USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

A BALANCED FORCE STRATEGY FOR THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

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ABSTRACT

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Can the United States create an effective National Security Strategy addressing the war on terrorism, peacetime engagement activities, and warfighting, by developing a Balanced Force Strategy?

To secure our goals as a nation, the United States must remain actively engaged in regions of national interest. The military, as an element of national power, must contribute to the National Security Strategy. There is a proliferation of threats throughout the world. This inquiry argues that there must be a Balanced Force Strategy - balanced emphasis must be given to the military's missions in three critical areas: the war on terrorism, peacetime engagement activities, and warfighting. The military instrument directed toward terrorism must be powerful and must be able both to strike capabilities preemptively and retaliate effectively. Peacetime engagement activities must be a second military security strategy imperative. U.S. and NATO peacekeeping activities in Bosnia and Kosovo have created relatively stable conditions in chronically troubled regions. World military powers, such as China, Iran, and North Korea, retain considerable conventional warfighting capability. Even though the United States currently enjoys a technological edge, its military must be ready to meet any conventional threat. Formulating an effective warfighting response will always be critical. This paper argues that a balanced approach to the use of military power is essential to create an effective National Security Strategy. In order to accomplish this, the U.S. Army must increase the end-strength and undertake the recommended reorganization.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ..... **III**

A BALANCED FORCE STRATEGY FOR THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT **1**

STRATEGY **1**

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 1

NEW PARADIGM FOR A NATIONAL AND MILITARY SECURITY STRATEGY 2

PILLARS OF THE NEW PARADIGM FOR A NATIONAL AND MILITARY SECURITY STRATEGY 4

Legitimacy **4**

Integration of Instruments **4**

Standing Organizations **5**

TRINITY OF EFFORT **5**

WAR ON TERRORISM 5

PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT ACTIVITIES 7

WARFIGHTING 7

IMPLEMENTING THE BALANCED FORCE STRATEGY **8**

PLANNED TRANSFORMATION 9

ORGANIZING THE ARMY TO SUPPORT BALANCED FORCE STRATEGY 10

TRAINING THE ARMY TO SUPPORT THE BALANCED FORCE STRATEGY 12

CONCLUSION **15**

ENDNOTES **17**

BIBLIOGRAPHY **21**

A BALANCED FORCE STRATEGY FOR THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Now more than ever, there is a need for a balanced approach to a national military strategy. Armed with an approach that leverages innovative thinking, the prioritization of strategic imperatives, and sufficient force structure, America's military can meet the challenges of the future. Considering the array of conventional and unconventional threats, coupled with areas of instability throughout the world, a balance must be struck between the military's missions in three critical areas: the war on terrorism, peacetime engagement activities, and warfighting and its force structure. This calls for a Balanced Force Strategy. The military instrument directed toward terrorism must be powerful, accurate and able to strike terrorist capabilities preemptively and punitively. Peacetime engagement activities must be a second military security imperative. The U.S. military will continue to be called upon to play peacekeeping roles in areas of the world where stability is a major problem. The third area, the warfighting capability of the military, must not be eroded because of the additional national security requirements of the war on terrorism and peacekeeping stability operations. This point is critical, not because of some military cultural ideal, but because, despite the United States' current primacy in military power, new and existing conventional threats will challenge us in the future. To achieve a better-balanced military strategy, the Army component of the balanced force should develop doctrines, training, force structure, and equipment to better support the National Security Strategy (NSS). By doing this the challenges of the new security environment can be met.

STRATEGY

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The new strategic environment has become more complex and uncertain and a reassessment must be made to formulate a comprehensive and effective NSS. This reassessment must be reconciled with proven security techniques that support strategic imperatives. The United States has struggled with the creation of a consistent NSS since the end of the Cold War. This paper will not address all the elements of an effective NSS, but rather recommend policy changes to the current military strategy to better support an effective NSS. Its focus will be placed on the U.S. Army. Without a comprehensive and flexible military strategy and the military structure to support it, there cannot be an effective NSS.

NEW PARADIGM FOR A NATIONAL AND MILITARY SECURITY STRATEGY

Many considerations come into play when developing a balanced and comprehensive NSS and a national military strategy that will support it. As the security environment changes, the nation's initiatives for security must be changed. The September 11th terrorist attack created a line of departure for a new paradigm in political and security planning. If our nation is to make any real progress in stabilizing this new strategic environment, all the elements of national power must be used. The most influential of all the powers is the military, which must be used in conjunction with other means of national power to be most effective.

