CENTER for ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI
CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA

THE SOVIET UNION:
YESTERDAY, TODAY, TOMORROW
A REPORT ON
A COLLOQUIUM OF AMERICAN
LONG-TIMERS IN MOSCOW

DTIC
ELECTED
SEP 27 1993

93-22234

91-1426

93 9 24 0 6 2
The Soviet Union: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow, a Colloquy of American Long-Timers in Moscow

Various

Univ. of Miami
Ctr. for Advanced Intl. Studies
Coral Gables, FL 33124

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Office of the Director of Net Assessment
Rm 3A930, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Presents account of a colloquy by a group of Americans with long experience in the Soviet Union.
CENTER FOR ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI

ARPA PROJECT IN THE STUDY OF SOVIET PERCEPTIONS
A PRELIMINARY SELECTED REPORT FOR REVIEW PURPOSES

THE SOVIET UNION: YESTERDAY, TODAY, TOMORROW
A Colloquy of American Long-Timers in Moscow

Prepared for:
DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
1400 WILSON BOULEVARD
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209

Under:
CONTRACT DNA 001-75-C0135, ARPA Order No. 2859

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED
ABSTRACT

This Report constitutes a summary and full stenographic account of a colloquy by a group of Americans with long experience in the Soviet Union designed to provide in-depth perspective to the Center's study of Soviet perceptions for the Advanced Research Projects Agency. The report begins with overall views by the participants on the road already traversed by the USSR, with special emphasis on elements of continuity and of change. The discussion then concerns the determinants of Soviet behavior and the factors which make up Soviet totalitarian and expansionist impulses, and the drive for military superiority. It next covers more immediate questions particularly detente and Soviet attitudes toward foreign communist movements. After a look back at the beginning of the Soviet regime and US-USSR relations--especially by some of those personally involved--the report concludes with a look forward at future Soviet leaders and statements by all the participants on where the Soviet Union seems to be headed.

DISCLAIMER

The views and conclusions contained in this report are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency of the US Government.

CONTRACTUAL TASK

The report is submitted in partial fulfillment of research under Contract DNA 001-75-C0135, ARPA Order No. 2859.
This report presents the results of a conference held in Miami, February 23-25, 1975, involving a group of Americans who have devoted their professional lives largely to work in and study of the Soviet Union and whose collective experience with that country spans the entire fifty-eight years from the first phase of the 1917 Revolution until to a. The purposes of the conference and the report on its proceedings are, first and foremost to secure guidance and counsel and to lay a solid foundation for an in-depth study which the Center has underway of Soviet perceptions—past, present and prospective—of the strengths and weaknesses of the USSR as against the U.S. and its allies, the Peoples Republic of China, and the Third World. Additional objectives are (a) to obtain and record for the use of scholars and others who are now or may in the future be concerned with Soviet affairs an interchange of the recollections and judgements of a selection of long-time observers of the Soviet scene whose opportunities and experiences are truly unique in their richness and pertinence; and (b) to provide at this important period of development in US-Soviet relations insights and a degree of wisdom that can be obtained from no other source.

The Center naturally owes a great debt to a number of persons in connection with the conference and the preparation of this report. But here we would put emphasis on the participants themselves. These included Frederick C. Barghoorn, Jacob L. Beam, Elbridge Durbrow, Loy W. Henderson, Wynfred Joshua, Robert F. Kelley, George F. Kennan, Foy D. Kohler, Andrew Marshall, Earl L. Packer, John Scott, Henry Shapiro, Thomas P. Whitney. (Biographical sketches of these are given in Appendix A and the considerations underlying invitations to them are discussed in the Foreword which follows.) We are also deeply grateful to a number of wives of participants who provided individually and collectively a source of special experiences and insights that proved of great worth in the informal discussions which contributed immensely to the usefulness of the three-day effort. These included: Mrs. Elbridge Durbrow, Mrs. Mose Harvey, Mrs. George Kennan, Mrs. Foy Kohler, Mrs. Earl Packer, Mrs. Henry Shapiro, and Mrs. Thomas P. Whitney.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>iv-v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>vi-xvi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td>xvii-xxvi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I. OPENING REMARKS. ......................................................................................... 1-3

II. CONTINUITY VERSUS CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION ........................................ 4-18

1. Long-Term Perspectives .............................................................................. 4-18
2. The Import of Dissent .................................................................................. 18-25

III. DETERMINANTS OF SOVIET BEHAVIOR ........................................................... 26-43

1. The Status and Force of Revolutionary Ideology ........................................ 26-43
2. The Issue of Social Transformations ........................................................ 43-46
3. Prospects for Democratization ................................................................... 46-56
4. The Question of Outside Influences ........................................................ 56-56
5. Inferiority or Superiority as Motivating Forces ..................................... 56-63
6. The Impact of Specific Setbacks on Soviet Motivations ........................... 63-69
7. The Question of the Peasant Heritage ....................................................... 70-75

IV. SOVIET EXPANSIONISM .................................................................................. 81-83

1. Totalitarian and Power Factors in Soviet Expansionism ........................... 81-83
2. Internal and Nationality Factors of Expansionism ..................................... 83-88
3. The Risks of Confrontation and the Issue of Tactics ............................... 88-98

V. THE MILITARY FACTOR IN THE SOVIET UNION ............................................. 102-106

1. The Soviet Military Effort: Scope and Possible Constraints ..................... 102-106
2. The Question of Military Superiority ...................................................... 106-110
3. The Soviet Military Effort: Aims and Expectations .................................. 111-119
VI. SOME MAJOR QUESTIONS AS TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WORLD TODAY

1. Detente: The Issue of Conflicting Interpretations. 120-130
2. Multipolarity and Bipolarity. 130-135
3. The World Food Situation and Soviet Policies. 135-140
4. How Real is Soviet Interest in the Further Spread of Communism. 140-146

VII. A LOOK BACK AT THE BEGINNING

1. How it was in 1917-18. 147-156
3. The Making of the Russian Revolution and Its Implications. 163-173

VIII. PROSPECTIVE CHANGES IN THE LEADERSHIP AND THE IMPLICATIONS

1. A Look Forward at Upcoming Successions. 174-182
2. New Leaders and the Balance Sheet on Detente. 182-188

IX. WHERE IS THE SOVIET UNION HEADED?

1. Thomas Whitney. 189-190
2. Jacob Beam. 190-192
3. Loy Henderson. 192-194
4. Earl Packer. 194-195
5. Elbridge Durbrow. 195-197
6. George Kennan. 197-201
7. Frederick Barghoorn. 202-203
8. Robert Kelley. 203
9. Foy D. Kohler. 204-205
10. Wynfred Joshua. 205-208
11. Henry Shapiro. 208-211
12. John Scott. 212-215

APPENDIX A. 219-221
APPENDIX B. 222-224
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The Approach: These discussions among an especially selected group of Americans with long-time experiences in the Soviet Union and in interpreting and dealing with Soviet affairs was designed to capitalize on the variety of vantage points from which the several participants had observed the Soviet scene and developments within that scene over the past fifty-eight years. No effort was made to secure a consensus on any of the questions discussed, or to reach a set of agreed-upon conclusions as to either past or future trends. Rather, the aim was to elicit and record the rich range and variety of views held by the individuals involved as to the Soviet situation within the context of its total history, including its links with the Russian past, and with the thought continually in mind of throwing light on current problems and producing insights that could be useful in assessing future possibilities as they might affect the security interests of the United States.

2. The Focus: The group considered a large number of issues which flowed from questions posed for prior consideration, and from the dynamics of the discussions themselves. These ranged over such broad areas as inquiry as the ways in which the Soviet Union has and has not changed over the past fifty-eight years; considerations and factors which appear to account for Soviet behavior; the source and nature of Soviet expansionism; the nature and purposes of the Soviet military effort; the role of the Soviet concept of "the correlation of world forces"; the Soviet position on detente; the question of constraints on Soviet conduct; the prospects of the democratization of Soviet society through evolutionary processes; major problems confronting the leadership; succession possibilities, particularly with respect to the accession of a new generation of leaders; and where the Soviet Union appears to be heading over the next ten to fifteen years. In the discussion of these issues, it was evident that there was a considerable measure of agreement on many key points, but differences, often sharp, on others.

3. Growth of Soviet Strength: There was full agreement that with respect to change in the USSR over the past half century or so, the most spectacular by far has been the tremendous increase in its internal strength and its external power and influence. It has emerged as a highly industrialized superpower with full control of its territories and peoples. It maintains a very high degree of law and order. It leads all other countries in the production of such basic items as coal, steel, cement, and oil. It has become an urbanized society with a high level of literacy with a steady, albeit very modest, rise in standard of living. Above all, it has developed the industrial-technological base of military power at a rate and to a degree that is without parallel in the world. It has greatly improved its external position especially since World War II. It is able to exert leadership over at least a dozen countries. It appears capable under present conditions of further steadily extending its power and influence, not only with respect to neighboring regions, but on
In all of this, Moscow has benefited greatly from changes in the outside world, particularly from: 1) the elimination of German and Japanese military strength at each end of its enormous territory; 2) the concession to it of a dominant position in Eastern Europe which has placed Soviet military power forward of the great gap Russia long faced to the West and now begins at a point only 60 miles from Hamburg; and 3) the collapse of colonial systems and the emergence of intense nationalism coupled with a high degree of anti-Westernism (particularly anti-Americanism) in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Also to be noted is that much of Soviet success reflects simply the continuation of trends well underway before the Revolution; Russia had long been a great power and in the years preceding World War I was industrializing and otherwise modernizing at a very rapid pace. Much has been achieved only at the cost of great human sacrifices. But whatever the underlying factors, the Soviet Union is today a true superpower with only the U.S. capable of holding back its attainment of worldwide ascendancy.

4. Fundamental Aims and Methods: While there have been modifications in domestic and foreign policy, these have not changed the oligarchic, totalitarian nature of the Soviet system, its expansionist urge, or its stated purpose of engaging in a relentless struggle between two world systems headed by the USSR and the U.S. until one or the other finally triumphs. These characteristics have marked the Soviet Union from the beginning of the Soviet regime. The Cold War actually dates from 1917 and continues to the present day.

5. Detente and the Soviet Union: Detente has not brought any significant change in Soviet aims and methods either at home or internationally. Participants emphasized that the Soviets see detente in an entirely different light than do most Americans. Americans tend to look upon detente in terms of cooperation, if not friendship, and of common interests in and effects toward achieving international stability. The Soviets explicitly and categorically equate detente with the Soviet doctrine of peaceful coexistence which is designed and intended for no such ends but to obtain unilateral advantages for the USSR, that is, as a means to bind the West while leaving Soviet options open. The doctrine is not new; it can be traced back to Lenin, although he used a different term (i.e., "cohabitation"), and was a prominent feature in the foreign policies of Stalin and Khrushchev. At the moment, Moscow has been able through the doctrine to secure recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe (without comparable pledges on Western Europe); to get recognition of parity with the United States (without any assurance that Moscow will be satisfied with parity); and to secure some important economic benefits at bargain rates. They insist that peaceful coexistence (detente) does not apply to their own activities in the Third World, but does stand against any U.S. attempt to "export counterrevolution" (i.e., to take actions to protect its positions and interests). Henry Kissinger was cited, from a writing earlier in his career, to the effect that coexistence is a tactic, the best means to subvert the existing structure by means other than war, to overthrow the West at minimum risk. Participants emphasized that it is a mistake for the U.S. to accept Soviet definitions of detente and several argued that it has not done so. However, it was considered significant that for the first time the United States had agreed at the various summit meetings that have occurred from May 1972 to inclusion of the Soviet term "peaceful
coexistence" in the official documents signed with the Soviet Union. (The word detente appears in none of these documents.) Further, because of their position as rulers of a "superpower" the Soviet leaders are in a stronger position than before to implement in practice their views on coexistence or detente. Finally, there seems to be little inclination on the part of the U.S. Government to educate its public on the differences between U.S. and Soviet views on detente-coexistence. As a result there is a tendency in the United States to delude ourselves into euphoria over detente. At the least, it was suggested, detente should be defined as limited state-to-state cooperation within an overall adversary relationship. The origins of detente were seen as significant for the interpretations later put on it in the United States and the USSR. It was seen as linked with the electoral needs of President Nixon in 1972, as well as an expression of the American mood of withdrawal in connection with Vietnam. However, it was also pointed out that the Soviets connected it with a deeper process of U.S. decline, decay, or in Gromyko's words, impending chaos, which had given the United States no choice but to accept peaceful coexistence (detente).

6. Soviet Expansionism: Expansionism appears inherent in the Soviet system, as well as one of the strongest heritages from the Russian past. Basic to Soviet expansionism, as well as to its antecedents under the Czars, is the fact that Russia is a multinational state which breeds deep insecurity within the Kremlin with respect to neighboring countries, a situation which compounds itself as new acquisitions or spheres of control are obtained. Other important factors include a long-standing messianic complex which under communist rule has fed upon and utilized revolutionary doctrines; the need of the regime to justify its authoritarian minority rule by successes; a close interrelationship between totalitarianism, which was first developed and has been carried to its high point in the Soviet Union, and expansionist aspirations; a will for maximum power which is more or less common to the rulers of all great states and which must be particularly strong within any who succeed in rising to top levels in the Soviet hierarchy. Soviet expansionism cannot be expected to stop unless it is stopped by internal disintegration or outside forces.

7. The Soviet Military Effort: The Soviet rulers, like Czarist rulers before them, seek maximum military power. They certainly aspire to military superiority as against the U.S. and will continue their efforts to achieve it indefinitely, as well as their efforts to attain superiority with respect to the economic-technological base on which military capabilities rest. Moscow, participants appeared to agree, will never feel that the USSR has "enough" military forces. Russian governments at all times have maintained military strength in being far greater than anyone else could see any reason for. The Russians have a strong sense of national purpose and of the need to excel in all fields. Nothing ever really satisfies them. Parity must be viewed as only the opening card in a continuing game. Even military superiority when it is achieved will hardly bring a halt, but only an urge to go on and on. The Soviets have long since achieved superiority in conventional ground forces, but they give no indication of an intention to slow down in this area. The Cuban missile crisis gave special impetus to a Soviet decision to put themselves in a military position in the future where they would not have to back down. That crisis was the last and most humiliating of a series of situations--Iran, Greece, Turkey, the Berlin blockade, the Lebanon landings, the Berlin ultimatums, etc.--in which the USSR had blustered and threatened and then had to withdraw. Moscow now appears intent upon
upgrading Soviet economic and military strength to a point where -- as Brezhnev and Gromyko have made explicit -- settlement of any matter on the globe without the Soviet Union will be impossible. Such Soviet strength will include the ability to do what the United States has long been able to do, intervene in situations far from home borders. In short, what the Soviet Union appears to be seeking is a perceived overall military superiority whereby in the future it will be the United States rather than the Soviet Union that backs down in situations of conflict. Apparently the Soviet rulers want eventually to be so powerful that no one will be able to question them, so that they will be able to dictate or influence actions all over the world and effectively to veto any actions of others of which they do not approve.

8. The Concentration on the Industrial-Technological Base of Military Power: The Soviet drive for military superiority continues to be reflected in resource allocations. The Soviets have always given priority attention to the growth of military-oriented segments of their economy and this can be expected to continue indefinitely. In this connection, it was stressed that striving for military preponderance is one thing, its attainment another. The Soviets have to make choices among competing requirements. They have the problem of at least some improvements in the standard of living. They are hampered by the inefficiency of their economy. While they squeeze as much military expenditure out of their economy as the U.S. does, the smaller size of their GNP is a source of strain. On the other hand, the comparative costs of the U.S. military establishment, as for example the pay scale required for a volunteer army, may well have the effect of pricing it out of the competition.

9. The Soviet Concept of the "Correlation of World Forces": The Soviet leaders, while perceiving a greater role for military strength than most of their rivals, consider that the military factor is but one, albeit the most important one, of a number of factors that enter into "the correlation of world forces," which is the ultimate determinant of who does what to whom, the others being economic-technological progress and prospects; internal stability and cohesiveness; relations with allies and clients; external political, ideological and psychological clout; the national will to push forward, et cetera. This concept is continually emphasized in Soviet analyses and commentaries respecting the international situation, developments, and prospects. The Soviets insist, and apparently with increasing confidence because of the current difficulties of the U.S. and other Western states, that the correlation is acceleratingly shifting in favor of the USSR.

10. The Role of Ideology as a Determinant of Soviet Behavior: Whether the major impulses behind Soviet actions are nationalist or ideological elicited a variety of views and also the suggestion that this may be no more than a matter of semantics. A given action may be part of the world revolutionary movement or an expression of the nationalist ambition of the Russian state, very often a combination of both. It must be kept in mind that the Soviet Communist Party has always operated on two levels. It has responsibility for governing a modernized great state, with all the complexities that entails; it is a revolutionary party with self-assumed obligations to lead and support revolutions on a worldwide scale. Generally speaking, the Soviet state is not supposed to make sacrifices for the revolutionary movement; the movement is supposed to subordinate its interests to the Soviet state. Nevertheless,
the policies and conduct of the Soviet state have always been made to appear in consonance with the interests of the movement, and in actual practice the Soviet state has increasingly come to identify itself with the movement and to assume growing risks and costs in its name. Meanwhile, all participants agreed, concern over ideological issues and questions has steadily diminished. Some contended that this means that ideology has all but ceased to be a factor of importance either in decision-making or in the conduct and outlook of the bureaucracy, much less for the general populace; others that ideology had simply come to be taken for granted while still remaining a potent force not only at top levels but also throughout Soviet society. Irrespective, however, of the degree of real interest or faith in ideology, the consensus was that there can be doubt that it continues to serve a number of important functions. The leadership justifies its policies and activities in the name of the revolution. Ideology is, in fact, the only source of the regime's legitimacy. As one participant put it, without its ideological cover and with so much blood on its hands, the Soviet leadership would be exposed as no more than common criminals. Ideology also provides an indispensable rationale for the leadership's pretensions as a self-appointed, all-knowing ruling elite. Ideology serves, further, as an essential base for the regime's global aspirations. It is a requisite for Moscow's domination over captive communist states and its claim to an inherent right to leadership over the world revolutionary movement. It is treated as a principal source of Soviet appeal in the Third World and in this connection it serves a definite foreign policy purpose of the USSR. Finally, of course, ideological issues and postures are critical in the Soviet conflict with China. Loss of its leadership of the Marxist-Leninist, anti-Western, anti-imperialist role in the world would be synonymous in the regime's eyes with the end of its own reason for being.

11. Inferiority Versus Superiority in Soviet Behavior: Given the importance of the Russian messianic complex both under the Soviets and the Czars, the question was raised whether this and other motivating factors underlying Soviet conduct come from a sense of inferiority or a sense of superiority. There was general agreement that it is difficult to distinguish whether any given behavior of men or nations reflects a feeling of superiority or an attempt to compensate for a feeling of inferiority. In the Russian case, it may well be a combination of both. Russians seem to have an extreme sensitivity which produces a sort of compulsion to continually compare themselves with the West. On the one hand, they feel that they are stronger and better than others. The Russian does not believe that there is any field of activity in which, if he were given the proper chance, he could not match and probably excel anyone in the world. They have always had the idea that they are somehow the leading people in the world, that they have a mission to improve mankind. Marxism-Leninism has become a substitute in this regard for comparable doctrines of the Orthodox Church under the Czars. On the other hand, Russians feel that life has dealt badly with them, that fate has been unjust. Stalin's famous speech -- the Japanese beat us, the French beat us, the Germans beat us, etc. -- undoubtedly found great resonance among the Russian people (though when one looks at the expansion of the Russian empire, before and after the Revolution, one might ask who beat whom). The sense of inferiority, or perhaps better, inner insecurity, may stem from the rulers' lack of confidence in their own people, their inability to trust them and to rule otherwise than by force and absolute authority. The rulers, whether Czars of communists, have always treated their people like children. Until this stops, Russians will continue to feel inferior, or at least different. Be all this as it may, however, the Russians are still a people of great talent and strength and must be given their due.
12. Other Factors in Soviet Behavior: Soviet conduct can also be analyzed from the point of view of the dynamics of totalitarianism, the Soviet Union being the first and longest-lived of twentieth century totalitarian states. There is an almost inevitable antagonism on the part of the leadership of any totalitarian country toward democratic countries. The existence of freedom of expression in any society is going to be a threat to any totalitarian system. The rulers know that ideas are as powerful as bullets. They have always had the conviction that they could handle their own people only by a severe despotism and by shutting out all impulses of freedom. For this reason the proximity of freedom to their own borders has always been highly unsettling to them and they have always wanted to push it further and further away. Another important factor is that the Soviet Union's rise to the rank of superpower has been sudden and involved extreme force and coercion. Stalin justified his whole repressive system and the terrible measures he employed toward the people, and his own party associates for that matter, on the necessity of propelling the Soviet Union to the forefront if it were to survive. And Stalin's successors, although more subtle, have proceeded on essentially the same basis.

13. The Question of Problems and Constraints: Despite the substantial success Moscow has so far had, the Soviet Union is still subject to deep-seated problems and difficulties. Some of these are formidable. Fifty-eight years after the Revolution, the Soviets have not been able to achieve for broad sections of their economy the technical progress needed to perform against constantly reiterated domestic commitments or to make themselves independent of Western technology. Labor productivity is particularly bothersome. Their agricultural system remains in poor shape. Twice they have had the humiliating experience of having to make large-scale imports of wheat from the West, and there appears a real possibility that worldwide climatic changes will intensify these difficulties. Soviet leaders are particularly concerned with their youth, its apathy, cynicism and hedonism. There is also the fact that there is not a single country in Eastern Europe, except possibly Bulgaria, where they are not disliked. Along with their foreign policy successes have come a considerable number of failures. In their own sphere: China, Yugoslavia, Albania, reduced influence in North Korea, breaches of discipline among foreign communist parties. Outside: Iran, Turkey, Greece, early postwar setbacks in France and Italy, Japan. China is a problem of primary, and one can surmise mounting, concern for Moscow. Its denigration of Soviet worthiness to lead the world revolutionary movement, its direct border threat, its rapprochement with the United States, the significant headway it has been making at Soviet expense in the Third World, all greatly worry Moscow.

14. The Nationality Problem: The nationality situation constitutes a special problem for Moscow and has a number of important ramifications. In its multinational makeup the Soviet state in effect is an anachronism. It is the only great empire of the 19th century which was not split into its constituent parts in response to the forces of nationalism. The Soviet Union is going against a worldwide tide and this is one of the reasons for the insecurity and aggressiveness of the present group of Soviet rulers. The need to keep non-Russian nationalities under control is also a key factor limiting any diminution of central control in the Soviet Union or the development of a freer political system. The problem promises to become more worrisome with time as the non-Russians increase more rapidly than the Russians. However, it is questionable that the problem will become acute unless some sort of special catalyst
is provided from abroad or at home, e.g., a protracted war with China might produce very dangerous repercussions among minority nationalities of the Soviet Union; the same might be true in case of steadily reduced agricultural production as a result of climatic changes. Somewhat the same situation exists for Eastern Europe as for Moscow's domestic subjects. By means of its military power, the Soviets have succeeded in keeping Eastern Europe under control and handling German national urges. But given serious deteriorations in Soviet external or internal positions, the situation could change radically.

15. The Problem of Dissent: The role and significance of dissent were extensively discussed. There was general agreement that overt dissent is a relatively new phenomenon in the USSR, but that it is unlikely to significantly change the nature of the regime, especially in the near future. The dissenters are weak and badly splintered. Also, Soviet policy has become much more sophisticated about such matters. More often than not, certain individuals are able to function for a long period, not because they have slipped the dragnet, but because the police are biding their time until contacts are traced. There are, however, certain similarities between current movements and those which marked later phases of the Czarist regime. On the other hand, it was pointed out that dissenters were not responsible for the fall of the Czarist state—that instead a group of exceptional circumstances were responsible, most notably the war and the ineptness of the ruling regime. Various types of dissidents are discernible. One group wants to change the system from within by such measures as giving increased autonomy to factory managers. Another group might be called the democratic opposition. So many of these have now left that we now have a new democratic Russian emigration. Another type of opposition was also stressed, a very strong Great Russian nationalist element which works within the party and which evidently favors a more assertive policy both toward the West and toward China.

16. Prospects of an Evolutionary Democratization Process: No participant saw a significant possibility for a Western-type democratic evolution in the Soviet Union. Russian rulers have always believed that they must be despotic and the people kept rigidly in line. Stalin developed the old predispositions to authoritarianism to a point of near perfection, and his successors have continued all the essentials of the Stalinist approach, although with less reliance on terror, which, however, appears to be less needed than formerly. As of now, the Soviet system remains an absolutist, totalitarian operation which has as its prime interest and purpose self-perpetuation and in which all power is in the hands of a small elitist element within the Communist Party, which in its turn consists of only a small fraction of the population. Just as the Czarist regimes did, the Soviet regime sees freedom of expression as a threat and any toying with the idea of liberalization as subversive. A possibility that was explored was that changes in the political system might come within the party rather than from experimentation with popular democracy, that is, through modifying the absolutism from the top downward in party decisions. However, such changes in the party were seen as certain to meet strong resistance on the part of the party apparat. The power of the apparatchiki can be seen in their ability to thwart the Liberman economic reform proposals which would have affected their vested interests in a much less vital way than any democratization of party operations. The Czechoslovakia intervention was seen as very revealing: proposals that the Czech Communist
Party permit open Central Committee discussions and elections by secret ballot of top party leaders were too much for the Soviet leadership to accept. While all agreed that there has been no fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system, there was a feeling that there has been a steady buildup of small changes which might ultimately be important. These changes have been gradual, almost imperceptible, hence often hard to identify, but should not be ignored. The emergence of dissent was viewed as one of these small changes. The evident increased attention to Soviet public opinion might be considered another, although this might be more a device to improve control than to be responsive. In the cultural sphere, when one compares the current scene with that of the early years of the Soviet regime, there has been retrogression. However, the question was raised about the consequence over the long run of forcing all creative cultural expression into dissidence or exile, particularly if dissenters living abroad are able to get their ideas into the country. The improvement in standards of living and the growth in literacy were other changes that might eventually be of real importance. It was argued that revolutions have been the products in the past of small but determined groups who seem out of touch. Others pointed out, however, that revolutions require even more a loss of will by the ruling elite, which is certainly not visible in the Soviet Union. In any case, there may be value in the old Marxist formula about changes in quantity becoming changes in quality. Fifty to one hundred years was the perspective suggested with respect to a significant impact on the Soviet Union.

17. The Basic U.S. Interest in Soviet Change: Whatever fascinations the possibilities of democracy in the Soviet Union might hold out, there was general agreement that the real issue for the U.S. is not the internal organization of the USSR, but its external behavior. Our emphasis on democratic evolution is linked to a more general U.S. concept that other societies should mold themselves in our image. The corollary of this has been to condemn others for not doing as we do; even if they pursued a foreign policy friendly to us. However, one can raise the question about whether we will get reasonable Soviet behavior unless they have a society and a political system with checks and balances, with restraints on the centralized government as it exists now in the Soviet Union.

18. Susceptibility to Outside Influences: It was generally agreed that the Soviet Union is now more susceptible to outside influences than previously, but that too much reliance should not be placed on this. External media are more important today than in the twenties when dissenters could secure publicity for their views domestically. Moreover, the predisposition needed to make external media useful does exist in the Soviet Union among scientists, economists, and other intellectuals. All intellectuals of any consequence listen to foreign broadcasting stations. The present regime pays somewhat more attention to foreign opinion than Stalin did. This, with respect to its treatment of dissenters, it clearly gives some attention to the possible reaction of foreign communist parties and the impact on relations with other states. Experience with Soviet groups who travel in the United States indicates that few such visitors will henceforth believe their government's anti-U.S. propaganda. Accordingly, it is important to maintain broadcasting from the outside, exchange programs, and insistence in the European Security Conference context of emphasis on freedom of movement of people and of ideas. However, the extent of outside influence remains very small in scale, and it is always possible for the regime to virtually cut it off.
19. Succession Possibilities: This question was discussed not in terms of the specific leaders who might replace Brezhnev but in terms of the type of leaders who will replace the present generation, and particularly what their attitudes toward the United States might be. No one seemed to feel, however, that a "Brezhnev succession" will produce significant recessions or policy changes. Attention was called to the extraordinary degree of stability of the current Soviet leadership. This group is virtually unchanged since Khrushchev eliminated the so-called anti-party group in 1957. As a result, there may be considerable tension between this old group and younger leaders waiting in the wings to replace them. It is at least a moot question, however, whether the younger generation of leaders will be any better than its predecessors with respect to their attitudes toward the United States. The first generation of revolutionaries, with the exception of Stalin, had been well-educated men, with strong ties to Western culture. Even Stalin demonstrated some intellectual attainments. Among other things, this first generation of leaders appeared for the most part to look upon the U.S. with respect and some admiration. Stalin destroyed this generation, which has been replaced by a second and third generation of Soviet rulers who are more primitive types, but who nevertheless have continued to admire, and to envy for that matter, much about the United States. This may now be changing as a post-World War II generation takes over. This coming generation may be less idealistic, more pragmatic, very nationalistic. To them, the United States may seem no different than any other great power which the USSR has so far successfully surpassed. Having moved from a position of inferiority to the U.S. to one of parity if not superiority, new Soviet regimes may well be more inclined toward chauvinism and hostility as against the U.S. and be more daring in their probes for U.S. weaknesses.

20. Prospects of Detente under New Leaders: A particular question explored in connection with prospective changes of leaders in the Soviet Union was whether new leaders would be inclined to continue or abandon detente. The consensus appeared to be that Moscow had done very well under the detente relationship as it has so far been practiced and that any new group will almost certainly do their best to secure its continuation (but again as so far practiced).

21. A New Round of Probes?: It was widely anticipated by participants that while the Soviet Union will continue to avoid military confrontations with the United States, it will step up its probes of U.S. will and intentions. The kind of things they can be expected to do has already been indicated by their supply of missiles to Egypt and their role in the 1973 Mideast War; the extraction in connection with the Cienfuegos affair of a more formal U.S. commitment not to attack Cuba; their resistance to U.S. efforts to secure an ad hoc stabilization in the Middle East; their encouragement of the use of oil and other material resources against industrialized states by Third World producers. The Middle East remains a target of obvious high priority. Moscow is probably already training Iranians and Iraqi Kurds to step in as favorable situation: ripen in the countries concerned. Gunboat diplomacy in countries such as Ceylon is a possibility. Farther out scenarios may be in the offing. The pressure of increasing population on inadequate food supplies, particularly in South Asia and Africa, may lead to situations that Moscow will label as
national liberation movements and confront us with collision course problems within the near future. However, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union will be able to orchestrate developments in the Third World in full accord with its own wishes. In a situation of nuclear stalemate, there is considerable likelihood of unwanted future conventional wars as well as the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The overall situation of the U.S. both domestically and in its relations with its allies is clearly being watched with care and no little anticipation by Moscow. The Kremlin must be dizzy not so much with their own successes but with what circumstances have achieved for them in the way of Western disarray and crisis. In this connection, a main Soviet objective appears to be the Finlandization of Western Europe with a dissolution of ties with the U.S. and the establishment of ever closer ties with the USSR. The weakening of the NATO alliance is already evident. Developments in Portugal, Turkey, and Greece, and the trend for Italy and Spain would seem highly favorable to the Soviets, although there were some suggestions that Moscow feels that it will need to handle these unfolding situations very carefully. What the Soviets probably want in Western Europe is for the disorganization to continue but under such control that it will not lead to fascist reactions or U.S. military intervention.

22. Soviet Policy Toward Establishment of New Communist Regimes: The nature and degree of Soviet interest in takeovers by foreign communist parties in connection with current Western disarray were subjects of considerable debate. It was suggested that costs of a communist victory, say, in Italy, would be too great and that Moscow would be apprehensive about communist victories or excessive disintegration which would jeopardize Soviet acquisition of economic benefits from the West. Moscow's experiences with Tito and Mao have dampened its banking on communist regimes not susceptible to its direct military control. Soviet reaction to current Western economic difficulties was therefore considered by some as likely to be relatively moderate. Most participants appeared to believe, however, that the Soviets are highly pleased with developments and trends in the West, are as a matter of fact smacking their lips. It was conceded that they might not want at this stage outright communist governments in additional countries because this might prove premature and perhaps counterproductive over the long term. The lessons of Chile seemed likely to exert weight: they confirmed both the need for care not to antagonize moderate strata and the need to prepare fully for a shift to more revolutionary tactics. For the time being, the Soviets probably prefer anti-American regimes rather than outright communist takeovers. But there should be no surprise about Soviet interest in communist movements abroad. It is not a sign of a new Soviet approach, simply a given of the regime.

23. Undermining the U.S. the Basic Object: From the standpoint of basic Soviet strategy, it was emphasized that the Soviets continue to see the world in bipolar terms, with the United States and the USSR locked in an irrepressible struggle. Within this context, their strategy is that of a zero-sum game, where a U.S. setback is a gain for them. Some doubt was expressed that they necessarily gain from U.S. losses: for example, in certain instances the Chinese might pick up the pieces; in others the Soviet Union as well as the U.S. could face added difficulties. The world has become more unpredictable, with the USSR no more able than the U.S. to anticipate assured control of events and developments. Global changes currently underway are raising new complexities for the Soviets that can become increasingly serious. Among the principal of these changes are the rise of new centers of economic power among the industrialized states;
the growing economic-political power of natural resources producing countries and regions of the Third World; the likely early further proliferation of nuclear weapons; Moscow's inability to manage client states not subject to its direct control; and, perhaps above all else, the hostility and rivalry of the Peoples' Republic of China.

24. **The Next 10 to 15 Years:** None of the participants saw any realistic possibility of basic changes in the domestic structure of the Soviet Union in this period. Despite differences on the likely role of ideology, it was generally agreed that, whether for traditionally nationalist or ideological reasons, current and successor Soviet leaderships will seek a continuing buildup of the military, economic and political might of the Soviet Union with the ultimate aim of making the USSR the number one power in the world. Most participants believed the Soviet Union will attempt to take advantage of every opportunity to score at U.S. expense, to insist on parity with the U.S. while aiming for superiority over it in the military and economic-technological spheres, and generally to follow a bolder rather than a more restrained course in the international arena. Several participants argued along a different line. They believed that the Soviet Union would be inclined toward a period of quiet in its relationships with the West. Within the continued parameters of coexistence as it defines it, Moscow will seek to avoid military confrontations while pushing ahead by all means short of such confrontations. It was thought that its primary targets for some time will be the Middle East and the Finlandization of Western Europe, where self-induced developments are providing particularly exploitable opportunities. Again, however, there was strong dissent on the part of some participants who foresaw a much less activist approach by Moscow and particularly for Western Europe. Meanwhile, it was stressed that Moscow will have major problems of its own -- China, its economy -- but, as throughout the conference, it was emphasized that what the West, particularly the United States, does will be decisive for the future successes or failures in Soviet purposes. The situation of the West which appears so pregnant with opportunities for Moscow is of Western, not Soviet, making. Whether these situations will be reversed or whether they will be translated into new Soviet successes will depend on what the Western nations do or do not do, and not on what the USSR wants or attempts. Above all else, U.S. strength and the will of the U.S. to use it wisely and well remain the crucial elements in gauging where the Soviet Union is headed.
FOREWORD

The Center for Advanced International Studies takes great pride in the presentation of this report. The genesis of the report goes back several years, as a matter of fact to January 1968, when Foy Kohler joined the University of Miami as a Professor in the University's Center for Advanced International Studies after a brilliant career of almost forty years in the Foreign Service of the United States and in various assignments in the Department of State, ending with a four-year tour as American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and finally as Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Kohler and I had long worked closely together on Soviet affairs, and both of us had been associated over the years with most others in and outside of government who had been professionally engaged for a protracted period with the Soviet Union in one way or another. A cherished project that we began almost at once to discuss when Kohler joined the University was to bring these former associates to Miami for a "Long Timers" Conference on changes in the Soviet scene and in Soviet perceptions and our perceptions of them over the years.

Our thought was that in the memories of such people we have a national resource of inestimable value, both historically and from the standpoint of the ongoing interests and needs of the country. We felt that we should do something within a colloquial format to preserve as much as we could the knowledge, the experience, and the understanding that so few in this country really have of the Soviet Union as it has developed over the years. We recognized, of course, that the United States and other Western countries now have a large number of Sovietologists of great ability. But the training and experience of the overwhelming majority of these date from recent
years: few go back as far as World War II, and a scarce handful to the days before the war. We also recognized that many of the long timers have written extensively and have provided good records of their own experiences and perceptions. But these writings for the most part have been directed toward specific problem areas or limited time periods. Moreover, they have been done on an individual basis and have not had the benefit of a collective approach, that is, of an approach which serves both to stimulate and to provide counterweights to individual views and interpretations.

Despite the long time duration of our interest in such an undertaking, we let year after year pass without taking action. Particular problems and views of the moment appeared too pressing, and although a goodly number of long timers joined us in one project or another on an individual basis, we kept postponing the collective effort we had in mind. Then, however, it was forcefully brought home to us that time was running out. In a relatively short period, death took an untimely toll of some of the ablest minds and best of the long memories regarding the Soviet Union available in this country. The losses included Phil Mosely and Merle Fainsod, U.S. academicians who early and deliberately chose to make a career of Soviet studies and became influential teachers as well as interpreters of matters Soviet; Tommy Thompson, who dealt so intimately with Soviet leaders as U.S. representative in postwar Austria and as American Ambassador in Moscow, and who served as a main adviser on the Soviet Union to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson; and finally Chip Bohlen, whose Soviet experiences dated back to the thirties, and who loomed large in the conduct of relations with Moscow during the war, and who during the postwar period served with George Kennan, Tommy Thompson and Foy Kohler as one of the "Big Four" in our postwar handling of Soviet problems. To this somber listing, many others could be added, as Bob Kelley and others brought out so poignantly during the course of our
conference sessions. Faced with this situation, Kohler and I decided to go forward with our project as speedily as possible.

An initial and difficult problem was that of choosing whom to invite. We felt that for our purposes, an essential was to keep the gathering small enough to make possible an effective colloquy into which could be drawn the experiences and ideas of all participants without having to pressure ourselves with a time factor which so often limits the worth of even the best of conferences. We set as a goal a round dozen, and in order to hold to this number established several basic criteria for selection of invitees. We decided to forego invitations to non-Americans, although many of other nationalities fit very well indeed into our criteria. The reason for this was that we did not want our discussions to come to be taken up with debates relative to U.S. policies, a possibility that suggested itself on the basis of extensive experience with other conferences. We also decided for much the same reasons to forego, with two exceptions noted below, persons who are currently actively engaged in the conduct of relations with the USSR.

The basic consideration that we felt should govern our choices was not only long-time experience with Soviet affairs but also extensive residence in the Soviet Union in a serious capacity. We wanted, above all else, to get at the problem of how and in what ways, and to what effects, and with what long-term prospects the Soviet Union has or has not changed since its establishment or seems likely to change in the years ahead. To this end we felt we should go as far back as possible, as well as to secure participants who have had recurring opportunities to observe the Soviet scene first-hand. And we wished at the same time to secure as much variety as we could of vantage points from which these long timers have viewed developments in the USSR.
In applying these criteria, we had to pass over many individuals who could have contributed importantly to our deliberations. Also, because of the numbers factor, we were not able even to include several very able people who fully met our basic criteria. Nevertheless, we believe that we managed to get together perhaps as able a group of long timers on the Soviet Union as could have been assembled at this stage of U.S. relationships with the USSR.

We feel in this connection that the value of this report will be greatly enhanced if we detail the specific judgments that influenced our choice of invitees.

The natural beginning point of our selection process was Earl L. Packer, who occupied a key place in the unbelievably thin U.S. representation in Russia during the unfolding processes of revolution in 1917, and who subsequently served as a key professional in early U.S. attempts to achieve a realistic understanding of Bolshevik objectives and behavior as against a settled U.S. conviction that any communist experimentations with the fundamentals of capitalist society were doomed to automatic failure. For fifty-eight years, Packer subsequently followed developments on the Soviet side, including an eleven-year period (1925-1936) as Deputy Chief of the State Department's Division concerned with Soviet affairs. He has since kept up with Soviet-U.S. relationships in various capacities and remains one of the ablest of all Americans with respect to Soviet perceptions of the world in which we live and of long-term Soviet objectives with respect to that world.

Loy Henderson, who has been frequently characterized as "Mr. Foreign Service" of the United States, has been over the years perhaps the keystone of U.S. approaches to the USSR. While Earl Packer was serving in Petrograd during the 1917 revolutions and in Archangel during the ensuing Civil War, Henderson came onto the Russian scene as a member of the American Red Cross
Commission to Western Russia and the Baltic States in 1919-1920. After returning to the scene as a Foreign Service Officer in the Division of Eastern European Affairs in 1925, he played a major role in the establishment of relations with the Soviet Union and became a major figure in the conduct of those relations, as a senior officer in the Moscow Embassy and recurrent chargé d'affaires from 1934 to 1938 and again in 1942. Indeed, the officially published history of Soviet-American relations in the 1930s is largely a record of Loy Henderson's outstanding role. Subsequently dealing with affairs along the Soviet periphery, as Director of Near Eastern Affairs in Washington and Ambassador to Iraq, India and Iran, Henderson ended his diplomatic career at the top policy level as principal administrator of the Department of State and the Foreign Service, then continued as a Professor of International Relations at American University to pass on to a new generation of students, as he had to succeeding generations of Foreign Service Officers, the benefits of his vast experience and his deep knowledge of Soviet and world affairs.

Bob Kelley represents a natural third choice among our participants as the long time head of the Eastern European Division of the Department of State (1923-1937). Kelley was the first to recognize the essentiality of U.S. understanding of Soviet purposes and potentialities and took the lead in inducing the powers that were in the State Department and in the U.S. government to support a program to train Americans in the capabilities necessary to understand and to cope with the peculiarities of the Russian language and culture, and with the special problems which the Soviet system posed for the United States and its future. Top level backing secured, Kelley in 1923 instituted the far-seeing program which provides the United States with a reservoir of trained Foreign Service Officers to man the observer missions in the Baltic States, and, after recognition of the Soviet Union, the Embassy in Moscow.
stationed in the USSR. But none has had a comparable continuity of experience
or opportunities for study and understanding of Soviet developments. Shapiro
has, of course, written much about the Soviet scene, but it seemed to us that
at this stage of his career, his knowledge and insights could add an extra-
ordinary dimension to the understanding of the rest of us of what has actually
taken place in the Soviet Union and what it portends for the future.

Fred Barghoorn again struck us as one who has had extraordinary oppor-
tunities to observe and interpret Soviet developments from varied vantage
points. A prewar visiting student of the Soviet Union (an experience which
coincided with a study period of my own in the USSR), Barghoorn subsequently
served on the U.S. Embassy staff during the war and early postwar years.
Later, he spent an extended period conducting in-depth interviews of Soviet
defectors. Subsequently, as a Professor at Yale University, he returned to
the Soviet Union for further studies and observations. On one of these trips,
he was set up by the KGB for incarceration (apparently in the hope he could
be used in a trade for the Soviet spy Ivanov). For some time he had the
dubious advantage of viewing the Soviet system from the confines of the
Lubyanka Prison, but was relieved from this privileged position through a
very direct demand by President John Kennedy. Barghoorn has published ex-
tensively about the Soviet developments. Lately, he has devoted his extra-
ordinary talents to the question of dissidence in the Soviet Union and to
underground (samizdat, or self-publishing) writings of Soviet intellectuals.

Elbridge Durbrow, another of the Foreign Service Officers deeply con-
cerned with Soviet affairs since he helped open the U.S. Embassy in Moscow
in 1934, seemed to us a natural selection for our group. Perhaps more than
any other individual, Durbrow, as Chief of the Eastern European Division in
the last years of the war, stood watch against the exaggerated hopes of a
permanent in U.S.-Soviet relationships as a result of wartime cooperation.
He then served as Minister in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow during the critical days of the unfolding of the Cold War. In various subsequent capacities, including Ambassador to Vietnam and Alternate Representative to NATO, he has had unparalleled opportunities to witness the vicissitudes of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Thomas Whitney appeared to both Kohler and myself as one of the most knowledgeable of the long timers concerned with the Soviet scene. A brilliant economist, Whitney performed notably during the war years as an analyst of Soviet economic capabilities. Subsequently, he served as chief of the economic section of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and after that as staff correspondent of the Associated Press in Moscow for some half dozen years. Since then he has been a leading observer of Soviet developments and activities with particular reference to the Soviet literary scene and to the careers and contributions of Soviet emigres abroad. Among other things, he has been one of the prime interpreters and translators of the works of Solzhenitsyn.

