

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

US/TURKISH RELATIONSHIPS AFTER OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

by

Colonel Harvey L. Hammond Jr.
United States Air Force

Colonel Gary Snyder
Project Advisor

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Report Documentation Page

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 03 MAY 2004	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED -			
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE US/Turkish Relationships After Operation Iraqi Freedom		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER			
		5b. GRANT NUMBER			
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER			
6. AUTHOR(S) Harvey Hammond		5d. PROJECT NUMBER			
		5e. TASK NUMBER			
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER			
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)			
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)			
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT See attached file.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 24	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Harvey L. Hammond Jr.

TITLE: US/TURKISH RELATIONSHIPS after OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 07 January 2004 PAGES: 24 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

On March 1, 2003 the Turkish Parliament voted not to allow US Forces to use Turkish bases during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. This vote stunned the United States. The United States and Turkey have been close partners since the beginning of the Cold War and the common perception was that, at the last minute, Turkey would allow the US to use its land and sea ports. Although both sides are moving forward after the war, lingering questions remain concerning the damage to the relationship between the two countries. Will the US support Turkey in their quest for European Union membership and in the world markets and banking systems? Will Turkey continue to allow use of Incirlik Air Base? Is the geographic location of Turkey still of strategic importance or has technology lessened this factor in the international community? The United States must forget the past and move forward with the Turkish government. With the fall of the Iron Curtain and now the change in leadership of Iraq, Turkey is actually more important than ever to US interests in Europe and the Middle East; however, a change in policy toward Turkey should be considered. This paper will explore the impact of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM on US / Turkish relations and provide possible alternatives and recommendations to ensure future success.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....III

US/TURKISH RELATIONSHIPS AFTER OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 1

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND..... 1

REGIONAL RELATIONSHIPS..... 2

RELIGION..... 4

NATURAL RESOURCES, OIL AND WATER 4

EXAMPLES OF TURKISH MILITARY NONSUPPORT 5

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM BACKGROUND..... 6

ALTERNATIVES..... 7

COURSE OF ACTION NUMBER ONE 8

COURSE OF ACTION NUMBER TWO 9

RECOMMENDATIONS 10

ENDNOTES 13

BIBLIOGRAPHY 17

US/TURKISH RELATIONSHIPS AFTER OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

On March 1, 2003 the Turkish Parliament voted not to allow United States (U.S.) Forces to use Turkish bases during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).¹ This vote stunned the U.S. The U. S. and Turkey have been close partners since the beginning of the Cold War and the common perception was that, at the last minute, Turkey would allow the U.S. to use its land bases and sea ports. Although both nations are moving forward following the conflict, lingering questions remain concerning the damage to the relationship between the two countries. Will the U.S. support Turkey in their quest for European Union membership and in the world markets and banking systems? Will Turkey continue to allow U.S. forces to use Incirlik Air Base? Is the geographic location of Turkey still of strategic importance or can technology replace location in the international community?

This paper will explore the impact of OIF on U.S. / Turkish relations and provide possible alternatives and recommendations to ensure future successful interactions. With the 4000 year history of Turkey and the long standing strategic importance of Turkey to the geographic region, the stage is set for several possible U.S. courses of action (COA) toward Turkey. Using a brief discussion of the regional politics and the importance of regional religious relationships and natural resources, some recommendations for future engagement with Turkey will be supported. The U. S. must not dwell on the IRAQI FREEDOM basing decision and move forward with the Turkish government. With the fall of the Iron Curtain and now the change in leadership of Iraq, Turkey is actually more important than ever to U.S. interests in Europe and the Middle East.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Turkish Republic was established on October 29, 1923, ending 631 years of Ottoman rule.² The Ottoman Empire entered World War One as an ally of Germany and suffered defeat as a result. In the years between 1919 and 1923 the ruling government in Istanbul was unable to hold the empire together. The occupying powers forced the Ottomans to sign the Sevres Treaty on August 10, 1920, which divided the lands of the empire. The Turkish Nation started a War of Liberation in protest to the occupation and Treaty requirements. The most intolerable portion of the Treaty stated that the Entente Powers could occupy any area of Turkey of strategic importance.³ Mustafa Kemal Ataturk led the War of Liberation and is considered to be the father of modern day Turkey.