The NSS must use a holistic approach to known and perceived future threats. The Bush administration, in the year 2000, did not understand this important principle; however, September 11th revealed its absolute necessity. Prior to September 11th, the Bush administration declared that it would not nation build and that the U.S. military was too involved in peacekeeping operations. The new strategy, to take the fight to the enemy, must shape and respond to the new threats, which is why adopting the concepts of dominance and preventive action is an important policy decision. According to Lawrence J. Korb, of the Council on Foreign Relations, "The United States needs to remain the strongest military power on earth, but it should also utilize an organization of coalitions aimed at solving major international problems and building world order."[1] Major international problems must be solved before they become critical.

Controlling the strategic environment was always important. However, in the new strategic environment it is essential. When the Iraqis invaded Kuwait in 1991, the United Nations (UN) was outraged because, "never before had a state totally occupied a neighbor" in the lifetime of the United Nations.[2] The UN and the United States gave Iraq a 45-day grace period and continued talks. Economic sanctions were suggested as an option, but Iraq had already invaded Kuwait and the world did not have the time to wait for a response to these economic pressures. Had the United States controlled its strategic environment? Its policy toward Iraq was ineffective and placed very little pressure on Iraq to change, while the Iraqi president terrorized his neighbors and the world through weapons proliferation and the atrocities inflicted on his own people. In 2000, Senator John McCain called for a policy of "rogue state rollback."[3] The United States has since invaded Iraq, fought for a just peace, and eliminated the problem of Saddam Hussein.

Promotion of democracy is another essential element to a comprehensive and effective NSS. Though some political thinkers question the utility of democracy in third world countries, this author believes that democracy transcends culture and is the way for future governments to

rule without disenfranchising groups or populations. The idea of promoting democracy must be allowed to increase and develop. If the United States does not support the creation of democracies in the world, its legitimacy in the use of its power diminishes .[4]

The military becomes increasingly important as new threats emerge from terrorism, rogue states, and weapons of mass destruction.[5] The United States military is the only instrument of national power that can respond to these threats in an expedient way. All other elements and influence wielded by the state must be applied during a period of time with unpredictable results. The United States has also learned that, as important as it is to have strategic alliances, these alliances cannot always be relied upon. This was evident in Iraq, where the realities of the new strategic environment led to a U.S. attack on a sovereign nation while U.S. allies, such as Germany and France, opposed such action.

While policies such as deterrence and alliance building still have utility and must be incorporated into a holistic approach to the NSS, the U.S. Dominance and Preventive Action policy is important for the future and should be examined to discover its usefulness.[6] Because the nation has embarked on a new way of securing safety and national interests, alliance capabilities cannot be assured; therefore, the United States must be willing to secure its interests alone if necessary. This idea calls for a strategy of dominance and preemption, allowing the United States to act and create opportunities for its security. New challenges in security operations can be looked upon as opportunities to begin to forge new relationships for peace and stability, but one must not be too optimistic. New opportunities for stable environments can be created, and through strength, aggression can be deterred. Deterrence aims to "prevent others from initiating an action that threatens a particular interest."[7] New preemptive approaches are a definite departure from the idea of containment carried on during the Cold War era.

The U.S. Dominance and Preventive Action policy will be effective in achieving security for the American people and advancing U.S. interests and stability in the world. The use of this policy will employ the power of the military.[8] Terrorism can be fought by preventive and preemptive means and so the use of a dominant and preventive approach will aid stability and advance the United States' interests, such as the rule of law, economic growth, and the development of democracies. Preeminent military power will be the way the United States achieves a comprehensive NSS.

Lawrence J. Korb stated clearly in reference to securing U.S. interests with a dominant and preventive approach, "We should be prepared to do this essentially with U.S. military power alone, unbound by the need for allies or UN approval."[9] He goes on to say that the United

States can protect its security and that of the world in the long run only by maintaining military dominance,[10] a requirement that can only be met by a well-trained, equipped, joint military. The U.S. Army's land forces are an important part of this team.

To be able to fulfill its role, the Army should become an effective part of the joint team and its force structure design should fit into the joint model.[11] To exercise U.S. dominance, the military uses precision strike and new operational concepts utilizing networked, integrated maneuver information. By adapting these concepts, Army will become more agile and lethal in order to fulfill its role as the land power element. Maneuver will require integrated systems throughout the battle space as the new strategic environment will demand ground forces capable of, "ready, deployable, survivable combat maneuver and striking power designed for close, as well as deep dispersal, mobile warfare on land."[12]

PILLARS OF THE NEW PARADIGM FOR A NATIONAL AND MILITARY SECURITY STRATEGY

Legitimacy

In employing any military or international leverage on a sovereign state, a premier strategic consideration is the legitimacy of the intervention. International intervention motivated by legitimate political goals should always be shown to be in our nation's vital interests. Angelo M. Codevilla has captured the essence of this argument when he writes, "We err at our peril if by focusing on the bloody show of totalitarian regimes, we imagine that they were wholly extraneous to the great trends of our time or to what is happening among us."[13] Before any nation commits forces to any conflict, it must be certain of its legitimate base. While considering the employment of military forces in the war on terrorism, peacetime engagement activities, and warfighting, the question of legitimacy must be asked and the answer must relate to the establishment of justifiable national interests.