Jacob Beam, as the most recent of U.S. Ambassadors to Moscow and one who participated in the Nixon-Kissinger negotiations that led to the detente (peaceful coexistence) relationship between the U.S. and the USSR, appeared to us a most valuable participant in our conference deliberations. Beam, as both Kohler and I well recognized, has been over the years an extraordinarily astute interpreter of the problems and opportunities in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, particularly as related to the Soviet position in Eastern Europe. As against other of the participants in our conference exercise, he was also particularly able to bring into perspective interchanges between the U.S. and the USSR in arms negotiations and what they may portend.

Finally, of course, is the participation of Foy Kohler. It would doubtless be unseemingly in this foreword for me to place emphasis on the capabilities of a colleague with whom I work intimately on all problems with
which we are concerned as against the Soviet Union. Yet I would be most
remiss if I did not acknowledge here the great wisdom that Kohler constantly
demonstrates with respect to Soviet affairs. Kohler would be as categorical
as I in acknowledging the benefits he has received from his association with
Loy Henderson, George Kennan, Chip Bohlen, Tommy Thompson, and others, in
his understanding of the Soviet Union. But, in my opinion, he has measured
up to each of these in his own abilities to interpret Soviet developments
and their implications for U.S. security interests.

In order to provide an added dimension to the colloquy and particularly
from the standpoint of planning and follow-up, we also secured the participa-
tion of two individuals whose experiences differ from those of our long timers.
One is Andrew Marshall, who after long service as a Senior Staff member of the
Rand Corporation now holds the position of Director of Net Assessment in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense. The other is Wynfred Joshua, a specialist
on political-military affairs, formerly with Georgetown University, the Brookings
Institution, the Stanford Research Institute, and now in the Department of
Defense. Both of these have long been very much concerned with Soviet affairs
and both contributed outstandingly to the success of our effort.

Given the uniqueness of the background and experience of the group and
the contributions they can make to American understanding of the Soviet Union,
we decided to take a different tack from the normal conference approach to
considerations of international problems. Our idea was, as Foy Kohler ex-
plained it, to generate reminiscences and ruminations among the group within
a broad frame of reference. We submitted a series of questions for considera-
tion prior to the meeting,* but made clear that we did not expect to follow
any closely structured format in the discussions themselves, hoping that the

*The questions submitted can be found in Appendix B.
exchanges would be as free wheeling and as varied as the participants felt inclined to make them. As it turned out, attention was focussed heavily on these questions resulting in a coverage of key issues relative to the Soviet Union that was, in our view, highly relevant to the varied puzzles with which we are confronted today.

Mose L. Harvey
Director, Center for Advanced International Studies
University of Miami
Conference Chairman

April 1975
I
OPENING REMARKS

HARVEY: I hardly need to say that all of us in the Center for Advanced International Studies of the University of Miami welcome you. We are delighted to have you and look forward very much to our discussions over the next two days.

KELLEY: May I bring up a subject which I think ought to be mentioned? It's a matter that when I think of it I almost start weeping. And that is of the fourteen Russian-language specialists whom we trained and developed—all are dead except George Kennan. It's incredible, when you think back, that all these young men were fifteen or twenty years younger than we are and they're all dead, everyone, except George Kennan. He was the first and he's the only one left. And I thought we ought to bring this up in memory of those Russian-language specialists, whom we all know.

KÖHLER: I might add a specific footnote that we, down here at the University, had the pleasure of having both Chip and Tommy pay us visits and I greatly regret that we didn't while they were still alive act on our idea of bringing this group together.

HARVEY: Certainly, we all share these sentiments. We think of that word "premature" often and I think seldom with greater reason for regret than in the case of these people. I guess looking back, George, you'd probably be...

best to testify as to why the toll has been so great since you fourteen received that training. There have been reasons, I suspect, related to pressures and stress and the sheer burden of unceasingly heavy responsibilities. But we can at least add a different note here, that we are extraordinarily glad that you are here and hope that you’ll be here for a great many more years to talk about your unexcelled experiences and that there are many others on which the nation can draw that you yourself have trained.

Several persons have asked me how I plan to proceed, as Chairman, with such an experienced and knowledgeable group as this and without a fixed agenda. I suggest that we at least start on the basis of the several groups of questions that we submitted to you several days ago. These of course are very far-ranging questions and were intended only to stimulate thinking in what we consider to be a number of critical directions. However, lacking any other agenda, I think we might try to use these questions as guidelines, or perhaps better sign posts to keep us moving along. I really expect the discussion to generate its own dynamics and that there will be little need for guidance or suggestions from this Chair.

I would say, that we emphatically do not want to seek anything in the way of a consensus on any question. If we agree on various matters, fine; if we disagree, equally fine. We are all looking at the Soviet Union from various vantage points, both as to time and as to experiences. Also, of course, there are a great many aspects of the Soviet situation and Soviet plans and activities about which we can have nothing in the way of surety. Although I doubt that any of us would subscribe to the implications of Winston Churchill’s characterization of the Soviets as an enigma wrapped in a mystery, etcetera, and hence beyond any understanding, I am sure that some of us views Moscow as operating in such a way as to make possible assessing what they are about or really intend by applying any set of preconceived formulas. Actually, as we all know all
too well, the Soviet leaders have emphasized since the days of Lenin the necessity of constantly adapting themselves to "objective realities" and of avoiding getting caught in any web of doctrinarianism. Hence we need, and here certainly want, as varied opinions and judgments relative to the various problems and developments we will be considering as we can get. Our objective is not assumed answers to, but the best possible insights into, some of the key things that have happened over time in the Soviet Union, that may be happening now, and that may happen in the future.

The first item of the paper we submitted to you asks for judgments as to changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union since initiation of communist rule.* Later, I hope we can set back to the early days and draw on the direct experiences of several of you who were in Russia when it all began. But first, we would like to plunge immediately into this matter of whether the Soviets have or have not changed in fundamental ways over the years. As Foy Kohler has said, it logically comes first and certainly should be an excellent point of departure for that dynamic development of exchanges of views that we hope for. I would suggest that we concentrate on basic purposes, methods of operation, and successes and failures rather than strictly physical changes.

Since Earl Packer's experiences in the Soviet Union extend over a longer period than those of any of us here, he would seem best to begin our discussion. Earl, will you get us started on this issue of fundamental change?

*Item I, as presented to the group, was as follows: "Has the Soviet Union changed in any fundamental way in this past half century? If so, why? Have outside influences had any effect—trade, exchange programs, radio broadcasts? If not, why not? Is the underlying assumption of Western policy that democratic evolution can be promoted in the Soviet Union valid?"
II
CONTINUITY VERSUS CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION

1. Long-Term Perspectives

PACKER: Well, since I've been nominated, unanimously elected, to open the discussion here on the first question, I agree with Mose's emphasis on the word "fundamental" and I've got a few thoughts here which are all negative in a way on the question of whether there have been beneficial fundamental changes.

I think one of the first things to remember is that the Soviet Union remains a police state—no freedom of speech, no freedom of religion, no freedom of press, no freedom of meeting, no secret ballot, no general freedom of travel, no freedom to change jobs. That is on the side of personal privileges.

A second point, it seems to me, is that the expansionist urge is still there. We have a bigger Soviet navy. We have Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. We have very serious, and to us, detrimental, Soviet ambitions in the Persian Gulf states. I sometimes think, with regard to the recent suggestion, demand, I don't know what to call it, that the Soviets have a fishing port in Portugal, that it wasn't advanced seriously. I think they want to throw out a question for the NATO people to think about. Maybe they'd get away with it. I think one of the things they're constantly doing is testing us and there was a good deal of that back in the early days. Then, Norway is concerned about Soviet ambitions in Spitzbergen, Denmark about Soviet ambitions in the Western Baltic. This is current. We have near at home the Cuban-Latin American situation.

A third point is that Soviet leaders still profess to believe in the international revolutionary movement. I have a book here by Brezhnev, which probably a lot of you know, called The Communist Party of the Soviet Union in
the Struggle for Unity of all Revolutionary and Peace-Loving Forces. This is from a lot of Brezhnev's speeches and writings and the last one in here is dated 1972. I picked this up at Four Continents recently. I don't know whether you're all familiar with it or not. There is a later one which is called To the Youth--to Build Communism which is along a similar line--selected statements. In addition, of course, there are four volumes of Brezhnev's speeches which you have all probably seen brought up to date--some through '73. The Soviet Union is still interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. Somebody might say, "Well, so do we." Granted. But who started this interference in the internal affairs of other countries? Who can take defensive measures against Kremlin effort if it isn't ourselves? I think we need to consider what Soviet expansionism portends for the US and the West and the Third World in the future.

A fourth point: There's been no compensation for acts of repudiation and confiscation. A fifth point: The Soviet Union has the greatest spy system in the world, all of which is aimed to enable them better to carry out their major objectives. The sixth point, and rather facetious, is that there are two members of the UN with which no foreign country is allowed to have any diplomatic relations and a seventh point is limitations on travel for foreign diplomats in the Soviet Union. That goes back, in a way, to the first point I brought up, which is police state business. Now, all these points are negative. In the agenda item with which we are dealing, there is mention of several points which are all on the other side of the question: trade, exchange programs, radio broadcasts. All those are certainly favorable as compared with fifty years ago. Radio broadcasts, of course fifty years ago there were no such things as international radio broadcasts. I think that about sums up what I can contribute for the moment on the fundamental problem.

HARVEY: Loy, as the second of our long-timers will you pick it up from here?
HENDERSON: Excuse me. I made some notes last night of which I'm not proud. Nevertheless, I thought it would perhaps be better to write down some of my ideas rather than to try to talk just off the cuff this morning. The question "Has the Soviet Union changed in any fundamental way during the last fifty years?" Now, in answering that, I may talk quite positively. That doesn't mean that my mind couldn't be changed. After all, my mind hasn't been changed much during the last fifty years, but it still might.

Yes, the internal strength, the physical power and the influence on world affairs of the Soviet Union has increased tremendously. It has emerged from a state possessing an enormous stretch of territory, but weak from an economic organizational and technical point of view, to a highly industrialized superpower with full control of its territories and peoples. It maintains a degree of law and order that is not matched by any other great industrialized state. It also is able to exert leadership over at least a dozen other countries. It leads all other countries in the production of iron and steel and has learned that it has awaiting the exploitation of natural resources unequaled by any other state.

There has been, however, no change in the ultimate foreign policy objective of the Soviet Union in the last fifty years. That objective has been and continues to be the creation of a communist-controlled world with headquarters hopefully in Moscow. During these fifty years, the tactics pursued by the Soviet leaders, in the pursuit of their ultimate goal, have shifted from time to time in order more effectively to cope with changes in the world situation.

In the latter '20s, after Stalin had succeeded in establishing himself as dictator, he decided it would be impossible to produce a communist world by propaganda unaccompanied by force or the threat of force. Therefore embarked upon a policy of trying to convert the Soviet Union with its extensive territories and tremendous resources into a powerful industrial state possessing
well-equipped land, air and sea forces and an economy capable of giving full
support to them. His idea was that as the power of the Soviet Union increased
it could gradually by stratagem, mixed with force, or threat of force, expand
the territories under communist control. He hoped gradually to strengthen the
communist world at the expense of the non-communist, so that eventually such
segments of the non-communist world that were successful in remaining free,
would eventually fall an easy victim to communist takeover. He believed that
if the communist sector of the world would maintain strict discipline and unity
it would have a decisive advantage over the so-called capitalist sector which
by its nature was riddled with disputes and rivalries. The communist sector,
remaining firmly united, could play the non-communist states off against one
another and could exploit the so-called contradictions within each industrial
state.

The basic policies outlined by Stalin have been and are still being followed
by his successors. As the Soviet Union has gained in strength it has been able
at times to make use of various non-communist nations which were disgruntled with
international situations and has even accepted some of them as temporary allies
in the course of its endeavors to weaken or destroy its more dangerous adver-
saries. It has also suffered some reverses in its efforts to maintain strict
discipline among various members of the communist sector. It has had its problems
of unity, for instance with Yugoslavia, Albania and China. More recently it has
tolerated temporary breaches of discipline on the part of the communist parties
in certain non-communist countries, when in its opinion such breaches might
strengthen the ability of those parties to overthrow the capitalist government
in power. I'm thinking about countries such as Italy where it is clearly allowing
the Italian Communist Party to criticize some of the actions of the Soviet Union
in order that the Communist Party may more easily come into power. Do you want
to go into the trade business now or is that going to come in later? I was just discussing changes. Shall I mention trade?

KÖHLER: I think that comes to the current issues, more probably.

HENDERSON: Trade, radio and so forth.

KÖHLER: Yes. Here we want only to talk about the basic question of change.

HENDERSON: Well, I shall end my contribution by saying that I agree with what Earl Packer has said.

PACKER: Well, I agree with what you said.

HARVEY: Mr. Kelley, Bob, since you provided the effort that led to the beginning of US professional preparations to deal with the USSR, would you speak to this first question of change or the lack of it?

KÖHLER: You started the whole deal, Bob, then went on to establish the radio. Did you waste your time?

KELLEY: I would say the basic objectives of the communist regime are the same today as they were under Lenin and Stalin. One thing which shocks me frequently is that in the American press, even good writers or intelligent people, date what they call the Cold War from after the Second World War. The Cold War started at the very beginning. And it could have properly been called Cold War because at the very beginning, as Lenin and Stalin indicated, the Communist regime was not to be extended by the force of the Soviet arms. It was to be done by other methods and then they eventually set up the Communist International. And so, the Cold War began at that time. It didn't begin, as now you read all the time that it began after the Second World War. That's all wrong.

PACKER: Could I interrupt half a second? I think the best document I know on the question of when the Cold War began is the Decree on Peace. Very often in Soviet publications in the Decree on Peace they leave out a very
important part of that first decree dated November 8, 1917 in which there was an appeal to the class conscious workers in Britain and France and Germany in effect to seize control in these respective countries. And that would enable them to get over their idea of a general peace. That is when I think the Cold War began. Of course, they didn't have the terminology at that time. Incidentally, of course, I feel very strongly that the Cold War isn't over.

HARVEY: Mr. Kennan, George, I think you'd logically be next if you would.

KENNAN: Well, I'd like to offer some thoughts that have been stimulated by what has already been said here this morning. They're rather disjointed and they're rather by way of commentary on this than an attempt to put together all my own views on the nature and the extent of change over these 58 years. Of course, this is a long time and no country is immune to the forces of change.

There've been really three generations not only of common people but also of the Soviet leadership. And these have, each one of them, been somewhat different from the other. There has, of course, been--there is in fact in every country that has a revolution and especially a revolution carried out by an ideologically-inspired group--there's been an erosion of the militant faith in Russia, just as there has been everywhere else. I think there are jolly few people in the Soviet Union today who really care a great deal about Marxism-Leninism. I think there are even fewer in Eastern Europe. I think you could go through Eastern Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and if you could find thirty convinced communists I'd be surprised. This is an opportunism, by and large with those people, and I think in the Soviet Union as well. I don't mean that there isn't enthusiasm for the regime in its undertakings vis-à-vis the outside world, but I think that such enthusiasm today is much more of an old-fashioned, patriotic nationalist nature than it is of an ideological nature. I think you'll find millions of young people in the Soviet Union who can be moved and are moved repeatedly by the appeal of the regime to their patriotic and nationalist feelings who would
be very little moved by any more talk about Marxism-Leninism. Even during the war. In 1952 the last times I served there, I had children there, they went to the Soviet schools. I can assure you that the children in these schools were just as utterly bored by the ideological hour as they had been in the old Czarist time by the hour of Zakon Bozhii [Religious instruction] which every school had to endure. So this, I think, has been a natural phenomena.

In addition to that, I would like to point out the effect of the Stalin regime especially as an agency of change. Stalin—how many people he killed, I don't know but I suppose it is upwards of ten millions just by execution or by rotting them to death in the camps. Remember that the Party itself suffered probably more intensively from the purges than did the population as a whole so this almost compelled the rise of a new generation of Party members and even, of course of Party leadership because, after all, the Party Congress of 1934 was decimated and over half of its members were killed. Now these youngsters who've come along in the Party and are coming along now in the leadership, what I'm saying though is that they are not the same as the old Leninist leadership. You mustn't get me wrong--I don't think they're any more friendly to us or anything like this: only that they are different. One thing to be remembered about the initial Soviet leadership is that these people, Lenin and his associates with the exception of Stalin, bloody-minded as they were, they were among the best educated governing groups anywhere in Europe. They were the products of the education given them by the old Czarist regime and their Western European studies. They were a highly sophisticated, highly cultured in a sense, group of men. These youngsters who have come along now are the products of a certain primitivization of Russian life and thought and culture which has been the effect of the destruction by abnormal means of at least fifty million people during the years of the Soviet regime. (If you take the purges, the war, the collectivization, the various vicissitudes
that have affected that country, and then the initial emigration and the killing off of five or six million people just after the Revolution.) It seems to me that there's been a steady driving out or killing of the more intelligent, the more sensitive, the more fine-feeling people in Russia for over half a century now, what you've got left is a pretty primitive mass of people. And this is beginning to affect the Party as well. Again I emphasize, please don't misunderstand me, I'm not saying that this affects things in a favorable sense; it may even make them worse.

Another thing. With regard to the question of Russia's great military power, which has been mentioned here several times, her great industrial military power, I think we should remember that Russia would normally have been a great power in these senses even if there had not been a revolution. That is, the Czarist government was, as we all know, and as very few other people know, industrializing very rapidly and very well in the twenty or thirty years before the Revolution. In fact, I think that if we were to put up a chart here and trace the curves of industrialization from the beginning of the 1890's on through, we would see that had there been no revolution, the Russians would have achieved roughly the same level that they're at now. In addition to this, they were, of course, then also a great military power. They always kept about double the number of men under arms than anybody else could think was in any way natural or right; and I expect they would have been doing the same thing today. In other words, they would have been behaving in many respects in a similar way. I think we must beware of expecting Soviet Russia not to act as a great power and as a great Russian power. Russia would do that under any regime.

Finally, I would say that, when we speak of Soviet military ascendancy in the world today, we must remember that this is not just their doing. As I see it, the change (and there's been a great change in the relative military
power of the Soviet Union) is with relation to the external forces by which Russia is surrounded. This change has come primarily from two factors which were connected with the end of World War II. First of all, the disappearance of Germany and Japan as great military powers at each end of the Russian empire. This is a very basic change. If one studies, as I have occasion to do all the time, Russia's position at the late nineteenth century, then one sees how what an enormous role Germany played in those days in the containment of Russia from the West and what an enormous role Japan played in the containment of Russia from the East. Now those two powers are today almost demilitarized, at least in their offensive power, and there's been a tremendous change in Russia's position.

Secondly, the Russian possession of Eastern Europe has a significance which has, in my mind, been greatly underrated abroad. The military problem for Western Europe presented by the Soviet Union today is not so much a problem of the size of the Russian conventional forces (we'll leave aside the nuclear weapons for the moment). It's the fact that Russia now has an area of deployment in the very center of Europe which enables her to overcome the communications-poor zone which lies between Poland, the old Poland, and the Soviet Union, the Pripet Marshes and that whole zone of territory between the Baltic and the Black Sea. The people who handed over half of Europe to Russia in 1945 should have reflected on what this was going to do to Russian military capabilities. And it's in these two factors, the disappearance of Germany and Japan, and the fact that Russia today can start from within sixty miles of Hamburg in any military encounter, it is this rather than the actual size of the Russian Armed Forces which, to me, explains the relative change.

Only one other thought: the changes that have occurred in Russia over the course of all these years have been of a very gradual nature and
almost imperceptible. That makes it much more difficult to identify them but also it makes it very dangerous to neglect them. The fact that change has been gradual, that it's almost imperceptible, doesn't mean that it's less important.

HENDERSON: Could I ask a question? George, do you think the Cold War has ended?

KENNAN: No. I agree very strongly with Bob Kelley that I've always objected to the use of the term Cold War as something beginning in World War II. Gracious me, it has existed from the word "go." The only thing is that there've been embraced into the Cold War elements of antagonism which would have been there even had there been a continuation of the Russian Empire because when one reads the complaints that were made in this country and Western Europe about Russian behavior during the Czarist period and sees how similar they are to the complaints we have today, one has to recognize that we're up against a phenomenon that is only partly new, partly old.

HARVEY: Again, to follow this question of change somewhat further because it seems to be so productive, John Scott, you were a person, I think, who went to the Soviet Union for a variety of reasons at a rather early time and saw it from a different light from anybody else at the table. As I remember, you went over to work in a labor capacity. It has always seemed to me to have been a daring thing to do but... I just wondered if you might pick up here.

SCOTT: Looking back, I'm not at all sure that my basic motivations were ideological. It was very difficult in 1932 to find a job in this country and I was just emerging from the University and there were personal things involved. I wanted to do something unusual and my family's position was such that I wanted to get out of the area of their immediate control. Nevertheless, I did go, being a member of the Young Communist League at the time in
this country with a very strong impression that capitalism was functioning imperfectly and that if central economic planning could make some contribution to the solution to the problems that we were encountering in the USA, let's see what they were.

And I landed in Magnitogorsk, an area full of young people who had come there for varying reasons, about half of them under administrative pressure, either actual prisoners or under administrative exile. The foreign community, about fifty, fifty-five strong, half of them were political refugees, mostly from Germany and Czechoslovakia and some others had come from this country just to get jobs. Most of these latter were American steelworkers of Slavic origin from places like Pittsburgh and Youngstown, Ohio. There was a lot of idealism in a limited sense, enthusiasm, on the part of many young people whom I met, for what we were doing, for what was going on. We were building a steel mill and the steel was going to be of use to all of us. We would get it back, our children would at some point, in bicycles and automobiles and other things. In the meantime, the physical expression of the economic fact that the capital formation rate at the time in the Soviet Union was about 35%, extremely high, consumption was very restricted, food was poor, housing was poor, climate was severe—all of these things seemed to be challenges that were met by many young people with whom I associated every day. With enthusiasm, well, let's get it done, let's do it... I know many people from other parts of the Soviet Union and I think that this general impression was fairly widespread.

I want to make the point that I don't think that is to be confused with ideological enthusiasm. There wasn't much ideology although the semantics of Marxist-Leninism were in constant use. Let's build something; we've got iron in the country, let's make steel and the things one can make out of steel. Let me address myself against this background to the question "Are
there fundamental changes?" I believe there's a good deal of verity in the
dialectic syllogism of the conversion of quantity into quality. And as
quantitative changes take place, at a certain point they assume a qualitative
nature. I think that the little changes that have been taking place right
along are now assuming or are beginning to assume a qualitative nature. Let
me be more specific in one or two cases. This enthusiasm that I mentioned
has now disappeared. In 1973 Masha and I visited many people whom we have
known, partly her family, in the '30's, and the essential motivation now is
almost mundanely economic. You work because you've got to eat the next day
and because Mama wants a new fur coat and because of other things directly
connected with the motivation of satisfaction of fundamental elementary eco-
nomic desires. The enthusiasm for the big picture is almost gone. I think
that this is becoming a fundamental change and I suspect, although I never
met Brezhnev or Khrushchev—I met Stalin once by accident—I have no contact
with people at the top, but I suspect that this change is now assuming a
qualitative nature there too, that the motivations connected with the en-
thusiasm of building a new country and what had been one of Europe's most
backward, has become more mundane than idealistic.

I remember vividly the 17th Party Congress statements of Stalin about
old Russia was beaten by the Japanese, by the Swedes, the Germans and other
people because it was weak; now let's make the country strong, strong not
only in military terms but in terms of economic power, steel and whatnot.
I think that's a fundamental change. It is becoming a still further funda-
mental change.

There's another area in which I think fundamental changes are in the
making. That is in the degree to which the Soviet society is being influenced
by developments in other parts of the world. Some of these are questions of
current folklore: the blue jeans, and whatnot, the manner of dress, that
Pepsi-Cola is in, the influence of these expressions of the societies of Western Europe, North America and Japan produced this array of assorted consumer goods, color TV and whatnot, that intrigues and beguiles the Soviet population. This was not the case, in my opinion, thirty years ago. But I think today it is very much the case. Along with this there goes another area of influence. Partly, I think, this comes through radio. There is beginning to be a much greater level of determination on the part of the Soviet population that they're not going to allow themselves to be put upon as they were under Stalin. Now, it's easy for a guy to say this and some people may have thought this under Stalin and it was beaten out of them, and it may be beaten out of them again. I don't know. But, look at the relative affluence that today has been achieved by the Soviet population at large, the eight-hour day, for the last three or four years the five-day week, two days off. Everyone now has shoes. Masha and I visited stores in twenty cities in the summer of 1973. There wasn't one where there weren't several different kinds of bread, where there weren't many different styles and colors and types of shoes. The consumer goods position has improved very substantially. These circumstances are the result of, in my opinion, the recognition by the government that they had to make certain concessions to popular desires.

And I want to express one specific example of this that I think is by way of becoming a fundamental change. In 1960 Khrushchev was in Chicago and maybe Mayor Daley contrived this, but anyhow, they got caught in a traffic jam. It took them twenty minutes to cross the outer drive to get from where they were to where they wanted to go. Khrushchev was indignant and that evening, I believe, made a very vigorous speech which he later developed in greater detail in the Soviet Union when he returned. Mainly, this is outrageous. This is ridiculous. Five thousand pounds of automobile, careening around, millions of them with one guy going to the store to buy a quart of
milk. This kind of irresponsible whimsy, we in the Soviet Union are not going
to go into. Let them take the bus. Taxis maybe, in special cases. Ambulances
if somebody is sick but the passenger automobile as an item of consumption in
the Soviet Union will not be tolerated. Shortly thereafter, as we know, Khrush-
chev had problems and was succeeded by Mr. Brezhnev. One of the first things
that Brezhnev did, I believe, although I can't document this, is to order a
fundamental study of the automotive industry in the Soviet Union which turned
up the facts that it was in qualitative and quantitative terms and in terms of
design, twenty-five years behind those in Western Europe and Japan and North
America. They proceeded then to initiate a series of developments which have
now resulted in the construction of the Zalgali plant by Fiat, having unsuc-
cessfully sought the assistance and cooperation of General Motors in this
respect, and the Kama River plant in the Soviet Union. Now, again, I can't
document this. I am convinced that the Soviet government makes what we would
call market surveys. They don't publish them, but they know what people want.
They know that young Ivan would like to have a car, and now the decision has
been made that, by golly, we're going to give them cars. This was a change
in economic planning on a major scale which took place between Khrushchev
and Brezhnev. There are now a million privately owned passenger automobiles
in the Soviet Union. There are 109 million here. Let's not make comparisons
along those lines. But they're now committed to giving the Soviet population
automobiles. I think that this is becoming a fundamental change in which the
influence of the outside world, I address myself here to the second sentence
of question one, has become a major factor in influencing the Soviet Union's
basic planning attitudes. I think that's enough.

HARVEY: For my own part, I very much question that the present leadership
has decided in favor of automobiles for the Soviet populace: a few more, yes,
but nothing on the order of what has happened not only in the US, but other industrialized countries of the world excepting only the USSR. It would seem to me noteworthy that since the building of the Fiat plant, the Soviets have increased their exports of automobiles by almost exactly the same number as are produced at that plant. But I do not want to interrupt the discussion. This is a matter that we might want to come back to later. Meanwhile, Fred Barghoorn, while your experiences in the Soviet Union fall within a more limited time period than others who have spoken, you've seen, I guess, the Soviet Union from a certain vantage point that others of us haven't. At least I do not know of any others having a chance to view the Soviet Union from within the confines of the Lubianka prison and to have had a president of the US make a special issue of his plight at a nationally televised press interview. I am sure you have some thoughts.

2. The Import of Dissent

BARGHOORN: Mose, I thought you were referring to the fact that I took the Trans-Siberian to Vladivostok. Well, let me start with a slightly facetious remark with respect to this huge first question. I think, in a sense, the most fundamental change that has occurred is the death of Stalin. But that sort of puts one back into the framework that George Kennan was using. There have been a number of stages, I think, in the history of the Soviet Union. The most fundamental change, I think, in the entire 50 years is the establishment of the Stalin-type political system. And now, in the twenty-odd years since Stalin died, I think certain fundamental questions are being posed. I'm talking almost exclusively about the internal political regime. I'm going to leave out all these questions of foreign policy and so on.

I think the most interesting and hopeful development, but one that is enormously complex, and I don't believe anybody understands it: I've been working
on it for several years now and I certainly don't profess to understand it, but I think the most interesting thing that has happened is what is referred to as dissent or the democratic movement. I think this has at least two major aspects, both of them vast. Let me just say, interrupting my train of thought, that I find studying the unofficial thought of the dissenters a much more difficult occupation than studying Soviet official thought because Soviet official thought has a pattern. We're all used to it. We've all spent our lives trying to interpret it. But this dissenting thought takes you off in every possible direction. And, of course, some of it is very reactionary, if you will. Some of it is violently nationalistic and so on. But I'm mainly concerned with the democratic component. Let me come back to that.

I think it has two main aspects: one is what you might call legitimate posing of demands, of the attempt to improve the system or if you will the reformist aspects and this has been, in my opinion, brilliantly described in a book that I just started to read a few days ago, a new book that has just come out by Moshe Lewin entitled *Political Undercurrents of Soviet Economic Debates*. Of course, there are many other books, and many other articles that attempt to deal with this subject, but I would recommend this as one of the most interesting. I also think that Stephen Cohen's biography of Bukharin is a major contribution to understanding this subject. This, within system dissent, you might say, addresses itself to the increasing difficulties of maintaining the Stalin-type economy in view of the fact that Soviet economy and society has become so much more complex, and I think there is increasing realization that some sort of decentralization at least, and the granting of a degree of autonomy to, for example, factory directors, and so on, and of course, the scientist has become necessary. I think that there is also an increasing realization among many members of the Soviet scientific and technical intelligentsia that other changes have to be made. But most of these people have not been willing to go so far as to openly challenge the authorities.
Now, the other group of critics, of course, are the people known as dissenters, people such as Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn, Amalrik, Roy Medvedev and so on. Earl Packer brought a book with him; I have Roy Medvedev's book here. This is another book which I would strongly recommend, a book which is entitled Kniga o Sotsialisticheskoi Demokratii, it's really amazing, that a member of the Soviet Communist Party has come out with a detailed program for democratization of the Soviet political and economic and cultural system. Of course, he was expelled from the Party in 1969, but still, he's alive and still frequently makes statements, and I think that does suggest that, although I would fully agree with the statements made by the first three speakers, that no fundamental change in the political system has occurred, nevertheless questions are being asked. Turning now to the last part of this enormous question here, which I broke down into five parts, and at least four sub-parts, is whether the West can do anything about what is described here as democratic evolution, I think that is a fantastically difficult question, but at least we can study what people such as Medvedev, Sakharov and others are proposing. One final point; one can ask whether or not those who openly confront the authorities such as the group of seven who demonstrated on Red Square in 1968 against the invasion of Czechoslovakia, whether these people are pursuing foolish tactics or not. That's an extremely difficult question, too and one that I think students of the Soviet dissent movement are constantly pondering, but there is one interesting reflection that you can have one that which was brought out in the book that I was looking at last night by Gorbanevskaya, a Soviet poetess who participated, one of the seven who participated in the demonstration. She includes in her record of the event and the results, the punishments that were meted out to the participants. She includes a statement by one of the leading
members of the democratic movement, Anatoly Yakobson; he did not participate. He wasn't told about it. But he says that by demonstrating, the participants, as he put it, saved the honor of the Russian people. Well, that's one way of looking at it. At any rate, certain precedents have been set.

I'm not going to stick my neck out to the extent of asserting that this movement is going to achieve any tangible results in the immediate future or maybe even in the next ten or fifteen years. It has for the most part been crushed and destroyed. However, again one can stay within the framework of denying that fundamental changes have occurred and yet also assert that things are considerably better than they were twenty-odd years ago. Two of the participants in that demonstration are now in the West. One is a young man named Feinberg and the other, of course, is Pavel Litvinov, now teaching in a college near New York City. And there is really a large number of former participants in the democratic movement now living either in England or Western Europe or the United States. And these people are perhaps establishing a new democratic Russian emigration.

Now, one other reflection, which is borrowed largely from the works by Cohen and Moshe Lewin which I referred to before... You could argue, I think, that there is a conflict between the heritage of the 1920's when social democracy still had the idea of democracy, as a constituent major component and the concepts of the 1930's, which were formulated and put into effect by Stalin himself. Who knows whether the heritage of the 20's which included the democratic component of socialism or the heritage of the 30's, which I think, is still dominant, will win out. In other words, I'm saying it's still essentially a Stalinist system, but it has been challenged and I also would agree with the statements that George Kennan made about certain almost imperceptible changes which are occurring below the surface.
HARVEY: Freddy, I have one question here about dissent, the effect of it, and your mention of Andrei Amalrik. Certainly, I think, Amalrik tried to belabor everything bad about the Soviet regime that he could think of. Yet, as I remember it, he disdained the idea of an effective dissident group or movement within the Soviet Union. One thing, he ridiculed the numbers, and another, as I recall, he said that most dissent was in form of being mad at the boss in whatever little bureaucratic establishment that one happened to be working in. And, I seem to recall him saying, too, that while someday the Soviet Union might come to be a nation with bare knees, it would never become a nation with a human face. I may have mixed this up, but certainly his commentary was along these lines. Most of the things about dissent, opposition, democratic movements, etcetera, that we've stressed in the West, he all but wiped out. As you doubtless remember, when he came down to hard cases in support of his contention that the USSR would not survive through 1984, the only thing cited was a protracted war with China.

KÖHLER: China and the minority nationalities.

HARVEY: Well, Almarik say the precipitating factor as war with China, a guerrilla war that would be fought indefinitely and for some strange reason in Siberia. I don't know why or how either Russia or the Chinese would fight a guerrilla war in Siberia. It would hardly seem a likely place for guerrilla operations on any one's part. But that is beside the point. Freddie, I just wondered if you discount Amalrik's views as to the strength and vitality of dissidents in the USSR.

BARGHOORN: No. As I said, toward the beginning of my remarks, everyone of these major dissenters has his own system. They're extremely individualistic people. It seems to me that it makes sense that if you've been living under an extremely conformist regime, if you are an independent personality,
you're going to be an extreme individualist. Take people like Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn, Roy Medvedev, Amalrik and many, many others, each one of them has his own interpretation but to try to get back to your question, I think Amalrik is one of the most interesting thinkers in this group but he may be too pessimistic. Who knows? That's just terribly difficult. One aspect of his thought that I would have to agree with, I don't like to agree with, but I think he rightly stresses the passivity of the majority of the people.

But on the other hand, you know, I think what we have to realize about this dissent phenomenon is that most Westerners for a while didn't even believe it existed. I remember, myself, when I heard Peter Reddaway talk at Yale back around 1970, I guess, or 71, that at that time a good many Western news correspondents were saying that Amalrik was a KGB agent because he wasn't in jail. He was writing these various critical remarks and statements and so on and he was talking to foreign correspondents and he wasn't in jail. Of course, the Kremlin soon corrected that situation, but the point that I think is important is that after all, dissent did occur and on a fairly large scale. Now in retrospect, it appears as though the regime was strong enough at all times to suppress it but they, and this gets back to what John Scott was saying, I think that they delayed in suppressing it partly because they were concerned about Western public opinion and that, I think, would break down into two components. One, they were concerned about the opinion of communists in countries such as Italy because they didn't want to offend the more liberal elements in the Italian Communist Party and secondly, they were concerned perhaps about detente. They didn't want to damage, blacken the image of the Soviet Union in Western Europe and the United States. I don't know. Like everything else on this subject; this is, of course, largely speculative.

DURBROW: Freddy, why are all these guys going in different directions for the alleged good reason of bringing democracy coming to the Soviet Union? Don't
you think a lot of it is wishful thinking by our own people, our newspaper men. There were a few types who said "no" to Stalin, others to Brezhnev, some went to Red Square to demonstrate. That's a drop in the bucket. How effective are they in influencing the rest of the people in the Soviet Union?

BARGHOORN: Well, of course, I don't think they're going to get into power in the foreseeable future, but the Bol'sheviks were a small group, too, in their time.

DURBROW: But you can't fight tanks with fingernails, and the government has a lot of tanks there in the Soviet Union.

BARGHOORN: I know, but the Bol'sheviks, how many Bol'sheviks were there in 1917?

DURBROW: 10,000.

PACKER: Well, less than that. But I think the membership of the party in 1917, 1918, there were only 10,000.

It was a defeated country, though.

BARGHOORN: Well, intellectual movements, revolutionary movements are always started by intellectuals and they're usually handfuls, and there may have been a thousand participants in this democratic movement.

HARVEY: Without keeping this subject going too long, there is a big difference too between those in power in 1917 and as of now. History suggest, I think, that revolutions aren't really started by intellectuals or popular uprisings but by the people in power who become unwilling because of some reasons, become unwilling to do the things necessary to preserve their power.

BARGHOORN: Well, that's OK. I'll agree with that but the present regime in the Soviet Union is not nearly as vigorous as Stalin was, either.

PACKER: I think you have a more effective police state today than you did under the Czarist regime.
HARVEY: I'd like to hear now from another vantage point. Mr. Shapiro. I assume, Henry, that you date back about as far as anybody in reporting on the Soviet Union, in living there and looking at it from the standpoint of a very hard-working correspondent. So, as a change of pace...
III

DETERMINANTS OF SOVIET BEHAVIOR

1. The Status and Force of Revolutionary Ideology

SHAPIRO: I have strong reservations about the use of the adjective "fundamental," except in a limited way, in connection with what John Scott said, that there have been sufficient quantitative changes in the Soviet Union in my experience of the past forty years to amount to some change in quality but without using the word fundamental. What I would like to address myself mostly to is perhaps some footnotes to what George Kennan said. Did I hear you correctly, George, when you said it's difficult to find six communists?

KENNAN: In Eastern Europe, not in Russia.

SHAPIRO: I'd be more like Diogenes; in the Soviet Union I think I'd have to go around with a candle to find one communist. The great difference in 1933 when I first arrived, I was a little younger like all of us, a lot more energy, and I met mostly young people at the time. It was a different period. It was possible then. I remember spending long winter nights discussing Marxism, revolution and what communists were talking about in those days. But that was forty years ago. In the last 15, 20 or 25 years, I have not been able to find one person who was willing to discuss communism, Marxism. Most of the young men I knew at the time, of course, many of them got caught in the purges and were liquidated, but some of them are still alive. Anyhow, through my daughter and my wife I was able to meet some young people. I'm not exaggerating now; I'm speaking the literal truth. For years I have not been able to find one, literally, one young person willing to discuss ideological subjects, and John Scott is perfectly right. They're interested in what most people in the West are. They're interested in a better apartment, automobiles and whatnot. I would apply that to the older generation and as far up as the leadership itself.

Nothing has been said yet sufficiently about the qualitative change in the
leadership. After all, think of Lenin's first Politburo, of the Central Committee, intellectuals, Westernized intellectuals, who not only had the benefit of a first-class classical education in old Russia but study abroad. The people who came back with Lenin from Switzerland, I think, were as a sophisticated and as cultivated a group of intellectuals as you could find anywhere. Look at your present Politburo. How many ideologists are there in there? How many doctrinaire communists are there in the Politburo?

I've checked the figures recently, but it's my impression that of the sixteen members of the Politburo, at least thirteen were trained as engineers. Some of them, of course, went to the higher Party schools, and so on. They started in the Stalin era, but developed much later. Most of their careers have been concerned with building a plant, directing a factory, running a shop. I'm not sure that you can find one, one ideologist in the Politburo now to compare with the most minor ideologist in the Lenin era, Bukharin, Leon Trotsky, certainly not even Stalin. After all, Stalin did have some intellectual pretensions; he did write books; he did play around with problems of Leninism. He wrote a pamphlet on the nationality problem, and so on.

What have the present leaders done to promote Marxist ideology? Well, Suslov, of course, is the official ideologist. Well, you know his background, also prepared as an engineer, and Suslov has managed, like Mikoyan, to survive one leader after another. He was Stalin's ideologist. He was Khrushchev's ideologist. Now he's Brezhnev's ideologist. Can anybody accuse Suslov of having contributed one original thought? He manages to articulate, to verbalize what is the policy, what is the ideological policy at the time.

One needn't have to go very far to look for documentation; there the original objective of the Communist Party has not changed. Certainly, you find at least lip service to world revolution. But I again, maybe since the beginning of the war, I have not, a little more modestly, I don't remember a period in recent years that I heard the phrase "world revolution."
You remember the slogans of the second World War were not like the Civil War when they talked in terms, of serving the Revolution and, there still was, even in 1933, there still was considerable talk about world revolution. And today you’ll find plenty of documentation in the Brezhnev speeches to the fact that eventually the whole world will go communist. Actually, my impression is that Khrushchev was the last of what may be called messianic leaders. It was Khrushchev who used to tell us how your children, your grandchildren will be communists. It was he who talked about "we shall bury you," meaning not quite what was popularly thought here that he meant. I doubt that you can hear language like that now, although on paper, at any rate, the objective is the same. The present leadership to me seems to be concerned with the immediate practical goal of developing strength in the Soviet Union, economically and militarily, and as George Kennan pointed out, as any non-socialist regime would have done. And, perhaps somewhere in their subconscious, or even their conscious, there is a feeling, or at least a hope, that the whole world will go communist.

At the same time, it seems to me, as a practical matter, the Soviet Union today has acquired a vested interest in stabilization of capitalism. I think the Soviet Union today would be terribly embarrassed if there were to be an economic crisis, what the Marxists used to call the final crisis of capitalism. During the war, I remember a conversation with Mikoyan. He spoke very highly about the United States, what the United States has been able to achieve. Just before the war; it was in 1940, I think, he said one reason the United States was so prosperous, so efficient, so successful, was, and he didn’t mean it as a joke, that the best people of Europe went to the United States. And, then one thing leading to another, I asked him about the final crisis of capitalism. He said, "Don’t worry. It’s coming."

But that was 1940. After the war, you all remember Yevgeny Varga’s book, in which he took a far different view of the future of capitalism, its viability,
ability to survive; under Stalin, he was discredited temporarily, but soon after Stalin's death, Varga was rehabilitated. His book was republished. He went back to his original thesis. So that, I think from our point of view at the moment, it seems to me to be more practical to look at what the present leaders consider is in their national interest. I think their ideological commitments are not as important as their present goals which are primarily to modernize their industry, their lagging industry, which must require Western technological know-how, and so on. I am not sure that, whether it's true or not, that their objective ultimately remains unchanged and (certainly on paper it does) whether that would really make any difference from the point of view of Soviet relations with the West in the foreseeable future.

HARVEY: Henry, I'd like to ask a question, either of you or of anyone else, and this applies also to some of the things George Kennan said. Speaking about changes in attitudes, do you see a special change in the attitudes of the youth; perhaps, say, a turn against authority and tradition, a turn similar to what's been taking place in Western countries, and, if so, would you surmise that an effect might be the willingness of youth to support, or more particularly to engage with any enthusiasm in, foreign adventures or to make the sacrifices that the regime says every Soviet youth is aching to make for his country?

SHAPIRO: Well, in that connection, I should like to say that the youth of today again is not the youth of the 1920's or the 1930's. Another thing is, and, Fred Barghoorn has referred to it, and that is the change of attitude both on the part of the people toward the government and the government toward the people. Stalin, of course, had nothing but contempt for public opinion, Soviet or foreign. That is not true entirely today. There is evidence of a relatively tolerant attitude up to a point towards the dissidents. In the case of Amalrik, for example, there may have been another reason why he wasn't immediately arrested. And that was because the police were probably a lot more sophisticated. I
suppose one thing that they had in mind, as in the case with Yakir and others, is watch them, keep an eye on them, and have them lead to other people. As Amalrik himself one said, when some of his friends in the dissident movement whispered that.

**HARVEY:** Let me put the questions maybe in a little different form. Assume it had been the Soviet Union and not the United States that had been involved in something like Vietnam for that period of time, do you think that the same sort of reaction would have taken place on the part of the youth in the Soviet Union, those directly involved? Or even those who were able to stay at home? Do you see something as happening to Soviet youth, affecting the fundamental attitudes, dedication, willingness to work, to make sacrifices and so on?

**SHAPIRO:** All I can say in that connection is at the time of the so-called Winter War against Finland in 1939 there was considerably less enthusiasm on the part of the young Soviet men to fight the war. And you remember they didn't do too well in the beginning of the Finnish war. Of course, they didn't do very well in the beginning of the war against Germany, too. But, after all, Finland was not Germany. There was great apathy among the people I knew at the time, the young men, about fighting against Finland. They didn't know what they were fighting about; those that I met had very serious reservations, but there were no reservations in the case of the war against Germany. They knew they were fighting an enemy. They were invaded. And, again the appeal to them was not on the basis of ideology but the defense of the fatherland, like in the Napoleonic War.