Ataturk led the country through a series of political, economic and cultural reforms that designed to modernize Turkey. In the words of Ataturk the movement was "to reach the level of contemporary civilization". Turkey immediately established strong political relationships with the

West and based her political and legal system on the modern secular model.⁴ Turkey continues to be active in regional and international politics. Turkey's unique geographic location makes this a difficult task.

Turkey is situated at the crossroads of continents, cultures and religions. Here East meets West and Christianity meets Islam. Historical conflict marks the region and many biblical events are traced to the region. Christian and Islamic holy places such as Ephesus, Tarsus and Antioch are located here as well. The seven ancient churches of Christianity are located in western Turkey. Turks can trace their history back over 4000 years through writings and artifacts.⁵

The very first documented Turkish tribe was the Huns. Records show the Huns migrated west into the region in the 8th century BC. As civilizations moved back and forth across the region the Turks were introduced to Islam in the 8th century AD. The Ottoman Empire emerged in the 14th century and reigned for over 600 years. Under the reign of Sultan Suleyman (1520-1555) the boundaries of the empire spread from Vienna to the Persian Gulf and from the Crimea to Ethiopia in North Africa. In 1683, the Empire suffered its first major defeat during the siege of Vienna and began to lose territory. The Ottoman Empire enacted reforms to reverse this downward spiral, but was unsuccessful. The Empire ultimately ended with defeat in World War One. This rich history produces some definite regional ambitions and relationships that are worth exploration.

REGIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

The rise of the Republic of Turkey resulted in open relationships with western cultures and countries. No modern relationship is more indicative of this than the Turkish relationship with Israel. The Israeli military and the Turkish military conduct regular training exercises and the respective intelligence services share information.⁶ From the U.S. perspective, many security interests are served by this relationship.⁷ It produces a model of regional normalization between Israel and a Muslim state. It produces an opportunity for deeper trilateral cooperation that enhances Israeli and Turkish security and increases weapons interoperability for U.S. forces at times of regional crisis. The relationship is also a source of pressure on Syria's peace process policies.

Turkish / Israeli cooperation produces a potential means for the U.S. executive branch to bypass Congress in support for Turkey. It also is a potential nucleus for pulling together other pro-U.S. states, such as Jordan, into a wider Middle Eastern regional security regime. The cooperation also enhances Israel's legitimacy in the eyes of the Turkic States of the former

Soviet Union that will open prospects for cooperation among states friendly to the U. S.. This relationship serves U.S. interests and merits U.S. support. The Turkish association with Israel could be a catalyst for establishing a lasting peace in the Middle East.

Turkey's neighbor to the southeast is Syria. Syria is on the U.S. list of states that sponsor terrorism and Turkey shares this concern. The Turkish military maintains a large force on the border with Syria. There are ongoing disagreements over the Turkish province of Hatay, which the colonial French ceded to the Turks in 1919, and the amount of water flow from the Euphrates into Syria. Syria sees the Turkish/Israeli cooperation as a threat because it potentially generates two fronts against them. A positive move occurred when Syria turned over Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of a militant separatist group, to Turkish authorities in 1998. Terrorist attacks from the Syrian border ended with this event.⁸ The situation with Syria appears to be improving, but is tenuous as the Middle East reacts to the fall of Saddam Hussein and the Palestinian / Israeli peace process.

Jordan is on excellent terms with both the U.S. and Turkey. Jordan plays a critical role in the Middle East peace process. The U.S. and Turkey both support the Jordanian commitment to peace and stability in the region. Turkey and Jordan have increased their defense ties and Turkey has helped to strengthen the Jordanian defense industry.⁹ Jordan represents one more Middle Eastern country that can support the peace process and bring stability to the troubled region.

Although the U.S. and Turkey agree on many issues, disagreement exists on how to approach some critical countries in the Persian Gulf region. The U.S. has long had a policy of isolation toward Iran while Turkey believes in a more open and engaging approach. Turkey sees Iran as hostile and dangerous, but is hopeful in the new Iranian government. The Turks want to see open economic policies toward Iran and believe that this is the way to include Iran in a stable and peaceful solution to regional unrest. Turkey did not support the Government of Saddam Hussein, but believed in engagement with Iraq.

After Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Turks are hoping to reopen the prosperous border trade with Iraq. The Iraq to Turkey oil pipeline can contribute to renewed economic stability in the area. Turkey was one of the first nations to offer large numbers of troops to help the security situation in Iraq. However, age-old concerns about Turkey wanting to regain control of the northern oil fields caused the governing council in Iraq to reject Turkish troops at the present time. This situation may change with more International support and mutual understanding between the Iraqi governing council and Turkey. Turkey is in a unique position to be a major

regional influence and is willing to perform that job. This will help foster U.S. interests in the modern strategic environment.

