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1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 2 June 1995	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis, 2 Aug 94 - 2 Jun 95	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Humanitarian Assistance Operations: A Command and Control Dilemma			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Major John M. Metz, U.S. Army				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			<div style="border: 2px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;"> <p style="margin: 0;">DTIC</p> <p style="margin: 0; font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">S E L E C T E D</p> <p style="margin: 0;">OCT 1 1995</p> <p style="margin: 0; font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">F</p> </div>	
10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER				
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) This study examines the command and control issue that joint forces encounter during United Nations sponsored humanitarian assistance operations. By analyzing current doctrine for forming and operating joint task forces, the thesis offers insight into the organizational problems faced by joint planners and commanders. An investigation of current command and control theory illustrates the dilemma of building an organization that contains military structure while at the same time is flexible enough to adapt to its environmental changes. This environment, which includes a variety of governmental and non-governmental organizations, is shown as the critical element that the commander must consider when designing his force structure. The case studies of Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE illustrate joint and combined humanitarian assistance operations. The study concludes that disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations force commanders into environments which require adjustments to traditional methods of command and control. The commander must develop an early understanding of what the military organization must accomplish and then structure it accordingly.				
DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 5				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Humanitarian Assistance Operations, Command & Control, PROVIDE COMFORT, SUPPORT HOPE			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 112	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Unlimited	

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HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS:
A COMMAND AND CONTROL DILEMMA

A thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

JOHN M. METZ, MAJ, USA
B.A., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and University,
Blacksburg, Virginia, 1982

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

1995

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
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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major John M. Metz

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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS: A COMMAND AND CONTROL DILEMMA by MAJ
John M. Metz, USA, 102 pages.

This study examines the command and control issues that joint forces encounter during United Nations sponsored humanitarian assistance operations. By analyzing current doctrine for forming and operating joint task forces, the thesis offers insight into the organizational problems faced by joint planners and commanders.

An investigation of current command and control theory illustrates the dilemma of building an organization that contains military structure while at the same time is flexible enough to adapt to its environmental changes. This environment, which includes a variety of governmental and non-governmental organizations, is shown as the critical element that the commander must consider when designing his force structure. The case studies of Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE illustrate joint and combined humanitarian assistance operations.

The study concludes that disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations force commanders into environments which require adjustments to traditional methods of command and control. The commander must develop an early understanding of what the military organization must accomplish and then structure it accordingly.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A study of this magnitude resulted from the efforts of many dedicated professionals. Without the support of my thesis committee, which was comprised of Mr. John Hunt, Mr. Donald Vought, and LtCol Murray Swan, I could not have possibly completed this task. With their direction, I honed my analysis and literary skills.

The officers and non-commissioned officers of the Center for Army Lessons Learned provided were another group that supported my research. Special mention goes to Captain Bill Huggins who allowed me access to all his Operation SUPPORT HOPE files and archives.

Lieutenant Colonel Stan Moore, as my academic advisor and mentor, motivated me to attempt this endeavor. In addition, his experiences and archives relating to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT provided an indepth view of command and control at the strategic and operational levels.

To my beloved wife Jan and son Glenn, who made many personal sacrifices and supported and helped me immeasurably during the preparation of this thesis, and to my friends, who added their encouragement. I am thankful and indebted to them all.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<u>AOR</u>	<u>Area of Responsibility</u>
<u>C²</u>	<u>Command and Control</u>
<u>CA</u>	<u>Civil Affairs</u>
<u>CINC</u>	<u>Commander in Chief</u>
<u>CJCS</u>	<u>Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff</u>
<u>CMOC</u>	<u>Civil Military Operations Center</u>
<u>CONUS</u>	<u>Continental United States</u>
<u>CSAR</u>	<u>Combat Search and Rescue</u>
<u>CORDS</u>	<u>Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support</u>
<u>CTF</u>	<u>Combined Task Force</u>
<u>DART</u>	<u>Disaster Assistance Response Team</u>
<u>DJTF</u>	<u>Deployable Joint Task Force</u>
<u>GVN</u>	<u>Government of Viet Nam</u>
<u>HACC</u>	<u>Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center</u>
<u>HAO</u>	<u>Humanitarian Assistance Operations</u>
<u>JTF</u>	<u>Joint Task Force</u>
<u>MACV</u>	<u>Military Assistance Command Viet Nam</u>
<u>MEF</u>	<u>Marine Expeditionary Force</u>
<u>NATO</u>	<u>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</u>
<u>NGO</u>	<u>Non-Governmental Organization</u>
<u>OFDA</u>	<u>Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance</u>

<u>OSOCC</u>	<u>On-Site Operations Coordination Center</u>
<u>POLAD</u>	<u>Political Advisor</u>
<u>SETAF</u>	<u>Southern European Task Force</u>
<u>UCP</u>	<u>Unified Command Plan</u>
<u>UN</u>	<u>United Nations</u>
<u>UNAMIR</u>	<u>United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda</u>
<u>UNDHA</u>	<u>United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs</u>
<u>UNDP</u>	<u>United Nations Development Program</u>
<u>UNFAO</u>	<u>United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization</u>
<u>UNHCR</u>	<u>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</u>
<u>UNICEF</u>	<u>United Nations Children's Fund</u>
<u>USAID</u>	<u>United States Agency for International Development</u>
<u>WFP</u>	<u>World Food Program</u>

INDEX OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

Summarized below are the U.S. military operations discussed throughout the thesis.

1. Operation URGENT FURY. Operation URGENT FURY occurred in October 1983. The mission was to rescue U.S. nationals on the island of Grenada. A joint task force deployed consisting of Navy, Army, Marine, Air Force, and Special Operations components.

2. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT occurred from April 1991 to the present. The initial mission was to provide humanitarian support for Kurdish refugees in the mountains between Iraq and Turkey. A combined task force was established which consisted of U.S. and international military forces.

3. Operation RESTORE HOPE. Operation RESTORE HOPE occurred between December 1992 and May 1993. The mission was for U.S. forces to support joint and combined efforts to provide security and humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia. The joint task force primarily consisted of elements of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry).

4. Operation SUPPORT HOPE. Operation SUPPORT HOPE occurred between July and August 1994. The mission was for U.S. forces to support the U.N. and NGOs refugee relief efforts in Rwanda and Zaire. A joint task force deployed from U.S. Army Europe Command consisting of Army, Air Force, Special Operations, Logistics, and Civil Affairs components.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

One of the greatest challenges confronting the international community at the end of the twentieth century is increasing the capacity of the United Nations system to mount and sustain effective multilateral responses to the many global problems that threaten peace, security, and human well-being . . . consensus is the most critical element for sustaining multilateral action.

Roger A. Coate, Increasing the Effectiveness of the UN System

This study analyzes command and control (C²) methodology as it relates to U.S. military forces supporting United Nations sponsored humanitarian assistance operations (HAOs). The joint task force (JTF) is the vehicle used to examine past, present, and future U.S. military C² structures. The information is presented in four major categories. First, a historical perspective is given to establish a foundation for understanding military experiences with HAOs and the doctrinal lessons drawn from that experience. Command and control theory is the second category. This is where current ideas concerning organizational environment, structure, and participants is related to HAOs. The third category looks at the various agencies who participating in HAOs and the interagency coordination requirements. Finally, case studies of Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE provide a transition from theory to practice. The case studies illustrate the challenges facing the joint forces commander as he attempts to wrestle with the issues of

organizational development, interagency coordination, and end state achievement. From the information received from these categories, I provide conclusions and make recommendations for organizational and training initiatives that can assist commanders at all levels as they address HAO command and control issues.

Historical Perspective

Interagency coordination and unity of effort are the common threads throughout military support for foreign HAOs. The parochialism that often characterizes today's interagency operations are traced back to the United States involvement in Viet Nam. In Viet Nam, the "new model" pacification program of 1967-1971 was known as the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support or "CORDS." CORDS was the first major effort to centrally *command and control* both military and civilian pacification efforts.¹

The U.S. Government's aim during the Vietnamese pacification effort was to draw public support away from the Viet Cong and other North Vietnamese sympathizers.² Initially, civil-military coordination efforts operated without an established centralized management structure to provide a common operational focus.³ The U.S. and Government of Viet Nam (GVN) militaries discounted the pacification program as "civilian business." Their role, as they saw it, was to fight the "main force" war. President Johnson provided the solution when he directed Military Assistance Command, Viet Nam (MACV) to coordinate all civil and military

pacification operations.⁴ This civilian led pacification effort resulted in the successful coordination of both the U.S.- GVN military and governmental agencies.

U.S. military support to international HAOs increased during the period between the end of the Vietnam War and the Soviet Union's dissolution.⁵ This resulted in Congress passing the 1985 Stevens Authority act which officially mandated U.S. armed forces support for HAOs.⁶ In addition, tensions between the United States and Soviet Union continued to dictate U.S. foreign policy. Ambassadors requested troop deployments to support theater humanitarian needs as a means of maintaining a forward presence against the spread of communism.⁷ Unfortunately, the United States response was not always properly coordinated. In some cases, relief efforts had little or no effect on the disaster victim.

United States 1976 involvement in Guatemala illustrates the problems donor governments experience when supporting humanitarian relief causes. The U.S. military supported an Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) request by deploying fifteen tons of medical supplies and a U.S. Army field hospital.⁸ The OFDA failed to fully coordinate the support requirements with the host nation and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The result was a massive influx of medical supplies and low cost foods that undermined NGO efforts to stabilize the Guatemalan economy and support structure.⁹

The Cold War's end established the conditions for greater cooperation within the international community. Nations could now address issues of refugee control, famine, and disaster support without

the overshadowing affect of the U.S./U.S.S.R. political brinkmanship. The U.S. military was affected by these changes in global dynamics in terms of mission requirements and internal organization. Today, the U.S. Department of Defense is viewed as a means for responding to the disasters that are overwhelming the international relief community. This, coupled with our emphasis on "jointness," created a situation where the regional commanders in chief (CINC) now possessed the resources and authority necessary to support governmental agencies and NGOs.¹⁰

Another result of the warming of East-West relations was the emergence of the United Nations' role in coordinating international response to humanitarian crises.¹¹ Nations now use the United Nations forum to collectively address the issues of disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. Even though a stronger voice for action now existed, the organizational systems within the U.N. responsible for coordinating large international operations were incapable of meeting member expectations. The current problem facing the United Nations, donor nations and NGOs alike is that, "they are all permanently 'behind the wave' struggling to deal with multiple crises"¹²

Donor nations are attempting to expand the U.N. and NGO capabilities by developing support systems that enable all parties involved in HAOs to efficiently mass their efforts. Today, the United States' government is seen by many in the international community as the only nation "capable of providing the financial, organizational, and material support for rapidly expanding humanitarian support requirements."¹³ Whether this statement is true or not, the President

of the United States did pledge his support to the United Nations and directed U.S. government agencies to assist in the formation of U.N. peace operations headquarters and planning staff within the United Nations.¹⁴ Ultimately, the United States' Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Defense (DOD) will shoulder much of the responsibility for executing this support.

The current systems for interagency coordination highlight the command and control challenges faced by military planners. Both civilian and military organizations are analyzing the U.S. military's role in HAOs.¹⁵ The problem faced is how to standardize the system for U.S. military support. To do this, planners must search for the best combination of forces, equipment, and C² systems. Recent HAOs in northern Iraq and Rwanda show the JTF as one means of solving this problem.

The Research Question and Problem Statement

The purpose of this study is to answer the question: "does today's joint task force command and control architecture effectively support interagency coordination requirements during United Nations sponsored humanitarian assistance operations?"

The U.S. armed forces' organization, doctrine, and missions are evolving to meet post-Cold War challenges. The emphasis on joint operations is one example of this evolution. The transfer of power to the regional commanders in chief brings with it the responsibility to identify training, manpower, and equipment requirements. CINCs are now,

more than ever before, responsible for military and civil-military operations within their areas of responsibility.

