RESEARCH STUDY 59-3

Prediction of Effective Officer Performance
Research Studies are special reports to military management. They are usually prepared to meet requests for research results bearing on specific management problems. A limited distribution is made—primarily to the operating agencies directly involved.
SUMMARY

The purpose of this Research Study is to summarize events leading to the planning and development of situational performance tests as criteria for the Research Task, "Identification of Potential Officer Leaders" (retitled by DCSPER, "Prediction of Effective Officer Performance" for FY 60 Work Program).

Research considerations and recommendations by the Army Scientific Advisory Panel indicated that situational performance tests would be the most objective, reliable, and valid means of assessing the differential leadership of officers in the follow-up phase of this research task. Situational performance tests provide for performance on tasks which are a sample of the job. This type of performance criterion (as contrasted to retrospective evaluations and work products) attempts to reproduce the critical elements of the job in miniature. Since field observation and logical analysis of officer MOS schedules had led to the hypothesis that psychological demands differ among administrative, technical, and combat type jobs, situational tests corresponding to these three job areas were chosen as the principal technique to be used in follow-up evaluation.

Original plans called for development of 20 situational tests—a number believed to give reasonable assurance of success in achieving differential officer prediction. These tests were to be administered to 1500 examinees (all officers of an original group of 5000 who had been administered a large battery of experimental predictor tests from January 1958 to June 1959 at 11 branch basic schools). Testing was to be conducted at two evaluation centers—one in CONUS in FY 60 and in FY 61 and one in USAFEUR in FY 61. Major support requirements, submitted from TAG to DCSPER by D/F in December 1958, were 21 officers and 66 enlisted men for each center plus a total of $105,000 for travel and TDY for examinees, logistic support, and 12 square miles of terrain. Staffing action by the sponsor (DCSPER) continued over a period of several months because of a general shortage of personnel spaces and a reduction of the Army manpower ceiling.

In May 1959, DCSPER requested a plan which would reduce the support requirements to that needed for the minimum number of test situations which would still justify a performance testing approach but under conditions which would reduce to the barest acceptable minimum the likelihood of achieving differential prediction. In response to this request, the situations were reduced to thirteen—five combat, four technical and four administrative—which would cover some of the most critical aspects of officer performance. Support requirements were correspondingly reduced to 9 EAD officers, 24 RFA officers and 9 EM for each center. Logistical support was scaled down to approximately 2/3 of that originally required. Terrain requirements were reduced to 10 square miles. Testing time was reduced to 38 hours per examinee over a 5-day period instead of 59 hours over a 5-day period.

In June 1959, DCSPER advised TAG that although the desirability of completing the research task by using situational performance tests (in the interest of differential selection aspects of the research) was recognized, the relative priority for the required personnel support in relation to other requirements was determined to be insufficiently high to be supported under the personnel restrictions faced by the Army at that time. DCSPER accordingly directed TAG to a) complete the officer prediction research using the next most appropriate criterion measures, such as ratings, in place of the scores on performance tests administered at evaluation centers, and b) to continue work on those situational performance tests nearing completion so that the research battery could be held for possible future use in connection with appropriate research.
PREDICTION OF EFFECTIVE OFFICER PERFORMANCE

STATE OF THE ART

The demands for competent officers in modern war require persons with aptitude and personal characteristics necessary for success as commissioned officers. A long-term research objective of the Army has been improved techniques and criteria for the selection and rejection of officer applicants.

Traditionally the requirements for officer leaders are set forth in general terms such as Decisiveness, Initiative, Judgment, etc. The present state of the art is not such that these terms are immediately researchable. Techniques do exist, however, for turning the present literary meaning of these terms into tangible and objective behavioral referents which themselves will be amenable to the application of experimental techniques. Thus far, research conducted in the military service has shown considerable success in the development and use of tests which permit early identification of individuals who will successfully complete officer training and perform well in military assignments. The technical promise of doing research to identify special facets of job competence and special abilities peculiar to high level jobs has been increased through prior research for the U. S. Military Academy, Command and General Staff College, OCS, and ROTC.

ORIGINS OF THE PERFORMANCE TESTING REQUIREMENT

Near the end of 1954, the Secretary of the Army established a special committee headed by Dr. Harry Harlow to "make a critical review and analysis of the Army program in human resources research and to make recommendations for the improvement of the program." The committee issued its report in March 1955 recommending that "the Personnel Research Branch increase its research effort to discover new and improved methods of selecting, assigning, and developing leaders at both commissioned and non-commissioned levels."