Integration of Instruments

All the instruments of national power, diplomatic, military, informational, and economic, are used to develop a NSS. The military, to be effective, integrates its capabilities and complements these elements. It also can foster relations with other countries through coalition activities, such as exercises and military-to-military training activities. By deterring aggression as a forward presence in the world, the United States can aid diplomatic efforts. Military analysts are an excellent source for information to use in counterterrorist operations. Creating stable environments around the world through deterrence and peacetime military engagement

activities helps third world countries stabilize their own environment, so that economic progress can continue to develop in those regions.

Standing Organizations

The U.S. Army will help fulfill the role of the military. Army forces today are preeminent in the world and are dominant in land operations, the decisive complement to air and sea operations. Army forces should be focused on a full spectrum of operations. Their focus cannot be on warfighting only, with peacetime military engagement activities considered lesser missions. Army forces that respond to civil authorities at home and abroad help in the international security environment. The Army should transform current organizations, policies, and mobilization-based training and readiness structure to provide those capabilities.

Force structure changes must be made with a joint mindset and with an appreciation of the full spectrum of missions. In the new strategic environment with peacetime military engagement activities increasing, units that will be called upon to conduct peacetime engagement operations should be structured and not formed ad hoc. While American air and naval forces are deployed to a crisis before Army forces, it is necessary that Army units be organized to provide joint force commanders the elements they need. Expeditionary Army forces, particularly brigade combat teams must have the right mix of combat, combat support, combat service support, civil affairs, and special operations capabilities. They must also be trained to operate within a Joint Task Force (JTF) for humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. While in a warfighting role, the brigade combat teams should also be proficient in civil military operations. During the Iraqi war, only infantry and military police units had adequate civil military operations training. After action reports sent to the National Training Center from the Center of Army Lessons Learned indicated armor units during Operation Iraqi Freedom were not trained sufficiently in civil military operations. Depending on the situation, units not trained in joint operations or proficient in civil military operations may not serve the military or NSS well.

TRINITY OF EFFORT

WAR ON TERRORISM

The war on terrorism is unprecedented in the history of the United States. Military power will be an important instrument of the national strategy used against this threat.[14] To fight terrorism the U.S. military will have to be more responsive and more technically capable than ever before in its history. The NSS calls for continued action against terrorist groups, which will significantly expand the role of the U.S. military and the Army. [15] Some believe that the military

will have a limited role in fighting terrorism because of its lethality and the implication of disproportionality in the world community. Yet, September 11th has raised terrorism to the highest priority for policy makers, and they have used the military as a principle instrument in the arsenal of weapons arrayed against this threat.[16] This is evident in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The military has been used in these campaigns and it fulfilled two important roles. First, the military brought the fight to the terrorists responsible for the September 11th attacks. Second, conventional forces were used to invade Iraq, stabilize the country, and set conditions to form a new government for the Iraqi people.

The U.S. Army will have a much-expanded role in deterring terrorist attacks. Precision air strikes can be important in deterring or prosecuting attacks; however, only ground forces can capture an enemy or stabilize a situation and create an opportunity for legitimate authority. Enemies employing asymmetric means can cause massive effects and, in the age of weapons of mass destruction, bring the threat to American soil. The future of warfare will see a more complex environment, with enemies using tactics that may be hard to detect and harder to predict. China, for example, published in 1999 a new concept that "…will cause ordinary people and military men alike to be greatly astonished at the fact that commonplace things that are close to them can also become weapons with which to engage in war."[17] The security of the nation will now depend on the ability of the intelligence community to detect attacks so they may be deterred or defeated.

To fight terrorism effectively, all the elements of national power must be used. The Army will have a large role in this fight and must be able to conduct two types of activities: antiterrorism and counterterrorism.[18] Simply put, antiterrorism is offensive action. The U.S. Army has not done much of this in its past, so appropriate training, organization, and equipment are necessary. To be successful, the Army must be proficient at both antiterrorism and counterterrorism efforts and both should be mutually supportive. The Army can deny terrorists targets by working and coordinating with law enforcement, government agencies and host nations. The major roles for the Army in terrorism will be fighting insurgency and terrorists in host nations. The terrorists' goals and techniques include "bombing, assassinations, kidnappings, threats, mutilation, murder, torture, and blackmail."[19] All these are used to coerce, provoke, and intimidate. The Army must be able to rapidly attack base camps of insurgents. From these base camps, terrorists can launch attacks in many places. If these camps become sanctuaries, they can plan attacks using unconventional means in any place, even the United States. The Army must be able to attack base camps with surgical accuracy and lightning speed. To do this, it must have the full capabilities of Stryker technology. These capabilities-

based formations can be used in fighting insurgents. For the fight against insurgents, designing a taskforce package to deploy and win is not as hard as it appears. Deploying the right force structure must include all the necessary capabilities. The modularity concept that General Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army, is proposing will be the tool used to design structures with the necessary capabilities - the right force with the right training in sufficient numbers to meet the future threat.[20]

Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) will be active in counterterrorist missions, to include stability and support operations.[21] These forces will become increasingly important. ARSOF units will also be used to train indigenous forces to counteract terrorist activities. These missions will take major resources and tax the perstempo of these highly specialized units.

PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT ACTIVITIES

Military peacetime engagement activities have been an effective tool in securing stability in troubled world regions. As Clausewitz has asserted in his writings on the use of armed conflict, war is an extension of politics.[22] Clausewitz explains, "War, therefore, is an act of policy."[23] This was the case in Kosovo, where ethnic cleansing endangered the stability of an entire region. NATO was very reluctant at first to commit to any military action; however, its non-military intervention was ineffective. The Kosovo campaign was effective and stabilized a situation that had great potential to escalate. The United States and the international community must be willing to take this type of action in the future.

The example of Kosovo can serve to illustrate the effectiveness of military action, and subsequent stability operations. The efforts of the international community and the United States were not able to resolve the conflict between Yugoslav security forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army.[24] This conflict had great potential to escalate, so the international community felt compelled to prevent further disruption of the stability of the region. Many organizations sought to resolve the crisis, such as the UN, the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia, NATO, the Contact Group on Bosnia-Herzogovina, the European Union, and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.[25] Yet without military action, their efforts failed.

WARFIGHTING

To meet new threats in terrorism and respond appropriately to peacetime engagement activities, and warfighting, the Army must rely on new forms and approaches. Training, equipment, and doctrine, with a maximum use of technology, will be required. For the strategy of the United States to be successful, it must use all these elements. For its warfighting part, it

must be able to be all the things it has to be for the war on terror – responsive, agile, and lethal. It must also be decisive in conventional warfight. The way the force structure should be altered must not diminish its capabilities for a large force on force fight. The new force structure will be designed to produce warfighting equipment, systems, and structure that will be effective in a variety of strategic settings, from the Middle East to Asia.

Before September 11, 2001, the U.S. military was designed to be able to fight in two major theaters of war concurrently. [26] This new security environment requires the ability to conduct both major theater of war and contingency operations with the same intensity and force structure. Dr. Metz of the Strategic Studies Institute writes, "Robust and versatile American landpower will be essential in the emerging security environment."[27] In an environment as described by Metz, i.e., protracted, complex, ambiguous, and asymmetric, the Army and military must have the ability to sustain and initiate rapid and flexible response. To do this, according to Metz, the Army must provide "versatility of landpower" and new force structure must be provided for the Army of the future.[28]

The Army's warfighting skill will be an integral part of the future force's capabilities to secure strategic goals in support of the NSS. The size of the Army's ground forces must be large enough to deter and defeat any potential threat that has a large standing force. Much of the research and writing done today discusses change and would lead some to believe that any force on force style of fighting is irrelevant. Yet, there are still large standing armies and militaries that have conventional capacities, such as China, Iran, and North Korea. Numbers do count, as in the case of the Kursk Campaign during World War II in which an effective German force with superior technology and tactical mobility was defeated by the larger Russian force. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, land forces with the joint team used conventional forces and methods to secure ground and take Baghdad setting the stage for regime change. The fact that warfighting will play a major role among this trinity of threats cannot be emphasized enough.

IMPLEMENTING THE BALANCED FORCE STRATEGY

What will the military be able to bring to future national security challenges? The military must have a Balanced Force Strategy that meets the strategic mandate established by the NSS, Defense Planning Guidance, Quadrennial Defense Review, and Transformation Planning Guidance. All this must be coordinated in a balanced approach by the military. The military's missions must be detailed in three critical areas: the war on terrorism, peacetime engagement activities, and warfighting. All force structure, doctrine, training, and equipment must match missions in these areas. At the present time, units are not structured or trained for peacetime

engagement activities as a recurring mission. Only when a unit is to be deployed for peacekeeping missions are they given a tailored Mission Rehearsal Exercise. This is also true of other peacetime engagement activities such as stability operations, i.e., humanitarian and civic assistance, security assistance, and foreign internal defense. Equally important are support operations such as building coalitions and alliances, and conducting Domestic Support Operations. In the new strategic environment, these tasks are as important as warfighting.[29] Units need to be trained, equipped, and prepared to meet those missions. Policy and funding must support a Balanced Force Strategy to meet this broad spectrum of operations anticipated.

