.00	3705.00
Egypt	1300.0	$1325.00	1325.00	1300.00
Israel	1700.0	1700.00	1700.00	1700.00
Jordan	75.0		40.00	75.00
Lebanon	15.0	10.00	10.00	15.00
Morocco	100.0	75.00	75.00	100.00
Oman	40.0		30.00	40.00
Pakistan	275.0		200.00	275.00
Sri Lanka	-		-	-
Tunisia	140.0		62.00	105.00
Yemen	15.0		4.00	10.00
EUROPE	1235.0		1022.50	1087.50
Greece	280.0	280.00	280.00	280.00
Portugal	90.0	52.50	52.50	52.50
Spain	400.0	400.00	400.00	400.00
Turkey	465.0	290.00	290.00	355.00
AFRICA	234.0		33.70	87.00
AMERICAN REPUBLICS	125.3		39.80	70.00

Notes. "Congressional earmarks" are the amounts called for by committee reports and authorization and appropriations acts. Where the appropriated amount was less than the other earmarks, this lower amount is listed.

"CRA planning levels" are the amounts that the President notified Congress would be allocated to specific countries within the total of $4,813 million available under Continuing Resolution Authority.

Attachment 4

FY82 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
(DOLLARS IN MILLIONS)
RANKED BY MILITARY TOTALS

	ECONOMIC		p/c		MILITARY	
	RANK	TOTAL	RANK	GNP	RANK	TOTAL
Israel	2	806	57	5,160	1	1,400
Egypt	1	1,065	28	650	2	902
Turkey	3	301	45	1,540	3	403
Korea	98	0	47	1,700	4	297
Greece	99	0	54	4,420	5	281
Spain	32	22	58	5,640	6	127
Sudan	8	152	17	380	7	101
Tunisia	41	17	42	1,420	8	96
El Salvador	6	182	29	650	9	82
Thailand	24	36	30	770	10	81
Portugal	33	20	52	2,520	11	67
Jordan	46	15	46	1,620	12	57
Philippines	10	107	31	790	13	51
Indonesia	11	91	23	530	14	42
Kenya	19	59	19	420	15	33
Honduras	13	81	25	600	16	31
Morocco	18	63	32	860	17	31
Oman	44	16	56	5,022	18	30
Somalia	20	56	10	280	19	25
Liberia	17	66	22	520	20	13
Yemen	29	26	21	460	21	12
Zaire	30	24	6	210	22	11
Lebanon	52	11	50	2,114	23	11
Colombia	74	3	41	1,380	24	11
Malaysia	82	1	48	1,840	25	11
Dom Rep	12	82	40	1,260	26	6
Panama	49	13	49	1,910	27	5
Peru	21	55	36	1,170	28	5
Ecuador	31	23	37	1,180	29	5
Gabon	81	1	55	4,440	30	3
Niger	39	18	14	330	31	2
Sri Lanka	15	71	12	300	33	2
Jamaica	9	139	38	1,180	32	2
Costa Rica	23	52	43	1,430	34	2
Cameroon	37	19	34	880	35	2
E. Caribbean	16	70	44	1,478	36	1
Pakistan	5	200	16	350	37	1
Botswana	43	16	39	1,195	38	1
Haiti	26	34	13	300	39	1
Ghana	40	17	18	400	41	0.3
Senegal	27	31	20	430	40	0.3
Bangladesh	7	173	1	140	42	0.2
Burma	48	14	3	190	43	0.2
Nepal	38	19	2	150	47	0.1
Mali	51	12	4	190	48	0
Malawi	58	9	5	200	50	0

Uganda	60	7	7	220	51	0
Upper Volta	35	20	8	240	46	0.1
India	4	222	9	260	44	0.1
Zimbabwe	14	75	33	870	45	0.1

Attachment 5

U.S. Military Aid to Regional Balances[4]

Region		Threat	Key Recipient Countries	% of FY82 Military Grants**	% of FY82 Military Loans at Cost of Money
1.	North-East Asia	North Korea	Republic of Korea	0	5
2.	South-East Asia	Vietnam	Thailand	*	2
3.	South Asia/ Persian Gulf	Soviet Union	Pakistan	0	0
4.	Middle East	Syria	Jordan	0	2
5.	Horn of Africa	Ethiopia/ Cuba/ Soviet Union/Libya	Sudan/ Somalia	6	2
6.	North Africa	Libya	Tunisia/ Morocco	1	4
7.	Central America	Cuba/ Nicaragua Insurgents	Honduras/ El Salvador/	7	1

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* Less than 1%.

** Grants refer to MAP and to FMS forgiven credits.

Source: Congressional Presentation. Security Assistance, FY'84.

Attachment 6

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE AS A PERCENTAGE
OF
RECIPIENT'S DEFENSE SPENDING
(Dollars in Millions)

Major FMS Loan Recipient	1981 Defense Expenditure	U.S. Military Assistance In FY'82 FMS Loans	FMS Grants*	U.S. Military Assistance as a Percentage of Defense Expenditure**
Israel	$6,056	$ 850	$ 550	23%
Egypt	2,103	700	200	43
Turkey	2,632	343	57	15
Greece	2,273	280	-	12
Korea	3,970	166	-	4
Spain	3,655	125	-	3
Tunisia	211	95	-	45
Thailand	1,306	74.7	4.5	6
Jordan	425	54.9	-	13
Philippines	862	50	-	6
Sudan	333	50	50	30
Portugal	840	45	20	8
Indonesia	2,692	40	-	1
Morocco	1,106	30	-	3
Oman	1,687	30	-	2

* Includes FMSCR forgiven loans and MAP.
** Compares FY'82 assistance with 1981 Defense Expenditure.

DATA SOURCES: The Military Balance 1982-1983, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1982.

Congressional Presentation, Security Assistance Programs, FY 1984.

IMPROVING THE U.S. RESPONSE TO MILITARY THREATS IN THE THIRD WORLD

Once again the United States is caught up in an election-year debate over foreign policy. And once again one of the main issues is U.S. involvement in the Third World. The crux of the argument is how the United States should respond when friendly states in the Third World are subject to serious military threats. As the ongoing debate demonstrates, this is both a military and a political question. This paper is concerned with a primary policy instrument used by the United States in such situations: military assistance. The main areas examined are our ability to respond with military assistance, the effectiveness of our response and the effect of political factors on the program.

It is important to note at the outset that, more often than not, political questions overshadow military considerations. For example, a major factor in U.S.-Soviet rivalry is the lack of consensus among the Western nations and within the United States as to the nature of superpower competition. This disagreement affects every area, but is particularly important in the competition for influence in the Third World. Different views of the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States lead to quite different ideas as to the best U.S. response. It is helpful to examine the technical and management aspects of the U.S. military assistance program. However, in almost every case these aspects take second place to political considerations when it comes to high-level decisions on U.S. policy toward the countries of the Third World.

The first conclusion of the 1983 CSIS report on "U.S. Security Assistance in the 1980s" was that we should not count on reconciling in this decade the divergent views of Americans on the nature of the world and the role of the United States on the world scene.[1] Nevertheless, that report argued, our political leaders can take the initiative in measures to preserve and enhance our worldwide interests. This paper aims to identify such measures in the military assistance program and to suggest how they might be implemented given the pattern of political deliberations that ultimately determine U.S. policy and action. The measures themselves are not really extraordinary or difficult. The problem lies in reaching a consensus that they should be implemented.

I will begin with a very brief review and comparison of the Soviet and U.S. military assistance programs, then take a closer look at U.S. capabilities to respond to military threats with military assistance. These recitals will provide the basis for appraising U.S. performance, proposing improvements and suggesting how policy might evolve to institute these proposals.

Soviet Military Assistance

Unlike the U.S. program, Soviet military assistance did not assume its present character right after World War II.[2,3,4] The Soviet Union had to give first priority to rebuilding its own economy and military strength, was preoccupied with establishing client regimes along its immediate borders, and did not view most of the countries in the Third World as fertile ground for active intervention. The abortive effort to maintain control in north-

ern Iran, the support of the insurgency in Greece, and the support of North Korea's invasion of the South were attempts to exploit forward positions left from World War II rather than part of a general campaign of expansion into the Third World. All this changed with the passing of Stalin and the rise of Khrushchev.

Starting in 1955, the Soviets undertook an active policy of expanding their influence into the Third World at the expense of the Western powers. The political situation was ripe for such exploitation. The colonies wanted to assert their independence from their erstwhile masters. Years of domination had fostered deep hostility. Even in cases where the colonial power sought a peaceful transition, the political forces at work were so explosive that conflict ensued. It fitted with classic Marxist-Leninist doctrine to aid and abet destabilization of capitalist societies as the first step in spreading communist influence.

The common thread in all the Soviet and surrogate efforts was the focus on the security apparatus--both the armed forces that were the agency of external security and the police that were the agency of internal security. Whatever longer-term appeal there might have been in a socialist approach to the severe economic problems of the former colonies, economic ties to the West were generally too extensive and too vital to be readily replaced. Besides, the Soviets lacked the resources.

In contrast, second-hand military equipment was plentiful. This was the commodity with which the Soviet Union and its surrogates could compete at least on equal terms with the Western

powers. Thus began a pattern, continued to this day, of using military assistance--equipment, training and support--as the primary instrument of Soviet penetration of the Third World. What had once been the dominion of the West became the locus of an intense competition for influence, with a Soviet objective of ultimate hegemony.

In contrast to the Soviet singleness of purpose, the post-colonial West appears beset with ambivalence about the Third World. There are certainly grounds for the proposition that the basic conditions for revolution in many less developed countries exist independent of any Soviet intervention. This provides a basis for the view that Western efforts should be directed at remedying these conditions rather than at competing with the Soviet Union in an attempt to resolve the issue by military means.

However, there is another side to this argument. So long as the Soviets employ "security" assistance to revolutionary groups to destabilize the situation and bring to power elements dependent on Soviet support, it is difficult, if not impossible, to remedy the adverse economic and social conditions that make the less developed countries susceptible to Soviet intervention.

Western assistance needs to achieve balance between economic and security goals. However, much as the Western powers might prefer to compete primarily in the economic and social spheres, the Soviets consider military assistance their strongest suit. In this game of cards we have to be able to play in the suit led because it may be trumps.

U.S. Military Assistance.

Through the Lend-Lease Program the United States provided $50 billion in equipment and supplies to Great Britain, the Soviet Union and other allies during World War II.[5] The war was barely over when the Soviet Union confronted the Western allies over the status of Berlin. NATO was formed to resist the Soviet threat, and the United States launched the greatest foreign assistance program the world has ever known. From 1950-1983 U.S. military assistance amounted to $100 billion and economic aid to another $165 billion.[6]

By the early 1960s Western Europe had largely recovered from the effects of World War II. With the allies able to carry more of the NATO defense burden and the growing threat to Western interests elsewhere, the geographical focus of the U.S. military assistance program shifted to the Third World. The fundamental purpose of the program--to help other countries resist the influence of the Soviet Union and threats to regional stability--remained the same. So did much of the program structure and administration.

However, the program has inevitably been affected by the differences between the industrialized and less developed countries and in U.S. relations with such diverse governments. Two aspects deserve special mention: self-sufficiency and reliability.

From the beginning the philosophy of the U. S. foreign assistance program has been to help the recipients progress to self-sufficiency. This has occurred in the case of almost all

the industrialized states. Some may still acquire U.S. weapons rather than develop and produce their own. Some may still require financial aid. But the members of their armed forces have reached a level of technical and managerial skill comparable to skill levels in the United States. Their own industries play a major role in the maintenance of their forces. In the Third World this is the exception rather than the rule, and progress is painfully slow.

Reliability as a partner in defense cooperation involves far more than the mechanics of rationalization, standardization and inter-operability. Fundamentally, it depends upon the commonality of interests between the cooperating countries, their importance to each other and the stability of their governments. In the case of assistance to countries of the Third World, stability appears to depend critically on the social fabric of the recipient nation. Few Third World states have the kind of social heritage shared by the United States and the advanced countries who are our closest allies. The result is a patron-client relationship subject to great strain over time.

The U.S. approach to military assistance to countries of the Third World suffers from an idealized concept of U.S. relations with friendly sovereign states. We presume progress by a reliable partner toward a state of self-sufficiency where our combined efforts effectively block Soviet expansionism. The reality is quite different, and we lack the patience and understanding to persist in such an imperfect world.

Comparison of Soviet and U.S. Military Assistance

It is popular to make elaborate comparisons of the dollar levels and composition of Soviet and U.S. arms transfers to the Third World and draw strategic meaning from their year-to-year fluctuations and trends. Thus, the latest paper on this subject from the Congressional Research Service headlined that the United States was once again the leading supplier of arms to the Third World.[7]

Certainly, the gross value of these transfers and the quantities of weapons attest to the importance of this arena of superpower competition. Transfers by other countries, notably France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Brazil are also significant. The quantities of various types of weapons afford insights about the comparative emphasis of the Soviet and U.S. programs. Arms industries and commercial suppliers rightly study these figures to appraise the market and their own performance.

However, it is a mistake to view arms transfers as a race in which the country with the highest total somehow wins the strategic prize--or, in the view of others, deserves the greatest moral opprobrium. In the case of the United States, at least, arms transfers are only one of the activities growing out of our relations with countries with whom we share significant interests. The true test is the ultimate well-being of the recipients of these arms and, for the United States, whether these transfers serve the security of the free world and international stability. The nature of the programs, rather than their size, is of greater strategic interest.

The different approaches in the Soviet and U.S. military assistance programs reflect the distinct organization and doctrines of the two military establishments and the disparate political and social systems of the two countries.

The Soviet practice has been to supply quantities of weapons supported by numerous advisers and technicians and to leave little to the initiative and control of the recipient.[8] This approach favors the early improvement of military capability and affords the Soviets substantial control over its employment and duration. It fits with the objective of increasing Soviet influence to a level approaching hegemony. Over time it is burdensome to the Soviets, onerous to the recipient and erosive to their bilateral relationship.

