CONFIDENTIAL - Unclassified upon removal of enclosures

From: Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam
To: Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet (Code 12)

Subj: U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam Monthly Historical Summary; February 1962 submission of

Ref: (a) CINCPACFLT ltr ser 1/6925 of 2 October 1967

Enc: (1) Post-Tet Enemy Offensive Summary
     (2) Operation SEA LIONS Summary
     (3) Coastal Surveillance Force Summary
     (4) River Patrol Force Summary
     (5) Riverine Assault Force Summary
     (6) USN Statistical Summary
     (7) Naval Advisory Group Summary
     (8) VPAF/VNCG Statistical Summary
     (9) Psychological and Civic Action Operations

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosures (1) through (9) are submitted.

2. Due to a change in reporting procedures, the information for the USN Civic Action Statistical Summary is not available for the current month's Historical Summary. Beginning with next month's Summary, the Civic Action Statistical Summary will carry the figures for the previous month's work i.e., March Historical Summary will contain February's Civic Action Statistical Summary.

3. The data contained in enclosures (6) and (8) is based on information available this date. Any adjustments to enclosures (6) and (8) will be reflected in February's Historical Supplement.
More than 100 cities, towns, including Saigon, and military installations throughout South Vietnam were targets of Viet Cong rocket and mortar shells on 23 February as an apparent new enemy offensive began. Widespread and coordinated rocket/mortar attacks, in addition to some ground probes, were experienced in all four Corps areas, and provoked retaliatory actions from allied forces.

U. S. Navy units and installations in I, III and IV Corps areas reported numerous scattered enemy initiated actions that were associated with the new offensive.

Hardest hit among U. S. Navy activities were I Corps' Danang Naval Support Activity and vicinity. On 23 February, an estimated 20 to 30 enemy 122-mm rockets, fired in three volleys, impacted on the NAVSUPPACT, Danang deepwater piers (BT 025 836). The initial casualty list revealed no U. S. Navy personnel casualties, however, material and property damages were extensive. The adjacent ARVN ammunition dump received several rocket hits which set off secondary explosions which spewed shrapnel fragments over a wide area, causing fires and destroying and damaging U. S. Navy structures and materials.

Elsewhere in I Corps, NAVSUPPACT Detachment Sa Huynh in Quang Ngai Province (BS 928 221) received five enemy mortar rounds on 25 February. Three impacted in the water near POL barges, and two rounds landed on a nearby hillside. The mortar attack was accompanied by small-arms fire.
from directions north and east of the island. NSAD reaction personnel
returned the fire with .50 caliber, M-79 and M-60 fire. Gunships were
also called to the scene. One pusher boat sustained minor damages and
one Navyman was wounded during the attack.

On 27 February, two enemy 122-mm rounds slammed into the NAVSUPPACT,
Danang covered storage area (BT 055 795) causing extensive damage,
including wounds sustained by 13 Navymen. More rockets were lobbed at
the Danang bridge loading ramp (BT 035 762) during a rocket barrage on
the 27th, destroying LCU 1500 and IFU 78. LCU 1500 received a direct
hit by a rocket of unknown size. Ammunition on the LCU was detonated
and an explosion occurred with fire spreading to the nearby IFU. Another
craft, LCU 1614, sustained minor damage by shrapnel. Total U. S. Navy
personnel casualties were reported at 21 Navymen: killed and 38 wounded.

The enemy initiated attacks in the Giant Slingshot area, III Corps,
on 23 February, with a 0100 assault on Tan An, followed by attacks in
Ben Luc, Go Dau Hoa, Duc Hoa, and Tra Cu, in rapid succession. The
enemy employed rocket and 82-mm mortar fire with coordinated ground
movement in their rapid attacks. Navy units in these areas were already
poised for such attacks as a result of published intelligence by CTG
194.9. The only ISN casualties resulting from these attacks occurred
at Go Dau Hoa when one Navyman was killed and five others were wounded.
Enemy casualties resulting from return fire were unknown.

In IV Corps, the Dong Tam Support Base received 24 rounds of 82-

Enclosure (1)
mortar and seven rounds of 75-mm recoilless-rifle fire on 23 February.

No hits were received in the Navy area or within the Mobile Riverine
Base. There were negative reports on U. S. Navy casualties.

On 26 February, 11 enemy rockets impacted in My Tho City. The My Tho
PBR base received a direct hit and several near misses. One round hit
a bunker in the corner of the base. There were no USN personnel
casualties. Material damage was minor shrapnel dispersion into a SEAL
quonset structure; major damage to one electrical connection box and
phone lines between PBR base and Victory Hotel were severed.
OPERATION SEA LORDS SUMMARY
February 1969

Each campaign area in Operation SEA LORDS remained at a high level of activity during February. Vietnamese Navy (VNN) participation increased with the transfer of TF 117 craft to the VNN to form two River Assault and Interdiction Divisions (RAID) which began operations in the GIANT SLINGSHOT Campaign and the addition of coastal group units to the Rach Giang Than—Vinh Te Campaign for Operation TRAN HUNG DAO. Results obtained from both interdiction and river incursion operations showed improvement with increased employment of ground forces in combined and joint operations with the naval forces. Enemy opposition to operation SEA LORDS forces remained heavy, especially in the GIANT SLINGSHOT Campaign.