If, I think, the Soviet Union had been involved in actually fighting in Vietnam, I'm sure there would have been the same lack of enthusiasm on the part of youth as there was at the time of Finland. They would have gone, naturally; the Soviet system being as coercive as it is, there would have been no difficulty in getting troops to go to Vietnam. But I'm sure there would have been very little enthusiasm, particularly since the appeal now that's being made to the
young generation is not connected with ideology. I'm sure the indoctrination in the army is defense of the fatherland. The young soldiers are not being trained to fight for the world revolution, but to defend the Soviet Union. So I would guess that the attitude would be about the same without expressing itself. But with all the freedoms in this country, the youth expressed itself differently.

**HENDERSON:** Ever since 1921, from time to time, there have been widespread statements to the effect that the Soviet leaders are not really interested in world revolution, or propagating revolution. "That's only lip service; they're only giving lip service." Such statements were heard at the time of the adoption of the New Economic Policy in 1921, and have been repeated since many, many times. Why, if there's no deep interest in world revolution at present among the people and leaders of the Soviet Union, do the Soviet leaders, whenever they make a change in tactics that might be considered as a deviation from the world revolution path, immediately insist that their world revolutionary fervor is as great as ever? Why should they continue to try to ride a dead horse?

**SHAPIRO:** Well, there have been very important developments since 1920, most important of which, of course, is the emergence of other communists, not only communist countries, but communist systems. I'm not sure the Soviet Union today is very happy that China has gone communist. Of course, I'm the last one to talk to you gentlemen about Stalin's attitude toward Mao Tse-tung. Stalin's feeling at one point was that Soviet national interests were better served by supporting Chiang Kai-shek than Mao Tse-tung. He was always against Mao Tse-tung.

Anyhow, today they they have this problem. On the one hand, they want to retain control of the international communist movement. Well, that certainly is a source of strength to them, to have some control over the international communist movement. On the other hand, if any Western country, say Italy for example, were to go communist, I'm not sure the Soviet Union would be happy. An Italian communist regime is more likely, I think, to go the Yugoslav way,
or even the Chinese way, than to follow the Soviet Union. At this point, I think, as you know, the Italian communists are often very critical of the Soviet Union and I think Fred Barghoorn is perfectly right when he says that they tolerate a certain degree of dissidence on the part of foreign communist countries, and that isn't because they're tolerant. It's simply because they cannot help it.

As I said, if say Italy were to go communist, France, I am not sure, given the present Soviet goals, and present planning, as they work on a 15-year plan, that they wouldn't prefer at the moment to have a stable Western world with which they could do business, from whom they could benefit immensely. What would happen fifteen or twenty-five years from now is another question. In the meantime, there has been, I think, a very serious erosion in the communist ideology. The so-called New Left in the Western countries is Maoist rather than pro-Soviet; most of them are anti-Soviet. So, from the point of view of the survival of the present Soviet regime, and given what I think is their immediate goal to modernize their industry, raise the living standard, if they still believe in world revolution, it is very much on the back burner. And given another generation or so the country will be taken over by engineers. I think the present Politburo is as close to being a technocratic group of rulers as you can find anywhere in the world.

PACKER: Could I have the floor half a second? I'd like to interpose here a couple of remarks that Stalin made. One, in my recollection, in '22, '23 when he said that in the 1920's the Soviet forces were insufficiently strong to break through Warsaw into Western Europe and reach Paris. And in his correspondence with Tito, Stalin said at one time, this was after the second World War, Stalin said that the Soviet Party, Soviet forces had been instrumental in putting Tito in power, and it was too bad that they were unable to similarly help their French
and Italian comrades. That's a question of ambition. I haven't got with me the precise citations but you're familiar enough with the material.

Now with regard to the question of the use of the phrase "world revolution," this certainly has dropped out very largely from Soviet terminology. But that's a question of semantics. Here is a speech of Brezhnev on the 20th of March, 1972 at a Soviet Trade Union Conference where he uses the phrase, not "world revolution," but the "world labor and trade union movement." Later, speaking about relations which China and the Resolutions of the 24th Congress of the Soviet Union, he says, "in resolutions of the Congress it was stated (ukazano) that our party stands on the position of the consistent support of the principles of the Marxist-Leninism, the all possible strengthening of the unity of the world communist movement." That's a question of phraseology and something like our "fundamental" here.

HARVEY: Let me first get back to George Kennan. I would like to spread the problems you raise around.

KENNAN: Well, I just wanted to add a word in answer to Loy's question as to why they continue these semantic exercises. I see two fundamental reasons for it.

In the first place, this regime, given its continuity from the revolution that occurred in 1917, has more blood on its hands than any regime in the world today. It has destroyed upwards of ten million people, probably, and all in the name of ideology. If the ideology is ever officially dropped, I mean if they ever have to admit that it's not correct or that they no longer hold to it, they become criminals to this extent. It's their own excuse for what they have done and they have to cling to it.

But secondly, I just want to reinforce what has been said, and what Henry Shapiro said, I think, here. They are faced not only in the military sense but
also in the ideological sense with the Chinese heresy and also the Yugoslavs. But the Chinese is overwhelmingly important. And they're very concerned not to get caught out by the Chinese, using language that would make it appear that they had abandoned the ideology. Why? Because they feel that it is their great appeal to the Third World countries, to the underdeveloped countries and that if they cannot demonstrate at every turn that they are still attached to the ideology, their leadership both with other communist parties and with all the left-wing, Third World regimes will disintegrate and their place will be taken by the Chinese. For some reason which I wouldn't want to try to analyze here because it would take much more time and I'm not sure I've thought it out myself, but to them, again instinctively, a loss of their leadership in the Marxist-Leninist anti-Western, anti-imperialist part of the world is almost synonymous with failure and the end of the revolution in Russia. This idea of their leadership is absolutely essential to their image of themselves. And, therefore, they have to keep repeating these phrases.

HARVEY: I read an interesting article you wrote which appeared in the Washington Post and also the Herald here in Miami, maybe around the country, in which you emphasized the problem of legitimacy and the interrelationship between the world revolutionary line, Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the claim of the ruling regime to a right to hold power. You feel that is an important consideration?

KENNAN: Well, that is the first point I meant to make, that this ideology is identical with their sense of legitimacy. But second, it's also identical with their claim to world leadership and the abandonment of either one of those could knock the stuffings out of them morally and politically.

HARVEY: I don't want to cut off a good discussion but I know we will be coming back to this problem especially since it clearly is central, but I feel
we should follow the format which I think is good with this first question: that is to get the views of everyone at the table. It seems to me that this will give us a base for later exchanges. So, again to change pace, I'd like to turn to the youngest . . . and most recent of our ambassadors to the Soviet Union and one who perhaps is in as good a position as any to deal with a matter that is inherent in this first question. Jake, is there such a thing as a new Soviet man? How does it look to you? You were there last in a responsible capacity so I feel we should turn to you and get perhaps a change of direction.

BEAM: My experience with Moscow begins at the time of Stalin's death, but I'd like to address myself to the question, "Why can't you find a communist in the Soviet Union?" The reason is that communism is regarded as a normal way of life, is not an issue anymore. People don't talk about it. We don't talk about our system in terms of capitalism. We don't pinch ourselves to remind ourselves that this is a capitalist system. We go ahead with our business. I think communism has worked itself toward and has achieved a certain amount of stability. It's no longer an issue domestically.

SHAPIRO: What is communism?

BEAM: Let us simply say it is the system the people are used to; it's been generally accepted.

SHAPIRO: It's been changing since 1917 all along.

BEAM: Well, I know. It's evolved and has generally stabilized. My point is it's not an issue and nobody's going to go out and say, "I'm a communist." In our conversations with Russians, we didn't talk about the issue of communism. We talked about current economic problems between the countries. It was taken for granted that the workers' situation has gradually improved. Even now they can goof off, which is the average Russian's ideal. The system guarantees them and eight-hour day, housing, job security, vacations, coffee breaks, but
whether it works or not at full efficiency is not of popular concern. It's adequate to their needs and they do have a small rate of advance in living standards, maybe 2% per year which keeps things going.

The other aspect of communism of course is world revolution. As we know, the Soviet government and Party, particularly the government, operate on two tracks. Internally the regime operates to build up the economy and carry out the normal functions of government. At the same time it is the vehicle of revolution abroad. In this respect it is not bound by international legal restrictions. Preoccupied as they are with day-to-day existence, the people take no interest in the revolutionary factor, and leave this entirely to their leaders.

HARVEY: Well, Jake, if they should have a plebiscite, really the finest sort of plebiscite in the Soviet Union, one that dealt with whether to continue the Communist Party as the ruling force in the Soviet Union, how do you think it would go?

BEAM: With a free vote?

HARVEY: I mean with a free vote, that is as free as any vote can be.

BEAM: Well, they wouldn't know what the alternatives are.

SCOTT: To make the question meaningful, you've got to say if there were a plebiscite after six months of discussion, because just to have a plebiscite tomorrow morning, nobody would know what the hell was the frame of reference.

HARVEY: After a year of discussion?

SCOTT: Well, all right, after a year.

HARVEY: What is your guess, if they had a great deal of discussion, say the choice was between communism and capitalism. Let me make it simple.

BEAM: All depends on what the state of both is.

HARVEY: I don't mean that. If they had a year to explore. John Scott, shall we say, would train them for a year.
BEAM: They certainly have an investment in communism as such, over
the period of years.

BARGHOORN: Mose, a couple of remarks that relate to some of these recent
statements. This is a rather vague idea but I wonder whether the internationalism,
if you want to call it that, can't be related to something that's really very
deep in Russian culture. They've always had the idea that they are somehow the
leading people in the world, that they have a mission to improve mankind and so
on, and I think that in some way which is very difficult to phrase or explain,
the orthox version of this has been replaced by Marxism-Leninism. I think
you can still believe in this in a very vague general sort of way even
though you don't know anything about the fine points of Marxist theory but to turn
to the point that Ambassador Beam was just making. With regard to what would
happen if somebody asked the question what would happen if we had six months
of discussion, I think the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 are very relevant
here and also the Soviet reaction to those events. This would be something
they would be absolutely deathly afraid of—six months of discussion—this
would destroy the entire system.

DURBROW: It certainly would.

It's a very unrealistic approach to what the situation actually is.

SCOTT: It's not going to happen.

BEAM: And also, the Russians had no sympathy for the Czechs whatsoever.
Nor for the uprising or its purpose. They thought the Czechs were crazy.

BARGHOORN: I'd like to ask Jake Beam a question. You say they hate the
Czechs. Why? In what way? What do they think is wrong with what the Czechs'
did?

BEAM: They were regarded as trouble makers.

DURBROW: They were trying to break up the system.
SCOTT: They lived too well.

BEAM: Yes, and there is a sort of resentment against that and also they were just stirring up trouble for nothing and were ungrateful to the Russians for saving them from the Germans. The official explanation was confused but there wasn't much sympathy for the Czech cause.

KOHLER: You mean popular sympathy.

BEAM: Popular sympathy, yeah.

DURBROW: If the Czech system had gone into effect, it would have spoiled the whole picture, party control. Decentralization doesn't work, that is, groups going in fourteen different directions. There must be central control under the Soviet system.

BARGHOORN: Well, I think that brings up another point that might perhaps be brought out on the table. It seems to me that whatever anyone thinks about communism, Marxism-Leninism, any of these huge abstractions, you do have to remember the authoritarian tradition of Russia which has been greatly reinforced by Stalin and Stalinism and that's been accepted. I think that that's part of what you have in mind there, that they've accepted this and you have a central administration and everybody takes orders from them and so on. And it's very hard to get away from that.

KOHLER: Well, this brings us back to the basic question which is essentially whether we can assume that the February revolution was a real valid democratic type revolution which was overthrown by the Bolsheviks, and that Stalin set the clock back a century or so. The real question--because after about say 1812 there was ferment, dissidence, a few secret societies, the underground publications and so forth and so the real question is this evolutionary process being repeated today and can it be influenced. Do these dissidents add up to anything like that.
HENDERSON: I do not think there is any possibility of a democratic regime appearing in what is now the Soviet empire in the foreseeable future. If there were to be a free plebiscite in the Soviet Union, the result would be complete chaos—a chaos that would end up in another dictatorship, perhaps a military dictatorship. There has never been a democratic form of government in Russia. The people have had no experience in maintaining a democratic government. Furthermore there are more than a score of constituent or autonomous so-called republics in the Soviet Union, the people in which still possess strong nationalistic feelings. If these peoples were given a free choice a great number of independent countries would emerge, each with several dissenting minorities.

KOHLER: Well, aren't these constituent republics a real factor? They do exist and the populations are multiplying much faster than the great Russians are.

HENDERSON: Yes....

KOHLER: Today the Russians have become a minority in the Soviet Union.

BEAN: Now, however, in the party leadership they dominate.

PACKER: Can I throw in a comment on something George Kennan said which, if I understood correctly, correct me if I'm wrong, George, that even if there had been no revolution, we would be faced with some of the problems as concerned our relations with a Russian state under the Czarist regime as we are under the Soviet regime, mainly this expansionism business. But, I think there's one difference and I think it's a question of determining the motivation of Kremlin actions today. Is a given action, where there's some question of doubt as to what motivated it, is it part of the world revolutionary movement or is it an expression of the nationalist ambition of the Russian people, the Russian state? It's very difficult to determine which is which and very often it could be either or both.
SHAPIRO: I would like to make two observations. One, I referred to Khrushchev before as the last of the Soviet messianic leaders. But I just recall that he wasn't that messianic, depending on the constituency whom he was addressing, whether for example, an International Communist Conference, or some other body. Referring to the dictum attributed to Lenin and after the revolution once the world is divided into two camps, which was the beginning of the Cold War, Lenin said the world now is divided into two camps, one socialist and one capitalist, eventually there must be a clash and one will survive. It's true, Khrushchev said. Comrade Lenin said so. But Comrade Lenin is dead, Khrushchev added. He said this in a different historic period and a different context, and as far as I know that was the closest to a repudiation of that statement of Lenin's.

And then you remember all the talk about goulash communism. And at one time Khrushchev was ridiculing ideologists. I think that was in Hungary too or Czechoslovakia. He said I know Comrades like to cite Marx and they like to cite all sorts of communist writers, but there's one thing they forget, these ideologists; they usually forget to ask and this is a Marxist question, "Comrade, when are we going to eat?" I think there's a lot more of this now than there was even under Khrushchev.

And, secondly, with regard to Jake Beam's suggestion that the reason one doesn't any longer discuss communism in the Soviet Union is because they take it for granted. Americans, of course, don't talk about Jeffersonian democracy. That happened a long time ago and that is taken for granted. But we still don't know what communism is. I'm sure the generation of the 1920's had an entirely different idea of communism than the present generation. They will discuss politics. They want to know what's happening in the West. What's the GNP of other countries? How does a worker live and that sort of thing. But they're all practical questions. No suggestion that Marxism is superior or
that the communist system will prevail. They laugh at you if you suggest it. Certainly, you'll find plenty of young Americans, young intellectuals who will, if you ask them, if you challenge them, will discuss democracy, will discuss the American system, the way it functions and so on. However, in the Soviet Union, I couldn't find anybody.

DURBROW: Mose, if we're going on debating whether the Soviet leaders are motivated by ideology, nationalism or just plain old-fashioned Russian expansionism, we're spinning our wheels, wasting time, they all are part of the Soviet operational mix. If not, why the devil are the Soviets building up a tremendous navy getting more and more bases in the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean and the Red Sea? Why are they building carriers and landing craft and things of that kind? Why have they been for years aiding Alvaro Cunhal, the head of the Portuguese Communist Party, then living in Prague, to infiltrate Communists into the Portuguese armed forces and trade unions who expound the glories of Marxist-Leninism in order eventually to take over Portugal as they are doing very well—a big blow to NATO. They are just acting as well trained pragmatic Marxist-Leninists. They are building up the power, and they use some ideology to go along with the power. This nice mix appeals to lots of people around here and elsewhere who help in various parts of the world to extend the Kremlin's operations and thus increase their influence and/or control. Its influence is exerted through ideology, or nationalism or just great power politics. They are using all these means in various mixes depending on the local situation.

The detailed directives to the faithful agreed to, after long debate before and at the June, 1969 "International Conference of Communist and Workers Parties," set various courses to use: détente-peaceful coexistence, wars of national liberation or popular fronts, etc. The National Communist Parties were urged to drop the old go-it-alone tactic and try to work out coalitions with
"all anti-imperialist Forces." These specifically included socialists, socialist democrats, christian democrats, catholics and other religious groups. In other words, join with almost any group in order to use the democratic freedoms and parliamentary process to become part of the ruling faction in the country. From there, Communist could work from within to try to gradually install their "socialist" system. This tactic initially was very successful in Chile. It is being used very well by Cunhal in Portugal. However, in this case, Cunhal is working with the infiltrated part of the armed forces. It is being tried in France and Italy. The Icelandic government for some three years until 1974 was in power because of the few extra Communists' votes needed for a majority. The current governments in Norway and Sweden are in power by slim majorities due to inclusion of the small local Communist parties.

I don't think we have to worry about ideology. That is part of the system. If it appeals to some, that is fine, if not, use other tactics to try to increase Kremlin type Communist influence and/or control. Isn't that about what it is?

In any event on the fifth anniversary of the 1969 Moscow meeting, Pravda, Izvestiya, Kommunist and most other Soviet papers published long glowing accounts on the achievements attained under these 1969 directives--such as: the fruits of their (1) detente - peaceful coexistence policy, (2) the worsening economic and monetary crisis in the capitalist world, (3) the coup in Portugal, (4) the almost victory of the Communist - Socialist coalition, the French presidential elections, (5) similar gains in Italy, (6) the gains of the national liberation movement in Vietnam and elsewhere, (7) as well as the lessons to be learned from the setback in Chile, etc.

SHAPIRO: You know what's happening. They're acting like a major military imperialist power. As George Kennan said, we would have had the same problem
if there had been no communist revolution but that puts it in an entirely different context, I mean discussion.

DURBROW: ...extend the influence of a place called the USSR or Soviet Russia or Czarist Russia, the same basic area, the more control the better it is.

PACKER: Personal ambition enters into that very much, I think, aside from the Party ideology, or nationalist ambition.

HENDERSON: I think I'm one of the guilty parties to disturb your agenda.

HARVEY: No, not a bit. As I said we hoped the discussion would generate its own dynamics . . . .

KÖHLER: I think that maybe the turn the discussion has taken leads us to discuss some of these specifics that are listed under Item 2 of the Agenda.

HARVEY: Before we shift our focus, Foy, I would like to complete inputs by all participants respecting this basic question of change. Happily, it seems to me, we are getting a good sprec. of the issues involved in this question. So I would like to turn to Andy Marshall. Do you have any thoughts or comments here?

MARSHALL: Well, I think not on this broad general question, which I think is a very difficult one, but I will have some questions related to agenda items later on.

HARVEY: Tom Whitney, you're next and one of those guys again who served in a number of different capacities and as I remember were there for a hell of a long time after World War II.

2. The Issue of Social Transformation

WHITNEY: Well, you've got this question here: "Has the Soviet Union changed in any fundamental way in the past half century?" Half century, as far as I can see is fifty years. Let's go back and look at what the Soviet Union look like in 1925, what it was. Sergei Yesenin had just committed suicide, Vladimir Mayakovsky had not quite yet committed suicide. There was a very active
ferment intellectually and literarily. There were very interesting things being painted, being written, being discussed. There had been an art exhibit in Berlin in 1922 which had been a landmark in the development in the world's modern art and it was an occasion which was used by some of the smartest Soviet artists to emigrate permanently because they saw the handwriting on the wall: Gabo and Pevsner for example. Malevish then exported most of his major works to Western Europe so that they are a treasure in Holland, not in some cellar in Moscow where they couldn't be seen; at least until recently. If you look at the Soviet Union at the time of 1925, the peasants had got what they wanted or at least what some of them wanted as a result of the Revolution. It was a nation of small-scale peasant agriculture, with many of the peasants having recovered from famine and beginning to prosper again, over them hanging the sword of Damocles which was later to result in the extermination of the best part of the Russian peasant class. Just as the sword of Damocles was hanging over the finest Russian writers including later liquidated people like Babel and Mandelshtam and Pilnyak; also over Zamyatin who managed to get out of the country.

If we ask, if this Soviet Union which had relatively small cities, even its largest cities were small by modern standards, has changed, the answer has to be, yes. It had in 1925 not recovered from the ravages of the Revolution and the Civil War. In terms of its industrial output it was struggling along trying to reattain its pre-revolutionary levels of output of major industrial commodities. The economic questions that were being argued were, among others, questions of relative pricing of agricultural products vs. industrial products. It was relatively a primitive country. I don't think I need to describe to any of you what the Soviet Union looks like today because most of you know better than I. I haven't been there for the last nine years. I did see it in
1966 thanks to Ambassador and Mrs. Kohler. And what strikes me is that if you ask the question "has the Soviet Union changed in any fundamental way in this past half century," you're asking the question "has the world changed in any fundamental way in this past half century." Now I don't deprecate the discussion of political systems and political realities and of ideologies. It seems to me that if you talk about the developed portion of the world as between 1925 and 1972, whether you're talking about the United States or the Soviet Union, you have to say that the world has changed in a very fundamental way, that people are no longer the same kind of people that they were in 1925.

You can, I suppose, make all kinds of comparisons. You can say that an executive in the Soviet Ministry of Automobile Industry has more in common with an executive of General Motors than either one of them had in common with a handicraft artisan in a shop in rural Russia or in semi-urban Russia. You can say that the automobile worker in the Zhiguli plant has more in common with the worker in the Ford plant despite all the differences that we know so well in their standard of living and so on. But in their outlook as human beings and the things which motivate them and the questions which are real to them, they have more in common than either one of them had in common with a Soviet peasant, I mean a Soviet peasant in 1925 soon to be liquidated as a Kulak or enchained as a serf on a Soviet collective farm.

The quality of life has changed, and if the people have changed, the Soviet Union has changed. Whatever it's system is, whatever the political framework within which it operates, it has changed and so have we. We have changed also. Life is unrecognizable in comparison with what it was in 1925 in the memories of each one of us which, in fact, at this table, extend back that far because we have all lived that long. So, I think that one thing that we have to keep in mind when talking about politics is that life has changed. What has changed it?
The obvious answer is technology, in combination with the absolutely unbelievable growth in scope and size of modern society which has compelled society, be it that of the Soviet Union or be it that of the United States, to attempt to deal with the social problems arising out of technology and out of modern life on a very, very centralized basis. Yes, the Soviet Union has changed in a fundamental way. So has the United States.

HARVEY: Durby, do you have some further thoughts on this subject.

DURBROW: I think I said what I had in mind. I could go into much more detail than that but why the devil are they building up such large military forces, the kind of forces that can land in India, or other parts of the world e.g., landing craft, helicopters, regular carriers for air cover.

HARVEY: Let us then move to what is standard procedure within our Center, turning to Foy Kohler. Foy Kohler always has the last word, perhaps not always the right last word but it's always for us the authoritative last word. Foy...

3. **Prospects for Democratization**

KOHLER: I think most has been said. I don't think we've come to any conclusions as to whether in fact there is an evolution going on in Soviet society that could eventually lead to a change of political system or a freer system. In fact, even if one believes that, what we've heard on one side about preoccupation with material questions and on the other side about extraordinary political thoughts coming out of the dissident groups—and in passing we mentioned the fear of the leadership in the Kremlin of these kinds of thoughts—particularly as exemplified by Czechoslovakia; even if we accept that these things are going on and that they do have political force, some of the writings being published abroad, or getting back and stirring evolution through radios, through surreptitious books going back and forth and so on,
you still have a big question as to whether there are any prospect that this could lead to a change in the political system. That's harder to envisage today than it was under conditions of World War I, for example. But, the only one who has suggested you might get comparable conditions is your friend Andrei Amalrik who suggests that the fact that Central Asian republics and other component republics have not lost their national feeling, that the Chinese are next door and will benefit by this; and comes to the conclusion that this could stir a great change. Amalrik doesn't go all the way to say what this would mean in political terms but he envisages it as a real unsettling of the society again as a result of China intermixing in this situation. I don't think we've settled this question, but we've got some thoughts on paper and I'm sure we'll come back to the general question involved.

**HARVEY:** The question of possible political change in the way of breaking down the absolute authority of the top party hierarchy is so basic that we might spend the next fifteen minutes in letting anyone hold his hand up for either second or new thoughts. I know everyone has much more that he could say but I think that the nature of this discussion is such that it is unwise to cut it off abruptly, but after a few minutes I would suggest that we move to Item 3 for the remainder of the morning. The reason is that Item 2 largely deals with current situations. I think it can logically come later.

**SCOTT:** I want to address myself to this sentence, or to the phrase "democratic evolution." Most of us, I think, tend to think of democracy as being, as consisting in multi-party parliamentary institutions, functioning more or less along the lines that are common in Western Europe and in the US. I think that this is a presumption that we're not justified in making. I think that this democratic evolution if and when it begins to be felt in the Soviet Union may very well take place within the party rather than among
parties. I want to point in this connection to Mexico. Mexico has one big party, the PRI, which has, I think, 94% of the Houses in Congress. And there is substantial discussion of substantive issues in Mexico, but it takes place essentially within the PRI.

There is no direct analogy between the situation in Mexico and in the USSR, but in an attempt to avoid the disarray which several of us have indicated would occur if there were, let's say, a plebiscite, or if the present oligarchical regime somehow should fall, I think that they're likely to search in the direction of democratic evolution but within the party rather than among, rather than introducing, for them the abrasive and very dangerous concept of a recognized loyal opposition. I believe that this gets into an area which has been polemicized upon by two of the most prominent dissenters at this point, namely Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov, in which I think I'm correct in saying, Sakharov's fundamental assumption is that democracy is applicable in the Soviet Union and they are to work in that direction whereas Solzhenitsyn's orientation, at least as brought up in the letter to the leaders rather than in his novels which are much more difficult to interpret, is that rather the country should go back and must look forward to going towards an orthodoxy on a more restrictive geographic base with essentially an agrarian or certainly a highly ecological-minded industrial society. These two extremes, I think, have between them all sorts of gradations and I suggest in dealing with sentence 3 of Question 1, that these matters are to be borne in mind.

KENNAN: I'd just like to comment on what Freedy talked about here, the dissidents and their prospects. I think one has to distinguish here between the short term and the long term. In the short term I see no possibilities here at all, but I am struck again and again as an historian
working on the Czarist time with the similarities between the situation in the 1860's and 1890's and the situation you see today in Russia. At that time, too, the regime was faced really with two oppositions, or two great groups of opposition. One, left-wing, which worked outside the system, was largely revolutionary, almost entirely revolutionary, and opposed the system from outside. But there was also a strong reactionary, highly nationalist opposition which really worked within the system, the Black Hundreds and their connections at court and so forth.

It seems to me we have a similar situation today. You have a lot of these dissidents who are really comparable to the old left-wing who work outside the system like Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn; but you also have a very strong nationalist opposition which works within the party. Now, goodness knows how long or whether the development will follow the same course than it did before. After all, as someone correctly pointed out here (I don't know whether it was you, Mose, or Foy), it did take the war finally to topple the old Czarist government. I'm not at all sure that there would have been any—certainly no second Revolution, and the first one might have been a gradual change had it not been for the war.

PACKER: At first it was largely accidental, anyway.

KENNAN: Yeah, it was largely accidental anyway. I see three main causes for the fall of the Czarist regime in 1917. One was the nationality problem which exists again today very much as it did after the 1880's, after the beginning of the Russification. It is so similar that it is absolutely amazing. The second was, of course, the inactivity of the regime, the stupidization of the bureaucracy, the fact that intelligent young men didn't go into it, tended rather to go into the revolutionary movement. To what extent that is happening today, I don't know. I would defer to those of you who have been there
more recently. But the third cause was, of course, the war which put strains on morale and the whole situation . . .

KELLEY: George, aren't we basically interested, not in establishing democracy in the Soviet Union, but in bringing about the establishment of a government concerned solely with the interest of the peoples within the Soviet Union and improving their welfare and so forth and having no interest at all in the establishment of ideological systems in other countries,

KENNAN: Well, I couldn't agree with you more. I couldn't care less whether the Russians arrive at something that we call democracy. What I'd like to see is moderate, reasonable behavior on the part of their government in world affairs.

DURBROW: And minding their own business pretty well. We'll have a long time waiting.

BARGHOORN: I would accept George's prescription. I do think, however, that one can raise the question as to whether or not you're going to get that kind of behavior unless there are checks and balances within the society and the political system. Who can restrain such a centralized government as exists now in the Soviet Union? I think the democratic opposition argues that it can only be done if there is something comparable to democracy. I'd like to make a point about the possibility of exerting influence from the outside. Now I was one of those who made all kinds of favorable statements about Radio Liberty and so on when it was threatened with abolition, in 1970 I guess it was. So, I believe strongly in continuing such activities.

On the other hand, I think that whatever influence can come from outside can only be effective if there's already a predisposition within a particular country to listen to the messages and I think that the change,
when and 'f it's coming—I think there's a long-term trend toward change but maybe it'll take a hundred years or fifty years—but this is going to come by a combination of people inside wanting important changes. One which I think of as the most immediate sort of internal opposition, and here I agree with George Kennan, is this nationalist one. But I think there's also an effort on the part of scientists and engineers and economists and planners and so on to improve the efficiency of the system and that is one kind of internal change which sympathizes with influences which could come from outside. I think there's a common interest among scientists, for example, economists, people who are trying to make the system work more effectively, to get away from this top-heavy centralization and so on. One other point: I guess it's obvious that nobody has made it. But I think that the greatest influence for change in the Soviet Union has been atomic bombs and other super weapons which have made everybody realize that you can't have another major war.

SHAPIRO: Mr. Kennan, in analogizing the situation before the war, the revolutionary movement, the opposition movement in the early 20th century, with the present situation, do you speak of a nationalist opposition within the system in the Politburo or in the Central Committee? Wouldn't it be more correct to call it an internationalist opposition in the sense that most of the members of the Politburo, most of the rulers of the Soviet Union are the Russian nationalists, Great Russian nationalists rather than internationalists. I don't know who the internationalists are.

KENNAN: It's my impression that there is a center of sharp discontent within the Party that is headed by strong Russian nationalists, ones who would really like a war with China, ones who are strong Russian as opposed to Soviet nationalists, very much, that is, against the nationalities and
who want to see Russian hegemony maintained. I think they were active in
the magazine Sovetskaya Rossiya which was the organ of the RSFSR.

BARGHOORN: And the Veche group.

KENNAN: And the Veche group, yes.

SHAPIRO: Don't you think that whatever slight differences there may
be between one organ of the Soviet press and another is planned? Doesn't
it all come from Agitprop? Spreading and sharing, saying you take this
point of view, sort of a trial balloon.

KENNAN: Possibly. I wouldn't exclude it.

SHAPIRO: . . . taking an independent position. I'm inclined to think
that even when members of the Politburo go out to try to collect votes, per-
suade people to vote for them before an election, it is my impression that
the speeches are written in the Central Committee and they're assigned. In
Sovetskaya Rossiya, it's true, as a matter of fact, Soviet Sel'skaya Zhizh',
an agricultural paper, sometimes comes through with the most original, the
boldest ideas and I'm certain it isn't because the editor of Sel'skaya Zhizn'
really takes an unorthodox position.

One more point I would like to make in regard to the dissident movement
aren't we inclined to exaggerate the extent and the influence of the dissident
movement because it's very small and it's fragmented through the extreme right,
through the extreme left? There are the Amalriks among them and, of course,
on the extreme right, you have monarchists, and to some extent, well, the
very extreme right. It is my impression that if it were not for the Western
press, particularly the American correspondent, a lot less would be known
about the dissident movement, both here and in the Soviet Union. Most people
in the Soviet Union know about dissidents through the Voice of America, and
other Western broadcasting networks. In the early 20th century, the opposi-
tion, of course, had the support of a large group of intellectuals, Russian
Intellectuals, by and large, who had all sorts of reservations about the regime, liberals and socialists and revolutionaries. Is that true today? Is it true that the bulk of Soviet intellectuals support the dissident movement in one way or another?

BARGHOORN: I'd like to comment on some of these points. With regard to the nationalists that George was talking about, there's hard evidence of the existence of such groups. For example, there was a sort of fascist thinker named Fetisov who was also anti-semitic and an extreme Russian nationalist and so on and they arrested him. In fact, they declared him insane, the same method they used on some of the democratic dissenters. Then there's also another document called "Slovo Natsii." Now, of course, I agree that it's always very difficult to verify the authenticity of these sources and so on but there's sufficient evidence, it seems to me, to indicate that they do exist, and I think that the point you can make about both the democratic or leftist dissenters (terminology is very tricky in this business), but in both cases you have extreme manifestations that result in confrontations and open statements and so on. But these are related, I think, to much larger groups. Now finally on your point about whether or not, let's say, critically minded scientists and people of this sort, whether or not they support dissenters. I don't think anybody can answer that. There is considerable evidence that they have sympathy with them if they don't go too far. I think they tend to feel that if they create too much trouble, or if they stick their necks out too far, they'll probably do damage to the causes that they themselves believe in. But, of course, obviously, we can't go around conducting a poll on this subject.

HENDERSON: If we're looking to a democratization of that enormous area extending from the Baltic to the Pacific, I think we'll have to consider it being broken up into a number of independent countries. As I have
already indicated, there is still a grave nationality problem in the Soviet Union. If a truly democratic regime should attempt to replace the dictatorship, that area would break down immediately into a number of highly nationalistic states, each jealous of its own sovereignty. In my opinion it would be impossible for a single democratic government to control what is now the Soviet Empire. If the Soviet dictatorship should collapse, it must therefore be replaced by another dictatorship unless the country is broken up. The successor dictatorship, probably a military dictatorship, would also be extremely dangerous to the rest of the world. Imagine how Europe would feel with such a monster power with its tremendous resources under an out-and-out military dictatorship stretching from the Baltic and Black Seas to the Pacific. I realize the idea of the possible break-up of the Soviet Union is constantly being peddled. Nevertheless, the alternative, it seems to me, is the continuance of the area now ruled by the Soviet government being ruled by some kind of a dictatorship for the indefinite future.

**BEAM:** I would like to take up what John Scott said about the possibilities of democratization within the Party. Of course we do have a case history of that in Czechoslovakia. What stopped it there were the proposals for reform of the Party statutes, which included public discussion within the Central Committee, secret votes for officers in the Party, and coopting youth groups and labor unions in the Party Congress. It was decided by the hard-core Party people in Czechoslovakia and also by the Soviet Union that this was completely intolerable.

There were some foreign factors also involved. The Dubcek regime and the new elements in the Party seemed to be drawing closer to West Germany. All in all, the limits of tolerance were breached.
While there are some possibilities of democratization within the Soviet Party, they're apt to evolve very slowly. Abrupt movements of this kind could—as they did in Czechoslovakia—destroy very carefully created balances within the Central Committee, the Politburo and the Party itself. Personally, this balance became evident to me during the 1972 summit conference. We had a number of meetings with their three leaders on one side and Nixon on ours. When Brezhnev spoke the others insisted—Kosygin and Podgorny insisted—on making a speech also, apparently to show that their leadership reflected a balance. I think it's somewhat disturbed now, dislocated now more in Brezhnev's favor but the point is that such appearances are meant to be symbolic of existing power relationships.

SHAPIRO: May I ask a question, Jake? You said that Kosygin and Podgorny insisted. Does that imply that the list of speakers hadn't already been arranged in advance?

BEAM: I think it was purposely arranged to show the balance within the Party.

SHAPIRO: Were there differences in points of view expressed?

BEAM: No, there weren't. They were simply emphasizing their participation and influence in the Politburo.

SHAPIRO: You think that the impression they're trying to convey is that it's a collective leadership, that the power is shared between the troika—Podgorny, Kosygin and Brezhnev? I don't quite understand what would be the purpose of each one expressing his views.

BEAM: They probably represented, I won't say factions, but separate elements of influence within the Politburo.

BARCHOORN: It seems to me that it's significant that Brezhnev is not the head of both the Party and the Government as Khrushchev was.
BF'M: Maybe not quite, but more so than earlier.

BARGHOORN: Well, probably de facto, but nevertheless, formally, he's not.

SHAPIRO: That is prohibited . . .

BARGHOORN: Well, OK, but that's part of this oligarchic arrangement, this sharing which everybody agrees is less of a stigma than one-man domination.

SHAPIRO: A specific resolution of the Central Committee in 1964 when Khrushchev was ousted provided that never in the future is the office of the Secretary General, or First Secretary, to be combined with that of the Premiership.

HARVEY: And once a law is made in the Soviet Union, it sticks, doesn't it? I am, of course, being facetious. But let me, Jake, hit on a point that I feel is extremely important; that is the whole business of changes within the hierarchy and the question of succession. But I think it comes logically under Agenda Item 5.

4. The Question of Outside Influences

PACKER: The third sentence in 1: Have outside influences had any effect, trade, exchange programs, radio broadcasts. I don't think that specific question has been answered. It may have been answered indirectly. I think definitely all of them have had some effect on what, to me, are largely superficial changes in the Soviet Union; whether they go back to the fundamental, I don't know. I would like to speak just a second on the exchange program because I travelled for the State Department with Russian importations under the program, the Moiseyev group, a group of economists and a group who came over to exhibit Soviet children's books. And my impression was that probably none, certainly very exceptional cases if there were any, probably none of those people after they had seen what they saw in the United States would go back to the Soviet Union believing, or would believe thereafter detrimental remarks made about the United States in
Soviet internal propaganda. They had seen for themselves that they had been deceived over the years and would be very hesitant to accept straightforward statements from the Kremlin regarding conditions, economic or political, in the United States. That, true, probably wouldn't lead to extensive, to fundamental changes because the dissemination of the knowledge these people had acquired would be very limited and the Kremlin could clamp down on them at any time it might wish.

KELLEY: By the way, there's one significant development that's probably worth considering. The time I was about to leave Radio Liberty, in the early '60's, we were faced by the tremendous problem of getting people from the Soviet Union. There was nobody coming out, nobody! Occasionally we got a sergeant from the army but that was the highest type. But now, you know in the last ten years, that's changed completely. Now we're inundated with high-class people, with intellectuals who have a lot of achievements to their credit, very capable people. All over Europe. This has gone on for the last ten years. In addition to that, our people in Munich are getting publications from the Soviet Union in great bundles, illegal publications. That's all developed in the last ten years. Now, what is the significance of that?

SCOTT: I started to do a book on contemporary Soviet literature in 1960's and I had a list of approximately 12 or 15 writers whom I was writing essays about and it was Soviet Russian literature. I never managed to finish the book, but of that list of 12 or 15 outstanding writers, there are at least half a dozen who are now residents permanently outside the Soviet Union.

Naum Kharazhavin is in Boston or somewhere nearby. Solzhenitsyn's in Paris. Victor Nekrasov is in either Switzerland or Paris. Sinyavsky is in Paris. What is the consequence to Russia, culture of losing this group? It's the same thing that happened to the Soviet regime in the early 1920's when...
they let the flower of the intelligentsia, that part of it that hadn't been massacred, go abroad to Paris.

PACKER: Well how much of that material is being broadcast back into the Soviet Union by foreign radio stations?

SCOTT: A great deal.

KELLEY: Most of it. Nearly all of it.

SCOTT: We get about 250 pages a week of new Samizdat material, about two-thirds of it in the Russian language, some of it almost illegible. It's been carried in somebody's shoe for a week. It's processed in Munich and we've now gotten out about thirty volumes of processed material, which means it's typed up in the language in which it was written—not yet translated. This is being broadcast back, depending upon the merits of the individual thing. Now, we broadcast the whole Gulag Archipelago in thirty 30-minute installments and we're partway through the second book . . . This is Radio Liberty. About two weeks ago there was a Lithuanian document which came out, very voluminous, in the Lithuanian language. That's been broadcast in our new Lithuanian language service and summarized in the Russian language broadcast services. I would guess that five or ten percent of the total program content of Radio Liberty broadcasts either consists in or is based on Samizdat material.

PACKER: And that material is not being jammed by Moscow?

SCOTT: We're being jammed constantly . . .

PACKER: So you don't really know how much of it gets . . .

SCOTT: Well, we have a pretty good idea.

PACKER: Do you get reports back?

SCOTT: We have audience research . . . do you want me to talk about that now? Audience research of our radio and Radio Free Europe used to be based largely on mail. Well, we stopped getting mail. We ran some tests. We had
sympathetic travellers who mailed postcards addressed to Radio Liberty. Well, beginning about four years ago we got one out of one hundred, which indicates that 99% of the mail addressed to us was disappearing.

Now we have a system of audience research based in four places. Scandinavia, Turkey, the UK, and France. A plane arrives from Moscow in Paris. A pretty girl goes up to the arriving passengers and says in bad Russian, "Sir, you're just coming from Moscow. Would you answer some questions?" The girl doesn't know who she's working for. She's working for a French market research organization or an organization like Nielsen here in radio and TV. Frequently, of course, the guy says, "Go away. I'm busy." Sometimes he says, "What do you want to know?" Well, "Where do you live?" "Moscow." "Are you an engineer?" etc. and then among a number of other questions, "Do you listen to the radio? What do you listen to? Do you like it? Don't you like it? Why?" We have about eleven hundred of this kind which is about the same number of samples used by Nielsen. Obviously, Nielsen chooses his samples scientifically. Ours are a mix of whatever comes. Basketball players and astronomers and God knows who, that are coming out of the Soviet Union. It isn't scientific but it still is much better than a guess.

In addition to that, we have depth interviews, particularly with people who have left the Soviet Union as emigrants, and therefore are much more available and much more willing to talk. In this we try not to overevaluate the significance of the Jewish emigres, who are by far the most numerous single part of it, as they are in other countries. The Jews are better educated than the average citizen and they're very prejudiced. They're atypical. We have an arrangement with MIT through Professor Ithiel da Sola Pool to use his computer he operates in this area for many other purposes, on the basis of which we believe that we have a what we call an occasional listenership, once a
month or so of about 35 million and once a week or more frequently about 5-7 million. This is, I would say as an individual not being directly involved with audience research, plus or minus 10%, let's say. But, as I said, it's much better than a guess and it indicates a very substantial listenership in spite of the jamming.

PACKER: Do the BBC and the French and the German radio people operate on the same basis and do you exchange information?

SCOTT: We have a substantial exchange of information but there is a fundamental difference. For the last several years, the Soviet government has not been jamming the BBC, or the VOA or Deutsche Welle. The jamming is concentrated at the present time on Radio Peking which they jam very heavily and Kol Israel which they jam heavily, Radio Vatican which is jammed selectively, Radio Liberty all the time. But there are two technical circumstances that make it possible for jamming to be less effective than it otherwise would be.

There are two kinds of jamming. One is called ground wave jamming. That's a small unmanned masked installation. You can see one out of the back windows of the American Embassy. It's halfway to the Hotel Ukraina. There are about 13 in the city of Moscow. And this just grinds out rrrh, rrrh, rrrh all the time. But they can't use those things in the neighborhood of their airports or they would screw up the landing apparatus of the airplanes. So it becomes generally known that if somebody really wants to listen to a program that is being jammed, get into the streetcar and go out near one of the airports and that kind of jamming is obviated.

The other kind of jamming is skywave jamming which is ionosphere-bounce jamming, which is the same process we use in our broadcasting where you bounce a signal up to the ionosphere where it then is reflected back down again. The optimal distance between the transmitter and the target is about 1800 miles.
which is the reason why our big transmitters, Radio Liberty's, are in Spain, in Playa de Pals, halfway between the French frontier and Barcelona whereas Radio Free Europe's big transmitters are in Gloria near Lisbon in Portugal, because of the 300-mile or so difference in the location of the targets.

A jammer to be maximally effective, that is a skywave jammer, the optimal location would be right next to the transmitter, but since the Spaniards and Portuguese wouldn't like that, the next optimal location is equidistance and in the opposite direction from, which puts their jammers up sort of near the Arctic Sea, which we think is rather fun. But now you've got the phenomenon of twilight immunity. There is about an hour and a half at dawn and at dusk when ionic changes in the ionosphere make it less opaque and the wave doesn't bounce. It goes frittering off into nothing. Because the Earth rotates and because of the roughly 500-or-so-mile difference in the location of the apex of the bouncing triangle, there's about an hour or an hour and a half at dawn and at dusk when the signal of the jammer is more or less lost and the signal of the transmitter is not. Here again, through this phenomenon, people who really want to listen find it much more, much easier than they would if it were not for these circumstances.