The U.S. practice is to supply selected equipment supported by the minimum practical number of advisers and technicians and to rely on the initiative and management of the recipient to the extent practical, in the interest of fostering self-sufficiency. Except for cash sales, budgetary economy and cost effectiveness are constant concerns. This approach develops military capability more slowly and affords the donor less influence over its employment and maintenance. On the plus side, it offers more potential for maintaining and hopefully strengthening bilateral relations over time.

It is hard to reach conclusions about the superiority of one approach over the other based upon the evidence of the last 30 years. The Soviets were able to improve their strategic position in Africa with their massive intervention in Angola and Ethiopia.

However, for largely domestic political reasons these moves were virtually uncontested by the United States.[9,10]

In the same period the Soviets wore out their welcome in Egypt, Sudan and Somalia.[11,12] The successor U.S military assistance programs are more modest. But then the United States is intent on deterring aggression, whereas the Soviet Union was willing to support it. At this stage one can only speculate as to whether the U.S. efforts will survive the test of time. Political factors are more likely to determine success or failure than military ones.

We do know that the U.S. approach failed in Vietnam. Media commentators have tended to dwell on the technical shortcomings of our military effort--in the performance of our own forces and of the Vietnamese forces supported by our military assistance. Certainly, our military strategy was seriously flawed. However, the failure was basically political. The South Vietnamese lacked the political fabric to establish and sustain effective forces, and the United States lacked the political will for the prolonged struggle necessary to prevail. The U.S. approach depends upon a certain level of skill and motivation on the part of the countries we are aiding, without which neither we nor they can expect to succeed.

Just as they do in their own country, the Soviets use every means at their disposal to manipulate the institutions and people of the countries they choose to penetrate. They may be inhibited by the conditions and attitudes they encounter, and they may be cautious to avoid adverse reactions. But according to their

thinking it is both proper and wise to coerce others to their ways. Military assistance is fundamental to their approach.

The United States, on the other hand, proceeds from the premise that self-determination and individual initiative are the keys to national well-being. We are not lacking in missionary zeal or martial spirit in support of our way of life. Nor are we reticent about pressing it on others. In fact, we often seem to forget that we are dealing with sovereign nations. However, just as leadership in our own armed forces is predicated on the willing obedience of subordinates, so also are we intent on evoking the willing embrace of our system by the countries receiving U.S. military assistance. This is fine in theory. In practice, the differences between our cultural heritage and industrialized society on the one hand and the very different cultures and social conditions in much of the Third World cause serious difficulties.

Those responsible for the U.S. security assistance program are acutely aware of this problem. Much effort is devoted to its solution. The trouble is that all the practical solutions take time. In the competition for influence in the Third World, so vital to protect our interests there, we are not always afforded enough time. Immediate crises demand our attention, and longer-range efforts slip to lower priority. At the political level only the immediate crises may receive the necessary support. Investment to ward off future military threats is often considered too uncertain to merit funding. Only as a new crisis arises is there belated recognition that it would have paid to make a greater effort over time. The competition between immediate and

longer-range requirements is evident in the following review of capabilities.

U.S. Capabilities

The U.S. security assistance program is designed primarily to build the military strength of friendly countries over time, both to deter aggression and to defend against any that occurs. However, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) contain an impressive array of emergency authorities aimed at responding expeditiously if hostilities are imminent or have already broken out. The following paragraphs touch briefly on the scope of the main program, then go into these emergency authorities.

Under the continuing resolution for FY 1984 the U.S. military assistance program amounts to $6.3 billion, made up of the following components:[13]

	$ in Millions
Military Assistance Program (MAP)	$ 510
International Military Education and Training (IMET)	$ 52
Foreign Military Sales Financing Program (FMSCR)	$5,716

The following breakdown clarifies the nature of this assistance:

	$ in Millions
Equipment and support grants (including "forgiven" credits for Egypt and Israel)	$1,825
Training grants	$ 52
Loans at market interest rates for the purchase of equipment, training and support	$4,401

The distribution by regions is:

	$ in Millions
East Asia & Pacific	$ 443
Near East & South Asia	$3,742
Europe	$1,730
Africa	$ 158
American Republics	$ 163
General Costs	$ 42

Of the 85 Third World countries receiving U.S. military assistance in FY 1984, 20 are receiving $10 million or more. These 20 account for 97% of the funds. The following table shows both the broad coverage of the program and the concentration of resources on those countries considered most important to the United States and subject to the greatest military threats:

	$ in Millions
East Asia & Pacific	
Indonesia	$ 47
Korea	$ 232
Malaysia	$ 11
Philippines	$ 51
Thailand	$ 101
Six (6) others	$ 1
Near East & South Asia	
Egypt	$1,367
Israel	$1,700
Jordan	$ 117

	$ in Millions
Lebanon	$ 48
Morocco	$ 58
Oman	$ 40
Pakistan	$ 301
Tunisia	$ 106
Seven (7) others	$ 6
Africa	
Kenya	$ 24
Liberia	$ 13
Somalia	$ 33
Sudan	$ 47
Thirty-three (33) others	$ 41
American Republics	
El Salvador	$ 65
Honduras	$ 41
Peru	$ 11
Nineteen (19) others	$ 46

In the last three years there has been a major reversal in the trend in military assistance. As a result of the failure in Vietnam and the disillusionment with the efficacy of military assistance, Congress in the late 1970s called for an end to the MAP progam of grant aid for equipment. It was argued both that countries should be weaned from grants to loans and that this would discourage arms transfers. Now it is evident that the extreme economic difficulties of many Third World countries are

exacerbated by the system of military credits. In most cases it does not make sense for the United States to be adding to the huge international debts of its Third World friends, increasing the risk of defaults and requiring repeated application of funds from the loan guarantee reserves to finance re-schedulings. MAP appropriations reached a low of $83 million in FY 1979, but recovered to $510 million in FY 1984.

While the trend is favorable, Congress still cut the Administration's FY 1984 request for MAP funds by 32%. The cut in grants was partially offset by an increase in credits. However, this hardly ministered to the economic problems of the Third World countries with large debts who nevertheless must strengthen their forces to deal with military threats.

Furthermore, in the annual congressional pruning of the foreign assistance budget, funds for the larger recipients are often "earmarked," forcing cuts to be taken primarily against the military assistance programs of the smaller countries of the Third World. In a typical year a cut that would amount to 10% across the entire program becomes a 50% cut of the smaller countries because aid to the largest recipients must be kept intact. There is no question about the strategic importance of the recipients of the larger aid programs. The issue is the marginal utility of equal increments of funding to the large and small recipients. Immediate political imperatives preempt the longer-term investment in the security of the smaller countries.

Fortunately, this no longer applies to the International Military Education and Training Program--probably the most significant investment that the United States makes in relations with

the countries of the Third World. Annual appropriations have doubled in the last five years, and new costing rules have increased the training available by an even greater factor.

IMET reached a low point in the late 1970s based on the notion that the military in the Third World often engaged in repression and that association with them amounted to connivance in their misdeeds. As time has passed and we have reached a more balanced view of the Vietnam years, there has been a greater appreciation of the key role played by the military in the Third World. A survey by 47 U.S. diplomatic missions identified over 1,000 IMET-trained personnel holding positions of influence in their countries and almost 1,200 holding flag rank.[14] In this program more than any other we are in direct competition with the Soviet Union for the future of the Third World.[15]

Each year, Administration witnesses appear before the congressional committees with voluminous data and carefully prepared rationales. Their testimony is aimed at convincing somewhat skeptical members that we should be investing over time in the security of our Third World friends through modest levels of military assistance rather than waiting until the threat is serious to come to their rescue with much larger quantities of aid. The formal presentations are established practice, but the most effective contacts are the one-on-one discussions where the members and their senior staff assistants can come to grips with the issues away from the glare of publicity. This is where a greater consensus in support of military assistance to the

threatened countries of the Third World will be built, if anywhere.

We can hope that, when one of the states of the Third World is threatened with aggression supported by the Soviet Union and its surrogates, that country will have benefited from a sustained program of U.S. security assistance that has built a professioanl fighting force equipped to meet at least the initial onslaught. Whether it has or not, if vital U.S. interests are involved, we will have to respond with emergency assistance. We have a long list of emergency capabilities.

Heading the list are Sections 506 and 614 of the FAA. Section 506 allows the President to "direct . . . the drawdown of defense articles from the stocks of the Department of Defense, defense services of the Department of Defense, and military education and training" if he determines that "an unforeseen emergency exists which requires immediate military assistance to a foreign country or an international organization."[16]

When first enacted the Section 506 authority was limited to an aggregate value of $10 million in any fiscal year. It was increased to $50 million annually in 1980 and to $75 million annually in 1981. The Administration used this authority in each of the preceding three years:[17]

FY 1981	El Salvador	$ 25 million
FY 1982	El Salvador	$ 55 million
FY 1983	Chad	$ 25 million

It might have been used more, but Congress became very sensitive about the appearance that it was being used to provide more assistance to El Salvador than the Congress approved.

Three other limitations in Section 506 deserve mention. It requires a "drawdown" from DOD resources and cannot be used to contract for supplies or services even though that might be the preferred or only practical way to provide a particular type of support. It requires prior notificaion to the Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs and Appropriations Committees, and this has led frequently to delays and political confrontation. It requires appropriations to reimburse the DOD account against which the drawdown has been charged--another requirement for negotiation between the Administration and the Appropriations Committees. As a practical matter, the DOD can go and has gone without reimbursement. For a time at least, defense rather than foreign assistance appropriations are paying for the aid.

Section 506 was never intended for large-scale use, but rather in minor crises or as a stopgap while the President sought and obtained congressional approval for full-scale aid.

Section 614 allows the President to furnish assistance without regard to any provision of the FAA or AECA when he determines that "to do so is important to the security interests of the United States."[18] He must first consult with the congressional committees, provide them a "written policy justification" and notify the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations of his determination. The authority includes making sales, extending credit and issuing guarantees under the AECA.

The "reprogramming" authority of Section 614 is limited to an aggregate of $250 million in any fiscal year, $100 million in

accrued foreign currencies and $50 million for any one country "unless such country is a victim of active Communist or Communist-supported aggression."

Section 614 would allow an Administration to provide an "increment" of military assistance to a threatened country, but would not be an adequate basis for the sort of sustained program generally required to counter serious threats in the Third World.

As a general rule, the AECA authorizes procurement for foreign sale only on the basis of a firm order from the customer and requires payment in dollars in sufficient time to cover all U.S. Government expenditures for such procurement. When the sale is from stock, full payment is due upon delivery. From the length of the procurement cycle and the financial condition of most of the Third World, it is easy to see how much these requirements constrain the U.S. response to threatened states in those parts of the globe.

However, Chapters 2, 3, 5 and 6 of the AECA contain a series of provisions setting aside the general rule in order to respond more quickly. Section 21(d), for example, provides that interest be charged for any amount still due 60 days after delivery from stock, implying that payment may be delayed until 59 days after delivery.[19] The President may extend this period without interest charges to 120 days if he determines that the emergency requirements exceed the purchaser's ability to pay. He must submit his determination to Congress together with a "special emergency request for authorization and appropriation of funds to finance the purchase."

Section 22(b) provides essentially the same procedure for procurement for foreign sale.[20] It allows the issue of letters of offer that provide for payment within 120 days of delivery. The requirement for an emergency determination and submission of an authorization and appropriation request is the same. DOD appropriations may be used to fund the procurement until reimbursement is received.

As an emergency departure from the "principles" of the AECA, Sections 21(d) and 22(b) allow an Administration to supply or undertake procurement for a threatened friendly country, then seek funding from Congress. People wise in the ways of Washington will recognize the considerable risk of such an undertaking without advance consultation and assurance of support from the congressional leadership.

Congress has two main ways of influencing the quantity and types of equipment supplied to foreign governments from the United States. As discussed earlier, the annual authorization and appropriation of funds for the security assistance program determines the quantity supplied those countries dependent on grants and credits to pay for the equipment received. This is consistent with the constitutional concept that the executive branch proposes and the legislative branch disposes. Section 36 of the AECA allows Congress to review the types of equipment supplied through government and commerical sales. Beyond these two general mechanisms Congress has, from time to time, enacted prohibitions on the supply of military equipment to a particular country or a group of countries.

Section 36 can be very significant in the decision to supply arms to threatened friends. It requires the President to notify the Congress of any proposed sale to a foreign country that includes "defense articles" valued at $50 million or more or "major defense equipment" valued at $14 million or more.[21] Thirty days must pass between the notification and the issue of the letter of offer, or the export license in the case of a commercial sale. Before the Supreme Court declared the provision unconstitutional in 1983, Congress could exercise a "legislative veto" of the sale by a concurrent resolution of both houses within the 30-day waiting period. If the President certifies in the notification that an emergency exists, the 30-day waiting period is waived.

The recent sale of 400 STINGER air defense missiles to Saudi Arabia illustrates the problems presented by Section 36 and its emergency provisions. Earlier the Administration had withdrawn a proposal to sell 1,200 STINGER missiles to Saudi Arabia to enhance Saudi air defenses in the face of the threat of air attack by Iran. Israel had objected to the sale on the grounds that the missiles could be turned against that country in terrorist attacks or future hostilities with Arab states. There was enough support in Congress for Israel's objection that both houses might have passed a resolution against the sale. While that would not have become law without the President's signature or an override of his veto, the Administration decided that forcing the issue would do more harm than good.

The subsequent notification of a smaller number of missiles has also evoked intense congressional criticism. However, the

air attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf and the certification of an emergency have prevented Congress from effectively opposing the delivery of the missiles. The political cost of the confrontation between the Executive Branch and the Congress has still to be reckoned, however.