In another display of Turkish regional influence and support to the Global War on Terrorism, Turkey sent a task force to Afghanistan and provided the Joint Task Force headquarters for an extended period of time.¹⁰ Turkey continues to demonstrate that it is an effective ally in the world.

RELIGION

Ninety-eight percent of Turkey's population is Muslim.¹¹ The Government of Turkey is built on a secular, democratic foundation and it continues to strive to separate religion from politics. However, this leads to a discussion of the Christian versus Muslim religions. Many Westerners have no problem with Islam, but only with violent Muslim extremists.¹² The two religions have coexisted in times of peace; however, many wars have erupted from both the differences, as well as, the similarities between the religions. Both Christians and Muslims believe that there is only one true faith and that all humans should be converted to that faith. There are significant parallels in the idea of "jihad" and a crusade. Modern analysts cite five factors to be aware of in the current worldwide clash between Muslims and Christians. First is the Muslim population growth that is producing large numbers of unemployed youth to fill the ranks of fanatics. Secondly, there is resurgence in the Islamic belief of character and worth over the western culture. Thirdly, the West is maintaining its military and economic superiority causing interventions in conflicts in the Islamic world. Fourth, the collapse of communism removed the common enemy of both religions. Fifth, there is increasing contact between east and west as a result of globalization. This interaction and intermingling actually increases the friction between the cultures.¹³ Over the last fourteen hundred years history has proven that there is conflict between the two religions. The violent nature of the relationship is reflected in the fact that 50% of the wars between 1820 and 1929 were between Muslims and Christians.¹⁴ While resurgence in religious conflict is present, Turkey sets an example for the entire world of how the Muslim religion can prosper in a democratic, secular country and remain in good relations with the West. Therefore, it is of vital importance to U.S. national interests that Turkey be successful.

NATURAL RESOURCES, OIL AND WATER

The Persian Gulf region is critical to world oil production. Estimates show that 34% of American oil will come from the Persian Gulf by the year 2015.¹⁵ America is searching for new areas of energy production to decrease this dependence on the Middle East. The end of the

Cold War opened the Caspian basin area for international development. Possible world reserves in the area are approximately 15% of the oil and 12% of the natural gas reserves.¹⁶ This area is replete with economic and political challenges. The Caucasus countries are beginning to modernize after the end of the Cold War and international investment is beginning to occur. Security and stability are major concerns. The U.S. is engaged on all fronts of national power to help the region become more stable and to boost the infrastructure which supports energy production and its export from the area. The Baku to Ceyhan pipeline through Turkey is one of the most important infrastructure improvements for the U. S. Construction began in June of 2002 and is scheduled for completion in 2004 with exports beginning in 2005.¹⁷ Transportation of the energy reserves from the Caspian basin area to the West remains key to economic advancement.

A second vital natural resource is water. The geographic location of Turkey places it in a very unique position with regard to water in the Middle East. The Tigris and Euphrates rivers originate in Turkey. Turkey is blessed with many other rivers which support its own water needs, as well as, having the ability to control water flow to the countries to the south. The Tigris and Euphrates river basin not only holds natural resource value, but is also considered to be the cradle of civilization.¹⁸ Turkey has placed great emphasis on its construction projects and control over the water in the area. The \$32 billion dollar Southeast Anatolian Project will be comprised of 22 dams, 19 hydroelectric plants and irrigation networks in 13 separate locations.¹⁹ The project is expected to provide electricity and economic prosperity to poorer regions of Turkey and as such is a source of national pride. While the project will greatly benefit the Turkish economy, it could be considered a point of contention with the countries to the south as Turkey gains even more control over the water situation. The treaties and agreements on the flow of water to the south are key to a stable and peaceful region; therefore, the U. S. must be in a position in the future to ensure the water continues to flow.