KOHLER: John, you do that very well. In trying to explain to Congressmen the Voice of America I had more difficulty. I think you have your field down fluidly. You only left out one point—that it's impossible shooting from a location other than the origin of the signal to have your bounces come down uniformly so that you cannot, with a jamming transmitter in the Soviet Union, hit every bounce of the outside transmission. It's impossible.

SHAPIRO: I would like to supplement what John said to the effect that I don't know of a single Soviet intellectual among the people I've known who did not listen fairly regularly to the Voice of America, the BBC or any foreign
networks. Actually, I was often very surprised to the extent of their knowledge. You know perfectly well any educated Soviet citizen knows that he gets a distorted picture of the world from his own media. There was a period when the BBC was considered the most reliable one, more balanced, more objective. The VOA was considered more propagandistic. That has changed. The Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe having taken over the roles, the VOA has become more like the BBC. It has increasing credibility. That is why so many of the Soviet intellectuals listen to the broadcasts.

**KÖHLER:** I suppose that all of this has some lessons for us in terms of what we do on Chapter Three of the CSCE conference. That is, if the conclusion to be drawn from what you said is that we've got to keep on trying to open up that society and establish a certain freedom of movement, publication and information, then if we compromise on the free movement of people and ideas chapter in this European conference, well, we're making a serious mistake.

**WHITNEY:** I agree entirely.

**SCOTT:** There are two aspects there, it seems to me. One is to do everything that can be done legitimately and can be done by private organizations as well as public to encourage and to help Russians abroad, to get their material and their views in print. The next thing is to help some of this get back to the Soviet Union because, in the long run, this is what Russian culture is going to be. I don't think we should have a lot of over-optimistic ideas as to some kind of instantaneous results. I think you could write an essay on the subject of the inability of a determined minority group, even one which is well-organized and unified and knows what it wants, not only to overthrow a determined ruthless dictatorship like that in the Soviet Union but even to make a dent on a faceless bureaucracy such as we have in our own country. It's not easy to change things even if you're determined to
and you know what you want and you know what you wish to accomplish. This is something, it seems to me, that refers to the long run, the very long run. But, it's important.

5. **Inferiority or Superiority as Motivating Forces**

**HARVEY**: I would like now to concentrate on Item 3* which, of course, is closely related to this question of change that we have been so far exploring. Item 3 deals with the issue of possible Soviet feelings of inferiority as against superiority and with what consequences on Soviet attitudes and behavior. I would like to get started with this question by asking George Kennan about the point he raised regarding the messianic complex of the Russians. What is the source of the complex: a drive to offset a deeply ingrained sense of inferiority or a conviction that Russians have something as Russians that no one else in the world has and that it is their historical mission to transform others to their own liking?

**KENNAN**: Well, this question is one of such immense complexity that I hardly dare to touch it. Because it's both a sense of inferiority and a sense of superiority. I would describe it rather as an extreme sensitivity, a sort of a love of comparison of themselves with the West, in some ways marked by a deep underlying feeling that, after all, they're stronger and better than we are, and on the other hand, by a feeling that life has dealt badly with them, that fate has been unjust, that they haven't gotten where they were supposed to get. Somebody referred earlier today to Stalin's famous speech in which he said that all these people beat us, "Nemtsy nas bili, Frantsuzi nas bili."

*Item 3, as presented to the group, was as follows: "It is often said that Russian actions or reactions reflect a deep-seated inferiority complex vis-a-vis the West, and especially the United States. If this is so, in what areas do they feel inferior: culture, technology, economic strength, military power, strategic doctrine? Why do they have these feelings? How have they been manifested in specific cases? Can we exploit them?"
(The Germans beat us, the French beat us). I'm sure that this was widely credited in the Soviet Union and that a great many people, millions of them, thought yes, that's right. They all beat us and so forth.

How much did they really beat them? The Russian Empire expanded steadily from the Middle Ages down to the 20th Century and I don't know who beat whom here. All I can say is that they became steadily larger. Of course, they suffered defeats in the course of the period, but they also had a great many victories. Now, I don't know whether this is an inferiority complex or superiority.

Undoubtedly they were deeply impressed by the American technological process and by the progress of certain Western European countries. They were envious. They wanted to catch up. I think in this respect, what you said, Henry, about Stalin's emphasis on dognat' and perognat' Ameriku, to overtake and surpass America, in the '30's was absolutely correct; they liked this. They were enthusiastic about it. I do think that the Russians have a very strong sense of national prestige. They would like to have power. They would like to be recognized on a worldwide basis. Well, this runs all through the history of the Czarist period, too. It's not just Soviet. And nothing ever really satisfies them. They're never fully satisfied with this. Naturally they want a maximum of power with a minimum of responsibility.

But I can't answer the question in the terms that it's placed here. I don't think they have any sense of inferiority about culture. Their feeling about technology and economic strength is simply a recognition of the disparity that does today exist. In military power, which you've put fourth there, I would say that there, (and perhaps this is where I would disagree with Durby here) they probably exaggerate our strength, just as we probably exaggerate theirs--that they have an exaggerated picture of the military power of the
United States and in some respects, feel inferior, in others not. When you come to strategic doctrine, well, there again, that's the whole question of the nuclear weapons and that's a chapter in itself. All I can say about it is that they are extremely sensitive of their relative level as compared with the levels of people in the West, in every field, and this makes them very difficult people to deal with. I wish they could just stop making comparisons. They're always doing it.

HENDERSON: Could I make a comment about Soviet feelings of superiority or inferiority? I think that among Soviet leaders there is a general feeling that the American armed forces are capable, well-armed, well-equipped, and ably commanded. In my opinion, however, they also believe that unless the United States is directly attacked or is engaged in a war of down-right self-defense, its armed forces would not long have the support of the American people, and that without such support they would gradually lose the will to fight. They believe that the American people do not like the idea of a long war, and like those in most democratic countries are not willing to make the sacrifices entailed by such a war.

WHITNEY: Mose, I don't feel that Russians in the mass can ever overcome their feelings of inferiority towards the United States and towards the West until there is or unless there is total freedom of communication between Russia and the outer world. There's always the situation in which Russians are largely cut off from abroad. I mean that while they can now travel abroad to Bulgaria, still if they go to Rome they have to go in an organized group. There's always an escort and they have to account for every minute. It's not like it used to be in 1900 and 1910 when they could go abroad and live there and then return.

There's an artist right now. He's a very well-known artist in the Soviet Union and he wants to come out. But, he wants to come out and go back and he
can't do it. So he faces the dilemma that in order to come out, he can't go back.

This point covers the entire spectrum of Russian relations with the foreign world. You can talk about the monopoly of the Ministry of Foreign Trade which manages to decide what foreign goods, if any, the Russians get. And we all know what they feel about foreign goods as a result. Now, it seems to me that Russia in the period from 1900 to 1914, despite all the problems that imperial Russia had, was much closer to having overcome that feeling of inferiority than it ever had been before, and if that evolution, that cultural evolution, had been allowed to continue a decade or two more it might have been a totally different picture. I have a feeling, and I don't know because I wasn't there, that of all the places to have lived in the world in the period from 1900 to 1915, Russia, maybe Moscow in particular, was perhaps the most interesting, fascinating, culturally alive place that there was in the world. This kind of thing ultimately comes back to roost in terms of consciousness. Because how is the feeling of inferiority overcome? It's nothing really but maturity. We talk about a cultural maturity. It's what an Englishman has. He has it because of his culture and his consciousness of his culture and his consciousness of the relationship of that culture to what's important in the rest of the world.

Let's ask ourselves another question in this regard which has a lot to do with the situation of Russia. What is the ultimate consequence of the Soviet government's, the Soviet Communist Party's, inability (and I have to say it's inability) to permit freedom of cultural expression within the Soviet Union. What is the consequence? They have forced all, I mean ever since the early 1930's, all important literary and cultural activity into dissident channels. The only way that a Russian ten years from now, or for that matter a
Russian right now can become acquainted with the real mainstream of Russian cultural history would be to gain access to emigré journals published in Paris in the 1920's, in the 1930's, to those pitiful little emigré journals that are published outside the Soviet Union nowadays, to the publications of the YMCA press in Paris, and that's the only way a Russian can become acquainted with his own cultural history. And what is the essence of being a Russian--more than the cultural consciousness, arising out of that Russian language and that literature--and the ideological sustenance of the country so far as there's been a genuine ideological sustenance, is the classical literature of Russia. And in the future as it works out, all of the classical literature will have been either illegally written in Russia and illegally published outside the country and unavailable in that sense to the Soviet population unless they do it illegally, and it will all be expressing the same kind of dissident, discontented feelings, or at least subversive culturally, expressing what the Soviet government will have to call culturally subversive ideas and tastes and aesthetics that it is forbidden to express in the Soviet Union. What is the long-run consequence of forcing all really creative literature into dissident channels?

BARGHOORN: Tom, what you're saying, it seems to me is that the government treats the Russian people like children and until the government stops doing this they're going to have an inferiority complex.

WHITNEY: You couldn't be more right. How long will it take? I mean how long will it take, will they ever be able to?

DURBROW: Can they afford it?

SHAPIRO: About this question of the feeling about superiority or inferiority, I'm reminded of two stories about Stalin, which I think are illustrative. One, when Winston Churchill was in Moscow, he at one point asked
Stalin, "When will you permit your people to travel freely abroad?" And Stalin answered, "As soon as we have a standard of living as high as yours." They were very much conscious of the fact. And the other one was the Indian Ambassador, later President Radhakrishnan asked Stalin, "Why don't you teach the Bible as great literature?" And Stalin answered, "We will, one of these days. But we have to build the material base of our society first until it reaches a comparable level." They were always so conscious of that sort of thing.

Up to the very last minute Khrushchev was interviewed in 1957 and he boasted that "in ten years, we'll reach the American standard of living," always comparing with the United States. But then he said, "now wait a minute. It all depends what you mean by a standard of living. Culturally, we're already superior, medical services are superior, our ballet, our theater." I'm not talking about the merits of what he said. But that was his attitude, always comparing himself to the United States. In Pittsburgh, on his first trip to the United States, at the University of Pittsburgh he spoke and he said, "You come to the Soviet Union and I'll show you how we live. I have been in this country and I've seen how your working class lives. Well, it does not live badly." That was quite a difference from a few years earlier when the propaganda line always was the American workers are starving, there are great disparities in wealth between the upper class and the lower class. And now you'll never find a Soviet spokesman publicly claiming that the working class in the United States is suffering or that they are in any way superior. They're always comparing themselves to the United States. That is part of the syndrome.

HENDERSON: In line with what Stalin said, Bukharin said to me in 1935. "We don't have to have a war to take over the countries of Europe or to take
over some of the countries in the Middle East like Iran." He said when the scale of living in the Soviet Union reaches the height we're going to build it up to, they'll be begging to come in and join us.

SHAPIRO: They don't say that anymore. Khrushchev used to say that.

PACKER: May I raise one question about this article by Hedrick Smith in the Times of December 23, 1974, about the situation in the Soviet Union after three-years residence as head of the Times bureau in Moscow. Do you remember that? It was terrific.

KOHLER: You had a comment George?

KENNAN: Well, I'd just like to revert to something I said at the very beginning of this discussion, the analysis of the Russian sense of inferiority. I should have put it this way. I'm speaking of Russians as distinct from the nationalities, because some of the nationalities don't have the same quirks of personality. I think the Russian would not believe that there was any important field of activity in which, if he were given a proper chance, he couldn't match and probably excel anyone else in the world, whether it's athletics, whether it's culture, whether it's industrialization, whether it's military affairs or what. On the other hand, he does feel that he hasn't had the chance. Therefore he is inferior, but he's inferior due to the force of circumstances, not due to any real lack of talent in himself.

I must say that to a certain degree I think that is very true. I think the Russians are people of great talent and great strength and they're conscious of that. And it's advisable for us not to look down on them, that is, to bear in mind that some of their failures have been the result of circumstances, and not to tear them down. I think that that's very important in all that we say about them. Give them their due where they deserve it.
6. The Impact of Specific Setbacks on Soviet Motivations

KOHLER: I have an observation for purposes of spanning some pertinent elements from Item 2* and Item 4** that bear upon this problem of interiority-superiority, and taking off from this final question in No. 4, What kind of behavior may be expected? Then in Item 2, there are listed for illustrative purposes, such things as Greece, Turkey, Korea, one could add Iran, the Berlin blockade, the Lebanon landings in '58. Most of these were essentially setbacks for the Soviets, as they would view them. And in particular, I think, maybe the Lebanon landings and Cuba were regarded as great humiliations where the Kremlin leaders blustered and threatened and were disregarded or, in the case with Cuba, where they had to withdraw. And I'm persuaded that this has led to decisions that, at whatever costs, they're going to put themselves in the position where they're not ones who have to back down in future conflict situations and that this is the immediate goal and that they're driving, as Durby was emphasizing earlier, rather rapidly to achieve this position. They are even getting their status legalized by means of treaty confirmation and so forth. I think this will affect their behavior. I think they're already probing to see to what extent. For example, I think our failure to take any strong stand when they helped Egyptians violate the original Rogers cease-fire accord and move the missiles into Suez, the fact that we didn't act was noted. I think they were probing on Cuba, in Cienfuegos, to the point where

*Item 2, as presented to the group, was as follows: "What events, in which the US was a prime actor, have been considered most significant in the USSR since World War II (e.g., Greece & Turkey, Berlin blockade, Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, Man-on-Moon, etc.) Why were these seen as eventful, how were they interpreted, by what Soviet groups, and what lessons (or actions) have been their consequence?"

**Item 4 of the agenda, as presented to the group, was as follows:

"To what extent have inferiority feelings been affected by growing Soviet military strength, world role, industrialization, urbanization, education? What kind of behavior might be expected from an increasingly self-confident USSR?"
they got a reconfirmation; of government-to-government commitment that we wouldn't invade Cuba; these were probes of whether they're getting in as position where they can (1) be the first there and (2) not have to back away. And I think that this will in the next ten or fifteen years make the situation very different from the one most of us dealt with during our lifetimes where we had a certain confidence in our ultimate strength if it came to a showdown, because I think they're trying to get themselves in that position and moving rather rapidly in that direction. Come a showdown, we're probably going to be the ones who blink. That sort of spans these points. They felt inferior. They felt humiliated. They've taken the decisions in terms of military strength, of their world role, certainly of industrialization and they'll be not necessarily aggressive but they will be assertive and they will do what they think is in their interests expecting that they will not have to back down.

PACKER: May I ask a question? You said that there was a government-to-government relationship with regard to our non-invasion of Cuba. I've never seen, although it may exist, an official statement on that from our government.

KOHLER: Yes. It was more or less said by Kissinger publicly. You have to get the time difference I'm talking about. In '62 when they failed to meet their end of the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange, we let them know that there was no obligation on the part of the United States since they did not arrange for supervision in Cuba of the UN supervision to withdraw the missiles and non-replacement, that the other half of the bargain, that is pledge, to the Soviet Union from the United States, not to invade Cuba or to interfere in Cuba, was a dead letter. But in the Nixon administration at time of Cienfuegos, when Nixon and Kissinger got from them (Jake probably knows the details of this better than I), a sort of pledge that they would not establish permanent submarine-servicing facilities at Cienfuegos. They got, as I understand it,
an assurance from the United States government confirming what had not been confirmed in 1962.

**BEAM:** This was done in an exchange of letters which gave tacit confirmation.

**HARVEY:** How do you tacitly confirm?

**BEAM:** They referred to the understanding about Cuba. This apparently was the first time the understanding was revealed in formal correspondence.

**PACKER:** Have those letters been made public?

**BEAM:** I believe they were published late in 1971.

**HENDERSON:** Could I make a comment about the list of events you put in Item 2, to which you, Foy, have just referred. You say Greece and Turkey, Berlin blockade, Korea, Cuba, Vietnam. I note that no mention has been made of Iran. I believe that the success of the West in checking Soviet advances in the Middle East through Greece, Turkey and Iran must have been regarded as significant by the Soviet Union. If the Western powers had shown a degree of determination in preventing the Soviet Union from strengthening its hold on central, eastern and southeastern Europe, similar to that which they displayed in blocking Soviet efforts to add Greece and Turkey to the communist bloc and causing the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Iran, the present situation in Europe might be very different at the present time.

The dominant role played by the United States in the establishment of the state of Israel and the subsequent support of Israel were welcomed by the Soviet Union. It is making use of our present support of Israel to weaken the position of the United States not only in the Middle East but in various Moslem countries. The Berlin blockade was important and made the Soviets realize that it would be dangerous to attempt to go further at that time. It is unfortunate that a similar display of firmness in Eastern Europe, Central Europe was not exercised earlier. Korea was important. If the West had remained passive while the communists supported by China and the
Soviet Union had taken over all of Korea, the situation in the Far East would have deteriorated rapidly. The no-win policy of the United States in Korea, however, encouraged communist aggressions in Southeast Asia and the ensuing tragedy in that area. History may well regard the outcome of our war in Vietnam as the watershed of United States influence on world politics. Our divisiveness, our inability to withstand the strain of war over a protracted period, and our lack of determination and decisiveness caused the United States to lose the respect of both friends and adversaries and strengthened the forces of communism.

**KÖHLER:** Right. Both Gromyko and Brezhnev have stated publicly in connection with this general theme that no problem of any significance in the world can now be settled without the participation of the Soviet Union. And you are getting a practical application of that in terms of the Israeli-Arab settlement. We've been saying in our studies for well over a year that there would be no settlement arranged by the United States since the Russians were making it clear that they would frustrate any settlement in which they did not participate. I think it's becoming clearer every day. And we took this from what they were saying in their own publications.

**HENDERSON:** So this step-by-step approach to the solution is likely to be ineffective.

**KÖHLER:** You could get conceivably one more little step but it will not be called a solution by any manner of means and it will not in fact be a solution. If the Soviets don't find it to be in their interests that there be a solution, and I don't think they do find it in their interests that there be a permanent one, then there will be no quote solution unquote.

**BEAM:** This is one of the consequences of parity, or rather the appearance of parity.

**KÖHLER:** Perceived parity.
BARGHOORN: I have two questions. First, what was the nature of the placing of missiles by the Soviets in the Middle East? I never clarified this in my mind. And the other one has to do with the agreement, with the inclusion in the 1972 Principles of our acceptance of the doctrine of coexistence. Do you think that the latter was a mistake? That has created an impression that we were accepting some of their concepts.

KOHLER: Well, for what it's worth, I'll reply and then certainly anyone can chip in who wants to. To me, the Cuba case and I oversimplify it, was a clear case where people forget we had had a showdown in the corridors of Berlin before that. And that in fact Khrushchev had backed off after having issued several ultimata. And he backed off because, as we later fully perceived, the missile gap was not on our side but on the Russian side, which Khrushchev knew perfectly well. And it was an attempt to suddenly and surreptitiously, by putting medium range missiles in Cuba--of which they had an ample supply, they didn't have the ICBM--to change that balance, essentially to reopen the question of Berlin.

Now on the second question relating to peaceful coexistence, which was an act that took place a good many years later, about ten to be exact. I am in agreement with keeping everything open toward Moscow we can. I think in that sense I'm glad to see it. But I feel that adopting a well-known Soviet term for the official agreement with the Soviets was a mistake at least if we came back and didn't explain to our people what this term meant but instead used a phony meaningless term like "detente" and tried to make it sound like euphoria. If we had been honest as to what we had agreed to--the only term that was agreed to in this sense was "peaceful coexistence"--as to what the Russian definition of peaceful coexistence is instead of calling it euphoric detente. I would be for most of what was actually done. For example, we had thirty-odd agreements ... trade and missile agreements but twenty-five
of them are for various exchanges which I find a good long-term investment for the United States, as I see it.

My regret is that we have misled ourselves about what we are doing and what we are accomplishing. State-to-state agreements regarding closer contacts between our two countries are one thing: they may in time--I would say a very long time--lead to some important results. But "peaceful coexistence," as the Soviets have consistently used that term for many years, is a different matter. This, however, has implications that go beyond the issues we are discussing here. I am sure we will get to those issues later.

PACKER: Well, I'm sorry to see us adopt the communist term of "peaceful coexistence" which is simply Cold War when you turn the coin over. We shouldn't have adopted that and shouldn't continue to use it. It's phony.

KOHLER: Or if we use it, explain what the Russians mean. I'd rather use that than detente, which is utterly misleading.

DURBROW: But we are still doing this to ourselves.

7. The Question of the Peasant Heritage

HARVEY: I would like for us to take off from here to get back to the basic question of what's driving the Soviets, what are they about, which I feel is very much related to the question about the feeling of inferiority-superiority and of the impact of past Russian experiences that have affected this feeling. I don't think we have yet come to any conclusion as to whether they are really driven by a concept that they are superior and have ingrained rights as against others, or you might say obligations to do things to or perhaps for other people, or by a concept that they are inferior and they feel compulsions to do things to offset it? I think it's very fundamental whether or not the Soviets, or the Russians, do feel superior or inferior, and Foy, I'll go back to a discussion we had a few days ago among our group in the Center and I asserted that the Soviets really feel superior to only one people on earth and that's the Chinese. And then a half dozen of you jumped down my throat.
George, why this messianic complex sort of thing? Why not be satisfied with what they have? Any reasonable group of rulers of a great state ought theoretically to be satisfied with what the Soviet Union has achieved or has almost in its grasp. But it seems anything but satisfied. Now what's behind it? And I think this is really an important question. Every Russian, some say, feels that given the opportunity he can do anything better than anybody else. Some say that basically this feeling is the product of the peasant background and heritage of the vast majority of Russians. Given that peasanthood, if I may coin a phrase, the average Russian is not a damned bit concerned about the world in general but whether he can outdo or outfox his neighbor or his father-in-law or his boss or maybe his wife? But how does this jibe with messianism? What is it they are up to? What are they really about? How do they feel as against the rest of the world? Do we have at play simply a two-headed coin thing? You feel superior then you feel you can override everybody. On the other hand, you feel inferior and you feel you've got to override everybody. I had a feeling earlier when we were talking about this issue that none of us had really thought these problems through. I would like for us to explore it further.

KELLEY: Why have we brought up the question of inferiority or superiority? The Soviets have simply a vision of a world organized in a different way than it is now, and in a way in which they are in the position of leaders.

HARVEY: But the question still remains: Why? Some interpretations of the Russians, and a convincing case is made for this, is that essentially those who now run the Soviet Union are a bunch of peasants, or at least peasant-minded people, who have gotten in control. They're still peasants and they still think in terms of Russian peasant philosophy. Who does what to whom? Who beats whom? Who's on top? That sort of thing. Maybe this is right. Maybe it isn't right. Professor Richard Pipes of Harvard has written excellently along these lines.
I am very much oversimplifying and perhaps distorting his argumentations, but still this seems to represent the main thrust of his thinking.

**KELLEY:** Why do you think they're peasants, the leaders are peasants?

**HARVEY:** I am not thinking of the original leaders, Lenin, Bukharin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, etc. These, of course, were intellectuals, and mostly highly Westernized. I am thinking of those who took over with and after Stalin. There was the great emigration that followed the Bol'shevik takeover and the civil war. And of course there were Stalin's great purges which eliminated nearly all of the really educated leaders of the twenties and early thirties. As George Kennan said earlier, over a period of fifty years the Soviet leaders have done a thorough job of eliminating the real intellectual forces of the country. By and large wasn't Russia deprived of its intellectuals, the products of the small but extraordinarily effective educational system built up in the 19th and 20th centuries that was referred to earlier? When you're talking about Russians after the initial Bol'shevik period and on up until today you're talking essentially about peasants moved into the Kremlin or into the cities and that sort of thing and the best guide to an understanding of the Russians is not Marxism-Leninism as developed by these and similar leaders but a body of simplistic Marxist-Leninist slogans intermixed with long-standing peasant beliefs, an admirable key to which, according to Richard Pipes, is provided by peasant proverbs. I have often heard it said by some of you, and by others with similar opportunities to judge, that Khrushchev's mentality and methods of operation, were essentially those of a Ukrainian peasant. That he was, in fact, essentially a "clever peasant." And certainly Khrushchev spoke as much and as often as he could in terms of the earthy proverbs of the peasants.

This morning it was pointed out that nearly all of the members of the leadership are engineers. But what sort of engineering training and experience have they really had? At least several were products of the "mass examination" operation
that for many years marked Soviet higher education. I am not dead sure as to what
I am trying to get at, but it relates to what seems to me one of the most funda-
mental of the problems we have with trying to understand the Soviets. Despite our
efforts to read into their motivations and behavior a rationality and sense of
values essentially the same as our own, they in fact represent an entirely dif-
ferent breed of people with entirely different outlooks and purposes. Wherein lies
the difference? Those who run the Soviet Union today and have run it for many
years, while clearly "Russian" in many ways, are again not like those who ran
the country under the Tsars. Again, why and wherein the difference? We would
all seem to agree that Marxist-Leninist ideology plays a part. But a Russian
Marxist-Leninist is not like one of another country: Germany or France or Italy,
and quite evidently not China. It has been suggested in our discussion that
Khrushchev was a "true believer" in Marxism-Leninism, perhaps, some have said,
the last. But there is certainly nothing classic about Khrushchev's Marxism-
Leninism. He, as far as I know, never claimed to have read Marx; one questions
that he had read very much of the original Lenin. Doubtless since he began with
Stalin, he virtually memorized much of Stalin's rather sparse and highly selective
interpretations of Lenin (The Short Course, Problems of Leninism, etc.) Mean-
while, as President Kennedy found out at Vienna, he was something more than and
different from, a clever political bargainer.

KELLEY: Well, I don't know how the others feel but I feel that that has
nothing to do with the question.

BARGHOORN: I believe that the desire for power is pretty widespread among
human beings and particularly among politicians. If you have a group of political
leaders who have absolute power in their hands, they're in a much better position
to exercise this inherent desire for power that I think we all tend to have to a
greater or lesser degree. But politicians in a country like the United States
are constantly being obstructed by criticism from the opposition and so forth.
Here you have a dictatorial group. I think that peasant idea might have some value if you place it in some sort of context or theoretical structure. I think it perhaps makes some sense if you assume that class-hatred was somehow legitimized by Marxist doctrine, by the Revolution or something like that.

**WHITNEY**: You can get any philosophy you want out of a collection of Russian proverbs.

**PACKER**: I think this argument about the peasant view being decisive on this is phony because the average Russian peasant in the past or today on a collective farm has no knowledge or interest in foreign affairs or in expansionism.

**HARVEY**: But the point here is we are not dealing with peasants still on the farm. We are dealing with peasants who have moved from the farm but have carried with them, either as a result of their direct experiences or their heritage from their fathers, much that is peculiar to a basic peasant outlook and have adapted this to the requirements of political power and a revolutionary ideology, as postulated in extremely elementary terms first by Lenin and then by Stalin, both at home and internationally.

**SHAPIRO**: I don't think I can say it. Some of my best friends are peasants. But I would like to point to the fact that the population of the Soviet Union now does not consist of the muzhiks who made the Revolution, at least who manned the barricades. You have today, as George Kennan pointed out earlier, the third generation. Most of the people of the Soviet Union today were born since the Revolution and close to 50% since the Second World War. From a position of illiteracy, 70-80% were illiterate, you have a fairly literate population. The Soviet intelligentsia of today is not the intelligentsia of 1917 and even the revolutionary intelligentsia. That's been wiped out. But you have a new intelligentsia. Most of the population of the Soviet Union has had at least a secondary education. They're not peasants.
Only about one third of the population of the Soviet Union still lives on the farm.

**HARVEY:** Look, I have way overdone the points I am trying to make and will not belabor them further. But, there is a problem of recognizing that the Soviet leaders and their pliant followers are not a mirror image of ourselves or any other of the so-called "modern" people of the world, including other "communists." Why and how is this so and what does it mean over the long haul? I simply feel that these are matters that need recognition, exploration, and some sort of explanation as well as understanding. But, please, let's move on.
IV

SOVIET EXPANSIONISM

1. Totalitarian and Power Factors in Soviet Expansionism

WHITNEY: It seems to me that in thinking about the Soviet Union we have to think of a broader historical political sociological phenomenon which is peculiar to our 20th century. That is the growth of totalitarianism. The Soviet Union isn't the only example of a totalitarian state in the 20th century. We have seen fascist Italy, we have seen Nazi national-socialist Germany, we have seen, of course, Communist China. You can approach an analysis of the Soviet Union, from the point of view of the dynamics of totalitarianism and you have to approach it from this point in the case of the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union is the only big totalitarian state that has been in existence for so long. It is the first one and it is still in existence. It still is dynamic and it is still growing. It seems to me that there is an almost inevitable antagonism and hostility on the part of the leadership of any totalitarian country toward countries that have a different system which we might want to call democratic or free or as, you might want to express it in different terms, in which decisions, in which the process of decision-making is diffuse. The existence of, let us say, freedom of expression in any society anywhere is always going to be a threat to any totalitarian system anywhere. And this they know. They got there that way. They know that ideas are as powerful as bullets and that the free expression of ideas anywhere in the world is always going to be a threat to any totalitarian society.

Let's look at the Soviet system from another point of view. One of the most amusing things about the Soviet Union is that it is such a grotesque caricature of Marxism. On the one hand, Marxism was going to see the withering away of the state, and the Soviet Union has seen the greatest growth of state power that ever existed anywhere and that exists anywhere at the present time.
We could go back to Engels and see what he said about the incompatibility or the impossibility of the existence of freedom with the existence of the state. Engels said that there could be no such thing as a people's state. The two things were in contradiction. A state is the weapon of a class, the organization of a social class for the purpose of domination of a particular country. Now, look at another grotesque aspect of the Soviet Union. You have a caricature of the Marxist definition of a class. You have a group of people, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which is united in one single aspect. They have constituted themselves, as a group, the ruling class of the country and also the owners of the entire country. What is more natural for them than to wish to extend their ownership beyond the bounds of their own state? This brings us to the point of discussion we got to this noon, at lunch, which has to do with the nature of the Russian empire and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is populated by not just one nation, not just one nationality of Russians, but by a large number of other nationalities as well. The burden of what we were saying at lunch today was that Russians can never have freedom for themselves unless they are willing to allow the minority nationalities living within the bounds of Russia or the bounds of the Soviet Union the same freedom. They can never have it. There, you see, you have the Communist Party as a class owning the country, but not only Russia as a country, but owning the Soviet Union as a country, but looking beyond its boundaries to extend its ownership. And then, of course, the Soviet Communists do know the realities of the world and one of the most cogent realities of the world is power. Power does rule the world. What is more natural for them than to seek to extend that power and if there isn't anybody to stop them, why should they call it off?
any other people and whose major preoccupation is with the job they are doing and the rewards which they do or do not receive and who themselves as rulers enjoy great special privileges at every level. What is there that could drive these rulers to seeking world aggrandizement?

**WHITNEY**: I can't see that the world history is anything else but the story of various groups of people who have been trying to extend their power at the cost of other people. When do they stop? They don't stop until they get stopped.

**PACKER**: Well, I would say that it's the same thing that drives Lyndon Johnson or FDR or Richard Nixon into a position of power. It's personal ambition. I think that explains an awful lot of what happens in the Soviet Union with regard to this question of Soviet expansionism. They have this urge to expand and it's personal power that gets them into a position of trying to do something about it by knocking other people off the ladder.

**KÖHLER**: George is asking for the floor. I want to remind you, George, that we put this question to Gromyko when we had an intimate lunch with him when you came back to the Soviet Union in the early '60's. I don't remember that we got a satisfactory explanation from him.

**KENNAN**: He can handle himself. Of course, my answer would have been, first of all, Tom Whitney's answer about what's new in the search for power by governments in this world?

**HARVEY**: Not governments but a ruling oligarchy.

2. **Internal and Nationality Factors of Expansionism**

**KENNAN**: Well, we are talking about a government and this is precisely the point. To my mind these people are behaving like Russian rulers pretty much the way that Russian rulers have always behaved. Now here is one specific condition of Russian power which is different from others. They have always had the consciousness that they could handle their own people only
by a severe despotism and by shutting out all the impulses of freedom from elsewhere. This, if you want, is their sense of inferiority. Other people can depend to some extent on the opinions of their own people and fall back on those opinions and submit to them. Russian rulers never have been able to, and for this reason the proximity of freedom to their own borders has always been highly unsettling to them. They've always wanted to push it a little further away because they feel that it's an infection which could undermine their rule. Now, I think, really this is the seat of Russian expansionism in historical terms, and I think it is just as true of the Soviet leaders as it is of the old Czarist ones. There is a sense of inner insecurity, I would rather say than inferiority, of inner insecurity on the part of the Russian leaders flowing from the fact that they know that they cannot place confidence in their own people, that they can hold them only by power and authority. This leads to expansionism, I think.

Packer: Do individuals try to respond to this national urge if it is a national urge?

Kennan: Well, we're talking about the rulers here, because never was there an instance, surely, in which one had less to concern oneself with the feelings of the people than when one talks about the behavior of the Soviet government as a force in international affairs. One is talking about the reactions of men who find themselves in a position of power in Russia, and believe me, they, like all their predecessors, have an animal by the tail and they can't let go. They're not as free, therefore, as they seem to be.

Harvey: You were talking this morning that pre-1914 Russia was basically German-determined and ruled. The German influence was tremendous.

Kennan: You could overdo that.

Harvey: Then I misunderstood you.

Kennan: No, in the Petersburg era it was the people in the Baltic States.
From Peter the Great on you had a capital in which there were a great many German and other Western European names in the government, but these people behaved very much like Russians. You know that Russia has an amazing capacity for absorption.

**BARGHOORN:** I'd like to add a point or two. I think Tom Whitney made some good points. Some of them coincide with what I said, I think. But I want to add a couple of additional points. One is that we as Americans are not in a very good position to judge this question because we have a history, an internal structure which is so different from that of other major world powers, that the Russians probably seem particularly aggressive when in fact they are probably acting the way that great powers have usually acted. That's one point I would make. The second point, which I think fits in with what Mose, Tom and George have said, is the sudden passage from a state of underdevelopment and almost primitivism to an advanced industrial society. An underdeveloped country has within a very short period of time become a major power, a largely industrialized power. This process, of course, required a great deal of coercion and force, and it also stimulated a lot of ambition and a lot of energies. The third point I'd like to make is the structure of world politics, the structure of world power is such that there are, after all, two major powers. The logic of national security is that you undertake such actions as will safeguard your security. Maybe we Americans are not behaving with the logic although I think there are certainly people in the Pentagon who think this way. But in order to safeguard your security you have to take actions which may, to the other side, appear to threaten his security.

**WHITNEY:** It seems to me, following up what George said, a large part of the problem of Russian expansionism arises out of the multinational character of the Union. If you have a national state which decides it is going to be a German Germany or a French France or a Spanish Spain or whatever,
that is one problem. There have been a lot of wars started by such powers and they've often been started over the question of unifying some particular part, some ununited part to their nationality. But only when you get some grotesque situation like Nazi Germany wanting to colonize the East and so on for the German master race. Did this necessarily have to go beyond the bounds of that national state? The nationality boundaries set the boundaries of their aspirations. It's unthinkable for France today to try to carry out the kind of expansion that at one time Louis XIV was engaged in. Now, the Russians do not have the principle of a national state. They have a multinational state, and by the very definition, it's impossible to set bounds to that particular kind of a state because there's always another nationality next door. It's a very interesting thing because, you see, in his own way Solzhenitsyn is saying that we cannot rule ourselves the way we need to be ruled, and so let these other people go the way they need to go. Therefore, let us go to the northeast and thereby counteract the Chinese danger, the yellow peril. There are a lot of overtones here and undertones. He is saying very much that.

KENNAN: May I comment on that just a minute, Tom. That is so perceptive, what you said, Tom, because, you know, the romantic national movement of the 19th century culminating in the first World War destroyed in general the great multinational empires like the Turkish and the Austrian and for the moment it destroyed a lot of the Russian multinational empire. The Russians are the only ones who since then have tried to put together again this thing which is really an anachronism. And one of the great difficulties that they have faced from the very time of the Revolution and one of the reasons for the insecurity of this particular group of Soviet rulers, is that they have had to recognize that national feeling rather than class feeling was the greatest emotional political force of this age. Do you see what I mean? They're going against
the times by trying to hold together a multinational empire in a period of nationalism.

WHITNEY: And yet they've had enough success to make them eager for more. They've been able to keep Germany split and to keep a communist German government in power in half of Germany against German nationalism. They had enough success in controlling and suppressing nationalism, much more successful than any other empire.

HENDERSON: What George said is very true. I can remember how at the end of the first World War the idea of self-government for all peoples was popular with the victors. Both the Austrian and the German Empires were dismantled. Our own Government, however, insisted that the Russian Empire should remain intact. It took the position that although Russia was under a temporary cloud, it would not be a loyal act to dismember an ally in trouble. Therefore, we stood firm for a united Russia at a time when Great Britain and France urged that it be divided into several national states. It was not until the middle of 1922 that we were willing to recognize the independence of even the Baltic States.

Could I make another comment with regard to the question of Soviet feelings of inferiority or superiority? When we try to find answers to questions of this kind we run into psychological difficulties. It is frequently impossible to identify the kind of a complex, inferiority or superiority, an individual or nation might have. An inferiority complex sometimes rewards itself by the assumption of feelings of superiority. Similarly a superiority complex is frequently accompanied by feelings of inferiority. I do not believe that we will get anywhere by trying to analyze various Soviet complexes.

I would like to make a comment here with regard to what might be called the "Soviet sense of mission." We are all, I believe, aware of the sense of mission that animated many leaders of Czarist Russia—the propagation of
absolutism. To the rulers of imperial Russia the concept of democracy was
dangerous. It could lead to disarray, corruption, and the breakdown of
society. Absolutism was the antidote to democracy, and absolutism, accom-
panied by pan-Slavism, were the slogans which the Czarists used in connection
with their efforts to extend the rule of the Czar into Southeast Europe. The
Soviet mission, of course, is to spread what it calls Marxism-Leninism through-
out the world. Marxism-Leninism took the place of religion as an inspiring
cause worthy of great sacrifices. The Soviet rulers took the position that
a rigid proletarian dictatorship was temporarily necessary in order to pre-
pare the world for communism and must continue until there is a communist
world.

HARVEY: And then after that to keep it a communist world.

BARGHOORN: I think that the multinational business spurs them to expand
but at the same time it also must be a check because they must realize that
if they expand beyond a certain point they're going to die of indigestion.

HARVEY: Well, Freddy, that sounds like a hope of what would be if it
could be which it can't and obviously they've never worried about it because
they keep on expanding and expanding.

BARGHOORN: I think you're exaggerating the expansion.

HARVEY: Well, I don't know then; some supernatural force must be pushing
them forward against their will.

3. The Risks of Confrontation and the Issue of Tactics

BARGHOORN: I'd say that is so in the last few years, and I think George
Kennan raised this question, take for example a country like Italy or take
Portugal. There are a number of countries where if, I suppose, the Soviet
Union were willing to risk another confrontation with the United States, if
it were willing to give up the so-called detente policy, they would push
vigorously for a takeover; thus far they've been pursuing a pretty cautious
policy along these lines.
HARVEY: How do you explain Cuba in the light of this argument, or the Middle East, or for that matter what is now happening in much of the rest of the world?

BARGHOORN: Castro gave Cuba to them.

HARVEY: That is right. But once he did they took it to their breast and held on tightly. Then we had long arguments about what they would do with Chile, that they wouldn't touch it in light of their Cuban experience, and yet within less than a year and a half they did more in the way of material support for Chile than they had done during a similar period for Cuba. I get awfully puzzled about these things. They don't want Portugal; they don't want another Cuba. But some way they get involved and deeply so. I agree, it doesn't make any sense as we understand or rationalize sense. But it still happens and I think we ought to want to know why.

BARGHOORN: I don't know the figures on Chile but I'm really rather startled to hear you say this. Maybe in terms of the amount of money invested. I had the impression that they were pursuing a rather cautious policy in Chile. In fact, I have the belief that they don't take anything until they're absolutely sure that they can hold on to it. Up to that point they're going to be pretty cautious.

HARVEY: This appears to me a misjudgment that we have made time after time, at our great cost. I think we all thought that at one time the last thing Soviet leaders would do in the world was such a thing as they did in Cuba. Yet they did it. In this connection, we had a conference very similar to this with a lot more people with a lot less intelligence that insisted that Cuba was it forever for the Soviets in this hemisphere. Whether you trust my figures or not, they're still accurate. The degree of commitment that the Russians made to Chile in roughly a period of nine months was far more than was made to Cuba for several years. And let us not forget, directly and indirectly
they involved themselves with the activities of the extreme left in Chile in the internecine struggle that preceded Allende's fall in a way and to a degree that represented true fostering of revolution in a way it has become fashionable to rule out for the Soviets.

**BARGHOORN**: That is certainly very interesting, Mose, because I just don't know the facts and I'm really very interested to hear this. What time span are you comparing?

**HARVEY**: Commitments began almost as soon as Allende began to run into trouble, and there was a demonstrated Soviet willingness to get involved with the Chilean military. And of course there is currently the matter of Peru.

**KENNAN**: Mose, would you regard our commitments of this nature of aid to other governments as a sign of expansionism, too?

**HARVEY**: George, I don't know the answer. I keep trying to ask. What in hell is the reason?

**KENNAN**: One likes to make friends and influence people.

**HARVEY**: So you pay one hell of a lot of money and you take a lot of risk with regard to a Cuba or an Egypt, a Chile or a Syria, etc. I should not dispute anymore, but it's very significant that over and over again, it's argued, they'll never do it again with anybody else. Then within weeks they are doing the very thing we say they won't.

**BARGHOORN**: If one were to measure a nation's expansionism in terms of the amount of money they spend, we're the most expansionist country in the world. We've spent probably three times or four times as much money . . .

**HARVEY**: Freddy, can I pull a dirty trick on you? We're talking about the Russians, not the Americans and we are surely talking about different motivations and objectives.

**BARGHOORN**: I know but you can't talk about one and isolate the other.
PACKER: I wonder if one factor in this Soviet push toward preponderant military power isn't a realization in the Kremlin of what I assume is the fact that without preponderant military power there's no chance for them to impose on the world their type of government. With preponderant power nobody is going to oppose them and they can tell a communist or whatever government in Australia what they want them to do; if they don't want to do it then they're threatened with extermination. That's putting it perhaps too simplified but I wonder if that urge to preponderant power hasn't to do with the world hegemony that they see.

KÖHLER: The gospel as they preach it in their publications nowadays is that they will prevent the export of counterrevolution, meaning that they'll prevent American intervention in these situations so that regimes like Allende in Chile will not be overthrown by forces supported by the capitalist countries.

PACKER: But you can't do it without preponderant power.

KÖHLER: That's right. I think in a sense we're confusing two issues here. The question is political commitment. In this sense they were very careful about Castro, not really accepting him for two or three years until Castro firmly proclaimed himself a Communist, not only today, but a hidden Communist for years, and committed himself to the camp. Even then it took them years before they brought Castro to heel using their economic aid and Castro's dependence in terms of his really obeying their doctrine. Allende, on the other hand, in terms of political commitment, fitted into the gospel they have been preaching since Khrushchev, at least of the possibility of peaceful advent to power. Even so they were very careful and cautious about it.

I think it's literally true that in the period from '59 to '62 and from '70 to '73 the amount of material aid they gave Chile was greater than what they had given Castro in the same period. But I don't think that is too
relevant for the question of political commitment. After their experience with Allende which they still haven't really explained in ideological terms, the Chinese are saying you were wrong all along. There's no such thing as a parliamentary road to power for communists. The only road is a violent revolution. And the Russian still haven't come to grips with that.

They're now blaming Allende's fall on capitalist subversion, supporting rightist, fascist forces inside the country. And the reason in terms of political commitment is where you come out with Portugal and with Italy—eventually with Greece, maybe—that they don't want a premature attempt to seize power by the communists. What they want at this stage, and I think they make it clear, is united fronts and communist penetration of the main sources of power, the press, the police and so forth to try to establish control before they seize power officially. They certainly don't want the communists weak, in a minority, but in control of the levers of power and to inherit any mess, let's say, as in Portugal and get blamed for it and then thrown out by a rightist coup. The same would probably be true of Italy which is in a certain mess these days. They have been, therefore, very careful. And Cunhal, when he went to Moscow after the Portuguese coup, strictly went there—and it was amusing to read the Soviet press—as a government official. You could have read the Soviet press and hardly realized that he was the Secretary General of the Portuguese Communist Party; he was simply Minister without portfolio in the Portuguese government.

DURBROW: He went there three times officially.

KOHLER: Yeah and a lot of others.

HARVEY: The lesson of Chile. What is the Soviet interpretation of the lesson of Chile?

ROTHENBERG: Well it's basically similar to what Foy said. You've got to be very careful about having the levers of power in your hand. I think
they've been much more hesitant now about peaceful revolution although they have reiterated because of the impact in Western Europe, that the peaceful road to power is still the proper doctrine. But I think they've been shaken a bit by the Chilean events and the faith they put in that.