The Administration has chosen, so far, not to pursue the sale of STINGER missiles requested by Kuwait. The United States and Kuwait are proceeding with steps to improve the effectiveness of the I-HAWK air defense system previously supplied by the United States. At the same time Kuwait has turned to two of its other suppliers--the Soviet Union and France--for weapons to strengthen its defenses against attacks from Iran spilling over from the Iran-Iraq war, and Kuwait has announced a large purchase from the Soviet Union. The repercussions of the Section 36 deliberations on the various STINGER sales will hardly strengthen the President's hand in dealing with similar situations in the future.

Another aspect of the STINGER sales has not received much public attention. The 400 missiles could be provided on short notice only from procurement originally undertaken for the U.S. Army. The impact of such "diversions" has been the subject of sharp dispute over the years.

The Services are very possessive of weapons, equipment and munitions on which their combat readiness depends. Americans should be glad that they are because they cannot defend us without guns and bullets. In a narrow sense, it is a derogation of the DOD requirements, authorization, appropriation and

procurement process to take equipment destined for or in the hands of U.S. troops and supply it to another country.

However, in a larger context, supplying equipment to allied and friendly forces enables them to conduct a forward defense that we hope will prevent our own forces from ever becoming engaged. If the STINGER missiles in Saudi hands help to limit the spread of hostile actions in the Persian Gulf, or at least protect Saudi oil facilities from attack, that will be of more benefit to the Western democracies than the small increment contributed by this number of missiles to the readiness posture of the U.S. forces. Moreover, diversions are eventually paid back from production.

Chapter 5 of the AECA was enacted to relieve, if not remove entirely, the problem of diversions. It authorized a "Special Defense Acquisition Fund" (SDAF) to fund production of defense articles likely to be needed by foreign governments in advance of actual orders.[22] In adding this chapter to the AECA Congress created an important exception to the general rule mentioned earlier that procurement for foreign sale would be only on the basis of customer orders. The concept of the SDAF is that, as time-urgent requirements arise, they can be met from production or stocks that were programmed from the beginning for foreign use, as opposed to materiel programmed originally for U.S. forces.

In most cases this distinction is more political than substantive. SDAF procurements, like other procurements for foreign use, are generally small increments added to buys for

U.S. forces. The difference is the source of funding. The political implications will be discussed further below.

One practical value of the SDAF is for procurement for foreign sale of a model or "mod" of a weapon which is going out of production for U.S. forces. An example would be ammunition or missiles for re-supply of other countries equipped with weapons that employ a round with different specifications from the new round entering production for U.S. forces.

So far the rationale for the SDAF has been primarily to allow advance procurement that will avoid diversions, or at least minimize the time for payback.[23] Experience provides a very good basis for forecasting the military equipment and supplies that Third World countries are likely to need quickly. Few if any of the items being procured now are likely to be placed in stock. They will be delivered directly from production to a foreign customer or to the U.S. forces to replace items previously diverted. This is consistent with the view expressed in Congress that the stocking of items for foreign sale is undesirable because it might become an inducement for sales.

However, if we are serious about providing timely assistance to threatened countries, we ought to expand the concept of the SDAF. Many Third World countries cannot afford adequate stocks for all contingencies. Moreover, it would be wasteful to have duplicate stocks around the world when the United States could establish a central reserve from which any country could quickly replenish its stocks. That is, in effect, the present situation, except that many of the items likely to be needed by countries of the Third World are the very ones that are scarce in U.S. inven-

tories. The issue is whether these stocks should be procured entirely from the DOD budget against the requirements of the U.S. forces, or whether some portion likely to be supplied to Third World countries should be funded from the SDAF.

When Congress was considering the Administration's proposal for an SDAF in 1981, the touchiest issue was whether such a fund would make it easier for the Executive Branch to supply arms to foreign governments without consulting Congress. Administration witnesses argued that procurement was separate from sale and that Congress would retain its same level of involvement in military assistance appropriations and Section 36 reviews of proposed arms sales. Many committee members agreed with this rationale. Others argued then, and still do, that the SDAF starts the government down the slippery slope of unwise arms transfers.

The net effect has been to restrict the growth of the SDAF well below the level of the recoupments from the foreign sales program that were designated as the main source for capitalizing the fund. Two categories of problems have affected growth of the fund. One has been a series of technical issues stemming from the process of congressional oversight of DOD revolving funds. The other has been congressional reluctance to increase the flexibility of the executive branch to respond with military assistance in crisis situations. The more such flexibility is needed to cope with trouble abroad, the more reluctant some in Congress seem to be to grant it. Those opposed focus on the potential adverse consequences of "unwise" action rather than the potential danger stemming from inaction.

Chapter 5 on SDAF was added to the AECA to increase flexibility. Chapter 6 on leases was added to reduce it. For years DOD leased articles to foreign governments under the authority of Title 10, Section 2667, a law "enacted in 1947 for the primary purpose of authorizing the lease of defense plants to private commercial interests."[24] This authority was widely used for such purposes as short-term loans of equipment for test and evaluation, loans pending delivery of a like item from production, and loans of cryptographic interface or other communications equipment to which the United States did not wish to pass title to a foreign government. Another attractive use of leases is loans for training when delivery of the item may be some time in the future, or anticipated in a contingency.

In a classic case of exceeding the limits of congressional tolerance, the Administration used 10 U.S.C. 2667 to lease ten UH-1B helicopters to Honduras in the spring of 1980. That year the Congress reacted by including a section (109) in the annual foreign assistance authorization act requiring advance notice of all future leases to foreign governments of equipment valued at $7 million or more. The following year Congress added Chapter 6 to the AECA prohibiting the use of 10 U.S.C. 2667 for leases to foreign governments.[25] The new chapter substituted a more restrictive leasing authority with notification and legislative veto provisions patterned on Section 36.

A lease under the authority of 10 U.S.C. 2667 was the easiest, quickest and least visible way to provide helicopters to Honduras in 1980. There was some apprehension that the growing use of this authority would invite congressional intervention.

However, the Administration wanted to strengthen friendly forces in Central America without a full-scale debate on U.S. policy toward that area. This is the dilemma that the United States has faced and will continue to face time and time again. Quiet intervention may be preferred from the standpoint of international relations, but in a democracy such as ours public debate is integral to important foreign policy decisions. In the particular case of the helicopters for Honduras, the Carter Administration made the decision to intervene with military assistance against Soviet supported insurgency. The procedure utilized postponed debate, but very little, and the flexibility of the executive branch was further constrained.

Leases remain a potentially valuable procedure for assisting countries of the Third World to counter military threats. Some doubting members of Congress must be persuaded that they are a good way to act quickly at low cost. It will require close and continuing consultation with the committees to overcome the air of suspicion currently inhibiting the use of leases.

Possible Improvements in U.S. Military Assistance

The preceding review has itemized an impressive array of U.S. capabilities to provide assistance to Third World countries facing military threats. However, the decision to employ most of these capabilities must be shared between the President and the Congress. This makes it highly political, uncertain and subject to delay.

A simplistic approach would be to suggest ways to give the executive branch more flexibility and reduce the involvement of Congress. Many such proposals have been offered. However, they have met with very limited success. Perhaps in the first session of Congress after a Presidential election there is enough political momentum to achieve modest improvements in the formal provisions governing coordination, approval and execution of the security assistance program. However, short of a major international crisis, Congress is unlikely to relinquish its role in the decision-making process. Rather, there will be continual efforts to elaborate congressional involvement. This suggests that the Administration's main energies should be focused on ways to involve members of Congress so that they will have, and will be perceived publicly to have, a greater stake in the results of our involvement with the Third World.

The Commission on Security and Economic Assistance, appointed by Secretary Schultz in 1983 and chaired by former Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, was an example of involving selected members of Congress more intimately in foreign assistance issues. The constructive part played by the congressional members in the Commission's deliberations and the resolution of issues in the final report demonstrated this concept of "constructive engagement."

If a foundation of greater cooperation with Congress can be laid, four aspects of military assistance should receive priority attention: grant resources, training, advance procurement and the complementarity of military and economic assistance. These are

the keys to the breadth and adequacy of our military assistance effort in the Third World, its effectiveness and its timeliness.

Each of the last four budget requests has sought greater "concessionality" in military assistance in view of the oppressive debt under which much of the Third World is laboring. This was the main recommendation on the military assistance program by the Carlucci Commission. The response from Congress is encouraging. Both MAP and IMET have been increased, although not to the extent requested. This year Congress may approve the proposal, first advanced in the FY 1982 budget, for a program of low-interest-rate loans for military equipment purchases. The exact formulations are not critical. The basic need is to increase the grant component so that U.S. military assistance to the less developed countries is less of a drain on their economies.

The growth in the IMET program has bought professional military education (PME) for foreign students in the United States to a level close to the present capacity of the facilities and the availability of qualified candidates from many of the Third World countries. While we should continue to expand PME, we should do so at a rate that does not sacrifice quality for quantity.

However, the technical skills, leadership and professionalism in the armed forces of much of the Third World are still well below the levels needed to make effective use of modern equipment and conduct effective military operations. "Absorption" of our equipment is often extremely slow. We should expand the use of mobile training teams (MTT's) and technical assistance field

teams (TAFT's) to work on the absorption problem and to be a positive influence on the ground.

The Soviet Union and its surrogates continue to invest heavily in Third World training. U.S. military training compares very favorably with the programs offered by the Soviet Union. The United States can gain ground at Soviet expense if we will commit the resources.

The third area for emphasis is the buildup and elaboration of the Special Defense Acquisition Fund. Members of Congress and their staffs must be brought into the process of devising all the ways that an adequate and varied stockage list, procurement pipeline and stockage level will serve to improve responsiveness to both our most favored recipients of military assistance and other countries that cannot afford large peacetime stocks but may have to call on the United States in a contingency. Congressional involvement should be aimed at minimizing the apprehension--really unfounded--that the SDAF improves flexibility at the expense of congressional control.

A recent General Accounting Office study has focused on the most serious problem affecting the SDAF.[26] Because all obligation authority must be provided in annual appropriation bills, the SDAF cannot function as a revolving fund as it was originally intended. An amendment to the basic law or the annual appropriation bill should allow re-obligation of funds received whenever assets are sold from the SDAF.

The fourth area that deserves still greater emphasis is the close complementarity between military assistance to the Third

World and the economic development efforts for these regions. In the past the competition for budget resources has led the advocates of military and economic aid each to criticize the other program as wasteful of U.S. taxpayers' money. The Carlucci Commission concentrated on this problem and concluded that, on the contrary, the two programs were mutually supporting, as should be their advocates in the public and the Congress.

The difficulty of building a modern professional military establishment in a Third World country lacking the cultural heritage and industrial development enjoyed by the United States and its advanced allies has already been mentioned. Economic development is one of the keys to the technical progress and social well-being necessary for true military preparedness. Likewise, economic progress depends on security. This should be the message regardless of the political party of the President.

Two examples illustrate the effectiveness of security assistance when delivered in a timely manner in support of U.S. policy objectives. The first is our program in Liberia. The coup against President Tolbert threatened the loss of one of the United States' staunchest friends in Black Africa. Timely assistance was one of the keys to putting relations with the government of Samuel Doe on a sound footing and ensuring continuation of our long-standing friendly relations with Liberia.

During his visit to the United States in 1979 President Tolbert expressed apprehension about conditions in the Liberian Army, saying that low pay and lack of adequate quarters for the troops and their families were very hard on morale and could affect their loyalty. U.S. special forces mobile training teams

that spent several months with the two Liberian battalions did indeed find a low state of training and discipline, but reported successful completion of their training programs and marked improvement in the Liberian units. There were no funds in the budget for grants or credits that could be used to help Liberia with the housing problem, and the Administration did not elect to re-program funds to provide at least a start.

A year later President Tolbert was assassinated in a coup led by Sergeant Doe. Discontent with living conditions in the Army and the apparent lack of concern on the part of the privileged ruling group were cited as major reasons for the coup. Reports indicated that the new leadership was receiving strong overtures of support from Colonel Qaddafi of Libya. Security assistance was a major factor in the successful U.S. response to this situation.

First, Sergeant Doe admired and respected the United States from his own participation in the training program conducted in his battalion by the U.S. mobile training team. Second, the U.S. Ambassador gave top priority to Sergeant Doe's request for new troop housing. A U.S. Navy team was dispatched immediately to help plan the housing project, and a combination of grants and credits was arranged to fund construction supplies with which Liberian contractors and troop labor could erect the housing. Once the decision was made on this key element, a comprehensive military and economic assistance program could be worked out to help the Doe government address Liberia's most urgent problems.

The friendship and close cooperation of Liberia and the United States were thus reassured.

Many lessons can be drawn from this experience. Two seem most compelling. First, military training done well represents an invaluable opportunity to reach potential leaders in the Third World and establish bonds important to future relations. Second, timely use of security assistance to address the highest priority needs of Third World leaders can forestall Soviet and surrogate meddling. Of course, we are not always so well positioned to counter Soviet overtures. However, actions like those we took in Liberia are more effective and less costly than measures we would have to take if a military threat had been allowed to develop.

The example of the U.S. re-supply of Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War should dispel any doubts about the ability of the United States to respond with security assistance to military threats in the Third World. In a matter of days Congress authorized $1.5 billion in assistance, 25 F-4's and 25 A-4's were delivered by U.S. pilots, and 150 M60 tanks and other major supplies were drawn from U.S. stocks to replace Israeli losses.[27] Overshadowing the entire operation was the confrontation between the superpowers as the Soviet Union re-supplied Egypt and Syria. The handling of this crisis was at the time, and still is, the subject of some intense debate. What is not debatable is the demonstrated ability of the United States to deliver assistance when there is political consensus.

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ACTIVE MEASURES IN THE THIRD WORLD:

Some Comments and Prospects

INTRODUCTION

In discussing the use of "active measures" by the United States in the Third World, it would be foolish to recommend the emulation of "aktivnye meropryatiya" (active measures) of the KGB, or other Soviet agencies as described in the Special Report 101 of the U.S. State Department, the National Review, April , 1983 and in Survey, Autumn/Winter, 1983. The U.S. cannot simply take a leaf or two out of a Soviet manual and expect to succeed. Acting out of character is to court certain failure.