EXAMPLES OF TURKISH MILITARY NONSUPPORT

Many believe that Turkey is a staunch and loyal supporter of the U. S. As a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally, Turkey has obligations to the U.S. and the remaining members of NATO. Recent history shows many examples of nonsupport of U.S. and NATO interest by the Government of Turkey. During the 1973 Mid-East War, Turkey refused over flight rights to the U.S. but allowed over flight for the USSR. In 1976 and again in 1979, Turkey allowed Soviet aircraft carriers to transit the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits in violation of the 1936 Montreaux Convention. NATO voiced strong opposition to this move. The Soviet

carriers posed a significant threat to the U.S. Sixth Fleet and NATO forces. Also in 1979, Turkey refused to allow U.S. Marines the use of Incirlik Air Base for possible use in the evacuation of U.S. personnel out of Iran. At the same time Turkey refused the request to allow U-2 intelligence flights over Turkish airspace. In 1989, Turkey refused to allow U.S. inspection of a Soviet MIG-29 aircraft that was flown to Turkey by a defector. Turkey also vetoed a NATO effort to put military bases in the Greek Islands even though it would provide increased NATO defense against the Soviet Navy. During the first Persian Gulf War, Turkey did not allow coalition forces to operate from Turkish territory until 48 hours after the war started.²⁰ These examples prove that Turkey will act in its own interests over the interests of its Allies. These examples of Turkish nonsupport are in the military element of national power and point to the need for a modification of U.S. military policy toward Turkey.

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM BACKGROUND

As previously discussed, on March 1, 2003, the Turkish Parliament voted not to allow U.S. Forces to use Turkish bases during OIF. This vote stunned the U. S. Although both sides are moving forward after the war, lingering questions remain concerning the damage to the relationship between the two countries. The U. S. must forget the past and move forward with the Turkish government. With the fall of the Iron Curtain and the current changes in the leadership of Iraq, Turkey is vitally important to U.S. interests in Europe and the Middle East.

Prior to OIF, the U. S. objectives and interests in Turkey were based on preventing regional disputes and expanding market reform and democratic principles.²¹ The end of the Cold War spurred many new foreign policy considerations. With this shift away from the Russian threat, the mid-level powers such as Iran and Iraq drew much U.S. attention. Turkey's strong NATO alliance made its geo-strategic importance very high. Four main areas of strategic U.S. interests existed prior to OIF. First is Turkey's ability to serve as a power projection platform in the region. Turkey is uniquely situated on the edge of many areas of possible conflict and specifically allowed enforcement of the United Nations (UN) no-fly zone in northern Iraq. Secondly, Turkey acts as a very strong pro-western regime in an area of possible radical regimes. Simply stated, it stabilizes the area by its strong association to the West. Thirdly, Turkey has a very large military with the ability to deploy a large force if required. For example, Turkey took over a large portion of the security operations in Afghanistan. Finally, Turkey is a model for Middle Eastern countries to follow. Turkey's population is 98% Muslim and it has a working democratic republic. It is also a member of NATO and a candidate for

European Union (EU) membership. U.S. interests will be best served if Turkey is successful. To ensure these U.S. interests are advanced, the U.S. engagement in Turkey is substantial.²²

The U.S. has used a multi-faceted approach to accomplish its objectives in Turkey. Engagement at all levels has been the norm, but much has been made of the economic and military elements. The Turkish economy has performed poorly and the U.S. has been willing to help with aid and support in the world banking system.²³ The U.S. retains a healthy trade relationship with Turkey and maintains an even import/export ratio.²⁴ Close connections on the military front and the use of Incirlik Air Base in Adana were critical to U.S. efforts to enforce the UN sanctions against Iraq.²⁵ The U.S. also uses its diplomatic efforts in world opinion to support Turkey and its desire to become an EU member, as well as, its many other international endeavors.²⁶ U.S. information policies show support for Turkey in all the media formats worldwide.²⁷ In fact, the U.S. uses all elements of national power to support Turkey; however, there are risks associated with this support.

U.S. interests in the region are traditionally regarded as necessary due to Turkey's geographic location as the bridge between Europe, the Middle East and Asia.²⁸ A lack of success in our middle-eastern policies could lead to instability in an area which remains vital to U.S. interest.²⁹ Therefore the balance of ends, ways and means must be carefully fine tuned to produce minimum risk.³⁰ Prior to OIF, U.S. policies were feasible, suitable and acceptable, but the situation has changed. As a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the regime change in Iraq and the rise of asymmetrical threats such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, we must refine our policies toward Turkey.³¹ Considering these changes, what possible COA is best for the future of U.S./Turkish relationships?