In May 1955, the Chief, R and D directed The Adjutant General to add to the FY 1956 personnel research work program "a task with the objective of developing improved techniques and criteria for selection of persons with aptitude and personal characteristics conducive to their success as commissioned leaders." TAO's research proposal, then estimated as an eight-year project, was submitted to the Chief, R and D on 6 June 1955 and approved in principle on 13 June 1955. On 2 April 1956 this task was recommended for approval to the Chief, R and D by the Army Personnel and Training Advisory Committee, whose members consisted of representatives from DCSPER, DCSOPS, DCSLOG, ACSI, USCONARC, and R and D. Later that year the Army established a special committee to advise on officer selection research. Dr. Leonard Carmichael, Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, chaired this group. After more than a year of study, this group advised the Army to put more emphasis on the selection of young combat leaders and to concentrate on developing (combat) performance measures. This report was forwarded by Chief R and D to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, the task sponsor.
On 14 January 1958 DCSPER provided guidance that increased emphasis on combat officer selection should be given high priority. However, this emphasis was not to retard work on the Differential Officer Selection Project; moreover, the research effort was to include establishment of firm criteria of (combat) officer performance against which predictive measures could be validated. This guidance was incorporated into the task statement which was approved by the Chief of Research and Development.

DESIGN OF THE RESEARCH

Basic Hypothesis. Field observation and analyses of officer MOS schedules led to the hypothesis that psychological demands differ among combat, technical, and administrative assignments and that these differences are predictable. The chart shows performance profiles for four officers with theoretically different patterns of performance in combat, technical, and administrative assignments.

The Research Approach. After deciding upon the three main areas of assignment for study, in which over 400 MOS were examined, PRB research psychologists made a check of whether operational efficiency reports could adequately reflect the differential psychological demands from job to job. The efficiency reports of 10,000 officers were analyzed and the results showed no evidence of differential psychological demands among combat, technical, and administrative officer assignments or among any other groupings of officer assignments. A single dimension appeared to account for the interrelationships among the operational efficiency reports.

The second phase was a large scale effort which involved the construction and administration of a large battery of experimental predictor tests. The instruments in this battery were constructed in FY 1957-58. From January 1958 through FY 1959, the tests were administered at eleven basic branch schools to 5000 officers (regular and reserve) reporting for two or more years of active duty. Preliminary analyses of these test results begun in FY 1959 were to continue through FY 1960.

The third phase consisted of the development of situational performance tests, to be described in detail below.

The fourth phase is to consist of validation. The effectiveness of the experimental battery is to be determined in predicting success in the jobs which fall under the broad classifications of combat, technical, and administrative fields. From the complete analysis, a final test is to be made of the major hypothesis—that combat, administrative, and technical jobs have differing psychological requirements and that suitability of individuals for meeting these requirements is predictable.

End-Result Expected. From this research is expected a better definition of the psychological demands for officer performance on specific types of jobs and improved criteria for the selection or early identification of potential officers.
POSSIBLE LEADERSHIP PERFORMANCE PROFILES
FOR FOUR DIFFERENT OFFICERS IN THE AREAS OF
COMBAT, ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL ASSIGNMENTS
THE SITUATIONAL TESTS

Original Plan. Twenty situational tests were originally planned—eight combat, six technical, and six administrative. Tests for the technical and administrative areas were developed with the help of military advisors provided by DCSLOG. The outline scenarios of combat situations were developed with assistance from the Ranger and Special Subjects Departments of The Infantry School and later with representatives of the Artillery and Guided Missile and Armored Schools provided by CONARC. Personnel, equipment, terrain and office space were planned as necessary for the administration of the situational tests. These needs made it advisable that the testing be performed at designated centers to which the examinees were to report rather than by testing teams which could visit areas where examinees may be. Each examinee was to be tested almost continuously for five days. Input was planned at the rate of twelve examinees per week per center, a figure that represented the optimum compromise between maximizing flow of examinees and minimizing support requirements. To obtain the desired number of cases for analysis, it was planned to operate a center for a period of 18 months.