The U.S. cannot rely on the back-up support of local "capitalist parties" as the Soviet Union can, in relation to Communist parties. The United States never possessed an ideology for export. Furthermore, most Americans do not want their government to be involved in "foreign intrigues", in plots and counterplots. If there is a tacit and grudging agreement that, unfortunately, some covert operations may have to be performed to combat Soviet influence, it is often hedged with a rider that such operations should not run counter to American values. No easy task this, and perhaps it is nearly impossible.

Therefore, it must be said at the outset that although theoretically there are a variety of ways in which Soviet influence in the Third World could be combatted, many, or most are impractical because they would demand, on the part of American officials applying such measures, a frame of mind and dedication that people living in democracies can summon and

maintain only in short spells, and only in times of highly visible national peril. There is the additional factor of congressional scrutiny and media reaction in case something misfires, as sooner or later it inevitably does.

There is also the institutional aspect of "active measures" that demands not just the isolated activity of a "dirty tricks department", but also the issuance of instructions from high up in the administrative structure. To give a practical example: in the highly complex conditions that prevailed at the time when the American Marines were stationed in Lebanon, a combination of circumstances could very well have occurred which would demand an American ploy of disinformation regarding ultimate U.S. goals. This, however, could not have been effected without direct instructions from, or the knowledge of the Secretary of State, Defense or the National Security Adviser.

By way of comparison, let us consider a situation where Soviet authorities employed "disinformation" recently described: "In December 1980, in Norway, a forged copy of a U.S. State Department cable surfaced immediately before the visit of the Norwegian Foreign Minister in Moscow... the forged cable touched on a number of controversial issues for the Norwegian government and put the U.S. on the wrong side of each issue." It can be assumed that Andrei Gromyko must have been aware of what was being done and that he must have given his approval. Would George Schultz have done the same? Probably not. However, even if disinformation is practiced in a more subtle manner ti still requires direction from the highest quarter. Ethical scruples apart, it is doubtful if highly placed U.S. officials would agree

to get involved.

Essentially, "active measures" can succeed only if they are based on the explicit policy decisions made by the administration to counter Soviet influence in the Third World, by both orthodox and unorthodox means. Both the decision-making process and (at times) even the execution of such measures presuppose the existence of tightly organized inter-departmental cooperation.

Does this mean that the U.S. is condemned to watch passively the growing manipulation of the Third World by the Soviet Union? The answer is - not necessarily so. Provided a consensus is established among the main government departments and methods of integrated cooperation are laid down, an albeit limited number of reasonably effective "active measures" can still be employed by the U.S., using existing public and private American institutions abroad.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

A. Categories of Countries

Any attempt to discuss the employment of "active measures" by the United States to combat Soviet influence in the Third World must begin by limiting the terms of reference. No recommendations, however general, can apply in equal measure to all countries in the three continents of the Third World. The writer does not believe in the usefulness of abstract proposals, or in the creation of artificial "models", so beloved by some political scientists.

There are parts of the Third World where the U.S. has been deeply involved for several decades, or for the past few years; these are the Middle East, the Philippines, and Central America.

In all areas of continued American involvement, contacts with military circles, intelligence organizations and political parties have long been established. Although it is quite likely that new methods and a change of tactical engagement may well be advisable in some of these countries (especially the Philippines), it would be presumptuous on the part of this writer to suggest them. Each one of these cases, Iran, the Philippines and El Salvador, are under the constant scrutiny of specialists in the Defense Department, the State Department, and the CIA who are better qualified to pass judgement than any outsider.

This paper will attempt to suggest "active measures" for the "gray areas" that can be considered as likely targets of Soviet expansion in the future; these countries are predominantly in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean Basin.

Even if one excludes countries of present active engagement from the list of areas under review, one must recognize that there are numerous independent states in the Third World that are outside the sphere of possible American interest (and/or influence). For instance: a new coup took place recently in Upper Volta which brought a pro-Libyan, anti-Western government to power. However, regrettable as this may be, Qadafi's henchmen controlling the government in Quagadougou will not worry anyone in Washington excessively. Similarly, if a pro-Chinese or pro-Soviet regime were to be installed in Katmandu, instead of the amiable King of Nepal, it would doubtless cause concern in New Delhi, and worry or satisfaction in Peking and Moscow. Washington would register the change of regime with great interest, and follow closely the events in the Himalayan Kingdom because anything that affects the relations between China, the USSR and India may have wider repercussions into areas of Asia that are of direct interest to the U.S. However, this would require only a passive monitoring of events; there is nothing in terms of "active measures" that the U.S. could undertake to influence the change of regime in Nepal.

What then are the areas of the Third World that may demand the use of American influence to forestall the projection of Soviet power?

Apart from Central America, the Middle East and the Philippines, countries that are of special concern to the U.S. may fall into several loose categories:

I. Third World Countries Under Soviet Control and Influence

In Third World Countries (hereafter "T.W.C.") under Soviet control any American action can only be considered in an "adversary situation." There, only clandestine measures are feasible and their consideration does not belong in this kind of study.

The T.W.C.s under strong Soviet influence cannot be categorized into neat case studies. In a country such as Syria, for instance, due to the authoritarian nature of the regime, there is no room for the exercise of American influence. On the other hand, in India it is possible, although to a limited degree. We shall discuss the case of India separately.

It can be said, however, that under conditions currently prevailing in the Third World, very little can be done openly by the U.S. to combat Soviet influence if the government of a country is pronouncedly anti-American. In the case of Guinea, for instance, numerous American attempts, especially during the sixties, to counter Soviet infiltration failed because Secou Toure's dictatorial regime gave the Americans no opportunity to act.[1] After his death and the revolution, an opportunity may now present itself for the U.S. to establish closer relations. As in all other African countries, however, the situation is likely to be very unstable for some time to come.

II. Strategic Importance

These are countries that control vital waterways, such as Somalia (Bab al Mandab) or Singapore and Malaysia (The Straits of Malacca). States partly under Soviet or Cuban control which

offer the Soviet Navy servicing facilities which enable it to interfere with Western shipping, such as Angola (the South Atlantic routes) are also included, as well as islands in the areas of Soviet-American competition for example, Madagascar, the Seychelles and Maldives in the Indian Ocean.

III. Countries that Border on States Politically Friendly to the United States

These include countries whose central geographical position accords them a special political importance. Example for both cases: Sudan - it borders on Eygpt, is politically friendly to the U.S., protects that country's "soft underbelly" and has common frontiers with eight independent African states (Egypt, Libya, Chad, Central African Republic, Zaire, Uganda and Ethiopia). Two of these eight countries, Ethiopia and Libya, are closely allied to the USSR.

IV. Countries Whose Mineral Wealth is Essential to the West

Examples: Nigeria, Zambia, South West Africa (Namibia), Indonesia, Burma, etc.

V. Countries of Pro-Western Orientation

Examples: Singapore, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Kenya, The Ivory Coast, Cameroons.

B. Terms of Reference -- Functional

As we pointed out in the introduction, the employment by the U.S. of covert activities abroad presents certain difficulties principally because a post-Watergate public opinion will not tolerate or support such projects. If, nevertheless, such methods are to be used they belong in the domain of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Third World Perception of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.

After some 30 years of competition and confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Third World, most political leaders in Africa and Asia have a very clear idea these days of what to expect from each of the two superpowers.[2] Ideology apart, Asians and Africans know that the Soviet Union is a potential source of power and the United States is a source of money.

Third World leaders who choose alliance with the Soviet Union can sometimes (if they are sufficiently important) expect a "power package", consisting of East German specialists, to set up a security and counter-intelligence apparatus; Soviet, Czech or Cuban military personnel to train the local army in the use of Soviet weapons; in addition civilian specialists to help with transport, communications, and so forth.

Africans and Asians have also learned through bitter experience not to expect Soviet aid in agriculture, the building of infrastructures or in industrial development.

A pro-American stand can sometimes provide favorable treatment from the World Bank, the IMF, and help with development

projects from the AID. On the whole, American corporations have not followed the lead of the U.S. government and have not invested in Third World countries friendly to the U.S., unless objective economic conditions favored such investments, as was the case in Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea. Tourism is sometimes the main bonus of a pro-Western orientation as for example in Kenya, Sri-Lanka and Thailand.

However, even before public opinion and the media in the U.S. reacted against the continued presence of the Marines in Lebanon and U.S. involvement in Central America, most Third World leaders already knew that it was unrealistic to expect American military protection from their enemies, within or without, i.e. the kind of aid the USSR extended to some of its proteges in the Third World.

In choosing their foreign policy orientation, the rulers of Third World countries have to take into account another factor as well, which has nothing to do with ideology or the relative benefits obtainable through an association with the U.S. or the USSR. They must consider the political realities of the nonaligned movement, to which most of them belong.

The 100 or so developing nations that form the nonaligned movement have participated in a continuous anti-American witch hunt at nonaligned conferences for the past 15 years; above all, at the General Assembly of the United Nations and other UN forums. Although many of the nonaligned have come to accept this situation as a fact of life, which does not deter them from accepting American aid, or even from pursuing a pro-American

foreign policy, (for instance, by allowing naval servicing facilities to the U.S. Fleet) there has been inevitably negative anti-American feedback from the world of multinational diplomacy affecting the bilateral relations of Third World countries with the U.S.A. If it is not respectable politically to "appear with the U.S. in the public", any private arrangement with the U.S. is frequently perceived as a favor for which America is expected to pay a somewhat higher price than, for instance, a European country. Consequently, the American diplomat dealing with Third World leaders may be put in the position of a supplicant, rather than a bestower of sorely needed assistance.

Although the value of the "American Connection" is different if viewed from the vantage point of, say, a politician in Singapore than from his counterpart in Tanzania, the limitations of American power projection in the 1980s remains a factor which every Third World leader must take into account.

A book written by a Pakistani professor[3] in the seventies, contained a rather simplistic but apt description of the U.S. - Soviet contest as seen from Islamabad. The distinguished professor noted that throughout history a new contender for power would periodically arise to challenge the "reigning emperor"; the challenger often professes and propogates an anti-status quo faith or ideology. Having established his predominance the contender in turn becomes the guardian of the establishment. Thus, the United States is perceived as a guardian of the crumbling status quo.

Although generally true, this is an oversimplification that, while satisfying the views of the American and European Left,

does not always reflect the reality. In Ethiopia, South Yemen, Angola, Mozambique, Congo, Afghanistan, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Cambodia, the Soviet Union is the protector of the status quo, while the opposition forces (if they exist) look to the United States for revolutionary assistance. In addition, throughout the Third World the educated classes are aware that we are witnessing a technological revolution which will alter our way of life as profoundly as once did the industrial revolution. The United States, and not the Soviet Union, is in the vanguard of this revolution and thus becomes a desirable political partner -- if political orientation is a precondition for technological aid.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss ways and means how best to project the U.S. image as a viable friend and a realistic alternative to Soviet domination of the Third World, despite limited American power projection. To succeed, this effort cannot remain merely defensive, i.e. combatting Soviet influence; it must also take the offensive in the sense that the Soviet Union must be put into the position of having to respond to the propagation of the American view and to American moves.

POLITICAL THEMES

The major Soviet political theme picturing the U.S. as the exploiter of the toiling masses, the successor state to European colonialism, the exporter to the Third World of capitalist greed, and so forth, is wearing thin in the 1980s. For one thing, in most African and Asian countries, colonialism ended more than a generation ago and the average politician in his forties hardly

remembers the time when his country was ruled by a European power. Anti-U.S. propaganda, wherein America is accused of exploiting the Third World through multinational corporations, makes an impression only in European left-wing circles. In much of the Third world the presence of a multinational is eagerly sought.

The secondary Soviet theme is the portrayal of the Soviet Union as a paragon of social equality and progress. This propagandistic image is also becoming less and less viable. Although the Soviets have become quite adept in shielding the reality of Soviet life from Third World visitors, too many Africans and Asians have returned from the USSR deeply disillusioned for the myth of the Soviet example to persist. India stands as the sole exception, where a large and well-organized Communist Party has succeeded in preserving a pro-Soviet orientation among the Indian elite.

In much of Asia and Africa, as a consequence, the two old Soviet political themes had to be abandoned. They were replaced by a single simple, and sometimes effective argument: the Soviet Union is a reliable friend that can and will protect its allies and individuals who cooperate with it; Soviet military assistance to Ethiopia, Angola and Vietnam are cited as living proof of this contention. Conversely, various military setbacks suffered by the U.S. in the Third World, and periodic changes of American foreign policy are used by the Soviets to dissuade Asian and African politicians from seeking closer ties to the U.S.

This argument can be effective if the ruler of a Third World country needs the Soviet "power package" to protect himself from

internal coups, or is interested in waging war against a neighboring country. However, after two or three decades of independence, the main challenges which face Third World rulers are economic and social in nature, and there the Soviet Union has little to offer, except for the advice to practice "scientific socialism."

What, then, should be the main political themes of the United States in the Third World?

AMERICAN THEMES

These should be two-fold: I. critical of the Soviet Union and II. positive in offering aid tailored to respond to certain specific political and economic needs of the country, rather than to an abstract assessment of a T.W.C's long-term needs.

I. Criticism of the Soviet Union. It must be recognized that the usual Western charges against the Soviets as propounded by Radio Liberty or Radio Free Europe, or by American diplomats in Western Europe, would make little impression in the Third World. In much of Asia and Africa, Soviet expansionism is not regarded as a real threat.[4] Even the Russian invasion of Afghanistan has done little to arouse the fears of Asians and Africans; perhaps only in adjacent Pakistan is the presence of the Red Army near the Khabul Pass perceived as a potential menace. To the educated elite of Sri Lanka or Nigeria, the geopolitical realities arising out of the Soviet control of Afghanistan appear as remote and irrelevant to their own

situation as the threat posed to Western Europe by the Soviet deployment of the SS-20.