ALTERNATIVES

This paper addresses possible alternatives for U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey. The first possible course of action is to maintain the current level of engagement with Turkey, as if the rift over OIF never happened. A second course of action would be to increase economic, diplomatic, and informational support, while decreasing the military engagement with Turkey. A third course of action is to disengage from Turkey and not offer U.S. support in the EU membership drive or in the world financial system penalizing Turkey's non-support of the U.S. military in Iraq. The third alternative does not provide a viable method for achieving our national objectives in the Middle East. The U.S. desire to have a stable region would be much less likely to occur if the U.S. punishes Turkey. Also, Turkey is one of the examples of a Muslim nation with a successful democratic government. Other Muslim nations would not be willing to count

on democracy if they view Turkey in dire straits and abandoned by the U.S. The U.S. cannot afford to take such drastic measures against Turkey. The U.S. must stay engaged to ensure its interests are met; therefore, this course of action will be dismissed. Course of action one and two will be addressed with the backdrop of suitability, feasibility and acceptability, thereby reducing risk and producing a viable strategy toward Turkey.

COURSE OF ACTION NUMBER ONE

COA number one maintains the pre OIF level of engagement with Turkey. This is a viable COA because all elements of U.S. national power are used to engage Turkey while ensuring that U.S. interests in the region are successfully protected. Under this option, the U.S. would maintain strong economic, diplomatic and informational support for the government of Turkey in all its international endeavors and provide economic aid to ensure Turkey remains economically successful. In fact, the Bush administration signaled its desire to mend the relationship by approving a \$1 billion aid package.³² Military engagement would continue to be robust with exercises, basing and aid to each other. Considering Turkey's geographic location and NATO membership, the past U.S. relationship with Turkey has been heavily weighted toward military engagement.

Following September 11, 2001, the U.S. is now facing a different enemy. The Global War On Terrorism with this new threat necessitates a change in the military engagement posture with Turkey. The President has made the global war on terrorism a high priority for the nation and therefore the military. As a matter of fact, the National Security Strategy lists the number one job of the federal government as defending the nation.³³ The military objectives with Turkey must display an audit trail to the national objectives. This is the area of imbalance in COA 1 after OIF. An ongoing problem with the Government of Turkey is the rift over the Kurdish area of northern Iraq and whether Turkish troops should be allowed to enter that area.³⁴ The Turkish General Staff (TGS) is most likely responsible for the lack of support to OIF from Turkish territory. For the past 12 years there have been numerous minor issues with Operation NORTHERN WATCH (ONW) flying from Incirlik Air base and now that ONW has ended these problems can be removed.³⁵ Since the military situation in the region has changed dramatically, the U.S. should change its military engagement to keep a balanced relationship. There is risk associated with changing the military involvement. The TGS could send troops into northern Iraq and start a civil war in the Kurdish region. This would be a destabilizing factor, however, the TGS did not send troops into northern Iraq during or after OIF. Turkey is now offering to send troops into Iraq. This is a point of contention with the Iraqi governing council, so Turkey is

delaying any troop deployment until Iraq ask for them. While COA 1 is feasible, it is not suitable or acceptable given the change in U.S. objectives. The possible second and third order effects of not changing the U.S. policy toward Turkey, favors a different COA.

COURSE OF ACTION NUMBER TWO

COA number two is to maintain or increase our level of engagement on the diplomatic, economic and informational front while decreasing our engagement on the military side. Turkey needs to gain momentum in the economic arena and help in international monetary matters. The U.S. has the ability to help support Turkey's economy and can use its international leadership to help in financial endeavors. America must help Turkey gain a more profitable market for international investors and work on the trading equation.³⁶ U.S. support for the EU membership will help Turkey become a more important partner in central European matters. In fact, some would argue that Turkey's lack of support to the U.S. in OIF actually strengthened their efforts with Germany and France for EU membership.³⁷