The regional CINCs recognize that they may be asked to support United Nations-sponsored HAOs within their area of responsibility. The U.S. military organization most often deployed in response to HAO crises is a joint task force. The joint task force (JTF) differs from other military organizations in that it is an "ad hoc" organization that is limited by its mission. The problems encountered by most JTFs revolve around the components of people, equipment, and training. The time required to properly train people from various organizations on new equipment and operating procedures is often beyond the JTF commander's capabilities. This becomes a significant problem in short-notice crisis situations. The lack of interagency training among joint military planners often results in a delayed U.S. military response and coordination problems with governmental and civilian agencies already operating in theater.¹⁶

In today's environment of decreasing resources, the CINC is bombarded with missions that his subordinates may not necessarily be able to execute. To better prepare himself and his organization, the commander must understand both the military and civilian factors influencing operations within his region of the world. Planners must account for these factors when examining the environments where JTFs will deploy and operate. The joint task force commander's ability to deploy and execute HAOs in concert with governmental agencies and NGOs is the true test of the command and control system's effectiveness.

Research Methodology

The methodology combines historical analysis, content analysis, and case studies. Chapter one provides the thesis' historical analysis and background information. Chapter two is a comparison of command and control theory as it relates to HAOs. The organization's environment is analyzed to determine the structural configuration that best promotes unity of effort between the U.S. military and host of other governmental and non-governmental organizations supporting HAOs.

Once a basic understanding of command and control is established, an analysis is conducted of the major players involved in HAOs. The analysis of U.N., its associated relief organizations, and NGOs helps to illuminate the existing international disaster relief systems. An understanding of each player's role helps define the scope of the effort required in interagency coordination.

The military response to HAOs is viewed in terms of the political-military command and control requirements. The case studies of operations in Northern Iraq and Rwanda demonstrate key JTF related command, control and coordination issues. During the case study analysis, I will attempt to answer several basic questions:

1. Does the current U.N. structure support the civil-military coordination requirements for a U.S. military supported HAO?
2. How do U.S. governmental agencies support the JTF commander in his endeavor to coordinate with the U.N. and NGOs?
3. What is the CINC's role in supporting the JTF commander's coordination requirements?

4. What is the current state of interagency coordination between the military and civil organizations?

The analysis focuses on each question, centering on the necessary command and control links between the United States military forces, the United Nations, and NGOs.

Key Terminology

Four terms requiring introduction and definition are humanitarian assistance, command and control, joint task force, and non-governmental organizations.

HAOs are defined by Joint Publication 1-02 as;

Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to support or complement host nation civil authorities or agencies.¹⁷

Joint Publication 6-0 defines command and control as the process that commanders (including supporting organizations) use to plan, direct, coordinate, and control forces to ensure mission accomplishment.¹⁸ The command and control principles do not neatly apply to humanitarian assistance. Consensus-building and unity of effort, not command and control, are key to interagency coordination with the United Nations and NGOs.

In LTG Schroeder's Operation SUPPORT HOPE after action report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he emphasized that the Joint Task Force was the only organization with the versatility to support HAOs.¹⁹ A joint task force is defined as, "a force composed of assigned or attached

elements of two or more services and constituted by appropriate authority for a specific or limited purpose or missions of short duration."²⁰ Depending on the mission requirements, the joint task force's flexible organizational structure permits the attachment of both civilian and military agencies. This is a significant factor when discussing the nature and importance of interagency coordination during HAOs.

Non-governmental organizations are private organizations that support HAOs. NGOs are often at a disaster site before governmental support arrives and are usually there long after it departs.²¹ Their support base generally consists of private financial donors. NGOs differ from each other by the types of aid they provide and their charters. Developing consensus and trust between the U.S. military and NGOs is crucial to the operation's success.

Limitations

The limitations affecting the study of HAO command and control systems involve sources that link C² to humanitarian assistance operations and the case studies. The research material for humanitarian assistance is drawn from military doctrinal manuals, periodicals and books. With the exception of a few published and draft military documents, most publications do not separate humanitarian assistance command and control difficulties from other peace operations. Therefore, the focus of the study initially separates the discussion of C² and HAOs. Only after this analysis was completed was I able to combine the two areas to form conclusions. In addition, interviews with

participants in humanitarian operations helped bridge the gap between HAO and C² doctrine.

Case studies and personal interviews formed the primary link between the theoretical and practical application. The advantage of using case studies like Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE, is that they offer recent examples of JTFs created specifically to conduct HAOs. The research material was mainly limited to unpublished reports, individual and unit after action reports, and official military lessons learned. After comparing the after action reviews and participant statements, I drew conclusions concerning the effectiveness of the civil-military command and control structure.

Delimitations

The thesis' scope is U.S. military support for United Nations sponsored humanitarian assistance operation. Within this context, command and control and interagency coordination become relevant issues with respect to evaluating JTF operations. Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE illustrate the problems joint task force commanders face as they attempt to achieve successful results in an area where success is hard to define.

The joint task force is not the only organization capable of executing HAOs. Numerous operations around the world are conducted by organizations with varying C² structures. I chose to direct my analysis toward JTFs primarily because of they are tailored to a specific mission in a specific environment. This provides a good tool for studying organizational structure, the influence of command vision, and the

impact of the environment on command and staff functions throughout the organization.

Understanding command and control theory is the preliminary step required to fully appreciate the dynamics existing between the varying control systems. The U.S. military on one side, and the U.N. and NGOs on the other, often differ over their interpretation of control. This is largely due to the characteristics (e.g., open versus closed) of each system. By comparing the control systems in terms of information flow and communication with the environment, conclusions are drawn concerning the applicability of the JTF C² system.

U.S. armed forces are normally cast in a supporting role in HAOs. One of the problems faced by military planners is that the organizations involved in HAOs vary from disaster to disaster. The JTF organizational structure will dictate the level of integration it has with its environment (U.N., NGO, Host Nation).

Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE illustrate the interagency coordination process. These recent operations provide a basis for analyzing the organizational structures, and their effectiveness in different environments. Finally, they depict both the internal and external challenges facing the joint task force commander and his staff as they attempt to execute a humanitarian assistance operation.

Significance of the Study

The importance of this study is twofold. First, as the U.N. becomes more involved in coordinating and executing HAOs, it is likely

that U.S. military commanders and staff officers will operate with U.N. agencies and NGOs. By possessing a working knowledge of the U.N. and NGO operations, U.S. military officers can reduce the misunderstanding and confusion that often surrounds HAOs.

Second, as the U.S. military continues to participate in future world-wide HAOs, methods of organization and execution will evolve. Even though no two HAOs are the same, planners who analyze the humanitarian assistance environments can identify critical "nodes" that assist in JTF formation and operation. These critical elements of information about the HAO environment and its participants can support the formation of an effective and efficient JTF. This information also forms the basis for changes to joint and service doctrines. As the doctrine changes, so do the tactics, techniques, and procedures that are instrumental in training the soldiers to execute these missions.

Literature Review

The study's supporting literature is grouped into three broad categories: command and control, interagency coordination, and case study analysis. In Jon L. Boues and Stephen J. Andriole's book *Principles of Command and Control*,²² Dr. Roger A. Beaumont's section *Perspectives on Command and Control* attributes the differences in command and control to personal attitudes, perceptions, and individual background. His central theme is the impact of personalities on the development of command and control systems. In *Control of Joint Forces: A New Perspective*,²³ retired General William E. DePuy singles out the commander as the force that drives the system. The commander's concept

of operations," forms the basis from which the system design is derived to best support the mission."

In his book *Command Control Compromise: Values and Objectives for the Military Manager*²⁴, James Carrington demonstrates that large organizations operate in an environment of outside influences and competing interests. He uses the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as an example of a command and control system dependent on compromise. Consensus and compromise among NATO's sixteen member states provides the catalyst for achievement of organizational objectives.

Kenneth C. Allard, in *Command, Control, and the Common Defense*,²⁵ points out that even with today's sophisticated systems and technology, an essential ingredient is the organization's relationship to its environment. His "key determinants of command and control" place the armed forces command and control system at the apex of a pyramid whose connected layers include such elements as national values, operational environments, strategic paradigms, and service organizational norms. The ability to balance the demands of organizational autonomy and the need to integrate external systems produces operational flexibility throughout the organization.

Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE demonstrated that the joint task force is the organization of choice for controlling forces supporting HAOs. Joint Publication 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, contains established procedures for the formation and operation of joint task forces. Two additional sources for assessing joint task force capabilities and effectiveness are the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) publications and commanders'

journals or communications. CALL reports provide an analysis of the event-specific command and control infrastructure. Commanders' journals and communications illustrate organizational responsiveness to the commander's mission requirements.

The second literature category covers humanitarian assistance participants and interagency coordination. Army Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations*, and draft Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, outline the military's role concerning interagency coordination and HAOs. Aside from the military, the other U.S. governmental agencies that are major players in the humanitarian assistance arena are the National Command Authorities (NCA) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The 1994 National Security and National Military Strategies explain the administration's vision for HAOs. These documents provide guidance and set strategic goals for all government agency operations. Within USAID, the OFDA is tasked to coordinate the civilian, military, and political aspects of a humanitarian assistance operation. OFDA's *Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response*²⁶ is the source document for assessment and coordination standards.

A key reference for understanding the United Nations command and control apparatus is Stephen Green's book *International Disaster Relief: Toward a Responsive System*.²⁷ This book provides the basic understanding of the United Nations, its subordinate organizations, governmental agencies, and non-governmental organizations that participate in HAOs. Roger A. Coate's book, *U.S. Policy and the Future of the United Nations*,²⁸ discusses a broad range of United Nations

missions. In Coate's book, the United Nations' command and control system is discussed in terms of its relationship to donor governments and NGOs. The authors examine U.S. policy toward humanitarian assistance support. In addition, they use the examples of Somalia and Bosnia to highlight military C² requirements.

Probably the most interesting aspect of the literature collected for the study was in the area of non-governmental agencies. Here again, Stephen Green's book establish a base line understanding of non-governmental agencies involved in humanitarian assistance. Larry Minear's chapter on NGO operations in Kevin M. Cahill's book, *A Framework for Survival: Health, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters*,²⁹ logically depicts how the NGOs work and coordinate their operations with the United Nations and other support agencies. Finally, a report written by Charles B. Deull and Laurel A. Dutcher for the American Council for Voluntary International Action uses NGO operations in Africa to illustrate the coordination and communication difficulties. Deull and Dutcher recommend effective methods that facilitate cooperation among this group of diverse organizations.

The third category of literature involves the Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE case studies. In both cases, the majority of information was gained from journals, unpublished articles, personal communications between commanders, after action reports, briefing slides, and CALL summaries. LTC Rudd's article titled, *Operation PROVIDE COMFORT*,³⁰ provides an indepth analysis of the Combined Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT (CTFPC) formation, deployment, and operational

procedures. Additionally, Dr. John Fishel's *Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm*³¹ looks at Operation PROVIDE COMFORT from an interagency coordination perspective. Dr. Fishel's analysis of Combined Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT illustrates the complex array of joint and interagency issues that the commander and staff must address. The daily reports by Brigadier General Campbell, commander of the 353d Civil Affairs Command and commander of CTF PROVIDE COMFORT's Civil Military Operations Center, provide an insight to the CTFs relationship with the refugees and NGOs.³² Lieutenant General Shalikashvili's command briefings and testimony added critical facts concerning the period of time between when the President ordered the operation and the establishment of Combined Task Force Provide Comfort (CTFPC).³³ This source, coupled with the CALL reports, addressed the difficulties encountered by the military planners preparing for humanitarian assistance support.