Nor is the denial of human rights in the Soviet Union or in countries under Soviet control likely to arouse indignation in states which, in the vast majority of cases, are governed by authoritarian regimes.

The lack of economic progress on the part of the Soviet Union or its Eastern European allies may be of some interest to Third World intellectuals (in countries where they exist), but is of no immediate concern to them.

There are perhaps only three topics concerning the USSR that are of immediate importance to rulers of Third World states, and they are:

A. The meagerness of Soviet aid to the Third World.

A quotation from a New York Times editorial, January 25th, 1984, notes that Soviet assistance (in per capita terms) to the Third World ranks as 59th among world contributors. The $161 million given by the USSR (in 1982) amounted to a miserly 60 cents per Soviet citizen. The editorial goes on to say: "...That from a nation that proclaims itself the 'natural ally' of the world's poor." In truth, the Soviet bloc gives a bare minimum to global efforts and includes as "foreign aid" its security assistance to Communist nations like Cuba, Mongolia, Vietnam and Afghanistan. The Soviet bloc has boasted of disbursing $44 billion in foreign aid between 1976 and 1980, but a British study tracked disbursements of only $8 billion, nearly all of it to six "Socialist" allies. "Here, surely, is an opportunity for

Americans to expose Soviet penury in ways that hurt," the editorial continued.

This aspect of Soviet policy in the Third World should be reiterated constantly, in every possible contact with the elite of a T.W.C. - in private conversations, newspaper articles and in broadcasts from U.S.-controlled radio stations.

In addition, ways will have to be found to translate this political theme into political action. It should not be very difficult, for instance, to convince a group of African states, especially in the face of famine and large-scale unemployment, to propose a motion that would request the Soviet Union to increase its share of contributions to UN-related agencies of assistance at the next annual meeting of the nonaligned. Doubtless this initiative would fail (the Indians will see to it that the appeal is addressed equally to the U.S. and the USSR). Nevertheless, the Soviets would regard any appeal, including an evenhanded one of this kind, as a political defeat since it would destroy the myth of special American responsibility for the economic plight of the developing world.

Even if this kind of proposal fails in the councils of the nonaligned nations, it can be reintroduced by some African and Asian states in the General Assembly of the UN. Here again, the initiative would quite likely fail. However, if its failure is accompanied by well-managed publicity, it would be damaging to the Soviet Union.

B. The sorry economic state of Third World Countries that do enjoy full Soviet military and economic assistance

Examples include Ethiopia, South Yemen, Angola, Mozambique (now seeking Western assistance), Vietnam, Cambodia; as compared to Third World countries that have chosen economic and political links with the West: Gabon, Ivory Coast, Cameroons, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and, to a lesser extent, Indonesia.

C. The loss of political autonomy and freedom of political action on the part of Third World leaders who choose to accept Soviet tutelage.

Examples: Ali in South Yemen, Amin in Afghanistan, Bishop in Grenada. Another recent example of Soviet arrogance as the cause of strained relations between Ethiopia's ruler Mengistu Haile Mariam and the Soviet Ambassador Boris Kirnovski, who was asked to pack his bags, is one of many such cases where the Russian representative behaved like an imperial proconsul. This theme is particularly important to counter Soviet propaganda which describes the USSR as "the natural ally" of the Third World.

Finally, the circumstances which led to the expulsion of the Soviets and Cubans from Ghana, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Egypt and Somalia, provide ample material to demonstrate that a Third world leader's personal power machine is often destroyed once the Russians or Cubans are firmly in control.

II. The positive pro-American theme. Political democracy is a rare phenomenon in the Third World and is not likely to

spread. Yet the knowledge that political freedom exists in the West and in the U.S. causes most Third World regimes to genuflect formally to democratic values, even while practicing oppression.

American officials in Third World countries governed by some sort of authoritarian regime find themselves in a quandary. On the one hand they are naturally inclined to praise the democratic society, on the other hand they are fearful lest this be interpreted by the ruler of a T.W.C. as a challenge to his regime. A way can be found that would allow the American diplomat or U.S.I.S. official to propagate the American style of democracy without this being interpreted as a criticism of local political conditions. After all, he is expected to laud the political system he represents as much as a Soviet diplomat naturally proselytizes for Communism. Americans can only gain by representing moral political values, no matter how unattainable these may be in the Third World at present.

The importance and value of American economic, technological and educational aid can best be presented by describing the American effort in other parts of the Third World; it is wise to avoid praising an existing American achievement in the same T.W.C. since there are always elements of the political elite who have some reason to be hostile to an aid project from which their region or tribe did not benefit.

In the course of the past twenty years the U.S., like many other Western countries, has spent billions of dollars in aid to developing countries with few political returns to show. There were exceptions: Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Kenya; the French

were reasonably successful in Gabon, the Ivory Coast and the Cameroons. Much has been written about the causes of Western failures in aiding the developing world, most of which is irrelevant to this study.

The question to be posed here is: what kind of assistance is most likely to be politically cost-effective as an inducement for a pro-United States and anti-Soviet attitude on the part of a T.W.C. government?

In very general terms one can say that this aid must be politically "visible"; it should also involve the government of a T.W.C. in a practical day-to-day partnership with an American institution that is difficult to terminate without serious economic dislocation for the government in power.

In addition to economic and technical assistance, other forms of inducements are military training, cooperation with local security services and education. All these forms of inducement are more fully discussed in the following section.

MEASURES

A. The Propaganda Battle

In Europe both the U.S.A. and the USSR have at their disposal a wide range of propaganda channels: the electronic media, the daily press, the weeklies and the political quarterlies. While Western Europe is regarded as being formally in alliance with the U.S., it is a free society, and the Soviet Union enjoys access to it through its political sympathies and paid agents. The best example of Soviet manipulation of the European media is the recent disclosure that Greece's largest

circulation daily, "Ethnos", is financed by and operates in cooperation with the disinformation department (foreign operations) of the KGB.

In Asia and Africa however, the media are nearly always government controlled and in some countries, notably in Africa, of marginal political influence. Nevertheless, both the electronic media and the press exercise a certain amount of influence among the elite and therefore merit special American attention.

In countries such as India, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, the press has been government "influenced" for so many years that a political habit of obedience is well established.

In India, where the government favors a cautiously nuanced pro-Soviet orientation in world affairs, few Indian journalists dare deviate by supporting an American position on, for instance, arms control. Notwithstanding, certain newspapers like the Calcutta-based "Statesman", and a few weeklies and quarterlies occasionally allow themselves to be somewhat critical of the USSR. In addition, Soviet predominance in influencing public opinion, especially in the academic world, naturally causes a counter-reaction among some of the more independent-minded intellectuals.[5] It might be said that in the India of the 1980s there is room for conducting a sophisticated, highly selective campaign among Indian journalists, playing on their national pride and desire for a truly independent Indian foreign policy. In the case of India, the American cause is best served in presenting the U.S.A. as the aggrieved party which does not

receive a fair hearing in the local media. Only Americans who are thoroughly familiar with the Indian political scene and with the sophistry of Indian politics should be engaged in constructing a pro-American power base in India. Care should be taken to exclude from this endeavor American "India freaks", i.e. Americans who copy Indian behavior, dress and mannerisms. On the other hand, a few carefully chosen Indian immigrants to the U.S. can perhaps be of help. Whatever means one chooses, this is a lengthy and protracted process that demands enormous patience on the part of the Americans.

In countries such as Thailand, Sri Lanka and Pakistan, some thought may be given to organizing an exchange program between certain American newspapers and their Pakistani and Sri Lankan equivalents that would enable young American correspondents to be sent for a year to work with a paper in Karachi and Colombo in exchange for the placement of their counterparts in American papers. Similar arrangements may also be suitable for journalists from Kenya, Sudan, Tunis and Nigeria.

These exchange programs, unless properly arranged and monitored, may prove to be either useless or counterproductive. Certain precautionary measures will have to be employed. Careful selection must be assured in both sides of the exchange. The American journalist must be properly briefed about the history and day-to-day political reality of the country of his consignment. He should receive CIA "defensive" briefing as to the dangers of falling into various KGB traps, but preferably should not be burdened with active CIA assignments. The reporter from a Third World country chosen to come to the U.S. must, of

course, be selected with great care. Equally important is the choice of the host American newspaper or radio/television station.

As a general rule, the larger urban centers such as New York, Chicago and Los Angeles should be avoided in preference to the smaller cities and towns. The reporter should be protected as much as possible against racial discrimination and Communist recruitment. Unfortunately, the latter may be an easier task, from the Soviet point of view, in pluralistic America, than in the reporter's home town. His progress must be monitored and contact maintained with, perhaps, the press attache in the American Embassy after his return to his native country.

The purpose of these exchanges is to lay a foundation for a select group of pro-American reporters in a Third World country with definite tasks in mind:

(a) A pro-American journalist should be induced to inform his American contact of attempts by the Soviet Embassy to influence the editorial policy of a newspaper or of the electronic media;

(b) He should be used sparingly for the publication of pro-American articles, mostly avoiding direct praise of U.S. policies, concentrating on describing American achievements in science and technology;

(c) He should be encouraged, in countries where this is possible, to seek a political career.

B. Education

While advocating an exchange program in such fields as journalism, this writer is doubtful of the political return value of academic scholarships. True, the Soviet Union has developed an extensive system of academic scholarships for carefully selected Third World countries in a variety of fields ranging from training paramedics to the study of medicine, engineering and education; however, and unfortunately, the U.S. is not particularly suited to emulate the Soviet Union in this specific field.

For better or worse, too many of the American campuses these days appear to be the scene of anti-establishment, anti-Western and even pro-Soviet political campaigns. Too often an essentially pro-American youngster from a T.W.C. has returned home a convinced Marxist after studying in the U.S. In some cases the student does not return home at all, remaining in the U.S. legally or illegally. In contrast, the Third World student in the Soviet Union is carefully screened from Soviet reality, is every unlikely to meet Soviet dissidents and has no choice but to return home after the completion of studies.

Rather than running the risks involved in granting scholarships in the U.S., most American educational aid to developing countries should be given in a T.W.C. itself. The establishment of small-scale American training institutes for computers, for example, has high visibility in an average-sized African or Arab country, attracts the educated young elite and can be used as a recruiting base for the CIA or other agencies as well. Such educational centers can serve neighboring T.W.C.s

and would, therefore, lend prestige to whichever developing country is hosting the institute.

C. Cooperation with Local Intelligence Services

Most Third World countries (with such exceptions as India, Pakistan and Thailand) do not possess fully developed intelligence services aimed at procuring information abroad. Most of their intelligence services, to the extent that they exist at all, are counter-intelligence organizations, or security services whose principal task is to protect the regime in power. This writer does not possess unclassified material regarding the infiltration of such security organizations by the KGB, but it is reasonable to assume that they would merit Soviet attention.

In terms of the employment of "active measures", this is an important but dangerous and highly complex field for a possible American effort to secure a pro-American footing in some Third World countries.

The aim of an American endeavor in this field is five-fold: (1) to insure a pro-American and anti-Soviet orientation of the apparatus that controls the security of the regime (2) the transfer of information (both operational and substantive) relating to the internal situation in a given T.W.C. (3) information about Soviet activities (4) the very occasional use of T.W.C. operatives for "active measures" in the field of "disinformation" (5) the training of paramilitary security units.

Links with T.W.C.'s security services have the advantage of being a low-profile operation that does not require public

political approval, and yet, if successful, can provide rich returns.

The danger of this kind of operation lies in the implied support of the U.S. for the regime in power in a T.W.C. As many Third World countries, particularly in Africa, suffer from constant instability with frequent coups d'etat, those responsible for American links with a T.W.C.'s intelligence service must keep a weather eye open for the opposition and be prepared to "jump ship" if absolutely necessary.

Perhaps some thought should be given to the establishment of "shadow security services" for T.W.C.s under Soviet control, such as Yemen, Ethiopia, Congo (Brazzaville), Benin, etc., consisting of emigres. Personnel would have to be trained and the organizations would have to be maintained outside the confines of those countries - no easy task. The purpose of these shadow security services would not be so much in creating the wherewithal for the overthrow of Soviet-controlled regimes; rather they would serve to prepare a functioning security apparatus to be installed when a change of regime does occur. This is a highly complex operation, and much depends on the prevailing conditions which differ from country to country.

D. Links with the Military Establishment

The Russians have invested much thought, time and effort in trying to establish some sensible pattern in Soviet links with the military of T.W.C.s. Much of Soviet political literature in the early 1960s discussed the role of the "Voyenaya Elita" (military elite) in the development of the Third World. They

even managed to evolve a theory in accordance with which the military elites in T.W.C.s were a necessary transition stage from feudalism and colonial dependence to the creation of a socialist state. It is likely that Moscow was governed much more by the realistic assessment that coups in the Third World are almost invariably army-backed and consequently, links with the military would provide the USSR with an effective foothold in an African, Asian or Latin American country.

The Israelis were moved by similar considerations and therefore during the sixties, extensive military training was provided in Israel for certain African countries, along with Singapore and Nepal. The Israeli experience was not particularly rewarding. One of the star pupils in the paratroop training courses for Uganda was Idi Amin.

The greatest Soviet effort in this field was in training Indian military pilots and tank crews. The Russians kept their promise to the Indian government and did not subject their Indian trainees to ideological proselytizing. There is no evidence to prove that Indian officers who had been trained in the USSR constitute a politically pro-Communist element in the army; although quite likely they are pro-Russian in a broader sense, inasmuch as they are grateful to the Soviets for having provided efficient training facilities.