Along the Van Co Tay and Van Co Dong rivers, patrol and river assault craft hampered enemy movement taking evading craft under fire on more than 30 occasions. On several of these occasions arms and ammunition were discovered in the evading craft. On the evening of 27 February an evading sarkan, abandoned by its occupants after being fired on, was searched and found to contain two AK-47 rifles and 72 B-40/GI rockets. Patrol craft participated in nearly 60 ground operations by inserting small reconnaissance patrols, company size landing forces, and by providing blocking patrols. Twice during the month major operations, KEEL HAUL I & II, utilized convoys of patrol craft and heavy assault craft. These convoys were formed to carry out river ambushes and ground

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
sweeps on the Van Go Dong between Hiep Hoa and Go Dau Ha. Operation KEEL HAUL I took place 8 - 12 February and KEEL HAUL II occurred 21 - 25 February. Ground and naval forces in Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT accounted for 123 enemy killed (81 body count plus 42 estimated), 8 captured, 6 Ho Chi Minh, 9 suspects detained, 10 sampans captured, 48 junks/sampans destroyed. In addition to the evading craft taken under fire there were more than 80 instances when fixed wing or helicopter strikes/artillery fire were called in or the river craft engaged enemy positions. Enemy opposition came in the form of more than 70 hostile fire incidents plus 7 booby trap detonations. In addition, enemy attacks by fire and light ground probes on bases came with the post-Tet offensive beginning on 23 February. These attacks began at Tan An followed shortly by attacks at Ben Luu, Go Dau Ha, Duc Hoa, and Tra Cu. Go Dau Ha and Tra Cu were hit again on the 24th and 25th. The initial attack on Go Dau Ha was the most serious when one navyman was killed and five wounded as 10 rockets and 35 mortar rounds hit the area. Total friendly losses in February GIANT SLINGSHOT operations came to 5 USN and 1 USA killed; 49 USN, 19 USA and 5 VN wounded; 20 USN and 2 VN craft damaged; and 1 PBR destroyed.

January operations appear to have cleared out most of the large enemy arms caches near the two rivers as the number discovered fell from more than 40 to only 3 in February. Material captured in arms caches and direct action with the enemy included:

- 20,000 rounds small arms ammunition
- 9 107-mm rockets
- 76 B-40 rockets
- 8 B-41 rockets

Enclosure (2)
CONFIDENTIAL

The enemy mine threat that had developed in January on the Kinh Lagrange and Kinh Ong Lon appeared to be neutralized by the chain drag mine sweeping carried out during February in the BARRIER REEF interdiction campaign. Hostile fire incidents numbered eight with only two sailors wounded. Two Vietnamese were killed and one wounded in an attack on an outpost which patrol craft aided in suppressing with their gunfire. While ground forces were not as available as in the GIANT SLINGSHT Campaign a total of 11 sweeps, reconnaissance probes or ambushes were carried out jointly with RF/PF's or CIDG units. These operations, plus nine occasions when patrol craft guns or Seawolf strikes were brought to bear on enemy positions, resulted in five Viet Cong killed, three wounded, and 18 structures destroyed. In addition, one evading craft was taken under fire destroying the sampan and killing an estimated four Viet Cong. Another aspect of BARRIER REEF operations was a medcap and extensive psyops carried out in the vicinity of the major enemy north to south crossing point on the Ong Lon.

As in BARRIER REEF mine sweeping during February appeared to neutralize the mine threat on the Vinh Te Canal. Daily patrols by PBR's on the Vinh

Enclosure (2)
CONFIDENTIAL

Te and PCF's supported by an ATC on the Rach Giang Thanh continued during the month. Low water in the western portions of the Vinh Te hampered operations somewhat and district and provincial forces remained reluctant to join in operations on this section of the infiltration patrols along the Cambodian border. With the commencement of Operation TRAN HUNG DAO in mid-February and the introduction of SEAL operations along the Rach Giang Thanh the employment of ground forces began to show improvement. The VNN forces consisting of units from two coastal groups (8 Command, 23 Kien Giang, and 6 Yabuta Junks), 80 reaction troops, 1 LCVP and 2 POM began operating initially from Ha Tien. On 20 February additional VNN coastal and river assault units began their operations from Chau Doc on the Vinh Te and north westward along the Chau Doc River (VNN mine sweeping of the Vinh Te by LCVP had started in late January). During the month four hostile fire incidents resulted in one navyman killed and four wounded, one VNN LCVP sunk, and several VNN wounded.

Operations in the Rach Gia Campaign continued with patrols occasionally extending out from the Rach Gia-Long Xuyen Canal onto Kinh Ba Tho, Kinh Tri Ton, Kinh Chung Ban, Kinh Rach Soi, and Ha Tien-Rach Gia Canal. Patrols were largely unsupported with no USN casualties in only five hostile fire incidents which were directed primarily at ground units being supported. Contact with enemy units was made on several occasions by RF/FF's and ARVN operating with patrol craft and RF boat units. Results of these actions included 1 RF/FF or ARVN killed and 57 wounded, 56 Viet Cong killed and

Enclosure (2)
7 captured, one arms cache discovered, and 133 structures destroyed.

Coastal patrol craft continued their raids into rivers and canals off the Gulf of Thailand; South China Sea; and portions of the Co Chien, Hau Luong, Soi Rap, and Rung Sat Special Zone patrolled by "Swift" boats. The most significant trend in these operations was the employment of reaction forces with the "Swift" boats to engage enemy units along the waterways. Also noteworthy was the decrease in hostile fire incidents and the conduct of almost routine patrols on rivers which the PFCs had to fight their way onto in prior months. However, the enemy did deliver deadly accurate rocket fire from well-prepared positions in several engagements with one "Swift" boat sunk and another nearly lost (see Coastal Surveillance Summary for details). Results of the 48 river incursions included:

**Enemy casualties:**
- a. Killed 28 (20 VC + 8 EST)
- b. Wounded 1 EST
- c. Captured 9

**Friendly casualties:**
- a. Killed 1 (USN soldier)
- b. Wounded 18 (16 USN, 1 MSF and 1 newsman)

**Enemy material losses:**
- a. Destroyed
  - (1) Junks or sampans 184
  - (2) Structures 685
  - (3) Rice 14 tons
- b. Damaged
  - (1) Junks or sampans 129
  - (2) Structures 383
- c. Captured
  - (1) Junks or sampans 2

Enclosure (2)
Friendly material losses

a. Craft damaged  5
b. Craft destroyed  0

* PCF 71 which sank in 10 feet of water was salvaged.
Sea and air surveillance patrols along the coast of South Vietnam continued to maintain a highly effective barrier against the infiltration of arms and ammunition by sea. During February nearly 75 percent of the 32,407 junks and sampans detected were checked by 15,361 inspections and 8,694 boardings. Boarding operations resulted in the detention of 696 persons for curfew or restricted area violations, improper papers, and other suspicious activity. In addition craft which attempted to evade when challenged were taken under fire killing or wounding the occupants on at least 19 occasions. Other coastal surveillance activity consisted of 1,411 detections of steel hulled vessels transiting market time areas. No suspicious activity was disclosed by 603 close aboard inspections and 33 boardings.