PLANNED TRANSFORMATION

Revolutions in military affairs manifest themselves in reorganization as well as technology. Professionals win wars when they define and keep their eyes on the end state. This was the great lesson of Vietnam. The Vietnam War was an example of the Army building expectations on superior technology and using ad-hoc strategy to win a war.[30] Any Vietnam veteran would place the soldier and the organization at the forefront of any military strategy.

Better capabilities are needed now and it is clear that in the new strategic environment, opportunities for their exploitation abound. The kind of learning environment that awards top down thinkers who respect bottom-up approaches must be created. As Peter Drucker puts it, "The last of the deadly sins is feeding problems and starving opportunities."[31] The opportunities we will have in the future are immense, however, boldness is needed to grab hold of the future. During Vietnam special operations units and conventional units resented one another for the very things that make them great - flexibility and conventional methods. As a result, "The two types of forces were never welded into a coherent whole, nor was a coherent strategy developed for dealing with the full spectrum of warfare."[32]

Just when the Army has had the largest success, it must prepare to change because the environment will change because of that success. Existing strength must be increased while new capabilities are added. Drucker's question in *Managing in a Time of Great Change* fits the Army. What gives the organization its competitive edge? This question should be asked repeatedly. The answer shows both what the Army can do and what it should do: matching the Army's strength to the changes that have already taken place produces, in effect, a plan of action. It enables the Army to turn the unexpected into advantage.[33] Uncertainty ceases to be a threat and becomes an opportunity. In essence this is the meaning of transformation. The Balanced Force Strategy addresses a wide spectrum of missions to meet the challenges of the new strategic environment and treats the three critical areas, the war on terrorism, peacetime

engagement activities, and warfighting, in balance as the army develops the required training, equipment, organization, and doctrine.

If the Army does not take a Balanced Force Strategy approach to its future, it may not suffer from neglect but would miss the opportunities of the future - opportunities to be an integral part of the nation's grand strategy. In peacetime engagement activities alone, military missions can help all the instruments of statecraft influence the new strategic environment. These missions include show of force, arms control, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, noncombatant evacuations, humanitarian and civic assistance, security assistance, support to counter drug operations, foreign internal defense, support to insurgencies and support operations that includes building coalitions/alliances. The number of mission sets is impressive and critically important. The units called upon to do these missions must be trained, equipped, and structured to conduct these critical missions. The Army cannot afford come-as-you-are peacetime engagement missions. They are too important and too sensitive. In some cases, the Army is the only organization that can create an opportunity for regime change or regional stability. Also, the Army can be the tool to help failed countries and rogue states find their way by securing agents of the international community in their efforts to develop economic, social and democratic institutions that offer people the freedom to live and govern themselves. The Army must become a fine-tuned instrument, willing and able to do many things, from conventional warfighting to humanitarian assistance.[34]

ORGANIZING THE ARMY TO SUPPORT BALANCED FORCE STRATEGY

This paper has asserted the need for a Balanced Force Strategy as a result of assessing each critical element of the National Strategy, the war on terrorism, peacetime engagement activities, and warfighting. Subsequent paragraphs will discuss endstrength and capabilities policy recommendations as they relate to each. They will also address the importance of threat-based analysis as it should influence capabilities initiatives.

Endstrength is not a means unto itself. However, it is an important element in determining Army readiness and capabilities. This paper does not attempt to conduct a force programs exercise, but rather makes recommendations for endstrength as it relates to capability for the National Security Goals. As the Department of Defense (DOD) looks at Army capabilities and endstrength for the future, its effort must be accurate. The DOD must get it close to being right, despite the uncertainty of the future. Adjustment will be made and, if the decision makers and planners keep their ears to the ground, the United States can be ready.

Army transformation, to meet the needs of the future, should build a bridge between requirements and capabilities. Strategy, structure, mobility, and technology create a lethal landforce. The organization of such a force should be made up of some basic capabilities-based structures, such as Light Reconnaissance Strike Groups and Combat Maneuver Groups. Each structure will have a combination of the following elements: reconnaissance, combined arms battalion, Stryker battalions, C4I battalion and support battalion. These elements can be modified to meet the mission; however, training and sustainment considerations should be standardized to insure responsiveness and success. The new security environment will require maneuver forces with powerful strike assets. This will be a fundamental goal of Army transformation.[35]

In order to meet the worldwide strategic environment that has a great potential to create grassroots terrorist organizations that can overthrow countries and influence the use of weapons of mass destruction, the Army must be able to move quickly and deploy effectively. To deploy effectively, it must have the right structure. To be prepared to fight on two simultaneous fronts and still be able to fight insurgencies that may arise, the endstrength must be increased. The endstrength of ARSOF units, in particular, must be increased to meet contingencies to fight terrorism in small pockets and where smaller operations are needed. Also, the Civil Affairs (CA) units that will support ARSOF and are structured for counter-insurgency efforts in host nations must be increased. CA units are mostly in the Reserves, where they can remain, however, it is clear that a contingent of Active-Component personnel should be placed in these units for readiness and command and control when mobilized.