This writer is not in a position to evaluate the political benefits that have accrued to the United States from having provided military training assistance to various T.W.C.s. Much, of course, depends on the follow-up after the training period is

over, and the extent to which the U.S. military attaches in a T.W.C. keep in touch with Army officers who have been trained in the U.S.

The French and British examples may be misleading. It would appear that in both cases preference is given to former colonial dependencies and the re-establishment of old ties. The British, and especially the French, seem to have been more successful than the Americans or the Israelis in establishing a permanent foothold in the military hierarchy of T.W.C.s.

In discussing military training of Third World military personnel I am referring only to training in the U.S.; training conducted in the T.W.C.'s already assumes the existence of a decision by Third World governments to accept American military aid openly, and with it goes a degree of political commitment in favor of the U.S.

In either case it is essential to keep in mind that the goal of providing military instructions to a T.W.C. is also political; next to the immediate need to bolster a pro-American regime there remains the long-term aim of securing a pro-American attitude on the part of individuals who may, in the course of time, become a part of the ruling military elite. The excellent military instructors provided by the U.S. for the training of a Third World army are not always geared to the more sophisticated task of winning political friends. It is essential that whenever and wherever the U.S. Army is engaged in military training of this nature, special personnel be included whose main function is to establish long-term personal relationships with a carefully selected few of the trainees. This is difficult; it requires an

enormous amount of patience and dedicated persistence. It goes without saying that after such contacts are formed a follow-up is maintained by U.S. military attaches stationed in U.S. embassies.

Whenever military training is given by the U.S. Army to T.W.C. military personnel in training facilities in the U.S., perhaps more attention should be paid to the extra-curricular circumstances that surround the trainee after work hours.

The Russians have paid dearly for neglecting the social aspects of the life of an African or Asian military trainee in the Soviet Union when they began such an undertaking. Over the years they have greatly improved that aspect of their military training course, both by isolating T.W.C. officers from the ugly side of Soviet life, including Russian racism, and by seeing to it that social diversions of all kinds are available to the trainees; these include conducted tours to various parts of the Soviet Union, visits with local families and the like.

E. The U.S.I.S. Effort

Thereis no question that despite various shortcomings the U.S.I.S possesses potentially the greatest capacity of all the U.S. institutions abroad to influence a T.W.C. elite. Many Americans are unaware of the extent to which a U.S.I.S. Center in a Third World country represents a cultural oasis, in surroundings where the press, radio and television are government controlled; where foreign newspapers, books and video aids are, if not forbidden, at least very difficult to come by.

The UN Department of Public Information fully realizes the importance of UN Information Centers in the Third World, and as one of its directors told this writer: "We know people come to these centers not because they are interested in the UN, but because they want to know what is happening in the world."[6]

As opposed to the UN Information Centers, people who visit a U.S.I.S. Center are interested not only in the world, they are, irrespective of ideological leanings, especially interested in the U.S.A.

Quite rightly the policy of the U.S.I.S. is to allow eager young Asians and Africans to choose their own fields of interest in what America has to offer, and avoids ramming American propaganda down their throats. Sometimes, however, this laissez-faire attitude has been exaggerated. Far too often young people from the Third World want more than viewing slides about the progress of high-tech in the U.S.A. They want to understand how the American political system works, and find out if there is anything in it worth emulating. They should be encouraged to express their views to a suitable American representative. Even when political discussions are conducted successfully, one does not have the impression that the U.S.I.S. makes an attempt to establish, however discreetly, a follow-up contact relationship.

In many cases the American personnel in a U.S.I.S. Center are far better informed of political cross currents at the grass-roots level of a T.W.C. than are American diplomats or even C.I.A. officials. Unhampered by the confines of an embassy, U.S.I.S. personnel move about more freely, meet people outside

the cocktail party circle, and are in a better position to judge the mood of a country. Too often, their views and advice are disregarded by U.S. diplomats and C.I.A. officials.

Americans working for the U.S.I.S. are therefore uniquely situated for finding useful contacts and maintaining relationships with individuals who, for occupational or political reasons, may be outside the ruling mainstream of a T.W.C. In the volatile conditions of the Third World, today's "outsider" may very soon move into the corridors of power. It is true that these types of contacts are maintained in many U.S.I.S. centers, but it is not done often and systematically; after a U.S.I.S. official is replaced his successor does not continue with his predecessor's contacts. There does not seem to be a guiding hand in these matters, perhaps because no clear-cut policy decision has been issued from Washington.

F. American Technical Assistance to T.W.C.s

This is a subject that has been discussed in countless books and articles during the course of the past twenty years.

This paper will deal with just two aspects of American technical assistance and financial aid to countries of the Third World.

1. The tying of assistance to the political profile of a T.W.C. in international relations.

Stated simply: if a T.W.C. is manifestly hostile to the U.S. in the United Nations and other multinational conferences, demonstrates this hostility in speeches, the co-sponsoring of

resolutions hostile to the U.S., and maintains a consistently anti-U.S. voting record, aid should be restricted, or completely curtailed. Many T.W.C.s have grown accustomed to a situation that has allowed them to strike a blatantly anti-American stance and simultaneously enjoy the fruits of American aid. This, apart from the obvious inherent unfairness, has led to a lowering of American prestige in some T.W.C.s and is not propitious for the recruitment of political sympathizers.

The "tightening of the screw" spells out a simple message: If you want American aid, you have to work for it. "Working for it" also means that as a quid pro quo, the U.S. must be helped to achieve certain political aims. If this is clearly understood, it is safe to assume that a surprisingly large number of people would let it be known that they are available to help the U.S. effort. Not only would American diplomacy benefit, so too would the C.I.A., and any other U.S. agency engaged in building a pro-American niche in a T.W.C.

2. <u>The technological and financial elite</u>

In the process of supervising U.S. aid projects, the American aid official comes in contact with the local technological and financial elite.

In Thailand and Sri Lanka this elite is numerous, and is of a relatively high educational standard; in countries such as Zambia, this elite is miniscule; in Nigeria it is considerably larger. Obviously the smaller the elite, the greater its relative political importance on the local scene. Engineers rarely become prime ministers, but high officials in charge of a

project are usually political appointees and sometimes wield political clout. Local officials responsible for financial arrangements are sometimes indispensable to a government that possesses few of them. One way or another, Americans in charge of aid projects have the opportunity to work together with an element of the population of a T.W.C. that is more likely to be level-headed and constructive than many other groups.

Frequently, however, U.S. aid officials see their task only in technical terms, and valuable contacts are lost when the project is completed or terminated.

G. The American Use of Agents of influence

All American institutions in the Third World, the embassy, the U.S.I.S., an A.I.D. office or military mission can be a staging ground for "agents of influence". This is a fancy term for a very common diplomatic technique, used to enlist the support of various people to further one's country's cause. It is as old as diplomacy itself, and during the 17th and 18th centuries in Europe, most of the tasks of an ambassador consisted of obtaining (generally by bribery) the cooperation of skillful courtiers to win a King's favor. Most modern embassies, including the American, rely on local politicians, journalists and prominent businessmen for help in certain situations. The rewards are mostly social, although occasionally other inducements are proffered.

The Soviet contribution to this age-old practice lies in their systemization and intensification of the activities of agents of influence.

For example: The Soviets may urge a prominent friendly journalist to write articles mildly critical of the USSR in order to establish his credibility; after this is done the same journalist will write additional articles subtly supporting the Soviet point of view. The Russians are sometimes quite content to allow such a journalist to remain inactive on their behalf for a year or two before using him again. One way or another, the journalist becomes fully aware of his role in the Soviet scheme, but as long as he is not openly compromised he is often eager to cooperate because his involvement in the "larger scheme of things" bolsters his vanity.

The Soviets understand very well the importance of the trans-functional use of such agents; i.e. they will use an influential American businessman with ties to the USSR to help them meet an American scientist in whom they are particularly interested, or they might employ people interested in the Russian ballet to make the acquaintance of an American businessman. Although embassies are the main instruments for the recruitment of agents of influence, Soviet cultural centers, trade missions and scientific conferences are similarly utilized.

Conditions prevailing in the Third World require certain adjustments in the recruitment of such agents. In T.W.C.s where the media is tightly government controlled, journalists may be less willing to risk their future by aiding the U.S. if their government is pronouncedly anti-American. On the other hand, in

such countries the rumor mill is generally more active than in T.W.C.s where the press has more freedom, and agents of influence may be used accordingly.

Overall, in the employment of agents of influence in the Third World, the U.S. enjoys certain advantages over the USSR that may not always be fully realized by Americans. For many different reasons that need not be stated here, the American image projects an attraction that the Soviets can never match. Ideology apart, most prominent Asians, Africans and Latin Americans would much rather be invited for lunch by the American than by the Soviet Ambassador. The Soviet diplomat is severely handicapped in his contacts with Third World personalities by shortcomings resulting from his cultural background which tends to breed excessive circumspection, crude manners and aloofness.

The difference between the Soviet and the American manner of cultivating agents of influence lies primarily in the intensity of the preparatory and the follow-up process. It would seem that the Soviets choose their target after exhaustive probing into his/her background, and that they have all the necessary "operational information" at their disposal before making the first exploratory contacts. If the first encounters show promise, the follow-up process is lengthy and persistent. Through it the Soviet operatives show great patience, calmly tolerating the occasional setbacks as they take the prospective agent of influence over various hurdles. The Soviets realize that a successful agent of influence will eventually come to identify his pro-Soviet mission with his own quest for personal

success, without actually becoming a Communist, or even admitting to himself that he is being manipulated.

In contrast to the Soviet method, American diplomats at times seem to choose their targets with less circumspection, and if successful, they seem less relentless than the Soviets in extracting the maximum value from their agents of influence.

This is regrettable since the Americans are not making the most of a situation where, as we pointed out, they enjoy an initial advantage over the Russians. Furthermore, the systematic use of agents of influence is more suited to the American character than the employment of other kinds of "active measures"; in addition, it involves no large financial outlays and only the most minimal use of clandestine methods. However, to be successful, it requires constant coordination among all the departments concerned, especially in the field of "trans-functional" employment.

The Institutional Aspect - Combined Country Directorates

The need may arise to find an institutional solution for centralizing all American activity in a given T.W.C. with the single political aim of combatting Soviet and furthering American interests.

This writer therefore proposes the creation of a number of Combined Country Directorates, each to review, supervise and direct the activities of all American institutions in a given Third World country.

In an important T.W.C. there may be a number of U.S. institutions, each dealing with different aspects of that

T.W.C.'s relations with the U.S. -- the embassy, the resident C.I.A. personnel, several military attaches, the U.S.I.S., and an A.I.D. office. Apart from the usual interdepartmental competition, jealousy and turf-protecting maneuvers, there is also a failure to perceive the importance of certain contacts in a larger trans-functional context.

The role of a C.C.D. is to compile and analyze a general summation of all American contacts. For instance, in a country such as Tunisia, a review of all U.S. contacts may reveal that some important people in the corridors of power, and around them, have for some reason been missed in the annotation of all the specialized lists of contacts: i.e. the diplomactic, the military, intelligence, U.S.I.S. and A.I.D.

Only when such comprehensive lists are studied and analyzed can one plan a contingency game to answer two hypothetical questions: (1) When Bourgiba dies of natural causes, which persons on this list are likely to move into positions of power? (2) If Bourgiba is assassinated in a coup is anyone in the comprehensive U.S. list likely to survive politically?

Furthermore, a contingency plan for action should be worked out in the likely case that pro-Libyan elements will come to power before or after Bourgiba's death. Is it possible, for example, to establish special contacts that can remain dormant after a coup and be revived at a later stage?

Each C.C.D. should be served by a Special Advisor who preferably does not belong to any of the government agencies

represented in the C.C.D. He/she should be a specialist with a thorough personal knowledge of the T.W.C.

Let us use the example of a C.C.D. dealing with Sri Lanka. In addition to the representatives of governmental institutions, there should be two Special Advisors - a Sinhalese- and a Tamil-speaking American, each thoroughly acquainted with the political, cultural and economic realities of the two rival communities in Sri Lanka. The role of the Special Advisor in a C.C.D. is to provide his colleagues with a grass-roots evaluation of a given situation. It is important that before doing so, the Special Advisor not be allowed access to reports submitted by other colleagues. This is essential if he is to keep his evaluation as unaffected as possible by institutional considerations. The Special Advisor must be a frequent visitor to Sri Lanka, periodically spending considerable time in the country.

The C.C.D. has a number of primary functions, although with time it may feel the need to perform additional tasks that cannot be foreseen at the outset.

For each reasonably important T.W.C. a comprehensive and integrated <u>Country Plan</u> must be formulated by the C.C.D. It should contain basic political information with special attention to opposition forces, and pro-Soviet groupings. It must contain the input of <u>all</u> U.S. agencies active in a particular country; it should indicate potentially useful fields of action as yet unexplored. The Country Plan must be revised periodically as changing circumstances indicate.

The C.C.D. must also review all U.S. institutional contacts (except covert agents of the C.I.A.) in order to integrate them

into the comprehensive Country Plan. Above all, the C.C.D. should be able to recommend the use of trans-functional contacts across the board when needed, i.e. an A.I.D. contact can be cultivated by the U.S.I.S. or the C.I.A.

SUMMATION

Much of what is known as the Third World is in a state of flux and growing turmoil. The population explosion, rapid urbanization and the concomitant depletion of the food-growing capacity of Africa, Asia and Latin America portend upheavals of a magnitude perhaps unknown in recorded history. Asian and African countries that once were colonies, as well as the states of Latin America, are still groping to find a political system in consonance with their cultural and ethnic traditions. No economic order is yet in sight that would provide them with a minimum of stability, alleviate their terrible poverty and give hope to their rising expectations.

Third World countries that have adopted some form of Soviet Communism have achieved the stability of the barrack square but have failed to improve their economies, even to the extent of their fellow socialist countries of Eastern Europe.