Since the beginning of Operation SEA LORDS in late October 1968 TF 115 "Swift" boats have steadily increased the extent of normal river patrol operations. The expanded functions are carried out to free TF 116 PBR's for employment elsewhere and to maintain a US/GVN presence on rivers and canals opened by prior "Swift" boat river raids. In the Rung Sat Special Zone two PCF's under CTU 116.9 operational control continued routine patrols on the Soi Rap detecting 2,210 craft and carrying out 703 inspections and 1,053 boardings. In addition the PCF's assigned inshore patrol stations off the lower Soi Rap and Long Tau patrolled on these rivers until 20 February.
CONFIDENTIAL

On 18 February one "Swift" boat under the operational control of CTG 115.7 began patrols on the "handle" of GIANT SLINGSHOT, the Van Co River. Here 1,005 craft were detected and 486 inspections and 218 boardings carried out. As in prior months "Swift" boat patrols continued on more than 70 miles of the lower Ham Luong and Co Chien rivers under the operational control of CTG 115.3.

During the entire month 2 to 3 PCF's in company with an ATC maintained routine patrols on the Rach Giang Thanh covering that portion of the Rach Giang Thanh/Vinh Te Canal interdiction barrier along the Cambodian border. In addition, patrols and operations in support of ground forces began to take place on a near daily basis on the Bay Rap and Cua Lon rivers in southern Ca Mau Peninsula. Near mid-February PCF's in the First Coastal Zone also began conducting patrols on the Cua Dai River, 25 miles southeast of Danang.

Craft patrolling on all rivers carried out numerous gunfire support missions and participated in frequent ground operations by providing blocking patrols and landing or recovering troops. The latter aspect of operating with reconnoissance troops and embarking a reaction force on river incursions and raids marked a significant change in the nature of TF 115 river operations. Enemy forces initiating fire fights with "Swift" boats now often find themselves under attack by troops supported by the concentrated fire power provided by the PCF's.

Naval gunfire by TF 115 units scored heavily against enemy forces and installations again in February. Destruction of enemy junk's and sampans.

Enclosure (3)
was especially high and hurt the Viet Cong primary means of mobility in the areas of TF 115 operations. A total of 758 naval gunfire missions including targets engaged on nearly 50 river raids and patrols resulted in the destruction of 1,037 junks and sampans and 1,006 structures and bunkers plus another 877 junks/sampans/structures/bunkers damaged. Enemy personnel losses came to 131 killed (96 by body count plus 35 estimated), 50 wounded, and 9 captured. In 28 hostile fire incidents and two mine detonations TF 115 units sustained one killed (one Mobile Strike Force soldier) and 24 wounded (including one CBS newsmen and one Mobile Strike Force soldier). Material losses came to 6 "Swift" boats damaged and one sunk which was later salvaged.

On 1 February four PCTs carried out combined operations with EOD personnel and RP/PF troops from Cai Nuoc along the Bay Hap River on the west side of the Ca Mau Peninsula. At a point two miles up river PCT's 21, 50, 72 and 93 came under AK-47 sniper fire which was suppressed with no friendly casualties. After embarking the RP/PF units at Cai Nuoc approximately 8 miles up the river the craft proceeded another three miles to a canal running south toward the Cua Lon River. On the canal several bunkers and two barricades were discovered and destroyed by the EOD team. After sweeping along the canal for approximately four miles the RP/PF's reboarded the "Swift" boats for the return trip to Cai Nuoc. On the way back to the open sea targets of opportunity were fired on. Results of the day's operation totaled 15 bunkers, 3 structures, 5 sampans, 2 barricades, and 600 pounds of rice destroyed; 5 bunkers, 16 structures, and 3 sampans heavily damaged; and one

Enclosure (3)
CONFIDENTIAL

Viet Cong suspect detained. On the 3rd a similar operation was conducted by PCF's 5, 13 and 50 for the second of eight incursions on the Bay Hap during the month.

At the month's end preparations were underway for basing a SEAL platoon at Cai Nuoc as a particularly significant operation took place on the 28th. A three PCF operation had encountered intense hostile rocket and automatic weapons fire from positions three miles from the river mouth on the evening of the 27th wounding one crewman on PCF 23. On the morning of the 28th PCF's 23, 13 and 94 again entered the river and embarked RF/FF's from Cai Nuoc for a probe of the enemy positions. Landing parties from PCF's 23 and 94 discovered fresh spider holes and much empty brass in the area as PCF 13 provided cover from the river. After EOD personnel destroyed two bunkers the landing parties were reembarked for another probe three miles further up river. Heavy small arms fire was met as the planned landing area was neared. With 30 troops on board each craft the three "Swift" boats responded immediately by turning toward and beaching opposite the enemy positions. This surprise maneuver caused the Viet Cong to stand and run, followed closely by the RF/FF's. As the action moved up river PCF's 23 and 13 followed and again came under hostile fire. Again the enemy positions were charged with PCF 23 joining in the action. With the RF/FF's already ashore this time PCF crewmen went ashore in pursuit of the enemy. During this phase of the action one Viet Cong was killed and his still loaded rocket launcher captured. Total results of the day's action included 30 sampans,

Enclosure (3)
15 structures, 7 bunkers, 12 tons of rice, 1 still, and 50 gallons of liquor destroyed; 2 sewing machines, 6 individual weapons, one rocket launcher, small arms ammunition, enemy psyops material, a man, a woman, and a child captured; and 10 Viet Cong killed (4 by PCF's and 6 by RF/PF's). There were no friendly casualties and the "Swift" boats received only minor damage.