The Setting. To give continuity and meaning to the testing, the simulated context of a MAAG was used. The examinee, newly assigned to the MAAG, would be delegated responsibilities formerly those of a higher ranking officer. His first two days would be spent undertaking technical and administrative tasks in a peacetime setting. On the third day, the host nation would be attacked and the examinee would be assigned technical and administrative tasks in a simulated war-time setting. The examinee would be required to remain awake all of the night preceding the third testing day, and thus on the evening of the third day would begin the combat situations fatigued and preferably hungry as well. The combat situations were designed on the combined arms concept and would reflect, to about 25% of the total of the two days of combat testing time, the responsibilities of the combat officer in future warfare.

In summary, the technical and administrative tests cover problems in the installation and maintenance, repair, construction, transportation, supply, office management, and staff-work sub areas. The combat arms tests include strenuous field activities, general combat leadership, command post activities, and the tactical deployment of Artillery and Armored units. The ability of the examinees to lead troops, communicate and coordinate effectively, and to solve tactical, logistical and administrative problems was assessed. Support troops and operational equipment were to be used to the extent feasible to add realism and validity to the tests.

Personnel Requirements. To operate the two centers, a total of 174 persons was required. In summary, technical and administrative situations would require 9 officers and 14 enlisted men for each center; combat situations would require 9 officers and 40 enlisted men for each center; command and support functions for operation of the centers themselves would require 3 officers and 12 enlisted men per center. These figures represented minimum
estimates consistent with a fair simulation of realism. If officers are to be evaluated for leadership ability, they must have enlisted men to lead and they must interact with other officers. The figures cited provide the minimum estimate for manning of the testing situations and overhead operation of the centers.

THE MODIFIED PLAN

13 Situations. The plan requested by DCSPER in May 1959 which would reduce support requirements to a minimum included the following: (Outlines of each test appear in Appendix A including a statement of the behavior measured and a brief of the situation. Outlines of the seven tests not selected for the modified plan appear in Appendix B.)

a. Forward Observer (Combat)
b. Road Block (Combat)
c. Perimeter Defense (Combat)
d. Plan Tactical March (Combat)
e. Combat Patrol (Combat)
f. Exhibit (Technical)
g. Production Difficulties (Technical)
h. Radioactivity (Technical)
i. Road Damage Survey (Technical)
j. Site Selection (Administrative)
k. Highway Traffic Regulation (Administrative)
l. Improper Supply Records (Administrative)
m. Office Problem (Administrative)

General Requirements for the Modified Plan.

a. Personnel (one center): 9 EAD officers, 24 RFA officers and 9 EM for FY 60
   (two centers): 18 EAD officers, 48 RFA officers and 18 EM for FY 61.

b. Logistical support is scaled down to approximately 2/3 of that required by the original plan because fewer situations are utilized. Terrain requirement will be about 10 square miles per center.

c. Financial plan is the same as for the original plan.
APPENDIXES

Appendix A  Outlines of 13 Situational Tests in Modified Plan

Appendix B  Outlines of 7 Situational Tests not used in Modified Plan
APPENDIX A

OUTLINES OF 13 SITUATIONAL TESTS IN MODIFIED PLAN

I. FORWARD OBSERVER (Combat)

A. Behavior Measured

This situation measures the examinee's ability to perceive terrain characteristics, evidence of enemy activity, and potential targets, to make rapid estimates of range and azimuth, and to communicate this tactical information and commands with clarity, conciseness, and speed. More specifically, it measures his ability to direct fire onto visible targets.

B. Brief of Situation

Examinee is assigned to an FO position. He detects and reports targets and calls for fire on the most important. Simulators explode at various distances from the targets. Examinee must correct the fix and bring it on the targets. During the action, simulated enemy fire is directed on the observer.

II. ROAD BLOCK (Combat)

A. Behavior Measured

This situation measures the examinee's ability to apply basic tactical principles and to communicate important information to others. More specifically, it measures his ability to judge anticipated enemy actions, scope of battle situations and development of forces. It also measures his ability to plan offensive and defensive actions quickly and accurately with limited resources and to direct subordinates through face-to-face contact, motivation, and control.

B. Brief of Situation

The examinee is furnished with information about the expected passage of an enemy column through a particular area. He is ordered to prepare a road block to stop the movement. He must then make all necessary preparations which include map and terrain reconnaissance, selection of site, preparation of orders, and training and rehearsing the members of his patrol.
III. PERIMETER DEFENSE

A. Behavior Measured

This situation measures the examinee's resourcefulness. More specifically, it measures his ability to judge anticipated enemy actions, scope of battle situations and development of forces, also his ability to plan offensive and defensive actions quickly and accurately with limited resources, and to direct subordinates through face-to-face contact, motivation, and control.