There is the special case of Tanzania which chose a mixture of State capitalism and Socialism. It has received proportionately more international assistance than any developing country and has become a veritable graveyard of failed aid projects. States that chose a free market economy and allied themselves with the West, such as Malaysia, Sri Lanka (after some

15 years of a disastrous socialist experiment), Ivory Coast, Kenya and the Cameroons, have fared much better, but their political and economic stability is also threatened constantly by overpopulation, communal strife and shrinking food resources. (The city-state of Singapore is an exception.)

It is only a quesion of time before Mobutu's profligate "kleptocracy" is overthrown and Zaire's burgeoning millions revolt, causing chaos and destruction to an African country which possesses immeasurable riches.

The tragedy of Nigeria, Mexico and Indonesia, three oil-exporting Third World countries, is again proof that the availability of cash does not guarantee economic development and political stability when a social conscience and public probity are absent.

The majority of the Third World is neither Communist nor wealthy and lives precariously between handouts from the IMF and the World Bank.

For most leaders of the Third World the struggle between the two superpowers is only of marginal importance as it does not directly affect their most immediate and urgent problems.

The exception to this rule are Third World countries which, for reasons of their geographical location are situated in points of great power rivalry and areas of conflict. Thus Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan and the countries of the Middle East, to mention a few, are watching with growing apprehension the shrinking power projection of the United States and the consequent enlargement of Soviet hegemony.

The Soviet global view is essentially offensive: it pursues very definite geopolitical aims with patient determination, undaunted by occasional setbacks.

Although American global concern may seem to be contracting, there are still certain points of vital or secondary interest to the U.S. that call for a political and information effort in order to stem Soviet influence. Consequently, in the part of the study which deals with terms of reference, we have tried to define and narrow the field of American interest only to Third World countries which are of special interest to the United States.

The Soviet effort in the Third World, excluding the military aspect and apart from the aid by surrogate countries is powered by the employment of tens of thousands of Soviet citizens in various branches of government. These are virtually lifetime appointments, making the Soviet apparatus somewhat unwieldy; on the other hand, it is sufficiently massive to enable the Russians to play simultaneous chessboard games thousands of miles apart.

Unable to compete with the USSR in volume, the U.S. may have to seek the qualitative edge in the battle for influence in Third World countries. America may have to learn how to "come in lean and hard." High quality performance on a working level demands experience and persistence, both of which only a permanent staff of officials can provide. What is required, therefore, is a bi-partisan agreement to maintain a certain institutional framework dealing with the Third World which continues, irrespective of changes in the administration.

We have proposed the creation of Combined Country Directorates to synchronize all American activity in various T.M.C.s. This is only a tentative suggestion to achieve a more effective utilization of existing resources. Other institutional arrangements are possible, of course, but none will be of much avail unless and until the men and women working in American institutions in the Third World recognize the primacy of combatting Soviet influence over all other professional tasks to which they are assigned.

"The American Connection" has always had a powerful allure that is difficult to define, and for the Russians, impossible to imitate. It has an extraordinary appeal which is partly hope for, and perception of a better future; it is partly encouragement to the individual or nation, as well, implying that: "you can make it, too." However, this allure is of little use to the United States unless it can be directed into concrete instruments of political power, favorable to American goals in the Third World. This takes time and will demand unrelenting perseverance.

Notes

1. After a time Secou Toure became disappointed with the Russians and the Chinese. This change, however, did not open any doors for Western influence.

2. Latin America cannot be considered here together with Asia and Africa. Unlike Asia and Africa where the U.S. is a relative newcomer, in Latin America the U.S. suffers the overexposure of centuries of misunderstandings.

3. In the Caribbean Basin, however, Cuban expansionism is a living reality.

4. A New Delhi based periodical, Seminar of Sept., 1981, devoted a whole issue to India's "Soviet Connection." It gives a graphic description of Soviet penetration into academia and voices understandable resentment.

5. Unfortunately, the UN-produced information is blatantly anti-Western and anti-American.

Soviet Third World Literature as a Source for the Understanding of Soviet Policy

Do Soviet writings provide clues to Soviet intentions in the Third World? In the absence of other clues, these writings have been (and are) submitted to close scrutiny. They are likely to shed light on Soviet political and military conduct, but only if viewed critically, against the wider background of the sources of Soviet political action and decision making. These writings are meant to provide guidance to party, state and military officials - but not to make revelations that could be of use to potential "enemies." Nor should it be assumed that the authors of these writings are instrumental in shaping Soviet policy by providing the "correct" interpretation of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Soviet policy is shaped by the respective party, state and KGB organs who are - with some notable exceptions - not identical with the "writers."[1]

The basic aim of Soviet policy in the Third World is to enhance Soviet influence and to weaken the West. "Ideology" matters in this respect only to a limited extent. If the Soviet Union decided in 1979 to switch its position in the Horn of Africa, this had nothing to do with the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism but the obvious fact that there are almost ten times as many Ethiopians as Somalis; that, in other words, Ethiopia is the more important country. Ideally, Moscow would have preferred to maintain close relations with both countries, but once a choice had to be made, there could be no doubt as to what the decision would be. In such a situation, the task of the Soviet experts is that which Frederic III (the Great) of Prussia accorded to his

lawyers - to provide, after the fact, the justification for his actions.

On the other hand, it would be oversimplified to assume that Soviet Third World experts only engage in the rationalization of policies already taken on purely opportunistic lines. Their writings reflect certain differences of opinion prevalent among the Soviet leadership and this is particularly true with regard to major commentators known for their close contacts with the party control committee, foreign ministry, the army general staff and the KGB.[2] Their proximity to the corridors of power is the decisive factor, not their scholarship.

According to a leading American student of the Soviet code of conduct in the Third World (Elizabeth Valkenier), the West ought to differentiate between "conservative," tradition-bound ideologies" and "forward-looking globalists" whose outlook on the Third World is characterized by "sceptical realism." According to the same source, the top Soviet leaders attribute no less importance to the Third World than five or ten years ago; the role of the Third World in Soviet priorities is said to have decreased of late.

It is true that Soviet comments during the last decade occasionally reflect disappointment with developments in the Third World. This is manifested above all in frequent statements that "the situation is much more complicated than we originally assumed." Secondly, it has been accepted that paying lip service on the part of Third World rulers to socialism, anti-imperialism or even Marxism-Leninism means little. Again, as the result of

bitter experience, Soviet commentators are aware of the fact that Third World rulers, not under direct Soviet control, are likely to change their political course. Soviet writers have suggested that use should be made of Third World nationalism (and xenophobia) against the West. But they also know that this kind of nationalism may turn against the Soviet Union. Lastly, it should be noted that, with some notable exceptions (oil), the "specific weight" of the Third World in Soviet foreign trade policies (and, a fortiori, in Soviet aid) has been downgraded. But it would be quite mistaken to draw exaggerated conclusions from such shifts of emphasis.

There have been no basic changes in Soviet Third World politics during the last two decades, nor are such changes likely to occur. And it is easy to find for every quotation pointing to the alleged downgrading of the Third World in Soviet politics, one, or more, pointing to the opposite. This leads to another problem of relatively recent date: the growing airing of different assessments in Soviet publications. Such disputes do not concern, needless to stress, fundamental issues of Soviet doctrine. But they affect, for instance, the interpretation of the politics of other countries such as the United States. One example should suffice. K.A. Khachaturov is one of the most senior Soviet Latin American experts; his work in the field spans three decades. He is a professor, lived for years in various Latin American countries (apparently as a political consultant in the Foreign Service). He is the author of standard works such as The Ideological Expansion of the United States in Latin America and the Latin American Tragedy. In a new book (Latin America -

Ideologies and Foreign Policies) he deals with such questions as whether the extreme right-wing movements in Latin America should be considered "fascist" - and reaches the conclusion that they ought to be considered as such. This is a scholastic dispute involving some pitfalls from a Marxist-Leninist point of view. For the political movements *closest* to fascism in Latin America - such as Peronism - cannot possibly by considered "right wing" in the traditional sense. Khachaturov also argued that "for U.S. imperialism, Nicaragua is a key strategic foothold in the Western hemisphere. Nicaraguan territory provides the only alternative for a potential construction of a new canal." For this argument, Khachaturov has been criticized, even ridiculed in Soviet publications. One critic (N. Leonov) wrote that Nicaragua is of no military or strategic importance for the U.S. whatsoever and that on the territories of Panama and Colombia alone, there are 28 possible routes for a new transoceanic canal. There is on the part of the younger Soviet international experts, an impatience vis-à-vis the so-called "indisputable, traditional assertions" of the previous generation - which are manifestly false.

Soviet literature on the Third World comprises accounts by journalists as well as Moscow-based analysts attached to one of the leading research institutes. Quite frequently, the sons of leading diplomats and writers on international affairs tend to follow in the footsteps of their fathers - young Gromyko, Andropov and Troyanovski are well known cases; another is Arbatov's institute. The countries of the world are systematically covered in Soviet research in a number of series

such as "The Political Map of the World" (issued by Znanie publishing house), "The Map of the World" (Mysl) and "Socio-economic problems of the developing countries" (also sponsored by Mysl). A survey of Soviet literature published during the last 4-5 years shows a heavy concentration on certain countries, in some cases obvious - (Afghanistan - some 15 titles, Israel, Turkey), in others less obvious, but possibly accidental. There is more literature on the United Arab Emirates and Oman than on Saudi Arabia. There has been a systematic attempt to cover Tropical Africa, and there exists now at least one substantial work on every African country, however small, which is more than can be said on the literature in English or French. These works include three books on Gabon, four on Guinea-Bissau, one each on Cameroon, Burundi, Benin, Zambia and Sierra Leone. There are some interesting discrepancies; while several substantial books on Ecuador and Chile have been published, there is only one booklet of 64 pages on Brazil, no books at all on Colombia or Peru, and on Mexico only a symposium on Mexican culture. While three books were published in recent years on Nepal, there is only a tiny volume on South Korea. There is no serious Soviet study on Libya in the open literature, and there may be good reasons for this.

Soviet authors have specialized on transnational topics such as "Africa and U.S. Imperialism," "Contemporary problems of Asia and Africa" or of a more specialized character such as "Japan in Africa" (by I.V. Volkov). The level and competence of these studies vary greatly; some show considerable familiarity with the problems covered and also with the Western literature on the

subject. Others are little more than propagandistic tracts of no consequence. Broadly speaking, it can be said that the smaller the print order of a publication (a figure always given on the last page of Soviet books), the higher the level, the more serious its contents. But it is equally true that the party line is more likely to emerge from the mass circulation books.

To summarize: authoritative Soviet commentators, such as Brutents, believe that one can foresee the appearance of new, influential or even great states in the Third World, and geostrategic elements working within them. According to forecasts, the population of India, by the year 2000, will exceed one billion, that of Indonesia 230 million, Brazil 210 million and Mexico 130 million. But "this process does not run evenly; now it accelerates, now it slows down, depending on the dynamics of both domestic and international factors." (Kommunist 3, 1984). In brief, Soviet policy makers do not foresee the emergence of major powers in the Third World in the near future.

Third World Local Wars in the Soviet Mirror

According to Soviet doctrine, the Third World countries have turned from being objects of imperialist policy into subjects of world history, making an ever-increasing contribution to the revolutionary process. Yet, at the same time, the process is "complex and contradictory"; it manifests itself *inter alia* in the occurrence of more and more local conflicts in the Third World. Whereas Soviet military historians count 64 local wars in the Third World between 1917 and 1945, there were, according to

the same sources, 143 such wars between 1945 and 1975. The real number of armed conflicts was, in fact, considerably higher, but what matters in this context is the general trend not the exact figures. The standard explanation was, for a long time, that these wars were instigated by "imperialism"; however, an armed conflict between China and North Vietnam, to give but one obvious example, cannot possibly be explained with reference to the manipulations of the ruling circles of Western imperialism - the same is true with regard to most other such wars. Hence the endeavor of Soviet anlaysts to look for other causes - or to ignore the issue altogether, to take the recurrence of local wars for granted and to assume that they will continue in the future as well: Soviet authors have stressed in recent years that further wars in Asia and Africa are very likely indeed.

Instead, there has been the tendency to focus on the "lessons" of these wars. These comments are of only limited interest, for in the open literature such comments are almost always introduced with such formulas as, "According to Western sources..." Jane's, Wehrkunde and the American professional literature are most frequently quoted. Nevertheless, the selection of these Western sources sheds some light on Soviet preoccupations, even though there is not much new and startling in these conclusions. Thus considerable emphasis is put on the application of anti-tank weapons and their success (for instance in the Yom Kippur War) and on electronic warfare as well as electronic deception ("Radiomaskirovka"). Soviet authors put much stress on the use of infantry units in Third World local wars, for the simple reason that the air force and the navy are

often small or non-existent in these parts. Another aspect frequently mentioned by Soviet authors is the crucial role of artillery, an observation very much in line with traditional Soviet (and pre-Soviet Russian) strategy. On the other hand, the growing importance of helicopters (and helicopter gunships) in the modern battlefield is also noted. Soviet comments are frequently colored by political-ideological considerations. Thus it is alleged that the Syrian air force put up a much better showing against the Israelis in the 1973 war than the Egyptians who were allegedly "passive." Lastly, attention is paid to the various modern forms of active air defense (PVO - Protivno Vozduzhnaya Oborona). However, in view of the particular sensitive character of this technology, these comments consist only of quotations from the Western literature. At the same time this may reflect the fact that Soviet military thinking (and not only Soviet military technology) are strongly influenced by developments in the United States. This refers, for instance, to the "universalization of military technology," to the development of techniques which make more rapid mobilization possible and to the automatization of the conduct of armed forces on the battlefield -- C^3. Soviet authors note that developments on the battlefields of the Third World have had (and will have) a considerable impact on the structure, the organization and the conduct of modern armies - in West and East. These writings mention in passing the importance of the "moral factor" - the fact that technological superiority in Vietnam was not sufficient to win the war. But equally, there seems to be a realization of

the fact that in the wars between Third World countries (nationalist), motivation is likely to be equally strong on both sides and that in these circumstances, other factors are likely to be of decisive importance. Soviet authors occasionally comment on the weakness of Third World armies (especially in Africa) implying that they are quite incapable of any major military operations. There are also critical comments on the performance of the more substantial armed forces (in Asia and the Middle East). But, by and large, the Soviet literature in this field is not very rewarding. Leading Soviet military thinkers seem to believe that the main lessons to be learned from the Asian and African experience are of a tactical and technical character.