**HARVEY:** But there is one element, Morry, that they say over and over again and that is be prepared to resort to more drastic measures.

**ROTHENBERG:** Right. That's the other side of the coin—that you have to try harder to get control of the armed forces, either by what they call democratization which is bore from within or they say, for example, the communist movement has had lots of experience with street fighting and that sort of thing that communists in Chile didn't take proper account of. The next time around they're going to have to keep that in mind. On the other hand, they also say that the basic policy of the Chilean communists was correct, of trying to woo the middle strata, and one of the problems of Chile that they see, was the influence of the extreme Left. So when they talk about the lessons of Chile for Portugal, they say that they have to be very careful not to antagonize the middle strata as was done by the total Left government in Chile.

**DURBROW:** Yeah, but they've broken that rule a couple of times in the meantime. Cunhal said, "You strikers, you go back to work."

**ROTHENBERG:** That's precisely what they say was the lesson of Chile.

**DURBROW:** Yeah, then when Spinola and the boys wanted to have their demonstration, what did they do? They took to the streets and raised hell so Spinola called it all off and resigned three days later. The Communists did the same thing later when the Social Democrats Center tried to hold rallies, they broke up the first national congress of the Center Democratic Party (CDS), the equivalent of the Christian Democratic parties in Europe, four or five weeks ago. The mob came in, allegedly, young "uncontrollable"
leftists. Don't you think the Portuguese Communists didn't like it and didn't organize it? The CDS meeting was attended by British Labor Party and Christian-Social Democrats from other countries. They were besieged all night in the meeting hall in Oporto.

BARGHOORN: I think the situation in Portugal is more favorable in one way from their point of view than the situation in Chile... I don't know. Do they have control of the army?... I think the one basic point is this, though. In Chile, you had a strong socialist movement. Allende was a socialist. That's much more difficult for them to deal with than a reactionary government. When a government such as the one in Portugal collapses, then you have left-right polarization. They could much more easily take control of the Left. They could be the soul. They could be the Left. They'd get the trade unions and so on. On the other side of the coin, I would argue this: that compared to Chile, Portugal is more favorable an opportunity for a communist takeover. On the other hand, it's geographically in a much worse situation because it alarms the United States.

DURBROW: What about Chile? What about the influence on Spain?

BARGHOORN: I think we'd be more alarmed about Portugal than we were about Chile.

DURBROW: I keep getting back to it and I don't think anybody except for a few dopes like myself paid much attention to this very long document that came out in 1969 after a meeting of 70-odd communist parties in June 1969 where they urged the communist parties around the world to unite with socialists, socialist democrats and all other anti-imperialist forces. They laid down the various rules of how to do it. They gave up their old story of infiltration, sabotage, subversion, guerrilla operations, assassination and non-collaboration with socialists or other left of center parties. But they changed those rules in '69, as I pointed out earlier. Now they are
urging collaboration with all "anti-imperialist forces." The Communist-Socialist coalition almost won the presidential election in France. However, now this coalition is breaking up a little bit, thank goodness. They're trying to bring off the same thing in Italy. They're not going to try to take over control tomorrow or the next day. The new directives say, "Let's get in the government. Let's get a portfolio so we can have our man inside listening to what's going on." We all know what's going on in Italy today like what's already going on in Portugal. In Portugal they're applying the same 1969 directives which initially worked in Chile, but in Portugal they saw to it that they have pretty damn good control of the lower ranks of the Portuguese army and the lower ranks of officers from Majors on down, plus a few general officers. This infiltration and subsequent subversion of draftees and young reserve officers while they were fighting the "national liberation" war in Mozambique and Angola.

**Joshua:** With respect to the military, they're unfortunately very much split. At the moment they have control of some of the top positions in the Armed Forces Movement. It is precisely our hope that within the armed forces as a whole, where there are many conservatives, the latter will eventually gain control.

**Durbrow:** If you have the NCO's and the young Captains, you can't control an army. It's my theory anyway. You have most of the Generals in the conservative camp but they're in the popular mind a bunch of "has-beens," they were with the other regimes. They're labelled by the communists as a bunch of "reactionaries" and "conservatives" so I think the communists are in a much better position than in Chile. The Chilean army has a tradition of never being involved in politics. It's been so for years. Generations and generations. With the dictatorship for 50 years in Portugal, the communists infiltrated and indoctrinated the lower ranks of the Armed Forces Movement.
Therefore it makes it much harder for the Generals to say, "Hey boys, let's kick those guys out" like they did in Chile.

**BARGHOORN:** I think both Portugal and Spain would be more favorable situations than Chile would.

**DURBRON:** Yes. The communists are doing the same thing in Spain as far as I can see.

**BARGHOORN:** I think Spain is a very vulnerable country.

**SHAPIRO:** I should like to ask whether there isn't one other important element that hasn't been mentioned in the present Soviet advocacy of a united front between the socialists and the communists. As I know very well, it happened after the first World War when there was, in their point of view, a revolutionary situation in Germany and Italy. The revolution that took place was a revolution of the right, of the advent of fascism and of national socialism in Germany. Don't you think the Soviet rulers are now thinking of a situation like that and would be much better off with a united front left of the center than to have a straight communist regime in any of these countries?

**DURBRON:** They have not succeeded very well in trying to set up straight communist regimes and win elections in a hell of a hurry. They've not won any elections. They didn't have the force to take over as quick as a fox and pain effective power. So they're trying this other method of let's set up fronts--popular fronts or a "popular unity" front as they called it in Chile, then play on all the discontents one can find in any particular country, which they promise to correct, assure help to the people; bigger and better and cheaper food supplies and that sort of thing. They're going to try to use these techniques to get themselves into power in the government. Communists have members in parliaments all over the world, but if they can get a coalition going, as called for in 1969, and in the 26th Congress, to unite with the other "anti-imperialist" forces to assure an inside operating base in the ruling cabinet,
they can be much more effective and influential. As I've said, the Norwegian
government today is in power because of the small communist party in the coal-
tion; the Icelandic government for three years was in power due to communist
support. But the electorate voted them out last year. In Sweden, Palme's in
power but because ten or eleven communist MP's joined Palme's coalition. He
has a majority of one or two because of that tie-in. The Kremlin communists
are trying to do that around the world. Now, whether it's going to work or
not . . .

**BARGHOORN:** May I make a very speculative sweeping statement? I think the
problem that confronts the Soviet Union in its attempt to expand Soviet power
abroad is to do it in such a way as not to stimulate a really powerful American
counterresponse. That's the framework in which they have to operate.

**DURBROW:** Sure. That's why detente is such a beautiful thing for them.
We're not trying to take over France, not trying to take over Italy. Cunhal's
being a good boy in Portugal most of the time. He's not going to take over
power tomorrow but he had to get down to the brass tacks of the think when he
had to bring his goon squads out onto the street to get rid of Spinola. After
Spinola resigned, Cunhal told his goon squads: "Get back in your cases, boys,
get back in your cases." Cunhal wanted to make sure we in the West didn't get
too excited and shatter our little dream of detente and peaceful coexistence.

**BARGHOORN:** It's already been pretty much damaged.

**DURBROW:** I wish it were. I don't think it is.

**KENNAN:** May I make a couple of comments. First of all, I'm a little sur-
prised at the surprise shown here that they should be interested in communist
movements in other countries. I thought we regarded that as given from the
beginning and not as a special or as a recent sign of Soviet aggressiveness.
Of course, to establish a communist party in power has always been a two-edged
sword for them, especially if a country is far from their own military power.
It means they've played their last card. If this party doesn't remain faithful to them and turns against them they've lost everything, and therefore they approach this, of course, with great caution. Secondly, I think that in many instances and perhaps partly because of this anxiety about putting a Titoist party in by mistake, they've been more interested in achieving an anti-American regime in a given country than in achieving a communist one. I am talking about what they want. Well, they've rather got it in some instances. You mentioned Sweden and Palme. Look at the anti-Americanism there. And, of course, they're in the power game. They play it with due caution but they regard us as their great rivals and any place where they can promote the success of a regime which would have an anti-American spirit, which would be resistant to our diplomacy, resistant to our military purposes, they're certainly going to do it.

DURBROW: Undermine NATO, for example.

KENNAN: Yes. And then they have these questions of tactics. Is something better to be done by united front tactics, from the united front from below, from the united front from above? Is this a revolutionary situation? Or isn't it? And they will play this back and forth over the course of the years depending on the individual situation. But I don't think we should be surprised when they do it, and I wouldn't put it down to some special Soviet aggressiveness—special, that is, in this age. The fact that they are interested in the fortunes of communist parties in other countries is nothing new. We've known this ever since Bob Kelley ran the Russian division of the State Department in the early '20's.

KELLEY: I'm surprised here because several people indicate that they don't give much credence to the ideological beliefs of the leaders of the Soviet Union. Haven't you been surprised at that?

KENNAN: Well, I don't know, Bob. This is a priesthood, you see, and in a priesthood you can't talk against the religion.
4. Weakening the US: The Basic Objective?

HENDERSON: It is not new for those seeking power to do so, as I have already indicated, in the name of some noble cause. Both Christians and Moslems have engaged in conquests and the seizure of territories in the name of their respective religions. I do not think, however, that it would be quite fair to say that all the Soviet leaders are interested merely in seeking more power. I believe that many of them sincerely believe that world communism is a worthy cause and are prepared to make and call for sacrifices in order to achieve it. There have of course been changes in their tactics. In the early days the world as they saw it was divided into two opposing camps, the camp of capitalism and that of communism. Now there are three camps, those of capitalism, communism, and the so-called "third world." They are now attempting to find allies in this "third world" to support them in their conflict with the "capitalist world," particularly the United States. They also hope that the nations of the third world will eventually graduate into the communist camp. As I have already pointed out, Stalin, after what happened in Yugoslavia, became hesitant about recognizing as communist a state over which he was not in a position to exert control. He wanted to make sure that states accepted into the communist camp were practicing his brand of communism. To an extent, the Soviet leaders, or at least some of them, still have similar feelings. Although Ceylon, for instance, is a communist-type state, it is still not, I believe, recognized as a bona fide member of the communist camp. Several nations in Africa are also playing the communist game but have not yet been considered as full-fledged members of that exclusive camp. Nevertheless the Soviet Union welcomes as allies members of the Third World in its confrontations with the United States.

KOHLER: Much of the discussion that we've been having relates to a phrase that I think is today the most repeated phrase we run into in Soviet
literature that's almost replaced kak izvestno, "the correlation of forces." This concept is something like Washington strategists talk about when they say a zero-sum game. It took me a good many years to learn what that is. It meant that if you can get your opponent to drop one division from his armed forces that's as good as if you add a division to your forces. You take this across the board, when they use this term they're not just talking about military forces. They're talking about alliances. They're talking about social forces. They're talking about the strength of the communist parties inside non-communist countries and the whole gamut of the things that go into the elements of national power. They do have a sense of the relativity of power much more than our American Foreign Service diplomats have. We just don't quite think in these terms. At least we don't until we're subject to a good number of years of living in Russia or something. This has become the most common phrase that's repeated today in Soviet literature. You'll hardly get a think piece on world questions that doesn't have this "correlation of forces in the world" and usually in terms of the shift that has taken place in the correlation of forces in favor of the socialist camp.

KELLEY: It's tied up closely with the policy of detente.

KOHLER: So this goes back to . . .

KENNAN: Yes, but Foy, this is more complex. I agree with everything you've said here but it is not really a zero-sum game. They are finally discovering this. For example, all through the Third World they have been much more successful in selling anti-Americanism than they have in selling their type of communism. The funny thing is that while they have stirred up a great deal of anti-American feeling, the actual communist feeling in that part of the world has been very heavily invaded by the Chinese—to a measure, in fact, that must be a great source of anxiety to them.

KOHLER: It is, yes.
HARVEY: George, in the meantime, in playing the zero-sum game as long as the end effect is the reduction of US power, it's a net gain, because to the Soviets, as they put it, the enemy is the US. Anything that reduces our power and influence automatically increases their power and influence.

KENNAN: Yes, but it doesn't. That's the point.

HARVEY: Yes, but by definition, you see, if the US loses ground somewhere, they don't have to gain an equal amount of ground directly. It is a case of, "as my enemy becomes weaker, I necessarily become stronger."

KENNAN: The facts don't bear it out. There are many cases where we've lost out and they haven't won.

HARVEY: Yes, I know. But in the meantime if we've lost out, they've won. That's their definition of it.

BARGHOORN: Along the lines of what George is saying, I think you have to heed what they say but at the same time I don't think we always have to accept their interpretation. Just because they say it doesn't mean it's true.
V

THE MILITARY FACTOR IN THE SOVIET UNION

1. The Soviet Military Effort: Scope and Possible Constraints

MARSHALL: In this connection, let me raise a question which is the sort of thing, this agenda issue of inferiority we were getting at; and that is, is there anything about the way the Soviets look at things, the way they make assessments of the correlation of forces that is distorted by a feeling of inferiority or other historically generated experience? How are they going to decide when they have enough military power? Do they just keep on building their forces; do they ever have enough?

KENNAN: Look, this is always a compromise with them between priorities and allocations. They haven't got all their problems solved. Every penny they spend on military purposes has to be taken away from the domestic economy. They have to sit down just the way we do in Washington every year and go through an agonizing process of attempting to determine how much should be given here and how much should be given there.

BARGHOORN: I think, George, I would agree with that, but I have just one elaboration. If you put too much into military expenditures you reduce your economic strength, which in the long range reduces your military strength.

KENNAN: Exactly. That's true.

HARVEY: I have a question to ask Durby. I interrupted you when you were talking along the lines of something in which all are very interested. That is, what would you guess, you mentioned the navy and, of course, general armaments, is the real proportion of the gross Soviet product that has been going into armaments and into military capabilities of one sort or another. And the second part of the question, how could you really determine it, and how could you prove it?

DURBROW: I don't think you can get really accurate, even estimates, of the percentage of the GNP used for Soviet military forces. Much of these costs are hidden, some in the automobile industry, the tractor industry, etc.
The military budget is mixed in all over the place, including research and development which is very active in the USSR, but there isn't one single item in the budget that gives an accurate amount going to the military effort.

HARVEY: From the standpoint from which you are speaking, as I understand it, what they are doing is really staggering, in both absolute terms and in comparison with the US?

DURBROW: Well, they're building seven to ten submarines, Polaris-type submarines a year. We're building none. They're developing several new missiles, SS-19's, 18's, and they're MIRVing them. As I indicated, they have a carrier, another one being built, and they've got two helicopter carriers. They're building more and more landing-type craft. Why? Are they going to land in Sochi and then go to the capital of Crimea again to capture Tbilisi from the Armenian dissidents? No, hell no. They're going somewhere else. So, physically we know that they're doing these things, how much of the GNP it costs is unknown.

HARVEY: Well, I guess the general estimate around, the highest one that has come out of official sources, is about 20% of their gross national product.

DURBROW: I've seen that, yes.

HARVEY: Would you agree? Do you think it's larger or what? How do you feel about it?

DURBROW: Well, it's much more than ours, anyway. First of all, get that straight.

HARVEY: Proportionate to their production levels or absolutely?

DURBROW: Both as far as I'm concerned.

SCOTT: Absolutely, too?

DURBROW: Yes. I mean, you were talking about our budget, we have to pay our boys several thousands of dollars a year to stay as a private in the
army which is one reason why our budget goes pretty high; but the actual things that they're building today are much larger in numbers, their size, and diversification. The type of thing they're developing, by their research and development, they're going much further that we are and it's coming out at the end of the line, their new missiles, the new SS-17, 13, and so on.

HARVEY: Durby, tying this in to the question of change which we considered earlier, what is your feeling about the trend, that is, as against, say, the Stalin days and on through Khrushchev and on up to the present, do you feel there's been any change in trend, and if so, in what direction?

DURBROW: The trend is definitely up . . .

HARVEY: In building up their military forces?

DURBROW: I think they are growing very rapidly, it's much greater since World War II.

HARVEY: Well, World War II, strangely enough, was a long time ago.

DURBROW: Since '62, you go back to when they pulled their missiles out of Cuba, and they did--so let's not argue that. From there on in, they decided to do all they could to surpass us in all military fields so we could not again force their retreat. In the SALT I talks, we gave them 60 submarines on the platter; we kept ourselves down to 42. We gave them the right to have 1618 ICBMs to our 1054 and we didn't try to put any restrictions on the number of planes.

Now the US Congress may or may not in the long run vote for the B-1 long range bombers. The Soviets are already building their new long range bomber--the "Backfire." It was after the '62 Cuban crisis, Khrushchev and now Brezhnev, the Politburo, decided basically that "we've got to have enough force here, there and elsewhere to be able to extend our influence and control as much as possible, and never be forced to retreat
again under US pressure. We must use ideological or anything else we have in our quiver, wars of national liberation, to push our control and influence as far as we can." That is what they're doing by all means they have short of direct confrontations with the US.

KÖHLER: Here is an important point. You divide their spectrum and what they control into A and B, heavy industry and consumer industry. In heavy industry they produce well over half what we do and in some fields they produce more than we do in basics, whereas their consumer industry is less than a third of ours. You have to keep in mind that 75% of their capital accumulation goes into the A sector, the heavy industry sector, and less than 25% goes into the B sector, the consumer goods sector. They've made a great thing of changing the rate gradually of annual allocations, of increases in annual allocations to these two sectors of their economy. At the beginning of the last Five Year Plan they put the annual increase in the heavy industry sector at 7 1/2%. Actually, as the Five Year Plan is turning out, these figures have not been met and in fact the heavy industry sector has increased faster. But, this is 7 1/2% in one case of 75% of their capital accumulation and 7 3/8% of 25% so that you're never going to have the consumer catching up ...

BARGOORN: That's all true but I think it's also true that the inefficiency of their economy is so great that the apparent rapid growth doesn't amount to as much as it appears. I was just reading in Lewin's book last night that it takes three times as long to build a factory in the Soviet Union as it does in the United States. And there are all kinds of inefficiencies in the construction industry and so on. So I agree they're in an advantageous allocation situation, but what does it mean in practice?

BEAM: Which book?

HARVEY: Fred, there is something else. They're beginning to talk rather frankly for the first time of the relationship of the heavy industry sector and military power. They talked quite a bit after the war of how much more they had accomplished with so much less than the Germans, and in recent months, and this is the first time since the War that I've known them to do it, they're again talking openly in terms of the military capability they acquire from what they put into means of production. Their total production is, they say, 75% of ours, but against this, as again they say, they get 90% or more of military uses and they use the term "military uses."

BARGHOORN: That's their estimate.

2. The Question of Military Superiority

HARVEY: I know. But nevertheless, recently it is for the first time since the war that they've been willing to say these sorts of things. I'm not saying that it's true or not true. But there's another aspect to the thing of inferiority-superiority. It raises a question in my mind and one that's being asked all over the place: Does any one accept that they are searching for and seeking superiority in military capability?

KENNAN: Well, why shouldn't they? What do we think they're in business for? Did anybody suppose they were not going to? Of course, if they could get it they'd like it. What do you mean, are they seeking it? Don't we seek it too?

HARVEY: I would say absolutely not, that is at least over the last ten years.

BARGHOORN: When you talk about the space race in the military equation who won the space race? Didn't Khrushchev say that they were going to be the first to get to the moon and so on?
KOHLER: This is one of their humiliations I was talking about.

HARVEY: I really was getting back at the basic question of whether they are satisfied with parity, is that all they want?

WHITNEY: Why should they be satisfied with parity? Why shouldn't they want superiority?

PACKER: We want preponderance. Why shouldn't they?

BARGHOORN: I don't think we have as strong a desire for it because we're a much older state, for one thing. They're new and I think this is part of it.

HARVEY: Well Freddy, you do agree then that they are seeking superiority?

KENNAN: Mose, if I may come in on that. I've lectured I suppose several hundred times about Soviet problems since the last war. No question has been harder for me to answer than to the people who get up and ask "They want world domination, don't they?" The only way I can answer that is in a parallel. You have to draw a distinction between what people would think would be nice ideally and what they really expect to achieve. If you take the average small businessman and say, "What are your aspirations in business? They're to make money, huh?" "Yes, they're to make money." "Well, then you would like to make a million dollars, wouldn't you?" "Yes." "Well, then you're seeking to make a million dollars." "OK." "What do you expect to do this year?" "Well, if I could pay my debts and my taxes, I'd be jolly lucky." What he's thinking of in his day by day calculations is this rather defensive, much more modest aim. It's quite true. He would like to make as much money as you can name. And so it is with them. They would like to have as much power and influence and be faced with as little on the other side as could be achieved. But the question is: what is on their minds today? What governs their decisions as they go along day by day? I don't think they have time to ask themselves "Would we like world domination and should we therefore do this or that? They act in a complex situation as do we in which there's a whole bundle of
motivations, some defensive, some offensive in their minds. Every time they face a problem they act out of a combination of fears and hopes. These are very closely balanced in most instances. You see what I mean?

PACKER: I think that brings us back to a point that I thought you were asking and maybe misunderstood. How does the Kremlin decide when the bid for power is going to be made in one of these states where there's a question of the communists getting some position of power in the government? Is that the question you raised?

MARSHALL: What I had in mind was whether they, as well as we, must look at things such as strategic nuclear balance, how big do their conventional forces have to be compared with ours and is there anything idiosyncratic about their way of looking at it, flowing from feelings of inferiority, or historical experience, which is going to make them come down very strongly on the grounds that enough for them is twice as much as we have, rather than the same amount.

PACKER: Well, I misunderstood, then. You were talking about, in essence, as between the Soviet Union and ourselves and I thought that raised the question of a bid for power in a foreign government.

KENNAN: May I speak to that? If you put it that way, the answer is yes. There is this to consider. Russian governments at all times have maintained armed forces in being far greater than anybody else could see the reason for. Custine commented on this. So did our ambassadors. This was the early 19th century. I am now studying the 1880's. My goodness, the Russians kept on their western border over twice the total amount of forces that were marshalled there against them. They've always done this. They've always wanted a large measure of military superiority. I think this is a reflection of the insecurity, the distrust of their own people, that has always eaten on them.
HARVEY: George, I want to bring it down to something a little more specific which is the allocation of resources. What you are saying is that they have given far more of their sustenance to military capability, to military superiority than from your and my standpoint would make any sense?

KENNAN: Well, it would make sense even from the standpoint of the cultivation of parity with us, wouldn't it?

HARVEY: All right. Well then, you have parity. Are you satisfied?

KENNAN: It depends on what branch of services you're talking about.

They have far more than parity in conventional forces.

HARVEY: And yet they have continued to build conventional forces after they have achieved this superiority.

KENNAN: I don't know how much they've increased the conventional forces.

HARVEY: Maybe our figures are wrong. I remember an excellent memorandum of yours back in the forties in which you questioned figures then prevalent and I think very correctly since these figures allowed for I don't remember how many hundreds of Soviet divisions armed and ready, numbers they couldn't possibly have had. But, nevertheless, they have gone to very great extremes in attempting to achieve superiority in conventional forces.

KENNAN: Well, that they have.

HARVEY: But even still they keep building these forces.

KENNAN: Have they increased them in recent years?

HARVEY: I was thinking about one time right after the war. Soviet tanks, Soviet artillery, Soviet everything, they seemed to be adequate for just about anything. And then, what did they do? They proceeded to go to new tanks and to move from prop planes to jet planes and to a whole host of other things, and they surprised us in 1950 with a display of all these new weapons when we thought they would consider that they were already strong enough to deal with any conventional force. And yes, to answer your direct question, they have
greatly increased their conventional forces in recent years and they continue to do so. As Durby pointed out, in the last three or four years they have very much increased their emphasis on and their efforts toward greater and greater conventional capabilities and at the same time on attaining greater and greater sophistication in all types of weapons. Some of the results were clearly demonstrated in the October, 1973 War. And the leadership, very interestingly I think, has been increasingly talking of the "external role" of their armed forces, including "in times of peace."

SCOTT: The clearest example, I think, is the navy. They're putting a navy on the Indian Ocean. That's new. They never had one before. Nobody else has one. When will they be satisfied? Let me offer a little scenario of what they would be interested in that navy for.

Madame Bandaranaik has a government in Ceylon which is legally elected. It's well to the Left. There are right-wing people in Sri Lanka who don't like it. The possibility is there that the same thing could happen there that happened in Chile, that the Right wing will overthrow Madame Bandaranaike or seek to do so. If, at that point, the Soviet Union could sail a small navy into the port of Colombo with a brass band and some food, this would be a decisive element without firing a shot. If we at the time had no naval force in the Indian Ocean as we today practically don't have, this would be a way that they could do what Foy was mentioning: that is, they could prevent what they would call the export of counterrevolutionary forces which they would have interpreted the right-wing guys in Sri Lanka to have been, whether they were supported by us or not. And they might indeed have been so or by some other reactionary force.

Under such conditions, when will they have enough? At no point. You never have enough. You try to prepare to deal advantageously with circumstances as they evolve and this kind of scenario could take place and
did take place in Chile. They had nothing within 5,000 miles. They don't
want to be in that position again. Therefore they need a naval force—as
Grechko says "We want offensive and defensive naval forces in all the world's
oceans." All five of them. This is an endless frontier of expansion as long
as they have the money to do it and so far they can maintain this 2% increase
in real wages and still build battleships. They're building them right now.
I don't see what's going to prevent them from continuing this in the indefinite
future.

3. The Soviet Military Effort: Aims and Expectations

JOSHUA: May I elaborate a little bit more on the question of superiority?
What is the Soviet concept of superiority? Is it purely a military concept?
And if it is, how do they view military superiority? Is this a question of
just having more missiles, more forces? Or is the emphasis more on the
qualitative aspects of the arms race?

KENNAN: If the question is addressed to me, I would say you have to dis-
tinguish here between the types of weaponry you're talking about.

JOSHUA: Is it a purely military concept, the concept of superiority in
the Soviet perception?

KENNAN: Insofar as we're talking about military things, I think it is.

SCOTT: No. It's the correlation of forces, as Foy said, which is the
combination of the things that make up power, of which the military is one
aspect and of which economic is another.

KOHLE: And the strength of US will is another. It seems to me that
many of these terms, parity, essential equivalence, superiority, are a little
misleading unless you have a concept of what one is likely to do with what
he has. What they're seeking is a perceived overall military superiority
whereby in the future it will be the United States rather than the Soviet
Union that backs down in situations of conflict of national interest. To
measure exactly what this is going to be, they have already started doing a bit of testing. I mentioned two cases before. The Cienfuegos thing, and the Suez missile thing. We'll get more of this. Kissinger's alert at the time of the October War, I think, was a test, too, in the sense that they succeeded in having Kissinger do what they wanted him to do—enforce the cease-fire at a point when disaster loomed for the Egyptians. This then becomes, in the first instance, a question of what we and the world perceive to be their military strength and what our will is: to call or to back down. They've had what they regard as bitter tests on the other side where when they added the calculation up they decided, "We haven't got the missiles. We'll back down," and have done so. But we must ask ourselves, don't they want to have a reverse situation?

WHITNEY: I think the concept here that we're dealing with is basically a concept of the economic power base rather than strictly military power. Military power and political power are a function of economic power. After all, they are materialists. This is their philosophy of social development. They believe that that power which is the strongest power from the standpoint of its economic power base will be the strongest power in the world politically. In this they probably aren't so wrong because that is what modern history does seem to show, among other things. They believe, it is the key point in their doctrine, that there must be a continual increase in the military-economic potential of the Soviet state. Therefore, they must continue this. They must continue investing in group A production faster than they invest in group B. There is no end to this. There is no perceivable end whatsoever.

HARVEY: SALT and agreements therewith make no difference?

ROTHENBERG: There's another theory. Because of the dangers of nuclear warfare that they will not go for superiority because it'll have a destabilizing effect, lead to a spiraling arms race in which nobody will win and that therefore
they'll be willing to accept some kind of actual parity. I'd like to bounce that off. In this new situation in the world, this is the argument. I'm not saying whether I agree or not. But in this nuclear world the dangers are such that they might be willing to accept in good faith some kind of parity arrangement.

HENDERSON: Why do you exclude the possibility that they'll get nuclear superiority?

ROTHENBERG: The argument is that this would so destabilize the world political situation that it would be a risk that they would not want to take.

KENNAN: This was a thought that I've had all this afternoon. When we talk about military superiority we really have to make distinctions here. The nuclear weaponry is in an entirely different order than other weaponry. Anybody who talks about nuclear superiority in the sense that you can arrive at a point where you're going to be safe and they're going to be jeopardized doesn't know what he's talking about. There are already in existence warheads enough to blow us all to pieces. A fraction of this would do the trick. The only safety with respect to a war where these weapons would come to be used is that the war doesn't break out at all. If it ever starts, it's the end for everyone.

And for this reason, these weapons don't quite respond to the same expectations that you would address to other weapons. I have always had great misgivings about the theory of nuclear blackmail for this reason. This is also very glibly talked about, but I'm not sure that it's sound. I have lived in Yugoslavia where they had no nuclear weapons but they stood up very manfully at that time to the Russians and didn't go down on their knees and say: "What is it you want us to do?" I have misgivings about this.
I can remember dealing with brother Salazar during the war when we had overwhelming military strength over him. He was the most stubborn man that you could have dealt with. Precisely because of his weakness he realized that if he once began to yield to any demand of ours he'd have to ask himself: "What are they going to demand of me tomorrow? And how far is this going to go? If I'm going to be faced with an endless series of demands I might as well face up to this on the first one instead of on the last one." Well, so it is with weak countries and strong countries. What I'm talking about is the question as to whether military power is so automatically translatable into political power as we often think.

John Scott, you mentioned the possibility that they'd sail into an Indian port with a warship with some food and control the political situation there. Aren't you attributing a lot more power to gunboat diplomacy than we found we had in Vietnam and other places. I don't see the American Navy, even in seas where it has great superiority, able to influence political conditions on shore the way that one did in the 19th century. In other words, this whole question of the translatability of nuclear power into political power is something which requires a great deal of refinement.

Harvey: I'd agree with you completely but it seems to me that the issue at stake from the Soviet standpoint and it ought perhaps to be from ours, is that they want change, presumably revolutionary change. We want stability. The name of the game is to be able to force the other guy into a position where he has to make the decision as to whether to give ground or to resort to a fatal nuclear strike. It would seem that neither of us can take the latter step unless it knows that it is going to lose everything anyway. In the meantime if you are in a situation where you're doing the changing, as the Soviets are, and it is up to the other, which is the US, to stop it then the only way we can do it is to have the means and will to act effectively
without pushing the nuclear button. Moscow knows damn well that we won't push the button. This means, it seems to me that our problem essentially is to get them in a situation where we can say, and mean it, that if you do such and such we'll do such and such of a similar nature to counter you, which I think was the situation with the Cuban missile crisis. In other words, to get them in a position where they will be faced with the fatal nuclear decision. Perhaps the basic problem we face is to be sure that we can't have the world cut out from under our feet because we won't be able or willing to make the decision to react in kind in particular situations, but will get, or keep, ourselves in a situation where we have no other choice than to rely upon "massive retaliation" to save ourselves from one or another phase of a step-by-step undermining of our great power status.

KENNAN: We don't have to take their formula on this. Each of these situations has to be looked at on its merits. There is no sweeping determination that we will never intervene here or in any other place or that they will never intervene in some other place. Each of these situations is a specific one. I don't quite understand the anxieties you're talking about because if it's a question of intervening in situations in the Third World, surely the overwhelming superiority in numbers of military interventions since World War II has been with the United States, I don't recall a single instance in which the Russians have sent troops.

DURBROW: They use somebody else's troops.

KENNAN: Well, that's true. That's fair game. We try to too.

I would like to add one thing in connection with what's been said. Another modifying factor in their policies in the military field is going to be this question of the destabilizing or stabilizing of the military competition. It's quite true, of course, as was mentioned here this morning that we have almost priced ourselves out of the military competition. We
pay so much for weapons and troops that it's very difficult for us to keep up. But nevertheless the fact is that theirs is an economy which in general isn't more than about 50-60% of our own. And they're trying to maintain enormous military forces from it. Now this is a strain. Every penny that they spend on this has to be taken away from the domestic economy and they don't want to get into an indefinite spending race with us on weapons. This is too self-defeating for them. It puts too great strains on their internal programs. So this, too, will be a limiting factor on what they're going to want to spend.

**WHITNEY**: What proportion of that production then goes into military hardware? It would be related to what they see to be their immediate security ends and means—the means necessary toward those ends. But so far as the continual policy of increase in the military-economic potential of the Soviet state, there is no end to that. Because it will go on forever.

**HARVEY**: Why?

**WHITNEY**: Because that is a matter of doctrine. That is what it's all about. That is what they are about. That is what their state is about. That is what their system is about. That is where it is expressed. It's a dangerous philosophy. At one time or another I used the phrase, and I was clobbered over the head for it by people like John Kenneth Galbraith, of aggression through economic planning. The continual emphasis on the growth of heavy industry has a counterpart in the military and a political foreign policy, and it seems fairly clear to me that that is still there and it's an integral part of the whole system.

**BEAM**: Strategic parity, whether real or perceived, those are only the opening cards in the poker game. The big navy, as John Scott said, is to assert themselves around the world and I think initially to inhibit us from undertaking any things like we did in Lebanon and possibly to move in themselves, say, in Ceylon in favorable circumstances; though I rather doubt that.
That's fairly risky. The thing that really worries me is that if they went all out to build up mobile forces, I think that would show that they would be prepared to take us on and undertake some really outright aggressive moves. I don't think we've seen that yet.

DURBRON: What are helicopter carriers for, Jake?

BEAM: That isn't the same as going in for airborne armies and troop transport planes. Should they take that road we might get a clear idea in advance of some of the specific objectives they were after. It hasn't come to that yet. For the moment the Soviets are engaged in more or less a stand-off on strategic forces, while matching and trying to neutralize our power, most recently on the oceans of the world. They haven't reached the point where they've gone over to an unmistakably aggressive pattern in building up their forces.

KELLEY: But if they have worldwide military superiority as you mentioned, won't that permit them to avoid aggression because they'll get what they want without aggression?

KENNAN: It hasn't worked that way for us, though, Bob.

PACKER: It seems to me that the thing that Foy Kohler was aiming at was confrontation as of X time and it was military power in being at the time that would be important.

KOHLER: But that's backed by the whole strength formula.

PACKER: But this thing is going to go so damned fast, economic potential, military potential, manufacturing--the war isn't going to last very long, probably, because we will go into the nuclear phase and the economic power isn't going to be so important. I may be pessimistic about that.

HARVEY: But the thought that seems pervasive here, Earl, is that Moscow doesn't want or expect the military competition to come down to a war with the US. I would say personally that the Soviets are as anxious now as ever before
to avoid a nuclear war with the US. What they want is the means, which in my mind requires at least perceived superiority across the board, that will enable them to force breakdowns at critical points by the US and its allies, individually or collectively. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, they want the fruits of war without having to fight to get them. And they want them not necessarily all at once, but step by step, but with the result that they will have predominant power throughout the world, that they will be able, as Foy Kohler said, to exercise a controlling voice in every point of the globe: That in other words the Soviet Union will become first class while the US becomes second class.

BARGHOORN: There's a thought that occurs to me as I listen to this, I don't think I completely agree with what Loy said about the Vietnam War. Maybe you're right when you said that the way the Vietnam War turned out was disadvantageous to the United States, but on the other hand, I think there's a great danger in getting into a mentality in which we assume that we have to stop the Soviets at every particular point in the world before they decide to expand. This gets back to one of George Kennan's ideas that he set forth many years ago: namely that if the United States is going to survive, if democracy is going to survive and our system is to work, then we can't engage in an endless contest over every boundary, every disputed area in the world. It seems to me that we have to make qualitative decisions. We have to have a set of priorities, to decide what is really important. For example, I would say Western Europe is vital to us but I'm not so sure I care about what happens in Ceylon or whether the Soviets increase their influence in India where they're going to have to contend with the Chinese among other things. I think there's a real danger in getting ourselves into these situations.

HARVEY: I think we're really talking about something different. You're talking in terms of maybe five years ago and we're talking in terms of 1975.
The situation is quite the reverse now than when we had the policy of stopping everything everywhere. What we're talking about is what they are trying to do now and in the future, not what the situation was before. Now they have proclaimed doctrine of (1) detente, where we have committed ourselves not to do any of these nasty things and (2) they state that, and you can say that this is hogwash, the US doesn't have the power anymore to do what it formerly tried and for a while succeeded in doing. And so it's a case not of our stopping them everywhere but of our being able to stop them anywhere. From their doctrinal standpoint right now and their estimate of power right now is that they will stop us from trying to stop them.

BARGHOORN: What about Chile? Who stopped whom in Chile? I don't think they were very successful in Chile. And I'm not so sure they are going to be that successful in Portugal or Spain. I think that these are dangerous areas. But if I were in their situation, I wouldn't be cackling that much.

HARVEY: You're talking about selected, and I am not sure valid, setbacks. I'm talking about what they're thinking in overall terms. I'm not sure that I would not argue a bit about who won what in Chile and about your assurances re Portugal. The Soviets themselves emphasize not what they lost in Chile but what they learned and how they can use the lessons. And they seem willing to play the Portuguese game far more actively than you suggest.
SOME MAJOR QUESTIONS AS TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WORLD TODAY

1. Detente: The Issue of Conflicting Interpretations

KENNAN: I wasn't aware that there was any feature of detente that related to the Third World or what we were supposed to do in the Third World.

HARVEY: I pass to Foy who is much more authoritative on this. But as a simple straightforward matter the Soviets exclude the Third World and their national liberation movements from any of the requirements assumed by them under detente or, as they prefer to call it, peaceful coexistence. In categoric terms, they insist that the peaceful coexistence, or as we call it the detente relationship, precludes actions by the US to protect its positions and interests as against Soviet encouraged and supported liberation efforts. Such action by the US is according to Moscow "export of counterrevolution" which is a definite no-no under detente or peaceful coexistence. In the Third World, Soviet aspirations and activities are excluded from restraint under peaceful coexistence. Ours are not.

KENNAN: That's just my point. But then how can you say that undertook an obligation under detente not to press any situation in the Third World?

HARVEY: They don't talk about detente, they talk about peaceful coexistence, and peaceful coexistence means, in their view, no export of counterrevolution by the US, and, again in their view anything the US does to protect, much less promote, its positions and interests in the Third World amounts to the export of counterrevolution.

KOHLER: We didn't sign an agreement on detente but on "peaceful coexistence" to "avoid situations that could lead to war" and a lot of other words. Now their propaganda to the Third World, to Africa, to the Middle East, to Latin America is that the United States has pledged to abide by the principles of peaceful coexistence, and if the Americans do this then it means that they can no longer intervene in your affairs, that they
have to leave you to go your own way, that they can't do another Cuba or whatever the case may be. Recently, the Kissinger "threat" to take over the oil fields in the Middle East is said to be contrary to the principles of peaceful coexistence that the US government agreed to. I'm not saying these are true or that we undertook an obligation. I'm saying what they're saying.

The important thing to remember is that, as I said earlier, we have misled ourselves as to what sort of relationship has actually been established between the Soviets and ourselves. Until recently, Moscow eschewed use of the word detente, except in statements and commentaries specifically designed for outside consumption. The Soviets now frequently follow US practice and use the detente expression, but in doing so treat it as interchangeable with peaceful coexistence, as they have always defined the latter. In other words, now, as in the past, we must look to Soviet explanations of the meaning and limitations of peaceful coexistence if we are to understand how they see, and intend to operate within, what we choose to call a detente relationship.

The past three years show that, in contrast to widespread beliefs in this country, in the Soviet understanding detente-peaceful coexistence is far from being "indivisible," and that within a detente-peaceful coexistence relationship Moscow does not consider itself committed to or is willing to cooperate with the US in the maintenance of international stability or the current international strategic balance or assured security. Neither Soviet leadership pronouncements nor Soviet policies warrant an assumption that Moscow's motivations, intentions and priorities relative to detente-peaceful coexistence mirror our own, except in the sense that the US and the Soviet Union have a common interest in avoiding nuclear war. Western opinion to
the contrary, the evidence indicates that in the Soviet view detente-peaceful coexistence does not cancel out dangerous Soviet intentions, nor transforms the Communist leadership into Western-type "realists." I think it would be a profound error to believe, as many have said, that Moscow seeks the same sort of stable world order as the US; that a main concern of the Soviet leadership will henceforth be to provide its long deprived people with the benefits of Western style consumerism; and that detente-peaceful coexistence is already in process of producing a high degree of inter-linkage between the societies and economies of the Soviet Union and the Western world, or a new sense of joint US-Soviet commitment to crisis management with new limits on adversary relationships.

They interpret detente-peaceful coexistence as imposing unilateral restraints on US freedom of action, even while it allows Moscow full freedom to promote and support the global revolutionary and anti-imperialist national liberation struggle. And it shouldn't surprise us. Whatever else you say about it, Moscow has candidly made clear that in any change in relations between particular capitalist and socialist states the objective of the latter is to further the fundamental struggle between the two contending systems. In the Soviet view, detente-peaceful coexistence is merely a "special" and as they say, "highly effective form of the class antagonism and historic rivalry between world socialism and world capitalism"—"is a part of and one of the forms of the world class struggle." Soviet leaders and spokesmen do indeed assert that detente-peaceful coexistence and limited cooperation on a state-to-state level are possible between countries with "different social systems" and can be mutually beneficial in many ways, even while the power struggle between them continues unabated. They explain this seeming contradiction by asserting that at the level of interstate relations the most urgent political problem of the age is the prevention of the outbreak of a nuclear war, while the "main social problem of the
age" is said to be the transition of world society from capitalism to communism. Consequently, as Moscow explains it, while the principles of peaceful coexistence might set some "rules of conduct" or legal norms in the international arena, these are strictly limited. In fact, to them peaceful coexistence presupposes an acute political, economic and ideological struggle not only between opposing classes inside particular countries but also between states within the opposing systems.

All of this adds up to what I said at the beginning: Moscow considers and says that peaceful coexistence inhibits the US from actions intended to protect and promote US interests in foreign areas; such actions automatically constitute "aggression." Meanwhile, the Soviet Union can do anything it wishes to undermine US and other interests, since this by definition constitutes not aggression but the promotion of "peace" and the "liberation" of peoples.

KENNAN: For the US to renounce aggression didn't come into existence, as a principle, with detente. It has been our position for a great many years that we were not going to invade other countries, to take them over by force. This has been imbedded in every treaty that you could imagine for the last hundred years. It wasn't a feature of detente.

KOHLER: They wouldn't say that we had abided by this. They would cite Guatemala, they would cite Cuba, they would cite Haiti, the Dominican Republic, North Vietnam, Cambodia and so forth.

KENNAN: But a lot of these things took place long before anyone heard of this word detente.

HARVEY: Take the specifics. They say that if we should dare to do anything to control the Arab countries in connection with oil, that would be a complete violation of the principles of peaceful coexistence. On the other hand, they can do anything they want or are able to do.
KENNAN: I don't think they would take that position.

HARVEY: I agree we think that they shouldn't think that way. But we are talking now of realities. They contend over and over again that under the principles of peaceful coexistence, first, there is a right of every people to struggle with arms in hand to avoid exploitation, to avoid intervention and so forth, and that they, the Soviets, have the right to give such people, and that they will in fact give such people, all support necessary including military support. On the other hand, they say, we have no right whatsoever to bring to bear any force to protect our interests.

KENNAN: If that's their position it's not one that would be agreed to by our government.

HARVEY: Unfortunately, they say our government has agreed to it. They've said that the agreements in Moscow were based upon our acceptance of the principles of peaceful coexistence as they have long "struggled" for these principles, and that we were from thenceforth bound by these principles. They described the whole thing as a great triumph for long-standing Soviet foreign policies.

KENNAN: And that they weren't bound by the same things we were?

HARVEY: It's their position that we accepted their principles, and that under these principles they have a perfect right to help "peoples struggling for liberation" in every possible way; that's their interpretation. I agree with you--it's an absurdity. Nixon tried for a moment to get the record straight when he first came back from his May 1972 meeting in Moscow: he said that we had some differences left over; that we didn't agree with each other insofar as ideology was concerned; that we would continue to be rivals. But nobody paid much attention and Nixon very quickly quit talking about what was excluded from "peaceful coexistence." Still, as far as the Soviets were concerned they unendingly stressed that the principles of peaceful coexistence placed restraints on the US not to export counterrevolution or to do anything against national liberation movements or efforts to end the exploitation of peoples.
BARGHOORN: This is very annoying from our point of view, but it's nothing new. It's been going on from the very beginning.