On 11 February, 10 PCF's teamed with an LFR, an LST, an NSO, a WFR, a WB, an airborne spotter, Air Force jets, and Mobile Strike Force (MSF) troops to carry out eight hours of operations on the southern portion of the Ca Mau Peninsula. After preparatory naval gunfire by USCGC WACHSET (WHEC 114), USCGC POINT CYPRESS and USS WHITE RIVER (LFR 536) the river incursions began at 1223. At the mouth of the Rach Duong Keo PCF's h3, 11 and 71 proceeded approximately 2 1/2 miles up river while 20 MSF troops swept up the east river bank. Also starting from the same point PCF's 3, 10, and 31 proceeded about two miles up the Trum Gong River for a psyops broadcast. At the same time 10 miles to the east-northeast PCF's 28, 53, 60, and 103 entered the Rach Nang and in just four minutes came under heavy hostile fire from the south bank about one mile up river. With PCF 103 taking two rocket rounds in the port engine and PCF 60 hit in the bow below the waterline all four craft turned back down river and cleared the mouth about 15 minutes later. Two men were slightly wounded in this engagement, one each from PCF's 60 and 53. Then an effort to save PCF 60 which was starting to settle by the bow continued for over an hour. Finally when a P-250 was brought from the POINT CYPRESS by PCF 11 the flooding was brought under control with the bow already

Enclosure (3)
below the surface. Temporary repairs were then made by WHITE RIVER as
the remaining undamaged craft assembled for another venture up the Rach
Nang after the enemy positions were hit by air strikes and naval gunfire
in the early afternoon. At 1625 PCF's 3, 10, 31, 43, 61, and 71 with the
MSF troops embarked headed up river. The troops were landed at the river
mouth and contact was soon made as PCF 71 took a rocket hit on the port
side. By 1630 the troops had surrounded the enemy firing position. In
the ensuing fire fight two Viet Cong were killed and another probably
killed before the enemy retreated up river with the MSF unit in pursuit
until darkness forced breaking contact. In addition 3 crewmen on PCF 10
were wounded by broken glass. Efforts to beach PCF 71 after clearing the
river failed and the "Swift" boat sank in ten feet of water a half mile
south of the river mouth. Other enemy losses to PCF and MSF forces during
the day came to 27 bunkers, 20 claymore mines, 28 grenades, one structure,
and one sampan destroyed; 2 AK-l7 rifles captured; and numerous bunkers
damaged. One MSF soldier was wounded.

On 12 February PCF's 18, 39, and 99 entered the Cua Dai and proceeded
to Hoi An in company with three Tabeta junks of Coastal Group 14. At Hoi An
a pre-Tet concert was performed by the Third Marine Amphibious Force drum
and bugle corps in the market place. Other psyops activities were carried
out as tapes were broadcast and numerous materials were passed out. On the
transit back to sea targets of opportunity were taken under fire and light
hostile fire encountered causing no damage or casualties.
On the 24th PCF 67, while on patrol on the Co Chien River, received a request to provide transportation for the Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer, Tra Vinh. After proceeding about 2 miles up the Tra Vinh Canal from the river the "Swift" boat's stern was lifted out of the water and two crewmen thrown overboard by a command detonated mine. After recovering the two men from the canal PCF 67 proceeded back to the Co Chien where PCF 22 arrived to provide assistance. After the flooding could not be controlled PCF 67 was beached at Coastal Group 35. Three of the six men wounded were placed on PCF 22 and the other three went to Coastal Group 35 for medevac. After the flooding was brought under control PCF 71 made temporary repairs and proceeded to Vinh Long escorted by PCF 57.
In February, in addition to resources control and interdiction patrols on the rivers and canals of the Delta and RSSZ, GAME WARDEN forces continued to support Operation SEA LORDS by conducting interdiction operations in the Bach Gia, Vinh Te Canal, Barrier Reef and Giant Slingshot campaigns.

Enemy initiated incidents were relatively infrequent for most of the month and were lowest during the enemy-declared truce period of 15-22 February in honor of the Tet holidays. Intelligence sources continued to look for the start of a new enemy offensive during the period around Tet. The attacks launched by the enemy throughout the country in the early morning hours of 23 February were evaluated as the beginning of the new offensive. After the initial attacks, enemy activity against Navy forces remained substantial for about five days. The last day of the month showed a noticeable decline to the level of the pre-offensive period.

Some intelligence reports advise that the offensive may be accomplished in several phases. One report states that captured documents indicate there are to be three phases, of 5, 10, and 19 days respectively.

There were seven enemy attacks on commercial shipping during the month. All of these occurred during the period 23-27 February. The SS OCALA VICTORY on 23 February was attacked twice, once 20 miles southeast of Saigon (TS 100 645) and the second time 11 miles southeast of the capital (XS 995 765). The first attack was believed to be a
The mines command detonated mine that caused no damage to the ship; the second was an RPG attack that also caused no damage. The same day, the SS ANGEL came under RPG attack when about 11 miles southeast of Saigon (XS 985 763) with no damage incurred. On 24 February, 17 miles southeast of Saigon (YS 041 661) the SS LAWRENCE VICTORY and the SS EDWARD were passing in midstream on the Long Tau River when they came under hostile RPG attack from the east bank of the river. No hits were taken and there were no casualties. On 27 February, in a four hour period, three different ships on the Long Tau came under hostile rocket attack. The SS AMARIA was fired on 10½ miles from Saigon (XS 988 775). One rocket hit the ship causing minor damage. The Japanese ship WACO MARU received two rocket rounds 13½ miles from Saigon (YS 048 722), taking one direct hit and incurring minor damage. The previously mentioned LAWRENCE VICTORY received 7 rockets from a point 18 miles southeast of Saigon (YS 038 648), taking two hits on the starboard side and suffering minor damage. There were no friendly personnel casualties during any of these attacks. Enemy casualties as a result of PBR and Seawolf return fire are unknown.