Research for Operation SUPPORT HOPE included many of the same sources as for PROVIDE COMFORT. One principle difference was the availability of officers at Fort Leavenworth and Carlisle Barracks who participated in the operation. In addition, CALL publications provided a comprehensive description of JTF operations from the alert order to the final after action report. JTF plans and orders offer a view of the organization's formation and operation. These documents outline the initial perceptions by the JTF concerning the role of Civil Military Operations Centers and the amount of coordination done with USAID and OFDA prior to deployment. Another source of information was interviews with the officers who formed the JTF staff. These interviews included

military and civilian participants from Fort Leavenworth, Carlisle Barracks, and USAID. Each participant provided critical background information not found in operational summaries or after action reports. Many of these people held key roles such as the JTF J5, Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC)³⁴ coordinator, and JTF OFDA/DART representative.

Conclusions

This chapter establishes the basis for analysis into military command and control and humanitarian assistance operations. As the historical perspective shows, U.S. military support for humanitarian assistance operations is not a new phenomena. What is changing are the global dynamics. These changes influence the manner in which the United States assesses position as a world leader and the use of the military instrument of power. The Soviet Union's demise has opened the door for new and challenging missions. In addition, national and military leaders must realize the changes within the United Nations. The U.N.'s resurgence as a collective voice for humanity and peace implies that it may in the future exercise greater control over military forces supporting HAOs. The next chapter discusses command and control theories and specifically addresses the C² problems joint forces commanders face as they employ forces in the HAO environment.

Endnotes

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CHAPTER TWO

COMMAND AND CONTROL DOCTRINAL ASSESSMENT

The quality of an individual strategic action and of a series of strategic moves over time is a function of how well the organization has learned to identify and respond to new situations and to take a proactive position vis-a-vis its environment.¹

Richard Normann, Organizational Strategy and Change

Introduction

Large organizations require systems for developing and monitoring goals and objectives. Civilian organizations refer to these systems as management. In military terms, these systems are referred to as the command and control process.

The differences between management and command relate to their context. By definition, command is "to direct with authority; to have control or authority over."² Management is defined as "the act, manner, or practice of managing, handling, or controlling something."³ In the context of military thought, command is the authority given to one person, and management is a function executed by commanders and staff alike. Civilian organizations identify management with leadership and associate management skills with the tops levels within the organization. This chapter uses the military context of command and management.

Command and control as it applies to humanitarian assistance operations has four critical aspects. The first aspect involves defining command and control. Differences between C² definitions result primarily from differences in leadership, organizational structure, and the technology available. The second aspect is the command and control environment. Environments make up a C² system's external and internal conditions. These conditions dictate the amount of information flowing into and out of the system. Organizational structure is the third aspect discussed. An organization's structure reflects its mission and command and control requirements. Participants who operate the command and control system comprise the final C² aspect. Organizational participants fall into two categories, leaders and mid-level managers. Leaders establish a common vision and express it down through mid-level management. The basis for exercising leadership is knowledge, and the internal ingredient of leadership is C².⁴ Mid-level managers are the element within the command and control system responsible for information flow and coordination between the organization and its environment.

Definitions

Joint doctrine defines command and control as "the process that commander's (including supporting organizations) use to plan, direct, coordinate, and control forces to ensure mission accomplishment."⁵ This definition uses a "systems" approach for establishing a command and control architecture. The goal is to establish a medium for participants to gain information across the operational continuum.⁶ In

addition, the system promotes unity of effort between all subordinate elements or sub-systems. "Unity of effort" is the product of the system. This concept allows the views of many experts to contribute to any given task.⁷

An effective command and control system enhances the participants' synchronization and coordination efforts. The system promotes the organization's natural capabilities. During stressful, high tempo operations, the C² system must be responsive, simple, and easily understood.⁸ The speed and form in which information is processed is often crucial to the organization's success. A functional system establishes gates that delineate between routine information and mission essential intelligence. Finally, a good command and control system supports "simultaneous situational visualization" by fusing the many pieces of information together to enable the force as a whole to exploit opportunities.⁹

In *Control of Joint Forces: A New Perspective*, retired General William E. DePuy defines command and control as

A process designed to concentrate the immense combat power of an Air Land Battle force against the enemy to win engagements, battles, campaigns and wars. It is a process that unifies the efforts of thousands of men performing a bewildering array of battlefield functions, each one of which is utterly essential to success. This process produces unity of effort from a diversity of means.¹⁰

DePuy singles out the commander as the driving force behind the command and control system. The commander's "concept of operations" establishes the C² structural blueprint. The mission is embedded in the concept and translated to subordinates in a manner that reflects the commander's

intent. A clearly understood concept of operations increases the command and control system's efficiency and responsiveness.

DePuy also focuses on initiative as the critical element that drives the system. Whether against a cholera epidemic in Zaire, or an enemy force in combat, it is the commander and his staff's responsibility to seize the initiative. This means anticipating crises and possessing the tools that provide for a flexible responsiveness to present and future crises. Initiative means having the people, equipment, and training necessary to orchestrate the battlefield functions that are key to the operation's success.¹¹ An organization that exhibits initiative demonstrates that it has the flexibility and agility to react to changing external conditions. Successful joint organizations show initiative as they operate within a complex array of battlefield functions. At times, it is the host nation and HAO participants who place limitations on the commander's ability to exercise initiative. It is at these times, that the JTF staff should make every effort to contact these elements and include them (if not done before) into the JTFs planning and decision making process. This becomes a means of integrating these external influences into the JTF's operations and increases the organization's flexibility.

Coupled with these functions is the informational battlefield clutter or "friction" facing joint force commanders. The C² system supports the commander's by filtering out this clutter and allowing him to focus on his critical information requirements. The organizational structure that eliminates friction and increases information flow also displays the initiative required to meet its mission goals. Examples of

HAO associated friction are the support requests that the JTF receives from a multitude of agencies and organizations. The JTF commander brings to the crisis specific capabilities. It is the JTF staff's responsibility to ensure that requests are commensurate to the level of support required. This is the function of the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) which is discussed later in this chapter. The CMOC filters requests for military resources and identifies for the commander those requirements that the JTF is best suited to support. From this, the commander can make critical decisions without being clouded by the environmental friction.

In retired Lieutenant Commander James Carrington's book *Command Control Compromise: Values and Objectives for the Military Manager*, he takes the concept of command and control and defines the components. In simple terms, he defines command as causing actions by other people to attain a result.¹² Command is not unique to military structures. All organizations possess an element that establishes organizational vision and goals. The U.S. military's joint task force structure illustrates this concept. The JTF is formed with a specific goal in mind. The commander is responsible for issuing guidance concerning the C² system's structure. These systems reflect his vision and concept for accomplishing the mission. Multinational organizations differ from unilateral ones in that command often translates into consensus. In the U.N., the Security Council constitutes the leadership or command arm. Even though there is no lead nation, the Security Council exercises its influence through the weight of its recommendations as an expression of

world opinion.¹³ This is accomplished by promoting consensus and compromise among member nations toward common organizational goals.

Carrington then takes his discussion of command and control one step farther by including the element of compromise. Large organizations do not operate in environments absent of outside influences. Most operations require coordination with a variety of activities with common interests. The leader accounts for these influences while he builds his goals and guidance. Maintaining cohesion and meeting organizational objectives often require a willingness to compromise.¹⁴ The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a present day example of a military command and control system that is dependent on compromise. The mission of NATO's leadership is to build consensus between its 16 member nations. The member nations' subordination of national interests for the sake of organizational goals is fundamental to the success of this system.¹⁵

The Environment

The environment affects all aspects of an organization's development. Environments include physical space, such as Entebbe, Uganda; concepts like a coalition of nations or forces; or a sector such as the military or business environment. The organization is an interdependent element of a larger external environment.¹⁶ There are three environments in which organizations function: internal, task, and general. The internal environment consists of the organization and its components. The task environment, although it combines with the general environment to represent all factors external to the organization,

consists of forces that directly impact on the organizations operations.¹⁷ These forces compete for resources and place requirements on the organization. The general environment is a constant state. That is, those influences that are common to all situations and that may or may not affect the operation.

Relating these environmental concepts to HAOs, the joint task force's internal environment includes the commander, his staff, and the subordinate component organizations. The task environment may consist of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the host nation, non-governmental and governmental organizations. National and international media, tribal differences, or concerns over past U.S. policy characterize the joint task force's general environment. The primary concern is how the joint task force processes the information it receives from its external environment. A joint task forces's success depends on attainment of unity of effort between itself and the external environment. During humanitarian assistance operations, the JTF's ability to achieve unity of effort is complicated by a variety of agencies that make up the external environment. Figure 1 illustrates the organization and environment as they pertain to a humanitarian assistance scenario.

The information flow between the organization and its environment represents the degree of unity between the two systems. Whether a command and control system is open or closed relates to the amount of information that passes from one environment to another. An open system is very porous.¹⁸ This allows information to flow freely

between the organization and its environment. Conversely, a closed system is characterized by rigid boundaries with little or no




Figure 1. HAO Environmental Relationships

communication between the organization and its external environment. Joint task forces supporting HAOs must possess an open system if they are to fully integrate the military support with relief agency operations. Coupled with the U.N. and NGOs, the JTF supports the relief effort by supplying personnel, equipment, and security. JTF SUPPORT HOPE's transportation of water purification systems into Goma, Zaire illustrates the result of detailed coordination between the internal

environment (the JTF) and the governmental agencies and NGOs that constituted the external environment.

The Organization

Social, technical, and economic changes often result in modifications to existing organizations and the development of new ones. The dominating criteria used in determining organizational design is the amount of information that the system is required to process.

"Organizational strategies" constitute the structural blueprint for change and development.¹⁹ The analysis concentrates on three features of organizational development: organizational mechanisms, vertical and lateral systems, and interoperability. Two or more of these features may apply to any organization depending on its mission and environment. In the final analysis, if the goals are met and the information flow supports the system, then the organizational strategy is succeeding.

Organizational Mechanisms

The establishment of mechanisms to focus on specific tasks increases the C² system's agility. Mechanisms accentuate the system by making it receptive to change, reduce span of control, and increases the flow of information.²⁰ Organizations adapt to increased information processing requirements by integrating mechanisms which increase the parent organizations information processing capability. Mechanisms accomplish the complicated or critical tasks that the parent organization cannot manage effectively. This reduces the amount of information required to process and increases productivity.

The joint task force organization depicted in figure 2 shows the development of mechanisms in the form of component commands. Increasingly, joint task forces are called upon to perform a variety of tasks outside the realm of combat operations. Humanitarian assistance operations fall into this category. One solution is the formation of subordinate functional or component commands. These components are




Figure 2. Hypothetical HAO JTF Configuration

structured to support the commander's information and coordination requirements. The components of the joint task force are a form of organizational design theory mechanisms. Due to the size of the organization, these components often subdivide further into more specialized "mechanisms" that address specific tasks. This process easily adapts to environmental constraints and supports the commander's concept. The formation of a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) is a recent example of a component or "mechanism." CMOCs process information relating to the coordination of military support to HAOs. They accomplish this by providing a forum for participating agencies to voice concerns and request JTF support. In both Northern Iraq and Rwanda, CMOCs or similar organizations maintained lines of communications between the United Nations' agencies and NGOs. In addition to supporting these agencies, the CMOC gave the JTF commander and staff a critical source of information.

Vertical and Lateral Systems

Vertical and lateral command and control systems reflect the level of control the parent organization imposes on its components. A vertical system is best illustrated by the agencies within the U.S. government. Both USAID and the U.S. armed forces possess vertical command and control systems. This means the systems are based on a hierarchy of leadership where the span of control is limited. This system is effective when the greater the task uncertainty, the greater the amount of information that must be processed among decision makers

during task execution in order to achieve a given level of performance.²¹

A lateral system best supports the requirement for a joint decision process which cuts across lines of authority.²² It also supports organizational cross-boundary communication and coordination. NATO exemplifies a lateral command and control system where the participants are separated by physical barriers, language, and cultural differences.²³ In this case, the political realities make a vertical system impractical and unattainable. During HAOs, a lateral relationship exists between the U.S. military and relief agencies. This fact is not always apparent to joint planners and can often lead to embarrassing situations. The U.S. military will never command U.N. or NGO relief organizations. The primary military goal is build communications links that foster unity of effort between the JTF and the relief agencies.