B. Brief of Situation

The examinee is given the mission to defend an area into which supplies are to be brought in by air. He is provided with information about the terrain and enemy forces. He must then plan and organize the defense of the drop area.

IV. PLAN TACTICAL MARCH (Combat)

A. Behavior Measured

This situation measures the ingenuity and foresight of the examinee—his ability to judge anticipated enemy action, scope of battle situations, and development of forces, and his ability to plan offensive and defensive actions quickly and accurately with limited resources.

B. Brief of Situation

The examinee is ordered to write a plan for the tactical movement of a company-sized unit from an assembly area to a link-up with other friendly forces. He is provided with a map, information about the strength and disposition of the enemy forces, and a stipulated quantity of personnel and equipment.

V. COMBAT PATROL (Combat)

A. Behavior Measured

This situation evaluates the examinee's ingenuity in resolving emergency problems under harassing conditions. Specifically, it measures the examinee's persistence in continuing on his mission despite apparently overwhelming difficulties, his ability to select relevant situational factors for the making of quick decisions in rapidly changing conditions, and his ability to withstand psychological stress under simulated prison-of-war conditions.
B. Brief of Situation

On the mission of making a hit-and-run attack on an enemy material cache under atomic war conditions, the examinee is faced with a series of problems requiring rapid decisions. He will be confronted with emergency situations requiring ingenious use of available resources for positive action. In a radiation-contaminated area he takes a prisoner who is wearing radiation-repellent clothing. In attempting to bring this clothing back to headquarters he is taken prisoner and subjected to questioning and psychological harassment. The captors change their attitudes to friendly and benevolent treatment. Opportunities for escape are provided to ascertain whether the examinee is self- or mission-minded.

VI. EXHIBIT (Technical)

A. Behavior Measured

This situation measures the examinee's adaptability to technical equipment and equipment systems. Specifically, it measures the examinee's ability to make maximum effective use of enlisted personnel, and make on-the-spot diagnoses in a trouble-shooting context—directing subordinates in checking and using equipment and collecting detailed information, and analyzing equipment breakdowns and alternate solutions to technical problems. Also it measures his ability to initiate independent action to solve technical problems, making resourceful use of material expedients, and train subordinate in use of technical equipment.

B. Brief of Situation

The examinee is required to make a final check-out of an operating exhibit of a communications net. There are certain prearranged "bugs" in the net, which the examinee must uncover and correct. He is given as an assistant an EN who will do only what he is told.

VII. PRODUCTION DIFFICULTIES (Technical)

A. Behavior Measured

This situation measures the examinee's ability to analyze, plan, and communicate effectively. Specifically, it measures the ability of the examinee to analyze production data and alternate solutions to technical problems; his ability to communicate technical details, principles, and plans coherently, concisely, and smoothly in writing and orally; his ability to organize units for efficient shop operation.
B. Brief of Situation

The examinee is given the production records and present organization of a typical armament platoon of an indigenous ordnance direct support company. An examination of the records will reveal that a number of management and shop principles are not being put into practice, e.g., the assignment of repair jobs to shop personnel is not on the basis of their proficiency in repairing different types of equipment. The examinee must meet with his CO and brief him on how the productivity of his unit could be increased. He must then write a staff study.

VIII. RADIOACTIVITY (Technical)

A. Behavior Measured

This situation measures the steadiness of the examinee in performing complex tasks under pressure. Specifically, it measures the ability of the examinee to direct subordinates in checking and using equipment and collect detailed information; communicate technical details, principles and plans coherently, concisely, smoothly (a) in writing, (b) orally; organize teams for radiological survey; persist in technical task despite personal losses, time pressures, harassment and fatigue; and train subordinates in use of technical equipment.

B. Brief of Situation

The examinee is required to brief a team of inexperienced EM on the fundamentals of radiation surveys, including how to operate radiac meters. Later he must direct by radio their activities in the conduct of such a survey. He must estimate future dose rate contours from the data collected. The radio activity and road damage surveys are conducted concurrently.