During this reporting period GAME WARDEN units detected 168,448 craft and conducted 36,820 inspections and 53,435 boardings. This is slightly less than a 2 percent decrease over last month's detections. Although there has been a decrease in the number of detections made by GAME WARDEN forces over the past few months, this is explained by the fact that TF 116 units have been called upon to support various SEA LORDS operations. Their former
station and the responsibility for resources and population control on the lower parts of the rivers of the Delta have been assumed by TF 115 units.

United States Navy fatalities for the month were six, a forty percent decrease from last month's figure. The enemy, in the meantime, suffered an almost 91 percent increase in his fatalities. This month's enemy killed were 189 (body count) and 121 (probable).

About 0100 on 3 February a group of SEALs were inserted by LSSC on an island 11 miles west of My Tho (X5 325 408). The LSSC and the two PHR's in company then placed a blockade around the area while the SEALs began a house to house search. One Viet Cong was uncovered in a spider-hole and utilized as a guide for the rest of the search. They followed a footprint trail into heavy brush at the edge of the island, attempted to get the Viet Cong to come out of the brush and failing, opened fire on the area. Four Viet Cong were killed and another was wounded. Thirteen Vietnamese males were detained as a result of the house search. After interrogation of the detainees, nine were released; two were classified Viet Cong on their own admission and two others were listed as draft dodgers. The four prisoners were turned over to the My Tho police for disposition.

As part of Operation KEEL HAUL, on the evening of 11 February, three ambushes were set up along the Vam Co Dong River, utilizing two PHR's at each location. A roving patrol of two PHR's was established on the river, remaining in the area of operations. The roving patrol, PHR's
40 and 123, were proceeding north on the river to rendezvous with tango boats, also part of the operation, when they came under heavy rocket and automatic weapons fire from the west bank of the river about 9 miles northwest of Duc Hoa (XS 468 038). The enemy ambush area was estimated to be 400 meters long and contained four B-40 rocket positions and 10-12 automatic weapons positions. The lead boat, PBR 123, received one B-40 rocket hit on the forecastle centerline cleat. PBR 40, the cover boat, received two B-40 rounds in the stern sheet area. The cover boat ran aground on the east bank of the river at full speed ending up 25-30 meters inland of the beach. Initial U.S. casualties were one wounded on the lead boat; one killed, one missing, and two wounded, one of them critically, on the cover boat. The critically wounded sailor subsequently died of wounds and the sailor listed as missing was later found dead. PBR's from one of the ambush sites raced to the scene. With the arrival of the tango boats, 60 troops from C Company, 2/27th Infantry were inserted for perimeter security for salvage operations. Two alfa boats and two tango boats were needed to pull the PBR off the beach. After successfully freeing the boat it was towed to Tra Cu. While searching for the missing in action sailor, a small enemy arms cache was discovered. Enemy casualties for this encounter are unknown.

During early afternoon of 16 February, 17 miles west of Duc Hoa on the Vam Co Dong River (XS 490 965), PBR's 753 and 754 received one

Enclosure (b)
recoilless-rifle round and three rockets from the east bank of the river. PBR 753 sustained hits portside forward of the coxswain's flat, resulting in a holing of the hull and a fire aboard the boat. Both crews fought the fire until it became uncontrollable; the boat was then abandoned and the crew boarded PBR 754. The PBR was engulfed in flame and remained in mid-stream circling out-of-control finally beaching on the east bank of the river. After the ammunition and fuel tanks blew up the PBR sank. Two personnel were wounded slightly in the attack. Enemy casualties are unknown.

The following day, 3 miles southwest of Duc Hoa, (XS 562 924) in the early afternoon, PBR's 842 and 754 came under rocket and automatic weapons fire. PBR 754 was hit in the coxswains' flat, killing the boat captain and wounding three of the crew. The PBR's left the area for medevac and were replaced by another patrol acting as on scene commander for LANT and artillery fire. Enemy casualties are unknown.

On 19 February, 9 miles east of Tan An (XS 700 668), TU 195.9.5 was in night waterborne ambush position on the west bank of the Van Dong River. The boat at the southern end of the ambush sighted three sampans, with four occupants each, enter the river from a small canal on the east bank and proceed north staying near the east bank. The PBR's illuminated the sampans and took them under fire. No return fire was received. The sampans were pulled from the bank to the middle of the river for inspection. Eight of the Viet Cong were killed and the other four were listed.
as probable kills. Three AK-47's and a box of assorted medicines and documents were recovered from the sampans. There were no U. S. casualties.

Six PBR's were requested by the senior sector advisor of Tra Cu to block a canal three to five miles west of Tra Cu (XR 305 702 to XR 335 714) on the early afternoon of 24 February. The request was initiated as a result of the inability of pinned down RF/PF forces to pursue Viet Cong troops escaping from the firefight area. The PBR's had previously been requested to place 60-mm mortar fire into the same area in support of the Vietnamese troops. The PBR's requested Seawolf cover for the incursion. With the arrival of two Seawolves, the PBR's entered the canal. Light automatic weapons fire was encountered and the PBR's returned and suppressed the fire. The Seawolves placed strikes in the same areas and at targets along the canal designated by a forward air controller (FAC) on the scene. As the PBR's advanced up the canal, they took armed evading personnel under fire, killing 11, one of which was a Viet Cong tax extortionist, and wounding another. The Seawolves returned to their LST for replenishment and returned to the area upon its completion. When they returned the PBR's departed from the canal and the Seawolves placed strikes on targets of opportunity as designated by FAC. Seawolves strikes accounted for an additional 16 of the enemy killed. There were no U. S. casualties.