Interoperability

Successful military organizations adapt to their environment while continuing to respond to the commander's vision and guidance. The result is human and technical systems that operate in synchronization toward a common goal. As LTG McKnight states in *The Principles of Command and Control*, "The need for U.S. forces to be able to operate with each other and with our allies has never been greater."²⁴ The problem of interoperability exists in all organizations that must coordinate their actions and receive support from outside agencies.

Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, provides two definitions for interoperability:

1. The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.
2. The condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communication-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases.²⁵

The first definition applies to the study of joint task force command and control systems. Interoperability problems are sub-divided into the areas of management structure, common equipment, common standards, and doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Each area is essential when structuring an organization to support its communications and information requirements.²⁶ Organizational planners must analyze their information requirements and incorporate systems that enhance interoperability.

A joint task force is established and organized for a specific mission. To accomplish that mission, the JTF C² system must encourage interoperability among its components and the external environment. As the U.S. military continues to field new equipment and more sophisticated command and control systems, the realization of complete interoperability with our allies becomes harder to achieve. The U.S. military unified commands are making significant efforts to limit the negative effects on interoperability of these new systems. In European Command (EUCOM), key staff members are organized and trained in measures

that will secure at least organizational interoperability if technologic or system interoperability cannot be achieved.²⁷ As Richard Mallion states in *Command and Control of Joint Forces: A New Perspective*, "What really counts in interoperability are the forces. It does not matter if some radios or some computer systems interoperate. What does matter is that forces interoperate, but this fact is sometimes lost in the efforts to solve all problems using technical solutions."²⁸ During Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (April 1991) in Northern Iraq, Special Forces Teams made up of highly trained soldiers provided the human element that facilitated interoperability between the JTF and its external environment.

Another method to reduce the interoperability problem is the use of common equipment. This is as much an interservice problem as it is when working with coalitions. Operation URGENT FURY (October 1983) in Grenada demonstrated a weakness among the U.S. service's in their ability to operate together effectively. This ultimately led to the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act which strengthened the CINC's influence over service equipment procurement and fielding programs.²⁹ The purchase of "common item" systems resulted from the realization that single service operations were a thing of the past.

The concept of common standards, especially in the realm of joint task force operations, is now at the forefront of a new plan set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CINC U.S. Atlantic Command, with help from the Joint War Fighting Center (at Ft. Monroe, Va.), is developing training and operational standards for joint task forces. These organizational and procedural standards simplify the interface

between the U.S. military and coalition partners, governmental agencies and NGOs. A technique currently used by some CINCs is the formation of a Deployable Joint Task Force (DJTF). The DJTF consists of members of the CINC's staff who support joint operations and training exercises. The DJTF is capable of operating independently or augmenting an existing organization, such as an Army corps, a Navy fleet, or a numbered Air Force. DJTFs consist of personnel and equipment designed to support joint or combined operations. In addition, the DJTF provides an organization familiar with the CINC's standard operating procedures thereby adding continuity to the command and control system.

"Getting the United States to achieve a common doctrine and common tactical procedures is unlikely given the many countries with which the United States operates."³⁰ The objective is to promote a common understanding of each other's doctrine and procedures among the participants. Given this, the best means to ensure interoperability among participants is by providing liaison teams. The use of U.S. Army Special Forces Teams in Northern Iraq and to a lesser degree in Rwanda proved invaluable to the JTF commander as a means to assess operational requirements and coordinate relief efforts between the U.S. military and UN/NGOs.

The Participants

No study of command and control is complete without discussing the people who run the system. The key participants in any command and control system are the leaders who establish the vision and the managers who ensure the vision is communicated throughout the system. Vision for

humanitarian assistance operations may come from a variety of sources. These sources include National Command Authorities (NCA), U.S. Ambassadors, United Nations representatives, USAID, and host nation governments. The leaders we are concerned with are the regional CINCs and joint task force commanders. Their primary role is to translate strategic objectives into operational missions. This involves communicating organizational purpose, performance standards, and a means of evaluating the organization's goals. The CINC and JTF staff officers provide the conduit for analyzing the military mid-level manager. These staff officers are concerned with information flow to and from the commander, unity of effort between organizations, and the conveyance of command guidance throughout the organization.

Realistic and attainable organizational goals are the synthesis of the leader's involvement in the operational environment.³¹ One technique is to publish standard operations orders. Another less formal method is through discussions with key subordinates who then communicate the commander's intent. The leader must understand his mission and the strategic implications of failure and success. The joint task force commander receives guidance from a variety of sources. Both operational and political factors affect the joint task force commander's initial guidance. His awareness of the operational environment helps ensure the goals are communicated in terms understood by all participants.

CINCEUR addressed the strategic goals for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in three phases. Phase one included the immediate goals of stopping the dying and suffering, and stabilizing the population.

During phase two, the goals were to resettle the population at temporary sites. The phase three goals involved returning the refugee population to their homes.³² These goals were then compared with elements of the organization's external environment to determine their feasibility. The elements that had the greatest impact on goal accomplishment were the Iraqi military, the NGOs already operating in the area, and world opinion.

Managers meld the leaders' strategic goals with the C² system to promote a common understanding of mission requirements and objectives. These "staff officers" operate the command and control systems that support these strategic goals. They facilitate the flow of information within the organization and between the organization and its environment. In other words, "they establish an orderly arrangement of group effort to provide unity of action in the pursuit of a common purpose."³³ With unity of effort as the staff officers' primary objective, there are tools at their disposal to accomplish this. Two common tools are standard operating procedures and liaison operations.

The creation of standard operating procedures (SOPs) is one way staff officers coordinate leadership decisions. SOPs assist the flow of information in two ways. First, they regulate operations. Standard operating procedures allow interior and exterior elements to coordinate with one another purely on the basis of shared expectations.³⁴ The Civil Military Operations Center during Operation SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda established internal standard operating procedures for coordinating military relief support. The U.N. and NGOs reacted favorably to this standardization for it gave them an understanding of

the JTF and its operating systems. This was a difficult task, but ended with the participants understanding each other's capabilities. Another result of standard operating procedures, was increased organizational agility. These standards form information paths to the commander enabling him to quickly react to changes in the strategic setting.

Liaison elements represent a second tool used to support the commander's information requirements and operational objectives. Liaison teams locate with agencies within and outside the parent organization. Their primary purpose is to translate the commander's goals and facilitate the flow of information between organizational boundaries. As stated earlier, the success of both Operation PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE stemmed from the early liaison by Special Forces Teams with the refugees and support agencies.³⁵

Conclusions

Humanitarian assistance operations offer C² challenges that differ from normal combat related activities. The joint task force commander must maintain effective lines of communications are maintained with the National Command Authority, regional commander in chief, as well as the litany of governmental and civilian organizations. Success equates to the commander rapidly distinguishing between his task and general environments. Only after the commander understands the situation can he effectively organize his command and control system.

The rapid pace with which joint task forces are formed in response to crisis situations creates an information vacuum at the

leadership level. As illustrated in Operation SUPPORT HOPE, the organization continually evolved until it reached the right combination of equipment and professionals required to meet the mission requirements. This "lag-time" comes with a high price in political embarrassment and operational credibility. The joint task force commander must rapidly receive situational and environmental information to ensure his structural and organizational decisions are sound and will support the mission.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE INTERAGENCY ENVIRONMENT

America's forces must in the future be capable of operating in, and contributing toward, three distinct policy environments: joint military, or inter-service, the interagency process; and multi-national efforts.¹

Admiral Paul D. Miller, CINCUSACOM,
The Interagency Process

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to address the humanitarian assistance environment in terms of its major organizational participants (UN, NGOs, USAID, and U.S. military) and then to discuss current interagency coordination issues. Various governmental, non-governmental, and United Nations organizations participate in international humanitarian assistance operations. Often, the measure of an operation's success is how well these entities work together or "mass" their efforts to aid disaster victims. As discussed in chapter two, standard military command and control systems do not always meet a JTFs interagency coordination requirements. Commanders who understand the HAO environment and participants can effectively construct systems to support consensus building and unity of effort.

United Nations

The United Nations is neither a government nor a non-governmental organization. It is an intergovernmental organization whose power base is the cooperation that exists between member states. Unlike other HAO participants, the United Nations' Charter calls for member states to address the causes of humanitarian disasters and to mobilize international support for HAOs.²

The United Nations' predecessor, the League of Nations, established basic principles of respect for humanity and international peace. In the summer of 1945, the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco refined the United Nations' organization and operating principles. The UN charter was finally ratified by the original 46 nations on 24 October 1945.³ Article 1 of the United Nations' charter stipulates five organizational goals, they are: to maintain international peace and security; develop friendly relations among nations; cooperate in solving international economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems; promote respect for human rights; and be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations towards those common goals.⁴ The United Nations currently consists of 184 member states. Membership is open to all nations that accept these goals and charter obligations.

The United Nations operates through six principle organs: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the Secretariat, and the International Court of Justice.⁵ The General Assembly, Security Council and the Secretariat are all involved in HAOs. United Nations' Security Council resolutions

dictate the form and level of response to crisis situations. Therefore, a UN Security Council resolution establishes the mandate and funding for military or UN relief force deployments.

The UN organizations who answer directly to the General Assembly concerning HAO are the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The UNDP establishes offices in most developing nations. Its primary function is to plan and coordinate the United Nations' response to long-term as well as emergency relief requirements. The UNDP is often the United Nations' "Lead Agency" in support of HAO.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, one of the oldest international relief organizations, dates back to the League of Nations in 1921. UNHCR's primary function is as an intermediary with various national governments in order to ensure minimum rights are established for refugees. Whether dealing with refugees or with special situations involving persons who do not meet the criteria for refugee status, the High Commissioner is guided by humanitarian considerations.⁶

UNICEF works with both UNDP and UNHCR to support effected children and young mothers. UNICEF provides education, and distributes food and medical treatment in an attempt to improve nutritional and sanitary conditions.⁷ The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) approves emergency food aid that is distributed by its subsidiary organization, the World Food Program (WFP). When a disaster occurs, FAO

country representatives advise the UNDP resident representative on emergency operational matters pertaining to food and nutrition.⁸

Within the United Nations Secretariat, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) is the central coordinating office for disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations. Previously known as the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO), DHA functions in three ways: it mobilizes and coordinates aid to stricken countries; it mobilizes and directs aid from governmental and non-governmental donors; and it establishes emergency coordinators who report to the General Assembly on the operation's progress.⁹

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

Non-governmental organizations are involved, to varying degrees, in all HAOs. Their independence from governmental biases gives them opportunities to support people who the United Nations or governmental agencies cannot. NGOs are distinguished according to their legal status, functions, resources, operating principles, and expertise.¹⁰ Most NGOs are organized with separate headquarters for fund raising and field operations. The International Committee of the Red Cross is one NGO that supports humanitarian contingencies world-wide. Its organization, functions, and relations with governments make it unique within the NGO community.

The International Red Cross Movement is divided into two contingents with different responsibilities. The International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) acts to protect victims of armed conflict. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent

Societies, of which the American Red Cross is a member, helps coordinate international relief efforts for disaster victims, displaced persons, and refugees.¹¹ The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was formed in 1863 to protect those persons affected by war.¹² The Red Cross Movement does not neatly fit into the NGO or governmental categories. It is a movement of individuals who provide their services and funds, organizations that serve its purposes, and even governments that sit on its governing councils and support its activities financially.¹³ Both the ICRC and Societies offer a wide variety of assistance to people affected by natural or man-made disasters. Red Cross components are often the first relief agencies to reach the disaster and remain there longer than governmental support operations can afford. Seven fundamental principles guide Red Cross operations: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality.¹⁴ These principles allow the organization to transcend political, ethnic, religious and cultural barriers to assist those needing support. Relief efforts include mass care, emergency assistance, and long-term recovery assistance. Due to their well-developed systems for rapid movement and distribution of relief supplies the Red Cross often assists less capable NGOs to establish operations.