Significant force structure changes and training are required for the Army's CA battalions to be equipped and manned to conduct "nation-building". These CA units must be able to facilitate the establishment of government, police, judicial, and financial activities. One possible solution is the addition of one brigade to the endstrength of the Army. A multi-component brigade headquarters with Active-Component and Reserve-Component Active Guard Reserve full-time support and Troop Program Unit soldiers should make up the headquarters. This headquarters would assist combatant commanders with much needed support for all their contingencies. All of these contingencies are extremely important to the NSS. Without an effective CA team, one that can take the lead on infrastructure and civil issues before they can be handed off to the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State Department, winning the peace can be jeopardized.

CA units should have expertise in all the areas associated with peacetime engagement activities as well as "nation building." CA teams also become a vital link between the following:

tactical human intelligence teams, tactical psychological operations teams, and translators, as they interact between the local populace and coalition forces. If all these elements are effective and work together, they can be the key to success for commanders, assisting them in the formation of local governments, entering into negotiations, and dealing with indigenous people and their community leaders.

The role of Special Operations units in the new strategic environment must be expanded. In parts of the world, particularly in Afghanistan, ARSOF soldiers and their civilian advocates have argued that the Pentagon's counterterrorism policy is not flexible enough when employing ARSOF. The ARSOF units within the Army will be the global war on terrorism's greatest military tool. There is no ground force more rapid or accurate in a response, and combatants in the new war on terrorism must be responsive and preemptive. Special Forces must be trained and better equipped to coordinate with interagencies and the top levels of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This is critical to more timely and accurate responses. Hours can make a large difference in counterterrorist activities and accurate intelligence and the quality of decision-making is critical. Bad decisions may have reverberations on a global scale. Delta Force units may not always be available in sufficient numbers for contingencies and counterterrorism. They cannot be located globally in adequate numbers.[36] Because the United States relied too much on Delta in Afghanistan, high value targets were missed. The numbers of ARSOF units out-numbers Delta and the global response time will make a difference.

Special Forces units have the kinds of skills to be the best at counterterrorism. Their teams have linguists and regional expertise. They are extremely culturally sensitive and have experience in the countries on which they focus training. While Delta does not have comparable cultural depth of training or experience, Special Forces can go into these areas better prepared and be more effective. The legal questions and details of employment must be worked out. Top officials have stated that, after the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, the 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies in East Africa, and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Yemen, special mission units were never sent to capture or respond to these terrorists. The response to terrorist attacks and counterterrorist activities by special mission units will be imperative in the new strategic environment and the United States Army must provide this capability.

TRAINING THE ARMY TO SUPPORT THE BALANCED FORCE STRATEGY

Army forces will encounter many challenges in meeting the commitments of national security. The Quadrennial Defense Review Report states that, "The new force-sizing construct

specifically shapes forces to: defend the United States; deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions; swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving for the President the option to call for a decisive victory in one of those conflicts – including the possibility of regime change or occupation; and conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations."[37] To be fully trained to meet all these missions, Army doctrine and training must develop new mission training plans for units. Since September 11th, the Army has new requirements, so to train for a Balanced Force Strategy units must train in missions relating to the war on terrorism, peacetime engagement activities, and warfighting, throughout the training year. Those mission sets should be listed on the unit's Mission Essential Task List (METL). All Combat Training Centers should include additional training to meet the full spectrum of operational missions as appropriate. Home station training should include training on the newly established METL tasks. Infantry and armor forces should receive regional, cultural and operational training as deployment is scheduled. Brigade combat team staffs must be trained to become part of a standing JTF to work a variety of peacetime engagement activities. Training should include operations that may be needed in the future. Mission deployments must not have only a one-time training event, i.e., Mission Rehearsal Exercise, associated with them.

Training in the Army today for post war operations is minimal. The most striking example of the lack of a Balanced Force Strategy is the many challenges soldiers face in post-war Iraq today. The end state of any campaign would be in jeopardy if phase IV of the operation, stability operations, is mishandled. The Defense Department has undertaken the responsibility for many phase IV tasks for which units are not trained, while government agencies like USAID are the civil relations and infrastructure-rebuilding experts. National Security Policy Decision 24 made the DOD the lead agency for post-war planning and execution. If only CA units can perform these tasks with any effectiveness, their numbers are too small and their training is not comprehensive enough for the complexities of phase IV postwar stability and support operations. Some make a very convincing argument that post-war planning for Iraq was ill conceived. The United States Army Transformation Road Map states that, "within the operations environment, Army forces must be designed, organized, and trained for responsive and successful execution of Joint Operation Centers (JOCs), and rapid transition between the mission sets, tasks and conditions inherent in the JOCs."[38] Rapid transition between mission sets must include tasks in phase III, combat operations, and phase IV, stability and support operations.[39]