Reacting to intelligence of a Viet Cong wedding to be held on 25
February, with 20-30 VCI/guerrillas in attendance, four PBR's embarked 30 PF's and 14 National Police from Cai Be and proceeded to the area 7 miles northeast of Vinh Long (X3 157 408). At the same time 30 troops of 2/39th Infantry Battalion, U. S. NINTH Division proceeded to the area by helo. As the boats approached the landing area 25 civilians, apparently part of the wedding ceremony, scattered into the interior of the island. The troops from the boats began immediate pursuit and the PBR's spread out to block the area from the river. Army troops inland had scattered contact shortly after landing but the Viet Cong broke off immediately. A sampan with three males aboard left the landing area and headed south, ignoring the warning shots of the PBR's. As the sampan approached the south bank it was taken under direct fire. One male jumped from the sampan and started swimming to the beach. He was taken under fire and killed. The sampan was apprehended and the two occupants were turned over to U. S. Army S-2 Cai Be. The troops continued the cordon and search and several Viet Cong and the bride in the wedding ceremony were captured. One Chieu Hoi to USA troops stated he could lead them to his weapon. The troops returned inland with the Chieu Hoi while the PBR's extracted the PF's and National Police. Returning to shore with the Chieu Hoi and his weapon for pickup by the PBR, the Army troops encountered one Viet Cong squad and killed two of them in the resulting fire fight. A total of five Viet Cong were detained. There were no friendly casualties.

At the request of the Tra On senior sector advisor two Seawolves were
CONFIDENTIAL

scrambled, in mid-morning 24 February, to support U.S.-advised troops
in heavy contact with the enemy within three kilometers of the Tra On
(XR 044 046 – XR 047 046). The Vietnamese troops were being pinned
down by a crew served automatic weapon. The LCHT placed multiple strikes
in the area and received heavy automatic weapons fire on each pass. After
rearming and refueling, the Seawolves delivered the HA(L)-3 flight surgeon
to treat 14 friendly wounded, then placed additional strikes in support
of the troops. The Seawolves were credited with 20 Viet Cong killed.

Before returning to Binh Thuy, they embarked four of the Vietnamese
wounded for medevac to Can Tho.

While patrolling the Vinh Te Canal on the night of 27 February, the
lead boat of TU 116.5.2 was struck by an underwater explosion 16 miles
southwest of Chau Doc (VS 925 685). The mine exploded under the stern
of the boat throwing three of the crewmembers overboard and knocking
the boat captain and patrol officer to the deck. The gates were jammed
open as a result of the explosion and the boat beached. Seawolves were
scrambled and the cover boat picked up the personnel in the water. Two
PHR patrols, one from Tinh Bien and the other from an ambush position
east of Tinh Bien arrived on the scene and secured the area around the
PHR and landing zone. The Seawolves medeviced three of the crew to
Chau Doc. Harassment and interdiction fire from the Ba Xoi Special
Forces camp was spotted into the field between the border and the mining
site. The mined PHR was taken under tow to Tinh Bien. No enemy fire was
received during the entire incident.

Enclosure (4)
RIVERLINE ASSAULT FORCE SUMMARY
February 1969

Twenty-five river assault craft of River Division 92 were turned over to the Vietnamese Navy on 1 February, in ceremonies alongside USS BENEWAH (APB-35), flagship of CTF 117. Vice Admiral Zumwalt, CNAVFOR/CHNAVADGRU and Commodore Chon, Vietnamese Chief of Naval Operations presided. As of 1 February, River Assault Division 92 was dissolved.

MRF activity continued in the same pattern established in recent months with MIG "A" supporting units of the 2nd Brigade, U. S. 9th Infantry Division in Kien Hoa Province, and MIG "B" roving the lower Delta in support of Vietnamese Infantry and Marine Corps operations.

After several months hiatus, enemy initiated fire fights (ENIFF's) resumed on 16 February against MIG "A" assault craft in Kien Hoa Province. Naval craft came under attack 14 times during the month. The increased enemy activity in Kien Hoa is reflected in the substantial increase in his losses, an average of 23 KIA per day. Unestimated for the most part, are the results of MRF return and suppression fire.

Although MIG "B" craft came under attack 13 times during the month, ground contact during operations or after quick reaction insertions was in general, light, as the enemy remained elusive.

Twenty-nine river assault craft of RAD 92 continued to work in the GIANT S LINGSHOT Operation area, supporting troop lift of CIDG (Civilian Irregular Defense Group), PHU, RF/PF and U. S. Army units along with escort and patrol duties. MRF forces along the Van Co Tay and Van Co Dong...
Rivers incurred enemy hostile fire 14 times during the month.

Enemy swimmer activity within each of the mobile riverine bases was observed on six separate occasions by vigilant lookouts. Hull inspections revealed negative results on all occasions.

The following table indicates the extent and diversity of MRF boat assignment during a typical day in February:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY/OPERATION</th>
<th>MRF CRAFT ASSIGNED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASPH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Brigade, U. S. 9th Infantry Division (MRF &quot;A&quot;)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Battalion VNMC (MRF &quot;B&quot;)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Unit 116.4.4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Group 115.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRF &quot;A&quot; Base Defense</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRF &quot;B&quot; Base Defense</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualty Reports</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overhaul/Conversion/Backfit</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transferred to Vietnamese Navy</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enclosure (5)
CONFIDENTIAL

TASK GROUP 117.1 OPERATIONS

Standard watermobile, airmobile and infantry activity continued this month as MRG "A" operated primarily in several districts of Kien Hoa Province.