HARVEY: There's a difference, Freddy. And it is that they now say we've agreed to it, and we have at least deluded ourselves about it as Foy Kohler has said. They say that because of objective realities in the way of a shift in the "correlation of world forces" against us, that we have been forced to commit ourselves to coexistence, that, for example, we are not to do anything about what may happen in Latin America. I grant, however, that it is not new: it is as Loy Henderson said this morning, Cold War with a new name.

KOHLER: They have of course preached this gospel since the Comintern. But the difference is that today they are a great industrial power which actually provides the arms.

HARVEY: People call what they are saying, rhetoric. But it's dangerous rhetoric. They've begun, as I said a moment ago, to talk about an "external role" of their armed forces. This is new. Formerly they always defined the role of Soviet armed forces in terms of defending the homeland and later "the socialist community of states." Now they've added other roles which are: to give general support to the peace movement, to prevent the export of counterrevolution, to support national liberation struggles wherever they are underway. There's a whole volume of literature. It's rhetoric, granted, but rhetoric can reflect intentions. I am sure that you remember Hitler and Mein Kampf.

BARGHOORN: I would take that last point quite seriously. But I think that this period that we're living in is in some ways rather untypical. I think Nixon's detente policy was designed to get him elected in 1972. He didn't really need it but still it was extra insurance and I think he probably went a little too far in a lot of ways. You have to also consider that the United States during the period when the so-called detente was inaugurated
and developed, was in a mood of retreat. We had just been through the war in Vietnam. This country was not prepared to put up a very strong and vigorous front against the Soviets and we have to wait a little while.

HARVEY: I hope your view is correct. But I fear the Soviets honest to God believe that we are not simply in a state of retreat, or adjustment, but in a state of decline and that since the Vietnam war they do believe that with time our troubles will not diminish but rather will increase.

KENNAN: Not we alone, the rest of the world, too.

PACKER: I have a revolutionary suggestion to make. Can't we save ourselves on this question of peaceful coexistence and what it means by simply making a declaration that we accept the Soviet definition of peaceful coexistence which consists of five principles. And then they can't accuse us of violating the principles of peaceful coexistence, if we accept their definition.

HARVEY: The principles as the Soviets postulate them are extremely vague.

DURBROW: They're phony.

PACKER: Well, sure they're phony, but we can behave exactly as they behave and not behave, according to our own definition of peaceful coexistence.

DURBROW: We're not going to clobber each other, but what happens under the umbrella of nuclear weapons. I'm going to read something you wrote or something your boys did down here at the Center. This is your book on the '73 War and detente. "As the Soviets see it detente 'presupposes' an unrelenting class struggle between the opposing systems in which Moscow remains free to use all means short of nuclear war to promote the advance of the revolutionary and national-liberation movements, to achieve a shift in the balance of forces in its favor. Consequently, detente in the US meaning of the concept only applies to certain areas of US-Soviet relations,"
those which are of mutual interest and presumably of mutual benefit to both sides. Furthermore, and as the Soviet interpretation of 'peaceful coexistence' makes explicit, this concept does not extend to a coincidence of interests in the preservation of international stability. Thus, the global normalization of international relations and relaxation of tension of which Podgorny spoke simply means that the US must cease all attempts to defend its interests or protect its allies in the face of the 'offensive' of the Soviet-supported 'anti-imperialist' forces or intervene in the 'just' wars waged by them."

BARGHOORN: But Durby, as George said, that's their extreme interpretation.

HARVEY: Why do you say extreme? It's constant.

DURBROW: They're doing it all the time.

BARGHOORN: Why should they think that we accept their formula. It seems to me that this is wishful thinking on their part.

HARVEY: They insist when it comes to the Arab situation . . .

DURBROW: When we go to the aid of Israel, then that's unfair. The Arabs are trying to liberate the territory the Israelis are sitting on. So they're perfectly justified in doing that. We shouldn't even try to do a damn thing about it.

BARGHOORN: It's based on who's got the power, the Israelis or the Arabs. All this rhetoric isn't going to make a bit of difference. I don't think it's very important.

DURBROW: You mean we're all going to be girls together and we're all going to get along fine, no matter what the Kremlin does?

BARGHOORN: Well, I don't believe that either. I don't believe in detente either but I don't see why I should accept the Soviet definition of the situation.
HENDERSON: The Soviets are seeking overwhelming military superiority in order to be sure other nations, including the US, do accept their definition.

BARGHOORN: We've been discussing that for the last two or three hours.

KOHLER: The only real point is that that's what they're preaching to others. That's all.

BARGHOORN: Well, they've been liars since 1917.

KELLEY: Call Kissinger and ask him to comment on it.

HARVEY: Well, that's a good suggestion. Freddy says he doesn't believe in detente.

BARGHOORN: I've never been enthusiastic about it, whatever you may think of my remarks this afternoon.

KENNAN: Well, Kissinger would just laugh at this. He would say we never agreed to recognize any such formula.

HARVEY: Except hasn't he acted accordingly?

KENNAN: Has he? Who said that they would intervene in the Middle East? Was it we or was it the Russians? They haven't said this.

PACKER: No, it was we.

KENNAN: Well, is that acting accordingly?

PACKER: It's under the threat of strangulation.

KENNAN: I'm not objecting to what he said.

DURBROW: Who the hell's been intervening in the Middle East for the last five or ten years?

KENNAN: We're talking about military intervention. And if they send troops in there I don't know what we would do.

DURBROW: Troops are a different thing. All the weapons they've given to Syria, to Egypt, Iraq, etc.

KENNAN: There's one thing that I don't understand about this conversation. I have the impression that in the case of Khrushchev especially,
but I think it’s true of Brezhnev, these people say to themselves how come the Americans think that they’re the only people who should have a great fleet? How come again that they think they should be able to intervene in places we shouldn’t?

We Americans have intervened in one place after another. We have done things that we never would have accepted from them. We don’t talk about it the way they do, but this has been the way it is. We have been sending destroyers into the Black Sea for many years. I don’t think we’d like it if they came in the same way — if they sent Soviet destroyers into the Bay of Southern California or the Gulf of Mexico. We’re gradually teaching them to adopt these same habits; but we started with this sort of thing a long time before.

BARGHOORN: An interesting case is the Jackson Amendment, which I happen to favor myself. I think one has to admit that it was a form of intervention in the affairs of the Soviet Union.

KENNAN: My point is that we just had a mention of the USSR’s giving arms aid to the Arabs. Giving arms to other people — a terrible thing.

DURBROW: We do it, too.

KENNAN: You’re darn right we do and if you’d tally up what we’ve given it’s absolutely unconscionable, what we’re giving today to other people and to people who are at odds with each other. It makes no sense at all. We seem to have an absolute passion for dishing out arms to other people. I understand that it is dangerous when the Russians do it. But we’re in a very poor position to object to things like this. In the Middle East we’ve armed the Israelis as no power in the Middle East is armed. I’m not objecting to it. I’m merely saying that if that’s intervention for them, then it’s intervention for us too.
HARVEY: We're talking at cross purposes. Maybe the issue is one of change in the power balance, that we're not in the same position we were a few years ago. What about ten years from now? What about twenty years from now?

KENNAN: I would like to say this. Of course, there is change. Don't think I am optimistic about this. But the danger that confronts this country is right here in this country and the greatest danger that confronts Western Europe is right there is Western Europe. If we were what we should be I wouldn't be worried about the Russians. It's our betrayal of ourselves that bothers me.

2. Multipolarity and Bipolarity

WHITNEY: I detect a certain atmosphere of unreality in the whole framework of some of this discussion. We're talking about the world as if it has to be either our cookie or the Soviet Union's cookie. The reality of the world is that it is a very big and very complex place. If one thing has been characteristic of the period since the end of World War II, it has been the rather rapid emergence of other power centers. We've seen Peking. It certainly isn't the Soviet Union's cookie and it isn't our cookie. Now we're in the midst of a tremendous redistribution of world income based on an act of highway robbery by a group of ten or twelve underdeveloped nations, some of whom don't know what to do with the money they get -- so, they go and bomb villages in the Arabian desert with bon-bons whereby they will probably run out of money. But some of them are using that money with a certain amount of wisdom, and that amount of money, if it can continue to be pumped to those countries who are oil producers, is going to remake the world in itself in another respect in another ten or fifteen years. It isn't going to be for the United States and the Soviet Union,
even if they should decide to act in alliance together, to determine the
face of the world to come. There are a lot of other people and they are not
without means at their disposal. To some extent, a lot of their own response
is an attempt to try to create for themselves a strong and a secure position
in what they themselves begin to recognize is also probably a very insecure
world and one which they aren't going to be able to control.

HARVEY: I'm proving myself the lousiest Chairman that ever was. It
is unfortunate that the Soviets don't talk the way you suggest. We talk
about the multipolar world. They talk about the world as still bipolar
and locked in a "to the death contest" between their system and ours and
they talk about this bipolar world and its struggle in terms of a rapidly
shifting correlation of world forces, based at heart on military power,
in their favor. Certainly the Soviets are worried about the Chinese, and
I think your emphasis on that is probably most important. As the Soviets
envisage what's going to happen, according to what they say, perhaps the
one hope we've got is that we and the Chinese may together present a problem
to them that neither can present alone.

WHITNEY: All religions have their incantations and they keep repeating
them year in and year out and they keep compromising with realities of the
actual situation. It's a bad comparison in many ways, I know. But it's
my impression that Pope Paul is still looking forward to a Christian world,
throughout the world, and the coming of the Kingdom of Heaven, but somehow
or other the papacy has managed to fit itself into a very complicated world
which is not likely to be solely Christian . . . ever. The Russians are
going to keep saying the things that are part of their doctrine because,
as George Kennan has very correctly pointed out, it is their only excuse
for the things that they have done, their only justification. When they
get down to it they will have to deal with China and also with a group of Middle Eastern states who, regardless of the outcome with Israel, are going to be independent and powerful. So will we.

KELLEY: Isn't the basic fact this: The Soviets since a certain period of time have adopted a policy which is known as peaceful coexistence or detente; an essential element of that policy is overwhelming military superiority on the Soviet side and that they're going to get as soon as they possibly can.

WHITNEY: Yes, that's true. This is another way of saying what I said before about military-economic power. There's no end to its growth in that as far as they're concerned. That concept will have to fit itself into this very recently complex world with a lot of different powers in it.

KELLEY: The world will have to fit itself into their complex.

WHITNEY: No. They'll have to fit themselves into the world's.

BARGHOORN: Every time I hear people talk about this increasing economic power, I remember some of the things that I have read by Soviet scientists to the effect that it isn't all that efficient, and it isn't going to go on increasing at a geometric rate. You can draw a line on a graph and say that this goes on forever, but the facts are that there are all kinds of problems and obstacles. If they're going to increase their economic power, they're going to have to institute reforms which will reduce the political power of the leadership.

WHITNEY: This is one of their problems, certainly.

KOHLER: I think this idea is a bit exaggerated, Tom. If we're thinking about the next fifteen-twenty years, there are only two superpowers which will continue to have the overall power and above all that have the military power that will dominate the world. It is quite true that if you turn to
concepts of economic power that you're going to have to add Western Europe, Japan, and now to a degree, the Arabs. I think we could welcome a world in which there were in fact multiple centers of power. I think we can deal with that better than the Kremlin, which doesn't have that kind of concept. I think their concept of power is a rather monolithic concept, when you get right down to it. As a practical matter, we're not going to have that kind of world in overall terms within twenty years or so.

We have a few headaches on the economics with the Japanese, with the Arabs, even our Western European friends, and we have political problems connected with our support of Israel and things like that. The real power focus is going to remain with these two for as long as any of us is alive.

**HENDERSO**: In our discussion of power I haven't heard much about the problems which we have that the Russians don't have; that is, we have powerful organizations of dissent in our country, which they don't have.

We must bear in mind that in times both of peace and war we are handicapped by organized groups of dissenters who claim the right under the cloak of the right of assembly to assemble in many thousands in our cities, to tie up traffic, to burn and bomb buildings, to commit acts of violence, including murder, and to prevent the operations of our public institutions. These so-called demonstrations can interfere with our everyday life and sap the strength of the country. They are not tolerated in communist countries.

**WHITNEY**: Mr. Henderson, you're very right. But for every strength, there is a counterpart in weakness. Because they lack dissent, they thereby do not have an adequate freedom of communication to be able to operate their own system at maximum efficiency. Because we have dissent, we have a weakness at prosecuting a policy, let us say, in a part of the world like Vietnam, and we have a lot of other weaknesses. But because we have dissent, because we have freedom to express these ideas, a lot of the things that need to be talked about and discussed and worked out do get
discussed and hopefully get resolved sooner or later in one manner or another. I can't pass on a relative efficiency of the two systems if you just want to talk in terms of efficiency.

HENDERSON: I wasn't talking about efficiency. I was talking about power.

BEAM: In talks with Gromyko, his complaint to me was: "You're so unpredictable. We just can't count on American policy." The Soviets know that as of this moment we enjoy military superiority based on the accuracy of our weapons. They know that in any strategic confrontation, we've got them. This is one factor, I think which keeps them fairly cautious, namely, their belief in our unpredictability. What Kissinger said about our going into the Middle East keeps them guessing and it may be true that they take it at face value.

HENDERSON: But you're speaking at 5:30 today. What will it be twenty years from today?

BEAM: Well, I'm talking about the next three or four years.

WHITNEY: Roy, you said that during the next ten to fifteen years there are only two superpowers in the world who would have the capacity for world domination. I don't agree that either one of those two powers or even the two powers together possess that possibility right now.

KENNAN: You're right.

KOHLER: Maybe I put it wrongly then. I wasn't suggesting that we were going to use that positively. There's no other power in the world that could destroy the United States except the Soviet Union and there is no power that could destroy the Soviet Union except the United States.

WHITNEY: That's true.

KOHLER: In that sense you have a standoff. A high Russian once said to me, "What the hell are we going to do? Destroy each other and leave the world to the Chinese?" And I think this enters into the very basic concept
that they have. Beyond that, they want enough to stop us from undertaking conventional adventuristic undertakings or intervening in Third World situations. We have to assume that the same should apply the other way around so you get an area of dangerous operations. Third World countries know this, too. Under a nuclear stalemate you can have, and are likely to have local conventional wars even more than we have had in the past, with maybe neither of the superpowers with all their power daring to intervene.

Another factor in these twenty years we are talking about (and none of us has figured out) is the proliferation of nuclear weapons. That has all kinds of dangerous ramifications. The British and French have got it. The Indians are on their way. The Israelis, I think, can do it. The Swedes can certainly do it. The Swiss. The Arabs can buy it now. This is going to present real ramifications that none of us knows the answer to.

3. The World Food Situation and Soviet Policies

SCOTT: I'd like to mention a type of change that's beginning to happen now that I think is going to influence this bifurcation that Foy was talking about and the whole position of the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. That's the food squeeze in the LDCs. The sudden quadrupling or quintupling of oil prices, thereby quadrupling or quintupling fertilizer prices, thereby making the fuel necessary to run the limited sub-surface water pumps that they have and the agricultural mechanization that they have is obviating the utilization of the benefits of the 120-day rice. 120-day rice is only useful if you have the fertilizer and the labor power and the water at the right time. Otherwise you're better off with what you had. The LDCs are in the position now where it's nip and tuck, particularly Pakistan, India and Bangladesh being able to feed themselves. They're going to be able to pay for the deficits, to buy the deficits this year but probably not next year. And two years hence they're not going to
be in a position to deal with this thing at all.

TakeIndia, in which there are large quantities of peasants who have been traditionally counted as not politically active by the governments, as urban masses in the big cities. Maybe you have to be careful of them. But now with communications better, with a radio set in every village if not in every house, with a higher level of politicalization, when hundreds of millions of Indians begin to starve and this is within sight within the next couple of years for Pakistan or Bangladesh, already it's been happening in smaller African nations, when this happens two things are likely to occur. In the first place, are hundreds of millions of Indians going to starve when they have nuclear weapons to try to go and make the countries which have food surpluses give them to them? And in the second place, is this almost certainly not going to lead to new and far more massive wars of national liberation, far more spontaneously sparked than those with which we've been dealing, say in South Vietnam where North Vietnamese intervention was the motive power behind this? I think these things are going to open up vast new avenues to the application of the principle of the legitimacy of wars of national liberation supported both by the Chinese and the Russians and confront us with collision course problems way before we get to ten or twenty years hence. I think this lies ahead within the immediate future. It's going to make a qualitative difference in the way in which the United States and the Soviet Union prepare to deal with one another in the context of their relations with the LDCs.

KOHLER: Will it bring us together or bring us into conflict?

SCOTT: We had a meeting in New York the other day with Vikentii Matveyev there and a Soviet economist at the Council on Foreign Relations. There were about 30 people there and the issue was posed, "Can we and the Russians not cooperate in our attitudes toward the LDCs, particularly with the coordination of aid programs and sales programs?" to which
Vikentii's reply was a very clear one. He said, "No. Our essential objectives are antithetical; you go to the LDCs to make a profit. We go there to help." He's a graduate of the Vyshhaya Partinaya Shkola; he's in the leadership group. I think it's unlikely that the confrontation that will occur will tend to bring us and the Russians closer together under the present constellation of the correlation of forces.

KÖHLER: As a matter of fact, the Kremlin should probably stand in the world as guilty of criminal negligence for the inefficiency of its agriculture in a world of mounting population and mounting hunger. This is another aspect of the system that does have a bearing on the world, even if you say it's an internal problem; it had a bearing on our wheat prices a couple of years ago. It has great bearing on this problem that's being talked about right now by John Scott.

PACKER: Can we bring the accusation before the world community?

KÖHLER: It really is incredible and they showed no hesitation in the face of the LDCs when they thought they needed it themselves in going out and buying up enough on the world market to impoverish these LDCs as well as make bread a little higher here.

DURBROW: Maybe they want to get more wheat like they tried last year to give it to India and get more kudos for the boys around the circuit in the LDCs. But Ford stopped this possibility.

BEAM: Who are these LDCs going to liberate themselves from? They're all independent. Are they going communist or what? The Russians have not welcomed starving peoples with open arms.

KÖHLER: What you're going to see are wars of aggression around Africa, Southeast Asia, South Asia and so forth, not liberation . . . local wars, yes.
SCOTT: They'll be called wars of national liberation by the local left-wing groups.

KENNAN: But the question is a good one: From whom are they going to liberate themselves?

SCOTT: I didn't say they were going to be liberated. I said that they will be called wars of national liberation. There's a liberation front right now in Thailand. Who are they going to liberate Thailand from? They say the agents of imperialism, like King Adulyadej or whatever his name is, who are today enslaving them. This doesn't mean that using the phrase war of national liberation indicates that I agree that it is a war of liberation, and if so, from whom? But that's what these wars are being called.

BARGHOORN: Your scenario is fascinating and horrifying but I think it's also true that technology changes rapidly and that this is another example of projecting present situations into the future. It may be correct. It may also be incorrect.

HARVEY: I hope to hell they are wrong, but my good friends in the weather field, in the geography field, insist that profound changes are going to take place in the next ten years which are going to make food production worse and worse and worse. Then what do we do?

SCOTT: We had a meeting last week with a guy named Philip Handler. He is the President of the National Academy of Sciences and has studied this fairly carefully. He gave a thirty-minute talk at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on this subject, pointing out the factors I alluded to plus that the Northern Hemisphere temperatures have been falling a half degree a year for the last ten years. This so far has benefitted the United States because it's improved our rainfall pattern. It has damaged Canada and has done great damage to the Soviet Union.
Handler had a talk recently with Keldysh in which this issue was raised. Keldysh is extremely upset by the fact that winter wheat simply no longer is a viable crop in whole areas in Siberia. There's no question about the inefficiency of the agricultural system in the Soviet Union. The level of efficiency, given what it is, their crops are going to be smaller than they have been because of this change. Handler made another point. What we are doing currently is using the grain that we have in surplus because we have benefitted first and most profoundly from improvements in agricultural productivity both in terms of manpower and in terms of productivity per acre. We have benefitted from this and are now the world food bank. We are now going to just about keep our heads above water by exporting the food, enough of it to hard currency areas, to pay the Arabs for the oil that we need to convert, thanks to sunshine, into more food. This triangular thing, it'll keep us above water probably within the immediate future with no drastic decline in standards of living. But it's going to be an utter disaster in the LDCs where they're right now running out of the wherewithal to buy the food that they need and are so far utterly unrealistic in dealing with the population control issue.

BARGHOORN: I would think that in spite of what Matveyev said that the logic of the situation is that the United States and the Soviet Union have a common interest in the situation. I would imagine that Keldysh would be more likely to take that position than Matveyev...

SCOTT: I would suspect so. I wish I thought that Keldysh was an important policy-making factor in the Soviet government. I don't think he is.

SHAPIRO: More so than Matveyev. Matveyev is just a newspaper man.

KENNAN: John, there's one part of your scenario that I have my doubts about. Hungry people make very, very poor revolutionaries. The idea that people revolt out of hunger has been disproven time after time. They
become listless, apathetic and incapable of energetic political action. Maybe the wars will be made by the few that are well fed. They won't be made by the many that are starving.

SCOTT: If the distribution of food were even in India so that everybody got hungry at the same time, this thesis would be valid. But it's not going to be evenly distributed. There will be massive starvation to death, but there will be a small number (small number of Indians is quite a few Indians) who will be well enough fed to have not empty stomachs but strong stomachs.

KENNAN: I agree.

4. How Real Is Soviet Interest in the Further Spread of Communism?

SHAPIRO: May I ask one question. It has been assumed for some time that the Soviet Union has a lot to gain, nothing to lose, by the expansion of communism to other areas, particularly in the undeveloped areas. I'd like to challenge that. I think the Soviet Union would be embarrassed by the spread of revolution or the emergence of communist systems not only in the underdeveloped areas but in the developed areas in the West like Latin America. It goes back to Lenin. Soon after the Revolution Lenin said that once there is a revolution in another country, particularly in a mechanized country, a country with higher technology, the Soviet Union takes second place to Germany or England or France. Now you have accommodations. You have China. Even Romania in many ways takes an entirely different point of view from the Soviet Union. It would not do the Soviet Union much good, at least not as they're thinking now (I know that from contacts I had with medium level Soviet officials and with just ordinary intellectuals). They would be terribly embarrassed to have trouble in Africa or in Asia, and certainly Western Europe. At the moment I think...
the Soviet leaders are interested in stability.

HARVEY: There’s one thing I wanted to bring up earlier. Soviet rhetoric. I worry about it because over the years it seemed to be rather indicative of their intentions. The Soviet rhetoric is exactly the reverse of what you’re saying. The Soviet rhetoric is we’ve got chances in Europe now for great gains. They are not at this moment saying that they’re going to have communist revolutions everywhere. But the whole thrust of their views of a dire situation on the part of the enemy camp; it seems to boggle them, but they are, to say the least, very gleeful.

SHAPIRO: I’m not interested in Soviet rhetoric.

HARVEY: Everything they say points to them being very gleeful over trends of the recent past and currently: the energy situation, the deepening of the crisis of capitalism which we’re calling a recession and which I’m calling a depression. I have seen them no more joyful than at any other time since 1932. It’s the first time, indeed, that I have noted anything like such a ring of absolute confidence.

BARGHOORN: Look at what happened after 1932.

HARVEY: I know that. They do talk a bit about that and I think that may become more serious. Right now there is that sub-tone of concern about fascism. I’m no prophet and it may be that before long they will begin to think they’ve got to worry that there are going to be a lot of fascist governments. Now they say there are trends toward fascism, but they’re putting it in terms of the need for alertness and unity and united fronts, as in general a stimulus to leftist activity. It reminds you again of the business about Germany in 1931-33. I’ll agree with you, however, that a potential is there that may very well become of serious concern to Moscow.
SHAPIRO: Henderson said it goes back to Stalin. I don't think that Stalin was interested in having other countries go communist unless he could control them. If you believe Tito, Stalin was very much against having China go communist. Could the Soviet Union control a communist Germany? Or a communist France, or a communist Italy? Even now, they cannot control the Italian Communist Party which is not in power. In the case of the invasion of Czechoslovakia I think the only Western communist party that did not protest against the invasion was Luxembourg, wasn't it? Under such circumstances is it plausible to believe that the Soviet leaders are foolhardy enough to want a communist disturbance in any country?

SCOTT: Unless they can control it. A piece of supporting information -- Earl Browder told me before he died that on two occasions he talked to Stalin. Stalin, he says in retrospect, was trying to find out whether he would be obedient. He concluded that he would not be. That's when the trouble started for Browder. This refers to 1946 or 1947.

HARVEY: I'd like to refer to what George Kennan said earlier with regard to the trouble with us is largely of our own making. To me, this makes sense. I would go further and say that there's a hell of a lot of stupidity prevailing among us. But I wouldn't swear that there is similar stupidity prevailing among the Russians.

KENNAN: I haven't been following these things very closely but my impression -- and it is shared by a lot of other people -- (I noticed the London Economist said the same thing) is quite the opposite of yours. It's rather a surprise at the restraint that the Soviets have shown in the face of the disarray in Western Europe and their failure to spot this as a revolutionary situation.
HARVEY: I would say the Economist is wrong. The Soviets are not, it is true, predicting any imminent collapse of capitalism. On the other hand, the preoccupation of Soviet literature and commentaries with the disarray in the West, the problems that we have, suggest a great deal of lip smacking. This again is going on the basis of what they say, but when they say things over and over again and at every level and in every way, it indicates, in my view, a certain degree of real conviction.

BARGHOORN: Could I just say a world about some of these formulas. The formula of the general crisis of capitalism, like sootnesheenie sil (I forget the English), is very old. The general crisis of capitalism does not in itself mean that something's about to happen.

HARVEY: They've added something to previous analyses and that is that the crisis at this stage is qualitatively different from what existed before. These are not statements by little guys down the line. These are statements by top-level people.

BARGHOORN: It's significant that they've revived it.

HARVEY: There's another thing, it is often said Moscow is concerned about the Western oil situation, that they see the possibility of a spill-over of Western difficulties into their own situation. Unfortunately, everything the Soviets have said and done about the oil crisis is to encourage in every possible way maximum use of the oil weapon against the West, and an extension of the oil weapon strategy to other materials essential to the industrialized countries.

BARGHOORN: They haven't cut off export of oil.

HARVEY: They've raised the prices. And they've also introduced a little bit of blackmail with respect to their principal West European oil customer, the German Federal Republic.

WHITNEY: Our Canadian neighbors to the north have done a little bit of that.
BEAM: There is one new factor in this correlation of forces which may be favorable to the Soviets and that is the anti-Western cartels of raw material producers. The Russians don't have to play it up. I think it could be a very important weapon against us and would help them in this so-called correlation of forces.

HARVEY: They are playing it up. They're doing their damnest to encourage it all over the place and for every commodity.

BEAM: Time is on their side. They think they have only to wait.

KENNAN: I think that probably what worries them most as a challenge to their policies today is the disintegration of the NATO position all the way through the Northern Mediterranean from Portugal to Turkey because if this goes any farther it may confront them with a problem of policy towards us they don't even want to face. You see the jam we have got ourselves in with the Turks. You have Cyprus. Then you have the Greeks. Then you have Italy in this situation. Then you have Portugal at the other end on the slippery skids. And finally, between them Spain, which seems to me very, very close to great changes and chaotic difficulties. This may force them to take decisions they don't even want to take.

BARGHOORN: Moses, I didn't finish my statement. I don't read the Soviet press probably as frequently as you do, partly because I'm spending most of my time reading Samizdat. To the extent that I do read it I don't get the impression that they're that happy. They are talking quite frequently about sinister forces such as Senator Jackson who are interfering with their plans in the United States. I don't get the impression that they're in a state of euphoria....

DURBROW: They see a capitalist crisis.

BARGHOORN: Well, I know but that's a pretty general thing....
SHAPIRO: Here's a question, not a statement. I wonder whether anybody can answer whether the Soviet Union, the Soviet press has been crowing about the disarray of the economic situation in the world, whether there has been more on that question in the Soviet press than in the Western press.

HARVEY: We have made no effort at a comparative study of this. But there has been massive Soviet attention to the US and Western economic situation in the press, more I would say than of any other aspect of the international situation over the past two years. But more impressive than what you would call press treatment is analyses by specialists as well as high responsible officials in theoretical and professional journals and a variety of special symposia of research institutes. And, I would repeat, the Soviet analyses and prognoses are gloomy indeed from the US standpoint and gleeful from the Soviet. The standard line is that something has happened to the US economy and the very foundations of capitalism that is more profound, "qualitatively different" is their usual phrase, than anything that has happened before. There are no predictions that capitalism is about to collapse and a widespread communist takeover is about to begin. But there is evident full confidence that the US will never again be what it was before; that we have in fact started downhill from the pinnacle we once occupied, that we are going to continue on down over the years ahead; that while there will probably be periods of partial recovery both for us and other capitalist states, the die insofar as the ultimate decisive shift in the correlation of world forces in favor of the USSR is more or less finally cast.

SHAPIRO: They couldn't entirely ignore it.

DURBROW: They're cheering, Henry. They're cheering.
SHAPIRO: They have not been cheering. I think they've been rather restrained from my reading of the Soviet press, by Soviet standards.

KÖHLER: There's a new angle that has struck me, that intrigues me. I've recently been reading a number of official pronouncements defending their attempts to have more trade between the Soviet Union and Western Europe and the United States because it helps the workers. About two weeks ago, they called an emergency meeting of the Executive Committee of the WFTU in Prague. Very little has been published about that but they have described it as a meeting to consider what actions they should take in connection with the economic crisis in the West.

KENNAN: To help the Western workers?

KÖHLER: Along with other efforts to capitalize on economic problems ...
A LOOK BACK AT THE BEGINNING

1. How it was in 1917-18

HARVEY: I would like at this point, that is at the opening of our second day of discussion, to effect a temporary change in pace and in focus. When we began yesterday, I indicated that at some stage of our colloquy, we should take advantage of the experiences that a number of you had in Russia or in connection with Russian affairs during the early days of the Revolution and the emergence of the Soviet Union as a new and different nation, with particular reference to the impact on US perceptions and policies. I had in mind a period of relaxed reminiscing, with, however, the serious object of putting in a different perspective the developments and problems we explored yesterday and also to lay foundations for our further explorations of today which we expect to be directed primarily toward the Soviet Union of the future.

I'd like to begin by asking Earl Packer to take some time and tell us about how it was in the Soviet Union in 1917-1919: how you felt, what life was like, what the people were like, the political climate, and so on. Then I would like to ask Bob Kelley to tell us how we went about trying to develop a capability to understand and deal with a USSR that was increasingly clearly here to stay. Finally, I would like to have George Kennan give us the benefit of his experience as the first American Foreign Service officer who went through Bob Kelley's training operation and as the man on the ground during the period of renewed US-Russian relations in the early thirties.

Earl, we are delighted that you have agreed to reminisce with us.

PACKER: Well, this is going to be very sketchy and unorganized. I'll start off by saying that I was on duty in the War Department as a clerk when Miles Shand, whom some of you may remember, came into the Bureau of Insular
Affairs where I was working and asked the chief whether he had a couple of male clerks who would like to go over to Petrograd. So a friend of mine in the Bureau raised our hands and three weeks later we were on our way to Petrograd by way of London on the last trip of the old St. Louis with the sides painted with the American flag and lights showing there so German submarines wouldn't knock it off. We travelled first to Liverpool and then to London and then to Newcastle and on to Bergen. Then by rail from there to Oslo, to Stockholm around the Gulf of Bosnia to Finland, to Petrograd where we arrived on the 29th of January, 1917.

We had both been informed that we would work in the second division of the Embassy which had charge of German and Austrian interests at the time, but by the time we arrived there had been some reorganization at the Embassy and we were not so assigned. And I was assigned to Norman Armour who was Third Secretary as his assistant. Shortly, after that, in the middle of March, the Czar was forced to abdicate and the primary inspiration of the disturbances in Petrograd was the lack of food. There were parades and strikes and all the rest of it which was very hard for the government to take when it was at war. We, of course, were not yet at war. The Czar abdicated on March 13 and on April 6 we came into the War and that changed things very quickly. The protection of German and Austrian interests were turned over to the Swedes and the Norwegians. A lot of us had been living in the Austrian Embassy which was about three or four blocks from our own Embassy. We had to give up our quarters and find a place to live. Al Klieforth and Sam Wardell and I took an apartment a few buildings away from our Embassy from three sisters, one of whom later married Al Klieforth. Food conditions were hard. It was rather difficult for us to get food. We didn't suffer. We had lots of rabchiki and cranberries. No commissaries. Your servants went out on the market and got what they could.
We had a Military Attache there who was Francis Riggs who was assassinated in Puerto Rico about 10-15 years later. Through the Voennoye Vedomstvo we were able to get flour and sugar. But that was the extent of their contribution.

Shortly after that we were in the War, that is in May, 1917 the famous Root Mission came over the Russia by way of the Trans-Siberian. They went around and tried to do what they could. In the meantime, the L'vov government had taken charge. The Czar had abdicated and they were trying to work out some assistance for Russia to carry on the War with Germany. I can't say that the Root Mission accomplished a great deal. It tried but there was difficulty in regard to working with the new government which was not well organized.

There came with the Root Mission a Colonel of Engineers whose name was Judson. When the Root Mission departed for the States also by way of the Trans-Siberian, Judson was left behind as a Military Attache and Riggs became assistant. Judson was made a Brigadier General and began to organize some sort of staff. I was asked if I would join the staff and take a commission in the Army which I generously acceded to! So I became an assistant to the Military Attache. Some discord between the General and Ambassador Francis occurred over what the policy should be toward the Bol'shevik government which had come in in November with the result that Francis asked for Judson's recall.

Judson was interested on the Military side in having the US help Russia stay in the War. Francis' interest was in non-recognition of the Soviet government which he correctly analyzed as a disruptive element in the general international situation. Some people on the Embassy staff thought Francis was not too wise as an Ambassador. I was inclined to go along with some of this disruptive thought, inexperienced in international affairs as I was. I was 23 years old. The upshot of the General's transfer was that another officer was sent over to become Military Attache; he was almost completely unqualified for the job and I found out years later the War Department had made a mistake and
sent the telegram to the wrong officer, sent it to one who had the same last name and the same first name, but a different middle initial.

**HARVEY:** I've read some of Francis' writings and I tend to agree with that skepticism as to his ability. What was the more general view among our people about the changes in government?

**PACKER:** The feeling was one of great elation in general on the part of the staff of our Embassy when the Czar was forced to abdicate and the new liberal government came in. It was hoped that things would work out, that Russia would go out of the War as George Kennan so well describes in his book *Russia Leaves the War.*

**HARVEY:** Was there any appreciation of what the Bol'sheviks were about?

**PACKER:** Not at that time. So far as I know there was no idea at all that the Bol'sheviks would be able to succeed. Of course, the Kornilov affair occurred in September, '17 when he tried to march into Petrograd and take power. At that time Kerensky turned over a lot of arms to the workers of Petrograd to defend Petrograd against Kornilov's right monarchist movement. Later, that proved to be a great help to the Bol'sheviks when they staged their *coup d'état.* This was done by Lenin's decision who was in exile in Finland. Kamenev and Zinovyev shortly before the date set for the revolt, revealed the plans of the revolt. But so far as I know the Embassy didn't take it seriously. I don't know whether the Ambassador reported this.

**KENNAN:** The Bol'sheviks were a tiny faction; and we weren't very well informed—at least Francis was not—about the Left Wing. He confused them with the Maximalists. He thought "Bol'shevik" was a translation of "Maximalist."

**PACKER:** Francis was completely inexperienced in foreign affairs but the British had a career man there and so did the French and it didn't make any difference as concerned the outcome of the War, the Russian Revolution, anything. So I think Francis' inexperience didn't prove to be a handicap at all. Francis
lived in the Embassy in inadequate quarters. The Embassy staff became small. North Winship was Consul. Frank Lee was Vice-Consul. Roger Tredwell succeeded Winship. After the Bolshevnik seizure of power, Americans were encouraged to depart; the Petrograd branch of the National City Bank was closed. The Moscow branch still stayed open. Now I'll come to the evacuation of Petrograd by the Embassy.

SCOTT: Could I ask a question first? Did the Embassy at that time have an officer assigned to follow the Left as our Embassies now pretty well always do have.

PACKER: No. I think the left movement there was disregarded. They simply didn't appreciate the situation. Most Russians didn't appreciate it. I don't think even the Kerensky government appreciated the seriousness of the situation.

SHAPIRO: Did Sam Harper play any role?

PACKER: Sam was in and out. I met him first in Petrograd. He went back after the Embassy was evacuated some years later. He went back and forth to Moscow.

HENDERSON: Would you say that the Americans in Russia were generally happy at the overthrow of the Czar?

PACKER: Yes, in general that was true. They thought a new liberal movement would come in that reflected in a measure Washington's attitude because Washington welcomed the change. They didn't have to get into the War on the side of an imperial power against another imperial power. Kerensky was evacuated from Petrograd in an automobile belonging to Captain Riggs, the Assistant Military Attaché and a Russian baron and taken out to Gotchina. His life was saved by that. Later, I had a photograph of the machine in which he escaped and I showed it to him in the States, here. I didn't know him in Petrograd at all. And he denied that he escaped in this American automobile, with an American flag flying
on the car. He put up a different story as to how he escaped. He didn't like it very well and didn't want a picture of the car which I had offered him.

The Germans were coming in toward Petrograd in January and February 1918. The allied representatives didn't want to get caught there by the Germans and consequently the allied representatives left Petrograd. Some went with our group to Vologda. The British went into Finland and some of them were caught there in the Finnish-Russian War and had a very hard time getting out and later joining us in Vologda. We stayed in Vologda from the end of February, until the end of July when Ambassador Francis and the Military Attache left with all the staff of the two officers for Archangel on the same train on which we had evacuated Petrograd. It had been held all the time on the tracks in Vologda as living quarters because living quarters were very hard to come by in an already crowded provincial capital. Captain Prince and I had been able to get a room in a private home there. The Ambassador started a mess in the Embassy and we all ate there with bought food on the local market which was better supplied with food than Petrograd had been. The Ambassador arrived in Archangel with the French and British on the same train. They got on a boat and went out onto the White Sea. The allied troops came in occupied Archangel. The boat came back and the Embassy was set up in Archangel in September, 1918.

KENNAN: I think the reason why the allied embassies and our own were so pleased at the first February Revolution and the fall of the Czar was that our contacts had been very extensively with the Kadet party, the upper middle class, educated group in Russia; these people had conceived an idee fixe, that the reason Russia wasn't doing well in the war was that the Czarist government was pro-German, that the Empress was a German stooge and so forth. There wasn't a word of truth in this.

They thought that when the old Czarist regime was overthrown suddenly there
would be a great access of patriotism and determination. Of course, it was exactly the opposite.

And the reason they didn't know anything about the Left-Wing was that these people were at the time very obscure. Lenin wasn't even in the country at the time of the time of the first Revolution and the fall of the Czar and when he returned he was regarded as an obscure rabble rouser. There was no example of the overthrow of a great empire and the seizure of power by radicals like this.

Our staff was very small. They were not set up to do that type of reporting. Francis had been X times Mayor of St. Louis, Governor of Missouri. He was a grain dealer there and he was such a colorful character. He was called Davy Francis. In one of the O'Henry stories there's a story about a cowboy who had struck it rich and came to St. Louis with a pal to blow his money and the first thing they did was to go into a St. Louis restaurant and say to the head waiter, "I want you to give us such a meal as Davy Francis and the general passenger agent of the Iron Mountain would eat if they came here."

This is the sort of fellow that Francis was. He was a gourmet, he loved the flesh pots, he was very proud of his appearance. He was then 68 years old and very pleased with his prowess in a number of lines.

Norman Armour told me this about Francis. Francis during these days when things were declining at the time of the Bol'shevik takeover used to go out and take a walk in the evenings. And this worried his staff because they were afraid something would happen to him. There was shooting going on around the streets. He was fine looking with his grey whiskers, and he was beautifully dressed. Norman told me that they thought they ought to try to warn him but were afraid to do it. Francis had come there with his colored butler, Phillip Jordan, who lived with him and cook for him. When Francis gave his diplomatic dinners Phillip Jordan had a phonograph behind the screen at the entrance to the
dining room and everytime he went in or out he cranked it up and played the record again. Phillip was a character. He maintained that he never had any difficulty learning Russian—that he knew it from the beginning. Anyway, Norman went to Phillip and explained this dilemma: that they thought they ought to stop the old boy from going out and walking around. Phillip said he would tell him; and Norman hid behind the screen to listen to how Phillip Jordan would put it to him. And what Phillip said was, "Boss, you gotta stop goin out and walking around the streets the way you do here at night. One of these days a couple of them Bol'sheviks is goin to see you comin along with those white whiskers and that fur cap and fur coat and one of them is goin to turn to the other and say to him: 'Boy, look what the good Lord done sent to us.'" This was Francis.

PACKER: Francis was a great lover of smutty stories and used to tell them at our mess in Vologda which was an all male mess. We enjoyed them. There was one disadvantage. He was fond of repeating the stories so you had to listen to them a number of times.

DURBROW: Where was Imbrie this whole time?

PACKER: Imbrie was in Petrograd. Imbrie pulled off a very neat stunt. He had evacuated with the rest of us to Vologda with Tredwell and Lee. But Imbrie went back to Petrograd, where our consular quarters were in the Singer Building on the Nevkii Prospekt. The Norwegians had charge of American interests in Petrograd. Imbrie telegraphed Francis for authority to raise the American flag over the building. And Francis replied "no precedent." Imbrie replied "precedent established."

HARVEY: Going back over it, the thing that strikes one most about the Kadets, especially Miliukov who was the prime influence among them, and Kerensky, is their stupidity. It was absolutely unbelievable that people
could just sit and witness what they were witnessing and not understand it.

PACKER: Nobody in the Embassy anticipated that the Bol'shevik government would last. It was expected that it would be overthrown. They only had in the beginning Petrograd. Then they had Moscow. They moved the capital, because of the German move on Petrograd, to Moscow and invited all the allied missions to come down which of course they didn't want to do. They went to Archangel where they had communication either via the Far East or via Archangel in case the Soviets would supply the ...

HARVEY: It wasn't so much stupidity in the sense of underestimating the opponent as what those who stood to lose so much from the Bol'sheviks did and did not do, mostly the latter. Again looking back over that whole period, it wasn't the genius of Lenin as a revolutionary, as great as that was, or the skill of the Bol'sheviks. I think it was the stupidity of everybody else concerned with developments.

PACKER: The Russian groups couldn't get together. In the summer of 1918 the Bol'sheviks ordered all Russian officers in Moscow to turn in their arms and they went down and turned in their arms to Soviet emissaries shutting off any possibility of their participating in an armed effort to oust the Bol'sheviks. The whole White movement was disorganized.

HARVEY: The next point that I am sure we all agree should be emphasized is the long continuation of a conviction in the US which was fairly generally shared, that the Bol'shevik regime could not and would not last. The conviction continued even after the Civil War was won by the communists, and a large degree of stabilization achieved following the inauguration of the New Economic Policy in 1921. There is surely a lesson to be learned here, as it reflected the be-
ginning of so many misjudgments born of wishful thinking that have marked our interpretation of the situation and developments in the Soviet Union.

Some, however, began early to see the matter differently. They allowed that not only might the Soviet Union endure, but that it might become increasingly important to the US. Bob Kelley, you were one of the foremost among these. You sparked the beginning of a serious effort in the US Government, I might even say in the nation, to study and to understand the Soviets and to prepare for relations with the USSR. Will you talk to us for a moment about what you did and why?

2. Pioneer US Training of Soviet Specialists

KELLEY: As a result of my experience, I was for three years Military Attache in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Finland, I was convinced of the need of a group of officers in the Department of State who understood and spoke Russian. I had the feeling that to learn the language is not sufficient. Because language was an expression of the people of the country. So if you really wanted to know the language you had to know about the country. And that meant knowing thoroughly the history of Russia, including the background of the Bolsheviks.

When I became Chief of the Eastern European Division at the Department of State in '23, I took the matter up with the Department of State and to my great pleasure, they approved the idea, not only approved the idea but they allocated funds to permit me to pick out every year two officers to study Russian not for a few months as they do it now, for four years which I thought was very good. And that continued of course until the great disaster approached in the Depression when the first thing they cut off of course was the funds for training language officers.

I picked out two and the first two, one of them became one of the most brilliant officers, George Kennan here and we sent him to Berlin. It turned
out that he was the only officer we ever sent to Berlin for study. We sent the others to Paris.

I was fortunate in Paris; the head of the Langue Orientale Vivante, Boyer sympathized with us and promised assistance and went out of his way to help our officers accomplish what I had in mind. From that time on we sent everybody for two years to Paris. I must say that I had the responsibility for picking them out and I think I did a fairly good job. I can remember only one bad egg. You know who he was. The others I think did a fine job. The last one to pass away was Chip Bohlen.