The Army must develop training methods that support a Balanced Force Strategy. This means that the Army must train units in peacetime engagement operations, as well as operations for the war on terrorism and warfighting. The Transformation Road Map for 2003, signed by General Schoomaker, does not address training peacetime engagement operations during the normal training cycle. The Road Map states that one goal is to develop individuals and organizations that improvise and adapt to emerging crises and rapidly incorporate operational experiences and lessons learned. There is no mention of expanding mission sets to meet the new challenges of the new strategic environment. Peacetime engagement operations and counterterrorist operations mission sets are not being developed in mission training plans (MTPs). If the combatant commanders will send Rangers into a counterinsurgency operation like Somalia as a part of the global war on terrorism, these soldiers must have training in all the aspects of that kind of activity. The Army cannot expect that units can be the chief agents on the ground for massive interventions in a failed state – even one for humanitarian purposes without specific training. In Somalia, eighteen Rangers lost their lives when strategic leaders sent them into a situation for which these soldiers were neither trained nor equipped. The Somalia intervention failed because the initiative by President Bush to feed Somalis in December 1992 was changed by a second UN Operation in May 1993 to "nation-building". The roles and missions were not clear. Army units were not trained in the specific elements of types of humanitarian assistance missions and this led to disaster.[40]

Operational success depends directly on unit training. Mission execution is more difficult and takes on more risk without trained and well-organized units and staffs. Peacetime engagement activities are joint and combined environments and the "stand-up" JTF in Somalia is an example of the pitfalls units face when ordered to conduct missions for which they are not adequately trained. The Army's 10th Mountain Division began its operation in Somalia without the benefit of a peacekeeping doctrine.[41] Current joint doctrine provides guidance that aids our units to work as an effective joint team. However, the type of units that will be called upon to conduct peacekeeping do not have well-developed MTPs.

The Army can become a more sophisticated tool for executing increasingly complex missions to support the NSS; however, this can only be done through development of doctrine, training, force structure, and equipment. An example of this kind of sophistication can be found in an investigation of the operations in Somalia. The 10th Mountain Division's standing up a JTF in Somalia provides a look at how the Army was not adequately prepared. The 10th Mountain Division's light infantry unit sent to Somalia did not have the staff structure or the experience needed to conduct joint operations. Communication equipment to conduct joint operations was

also missing. Less than two weeks was available to prepare after the deployment order was given. In the publication *Somalia Operations, Lessons Learned*, Kenneth Allard states, "The initial difficulties in manning this headquarters were never entirely overcome, with the result that key functions – long-range supporting fires, combat engineers, and air operations – were either missing or not available 24 hours a day. The JTF had to improvise a Joint Operations Center using existing equipment and personnel, many of whom had no real expertise in some of the areas for which they were now responsible: joint and combined ground operations, fire support, air operations, training, and intelligence."[42] The Army must become, through its doctrine, training, equipment, and force structure, a ground force capable of becoming a part of a joint team that will go to the fight quickly. The sophistication that must be placed into our capabilities must include joint training in peacetime engagement activities and civil military operations. Senior Army leaders called upon to deploy for these kinds of missions must be familiar with new interagency policies and procedures.

Army doctrine and training should be integrated to a large degree with joint commands as new command and control structures are designed to meet strategic and operational expeditionary warfare requirements. All peacetime military engagement activities will be trained at the joint operational level. Units conducting these peacetime engagement operations should be trained on missions throughout the training year, not merely with MREs.[43] This would give the Army the kind of sophistication it must have to meet the requirements of the current and future strategic environments. This sophistication will give the Army the ability to conduct a full spectrum of missions.

CONCLUSION

The Army must be evolving and transforming. This means maintaining equipment and operational methods that are still relevant while moving ahead with technologies that will meet future requirements.[44] Technology, tactics, and organization will be directed to the future strategic challenges. The Army must develop doctrine, training, force structure, and equipment, supported by technologies to produce a Balanced Force Strategy, able to meet missions across the full spectrum. This will support any effective NSS.

If the Army fails to evolve and even transform itself, the danger will not come from neglect. The strategic environment is ever changing. To keep up with the new environment and new threats, combat units must become modules of a joint force. The module force will be called upon to conduct rapid decisive operations for the warfight.[45] It will be necessary to determine how land forces must be designed, organized, and postured for expeditionary warfare. A word

of caution – planners for future operations must not be too conservative in determining or preparing for future threats. Capabilities, force structure, and a trained and ready force will be critical in the uncertain future strategic environment, even though the United States is the preeminent power in the world today. New capabilities in war will depend on the Army's ability to respond quickly across the full spectrum of military missions.