IX. ROAD DAMAGE SURVEY (Technical)

A. Behavior Measured

This situation measures the attentiveness and perseverance of the examinee. Specifically, it measures the ability of the examinee to direct subordinates in checking and using equipment and collecting detailed information; to communicate technical details, principles and plans coherently, concisely, and smoothly in writing and orally; to organize teams for road damage survey; and to persist in technical task despite road obstacles, personnel losses, time pressures, harassment and fatigue.
B. Brief of Situation

The examinee must brief a group of inexperienced NCO's on how to conduct a road damage survey. He must assign the routes which four survey teams will cover and specify the information they will collect. He must direct the activities of the teams by radio so as to insure that accurate and complete information is obtained. The radio activity and road damage surveys together take 7 hours to complete.

X. SITE SELECTION (Administrative)

A. Behavior Measured

This situation measures the logistical judgment of the examinee. Specifically, it measures the ability of the examinee to extract and interpret information on a variety of factors pertinent to site selection; simultaneously consider these factors in evaluating the desirability of alternative site locations; justify recommended site locations to his CO.

B. Brief of Situation

The examinee must select four sites for the location of petroleum and subsistence depots from a list of 12 possible locations. From detailed maps of the areas, route reconnaissance reports, intelligence summary reports and other G-2 documents, the examinee must extract information on such factors as the vulnerability, accessibility, terrain features, transportation and communication facilities, and available labor supply of each of the 12 suggested site locations. The examinee must also justify his recommendations to his CO.

XI. HIGHWAY TRAFFIC REGULATION (Administrative)

A. Behavior Measured

This situation measures the resourcefulness and ingenuity of the examinee in accomplishing a logistical support mission. Specifically, it measures the ability of the examinee to plan logistical support for a large scale tactical operation; persist in administrative task despite tedium, time pressure, harassment, unforeseen contingencies, and fatigue; and to initiate logistical plans and decisions in response to rapid political and military changes.

B. Brief of Situation

The examinee must designate routes for the movement of troops and supplies from rear areas to combat zones. He must extract and utilize information from maps, overlays, and route recon-
naissance reports in order to develop a highway regulation plan which makes maximum use of existing highway facilities. He must select appropriate locations for highway regulation and traffic control points.

XII. IMPROPER SUPPLY RECORDS (Administrative)

A. Behavior Measured

This situation measures the thoroughness and carefulness of the examinee and his tact and persuasiveness in dealing with other officers. Specifically, it measures his ability to analyze supply records, and communicate discrepancies tactfully to a superior officer, and to write a summary memorandum quickly and concisely.

B. Brief of Situation

The examinee is told to investigate the cause of some apparent discrepancies between the requisitioning objectives and balances on hand of certain commodities being supplied to the allied country. An analysis of stock accounting records of these items will indicate that the discrepancies are due to improper record maintenance procedures. The examinee must tactfully explain to an allied supply officer the necessity for adhering to proper stock accounting procedures and write a memorandum for the record.

XIII. OFFICE PROBLEM (Administrative)

A. Behavior Measured

This situation measures the examinee's ability to organize administrative tasks efficiently. Specifically, it measures the ability of the examinee to analyze personnel records procedures, job descriptions, and organizational and work-flow charts; communicate critical evaluations coherently, concisely, and smoothly in writing and orally; perceive social factors, interrelationships and attitudes influencing unit performance; and suggest how an inefficiently functioning office could be reorganized.

B. Brief of Situation

The examinee is assigned as an advisor to an inefficient supply section to see if he can simplify the work flow and record processing. The section consists of a supply control unit and maintenance and service unit staffed by 3 EM and an NCOIC. After the examinee has suggested improvements in the current clerical routines, he will be asked to plan the work flow of an expanded unit.
I. RECONNAISSANCE PATROL (Combat)

A. Behavior Measured

This situation measures the perceptiveness and synthesizing ability of the examinee. More specifically, it measures his ability to discern that certain areas of terrain have been previously occupied by troops, and his ability to construct an accurate account of troop activities from the clues he has detected.

B. Brief of Situation

Examinee is given mission to reconnoiter an area to obtain information bearing on use of that area by friendly forces. Following a prescribed route, he passes the remains of an enemy OP, a previously used bivouac area, and encounters an enemy agent. He is harassed by a stream of requests from his CO, erroneous information on his map, and communication failures. Finally, the examinee returns to HQs and undergoes an intensive debriefing session.