The military portion of the equation has changed. As mentioned, the Turkish military involvement in northern Iraq is newsworthy. The offer by Turkey to send troops to Iraq was seen by some as aid to the troubled U.S. forces. However, others see it as a Turkish effort to gain control of the Kurdish issue in the north.³⁸ The Ottoman Turks governed Iraq for four centuries until the end of World War 1.³⁹ The new Iraqi governing council does not support Turkish troops in Iraq. Currently, the Turkish military agenda is not compatible with U.S. interests; therefore, the U.S. should decrease engagement supporting the Turkish military. Another important factor is that Turkey can no longer be viewed as a guaranteed base of operations. With the Turkish failure to allow U.S. forces to operate from their territory, the importance of the geographic location is reduced from a military point of view. The U.S. must seek areas that will allow U.S. forces to operate free of host nation restraints. The U.S. should leave Incirlik Air Base and restrict other support to the Turkish military in anything other than a UN or NATO role. Opportunities still exist to engage with the Turkish military in exercises such as the Turkish hosted Anatolian Eagle exercise or Red Flag in which Turkey deploys to the U.S. Also, the NATO operation at the Combined Air Operations Center Six at Eskirshir will continue at the pre OIF levels of interaction. Ground and Naval forces should continue to participate in multinational exercises, but without additional engagement. The U.S. should exit the old Cold War mentality of maximum military engagement with Turkey and begin more normal peacetime engagement. By decreasing military engagement the U.S. will actually increase the possible impact of the Turkish military in the region, which could then become a stabilizing force in both

Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The U.S. military is over-extended and has many problems with manpower and length of deployments, so this is a way to alleviate some of that stress. Utilize the Turkish military to deploy U.S. forces for other duty.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As the U.S. military seeks to expand into Eastern Europe with a shift in basing and support plans, it will end reliance on Turkish basing. Long term agreements could be formalized with the Turkish General Staff to provide reopening opportunities if the world situation changes and the U.S. sees the need to move forces back into Turkey. With the end of the Cold War and the regime change in Iraq, the military element of U.S. national power towards Turkey should be adjusted.

As pointed out at the beginning of this paper, Turkey is still an important ally of the U.S. and its geo-strategic location remains vital. Turkey is a model for fostering the democratic free-market world that Americans believe is the key to success. With all the changes that have taken place in the last decade in this region, it is time to adjust our engagement strategy with Turkey. The U.S. should increase its diplomatic, informational and economic engagement with Turkey; however, the military involvement should decrease to balance that strategy. Turkey has demonstrated that it will act in its own interests and the U.S. should not rely on Turkey's staunch support.⁴⁰ As pointed out in a previous section, Turkey has a history of nonsupport to the U.S. military. A change in the military engagement will have some beneficial second and third order effects.

Additionally, some have suggested that Turkey should apologize for not supporting the OIF request, but this is unlikely based on Turkish culture. U.S. policy makers must be aware of these issues and engage on a level that will benefit both countries. Turkey did not support the U.S. military; therefore, the military support to Turkey should change, while ensuring Turkey is still supported on the economic front. It is of great importance to the U.S. that Turkey be successful. Many positive results will flow from positive interaction with Turkey after OIF.

The Turkish population was against the war and the government simply supported the will of its' people. The U.S. should not appear to punish Turkey for this democratic ideal or the world will see it as a double standard. The U.S. needs to change the strategy towards Turkey to be in balance with the current world situation. When a stable government arises in Iraq, Turkey will most likely lose some of its military importance to the U.S., but will increase in other values. In the Islamic world the U.S. military is not a welcome force. Neither is the Turkish military as indicated by the bombing near the Turkish embassy in Baghdad on October 14, 2003.⁴¹ The

U.S. needs to disengage and allow a multinational force, approved by the UN, to intervene to help secure the peace and move Iraq toward democracy. Turkey may be one of those forces when they are disassociated from the U.S. Turkey can also have a major role in the most pressing problem in the Middle East by working to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.⁴² The U.S. must let Turkey assume a greater leadership role in the region. Turkey remains a valued partner in the quest for peace and prosperity for the world.

Both COAs provide suitable, feasible and acceptable strategies. The difference is in the degree of risk the U.S. is willing to take, but as Art Lykke points out, some degree of risk is associated with any COA.⁴³ Staying the course in Turkey, as with COA 1, could result in long term instability due to U.S. interference in Middle Eastern affairs. As a matter of fact, the International Institute for Strategic Studies stated on October 15, 2003 that the U.S. led operations in Iraq are increasing the ranks of Islamic militant groups.⁴⁴ The U.S. must adjust its strategy toward Turkey and it will provide beneficial second and third order effects that will help stabilize the Middle East region and ensure the U.S. objectives in the area are met. As David Jablonsky said in Chapter 11 of the U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy, page 153, "In an ever more interdependent world in which variables for the strategist within the ends-ways-means paradigm have increased exponentially, strategists are no nearer a "Philosopher's Stone" than they ever were."