During Operation SUPPORT HOPE, over 47 different NGOs provided relief in Goma, Zaire and surrounding camps.¹⁵ Each organization comes with its own understanding of relief requirements. Some NGOs respond positively to coordination, while others refuse to associate with governments or other relief agencies. For this reason, military

planners should know which NGOs are at a relief site and address them accordingly.

NGO impartiality creates problems for the United Nations and United States armed forces. NGOs often gauge their effectiveness on the basis of neutrality. Many NGOs view the UN and military forces as incapable of impartiality. Consequently, NGOs will refuse support from the UN and donor governments, ensuring that their impartiality is maintained.

The French organization "Doctors Without Borders" is one NGO that closely guards its neutrality. During Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the U.S. joint task force's Special Forces units attempted to support NGOs who were operating prior to any national involvement. Concerns over perceptions of siding with the coalition forces led Doctors Without Borders to ban U.S. support from their refugee camps. Prolonged discussions between the two elements finally resulted in U.S. relief supplies reaching these refugees.¹⁶

NGOs respond primarily to the international press and their contributors. Their headquarters operate from their home country for fund raising and reporting to contributors on the status of operations. The field sites consist of case workers whose sole function is to distribute relief, educate the populace, or construct facilities. There is little room within this organization for an operational element for external coordination. This often results in coordination failures during large operations involving the U.N. and governmental agencies. Limited NGO resources during complex operations like Operations SUPPORT HOPE and PROVIDE COMFORT illustrate this problem.

United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

The United States Agency for International Development, as an organ of the U.S. International Development Cooperation Agency, administers U.S. foreign economic and humanitarian assistance programs in the developing world, Central and Eastern Europe, and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.¹⁷ Within USAID, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is responsible for coordinating the U.S. governmental disaster response. OFDA accomplishes this through Disaster Assistance Response Teams who deploy and conduct on-site coordination (see figure 3).¹⁸ USAID is tied closely to the




Figure 3. USAID Organizational Structure¹⁹

Embassies. The level of AID representation is commensurate with amount of support provided to a state, with the Mission representing the most involvement and the AID section the least.

OFDA and the DART play key roles in coordinating the DOD disaster relief response. The initial recommendations presented by the DART contribute to the joint planner's determination of the joint task force's mission and composition. Once established in country, OFDA is the focal point for the procurement of supplies, services, and transportation. The DART carries with it sufficient funds to take the necessary actions to restore/build an infrastructure. What is critical here is the role OFDA plays in coordinating with the NGOs. OFDA is responsible for determining NGO resource shortfalls. The DART representative is authorized to distribute funds to NGOs to expedite the flow of relief. Finally, OFDA coordinates with the other donor governments to solve any operational or political problems.²⁰

Department of Defense

The U.S. Department of Defense is in the process of developing tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting humanitarian assistance operations. The lessons of Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE are being reviewed and incorporated into joint and service doctrine.

The central figure responsible for orchestrating the military humanitarian assistance response is the unified combatant commander in chief (CINC). This regional CINC usually forms a joint task force as the organization to command and control U.S. military forces within his

AOR. During HAOs, the JTF may consist of experts from both civilian and military agencies. The joint forces commander must tailor the organization in a manner that best supports the civilian relief requirements without compromising force protection.

The president, along with the secretary of defense, form the U.S. National Command Authorities (NCA). The strategic goals and end state are furnished by the NCA and form the basis of the CINC's concept of operations. The deputy assistant secretary of defense for humanitarian and refugee affairs, under the directions of the under secretary of defense for policy, is responsible for policy and direction of DOD relief activities.²¹ Additionally, he is the primary interagency coordinator in matters of humanitarian affairs. DOD Directive 5100.46 established direct coordination procedures between the DOD and USAID/OFDA for the execution of disaster relief operations.²²

After the president and secretary of defense, the regional commander in chief is responsible for planning and executing military support for HAOs. Presently, there are five regionally oriented CINCs. These CINCs are assigned their areas of responsibility (AOR) by the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and are responsible for all operations within them. The CINC's staff consists of both military and civilian agency representatives who assist in the planning for HAOs. Unless it is an unusually fast-breaking situation, the CINC will deploy an initial disaster assessment team to provide recommendations concerning the level of response required. The CINC is supported by Special Forces and Civil Affairs teams who deploy to a disaster site as a Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST).²³ A coordinated HAST/DART assessment reduces the

chances of duplication of effort and establishes the military/civilian interface necessary for success.

The CINC usually forms a joint task force (JTF) as a tactical or operational level military command and control element. The JTF's composition is dictated by mission requirements and may consist of a variety of services and governmental agencies. In every JTF since 1983, interagency coordination has played a critical role, necessitating close coordination between the forces and agencies outside their chain of command.²⁴ A JTF formed to conduct humanitarian assistance operations normally establishes a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC). The CMOC's purpose is to ensure effective coordination and to provide a forum for cooperation between U.S. armed forces and UN/NGO efforts.²⁵ When OFDA establishes a DART, the CMOC may locate near it and receive guidance from the OFDA representative. The CMOC is the commander's CA/HAO information center. It provides him with information concerning both JTF and external agency relief operations.

During Operation SUPPORT HOPE, the UN and NGOs did not possess the logistical capabilities to move supplies and provide water to refugees located in Goma, Zaire. Joint Task Force SUPPORT HOPE established CMOCs at Entebbe and Goma to coordinate military logistical and transportation support. Representatives from OFDA/DART initially positioned themselves near the CMOC to maintain continuity between the JTF and other U.S. governmental support operations. The level of cooperation that existed between the military and OFDA supported the efficient execution of a unified U.S. Governmental response and enhanced consensus building efforts between governmental and non-governmental

agencies. Figure 4 depicts the command and coordination lines of




Figure 4. CMOC Coordination Schematic²⁶

communications between military and civilian agencies during humanitarian assistance operations.

Humanitarian Assistance Interagency Problem Areas

Interagency coordination during humanitarian assistance operations is difficult in the best situations. This section discusses some present-day problems plaguing HAO participants and offers some suggestions for improving the current system. Interagency coordination problems fall primarily into three areas: neutrality/impartiality, organization and professionalism, and coordination.

There are two sides to the neutrality/impartiality problem. The first concerns the United Nations and donor governments. The UN and donor governments will not receive NGO support if they display impartiality only when it is politically convenient. That is, a policy of impartiality is a standard, and when that standard is broken it is difficult to regain credibility. Non-governmental agencies are usually the first to respond to a disaster, and will remain there after the UN and donor governments depart. NGOs become vulnerable to reprisals once the UN or donor governments side with one element in a conflict. Lessons learned from Operation RESTORE HOPE (Somalia) concerning support for relief organizations while addressing the problems of warring factions enabled U.S. commanders to better plan and execute Operation SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda.

The second side of the impartiality problem is the need for NGOs to commit more time and energy to becoming team players, or at least to stay in closer touch with the team, even at the occasional expense of

pressing ahead with their own activities.²⁷ This problem appeared during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (Northern Iraq) when relief agencies refused to accept assistance from JTF medical units. In the post "Cold War" era, donor governments are now more than ever willing to dedicate resources earlier earmarked for deterrence to support humanitarian efforts. NGOs must become actively involved in the planning and execution of relief operations. Through efforts to increase their efficiency and organization, NGOs can become full partners in future multinational operations.

The difficulties associated with organization and professionalism mainly involve the NGOs. No code of conduct exists for the community of humanitarian practitioners as a whole, or even the subcommunities for the United Nations, donor governments, and NGOs.²⁸ The fact that NGOs are independent operators, answering only to contributors and public scrutiny, creates problems within the international community. In 1990, the Sudanese government requested that the United Nations place tighter reigns on NGO operations. The problems mainly concerned NGOs who operated without host nation permission and sometimes against national security interests.²⁹ Closer coordination between NGOs and the United Nations may discipline the NGO ranks and enhance their support from politically sensitive and resource rich donor governments.

The donor government community is at fault when it comes to coordinating their relief support efforts with on-going U.N. and NGO operations. In their desire to show action, donor governments often waste valuable resources because they failed to fully understand and

coordinate their relief response with the host government and NGOs. The Guatemalan earthquake was one example which I discussed earlier. Another example was the "blanket count" of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. In its early stages, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT's planners determined success by the number of blanket pallets air dropped to the Kurds. Better coordination with host nation and NGO representatives may have resulted in an earlier delivery of critical medical supplies.

Humanitarian Assistance Remedies

The humanitarian assistance community is currently working to improve the interagency coordination situation. Actions taken by the United Nations, donor nations, and NGOs are decreasing reaction times and increasing organizational efficiency.

United Nations' General Assembly Resolution 46/182 constitutes the "road map" for the new United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs.³⁰ The resolution's key elements focus on organization and responsiveness. At all times, the United Nations will provide humanitarian assistance in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality, and impartiality.³¹

For their part, the NGOs are developing standards for conduct and organization that enhance their ability to work in concert with both UN and donor governments. The Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies is establishing guidelines for relations with national military forces.³² NGOs are becoming more responsive by attending United Nations' interagency working groups whose sole purpose is to identify problem areas and find solutions. The U.S. group, InterAction,

is developing standards to encourage "professional competence, ethical practices, and quality services" from its member organizations.

InterAction representatives also conduct seminars for their members to educate them on different organizations participating in the humanitarian assistance field.

Finally, the Department of Defense is changing its attitude toward humanitarian assistance interagency coordination. First, a trend toward common HAOs is developing in doctrine. Standardizing the use of HACCs and CMOCs within the CINCs and JTFs respectively, will facilitate a better understanding of military structure for UN and NGO agencies. At the same time, barriers to effective interagency coordination will weaken, improving consensus and unity of effort.

Attitudes within the armed forces are also changing. In coordination with InterAction, the Army is training U.S. NGOs and its forces collectively during routine exercises. This training secures an understanding of each others' capabilities and limitations and reduces the misunderstandings that often occur during actual HAOs.

Conclusion

The lessons learned from recent humanitarian assistance operations and the U.S. military's changing attitudes toward the UN and NGOs reflect the realization that the military is but one of many organizations in the humanitarian assistance community. The United Nations and NGOs are the major players with respect to interagency coordination and conduct the "grass roots" distribution of relief supplies. The military's role is mainly to provide a secure environment

for the distribution of relief supplies, and for limited logistical support. Its capacity for rapidly transporting massive amounts of supplies to remote locations adds new dimensions to the humanitarian assistance equation. The U.S. military recently demonstrated this capability when it transported water purification equipment, non-stop, from California to Goma, Zaire as part of Operation SUPPORT HOPE. The military's structure and equipment, coupled with the UN and NGOs situational knowledge, produces a powerful team capable of meeting future natural or man made disaster challenges.

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CHAPTER FOUR

CASE STUDIES

Increasingly, US forces will be called upon to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief both at home and abroad. As one of the few nations in the world with the means to rapidly and effectively respond to disaster, many nations depend on us for assistance. Not only must our forces be prepared to provide humanitarian aid, but as seen recently in Northern Iraq, in some cases they must also be prepared to engage in conflict in order to assist and protect those in need.

General Colin Powell, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT Briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee

Introduction

Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE illustrate contemporary C² and interagency coordination concepts for humanitarian assistance operations. These operations also highlight the myriad of complex issues facing our national and military leadership. This chapter involves an investigation of joint task force humanitarian assistance operations in terms of analyzing the situation, end-state development, organization structure, and coordination between governmental agencies and NGOs.