I think the program turned out very successfully and not only was successful but was absolutely indispensible to the development of our relations with the Soviet Union in those early years, of the knowledge and study of what was going on. Some of these officers spoke as well as any Russian. It enabled them to get a thorough knowledge and understanding of what was going on in the Soviet Union, which was absolutely needed in those days.

HARVEY: Who was basically responsible for helping you?

KELLEY: The Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, and another man who was very sympathetic was Stimson. He later became Secretary of State. He was Secretary of War at that time.

HENDERSON: From my point of view, Stimson was not really interested in the Soviet Union. In his autobiography he rarely mentions Soviet-United States relations.

PACKER: But when he was making a trip to Europe we worked very hard in the division preparing memoranda for him to look at on the boat but I don't know if he ever looked at them.

HENDERSON: One of the few times that he referred to the Soviet Union was when he replied to a communication from Senator Borah urging United States
recognition. In his reply he took the position that if we should recognize the
Soviet Union in spite of its bad reputation respecting international obligations,
we would lose our moral standing in our controversy with Japan.

KELLEY: What he did do, he supported very strongly this idea. And that was
very important. You can imagine how far something like this would get in
Congress today.

I felt that to know a language wasn't sufficient, to go out and learn the
rudiments of how they talked, but they must know the whole history of the
country, the people and everything.

PACKER: There is the additional aspect to this that when the schools closed
down in the summers the officers went to the Baltic States for the summer where
they could live with a Russian family because there were a lot of Russian emigres
from the Hinterland in the Baltic States, and on other occasions they came to
the Department and worked in the Eastern European Division.

KELLEY: Wallace Murray started the same time as I did. He was Chief of
the Near East Division. If you people go to study Russian I'm going to put up a
good case that we train people to know Arabic and Turkish. So he did. He
started it. He came to me some years later and asked me how I was getting on.
Then he said they were having a disaster. The officers who have spent four years
at the school in Paris where they studied Arabic can't talk to the Egyptians
in the current language because the training there was thoroughly language
training.

KOHLER: Classical Arabic, wasn't it?

KELLEY: They wouldn't change. They wouldn't make any concession. So he
abandoned it and started sending people to Cairo. To Beirut.

HARVEY: In remarking about the intelligence of Hughes and Stimson, I
should add that there was a hell of a lot of intelligence and foresight on your
part to realize from where you sat at that time the importance of doing what you did. The thing that still amazes me is the judgment for four years and the success you had in selling such a program to others. As I recall, the most one could get at the best of American universities in the way of language courses, and not to speak of basic training in Russian culture, at the time were some very elementary courses by Sam Cross at Harvard, Sam Harper at Chicago, and a few highly intelligent emigres but ill-trained for teaching scattered at a few institutions.

Now I would like to ask George Kennan, the first of your choices for the special training program, to reminisce with us about how it worked from his standpoint: the high points and the problems and disappointments, if any.

KENNAN: Just one or two glosses on what Bob has said. Actually the system that was set up then, was that we were sent first for a year and a half to the area for which we were going to study. And then we were sent to the universities for three years study. The idea of sending us to the area first was to make sure that we could cope with the local liquor and the local girls. There was no use in preparing a man for three years and finding out when he got there he took to vodka or something worse. So I was sent to the Baltic States and went first to Tallin where there were two Americans in the office and nine Americans in the country. The two Americans were the Consul and myself. I swept the office out every morning. I was there for six months alone. Then I went to Riga, and served another six months or so there.

Then I went down to Berlin. When I got to Berlin and went to the university and to the Oriental Seminary, I set about to find out what I should do with myself. I discovered that they had what were at that time the only courses in the world (and they were excellent ones) on contemporary Soviet subjects, Soviet finance, Soviet economics, things of this sort. And I wrote to Bob and
said that since these were unique facilities and I'm to be prepared for service in the Soviet Union, would you not like me to take these courses?

He very wisely wrote back--and I've been grateful to him all my life for this, because I thought it was one of the best turns ever done me--and said, "No, I don't want you to take those courses. I want you to get the equivalent grounding in Russian history and literature and language as a Russian who had finished one of the Czarist universities before the Revolution would have had. And all this about the Soviet Union can come later."

This was the best advice ever given to me, and it shows with what enlightenment and wisdom this language training was run at that time by Bob Kelley.

I stayed in Berlin for two years. I took the diploma of the oriental languages which gave you a right to be an interpreter before the German courts. I spent another year doing graduate work at the University of Berlin. Then I got permission to terminate the study at that time and went back to Riga and served two years there doing economic reporting. As it happened, I was on home leave--I had to borrow the money; nobody paid your home leave in those days--in Washington and I met Joe Green who had been my professor at Princeton and was then running the Foreign Service Examination Services. I asked Joe, or he asked me in the corridor, whether I had ever met Bullitt, who was going as the first Ambassador to Russia. I said no. He said I ought to meet him. So he took me right into his office, and Bullitt discovered that I knew Russian and that I could answer some question on the Soviet transportation systems to which he wasn't able to find answers. This pleased him very much. He was going out to present credentials and he took me along as an interpreter and secretary.

I was of course immensely excited. In the old wagon lit sleeping cars, I was so excited I couldn't sleep all night. I sat up scratching the frost off the window and trying to look through and I remember having a moment of horrible
hesitation because I thought just suppose all this Russian that I had learned out there shouldn't be relevant at all, that it should be like the Arabic and I should discover that what they speak here is something quite different? But it wasn't that way.

**KELLEY:** Can you tell us more about your experiences in setting up the preliminary US mission in Moscow?

**KENNAN:** Well, Bullitt was on the crest. Bullitt was a brilliant, charming, highly egotistical and impatient man. He had great qualities and great weaknesses. But we were never ashamed of him as an Ambassador. He held up his end. He could sit down and spend an evening with Radek and Bukharin and such brilliant intellectuals in the Soviet government and hold his own with them, talk French or German with them. Bullitt was at the high point of his life when we went in there. I can remember it because it was a sad time for me. Just two nights after we got in I got word my father died and I didn't want to say anything to the others because we were a tiny little delegation. But we went over there and presented credentials in the Kremlin. We lived in the National Hotel. That night there was a dinner given by the Politburo for Bullitt and it went on till about five in the morning. They tried to drink Bullitt under the table but they couldn't do it. I must say he could hold his liquor. And he came back and sat on the edge of my bed and talked about this experience. He was just so full of it.

He had great high hopes for what he could do for Soviet-American relations. Of course, they promised him the world at his dinner with the vodka going back and forth. We were going to get a place on the Lenin Hills to build our embassy. We were going to have currency arrangements made so that we wouldn't have to use the black market. (The ruble sold at that time for about 80¢ officially and you could get fifty or a hundred of them to the dollar unofficially; so this presented a great problem for the Embassy.)
None of this worked out. Bullitt went home. He left me there. My wife came in, and I found Charlie Thayer over there and employed him as a messenger at forty dollars a month, and got a Harley Davidson motorcycle and put him on it, and for about two months before they came back with the Embassy, we were alone there. The whole Embassy consisted of myself, Charlie, and one male stenographer who was a hell of a good stenographer when he was sober. What impressed me about all this is that I thought we got more done when we were only only three people than we did after the Embassy came in.

SHAPIRO: There was a report at the time that you were in Riga you went to live in the Russian Orthodox Monastery for a few weeks. Is that true?

KENNAN: No. When I was in Tallin I did go down once at Christmas time to the Pskovo-Pechorsky Monastery which was then just inside the Soviet border, the Estonian border. It's now of course within the Soviet Union.

SHAPIRO: How long were you there?

KENNAN: I was just there a few days because all they had to eat was a barrel of Selyodka and black bread. I must say my own endurance for this was limited. They were as poor as church mice.

SHAPIRO: There was a legend at the time that you spent many months there.

KENNAN: No. I didn't. I only went there for a short time. We could travel out to that Russian district of Estonia which was completely Russian, the Izbort area around Pskov which had been included in Estonia. There the whole peasantry was Russian. The textbooks were the old Czarist children's textbooks. And it was on these that I was brought up to learn Russian because they had all the little poems in them, it wasn't a bad way to start.

PACKER: When did the Soviet Union change those borders to include that area within the Russian Republic?
KENNAN: In 1940.

WHITNEY: I think they changed the border there to exclude that area from the Estonian Republic and include it probably in Novgorod Oblast or something like that.

KENNAN: We had the advantage that this was entirely still a Czarist peasant country. It was unchanged from what it had been from 1910—very remote, very backward. The people didn’t have shoes. It was real remote Russian village life; and we could go down there and come into contact with it.

3. The Making of the Russian Revolution and Its Implications

HARVEY: Something that intrigues me in connection with our earlier discussion is that all through history it has been that revolutions are practically never started by revolutionaries but by people in power. It’s a matter that people in power come to do stupid things or aren’t willing to continue in courses that are necessary to hold power. Certainly the Russian Revolution was a product of the aristocracy, of the rulers of the country. What leads people to do those things? Why don’t people understand what’s happening?

KENNAN: I’ll speak as an historian for a moment. I see three reasons for the disasters of 1917, the two revolutions and the way it all ended up with the Bol’shevik seizure of power.

One of them was the stupidities of the last imperial couple, the Czar and his wife. They really wrecked the Czarist government over a period of about eight years. Seldom do the failings of a monarch have so much to do with disaster as did those of Nicholas I and his endlessly unfortunate wife. They finally alienated everyone around them.

Secondly there was the nationality problem. You did have this restlessness among the nationalities just as you do today. They were ready to take advantage of any moment of weakness in this government to break off if they could.
But thirdly (and I think most important of all) there was the War, and the folly of Kerensky's effort to continue the War. This was a folly in which we encouraged him and the French not only encouraged him. And the French howled at him. They were furious at any suggestion that Russia should leave the War. And they put the greatest heat on him in the name of the Franco-Russian alliance.

This effort to continue the war played right into the hands of the Bol'sheviki; because it was a peasant army. The Bol'sheviki were able to adopt the slogan that encouraged the peasants to leave the army, to go home. This meant that to try to keep them in the army, to try to drive them into further conflicts with the Germans, meant that it put a great strain on morale. At the same time you had this unfortunate division of power between the provisional government and the Soviet with the Soviet having in certain respects the real power. The Soviet passed this really terrible resolution No. 1 which undermined the whole morale of the armed services and made it impossible to punish undisciplined men. (This was the Petrograd Soviet.) And the result is that you had a demoralized army in which no disciplinary action was possible and yet, here was Kerensky, trying to drive them into further offensives against the Germans. The result was the complete disintegration of the army. And since they already had destroyed the old Czarist police system there was suddenly nothing to prevent a small faction like the Bol'sheviki from seizing the capital city.

Another great mistake the Czarist government made was that they had put a great many of the convalescent soldiers in the Petrograd area and everything was set up for this sort of a seizure of power. I think the stupidities of the regime were only part of it.

KOHLER: I think the Bol'sheviks learned this lesson. Many of the things they do in the way of ideological programs in the army, the political admin-
istration, the use of recruits of a given nationality, their training and so forth, that these lessons were learned and remain part of the modus operandi today.

PACKER: What George said reminds me of things I saw in the streets of Petrograd. The number of wounded soldiers in the streets was just incredible.

KENNAN: As I recall there were something like thirty thousand convalescent troops in the Petersburg area and almost nothing else.

HENDERSON: It seems to me that Kerensky was stupid in that he seemed to feel that in the middle of war he would start a democratic form of government... with persuasion instead of having discipline. He had no conception about what he was dealing with. I knew Kerensky much later very well during the Second World War when he used to come to see me. He had the idea that after the Second World War the Soviet government might be overthrown. There might be preparation for a new government which he might have something to do with. He talked with some of the leaders of the Ukrainian movement and the Baltic State movement and they had great arguments about what kind of government that might be. The great disagreement was that he said you'll all be a part of the new government and you'll be given liberty, the plebiscite. They carried on all these foolish arguments which had no sense.

HARVEY: With respect to this question of a wrong kind of government at the wrong place and the wrong time, which had so much to do with the failure of the first and second provisional governments that preceded the Bol'sheviks in Russia, and our own enthusiasm for this government, would somebody like to comment on this more or less standard attitude of ours that we have that the whole world has to be in our image, a democracy, or it's not good for us.

HENDERSON: I think that attitude is based on naivete or ignorance. The feeling that every country should have a government like ours has caused many
Americans to be unjust in their criticisms of countries, which for various reasons could not afford to have our type of government. Just before the Second World War, for instance, no country bordering the Soviet Union could possibly have had a democratic government and survived. The powerful Soviet Government with its massive facilities for sabotage, with its control of the radio, and its comparatively unlimited funds, would have quickly brought about the overthrow of its small neighbors if the latter had had the kind of a government which would have given the Soviets the possibility of buying up the local media and intimidating those opposed to communism with threats of what would happen to them when the Soviets had taken over. Segments of the American press condemned these countries along with the communists for having fascist governments.

HARVEY: Durby, I'd like your comment on that since you have served in several countries where we as a nation have set such a high store on conformity to our democratic ideals. Take the case of Diem in South Vietnam where you were American Ambassador. Opinion in this country took him apart and certainly contributed heavily to the movements that led to his assassination. Such American opinion may have been well deserved by our standards. But how about Vietnamese standards and more particularly the circumstances in which South Vietnam was operating? Is this a good way to run a foreign policy?

DURBROW: No, it is not an effective way to run foreign policy. When you think about it and add up the countries in the world which have survived under systems which we consider to be really democratic, there are very few still in power since November 1917 when the Bol'sheviks took over power in Czarist Russia. By democracy I mean that by fairly secret, multiple choice, broad participation elections, a change of the ruling leaders has taken place and this change has been accepted by those opposed to the new ruling leaders or
parties. In other words, in how many countries in the world has the leading faction not been brought into power by coup d'etats as in Latin America and elsewhere, by violence coupled with trickery as by Hitler and Mussolini, or by other non-free will selection of the mass of the population?

If you add them all up there aren't many in the whole world. So democracy as we think of it, is a very beautiful and worthwhile system of so-called self-government—the consent of the masses, etc., but it hasn't worked too well during most of the twentieth century, unless there was a long tradition of accepting changes by majority rule. In my book there are only 14 or 15 truly democratic countries who have weathered the storm since 1917.

To bring up a sad example, with which I am quite familiar—the rule of that alleged tyrant, ruthless dictator, Ngo Dinh Diem, with whom I worked with for over four years. He was not in any sense a Jeffersonian democrat, but he was not a ruthless dictator as Halberstam and most of the American media insisted for years. Because of this unfavorable media built image, we encouraged a coup against him in 1963 in which he was unfortunately assassinated. The same allegations have been pointedly made against Nguyen Van Thieu by most of our "democratic" press. The allegations against Thieu are even more unfair because he is under a much more serious military threat from the real and effective totalitarian dictatorship in Hanoi supported by the even more effective totalitarian dictatorships in Moscow and Peking.

Given this sad situation, our very active wide ranging Secretary of State Kissinger presented the South Vietnamese people a cease fire agreement allegedly to bring "peace with honor" in the January, 1973 Paris accords. There was one big flaw which was not even mentioned in the Accords—they made no provision that the 100,000 odd North Vietnamese regulars already deployed over a good
part of South Vietnam should return to the North in a reasonable time. By implication they could stay in the South forever. We all know the disastrous results this brought on.

It's very unfortunate that we have usually insisted that in a country where a coup has taken place, the new government must promise to have "free democratic" elections within a reasonable time before we can grant official recognition. This of course didn't stop us from recognizing the USSR, all its European satellites and practically recognizing Red China. No, a democratic government with its self image standards such as ours is at a distinct disadvantage in trying to carry out an effective foreign policy.

SCOTT: Could I say in that connection this thing isn't entirely black and white although the New York Times may make it seem that way. But to go back to Diem, for example. He was a very ardent Catholic and in a country the majority of whose population was Buddhist. The discriminatory policies that he carried out in the army, in the civil service and so on in favor of the Catholics was almost calculated to arouse serious trouble with the Buddhists. This is not insisting on less dogmatic and less discriminatory positions taken at that time by the Chief of State.

DURBROW: It's misunderstood by all the press and by academia that Vietnam is a Buddhist country. It is not a Buddhist country. Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Ceylon are Buddhist countries. The number of Buddhists is about ten or twelve percent in Vietnam. You've got the montagnards, you've got the Chinese, you've got the Taoists and the rest of them but it's not a Buddhist country. They are about 10% Catholic, 12% Buddhist and that's all. The Buddhists were very well organized. You know, they have these self-immolations there. They'd know about it ahead of time and would get the press and say come on down, boys. A gal's going to burn herself to death. There were seven of those in the time
that Diem was overthrown. You got the impression that every day these Buddhist were just rising up against this terrible dictator, Diem. The self-immolation started again against Thieu. But Vietnam is not a Buddhist country. It’s a hodge-podge of religions. Statistics are very elastic in that part of the world you know but they have their own religion which is a mixture of Confucianism, Taoists and a few Buddhist tenets. They have very few temples and much that’s done in your home. Most of the people are of that local religion.

**BEAM:** I think the reactionary countries due to history and the composition of their peoples tend to have these nationality problems, minority problems...

**SHAPIRO:** If I may return to the Russian Revolution, I would like to raise a metaphysical question. In addition to the objective circumstances, wasn’t an important factor Kerensky’s own weakness of character? If he had arrested six Bol’shevik leaders, Lenin, Trotsky, a few others, there probably would have been no Bol’shevik seizure of power. Didn’t the Germans, Social Democrats go through the same experience? At the time Hitler became Chancellor the Minister of Police I think was a Social Democrat. He believed in the Weimar Constitution. If he had arrested two or three Nazi leaders, it would be correct to believe that Hitler would not have taken power. But history is not simply a matter of objective factors.

**KENNAN:** I think this is quite true although the situations in these two countries were different. I don’t know what would have happened in Germany, whether, that is they could have stopped the Right wing. But you certainly could have stopped the Bol’sheviki if you had really cracked down on them in the middle of 1917.

**PACKER:** This comes back to Kerensky. It was against his principles.

**KELLEY:** It’s true of course that many of the Russians, particularly the
emigres, consider Kerensky responsible for the Bol'shevik revolution. Once when we were trying to get together the emigre groups abroad it broke down on that very subject, that I wanted Kerensky to participate. Nearly all the Russian emigre groups said No. We will not participate with Kerensky.

HENDERSON: He was responsible. He helped to break down the apparatus of the Czar's regime and didn't have ready a new apparatus that could keep law and order. The Bol'sheviks, however, were well prepared.

PACKER: There was gradual deterioration there. Kerensky wasn't Prime Minister until July or August. Prince L'vov was the Prime Minister, the head of the government, Rodzianko, Chairman of the Duma. They were gradually replaced and Kerensky who was Minister of Justice, then Minister of War, became Prime Minister.

SHAPIRO: After the Bol'shevik uprising of July, Kerensky took full charge. He ordered the arrest of Lenin. Lenin went into hiding.

PACKER: He went hiding in Finland.

SHAPIRO: Why did he stop with Lenin? Why not go after Stalin and Trotsky and Zinovyev?

PACKER: Stalin wasn't important.

KENNAN: He did arrest Trotsky but he didn't keep him.

PACKER: He arrested Trotsky for a while but Stalin was not considered important at that time. He at that time I think was running a newspaper. He had been in exile in Siberia and had gotten free. As a matter of fact, the Czarist regime was pretty negligent as far as keeping people in exile. They slipped out...

BARGHOORN: I think it's also important to remember that the Bol'sheviks were themselves divided. Stalin and Zinovyev and Kamenev took a very irresolute line. Only Lenin and Trotsky as far as I can remember...
PACKER: I don't think Trotsky participated in the decision to hold the coup d'etat when they did. It was Lenin's decision.

BARGHOORN: The point I'm trying to make is that they didn't have the kind of case against Stalin and Zinovyev and Kamenev that they had against Lenin.

KENNAN: And you had this dvoyevlastiye, the two governments there. You had the Petrograd Soviet, in loose association with Soviets in some of the other cities. Since the old police apparatus had been abolished and the army was in the state of demoralization, you couldn't enforce any sort of firm measures without appealing to the Petrograd Soviet. They had power over the workers and the demoralized army.

SHAPIRO: And Trotsky was in charge of that.

KENNAN: I wasn't going to say who was in charge but it was a body in which the Bol'sheviks increasingly gained influence. Even before the Bol'sheviks achieved a majority in the Petrograd Soviet which they didn't achieve until about September or October after the Kornilov uprising, -- even before that, it was dominated by the Social Democrats, the Mensheviks and also the SR's. And these people all had revolutionary sympathies. You had this terrible situation which then ran through the whole Civil War and which made it so difficult for anybody on the outside to help them. The non-communist anti-Bol'shevik political spectrum was divided between the very conservative groups, the officers and others who had the technical knowhow of how to run a government and how to run a government and how to run an army on the one hand, and the Socialist parties on the other who had the manpower. They couldn't collaborate. They hated the Bol'sheviks. And the moment the allies came into the picture they immediately stopped fighting the communists and began fighting each other. The intervention had the opposite effect from what it was intended to have.

BARGHOORN: I'd like to add a point. I think you have an excellent account
about the downfall of the old regime. I think that one of the important factors was that during the War the Czar turned down all these offers of collaboration on the part of the moderate parties, Kadets and so on. In other words, the situation was almost fatally destroyed.

KENNAN: I also blame the Kadets. They never could make up their mind whether they were a revolutionary party or a non-revolutionary one. When they got the Parliament in 1906, instead of using it for constructive purposes they used it mostly as a forum with which to threaten and attack the Czar. They gradually forced the Czar into a more reactionary position.

HARVEY: We're leaving out something else. The initial revolt against the Tsar and Tsaritsa was from within the imperial family.

KENNAN: They behaved so terribly that they finally alienated even members of the family and remained absolutely isolated.

HARVEY: The point I am trying to get at and it may be important for us in our future as a nation is the Leninist principle, which I think was based on the experience of the French Revolution, that the one essential for successful revolution is the unwillingness of those who have power to continue to exercise power in an effective way, that they in one way or another in effect turn on themselves.

KENNAN: When you have a disintegrating authoritarian system such as you had in Russia, and when the disintegration goes to a certain point, you can't make the troops obey anymore. This was the situation at which they were rapidly arriving in 1917 although even this is so complicated that it almost defies historic inquiry, because at the beginning of 1917 the morale in the army was still good. People often forget that. It deteriorated over the summer. This also misled a great many allied observers. You find many reports of the Military Attaches who went to the front in early 1917 and said: "The army's fine. There's nothing wrong with it." They tried this offensive in
the summer and that is what absolutely destroyed it. The units were filled with these political Commissars from the left-wing parties at that time. Then they had this unfortunate order which prevented the officers from exercising any real disciplinary authority. Between these two things, it was very easy to disaffect this army.

PACKER: I think the Bol'sheviks have claimed much more credit for the disintegration of the army than they deserve.

KENNAN: I think so too.

PACKER: They're inclined to exaggerate very much their role and influence.

KENNAN: They weren't the only ones. The Social Revolutionaries were also working among these troops.
VIII

PROSPECTIVE CHANGES IN THE LEADERSHIP AND THE IMPLICATIONS

1. A Look Forward at Upcoming Successions

HARVEY: A lot of people who stood to lose by change were nevertheless willing to give up power. I'd like for us now to spend some time on Agenda item 5,* which moves us into the future and seems extraordinarily important at this particular time. This business of succession in Russia. The point made in the item seems to be that any new regime in Russia should have relatively easy sailing since the Soviet Union has progressed so far toward achieving security, well-being, etcetera. But there is the whole question of not having a constitutional system in Russia to take care of successions. We would all agree, I think, that in a relatively short time there will be a succession problem, that Brezhnev is ill and will in one way or another leave the scene. More important is the fact that not long thereafter there will be a far more far-reaching change: a shift of generations in the top leadership. The last of the "Stalinist" generation will be out. What about this question of whether there's any real prospect of significant change either in the short or longer term over transfers of power in the Soviet Union.

PACKER: My guess is that whatever we say here will be wrong.

HARVEY: That's a good guess. But if we regarded that, Pack, we'd never say anything.

BARGHOORN: The last time, everybody including myself said that there was

---

*The agenda item in question as presented to the group was as follows:
"British Sovietologist MacIntosh says that the transition to new leadership in the next two years will be smooth. It will rest on continuation of control, will need to promise greater benefits to elites, will need to promise continued strong support to military (as during the last 10 years) and will be able to depart from a point where "parity" with the US has been reached and the USSR has achieved the goal of becoming a dominant power in Europe. Would you argue these points? What would you expect the new leadership to do as a consequence?"
going to be great instability. Now they're saying there's going to be great stability.

HARVEY: What do you say now?

KENNAN: There is one thing that we could say. This is not a guess but a fact. This is a very old regime. The senior five men in the Politburo average about 71 years. For a political regime that is old. Indeed, the whole government is an old government. It does seem to me that they must be approaching the limit. And there's been an extraordinary degree of stability in this regime over the last eight or nine years. It's absolutely fantastic how little motion there has been within the Soviet government. Except for the elimination of Voronov, Shelest or one or two such changes there's hardly been a change of significance in the leading group in the Soviet Union. There has been very little mobility in this top crust. It must have led to considerable frustration. The average age of the Party is quite young at lower levels which means that there must be tension between this older group which hangs onto power, and ambitious people underneath them in the Party. A generation gap.

We don't know very much about the younger ones. I think the greatest mistake we could make would be to assume that they're going to be better from our standpoint than the ones they're going to relieve. I've talked to people who have come out of the Soviet Union recently and who know some of these younger people. What they tell me is that these people are less ideological, more pragmatic, very nationalistic, very patriotic, not necessarily pro-Western.

I was very much impressed with something Jim Billington said the other day. He said that among the older Bol'shevik leaders, together with all their defiance of our country and the difficulties they made for it, there was a sneaking idealization of the United States underneath the surface. This was a country they wanted to rival. They have been brought up on Jack London and Mark Twain, and they had a rather romantic picture of American society.
I can remember sitting with Madame Kolontai; and her telling me how much they liked the United States—how she and Bukharin had been over here in 1916, and what a wonderful country they thought it was. There is something of this that went through the older generation of the Bol’sheviks. I can remember in Siberia once during the War, an enthusiastic host said "Here we have some Americans. These are the only people worth having as an enemy." Underneath this there was a certain real admiration for the United States. They wanted our good opinion.

Jim pointed out that this may not at all be true of the younger generation. To them we may be no different from any other great power. I wouldn't even say capitalist power because I don't know whether they're interested whether you're capitalist anymore. They're Russian nationalists and we're another great power like Japan or China.

HARVEY: Another aspect of the matter but along the same lines, George, is that the party hierarchical system through which any new leaders will have had to pass before reaching the decision-making level will almost certainly insure that the new will be very much on the pattern of the old. Beyond this, the hierarchical system itself appears completely frozen to traditional positions and is likely to remain so in the absence of any cataclysmic development and its power will be sufficiently pervasive to check or get rid of new leaders who threaten to break substantially with the past. Here it might be noted that upcoming leaders like the present leaders will necessarily be the product of an apparatus which spans three generations and which has survived four major leadership changes without being changed in any fundamental way itself.
PACKER: The great thrust of the five year plans, to dogmat, peregmat', the US remains very basic.

SHAPIRO: May I point out that the present regime has not only been stable for eight years but has practically the same Politburo as Khrushchev designated in 1957. On the question of succession, is it really correct to say there is no law or rule or policy of succession? The rulers of the Soviet Union are in the Communist Party. There is a regular provision for succession.

KENNAN: Not for personal succession.

SHAPIRO: Lenin couldn't designate his successor. He wanted Stalin removed before he died. He failed. Stalin was unable to designate a personal successor. Obviously he wanted Malenkov. He failed in that. The rule is that the Politburo meets and elects a new Secretary General.

KENNAN: Doesn't the Central Committee elect him?

SHAPIRO: Yes. But the Central Committee is the Politburo. When the First Secretary dies, immediately there is an announcement of the Central Committee, actually it is the Politburo which is the executive committee of the Central Committee. When Stalin died, they didn't immediately summon the Central Committee.

KENNAN: A week later they did.

SHAPIRO: They did to ratify what Molotov, Malenkov and Beria had already decided.

KENNAN: But in the case of Khrushchev when he eliminated Molotov and these people he appealed to the Central Committee...

SHAPIRO: As far as I was able to learn the Politburo met and unanimously decided to remove Khrushchev. Khrushchev came back from the south. He walked into a meeting of the Politburo and he tried the same trick as he tried when the anti-Party group tried to remove him in 1957. He said "You did not elect me."
I want a meeting of the Central Committee." The Central Committee was already there. The Central Committee ratified the decision of the Politburo.

PACKER: Zhukov...

SHAPIRO: That was in '57. I'm talking about '64 when Khrushchev was ousted. Suslov and Brezhnev and the others who remembered the experience of 1957 already had at least a rump meeting of the Central Committee right next door. Is it true that the younger generation of the Politburo members idealize the United States less than the old generation. Certainly the young people of the Soviet Union that I've been able to meet idealize the United States even more than the old Bol'sheviks who have their ideological reservations. The dissidents more so. Stalin talked in terms of catching up and surpassing the United States. Khrushchev also talked about catching up with the United States and I think it's still true to this day that the young generation of Russian read Mark Twain, they read Jack London, all the classics of American literature and the good things in life come from the United States. As for the Politburo itself, the younger members now are even more likely to be engineers, likely to be executives than the previous generation of Politburo members. The Brezhnevs, the Kosygins, the Podgornys were more likely to be influenced by ideological considerations than the younger people. I don't see that there can be any hope for change either way, negative or positive from an American point of view. I think the line will continue.

HENDERSON: When you say the younger people do you mean the blue jean crowd?

SHAPIRO: The blue jean crowd is a simplification and a generalization. Actually they're all the blue jean crowd, even members of the Politburo, in a sense.

BARGHOORN: Henry, you said that the dissidents idealize the United States. I think that's true of many of them but certainly not of Solzhenitsyn,
at least not before he left. Maybe he's changed his attitude. He is very much opposed to our type of democracy. He's a very complex figure and it would be dangerous to make a sweeping statement. Certain they all don't idealize the United States.

WHITNEY: I detect a duality in the man as far as this is concerned. It's the love-hate relationship. I think he's enormously curious. I think he would like to come here and at the same time perhaps he doesn't want to come here. His instinctual reaction is perhaps to be anti-American, generally speaking. He seems to have around him at least people who have perhaps an anti-American bias. But there's a duality there. It's a complex thing. The interesting thing is when he gets down to questions of constitutional law in Gulag including the other two volumes, he has a tremendous admiration for the constitutional guarantees that exist in the British constitution and the American constitution. He said at one time. Could we prisoners just imagine having the right not to testify against yourself. Could we in our wildest dreams have imagined that there existed a country where you could have a lawyer of your own choice who would actually defend you.

BARGHOOPN: Perhaps some of those who participated in exchange programs—and there might be some close to the centers of power—report on their experiences. And that's one of the benefits perhaps of the exchange programs.

KOHLER: My comment comes out of my experience. I would agree with Henry Shapiro that the younger intellectuals' focus of interest was the United States. On the official level Shelepin and Grishin were rising up fast under Khrushchev and at parties or receptions they would always head to talk with me out of the whole diplomatic corps. Usually there were arguments. Grishin especially was a nasty man, but he wanted to be nasty to me. Shelepin was a little more forthcoming. He was the only one who I think was trained as a political scientist,
not as an engineer and he used to get into big arguments with me about Vietnam, how we were losing prestige and so on. The point is, however, that he headed for me. I was the focus of his interest no matter what the reception was. They’re all the product now of the party. The oldsters have held on to power and tried to deliberately widen this generation gap. Shelepin was rising too fast. In fact, he came out of the Khrushchev thing with more individual power on paper than any one other individual. Then in ’67 when there was obviously an argument in the Politburo about the Mideast War, this was the occasion for their cutting Shelepin down to size. He was deprived of his secretarial job. He was deprived of head of the Audit Commission. He was deprived of Deputy Prime Minister. He was transferred to the Trade Union. He had all these jobs in his hand, and then was shifted to a relatively insignificant position as head of the Trade Unions. But he was still left in the Politburo.

My judgment would be that he is still an ambitious young man or younger man who has seen that he’d better trim his sails to the oldsters for the time being. So he has stayed on praising Brezhnev and so forth. Whether this change of tactics will work for him remains as of now a matter of question. Some signs are favorable, some unfavorable. The significant thing for the moment is that his operational post remains relatively obscure and without real power. But unless and until he is dropped from the Politburo, no sure judgments can be made with regard to the future. However, it should be noted that they not only have cut down Shelepin personally but they have cut down his apparatus. All his associates who’d come up with him in the Komsomol have been scattered to the winds, a couple of Ambassadors and a couple of rural Party Secretaries and so forth.

After Brezhnev, I think you’re bound to get a holding operation in which the almost obvious leading guy is Kirilenko while the youngsters begin to fight out who’s really going to succeed. This would apply to Kulakov and Katushev.
But like Shelepin, none of these youngsters has been allowed to achieve firm foundation and symbols for personal preeminence.

Regardless of who succeeds Brezhnev, I don't think there's going to be much change in policy. At the Politburo level I think they share more or less uniform perceptions of the international scene. Although some things didn't come out as well as they would have liked when they started the peace campaign, nobody who's been sitting in the top councils can think that a change in policy is indicated. You might get a certain shift in emphasis—a turning more toward the West Europeans and the Japanese on the economic side, since we've turned them down and things like that—but I don't see any reason for anyone who may succeed Brezhnev to change the general line of policy.

PACKER: Do you foresee any further testing of the US as they did with Berlin at various times and that I think they're doing now with the Portuguese.

KÖHLER: I think the general policy lines of building up their arms strength, their military-industrial strength will continue and a corollary of this is seeking to reach the point where we will back down instead of them. We will constantly have probes to find out where the outer limits are. That will go on not only immediately but indefinitely.

BEAM: I might add that Bulganin died yesterday.

KENN: Bulganin did?

BEAM: I found that there was no active pro-American faction in the Politburo.

KÖHLER: I think that's true.

SAPIRO: Or anti-American—No pro-American nor anti-American.

BEAM: There are some people who go through the motions of being anti-American and I'd say that they're the younger people in the Party. We never saw Shelepin. He was under a cloud. He had nothing to do with us but we saw quite a bit of
Mazurov and Polyanski and they were pretty damned rough. The reason I think is because they are fighting their way up on a dogmatist platform. Once at the top, they might be more moderate.

KOHLER: Understand, I wasn't saying they talked to me because they like me but because I represented the important element that they thought about.

HARVEY: Two comments. One is at our Center we've been more recently looking at the Chinese succession situation through Russian eyes. The Russians are doing a lot of talking about the Chinese succession while intriguingly they are not talking about their own. We'll soon have a paper out on some of Moscow's views of the Chinese succession and we'll send a copy to each one of you.
Secondly, I think we should pay very close attention to the possibility that George Kennan stressed that with the longer term succession in the Soviet Union, that is the "generation change" may not be at all like we've thought over and over again it would be: that is, that when we get a new generation of leaders, they're going to be like us. It might be that they are going to be worse people than those we now have.

2. New Leaders and the Balance Sheet on Detente

KELLEY: Is it your view that irrespective of any changes in personalities in the upper realms of the government that the policy of detente, peaceful coexistence will continue?

HARVEY: That's not necessarily my view. It is instead my question.

But as things are going for the Soviets I surely see no reason for a change on the part of any Soviet leaders. But I feel we should discuss the possibilities somewhat. Perhaps we should do this against the background of Item 7 of our Agenda.*

*Item 7 as presented to the group was as follows: "For several years, Moscow has promoted a so-called 'peace program' approved by the 24th CPSU Congress, featured by Treaties with the Federal Republic of Germany and 'summitry' between the Presidents of the USA (and other Western leaders) and CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev, leading to what the Russians call 'the Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence' and the West has labeled 'detente.' How would the Kremlin's 'balance sheet' on detente look today, in terms of the Soviet Union's global position; relations with Europe and Japan; conflict with China; situation in the Middle East? What new 'peace' moves can be expected in strategic arms (SALT); forces in Europe (MBFR); political relations in Europe (CSCG); etcetera?"
DURBROW: It's working so well that it's bound to continue...

KELLEY: Yes. That's about my view too. It will continue irrespective of any change in personalities.

DURBROW: They're breaking up NATO. They've got Portugal on the ropes, they've got a new position with respect to Turkey.

KENNAN: Durby, they haven't done these things. Portugal broke up of itself.

DURBROW: Fine but they're helping it along. Our Congress is helping it along.

KENNAN: But it certainly isn't correct to portray this as though these were things that they had manipulated.

DURBROW: They've been planning it. They had Cunhal there, sitting in Prague. The Kremlin communists infiltrated the Trade Unions, they infiltrated the army well before the April '74 coup. They are doing the same thing in Spain. And our Congress is helping out very nicely by cutting out all aid to Turkey. They're really making sure NATO goes and Moscow must be just cheering because of detente, we've got all this euphoria, things are going to be better, the Kremlin has changed, it is more friendly etc.?

KELLEY: Would you say George that the policy of detente, peaceful coexistence is accepted by the majority of the ruling party?

KENNAN: I don't know what this policy is. They've talked about peaceful coexistence for thirty or forty years. This is nothing new. We all know what it means. It means it's a phrase through which they would hope to bind our hands and not bind their own. I don't know that this is anything new. We had peace congresses by the hundreds.

DURBROW: It means something different in the minds of many Americans: Detente is wonderful, we're all going to be girls together, peace is going to come in our time. The Soviet phony peace program is going very well. In the meantime,
they're building up their armed forces but we're not worried about that. Maybe, think many Americans, it's all newspaper talk! Their SS-19 and SS-18's, they're not as accurate with their missiles as we are. We're doing quite well. Now we believe they really want peace. These are our naive thoughts. I think the things Mose and Foy have written are two of the best I've ever seen, one on peaceful coexistence and one on detente and the '73 War. The Kremlin's game just sticks out all over the place. They have us in this euphoric attitude, we're so pleased we're not going to have any war with the Soviet Union, we signed SALT I, oh well, we can afford to give them the 1618 to our 1054 missiles, more missile-firing submarines, etc. because they've changed. And of course we've got MIRVs which we can sorta balance off. But now they have MIRVs. The '72 agreement and the Vladivostok one were to me equally bad as far as the United States strategic posture is concerned. And we're going lower and lower down the totem pole. NATO's going to be broken up, I'm sure, wake up and do something about it.

What can we do?

PACKER: There's an amusing thing in some of my research on peaceful coexistence. I found the first reference to the idea in something Lenin said way back in the early days. It was not mirnoye sosushchestvovaniye, peaceful coexistence, but mirnoye sozhitel'stvo, peaceful cohabitation.

BARGHOORN: They say it; they never do it.

DURBROW: Khrushchev really brought it up in the '50s.

BARGHOORN: Stalin began to use it in 1927.

PACKER: The idea goes back much earlier.

BARGHOORN: Well, Chicherin first used it in 1920 or 21 I think.

PACKER: I found it in something Lenin wrote or said.

BARGHOORN: Well, he did; but he did not use the expression sosushchest-
vovaniye but sozhitel'stvo.
Kohler: I think the beginning came in fact but not in name with Lenin's directives to Chicherin for the Geneva Conference in April, 1922. The circumstances are, I think, very instructive. We wrote about them in a book we did in our Center on Soviet Strategy for the Seventies: From Cold War to Peaceful Coexistence, as I remember the title. In a letter to Chicherin dealing with the draft of a speech Chicherin had prepared for delivery at the Conference on the Soviet position regarding the over-all international situation, Lenin praised the draft but at the same time ordered some drastic changes. He carefully struck or modified anything that might arouse suspicion or apprehension on the part of the capitalist states. The emphasis was to be strictly on the Soviet role as "merchants" who "consider it as our unconditional duty to support any efforts for peacefully dissolving any disputes." References to "the employment of violent means" and the "unavoidability of new world wars" were to be "unconditionally eliminated." In no case should such frightening words be used, Lenin said, because this would only play into the hands of the opponent. We must confine ourselves to pointing out that the view of the communists do not agree with the views of such pacifists...as Henderson, Keys, etc., but that we consider it our duty, for the purpose of attaining...economic agreement, to do everything that is possible in our power to realize at least a known part of this pacifistic program." Lenin, it might be noted had once said. "If you are not able to adapt yourself, if you are not inclined to crawl in the mud on your belly, you are not a revolutionary but a chatterbox." But he had also said, "As soon as we are strong enough to defeat capitalism as a whole, we shall immediately take it by the scruff of the neck."

Shapiro: I also did some research on the subject and I found it in Lenin and I don't remember whether it was sozhitel'stvo or sosushchestvovaniye but
certainly you find it in Stalin and Khrushchev and so on. But now there's the new emphasis since the end of World War II. That is, I think that one of the main goals of Soviet foreign policy has been recognition of the status quo which they have now from the Treaty with Germany. I think when they talk detente they have in mind a number of things. One of them is recognition of the status quo in Europe as they have it. Another one is recognition of equality with the United States. I think it's fair to say they have it now. Certainly in the case of nuclear weapons. We've admitted to parity. They've been smarting for a long time (Khrushchev always used to mention it) of the alleged discriminatory trade practices of the United States. Since the last trade reform bill, they haven't quite got that but President Nixon and the present Secretary of State and President Ford are willing to do away with what they call discrimination. I don't know what's going to happen, whether the trade agreement will be renegotiated. On the question of what detente is, detente or peaceful coexistence today is not what Lenin had in mind or what Stalin had in mind. I think the new element consists.

KENNAN: What is the new element?

SHAPIRO: As I said, recognition of the status quo in Europe which they have, recognition of equality by the United States which they have.

KELLEY: I would say it was overwhelming military superiority over the United States.

BARGHOORN: Well, that's not peaceful coexistence but I would argue a little bit. I would generally agree with your description, Henry, but I would say we have granted recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe. They haven't given any assurance about the status quo in Western Europe.

SHAPIRO: I was speaking of what the Soviets have in mind. They're not interested in what we have in mind.
BARGHOORN: How do we know what they have in mind as far as Western Europe is concerned.

DURBROW: They have formal recognition of the creation of the Iron Curtain by the USSR-FRG non-aggression pact of 1971 and CSCE is about to bless that "fine" creation.

BARGHOORN: That's how detente started, when we accepted their position in Eastern Europe.

DURBROW: That is what the Kremlin is saying: let's do all we can to discombobulate NATO which has been rather an effective thing for the Western world.

BARGHOORN: I think there were two main ingredients in there. Recognizing their position in Eastern Europe was one and granting them expanded and favorable trade terms was the other.

DURBROW: The European Conference on Security and Cooperation was trial balloon put up by them in 1954 when Germany was going to come into NATO. They said let's have an all-European security set-up and get the United States to back it. We finally agreed to the CSCE along with our NATO allies under certain conditions, one being to get the MBFR going. Now we're all girls together and it's working very well for Moscow as we bask under the euphoric opiate of detente.

KOHLER: I would like to add a comment. Although the Soviet advocacy of peaceful coexistence is almost as old as the regime and represents now as in the past a Soviet tactic to gain advantages for the USSR, the current leadership is showing much more finesse and sophistication than its predecessors. Khrushchev wrote an article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1959, before coming to the United States, on peaceful coexistence. But he was bellicose and he was bombastic. He used threats of force, not having the force, and this led to the Berlin and Cuban
missiles setbacks and various other things and was one of the main reasons for his ouster. I think his successors have learned that lesson and that the difference is that they're carrying on a quiet peaceful coexistence, peace campaign, not threatening without having the force to back up the threats, and at the same time building up the requisite force in a big way; the campaign to build up their armed forces is enormous. I think their calculations would be that this quiet campaign is paying them great dividends in the West. For example, those of us who used to have to defend budgets used to say we could always depend on Stalin or Khrushchev to do or say the right thing at the right time so that we had no trouble on Capitol Hill. These people have received some good advice from Dobrynin or somebody and they're not doing that. They are far from helping us get budgets passed. They're cultivating the Congress and talking peaceful coexistence in a systematic campaign that has now gone on since the 24th Party Congress. In that sense they're much more subtle and much more effective than any of their predecessors.

Harvey: Foy, for ten years my job in the State Department, in INR, was, among other things, to be damned sure that we found anything in Soviet conduct that needed to be considered at budget date for State, Defense, etc. Moscow does, through the way it is now proceeding, make this job much more difficult today. I am not sure, however, that the new techniques Moscow has adopted tell the whole story. A great part of the problem is, as I see it, that for some years now we have been deliberately closing our eyes to alarming features in the US-Soviet relationship and seeking out reassuring features even when they do not exist, except in our imaginations. I refer back particularly to your comments yesterday on how we have misled ourselves with respect to detente—peaceful coexistence, as well as to what has been said by many others in the course of this colloquy.
WHERE IS THE SOVIET UNION HEADED?