WORD COUNT=4906

ENDNOTES

¹ Henri J. Barkey, "Turkey's Strategic Future: A US Perspective," 12 May 2003; available from <http://www.eusec.org/barkey.htm>; internet accessed on 13 October 2003.

² Turkish Embassy, Washington D.C., available from <http://www.turkey.org/governmentpolitics/index.htm>; Internet; accessed 22 November 2003

³ Turkish Embassy, Washington D.C., available from <http://www.turkey.org/countryprofile/history.htm>; Internet; accessed 22 November 2003

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Turkish Embassy, Washington D.C., available from <http://www.turkey.org/countryprofile/turksandturkey.htm>; Internet; accessed 22 November 2003

⁶ Israel Making Friends, Money as it Sells Weapons, *Carlisle (PA) Sentinel*, Wednesday, 19 November 2003, Section A, page 5.

⁷ Alan Makovsky, "U.S. Policy Toward Turkey: Progress and Problems," in *Turkey's Transformation and American Foreign Policy*, ed., Morton Abramowitz (New York: The Century Press, 2000), 236.

⁸ Donald M. MacWillie, "The Increasing Importance of Turkey for U.S. Security," Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U. S. Army War College, 9 April 2002), 12.

⁹ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, *Jordan*, December 2001; available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/bgn/index.cfm?docid=3464>; Internet; accessed 20 December 2001.

¹⁰ Turkish Embassy, Washington D.C., available from <http://www.turkey.org/newsbriefs/2003/1016.htm>; Internet; accessed 22 November 2003

¹¹ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, "Background Note: Turkey," September 2002; available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3432.htm>; accessed 13 October 2003.

¹² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster Inc., 1997), 209.

¹³ Ibid., 211.

¹⁴ Ibid., 210.

¹⁵ Jofi Joseph, "Pipeline Diplomacy: The Clinton Administration's Fight for Baku-Ceyhan," Princeton University: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 1999; available at <http://www.princeton.edu/~cases/papers/pipeline.html>; accessed 10 December 2001

¹⁶ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 145.

¹⁷ Energy Information Administration, Caspian Sea Region Country Analysis Brief; available from <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspian.html>; Internet; accessed 22 November 2003.

¹⁸ Yahia Bakour and John Kolars, "The Arah Mashrek: Hydrologic History, Problems and Perspectives," in *Water in the Arab World: Perspectives and Prognosis*, ed. Peter Rogers and Peter Lydon (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1994), 127.

¹⁹ Frederick M. Lorenz and Edward J. Erickson, *The Euphrates Triangle: Security Implications of the Southeast Anatolian Project*, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999) 8.

²⁰ Gene Rossides, "A letter to the Washington Times," 24 June 2002; available from http://www.aheworld.com/070202_letter1.html; internet; accessed 16 November 2003

²¹ MacWillie, 8.

²² Henri J. Barkey, "Turkey's Strategic Future: A US Perspective,"

²³ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, "Background Note: Turkey," September 2002; available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3432.htm>; accessed 13 October 2003.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Philip H. Gordon, "America's Partnership with Turkey Is Still Valuable," 6 August 2003; available from <http://www.brook.edu/views/op-ed/gordon/20030806.htm>; internet; accessed on 13 October 2003

²⁶ Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Turkish Foreign Policy," 8 September 2003; available from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupg/gb/default.htm>; internet; accessed 13 October 2003.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Huseyin Bagci and Saban Kardas, "Post-September 11 Impact: The Strategic Importance of Turkey Revisited," 12 May 2003; available from <http://www.eusec.org/bagci.htm>; Internet accessed on 13 October 2003.

²⁹ MacWillie, 6.

³⁰ H. Richard Yarger, "Toward A Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model," *Course 2 Readings*, Volume One, (AY04): 388.

³¹ MacWillie, 1.

³² Barkey, "Turkey's Strategic Future: A US Perspective,"

³³ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of The United States of America* (Washington D.C., The White House, September 2002), 1.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ U.S. Department of State.

³⁷ Gordon.

³⁸ Jalil Hamid and Rosalind Russell, "Iraq Foreign Minister Stands Firm on Turkish Troops," Reuters, World Report; available from http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/nm/20031013/wl_nm/iraq_dc_3. Internet: accessed 13 October 2003

³⁹ Fouad Ajami, "The Tipping Point," *Newsweek*, 20 October 2003, 34

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ "Turkish Embassy in Baghdad Bombed," *Carlisle (PA) Sentinel*, 14 October 2003, sec A, p. 1.