The facts relating to Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE are presented by first discussing the setting. This includes background information concerning the crisis' geo-political setting,

concurrent U.S. government operations, and decisions at the national and CINC level that affected the employment of U.S. forces. Second, I address the military C² system. Here the joint task force organizational structure is presented down to component level. Third, I portray the interagency environment and the systems the joint task force used to coordinate with these outside agencies. In my case study analysis, I evaluate the operations against three criteria:

1. Was a clear command vision established by the NCA, CINC, and JTF leadership?
2. Was the joint task force organizational structure tailored to meet mission requirements?
3. Did the CINC and joint task force commander facilitate interagency coordination through all phases of the operation?

These criteria help define the key command and control problems associated with HAOs and support my recommendations.

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

Setting

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT's setting differs from other recent major HAOs. Many people see Operation PROVIDE COMFORT as a continuation of Operation DESERT STORM rather than a separate and distinct humanitarian assistance operation. The truth is that even though the conditions for the crisis were set during Operation DESERT STORM, there was an apparent difference in the international response. Operation Desert Storm's termination brought a tide of expectations from Islamic minority groups in Southern Iraq and the Kurds in the North.¹ This was

largely due to the psychological operation campaign and comments by President Bush that led the Kurds to believe that the coalition forces would support their efforts to overthrow Saddam Hussein. On 7 March 1991, the Kurds attacked several Iraqi military installations in Northern Iraq.² In keeping with its history of brutal attacks against the Kurdish population, the Iraqi government commenced operations in Northern Iraq using ground forces and helicopter gunships. Without coalition support, the Kurds could not defend themselves against the Iraqi armor and helicopter attacks. This resulted in their retreat into the mountains bordering Turkey. For political reasons, the Turkish government, although expressing sympathy for the plight of the Kurdish refugees, did not allow them to enter Turkey.³ Between 360,00 and 760,000 Kurdish civilians escaped to establish rudimentary mountain camps where they sat freezing and dying of starvation.

In late March, the United Nations reported that as many as two thousand Kurds, mostly children, were dying each day in the mountains.⁴ The Bush administration initially balked at U.S. involvement due to fears of committing a large regional military presence over a prolonged period of time. The administration changed its position as a result of two events: Secretary of State James Baker's situation report explaining the dire living conditions for the refugees and intense international and domestic pressure for the United States to take action. On 5 April 1991, President Bush ordered the Commander in Chief, European Command (USCINCEUR) to commence operations to aid the Kurdish refugees. Additionally, on 5 April, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 688 requiring Iraq to admit the United Nations and

NGOs access to the refugees.⁵ On 7 April, JTF PROVIDE COMFORT conducted the first air drops of food and blankets.⁶

The Organization

Joint Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT started from a preexisting organization, JTF PROVEN FORCE, whose purpose was to coordinate air strikes against Iraq from the Turkish base in Incirlik. The JTF was commanded by Major General Jamerson (U.S. Air Force). The Special Forces component, under Brigadier General Richard Potter, was responsible for combat search and rescue operations over Northern Iraqi.⁷ JTF PROVEN FORCE suited Operation PROVIDE COMFORT's initial support requirements. The JTF's Air Component staff assisted in the planning and execution of initial supply drops. The Special Forces troops were well acquainted with the area and provided invaluable information concerning refugee locations and status. As more countries committed forces, a general concern over the operation's duration became apparent. In response, President Bush decided to deploy additional forces, including a robust command and control element, with an end state of establishing refugee camps that would eventually transition to UN/NGO control. This led to the deployment of Deputy CINC of U.S. Army, Europe, Lieutenant General John Shalikashvili and the Deputy V Corps Commander, Major General Garner. LTG Shalikashvili's mission was to conduct multinational humanitarian operations to provide immediate relief to displaced Iraqi civilians until international relief agencies and private voluntary organizations could assume overall supervision.⁸ Upon their arrival at Incirlek, Turkey JTF PROVIDE COMFORT was

reorganized into Combined Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT (CTFPC) consisting of two subordinate joint task forces(see figure 5).




Figure 5. CTF Provide Comfort C² Organization⁹

CTF PROVIDE COMFORT formed on 17 April under Lieutenant General Shalikashvili's command. Major General Jamerson became the deputy CTF commander, Brigadier General Potter assumed command of JTF Alpha and MG Garner commanded JTF Bravo. In addition to the two JTF commanders, BG Campbell deployed to establish a Civil Affairs command. JTF Alpha's primary focus was to establish contact with the refugees, provide immediate aid, and convince them to move out of the mountains to either

their homes or the camps being established by JTF Bravo.¹⁰ JTF Alpha consisted of the 10th Special Forces Group and Civil Affairs teams from the 354th Civil Affairs Brigade. BG Potter's organization was also responsible for identifying and coordinating with the non-governmental agencies who had already established relief operations.

At the same time Task Force Alpha was moving refugees out of the mountains, Task Force Bravo was surveying, securing, and constructing refugee camps within Iraq. Their mission was to resettle the Kurds in secure locations out of the mountains. Additionally, MG Garner possessed combat forces whose mission was to entice and if necessary force the Iraqi Army out of the Kurdish villages, allowing the Kurds to return to their homes. Coordination at the operational and tactical level with UN agencies and NGOs was essential to the successful transition of operational control from the military.¹¹ Key in this effort was the work done by BG Campbell and the 353d Civil Affairs Command.

Interagency Coordination Measures

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was conducted in an ad hoc fashion, without the benefit of a humanitarian assistance plan. Military forces took advantage of experts available from within the host country (Turkey) and other US governmental agencies.¹² The CTF's Civil Affairs Command was responsible for tying together governmental and non-governmental agency operations into a unified effort. Fortunately for LTG Shalikhvili, BG Campbell (Commander 353d CA Command) supported EUCOM for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and was familiar

with the area of operations to include the U.N. and NGOs. Additionally, the Civil Affairs units and USAID representatives who participated in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT had also operated in Southern Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. This affiliation assisted in building a close civil-military relationship. It also led to meeting the goal of unity of effort between the military, other government agencies, and NGOs faster than initially anticipated.

The transition of relief operations to UN/NGO control was in question during the first weeks of CTF PROVIDE COMFORT's operations. Security for the refugees and coordination between the military forces and UN/NGOs were the greatest challenges facing the CTF. BG Campbell realized that if the CTF was to hand over the operation, he must have a mechanism to coordinate the relief effort. To do this, he established an interagency coordination center in Diyarbakir, Turkey. The interagency coordination center became the focal point for bi-weekly meetings between the military and representatives of participating NGOs, the UN, UNHCR, and USAID.¹³ As the UN's representation grew, it eventually became the umbrella organization that coordinated NGO operations. Finally, on 5 June 1991, the CTF PROVIDE COMFORT transferred operational control to the UNHCR who assumed overall responsibility for coordinating relief activities in Northern Iraq. Figure 6 depicts the interagency coordination links for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT and how the emphasis shifted from the military to the UN as the responsibility for relief operations were taken over by UNHCR.




Figure 6. CTFPC Operational Transition Plan¹⁴

Operation SUPPORT HOPE

Setting

The deaths of the Rwandan and the Burundi Presidents in a mysterious plane crash triggered clashes between rival Hutu and Tutsi tribes. This violence resulted in the dislocation or deaths of over two million people out of a country of 8.1 million.¹⁵ On 28 April 1994, the U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda, David Rawson, declared a state of disaster.¹⁶ USAID immediately deployed Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART) to Kigali, Rwanda; Entebbe, Uganda and Zaire. By far the worst situation outside Rwanda was at Goma, Zaire where an estimated one million people had crossed the border overwhelming the UN and relief agencies.¹⁷ An estimated two thousand people a day were dying from cholera and other related diseases. On 18 July, after meeting with Mr. Brian Atwood (USAID Administrator), President Clinton approved the deployment of U.S. troops to eastern Zaire to provide logistical support for delivery and distribution of desperately needed emergency relief supplies and to provide clean water.¹⁸ USCINCEUR established Joint Task Force SUPPORT HOPE on 22 July and simultaneously began planning, organizing and deploying critical assets in theater.

The Organization

As directed by the President, USCINCEUR established Joint Task Force SUPPORT HOPE to provide assistance to humanitarian agencies and third nation forces conducting relief operations in Zaire and Rwanda.¹⁹ Initially, the JTF consisted of a forward element at Entebbe under the command of Brigadier General Nix while the remainder of the JTF staff

worked from Stuttgart, Germany. On the 25 July 1994, LTG Schroeder, Deputy Commander EUCOM was designated Commander JTF SUPPORT HOPE, and BG Nix, the SETAF Commander, became the Deputy JTF Commander.

Upon notification, BG Nix reported to EUCOM headquarters where the CINC gave his initial guidance that "we are in Rwanda for humanitarian reasons, not for peacekeeping or combat operations. The troops must understand their role."²⁰ This guidance is key, for it established the conditions for military operations. Additionally, it placed limitations on the use of force by the JTF staff.

As supplies and equipment began to flow into Zaire, BG Nix deployed to Entebbe to link-up with Colonel Davis. By the first week in August, the JTF had deployed its major components consisting of the main command post at Entebbe, Uganda; JTF-Alpha at Goma, Zaire; JTF-Bravo located in Kigali, and the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) and the JFACC located at Entebbe (see figure 7). JTF Support Hope's mission statement consisted of four critical tasks.

- 1) Assist ongoing or planned efforts to establish an operational water distribution and purification system at Goma.
- 2) Establish airheads and distribution facilities at Entebbe.
- 3) Provide 24 hour airfield support services as required at Goma, Bukavu, and Kigali. (After the initial assessment, Bukavu airfield was deleted from the list because it could not support sustained operations without a significant engineering effort).




Figure 7. JTF SUPPORT HOPE C² Structure²¹

4) Establish overall management of logistics for humanitarian relief effort in support of UNHCR and civilian relief agencies.²² As the initial main effort, JTF Alpha was responsible for water and transportation support to Goma. BG Nix directed the flow of supplies and the establishment of water purification facilities. JTF Bravo was responsible for opening Kigali airfield and coordinating with United Nations' agencies. The Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) located at Entebbe provided personnel to each subordinate JTF to support

air operations in theater. The JTF staff officers assigned to the CMOC coordinated directly with the USAID, the UN agencies, and NGOs to deconflict requests for military assets and facilitate communications between the participants. The first CMOC was established at Entebbe with the JTF main command post. As the operation progressed a second CMOC at Kigali was opened to further facilitate coordination between the JTF and United Nations.

By 3 August, operations at Goma began to stabilize. The potable water facilities were operating and the refugee death rate dropped from two thousand to two hundred a day.²³ On 19 August, LTG Schroeder refocused his operations toward Kigali signaling the JTF's shift in emphasis to the UN agencies and the NGOs. Kigali became the operation's center of gravity. Located in Kigali was the United Nations center for relief coordination. This center, referred to as the On-Site Operations Coordinating Center (OSOCC), was formed by United Nation's Rwanda Emergency Office to concentrate the UN's relief operations. The OSOCC included representatives from each UN agency, most NGOs, USAID, and the Kigali CMOC.²⁴ Until the operation's completion, the UN's OSOCC was the focal point for interagency coordination.

Interagency Coordination Measures

LTG Schroeder identified the critical nodes essential for mission success. In a message to the CINC, LTG Schroeder stated, "The US military cannot solve the Rwandan refugee issue. This is more appropriately addressed by those national, international, and

non-governmental organizations that have operated in the area for decades."²⁵ With this in mind, he directed the CMOC be the primary military component responsible for interagency coordination. From the beginning, OFDA/DART, the NGOs, and UNHCR established liaison with the CMOC in Entebbe.

The mission of the CMOC was to ensure the effective coordination between the military and civilian efforts by providing a forum for cooperation between all of the principal agencies involved.²⁶ The CMOC was a "clearing-house" for military support requests. Additionally, it educated the UN agencies, NGOs, and U.S. military representatives in each others capabilities and limitations. One illustration of this was when the UNHCR provided vague requests for support, such as "we need water purification in Goma." With expert logisticians, the CMOC was able to define the problems and produce requests at the appropriate level of specificity.²⁷ Over time a mutual respect developed between the military and NGOs. The CMOC provided a critical forum throughout Operation SUPPORT HOPE for the coordination of US military support to humanitarian relief operations.²⁸

Case Study Analysis

Was a Clear Command Vision Established?