Infantry troops experienced occasionally heavy contact and the highest monthly casualty total on record was inflicted on the enemy as he lost 678 killed, 8 wounded and 194 detained. U. S. casualties were 26 killed (1 USN, 25 USA) and 187 wounded (35 USN, 152 USA). Navy casualties mounted as the enemy reinitiated attacks against MRG "A" assault craft on the Ben Tre and Ba Lai Rivers. Enemy initiated fire fights (ENIFF's) began on 16 February and continued throughout the month.

On two occasions, RAC came under particularly heavy and well-aimed fire during ENIFF's originating from river banks. At 1230 on 24 February, while enroute to landing sites with Delta Company of the 3/47 Infantry embarked, units of RAD 131 received combined rocket and automatic weapons fire from both banks of the Song Ba Lai, at a position three miles northeast of Ben Tre (13539 363). Six craft were hit resulting in 11 USN wounded (none serious) and only light damage to the boats. Fire was returned and suppressed with unknown results. On 27 February, RAD 112, enroute to beach sites on the Song Ba Lai with ALFA Company of the 3/60th Infantry aboard, came under heavy rocket, recoilless rifle and automatic weapons fire from both banks at a position four miles northeast of Ben Tre (13575 347). Fire was returned and suppressed. Twelve USN were wounded.

Enclosure (5)

CONFIDENTIAL
in this encounter (8 minor, 4 serious) and one VC was killed. Five of the assault craft received hits.

Enemy swimmers with SCUBA gear were sighted within close proximity of the USS VERNON COUNTY (LST 1161) at MRB ALFA, at Dong Tam, on two successive days - at 1635 on the 25th and at 2120 on the 26th. A swimmer was sighted climbing out of the water on the 25th. He was taken under fire by a 3/60th Infantry sniper on board AL-66 and was listed as a probable VC killed. In both cases concussion grenades were dropped into the water. Subsequent hull inspections by EOD personnel had negative results.

A Viet Cong attempt to emulate the NLF occasioned disastrous results. Two platoons of Alfa Company, 3/60th Infantry in night positions along the Rach An Binh, three miles southeast of No Cay (K3 501 157), detected three large motorized sampans moving northward along the waterway, reconning the banks by fire. The soldiers quickly set up an ambush and took the sampans under fire. Twenty-one of the enemy were killed and three sampans were captured. There were no U. S. casualties.

TASK GROUP 117.2 OPERATIONS

Water blockades along the Song Can Tho and Kinh Xa No in Phong Dinh Province, began 30 January, continued this month. The 21st ARVN Infantry Division had been conducting reconnaissance-in-force operations to prevent massing of VC forces in the area. The RAC, working in conjunction with elements of the 21st ARVN Infantry Division, established a water blockade along the Song Can Tho from the Cai Rang Bridge (WS 826 059) in Phong Dinh Province to a point eight miles west of Can Tho (WS 710 100), and along the Kinh Xa No from Thuan Mon (WS 641 923) to the junction of the Kinh Xa No and Song Can Tho. One company each of the

Enclosure (5)
CONFIDENTIAL

2nd Battalion Vietnamese Marine Corps and the 295th Phong Dinh Regional Force Company were embarked as ready reaction forces. During the operation, which lasted until the morning of 3 February, a total of 7,659 sampans were processed resulting in 62 detainees, 3 of which were confirmed Viet Cong. Ground forces reported only light and sporadic contact throughout.

On 23 February, RAC 15 commenced operations in Tam Binh District of Vinh Long Province in support of units of the 9th ARVN Infantry Division. Mission objectives were to destroy enemy bunkers and defensive positions in enemy base area 478 and to conduct riverine assault and eagle float operations as part of an extensive 9th ARVN Infantry campaign to drive the VC from the area. Enemy resistance was encountered early, as two B-40 rocket grenades were fired at the RAC at 1255 on the 23rd, shortly after backloading troops banks of the Rach Ba Ke, three miles north of Tan Binh (ZS 082 177). One rocket hit the coxswain's flat on A-152-1 wounding two sailors. The craft returned and suppressed the fire. One company of troops was landed as a reaction force and established light contact, killing two VC and capturing one B-40 launcher and one AK-47. One ARVN soldier was killed and two wounded. Supporting helicopter gunships and fixed-wing aircraft placed strikes on the enemy positions after the RAC departed the area. The aircraft destroyed six bunkers, damaged four and observed three secondary explosions. Frequent troop insertions gained light and sporadic contact as the operation continued. Monitor

Enclosure (5)
105-mm howitzer and HiT fire into suspected enemy troop concentrations produced several large secondary explosions. Thus far in February, NAS 15 units in the Tan Binh area have received hostile fire 10 times, one sailor has been killed and 19 wounded; 10 Viet Cong are known dead. MHO "B" EOD personnel have destroyed 132 bunkers along riverbanks as the operation continues into March.