⁴² Omer Taspinar, "Will Turkey Send Troops to Iraq," The Brookings Institution, *The Daily Times* August 3, 2003; available from <http://www.brook.edu/views/op-ed/fellows/taspinar20030802.htm>; Internet accessed 14 October 2003.

⁴³ Yarger, 386.

⁴⁴ Peter Graff, "Iraq War Swells Al Qaeda's Ranks, Report Says," The International Institute for Strategic Studies, annual report, *The Military Balance, 2003-2004*, available from http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/nm/20031015/w1_nm/security_iraq_b; Internet; accessed 15 October 2003.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ajami, Fouad, "The Tipping Point," *Newsweek*, 20 October 2003
- Bagci, Huseyin and Saban Kardas, "Post-September 11 Impact: The Strategic Importance of Turkey Revisited," 12 May 2003; available from <http://www.eusec.org/bagci.htm> ;Internet accessed on 13 October 2003.
- Bakour, Yahia and John Kolars, "The Arah Mashrek: Hydrologic History, Problems and Perspectives," in *Water in the Arab World: Perspectives and Prognosis*, ed. Peter Rogers and Peter Lydon (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1994)
- Barkey, Henri J. "Turkey's Strategic Future: A US Perspective," 12 May 2003; available from <http://www.eusec.org/barkey.htm> ;internet accessed on 13 October 2003.
- Bush, George W. , *The National Security Strategy of The United States of America* (Washington D.C., The White House, September 2002).
- Energy Information Administration, Caspian Sea Region Country Analysis Brief; available from <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspian.html>; Internet; accessed 22 November 2003.
- Gordon, Philip H. "America's Partnership with Turkey Is Still Valuable," 6 August 2003; available from <http://www.brook.edu/views/op-ed/gordon/20030806.htm> ; internet; accessed on 13 October 2003
- Graff, Peter, "Iraq War Swells Al Qaeda's Ranks, Report Says," The International Institute for Strategic Studies, annual report, *The Military Balance, 2003-2004*, available from http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/nm/20031015/w1_nm/security_iraq_b ;Internet; accessed 15 October 2003.
- Hamid, Jalil and Rosalind Russell, " Iraq Foreign Minister Stands Firm on Turkish Troops," Reuters, World Report; available from http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/nm/20031013/wl_nm/iraq_dc_3. Internet: accessed 13 October 2003
- Huntington, Samuel P., *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster Inc., 1997)
- Israel Making Friends, Money as it Sells Weapons, *Carlisle (PA) Sentinel*, Wednesday, 19 November 2003
- Joseph, Jofi, "Pipeline Diplomacy: The Clinton Administration's Fight for Baku-Ceyhan," Princeton University: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 1999; available at <http://www.princeton.edu/~cases/papers/pipeline.html>; accessed 10 December 2001
- Lorenz, Frederick M. and Edward J. Erickson, *The Euphrates Triangle: Security Implications of the Southeast Anatolian Project*, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999)

- MacWillie, Donald M. "The Increasing Importance of Turkey for U.S. Security," Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U. S. Army War College, 9 April 2002).
- Makovsky, Alan, "U.S. Policy Toward Turkey: Progress and Problems," in Turkey's Transformation and American Foreign Policy, ed., Morton Abramowitz (New York: The Century Press, 2000)
- Rashid, Ahmed, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 145.
- Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Turkish Foreign Policy," 8 September 2003; available from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupg/gb/default.htm> ;internet; accessed 13 October 2003.
- Rossides, Gene, "A letter to the Washington Times," 24 June 2002; available from http://www.aheworld.com/070202_letter1.html; internet; accessed 16 November 2003
- Taspinar, Omer "Will Turkey Send Troops to Iraq," The Brookings Institution, *The Daily Times* August 3, 2003; available from <http://www.brook.edu/views/op-ed/fellows/taspinar20030802.htm>; Internet accessed 14 October 2003.
- "Turkish Embassy in Baghdad Bombed," Carlisle (PA) Sentinel, 14 October 2003, sec A, p. 1.
- Turkish Embassy, Washington D.C., available from <http://www.turkey.org/governmentpolitics/index.htm>; Internet; accessed 22 November 2003
- U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, :Background Note: Turkey," September 2002; available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3432.htm>; accessed 13 October 2003.
- Yarger, H. Richard "Toward A Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model," Course 2 Readings, Volume One, (AY04).