Both PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE illustrate the need for clear command guidance in rapid response situations. In HAOs, the situation is not always developed enough for the NCA to provide specific guidance. In this environment, strategic and operational level leadership must provide the JTF commander with a consistent view of what

they want accomplished (end state). At the same time, the JTF commander must understand that this guidance may change and maintain a flexible organizational structure, capable of adapting to new situations.

The President, CINCEUCOM, and the JTF Commander's initial guidance to forces supporting Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was to establish the conditions for ultimate turnover of humanitarian relief operations to the United Nations and relief organizations. The CTF's subordinate and adjacent (UN/UNHCR/NGOs) components understood the concept of operations and end state. As both the UN and CTF organizations grew, both focused on the eventual transition of responsibility. This resulted in the understanding that the entire apparatus would eventually be turned over to the UNHCR. This mutual understanding supported organizational consensus building and unity of effort.

Conversely, Operation SUPPORT HOPE's initial commander's guidance was, "to establish liaison with relief agencies currently working in the crisis area, stop the loss of life due to disease, repatriate refugees, and work with humanitarian organizations to bring a solution to the problem."²⁹ This guidance illustrates the U.S. military's ignorance of HAOs and the role of the U.N. and NGOs. The CINC wanted to solve the problem via military means vice supporting the NGOs and U.N. agencies. It was not until after BG Nix's assessment, that the CINC reevaluated the mission and end state requirements. The initial confusion over mission requirements caused misunderstandings between the CINC's staff and the JTF. On the ground BG Nix was, in effect, supporting the UN and NGO efforts to build a sustainable infrastructure at Goma. The CINC and JTF staffs remained in Germany and

continued to plan according to the initial guidance. What resulted was a "gap" between what was being planned and what was actually executed by the JTF Forward.³⁰ The confused situation within the JTF translated to the UN and NGOs not fully understanding what the US wanted to accomplish. Only after the JTF commander understood the operation's complexity did he refocus on a transition plan involving the international relief agencies.

Was the Organization's Structure Tailored to the Mission?

Issues concerning CTF Provide Comfort and JTF Support Hope's formation and operations occurred in three areas. The first issue involved the ad hoc or piecemeal manner JTFs were formed. This relates to the formation of JTFs from elements of existing organizations. The second issue involves deployment problems. HAOs often require an immediate response to prevent further loss of life. The lack of time for indepth planning, preparation, and deployment encourages the use of "split-base" operations where the operators deploy early and are followed by the remainder of the staff. The third issue involves the level of expertise and training the CTF/JTF staff participants had prior to deployment.

JTF PROVEN FORCE gave CTF PROVIDE COMFORT the luxury of an established headquarters in theater.³¹ Although not equipped or staffed to conduct HAOs, JTF PROVEN FORCE demonstrated agility in quickly reacting to the 5 April NCA directive.³² JTF PROVEN FORCE reduced the time required to establish the CTF. Additionally, the existing communication links between EUCOM and JTF PROVEN FORCE reduced the

confusion normally associated with "split-base" operations. LTG Shalikashvili and MG Garner's arrival indicated a mission change that required reorganization. Due to the nature of coalition operations a combined task force was the only realistic answer to the command and control problem. Fortunately, the nations contributing forces also participated in the Gulf War and the lines of communications were easily established. The advantage CTF PROVIDE COMFORT had over recent operations was the availability of experienced staff officers who were qualified in critical humanitarian assistance fields. The experiences in Kuwait and Southern Iraq afforded the civil affairs units a better understanding of the environment. Their expertise in HAOs and familiarity with other participating USG agencies assisted the CTF's consensus building effort.³³

JTF SUPPORT HOPE also relied on split-based command and control during the early assessment and deployment stages. The JTF operated from two headquarters: the CINC's Crisis Action Team and initially the JTF main were located at Stuttgart, Germany while the JTF forward under BG Nix's control was located at Entebbe.³⁴ Unlike PROVIDE COMFORT, weak communications links existed between the JTF Forward and the Main command posts. This resulted in communications delays between the JTF's rear and forward command posts which further exacerbated the problems the JTF staff was having as it tried to keep pace with the tempo of execution.³⁵ The JTF planning staff was unaware of coordination between the JTF Forward and the UN/NGOs at Entebbe. Time was wasted by the planning staff as they often duplicated the efforts of the JTF Forward. Until the planners deployed to Entebbe, they never overcame this

problem. Once LTG Schroeder established the main command post at Entebbe, the communications problems subsided and the JTF assumed full operational control. The main command post, which was located with the CMOC, could now track and anticipate future requirements. The opening of the Kigali airport and the establishment of a CMOC there, further signalled the consolidation and movement of JTF operations toward transitioning support to the UNDP and UNHCR.

JTF SUPPORT HOPE experienced equipment and personnel problems associated with establishing an "ad hoc" organization. Initially very few secure phone and facsimile lines existed at the JTF headquarters. Automation equipment presented another problem. Members of the JTF staff brought their own computers which resulted in software standardization problems.³⁶ The lack of joint and staff training hindered the JTF's formation. Many members of the staff had never worked together and most performed functions that they received little or no preparatory training.³⁷ Officers untrained with joint operations filled critical JTF staff billets. Delays occurred as officers, unfamiliar with JTF formation and deployment procedures, were trained and experts in the areas of humanitarian assistance operation deployed from state-side locations.³⁸

Civil Affairs CMOC deployed from the United States to augment the staff instead of the CINC providing the necessary skills. Due to the operation's rapid pace, these Civil Affairs experts required time-consuming updates to inform them on the current situation. This created additional delays as these officers familiarized themselves with the area and organizations involved. Once incorporated into the JTF

organization, the civil affairs helped expand the CMOC operations from Entebbe to Kigali where they collocated their operations center with the U.N.'s OSOCC. This significantly enhanced the military to military and military to civilian coordination as the JTF began to disengage in October 1994.

Did the CINC and JTF Commander Encourage Interagency Coordination During all Phases of the Operation?

By the operation's end, both PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE were success stories concerning the organization's coordination with the UN, NGOs, and OFDA/DART. This was not true during the initial stages. Two factors contributed to the problems experienced. First, leaders and planners who were unfamiliar with NGO operations. This initially hindered coordination efforts.³⁹ Second, the planners, unable to foresee interagency requirements, did not deploy the Civil Affairs units into the area of operations early enough to establish liaison with the civilian agencies already supporting the crisis. This lack of understanding by U.S. military leaders often reinforced the stereotypical images NGOs had of military operations. The lessons learned during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT were not lost on the U.N., donor nations, and the NGO community. Many of the changes that fostered better relations between these groups were started as a result of the close relationships developed while assisting the Kurds.

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT's military planners experienced difficulty understanding the loosely organized NGOs and the significance of political and economic factors on NGO operations.⁴⁰ Again, the

factor that led to the CTF's success in Northern Iraq was the presence of qualified experts in the field of interagency coordination and humanitarian assistance. From the beginning, BG Campbell and his civil affairs staff trained the CTF planners. This resulted in fewer mistakes and closer ties with the U.N. in Geneva.⁴¹ Once the CTF formally established operations in Turkey, BG Campbell established the Civil Agency Relief Element (CARE). This was the precursor to the CMOC used in Operation SUPPORT HOPE to establish liaison between the military, OFDA/DART, the U.N., and NGO operations.⁴²

JTF SUPPORT HOPE experienced similar problems early in the operation. The mission of JTF SUPPORT HOPE was to coordinate with and support UNHCR and the NGOs. Coordination between the JTF and relief agencies did not come to fruition until BG Nix arrived in Goma.⁴³ The JTF did not have permission to enter Kigali until 30 July 1994. Compounding this problem was the delay in establishing a fully functional CMOC. This was, in part, due to the late arrival of civil affairs teams.⁴⁴ Once established, the Civil Military Operations Center became the epitome of interagency coordination. The CMOC, along with its logistics cell, established the critical link between U.S. governmental resources and relief agency requirements.

Conclusion

The ultimate goal of all military humanitarian assistance operations is to react in the shortest time possible, initiate immediate relief operations, and establish a base organization that allows US forces to smoothly turn over operations to UN and international

organizations.⁴⁵ Large scale operations require a smooth integration and cooperation of multinational military forces and civilian relief organizations.⁴⁶ The successes of Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE demonstrate the agility and flexibility US forces bring to HAOs. At the same time, these operations also illustrate that ad hoc, untrained staffs waste valuable time as they form and become operational.

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CHAPTER FIVE
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

Humanitarian assistance operations are characterized as a non-system, a series of ad hoc responses to the differing circumstances and geographical locations of each major emergency.¹

Stephen Green, International Disaster Relief: Toward a Responsive System

Introduction

The United States will continue to call upon its armed forces to support humanitarian assistance operations both at home and abroad. A major challenge to planners within this arena involves the development of command and control structures. In light of the environmental influences affecting U.S. military operations, the organizational structure needs to support internal flexibility and facilitate interoperability between itself and the other relief agencies. This is a difficult task due to the quick-reaction required for most disaster assistance operations. The regional CINCs are the central figures who must respond to the President's call. Therefore, it is the CINC's staff that plan and organize our nation's military response. Joint and combined task forces must deploy with the resources necessary to meet the President's objectives and foster a sense of teamwork within the international community.

During United Nations sponsored HAOs, it is often the joint task force commander who represents the United States' national will and purpose. It is his responsibility to create an atmosphere that promotes unity of effort between participating organizations. Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE demonstrated that the joint and combined task force organization is the most effective means the U.S. has to respond rapidly to humanitarian crisis situations.

Joint Task Force Limiting Factors

Even though joint task forces present the best command and control option, as seen in the case studies problems exist that limit their efficiency. The first of these limitations involves the CINC's decision concerning the actual joint task force structure. CINC's may form joint task forces in three ways; by combining individuals to form an ad hoc organization, by using a service component headquarters, or by developing deployable joint task force from the regional CINC's staff. Each option has distinct advantages and disadvantages depending on the situation in which the organization functions. Below is a discussion of each structure and where it might best be employed.

The second problem area involves interagency awareness. This awareness relates to the joint task force staff's experience and training level. It is the CINC's responsibility to employ experienced and trained organizations. In the realm of humanitarian assistance, this means the staff must not only understand joint operations, but must also know how to function in a new environment with governmental and non-governmental organizations.

The third limitation involves interoperability. An organization's effectiveness is often measured by the level of coordination between its internal components and its environment. The development of standard operating procedures that are understood by both the joint and combined forces and NGOs represents a means of increasing interoperability.

JTF Organization Options

In the 1992 National Military Strategy, for the first time the JCS recognized humanitarian assistance as an essential operational means to accomplish a strategic end.² Successful military support for HAOs often strengthens our national foreign policy. Although military participation in relief operations is usually limited in duration and scope, military planners must be trained to operate in this environment. Ill-equipped and untrained staffs may degrade relief operations to the point of negatively affecting the strategic end state.³

The normal U.S. response to disaster relief is the formation of an ad hoc joint task force. In addition to ad hoc organizations, CINCs also may choose to employ single service organizations or permanent joint task forces. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT illustrates the advantages of a single service task force in response to limited missions. Here we saw a predominately Air Force organization known as JTF PROVEN FORCE execute the initial drops of relief supplies on 5 April 1991. This organization satisfactorily supported the initial requirements established by the President and the CINC.

The primary drawback of a single service JTF is the participants lack of joint experience and awareness of sister service resources. During Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the JTF PROVEN FORCE structure accomplished the initial mission of dropping relief supplies to Kurdish refugees. Once the Operation PROVIDE COMFORT's scope grew, it was necessary to expand the headquarters to provide the proper level of command and control for the additional U.S Army, Navy, Marine, and international forces. If the JTF headquarters does not represent the force structure, difficulties arise as a result of the lack of the interservice experience that a fully integrated staff possesses.⁴ The lack of staff representation forces components to augment the JTF staff.