The Soviet Union, Iran and the Gulf War

Notes on comments made, lessons drawn and implications for the future.

Recent development in Iran have intrigued Soviet policy makers and analysts and have posed difficult problems for them, which by implication transcend the case of Iran. This refers, for instance, to the leading role of Iranian air force officers and non-commissioned officers in the February uprising against the Shah and the suppression of this movement by Khomeini's supporters.

Why the air force? According to Soviet explanations[3] the introduction of recent (mid-1960s) American planes such as the F4 and the F5 as well as the helicopters made it necessary to open

the air force to "lower middle-class elements" especially as far as the ground personal was concerned. (Russians compare these elements with razno chintsy in Russians history: those which somehow do not fit into the established order of landed gentry, merchants, peasants etc. - but are "in between" layers.) It is true that many graduates of technical colleges joined the air force and in 1968 a special institute for the chomafari (non-commissioned officers) was founded who were to play a notable role in the revolt. But it is also true that those joining the air force were better treated than any other service; there was big extra payment of those serving in bases far away from Teheran and the other big cities.

The "class interest" of the air force certainly does not explain the opposition to the regime. According to Soviet analysts there was a collision between the study of modern science and technology and the outdated political system headed by the Shah. But why should the air force officers and the "chomafari" make common cause with a movement which was considerably more reactionary than the Shah, who, whatever his weaknesses, was a modernizer of sorts? According to the Soviet version the Iranian air force was in closer contact than any other service with Americans based in Iran; as a result "tension was generated." Again, there is no evidence that air force officers were more anti-American than others. Lastly, it is argued that the junior officers were "patriotic" in contrast to the "corrupt" senior officers - again a "subjective" interpretation, anything but Marxist in inspiration.

Soviet analysts note that while the mood in sections of the

Persian air force was strongly oppositionist, an illegal underground organization could not be established because SAVAK and army counter intelligence were "too vigilant." Soviet commentators fail to mention that Soviet intelligence and the Tudeh party had succeeded in winning over or infiltrating cadres into army, navy and air force -- some on the most senior level. Some of these cadres were apparently used only for the collection of information and its trasmission and these had orders not to engage in political activity. But with the break up of SAVAK and military counter intelligence in late 1978 there were also illegal Communist cells established for active measures -- including propaganda and perhaps even eventually the preparation of a military coup. In late 1979 and the year after, the air force was rapidly and extensively politicized - some joined the Mojaheddin, others the Fedayin, and a significant part joined the Islamic revolution. Again, Soviet analysts try to find "objective social explanations" for the relative strength of the pro-clerical party in the air force. It is argued that, as far as social background is concerned, the clergy and the junior air force officers came from a very similar milieu.

The February 1980 revolt as Soviet analysts see it succeeded only because the elite army division in Teheran did not prevail over the Teheran Chomafari. The Chomafari were the "sword of the revolution," the Fedayin and the other left-wing groups were the avant-garde. But far more significant was the "spontaneous popular revolution" which took everyone by surprise.

At this point Soviet interpreters trying to establish the lessons of Persian revolution and counter-revolution become involved in major contradictions. They rightly note the specific Persian - Shiite character of the uprising - the "gloomy decisiveness," the "tragic willingness to sacrifice life," the explosion of hate and joy. According to the Soviet interpretation the clergy controlled the revolution all along, giving it more and more a consistent character - which made it possible to block the popular movement once the goals of the clergy had been achieved. Yet on the other hand Soviet experts argue that there is no doubt whatsoever that there was _not_ one center which organized and led the February uprising: "The clergy had not taken any part in it and it came for it quite unexpectedly." The partisans (i.e. the _Fedayin_ and the _Mojaheddin_) did _not_ start it either - they joined the popular movement and later on became its avant-garde. But they had no idea that a major uprising was about to take place. The _Chomafari_ were totally surprised by the outbreak and its wide extent - they thought that they were on the defensive. Several hundred air force people who participated in the street fighting had blackened their faces in order not to be recognized. They feared they would be defeated and apprehended and would have to pay dearly for their action. So much for Soviet comment and interpretation.

How to explain that the victorious revolutionary movement headed by the junior air force officers and the _Chomafari_ collapsed within a few days -- following a mere announcementby Khomeini (or on his behalf) that it had begun to deviate from the

right course set by the Ayatollah? According to the official Soviet explanation, organized religion was the undisputed integrative force of the Iranian revolution. It was well organized with 100,000 mullahs and hundreds of thousands of hangers-on. Despite its reactionary character it used effectively modern means of communication. The moment it began to organize "Islamic Councils" in the air force, the left-wingers were pushed aside just as the left-wing Ayatollahs (such as Talegani) lost influence.

Soviet comments about the "lessons of Iran" leave most key questions open. How to explain that the Communist party (Tudeh) and the unions under its influence played such a minor role throughout the Iranian revolution? How to explain that the student movements -- or at least the militant among them, were not as easily defeated as the revolutionary cells in the army? Terrorist actions against the new Khomeini order continued for many months. Colleges and universities had to be purged, "Islamized" and closed.

One of the conclusions ("perhaps the main conclusion") drawn is that the Iranian example has shown that the popular masses can overthrow any tyrannical and anti-popular regime. But why was this victory achieved not by "progressive forces," why, on the contrary, did it lead to the destruction of these forces? As Soviet analysts see it, the main mistake of the Shah was not the rapid development of the productive forces of the country, but the fact that he was over-ambitious (the plan to become the fifth largest industrial power in the world), that he was not

sufficiently nationalist (and by implication, xenophobic and anti-American) and that he antagonized the clergy by nationalizing their land (the *wacf*.) Soviet analysts stress at if the cultural revolution the Shah stood for would have succeeded, the clergy would have become superfluous. Again there is a parallel with Russian history. If the Stolypin agrarian reforms before World War One would have succeeded, the Russian revolution would have been redundant. In the final anlaysis it was a case of a cultural revolution from above and underrating the enduring power of organized religion.

But again why was the left, which allegedly had a strong popular basis, so easily defeated? The case of Iran proves that it is *not* true that terrorism cannot be stamped out as the result of "killing the terrorists." 7,000 members of the Mojaheddin were killed-- possibly their number was even higher - and the terrorist underground collapsed like a house of cards.

It is interesting that during this period the Tudeh party and the Soviet experts on Iran -- such as Doroshenko, the leading expert on Shi'ism -- supported the Khomeini movement. It was claimed that Islam could play a progressive role in the struggle against imperialism. In fact, Tudeh admitted having warned the Khomeinites. As the result of these warnings hundreds of *Mojaheddin* and left-wing air force officers were arrested and executed.

Having liquidated the extreme left, the Khomeinites turned against the Communists despite the fact that these had behaved most loyally towards them. Vladimir Kazichkin, the Teheran Vice Consul who defected provided a mass of information about

collaboration between Tudeh leadership and the KGB. But there is every reason to assume that Khomeini would have turned against them in any case. Within a few weeks in spring 1983 the whole leadership of Tudeh was arrested, some were immediately executed, others including the secretary general of the party Kianuri admitted on TV to "espionage, deceit, treachery, conspiracy." It was a most disgraceful performance on the part of a movement which was supposed to behave courageously facing "fascist hangmen." Dimitrov had stood up bravely to Goering in the famous Reichstag trial in 1933, but then the Nazis -- at least in 1933 -- did not use brutal torture. The Khomeinites, taking a leaf out of Stalin's book, did, and were highly successful in getting admissions in their show trial.

What, as seen from Moscow, are the lessons for the future? Soviet analysts correctly point out that there are major differences between the countries of Asia and Africa, that religion is not as deeply rooted everywhere as in Iran. Some of the Soviet experts were, in fact, among the first to stress the important role of Shi'ism in politics at a time when this was far from fashionable in the West. They quote Lenin (the early Lenin!) to the effect that in early phases of their historical development, popular revolutions tend to assume a religious coloring, especially when the class differences have not yet progressed far. But such references are not very helpful with regard to Iran in 1980; the major urban centers of Iran where policy is made cannot be compared with a medieval setting-- and

the class differences in Iran were as pronounced as anywhere else; literacy in the cities is almost universal.

Soviet experts claim that Khomeinism is bound to fail because of its "utopian character," its inability to solve economic and social questions (unemployment, agrarian unrest, minorities) because it became involved in a bloody and "senseless" (the epithets most frequently used) war, and that it will eventually be overthrown or collapse. But Soviet analysts have been careful to refrain from predictions as to the time-table and the circumstances of the coming collapse of Khomeinism -- nor are they specific about the stages of succession. Some maintain that the present rulers of Iran represent "bourgeois interests," others think that they advocate a "petit bourgeois interest." Some point to the presence of a strong Lumpen (declasse) element in the Iranian cities which on some occasions may join temporarily the revolutionary party but is not a reliable ally and is more likely to make common cause with the "reactionary forces." Lastly, the opinion has been voiced - even though it is somewhat risky from a Marxist-Leninist point of view -- that the politics of the Shi'ite clergy cannot be explained with reference to the class struggle at all, that it stands alone all for its own interest and manipulates social classes for its benefit.

Soviet analysts clearly bank on the erosion of organized religion in Iran as the result of economic and political failures, as the consequence of the struggle for the succession after Khomeini, or a combination of these and other factors. But can they be certain that Khomeinism will be succeeded by left-

wing forces which can be considered reliable from the Soviet point of view? Obviously not; the Tudeh party was smashed so easily precisely because of the stigma attached to it that it was an agent of a foreign power (the Soviet Union.) In the eyes of many Iranian leftists the Soviet Union ceased to be revolutionary a long time ago. In these circumstances it seems more likely that the erosion of the power of Khomeinism will not lead to the victory of the pro-Soviet party but to protracted civil war in which various regions may move in different directions and during which the very territorial unity of Iran may be put into jeopardy -- as it was during earlier periods of her history. This would be preferable from a Soviet point of view to a strong anti-Communist government in Teheran bent to export the Islamic revolution. But it will mean protracted unrest in an area adjacent to the Soviet Union which will be looked upon with disfavor in Moscow. Should left-wing forces eventually prevail in Iran, or parts of it, these will be more likely than not national-Communist in inspiration. Soviet policy makers have taken a dim view for many years of such movements: they vastly prefer predictable "bourgeois" forces such as Mrs. Ghandi's Congress, because the collaboration with them poses fewer difficulties.

Soviet Attitudes Towards The Gulf War

Soviet comments since the beginning of the war on September 22, 1980 have been exceedingly cautious. According to the official, ritual version which appears even in the Soviet professional literature, "imperialist and reactionary forces,

making use of border disputes provoked an armed conflict between Iraq and Iran in September 1980" (Voenno- Entsiklopedicheski Slovar, 1983; entry: "Iraq".) Nevertheless certain distinct patterns have emerged which are of interest for both political and military reasons. There is no cause to assume that Moscow was consulted by the Iraqis, but during the early period of the war Moscow favored Iraq even though it stopped most arms shipments to Baghdad in late 1980. The assumption in Moscow was that in view of its sad state the Iranian army was bound to be defeated quickly.[4] However, (to quote Soviet observers), the Iranians "showed determined resistance and their air force carried out effective blows against objects in the Iraqi rear." The Iraqis had clearly underrated their foe and Sadam Husain, according to Soviet sources, had been wrong assuming that a quick victory could easily be achieved. When the war broke out Iran seemed to be on the eve of general disintegration -- Sadam Husain clearly believed that only a little push was needed to complete the destabilization of Iran. In fact, the attack caused a kind of national rally around Khomeini.

The Soviet attitude changed several times; after the initial cautious support for Baghdad, greater warmth was shown towards Iran, as it appeared that Teheran would not be defeated easily. In 1982 and even more markedly in 1983, when an Iraqi defeat seemed a distinct possibility and the Iranians turned against the Communist Tudeh implicating the Soviet Union, Moscow dissociated itself from Khomeinism and called for an immediate armistice -- which happened to coincide with the Iraqi line.

By 1983 the Soviet assessment was that a decisive victory of either side was unlikely. There was considerable discontent in Iraq: However, Sadam's domestic hold was still strong and a military setback would not necessarily cause his downfall in the near future. But there was an ominous warning: "The price would have to be paid by Iraq only in a more distinct perspective...". Soviet military commentators noted that untrained Iranian "revolutionary guards" had successfully resisted Iraqi elite troops, such as in the battles for Choramshah.

By early 1984 a decision seemed to have been taken in Moscow to give almost full support to Iraq without trying to burn the bridges to Iran; the underlying reason seems to have been the assumption that while a reconciliation between Teheran and the West was unlikely in the near future, steps had to be taken to prevent a rapprochement between Iraq and the West.

NOTES

1. Among the exception is, for instance, Karen Brutents, who was an academic expert on Third World affairs before being appointed deputy head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

2. Among them, to mention only some of the best known: Evgeni, Primakov, Rostislav Ulyanovski, Georgi Kim, Y. Alimov, Kiva and M. Volkov.

3. The following comments are mainly based on reports by five Soviet Iran specialists: L.W. Sklyarov, S.L. Agaev, A.P. Shestakov, V.I. Yurtaev and above all A.B. Reznikov.

4. "Almost half of the army had deserted and the rest was stationed far from the border; the Iraqis had 2,700 tanks, the Iranians only 1,500." Aleksi Vasiliev, Persidski zaliv v Epitsentre Buri; Moscow 1983, p. 196.