HARVEY: Be all of what we have said as it may, however, I feel that now we should turn to Item 8.* Where do we think the Soviet Union is headed for the future? This is, of course, the real pay-off question in our discussion. I would like to move geographically around the table and ask each one of you to talk at whatever length you desire about the question raised here. What do the Kremlin leaders want to achieve over the next ten to fifteen years? What are their priorities? Tom, will you begin?

1. Thomas Whitney

When you ask this question it seems to me you're attempting by the very question itself to put to us a very complicated matter which involves an equation with a very large number of unknown variables. Before you can attempt to answer the question where the Soviet Union is headed, that is what do the Kremlin leaders want to achieve over the next ten or fifteen years, you must first answer, it seems to me, the question of where the United States is heading. What is the United States going to be in the next ten or fifteen years? If the United States achieves a sense of political purpose, if the United States makes wise use of its domestic and its foreign resources, if the United States puts its own house in order inside the country first and outside the country next, that's one situation. If the United States flounders around in a state of inadequate political leadership, including not only the executive arm of the government but the legislative arm of the government, if a recession goes on into a further depression, if in overreacting to a threat of a depression we

*Item 8, as presented to the group, was as follows: "Where is the Soviet Union headed? What do the Kremlin leaders want to achieve over the next 10-15 years? What are their priorities? What do they consider their major problems?"
manage to get ourselves back into a vicious inflationary cycle again, which again throws us back into the same difficult situation that we're facing at the present time, if the United States fails to achieve some kind of a better understanding of what is going on in the rest of the world, in the so-called Third World, if one after another of our allies fall away from us, I think you'll find a different answer as to where the Soviet Union is headed and what their leaders will wish to achieve. I suggest the irrelevance of asking separately this question "Where is the Soviet Union headed?" I don't think you can answer that question apart from attempting to answer the question "Where is the United States headed?"

2. Jacob Beam

I think the Soviets will take every opportunity to score off us. I don't think they have a detailed or fixed plan but a general plan to build up their economic, military and political strength at our expense. It's part of their grand design to probe and exploit our weaknesses.

However, they wish to keep in constant contact with us while doing all of this. They do not want a military confrontation nor even a political confrontation. As we saw during the Berlin blockade of 1948 and 1949, the reason they gave to get us out of Berlin was that we had forfeited our right to be there by introducing Western currency into the city. Nevertheless they distinctly did not denounce the Potsdam Treaty, for the principal reason that they wished to continue to share sovereignty with us over Germany. That principle was reaffirmed in the 1970 non-aggression treaty with Western Germany. The British at that time particularly insisted the Germans continue to acknowledge the supreme rights of the four great conquering powers. There was a hassle over this but the Soviets in effect agreed that the quadripartite rights over Berlin and Germany as a whole remained valid.
On the economic side, Kissinger has proposed we aim toward something called interdependence. Thus we should make deals with the Soviets, enmesh them as much as possible so they can't extricate themselves from a growing mutual profit. The Soviets of course will play interdependence to a point where it suits their purposes but they are essentially economically an autarchic country. They are never going to make themselves interdependent much less dependent on any country.

At present we and Western Europe and the Soviets are mutually profiting from trade. We are selling them large quantities of equipment and they are modernizing their plants. In fact right now they are in the driver's seat. With increases in the world prices for oil and gold, they have a trade surplus of over a billion dollars, which is the approximate amount of their deficit two years ago. Theoretically they could dispense with foreign credits but they are likely to shop around for the best terms they can get, leaving our manufacturers at a disadvantage because of the denial of EXIM Bank credits. In the long term the Soviets would like to make us dependent on them by enticing us into vast joint projects for the exploitation of Siberian natural gas and oil, costing billions of dollars, with deliveries to be controlled by them.

On the military side, parity, or its appearance, means to them that they will at least have an equivalent share in world management. Since they will be ostensibly equal with us, they will have to be consulted and treated as an arbiter in all major issues. Where we fail in our responsibility, they will be at hand to take over.

I think the main problem for the Soviets is their ideological confrontation with China. That's a source of tremendous embarrassment. I believe we are wise to stay out of the quarrel for the time being because it will continue to exacerbate their difficulties, particularly in the Third World.
On the whole however the Soviets are doing fairly well just now. They've consolidated their empire or commonwealth, and there will be some deterioration in certain countries in Western Europe which will probably give special opportunities to them. As Henry Shapiro said, they don't want outbreaks of violence in Europe since they fear this might provoke reaction from the right, as mentioned in the very perceptive article in today's (February 25, 1975) New York Times. What the Soviets wish in Western Europe is a kind of controlled disorder or disorganization without rioting or trouble which could produce military action. For this reason they would like to avoid a repetition of what happened in Budapest and Prague. Thus armed outbreaks in their area or in any European country would destroy the spirit of detente which they are bent on exploiting.

3. Loy Henderson

It's very difficult for me to answer a question of this kind. I'll just make a few comments. I think that the Soviet Union's main purpose at the present time is to become the most powerful country in the world, so powerful that no single country or combination of countries will dare in a few years to come to a confrontation with it. It doesn't want to have a confrontation at the present time. But it would like to be able in a few years, I won't say how many years, to not hesitate any longer about confrontation. It would hope that eventually there will be a confrontation in which we or other adversaries will bow rather than to risk a war we know we couldn't win and which would be the destruction of ourselves if not of all humanity.

I think Moscow is convinced that our idealists here would be opposed to such a war: "Better red than dead." At the present time the Soviet leaders feel the need of strengthening their economy tremendously and rapidly. They want to have great natural resources in Siberia and other parts of the Soviet Union opened up now or as soon as possible. They want to learn the more modern techniques of building, electronics, machinery. They'd like to
do that without spending any money. Therefore they're seeking credits, not only from us but also from Britain and France, any country that will give them credits. We talk about lending them several billion dollars. They hope to get also several billion from Germany and each of the Western European countries. On that they would like to develop their resources. The idea would be to pay back their loans in seven or eight years, if at that time it would be necessary to make payments on them, in the form of products obtained from their newly developed resources.

At the very time that they are seeking loans they are bent on making economic life difficult for the Western powers. They are careful, however, not to go so far and fast at this time as to endanger their long-range plans. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that they are encouraging the organization of cartels on a world-wide scale for the purpose of rendering it more difficult for the non-communist industrial nations to obtain the raw materials needed for the maintenance of their economies.

They realize, for instance, that we are no longer self-sufficient in most metals needed for our industries, particularly for our defense industry, and would like to see us pay prices for our imports high enough to dislocate our economy. They, themselves, are fairly self-sufficient except for what might be called luxury goods.

I think they are pleased with the idea of detente, which they consider to be just another name for a relationship they have been seeking since the time of Lenin. I refer to what they call "peaceful coexistence." A distinguished American political scientist in 1967 said that peaceful coexistence was really a Soviet tactic, "the best means to subvert the existing structure of peace by means other than an all-out war." Several years later, the same student said that whenever Soviet leaders "have had to make a choice between Western good-will and territorial or political gain, they have inevitably chosen the latter."
The same person later expressed the opinion that communist leaders "had no interest in the give-and-take of the bargaining process so congenial to Western negotiators." They did not advocate better relations for their own sake but "primarily as a tactical device to overthrow the West at minimum risk."

The political scientist I am referring to was none other than Dr. Henry Kissinger. He may since have changed his mind. It is also possible that in the present world situation he has come to the conclusion that regardless of Soviet attitudes and conduct of the past, we should strive for detente or peaceful coexistence rather than run the risks of outright confrontation.

I believe that what he said several years ago is still true. I also believe that the Soviets do not want a confrontation at this time. They would prefer to continue to strengthen themselves by using loans from us to develop their extensive resources and by adopting our advanced industrial techniques. Whether or not they will repay our loans will depend upon the world situation at the times the payments come due. In the meantime, they will be trying to use the detente in their efforts to weaken and undermine NATO and the unity of the great industrial non-communist power.

4. Earl Packer

I agree in general with what everybody has said up to now. I think a preponderant military position is probably the first priority for the Kremlin. That of course involves a very strong economic position. I think that with regard to East-West trade relations and technology and so forth, that the Soviets would be very glad strategically to get the industrialized Western world perhaps to be largely dependent on them or to be considerably dependent on them and their resources because they're going to retain the possibility of turning off these sources at any time they want to and they can very much damage the Western world at a critical moment. I think they'd like
to weaken our general position around the world and that would necessarily depend upon their getting preponderant military power. I think they'd like to get us out of Europe, disruption of NATO which Loy Henderson mentioned. I'm not so sure they want us at this stage to get out of Asia because of the Chinese situation and the advantage it may be to them in dealing with China that we still have some position in Asia which will keep Peking suspicious of some agreement between Moscow and Washington. That's about all I have to say.

5. Elbridge Durbin

I too agree basically with what Tom and Loy have been saying. I am going to emphasize what I've said before. I think they do not want any confrontation militarily. Politically they don't have to have a real confrontation like the Berlin crisis. We're doing it for them. They're doing all they can to divide our allies from us in Europe and in any other areas. The detente idea is working beautifully for them. As I said, you all ought to read the books that these fellows have gotten out down here at the Center, about how they've been trying to encourage the Arabs to use the oil weapon and the money that they're getting from the oil by withdrawing their holdings from the banks of the West to try to undermine the economic strength of the West. The Arabs are doing a pretty good job of it now. Moscow tried way back in 1971 to say "Hey, you guys, you have a wonderful weapon here to get the Israelis to go back to the '67 frontier. Here, go ahead and use it." But the Arabs didn't respond then. The Arabs were always divided.

Most of our Middle Eastern colleagues that I talked to said, "Don't worry, Durby. It'll be all right. The Arabs will never get together. They are always fighting among themselves. We can keep them apart. Faisal will never join Iraq and the rest of those Arab people and Qaddafi. He just won't do it." Fine, until they got down to the point where Faisal
came also to insist upon implementation of Resolution 242 of the United Na-
tions, "go back to the '67 frontiers." The Israelis haven't budged. They
haven't done a darn thing except what Kissinger forced them to do over the
last two years. The Soviets meanwhile are going to continue to urge the
Arabs to keep up oil prices etc., in order to undermine our whole damn eco-
nomic system. The Soviets want to get all our know-how. They need it. But
as along as they can get us estranged from our allies, maybe to pull out of
Europe, and shake up NATO completely or enough to weaken it so it's not worth
a darn, they'll be very pleased.

Despite this we are falling for peaceful coexistence and detente, which
makes me boil. Nixon and Kissinger sold this bill of goods. As somebody
said yesterday, the American public would understand it much better if some-
body gave a lecture course on every TV station in the United States for about
a week to explain what in the hell peaceful coexistence really is, what they
say it is and that the American public wouldn't think that it is give and
take, live and let live, cooperation, and not struggle.

The mass of Americans think that peaceful coexistence means the Sovi-
ets want peace and stability. But the last thing they want is peace or real co-
existence. No question about it. They not only say so, but do it and their
actions are what counts most. Detente ... why the hell are they building
up all their fleets, missiles and the rest of it? They have mobile missiles
and all these other things.

One hears many times in the Congress and in the press, "We shouldn't
do that. Maybe it'd be a good thing to do but if we do that it will spoil
detente." That naive attitude is going to undermine the possibility of the
United States holding its own in the world. Our allies are thinking of de-
serting us because they're not sure they can count on our word. Turkey's
let down and other things of that kind. I'm very much concerned. I'm sure
the Soviets are very happy. They don't want to have a nuclear war but are using these wars of national liberation when they can, to advance their cause. The Yemen "liberation war" has been going on for years. They'll probably get into the Eritrean one. They'll do more of this sort of thing in Africa, if they can get in there, in order to discombobulate and do away with whatever influence we have in many parts of the world.

6. **George Kennan**

For years I've been disturbed about the view of the Soviet leadership which sees them as a group of highly conspiratorial men sitting around the table just as we are here--men who have all problems of obedience within their own area completely solved and have nothing to do this morning around the table but think of how they can make trouble for us. I think that the world looks quite different to them, actually. When they take stock of their own situation today, they obviously see certain things happening in the world which are favorable to classic communist purposes but I don't think that the whole pattern looks as favorable to them as it's perhaps been suggested here.

If they look internally at their own situation they have not despite 57 years since the Revolution, been able to overcome the technological backwardness of Russia sufficiently to satisfy themselves or to make themselves independent of the Western capitalist world when it comes to the development of technology. I think that worries them very greatly.

The rise in the productivity of labor is declining in the Soviet Union. They're running into crises both of the general labor supply and of the efficiency of labor.

They have to recognize the relative failure of their agricultural system which is a very serious thing as John Scott has pointed out here, in a day when there is an advancing food shortage throughout the world.
They have to recognize the general ideological apathy of their own youth and of the populations of Eastern Europe. I'm not sure that Eastern Europe looks all that satisfactory from their standpoint. There isn't a country in Eastern Europe except possibly Bulgaria, and to some extent Eastern Germany, where the Russians are not heartily disliked and where people don't show this to them on every turn. This is an area which today can be held only by force of arms and this is always a rather delicate situation. I think it would be particularly delicate in the case of a war because I'm not sure that the armed forces of this area would be in many instances of great value to them. Only the East German ones would, I think.

I don't think they view this as a very satisfactory situation. And I think they are well aware of the great restlessness of their own nationalities. Here again they can hold them down by force of arms for the moment but this is not a comfortable situation.

If we look at their global position, I don't see it exactly the way that you do, Durby, or some of the others here. My mind goes back to the period right after World War II and I think of what these people appeared then to want and to be striving for. I remember the fact that they had high hopes of controlling a portion of Iran. Have they achieved that? No. Iran is today stronger and more independent of them than I suppose it's ever been in the last couple of centuries. They wanted bases on the Dardanelles. Do they have them? They do not. They had high hopes of a civil war in Greece which would put the Greek communists in power, although I think Tito had higher hopes still. In any case this did not work out. They do not have that. At that time they had toyed with the idea of general strikes in France and Italy which would place their communist parties in a position of power. This has not yet happened.
I don't mean that the situation isn't still fragile, Durby. I realize it is but the fact is it didn't happen.

If you turn to the Far East: They worked hard to get a foothold in Japan, which MacArthur resisted, and I think correctly. Today they have to treat Japan as an independent country, and indeed they do. They haven't even been able to get the Japanese to agree to a peace treaty with them.

They had at one time a high measure of influence with the North Korean regime prior to the Korean War. Today I would say that the outside influence there is nine-tenths at least Chinese Communist. That's my impression. Not Russian. And as for China, I don't have to mention that this is their greatest single failure and greatest single problem.

I don't think they are very happy about what has happened in Africa. They have made efforts in one country after another there through aid and subversion but they really have suffered a series of rather striking defeats. It is the Chinese Communists who are doing best as far as left-wing influence in Africa is concerned.

The Middle East, I just can't say, except the fact that what the Arabs have done has been an enormous blow to the West in many many respects, not just from the standpoint of the immediate economic effects but of all it's going to do to Western society. I think it's very shocking that we and the Western Europeans haven't reacted to this more strongly and more firmly than we have. I don't for a moment mean to underestimate the possible unfortunate consequences of this. I just can't imagine what's going to happen to Western Europe and especially to the northern tier of countries along the Mediterranean coast from Portugal to Turkey.

If I differ, Durby, from you in all of this it's because I feel that you say because they wanted the apple to fall into their laps, therefore they made it fall. I say they wanted it to fall but they didn't make it fall.
They're going to eat it if they can. But I think that in these circumstances they would feel that they had been generally frustrated in their political purposes.

What they have been able to do (and I quite agree that this is a formidable problem), is that despite their lower economic potential, they have the ability to allot very high priorities to appropriate a very high percentage of the gross national product for military purposes; and they have been able to begin and carry forward a very successful competition with us in a number of fields. I think they'll be able to achieve parity. I don't know whether they'll go beyond it or not.

I don't underestimate that. I think it's a very serious thing. But I don't think there is any future for either of us in an indefinite weapons race. This can grow to any point you want it to, to any expense, and it can cause any amount of hardships and sacrifices on the non-military side if you want to let it go indefinitely.

You can get to the point where the military expenditures are consuming 50 or 60% of your national product. I don't think we have anything to gain from that. I don't think they do. I think it's a great strain on them, as it's a danger to us. And for this reason I think they are, would be prepared to see this halted at a certain point. They are as well aware as we are that there is an absolutely fantastic quantity of overkill in the nuclear weapons field, that nobody could conceivably use a hundredth part of these weapons to any good purpose, and that, therefore there's not much to be gained by the further expenditure of funds on this. If they can find some way to cut this down, I think that they will do it. They will preserve the superiority of their ground forces unquestionably and that they will try to use their military power as a factor in world affairs, I quite agree.
I don't think they look as far ahead as ten to fifteen years. I think that for most realistic statesmen two or three years is the maximum it pays to try to look into the future. Here I think they are a bit dizzy—not so much with what they have achieved but what circumstances have achieved for the demoralization and disruption of Western society. I don't think it is they who have done a lot of this to us. I look around Europe. I live in Europe every summer, and I see what's happening in these countries, in well-behaved countries with a strong tradition like Holland and all: disintegration, morally and every other way, porrography absolutely taking over the centers of these towns, demoralized youth everywhere.

They didn't teach us these things. They suffer to some extent from the same phenomena. We are letting ourselves down. And I'm afraid that representative government in this country and Western Europe isn't working very well. I fully agree with what you've said about some of the authoritarian regimes. I think we were jolly well off with brother Salazar, who was a good force in Portuguese life and as long as he was alive, he kept that country in pretty good shape. I can tell you! I'm as indignant as you are with the American liberalism and the Left, at their insistence on overthrowing anything that has any stability anywhere in the world and trying to put in its place the sort of thing we're going to see now in Portugal. They seem to have learned nothing whatsoever.

My difference with some of the views that have been expressed here is simply that I don't think the world looks as rosy from the standpoint of the Soviets as some of you seem to do. I don't think the result of the processes of which the West now finds itself subject are so much their doing. I'm not surprised that they try to take advantage of them. I'm not sure however how much they can. I think their position is very complex, too. A complete demoralization of Western Europe would not stop at the Oder-Neisse line but would spread into Eastern Europe as well.
Frederick Barghoorn

It's very difficult to add anything after this long series of excellent statements which covered practically every aspect of the problem. I decided to make a very brief list of statements. First I want to offer a definition of detente: limited cooperation within an adversary relationship. This is not my own. I'd like to save my sources. I'm conducting a little study for the External Research Office of the Department of State and one of the tools that I'm using in this study is a questionnaire. One of my respondents offered this excellent definition. But since I've assured all of my respondents I'm not going to mention their names, this will remain an anonymous statement. I would add to this that I do believe that the Soviets, as Durby and others have pointed out, have been very skillful in manipulating the symbol of detente. I don't know how far this really gets them but I think it is characteristic that they cast anyone who criticizes their policies in the role of enemies of peace, enemies of detente. One could say a great deal more about that.

I want to make a couple of brief observations about their objectives. You could probably formulate their general foreign policy objective as the acceptance by the United States of their status as an equal and their right to participate in the solution of all major problems of international politics. I would also tend to agree that they hope eventually to achieve the status of number one power in the world. I think there is a great deal of patriotic nationalistic sentiment that supports this. Turning to the domestic objective it seems to me that the primary domestic objective is to raise the level of performance of their economy to qualitative equality or even superiority to the United States.

Having set forth these very general statements regarding Soviet objectives, I would very strongly agree with those who have pointed out that it's one thing
to have objectives and it's another to be capable of achieving them. George
Kennan gave a very good list of all the problems that face them. I think
they do face an enormous number of difficult problems. The memories of
Stalinism which cast doubt on the legitimacy of the regime and so on.
This has been successfully resolved for the present but they never have
really fully dealt with the ideological erosion which is closely related
to this, the problem of dissent which is also closely related to the weak-
ening of ideology, the loss of their faith in Marxism and Leninism, the
revival of revisionism in various forms which again is connected with the
problem of dissent, the extremely difficult nationality problems.

As for foreign affairs, I think one could raise the question which I
think is implicit in some of George Kennan's observations. How many more
successes can they afford? For example, if they got control of India. If
Cuba costs them a million dollars a day, how much would India cost them?
And finally, I would agree with what Tom Whitney said about the sense of
purpose, the cohesion and stability and so on of the West and particularly
of the United States.

8. Robert Kelley

I'll be very brief. I believe the Soviets have three major objectives.
One is to build up the power and strength of the Soviet state. Second is to
gain overwhelming military superiority over the United States. Third, in the
field of foreign affairs, to extend wherever possible the influence and power
of the Soviet Union and that includes the building up of communist regimes
in countries which they can control. But all this is to be under their
present policy of the avoidance of military confrontations and disruptions
of peace. Those I think are their three main objectives which they're going
to pursue in the next few years to come.

Harvey: Do you think they're going to be very successful or not very
successful?
KELLEY: I would hesitate to say. It's impossible to say. That depends on the action of too many other countries and world developments.

HARVEY: Tom's point was that much of it depends on the United States and I think George felt somewhat the same and I assume that you feel the same way. Foy?

9. Foy Kohler

I've already said some things that are pertinent to the answers to these questions. I think it's very useful that Tom and George both put this discussion into some perspective, in stressing that much depends on what we do and also in pointing out that they have not had a consistent pattern of success. Also that they're lagging behind in a lot of things of which they're still conscious which is one reason why I would anticipate that the basic policy of a non-threatening peaceful detente is liable to be with us even after a change of leadership in the Soviet Union which will come within the period that we're talking about. They will certainly continue their military build-up and we'll see this in their insistence on what they're constantly calling equality and equal security in all forums. We'll see it in SALT talks. After round II we'll probably have round III that goes to the navy and Brezhnev has already served public notice that they're ready to discuss navies but of course on the basis of equality. That will go on. On MBFR this will be a long hassle in which they will be very careful not to lose any essential strength in Europe either vis-a-vis the West or in terms of their control of Eastern Europe.

The only other point that I'd like to comment on a little bit is this question of Arab oil and its influence on Western Europe. I attended a big conference at Georgetown not long ago at which we had Arabs, Western Europeans, Japanese and everybody else present. As the Arabs made clear (I started out as a Near Easterner you remember) the Arabs would be the first to deny that
they made their decision under Soviet influence. But I think it's illustrative of the change of position of the Soviet Union and the effects this will have, even without overt action on the Soviet part, that the Arabs felt strong enough to take these actions. We have made studies of what the Soviets have been saying to the Arabs publicly by their radios and every other tool and we have reason to know from classified sources that Arab diplomats have been promoting the same line: "This is your oil. These monopolies have no power. The oil belongs to you. Take it. You're getting cheated" and so on. All I'm saying is that while the Arabs would deny and truthfully deny that they took this decision under any direct Soviet influence, it is inconceivable that they would have taken this position ten years ago.

KENNAN: When you say this decision do you mean the decision to nationalize the companies or to raise the prices? Because they're two different things.

KOHLER: Both. I think they go together in terms of Arab willingness to act. They started the nationalization before. This gave them a feeling of increased confidence. They discovered that they were encouraged to do even more by Soviet sources. I'm not saying that they didn't have some of these ideas themselves but it all helps. And the knowledge that they could take such action with the backing of a superpower enabled them to make decisions which they would not have dared to make ten years ago. I think in a sense this is illustrative of some of the kinds of troubles we may have in the future without any overt action on the part of Moscow. And I think I'll stop there.

HARVEY: Dr. Joshua, I'd like to hear what you have to say on this.

Wynfred Joshua

I think the objectives of the Soviet Union for the future are one thing. Whether they can achieve them is something else. Most of these objectives
have been mentioned at one time or another by all of you. I would suggest
a priority in these objectives is Soviet objectives in Western Europe and
those vis-a-vis us. Where Western Europe is concerned, there I would sa-
in the long run it will be what some of us have loosely called the Fin-
landization of Western Europe. This may be a poor term. You may wish to
call it Polandization or something else but whatever it would be, it would
be a situation in which the West European countries no longer could decide
their own course in foreign relations and perhaps not even in their domestic
situation without approval of the Soviet Union. Whether the Soviets will
achieve that is problematical. The way things are going now I'm very pes-
simistic. Not because the Russians are outsmarting us, but because of what
you, Mr. Kennan, called the betrayal of the West. I thought that was beauti-
fully expressed. I refer to the demoralization and the disintegration which
we see happening now in Western Europe and what we see happening to some ex-
tent in our own country. But here I have a great deal of faith in American
society. We do have more resilience in this country than in Western Europe
to overcome malaise. But the tragedy is that without Western Europe I don't
think that in the long run the United States will have a chance to sustain
and to retain its system as we know it today. It will be quite a changed
United States. Perhaps this isn't quite understood by some of our leaders
or by some of the people we have in the Congress, but the Russians under-
stand this very well.

I think the Russians have one advantage and one great disadvantage.
I think the disadvantage was brought out by some of you, particularly George
Kennan. I do not think the Russians are ten feet tall as we tend to see them
and portray them. I do not think that they are so brilliant or that they
have such prescience which perhaps we lack. But they do have one great
advantage which we do not have.
The Russians have an acute appreciation of military power. They have always seen the political shadow of military power; this military power consists not only of their conventional capability but it includes their nuclear capability as well. It is this growing power, particularly in terms of qualitative improvement which we in Washington, as well as West European capitals, have been seeing and which the Russians know so well how to exploit. We don't have that appreciation. Perhaps here the academicians have been to some extent at fault because they generally preach that there is no political utility to military power. Yet the more recent agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union show precisely that the Russians have been able to exploit their military capability and to exploit the political dimension of this military capability. In this sense, then, do the Russians have an advantage over us?

And for the rest, will they achieve their goals? Will they achieve their long-term goals such as the goal of strategic superiority over the United States? I'd like to qualify that. What is the concept of strategic superiority vis-a-vis us? I believe that it is a very broad concept of superiority which includes political, military, economic and technological superiority. It is an overall concept of strategic superiority. Where the military component is concerned, however, I don't think that the Russians have really defined it in their own mind, that is, I don't think they know exactly how to achieve it. Perhaps in the general sense, but it's not simply a question of having more missiles or building certain new systems although they will continue this on a fairly broad scale. I don't think they know precisely how to achieve it. I wish they would tell us more, because we would know better how to counter them.

But whether they will achieve this is a question of leadership in this country, a leadership, if you will forgive me because I'm in the government and I probably shouldn't say so, to some extent we have had less than might
have been desired in the last years, and I include much of the Republican administration. I would certainly include the Democratic administration here too. If we can imbue this country again with a sense of purpose, if we can imbue the leaders who are being elected to the Hill with a sense of political purpose which goes beyond an attack on the establishment as we see it today, then I think we can still win the ball game. It's particularly important here in this country because we are, after all, the leader of the West. I think it depends on us very much what will happen in Western Europe. Whether we can be effective in this particular I don't as yet know. I'm still willing to give it a try from my particular vantage point.

11. Henry Shapiro

The goals and priorities of Soviet foreign policy have been discussed adequately around the table and there seems to be a broad consensus of opinion. So I would like to confine myself to a few observations about domestic problems in the Soviet Union. For a long time the impression has been that whatever the Soviets were doing domestically was done either for propaganda purposes to influence modern public opinion or actually to influence the content of foreign policy. It seems to me the emphasis should be the other way. Much of Soviet foreign policy is directed toward internal conditions.

If I were to sum up what my strongest impressions have been as a result of forty years of coverage of the Soviet Union I would say that one has been the erosion of ideology which I have already mentioned at the table. By erosion of ideology I don't mean that only in the population as a whole but I think among the top leaders. They're not the same internationalist Marxists as they were in the twenties or the thirties. The Soviet Union is not at all I think an internationalist country anymore. It has developed into an orthodox nationalist, great Russian nationalist state for whom ideology I think plays a relatively marginal role.
Just before I left the USSR in 1973, I had a number of discussions in
the summer with old Soviet friends as well as with members of the cabinet
including the Minister of Higher Education and some of the more prominent
intellectuals. I carried away the impression that the main concern of most
of the people, what the editor of Pravda called Problem Number One in the
Soviet Union, is the problem of youth. What to do with Soviet youth.
George Kennan and Fred Barghoorn have already referred in part to that.
I was very much impressed by the worry among Soviet opinion makers about
the cynicism, the apathy, the hedonism of Soviet youth. I really found it
very difficult to run into any communists for many years. I cannot say that
I met a type of communists like I met in the thirties. What to do with youth?
Every now and then the Komsomol Central Committee has a session devoted ex-
actly to that.

Aside from the youth problem, I think they're mostly concerned with
the problem of modernization of industry. One of the reasons for detente
is the need for obtaining American know-how because they realize even if
they catch up, which doesn't seem to be very likely in the immediate future,
the Western world is not standing still. It's not simply a question of
catching up to a level of where the United States is now but of keeping
abreast. Since the ouster of Khrushchev they have stopped talking about
catching up and surpassing the United States in the economy. It's simply
a question at the moment of catching up.

Another thing is the agricultural problem. If you run into a Soviet
leader who is willing to discuss problems willingly and honestly he will
mention the agricultural problem. It's one of their big disgraces, that
so many years after the Revolution, so many years after collectivization,
the Soviet Union is so far behind that every now and then they've got to
go through the humiliation of importing bread from the United States and
from other capitalist countries. Khrushchev in Denmark when I covered his trip there in 1963 at a meeting of Danish agricultural leaders said that if we do not solve the agricultural problem within seven years "ne schitayte menya kommunistom" (do not consider me a communist). It's a lot more than seven years since Khrushchev made that famous statement and of course in his Khrushchevian way talked about fertilizer. He said the only reason you Danes are doing so well in agricultural production is not because you are smart and we are stupid. It's only because you have fertilizer and all we have is what the birds drop from heaven. The seven years are gone and they're still very much concerned with modernization of agriculture.

Flowing from this is the problem of raising the living standard. The people of the Soviet Union as I said yesterday are not the ignorant muzhiks, the illiterate muzhiks of 1917 that manned the barricades but are fairly sophisticated, fairly well educated and with a considerable amount of know-how, technological know-how and they cannot be run from above anymore. You certainly cannot run a fairly sophisticated industrial society by terror alone and by promise. Man doesn't live by bread alone but he must have bread. They have not yet solved the problem of bread.

These problems are interconnected with foreign policy and that's why I attach a lot more importance and a lot more significance to Soviet interests and good relations with the United States. Stalin always compared the Soviet Union to the United States. Most of the Soviet leaders have the United States as a model. In order to solve all these problems to which I have alluded, I think they must have good relations with the United States. The first priority of the Soviet leaders today is detente, whatever they mean by it.

PACKER: You are saying that when the Soviet leaders speak about the international revolutionary movement, they're doing that primarily for
domestic consumption in the Soviet Union. But how can you reconcile that interpretation with the obvious expansionism which they're undertaking in the Indian Ocean, etcetera. I'd like to know how you feel because you've had a first-hand opportunity to judge that which I and others have not had.

SHAPIRO: The time has long passed since the Soviet Union made sacrifices if it ever did for the cause of international communism. It's the other way. For a long time it's been the other way. Preparedness of the Soviet leadership to sacrifice whatever is considered the cause of international communism for the national interests of the Soviet state. I think the question on expansionism was answered yesterday by George Kennan, and that is if there had been no revolution in Russia, if Russia had remained a conventional orthodox state we would still have the problem of Russian expansion as indeed we have. What there has been, Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great and so on, that is not necessarily related to interest in spreading revolution though obviously they take advantage of whatever positive development there is from their point of view and the spread of communism precisely is to develop the national interests of the Soviet State.

Brezhnev is still the leader of the major communist country of the world. All this rivalry with China nevertheless remains. One of the reasons in addition to keeping up some of the ideological interest in the population of the Soviet Union is the rivalry with China. It's a question of influence over the international Communist Movement. If you consider Brezhnev's speeches you have to always pay attention to his constituency. If he is making a key address to a congress of the Communist Party, he says one thing. If he is talking to the Central Committee or he is talking to a group of workers, he says another. In strictly domestic speeches I think you find very little reference to communism. Most of the emphasis is on development of the Soviet Union, a higher standard of living, a higher cultural standard, etc.
12. John Scott

I won't try to deal with what eleven people have already stated. I'll make several comments on my own.

The first involves the issue that has been alluded to many times, the relationship between ideology and the national interests of the Soviet Union. I think that this has now become an obsolete question. It's become irrelevant. If some contemporary historian had been able to ask Sir Francis Drake whether he was first of all an Englishman or a gentleman or a pirate or a Christian. He no doubt would have said, "I'm all four. What's the difference?" And I believe from the standpoint of the Soviet government today there's no difference between the interests of the Soviet government and the interests of ideology; ideological concepts and semantics have become instruments in the achievement of success of a multinational complex with the emphasis on the Great Russians, of what is today the Soviet Union.

I disagree that they're not trying to plan far ahead. In May of 1973 I was one of a small group which had an hour and a half with Mr. Patolichev, the Minister of Foreign Trade in his office in Moscow and on of the things that he said is "We've got a master plan that we haven't discussed in public yet. We're planning for 1990." It's not just a series of five-year plans. They have an overall greater plan that looks quite far ahead.

What is the framework of this long-range planning? I believe that they view the interests of the Soviet complex of power in terms of the correlation of forces and it is based essentially in the first place on internal development, on the maintenance of orderly progress inside the Soviet Union. In the interests of achieving that they make systematic surveys, I believe, and watch very carefully issues and events which would indicate weaknesses that threaten the continuation of orderly progress. The two that I'm aware of were the events in Novocherkassk which surrounded the increase in meat
prices and the other was the Temir Tau one in Kazakhstan. Both incidents were the result of stupidity on the part of their police. In both cases, probably several hundred people were killed by gunfire. In both cases the areas were isolated for at least six months. The journalists and diplomats in Moscow didn't know about either of these events for a long time. I'm sure these things were carefully monitored along with the results of audience research or market surveys, polls that they themselves take constantly. The conclusion to which this brought them is that they've got to maintain a steady progress of 2% a year in real wages of the industrial workers based on an increase per year of 6% in labor productivity leaving them a good 4% cushion on which to base other activities, capital formation and special items such as the million dollars a day to support the Cubans, the support of North Vietnamese and what not.

They have succeeded rather well in avoiding those zigzags which we see graphically, if you look at the Wall Street Journal almost any day, the ups and downs. There is inflation in the Soviet Union but it's fairly carefully controlled and the average man or woman can look at himself and his living standard today and say it's better than it was ten years ago and it's certainly better than my father's and mother's were twenty-five years ago. He can probably look ahead and say if we don't get into another war the likelihood is that we're probably going to be able to continue this fairly steady progress. There are a lot of things that we don't like but in the meantime things are going along fairly well.

In the interests of maintaining this steady economic progress, they have obviously tried to improve the efficiency of the operation of their own economy. There was one such attempt made which was formulated by the September Plenum of the Central Committee in 1965 surrounding what had become known as the Liberman reforms involving use of the interest mechanism, the substitution of the profit motive for the centrally planned target as the criteria...
for the performance or failures of workers and administrators at every level. This, although passed at the time by the Central Committee was never implemented for the simple reason that it ran directly into the interest of the half million or so apparatchiki that run the Soviet Union and who owe their dachas and their chauffeured cars to their utilization of that important function in any country, the allocation of resources. They control this and to turn the allocation of resources over to market factors and/or to some engineers who happen to be running factories would be to obviate their own raison d'être. They rejected this and that's the reason why.

In the summer of '73 I had an opportunity to visit a big textile plant in Tashkent which I had visited ten years earlier. I asked the assistant chief engineer, a lady who took us around, the question: "Wherein do these new methods differ from what was here ten years ago?" The substance of her response was "In no way." "Essential decisions are still made in Moscow. Prices, labor conditions, wages, the source of our raw materials and the markets for which we are preparing our goods." I don't think they're going to be able to achieve any breakthrough in the immediate or near future in that because any change runs right into the interests of the Party.

In another area already mentioned, namely agricultural inefficiency, I think they can and will make some effective changes. I disagree that there is unlikely to be any fundamental alteration by the new guys who are going to move when the half dozen guys at the top now move out. In agriculture, there already has been serious talk of some alternatives to or modifications of the collective farm system, as for example, long-term contracts, under which a group of farmers would have effective control of everything involving their piece of land which they would not juridically own, and under which they will be able to operate as more or less like the kulaks ten, fifteen or twenty years ago. I believe that one of these guys
who is moving up, Shelepin or whoever, although I'm sure it would not be discussed now because the collective farm has become a scriptural matter written into the constitution of 1936. But I believe the second echelon leaders will try to alter, at least to improve the collective farm system in such a way as to try to get ourselves out from under the miserable position in which 32% of the population in the labor force who are working in agriculture aren't able to feed themselves in years of bad weather. I believe that this is something else that is likely to come up.

In the area of foreign affairs I think that the ideological considerations have become instruments for the realization of an improvement of the relative position of the Soviet Union in the complex of power, instruments military, economic, ideological and so on. I disagree that the Chinese occupy a major position in Soviet calculations. I think that they look ahead, having studied Chinese history, with a great deal of care to the overwhelming likelihood that the coincidence of the agricultural negative forces which came in China in '61, '62, which caused a very severe shortage of food there, and reversed a generation-long pattern in which China was a net annual average exporter of grain into the opposite is likely to recur.

Good climatic records, which were begun by the British after 1842, indicate that the likelihood of a recurrence of these defeats is very great. When that recurrence takes place, given the heavy Chinese population and growth rate—16 million or so new Chinese a year—and their already substantial dependence on imports from Australia, Canada, France and Argentina and now the US in that order, the chances are that massive starvation will lead to the fragmentation which has so frequently occurred in China in spite of the unifying forces of strong dynasties in the immediate past. I think the Russians feel that the Chinese are fighting a holding operation. They want to control the Chinese and try to surround them to the degree
which they can, which is the real reason for their activities in the Indian Ocean. But the target of their major concern I believe is and will remain the United States. I think that they believe themselves to be in a zero-sum relationship with the United States. In trying to look ahead to the problems of the future with the United States, they've got to achieve improvement in their technological position. But they've got to do more than that.

One way in which they can utilize the useful aspects of their ideology is in areas such as the Middle East and Iran. Looking at these now important issues from a raw materials standpoint as well as from a strategic location standpoint, they can foresee the overwhelming likelihood of drastic alterations in the power structure of these still feudal countries. They know and I think we know, at least we ought to know, because a lot of the people in these countries are liberally inclined; for example, most Iranian students in the United States are anti-Shah, anti-monarchist, etcetera. They see the likelihood that these people will begin to take over as the trade unions become accepted as they now are being accepted even in Saudi Arabia, as the proletariat gets better educated.

They are aware that established authorities will begin to be threatened by and eventually to face confrontations with the groups of their own population.

I think that, having studied themselves, the things we've been talking about today, the Soviets look back at our record in such countries as China and Cuba and Russia in the revolutionary period and calculate that we will antagonize the liberal left as it takes over by various means and drive them further left and into the hands of the Soviet Union in spite of religious resistance which exists to a very substantial extent in most areas.

I think that they are making preparations for this contingency. I don't know who they are, but I'm sure that there are Iranians and Kurds
and ordinary Iraqis and others in the higher schools of the Soviet Union now
being prepared for the kind of activity which would take place in these cases.
They would do this in the name of Marxist-Leninism but I think it's also an
instrument of national policy.

Looking ahead, I can only say that although we talked about this here in
this room today at some length there was no attempt made by any of us to pro-
ject the problems that several of us described vividly, the shortsightedness
with which we viewed the events of 1917 in Russia to the similar things which
are likely to occur in the future.

Finally I regret the rudeness of Scoop Jackson's phrase that the Russians
are like hotel thieves. They go up and down the corridor trying doors and if
they find an open door they go in. But there's a good deal of substance to
this concept. I think the Soviet Union will continue with the kinds of probes
that they have made in the past on such issues as Berlin and will take ad-
vantage of whatever door they find open. I think that their concept of the
chronology of this is a very loose one, a very flexible one, and I therefore
accept Tom Whitney's point that it all depends on what we do in the next ten
years—if we do one or the other of two rather extreme variants which he pre-
sented. If we do one, they will adopt a certain set of policies, altering
their timing. If we behave more sensibly and more flexibly, they will re-
tard the chronology of the utilization that they hope to make of their con-
trol of the correlation of forces which they believe to be in their favor.

What are their ultimate objectives? I don't think there is any doubt
that they want ultimately to see Russia as the number one power in the world.
I don't think that they envisage this as constituting a military takeover of
other nations but rather the assumption by them of the position of such pre-
ponderant superiority that no one will be able to question them, that they
will be able to dictate or to influence actions all over the world and
effectively to veto decisions of others.
HARVEY: Thank you John. The last word is yours, Foy.

KOHLER: The last word is that dinner is on. I guess this is the last time we will all sit at this table ...

HARVEY: I hope not.

KOHLER: ... in this round of meetings.

KENNAN: I would like to say that we're all deeply moved by your own hospitality, by the impulses that led you to call this group together. I think that older people are not often consulted in the way that you have consulted us here. I hope that we've been able to add something to the picture for those of you who are younger and are going to have to carry more of the active load than any of us can. Thank you very much.

HENDERSON: My regret is that I have been able to contribute so little but I take pleasure in having learned so much.
APPENDIX A

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCHES OF PARTICIPANTS

Frederick C. Barghoorn (1911), served in the U.S. Embassy Moscow, 1942-1947, with the Department of State in Germany, 1949-51, in the Department of Political Science at Yale since 1947, professor since 1957, consultant for various government agencies and the Ford Foundation, author of The Soviet Image of the United States, Soviet Russian Nationalism, The Soviet Cultural Offensive, Soviet Foreign Propaganda, Politics in the USSR.


Henry Shapiro (1906), foreign correspondent for New York Herald Tribune, London Morning Post, Reuters, ABC for a number of years since 1933, Manager of United Press International office in Moscow, 1939-1973, visiting professor at various universities, recipient of several journalism awards, currently at University of Wisconsin.

APPENDIX B

PRE-COLLOQUIUM QUESTIONS
SENT TO PARTICIPANTS

1. Has the Soviet Union changed in any fundamental way in this past half century? If so, why? Have outside influences had any effect -- trade, exchange programs, radio broadcasts? If not, why not? Is the underlying assumption of Western policy that democratic evolution can be promoted in the Soviet Union valid?

2. What events, in which the U.S. was a prime actor, have been considered most significant in the USSR since World War II (e.g., Greece and Turkey, Berlin blockade, Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, Man-on-Moon, etc.). Why were these seen as eventful, how were they interpreted, by what Soviet groups, and what lessons (or actions) have been their consequence?

3. It is often said that Russian actions or reactions reflect a deep-seated inferiority complex vis-a-vis the West, and especially the United States. If this is so, in what areas do they feel inferior: culture, technology, economic strength, military power, strategic doctrine? Why do they have these feelings? How have they been manifested in specific cases? Can we exploit them?

4. To what extent have inferiority feelings been affected by growing Soviet military strength, world role, industrialization, urbanization, education? What kind of behavior might be expected from an increasingly self-confident USSR?

5. British Sovietologist MacIntosh says that the transition to new leadership in the next two years will be smooth. It will rest on continuation of control, will need to promise greater benefits to elites, will need to promise continued strong support to military (as during the last 10 years) and will be able to depart from a point where "parity" with the U.S. has been reached and the USSR has achieved the goal of becoming a dominant power in Europe. Would you argue these points? What would you expect the new leadership to do as a consequence?

6. What are the main current and near-term issues facing the U.S. and the USSR as the world's "superpowers"? On which are the Soviet leaders likely to have different or opposing views, and how will this affect their actions? For example, with respect to: disarmament vs. arms race; oil and natural resources; "freedom of information"; law of the sea; the LDCs; the UN; China after Mao; Yugoslavia after Tito; Israel and the Arabs; India.
7. For several years, Moscow has promoted a so-called "peace program" approved by the 24th CPSU Congress, featured by Treaties with the Federal Republic of Germany and "summitry" between the Presidents of the USA (and other Western leaders) and CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev, leading to what the Russians call "the Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence" and the West has labeled "detente." How would the Kremlin's "balance sheet" on detente look today, in terms of: the Soviet Union's global position; relations with Europe and Japan; conflict with China; situation in the Middle East? What new "peace" moves can be expected in strategic arms (SALT); forces in Europe (MBFR); political relations in Europe (CSCE); et cetera?

8. Where is the Soviet Union headed? What do the Kremlin leaders want to achieve over the next 10-15 years? What are their priorities? What do they consider their major problems?