The advantages to a predominately single service joint task force are in reaction time and interoperability. Again, during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, JTF PROVEN FORCE's structure complemented the initial mission. The organization was trained in and equipped for the initial air drop of relief supplies. Additionally, JTF PROVEN FORCE established, through Air Force channels, the procedures necessary to expedite the movement and reception of relief supplies.

The third option open to the CINC is to form a permanent joint task force. This option gives the CINC an "in-house" organization to draw upon. Additionally, the organization may be tailored to meet the specific mission requirements. The greatest advantage is that this type of joint task force is fully integrated staff versed in joint operations, and CINC specific standard operating procedures. A permanent JTF provides the CINC with an organization capable of rapid deployment and requires little or no augmentation or training.

The disadvantage to a permanent JTF is cost. The CINCs are not normally resourced to establish permanent joint task forces. An organization of this nature, in today's environment of fiscal austerity, would "come out of hide." Another disadvantage is unless the CINC can justify its existence, a permanent humanitarian assistance task force may not be feasible. As a result, the formation of permanent JTFs depends on requirements for its services and resources available. It is unclear whether or not CINCs would prefer this method over an ad hoc or service predominant organization.

JTF Training Requirements

The responsibility for joint training lies with the regional commander in chief.⁵ Every military planner on a CINC's staff must understand the requirements and possess the tools to ensure complete interservice, interagency, and country-specific coordination.⁶ Rarely are JTF staff officers and non-commissioned officers trained to operate in the joint and combined setting. A train-up period is often required to educate JTF staff members on standard operating and reporting procedures.⁷ Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and SUPPORT HOPE demonstrated a lack of organizational and training skills by the JTF staffs to support HAOs. In both cases, the joint task force commander initially had neither the structure nor the qualified people to coordinate military, U.N., and NGO operations. Trial and error finally led the JTF to acquire the combination of facilities and expertise needed for interagency coordination.

The CINCs and JCS are currently examining several methods that will better prepare joint task forces for joint, combined and interagency operations. Two methods being examined are the formation of a Deployable Joint Task Force (DJTF), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff formation of the Joint Warfighting Center.

The first method involves the creation of Deployable Joint Task Forces (DJTF) from within the CINC's staff. DJTFs differ from permanent JTFs, in that, they are primarily C² planning cells within the CINC's headquarters. There is usually no pre-identified commander and no subordinate service components.

Currently, DJTFs are operating in USACOM, and PACOM. The organization is usually a joint staff directorate on the CINC staff. Unlike a standing JTF, the DJTF is primarily an augmentation cell. The DJTF provides responsive joint staff expertise in Crisis Action Planning (CAP) during training exercises and actual operations. The DJTF augments the JTF headquarters with officers and non-commissioned officers who make the staff joint.⁹ By staffing the DJTF with trained Civil Affairs personnel, the joint task force commander can shorten his organizational interagency learning curve. These specially trained officers and non-commissioned officers coordinate with United Nations, U.S. governmental agencies, and NGOs operating within the CINC's AOR.

The advantage of a DJTF is that it is a cost effective way for the CINC to ensure operational standardization within the joint task force. Unable to afford a permanent joint task force, the CINC deploys this trained cell of "joint experts" to augment the organization and support the flow of information within the joint task force headquarters

and between the organization and its environment. The second advantage to the DJTF is its adaptability. It can be tailored to meet mission requirements. Therefore, in the case of a humanitarian assistance operation, the DJTF deploys with Civil Affairs and logistics experts who understand the characteristics of the agencies involved.

The primary disadvantage to the formation of a Deployable Joint Task Force is keeping qualified personnel. Maintaining a trained and experienced team of officers and non-commissioned officers is difficult in a era of reduced manning. Often these organizations surge for a specific operation or exercise. CINCs should place a high priority on the training and stability of officers and non-commissioned officers assigned to DJTFs. This is the only means by which they gain and maintain the level of expertise required for rapid deployment support to the JTF.

The second method recommended involves a training option available to all CINCs. In September 1994, the JCS Joint Doctrine Center and the Joint Warfare Center combined to form the Joint Warfighting Center at Fort Monroe Virginia. The Joint Warfighting Center's mission:

Assist the CJCS, CINCs, and service chiefs in their preparation for joint and multinational operations in the conceptualization, development, and assessment of current and future joint doctrine and in the accomplishment of joint and multinational training and exercises. This package focuses on the establishment of joint task forces and the execution of joint operations.⁹

Additionally, the Joint Warfighting Center produces training seminars and exercise packages to support the CINCs interagency coordination requirements.

The Joint Warfighting Center supports CINC directed exercises by training joint staffs in the areas of interagency coordination and joint operations. These exercises allow the CINC to refine the joint task force structure. This saves valuable time that is often wasted during an operation's initial stages. With a limited number of qualified civil affairs experts and increased requests for their services, the Joint Warfighting Center training gives the CINCs an organic means to support their civil affairs assessments. These officers and non-commissioned officers are then better prepared to make initial recommendations concerning the operation's scope, environment, and mission requirements.

There are really no disadvantages to this method of training CINC and JTF staffs. The greatest asset the JWC provides the CINC involves time and location. During these exercises, the CINC assembles all the players that would normally be involved in an operation. This is an excellent opportunity for the development and refinement of standard operating procedures. Additionally, as exercises progress, the organizations become better prepared to execute contingency operations.

JTF Interoperability

The CINC's greatest challenge is interoperability. As stated in chapter two, the problem of interoperability exists in all organizations that must coordinate their actions and receive support from outside agencies. In chapter three, we saw where this problem was magnified due to the variety of governmental agencies and NGOs. That is why it is difficult to predict the interoperability requirements during

HAOs. The joint task force commander must ensure he is capable of operating with a wide range of organizations whose structures and equipment capabilities do not necessarily support interagency coordination requirements. The primary means of evaluating interoperability is if an organization shows it can process timely and accurate information flow into and out of the JTF commander's headquarters.

The CINC's Civil Affairs professionals must actively track and analyze the development of a crisis situation. Civil affairs units cannot react fast enough to support a CINC's initial information requirements. As was the case during Operation SUPPORT HOPE, it was too late in the decision cycle to wait for the Civil Affairs units to deploy into theater to determine the interagency support requirements.¹⁰ JTF commander's must understand that in emergency response situations the organization's structural requirements may change as a result of changing situations. The CINC's staff officers are responsible for ensuring the joint task force is capable of operating within its environment. By placing qualified civil affairs experts with both the Crisis Action Team and the JTF, the CINC receives a better understanding of the situation at all levels. In addition, it enhances the information flow between the unified command and the JTF concerning U.N. and NGO operations. Operation SUPPORT HOPE demonstrated a need for greater continuity between the CINC's Crisis Action Team and the forming JTF staff. It was not until the CMOC was established at Entebbe, Uganda that a link existed between external agencies and the JTF.

The CINC's Political Advisor (POLAD) is one avenue through which information concerning governmental and non-governmental operations can be transmitted to the forming joint task force. The Political Advisor is usually an experienced foreign service officer who is familiar with the CINC's AOR and can advise the staff concerning State Department and USAID operations in theater. In addition, through his connections at the United Nations, the POLAD is a conduit for information pertaining to non-governmental agency operations. Whatever the means employed, the staff must provide the CINC the situational awareness that best represents the environment. This awareness enables the CINC to better recommend options to the President and Secretary of Defense. It also provides him with the necessary tools to draft his initial concept statement for the joint task force and determine the best organizational structure.

Conclusions

Disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations force commanders into non-standard environments which result in adjustments to proven methods of command and control.¹¹ Humanitarian assistance environmental considerations define the military organization, its manner of communication and its relationship with governmental and non-governmental partners. The joint forces commander must be capable of rapidly developing an operational concept and the guidance leading to organizational development. He can only satisfy the organization's structural needs if he understands this environment. The joint task force organization must retain the greatest amount of flexibility

possible. The situation will change and the organization must be capable of adjusting to meet new challenges. This requirement necessitates the development of information systems, which assess the situation and provide immediate feedback to commanders and staffs.

The commander must develop an early understanding of what the military organization must accomplish and then structure it accordingly. In the realm of HAOs, understanding relief organization's needs is not always obvious. That is why, from its inception, the organization planners must place a high premium on interoperability. The joint task force is useless if it cannot communicate its intent to the relief organizations and receive information from them. Developing human and technological systems that match or support those used by relief organizations builds confidence and a sense of commonality among the participants. The commander who anticipates his humanitarian assistance challenges establishes systems that are linked to the U.N., governmental agencies, and NGOs. In addition, he educates and trains his staff and subordinates in interagency coordination techniques, and promotes interoperability between himself and his environment. These efforts position his command and control systems for success during U.N. sponsored HAOs.

Summary

This study examined the command and control dilemma faced by forces supporting United Nations led humanitarian assistance operations. The first obstacle that needed resolution was defining command and control and how this concept is applied to the humanitarian assistance

environment. What resulted was to discard the notion of unity of command and replace it with unity of effort when referring to interagency coordination. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is one example of a military organization built on compromise that achieves its goals through the consensus of 16 member nations. Another key concept linked to command and control is the commander's concept of operations. This is especially pertinent to HAOs. The information received by the CINC will form the basis for his concept of operations. This concept establishes the organizational and C² structure design criteria. Whether an organization is designed for success is largely dependent on the commander's initial concept.

The next facet of HAOs discussed was its major participants and interagency coordination requirements. This discussion illustrated the difficulties the joint force commander incurs when he attempts to identify a lead organization or agency within the NGO arena. In addition, we saw how the political realities of neutrality affect the manner in which the military is viewed by the U.N. and NGO community. Finally, military humanitarian assistance support operations in Northern Iraq and Central Africa illustrated our accomplishments and failures to facilitate civil-military interagency coordination. They also demonstrated how the CINC's staff must establish early liaison and coordination with the lead UN agency during relief efforts.

Endnotes

¹Stephen Green, International Disaster Relief: Toward a Responsive System (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980), 30.

²Ernest L. Sutton, COL, U.S. Army, The New Role of Humanitarian Assistance in National Military Strategy: How to Make it Work (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1992), 1.

³Many members of JTF Support Hope in Rwanda had never before operated in a joint or combined environment. Their lack of familiarity with joint publications and procedures created delays in organizing and executing the complex array of command and control responsibilities a JTF staff must accomplish.

⁴As a joint task force command and control observer/controller while assigned with the Battle Command Training Program, the author witnessed the formation of joint task forces from all five regional CINCs. These JTFs varied in complexion from ad hoc organizations to predominately single service command and control structures. JTF headquarters that were predominantly single service experienced difficulties coordinating sister service operations. Usually this type of structure requires a significant amount of liaison between the component and JTF headquarters.

⁵Joint Publication 3-0, II-13.

⁶Sutton, 5.

⁷U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT After Action Report (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Center, 1994), 5.

⁸CINCUSACOM Deployable Joint Task Force 140 Standard Operating Procedures.

⁹Joint Warfighting Center Command Briefing Slides, 4.

¹⁰The commander of Operation SUPPORT HOPE realized early-on that the center of gravity for transitioning humanitarian assistance operations to the United Nations was in Kigali, Rwanda. Kigali was where the U.N.'s lead agency was located, as well as the U.N.'s OSOCC. The commander's problem was that he did not have enough qualified C.A. specialist to cover both the main command post and efforts to establish a C.A. presence in Kigali. Only after CONUS based C.A. forces arrived in theater was he able to stand-up CMOC operations in Kigali.

¹¹The environment refers to the external influences that impact on JTF humanitarian assistance operations. These influences are the organizations, agencies, governments, and other elements that the joint force commander must take into consideration when structuring his organization.

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