II. IMPLEMENT TACTICAL MARCH (Combat)

A. Behavior Measured

This situation measures the examinee's ability to adapt to changing conditions and to make rapid and sound decisions. More specifically, it measures his ability to control the activities of three platoon-sized units moving through enemy-held territory, and his ability to solve the problem encountered by these units which include enemy attacks, equipment failures and terrain obstacles.

B. Brief of Situation

The examinee is provided with information about three friendly columns which are moving in enemy territory toward an assembly area along three approximately parallel roads. When the leader of these units becomes a casualty, the examinee is ordered to assume command through radio contact and direct the units to the assembly area.
III. MOBILE DEFENSE (Combat)

A. Behavior Measured

The key concepts of war are increasingly those of mobility, dispersion, and autonomy. The small unit becomes more and more a thinking, planning, effectuating organism. The small unit leader will ever more frequently have to operate "on his own." He will have to make hair-trigger decisions based on complex, changing, and sometimes contradictory data. He should be quickly responsive to rapid and fluctuating situational change, initiating action in tactical situations as changing battle developments require. He will have to persist in overcoming obstacles under pressure of equipment failure, enemy action, terrain difficulties, harassment and fatigue. A possible mission for such a leader might be to lead a platoon-size unit which would act as a mobile reconnaissance force covering the area between two friendly strong points. "The side able to control the dead space between units and to find and fix the enemy will control the battle field." (Lt. Col. A. H. Shipley, Infantry, July-September, 1956, p. 42.)

B. Brief of Situation

The examinee is given the illusion of patrolling an area between two defensive strong points. His job is to plan operations and deter the enemy from infiltrating the "dead space," or to maneuver them into vulnerable concentration of their forces. He will be in communication with 4 squad leaders and a recon helicopter pilot who will report enemy infiltration. The examinee, given certain terrain characteristics, will be tested on his ability to plan a deterrent and search operation, on his initiative and ingenuity under communication breakdown conditions, on his reactions to critically disturbing reports from his subordinates, on his skill in detecting enemy ruses, and on his maneuvering ability.

IV. INSISTENT CO (Technical)

A. Behavior Measured

This situation measures the examinee's critical judgment and initiative. Specifically, it measures the ability of the examinee to weigh the opinions of technically trained subordinates, brief his superior on the nature of encountered technical difficulties, and to improvise an expedient substitute for an unusable piece of equipment.

B. Brief of Situation

The examinee is told to supervise the repair of a piece of equipment. The EM who are repairing the equipment can not
agree as to how to repair it. The examinee must decide what suggestions to follow, and when all prove ineffective, brief his superior on why the equipment can not be repaired. He must then find or improvise substitute equipment.

V. TECHNICAL PAPER (Technical)

A. Behavior Measured

This situation measures the ability of the examinee to organize his thoughts and express himself clearly in writing. Specifically, it measures the ability of the examinee to analyze the significance of technical and operational differences between alternate procedures and his ability to communicate his understanding in a staff paper.

B. Brief of Situation

The examinee is given the task of examining the minefield operations of the indigenous forces. The examinee will be given two examples of how indigenous minefields are being laid. He will be instructed to evaluate critically these methods, compare them with standard U.S. methods, and present in a staff paper recommendations for improving the indigenous procedures.

VI. CONFERENCE (Administrative)

A. Behavior Measured

This situation measures the examinee's social awareness and his ability to interact with and influence a group of his peers. Specifically, it measures the ability of the examinee to contribute effectively to group decisions on personnel problems.

B. Brief of Situation

Six examinees are called into a meeting to discuss a number of personnel problems, e.g., social relations with allied officers and civilians. The meeting is held under the direction of a senior officer who introduces the topics or problems. The senior officer's participation in the discussion will be restricted in order to allow the examinees freedom to express themselves and to arrive at their own consensual solutions to the problems raised.
VII. IMPROPER STORAGE OF SUPPLIES (Administrative)

A. Behavior Measured

This situation measures the examinee's perceptiveness and organizational abilities. Specifically, it measures his ability to determine through a study of the layout and operation of a supply unit, how best to improve efficiency, safety, and storage capability.

B. Brief of Situation

The examinee is given photographs of a warehouse interior, depicting numerous malpractices in safety, storage principles, and use of MHE. He is also given a schematic layout of the warehouse. He is required to recommend changes and corrections in the existing layout and procedures.