The new, sophisticated Army that employs a Balanced Force Strategy will achieve military security objectives. An Army proficient in peacetime engagement activities will help stabilize regions so democracies and economies can be developed in third world countries. This alone will enhance the United States' security goals around the globe. Increased Special Forces units will become a more effective weapon against terrorism, a top national security priority. A more highly trained joint focused Army will become a more efficient warfighter and its capabilities will help topple regimes that are a threat. The Army warfighting element must be more proficient in regime change and phase IV operations, a current security imperative. The new focus for the Army must be placed on the Balanced Force Strategy because it enhances the accomplishment of national security goals.

WORD COUNT= 6839

ENDNOTES

[1] Lawrence J. Korb, *A New National Security Strategy: In An Age of Terrorists, Tyrants, and Weapons of Mass Destruction* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003), 3.

[2] Douglas Menarchik, *Powerlift – Getting to Desert Storm: Strategic Transportation and Strategy in the New World Order* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1993), 157.

[3] Lawrence F. Kaplan and William Kristol, *The War Over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003), 63.

[4] Douglas Menarchik, *Powerlift – Getting to Desert Storm: Strategic Transportation and Strategy in the New World Order* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1993), 157.

[5] Lawrence J. Korb, *A New National Security Strategy: In An Age of Terrorists, Tyrants, and Weapons of Mass Destruction* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003), 2.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., and Lawrence J. Korb, *American National Security: Policy and Process* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 29.

[8] Ibid., 6.

[9] Ibid., 5.

[10] Ibid., 6.

[11] Douglas A. Macgregor, *Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003), 81.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Angelo M. Codevilla, *The Character of Nations: How Politics Makes and Breaks Prosperity, Family, and Civility* (New York: BasicBooks, 1997), 5.

[14] George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 1.

[15] Ibid., 2.

[16] Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 97.

[17] Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America* (Panama City, Panama: Pan American Publishing Company, 2002), 17.

[18] James J. Gallagher, *Low-Intensity Conflict: A Guide for Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1992), 92.

[19] Ibid., 35.

[20] Douglas A. Macgregor, *Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003), 144-5.

[21] Lynn E. Davis and Jeremy Shapiro, eds., *The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 34; available from <http://www.rand.org/ publications/MR/MR1657/>; Internet; accessed 10 December 2003.

[22] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Florian Bieber and Zidas Daskalovski, eds., *Understanding the War in Kosovo* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 80.

[25] Ibid., 79.

[26] Michele A. Flournoy, "Re-evaluating the 2 Major Theater War Strategy," 20 June 2001; available from http://www.csis.org/hill/ts010620flournoy.htm; Internet; accessed 15 December 2003.

[27] Steven Metz and Raymond A. Millen, "Future War/Future Battlespace: The Strategic Role of American Landpower" (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2003), 9-76.

[28] Peter A. Wilson, John Gordon IV, and David E. Johnson, "An Alternative Future Force: Building a Better Army," *Parameters* Vol. XXXIII, No. 4 (Winter 2003-04): 22.

[29] Huba Wass de Czege and Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Toward a Strategy of Positive Ends* (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 16.

[30] Douglas A. Macgregor, *Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003), xv.

[31] Peter F. Drucker, *Managing in a Time of Great Change* (New York: Truman Talley Books, 1995), 49.

[32] Douglas A. Macgregor, *Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003), xv.

[33] Peter F. Drucker, *Managing in a Time of Great Change* (New York: Truman Talley Books, 1995), 43.

[34] Huba Wass de Czege and Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Toward a Strategy of Positive Ends* (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 15.

[35] Douglas A. Macgregor, *Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003), 147.

[36] Wesley K. Clark, "Ready for What?" *Washington Post*, 8 September 2000, sec. A, p. 33.

[37] *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 30 September 2001), 17.

[38] Department of the Army, *United States Army Transformation Roadmap 2003* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army), xii.

[39] The Clinton Doctrine had attempted to give the United States a balanced Shape-Respond-Prepare approach to the full spectrum of operations. Meeting the challenge of the full spectrum of operations is a balanced approach. The Army, during the Clinton administration, did not achieve its full spectrum objectives. The Army can help fulfill the hope of a balanced approach to a National Security Strategy by giving it a balanced military strategy. The Army can assist in improving the National Security Strategy's objectives by developing a Balanced Force Strategy. Jointness will also become more important and this will make the Army more effective. The Army, however, focused only on transitioning to the Objective Force limited itself to moving the force quickly and improvements in urban warfare. Transforming the force will rely on more than moving the force to a conflict faster. True transformation will design and build doctrines, training methods, force structures, equipment, and technologies to meet current and future challenges in the strategic environment.

[40] Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention," *Foreign Affairs* (Mar/Apr 1996): 73.

[41] Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 6.

[42] Ibid., 62-3.

[43] Douglas A. Macgregor, *Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003), 4.

[44] Douglas A. Macgregor, *Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003), 8.

[45] Ibid., 7.

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