Enemy swimmer sightings occurred within MHO "B" on 5, 7, and 9 February. In each case, results of swimmer search and hull investigations were negative.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MARKET TIME</th>
<th>GAME WARDEN</th>
<th>MOBILE RIVERDAME FORCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Detections</td>
<td>37,024</td>
<td>168,448</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspections</td>
<td>17,153</td>
<td>36,820</td>
<td>5,498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boardings</td>
<td>10,190</td>
<td>53,435</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft detained</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons detained</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>276 + 21**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet Cong suspects</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile fire incidents</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>27 + 1**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy casualties:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Killed</td>
<td>131 (24 BC + 37 EST)</td>
<td>174 (24 BC) + 131 (PROB)</td>
<td>706 (24 BC) + 174 (PROB) / 5**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Wounded</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5 (24 BC) + 12 (PROB)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Captured</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy material losses:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Destroyed:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Junks or sampans</td>
<td>1,037</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>10/9**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Structures</td>
<td>1,006</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>7%6/23**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Captured:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Junks or sampans</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Weapons</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>See page 2</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Ammunition (rounds)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>See page 2</td>
<td>35.390/68,448**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Rice (tons): (destroyed)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>See page 2</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Damaged:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Junks or sampans</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Structures</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>164</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN material losses:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Destroyed:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Surface craft</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Helicopters</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Damaged:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Surface craft</td>
<td>7***</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>27***/6**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Helicopters</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAR missions</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remarks:
- * Not available
- ** Occurred on Giant Slingshot operations
- *** In addition there were 1 USA KIA, 1 USA WIA & 1 CBS weird
- WIA on TF 194 (MARKET TIME Raider) operations.
- **** PCF 71 sank on 1 February and was later salvaged
- ***** Includes 1 ATC captured not as a result of enemy action

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years

Enclosure (6)
**CONFIDENTIAL**

**TF 116 Captured Weapons/Ammunition**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual weapons</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107-mm rockets (complete)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG-7 rocket rounds</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-40 rockets</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-41 rockets</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water mine (100 lbs)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land mines</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/4 lb blocks of C-4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangalore torpedo</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clips/magazines for individual weapons</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small arms rounds</td>
<td>637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box Chicom machine-gun ammo</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TF 116 Captured Foodstuffs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>600 lbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>1,060 lbs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Vietnamese Navy encountered moderate enemy activity throughout most of the month of February with an increase in harassment, mortar, mining, and sapper attacks commencing 23 February when the announced Viet Cong Tet cease fire was over. These attacks appeared to be intended as a show of force as there was a decrease in enemy initiated incidents after the 25th. The Fleet Command Ships, Coastal Force, and Riverine Units, operating in their respective tactical areas, performed a variety of missions including patrols, escort, naval gunfire support, logistic support, and amphibious assaults. The increase in the number of coordinated VNN/JSW operations added to an expanding Vietnamese Navy role in the war effort.

While providing greater coverage of the waterways, the expansion of the VNN operations on to the Van Co Tay and Van Co Dong rivers, and the Rach Giang Thanh and Vinh Te Canal has hampered enemy personnel and materiel infiltration. Intelligence sources indicate the presence of VNN forces in these areas has brought about improved relations with the local people.

On 1 February aboard the Mobile Riverine Force flagship, USS BENEMAN (APB 35), Vice Admiral E. R. Zumwalt, Jr., Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam/Chief, Naval Advisory Group, turned over 25 U. S. Navy river craft to the Vietnamese Navy under the accelerated Turnover Program (ACTOV). The 25 vessels; three LCM "Monitors", one Command and Communications Boat (CCB),
eight Assault Patrol Support Boats (ASPB's), and thirteen Armored Troop Carriers (ATC's), are now divided into two Vietnamese River Assault and Interdiction Divisions (RAID 70 and RAID 71). Their mission, as their name implies, is to conduct river assault and assume an interdiction role similar to efforts now being made by the U.S. Navy units in the Mekong Delta.

The initial utilization of the two RAID's was in GIANT SLINGSHOT Operations. RAID 70 units are stationed on the Van Co Tay River with one CCB, one monitor, four ATC's, and two ASPB's at Tan An and four ATC's and one monitor at Tuyen Nhon. RAID 71 units are stationed on the Van Co Dong River with one monitor, three ATC's, and three ASPB's at Ben Luc and two ATC's and three ASPB's at Tra Cu.

During the period 20 through 22 February the RAID units commenced the integration into the GIANT SLINGSHOT Operation as they rendezvoused with TF 116 and TF 117 units presently assigned on the Van Co rivers. After receiving indoctrination in tactics, training, communications, and VNN operations center capabilities, the RAID's were ready to commence operations.

Operation KEEL Haul II of the GIANT SLINGSHOT Operation was launched at 211000H. On the third night of the operation, 23 February, an integrated heavy convoy consisting of one VNN ASPB, one U.S. ASPB, and two U.S. ATC's with troops embarked departed Tra Cu heading south on the Van Co Dong River. The heavies were preceded by two U.S. FBR's in normal KEEL HAUL fashion as the entire force assumed a convoy posture while patrolling.
the river. During the patrol an ambush unit of one VNN ASPB and one U.S. ASPB received automatic weapons and B-40 rocket fire from both banks of the river. Both boats sustained B-40 rocket hits resulting in two U.S. wounded, including the U.S. advisor on the VNN boat, and two VNN personnel wounded, who were treated at Tra Cu and returned to duty. After the fire fight all units cleared the area and a B-52 strike was placed at the location of the attack. Later that night Tra Cu came under attack receiving seven rounds of 82-mm mortar. The mortar positions were pin-pointed and taken under fire with 40-mm cannon from a Monitor. Three secondary explosions were sighted.

The next day the final phase of Operation KEEL HAUL II took place. At 2153H five Viet Cong were observed moving toward one U.S. ASPB and one VNN ASPB. They were taken under fire by the US/VNN force at point blank range. The two units cleared the area and then returned for two more firing runs. After heavy artillery was placed into the position, the two ASPB’s and U.S. PBR’s made a search with negative results. KEEL HAUL II was completed at 0030H, 25 February.

Operations to interdict personnel and material infiltrations across the KPN/Cambodian border into RVN were expanded to include VNN units. The Fourth Coastal Zone Commander (VNN) is in command of VNN forces consisting of two Coastal Groups (8 Command, 23 Kien Giang, and 6 Tabua Junks), 80 Raiders (Reaction Troops), approximately 30 personnel for the operational command, and a repair/support team. The four LCVP’s and two PON’s assigned
to the Vinh Te Operation from RIO 26 which chopped to the VNN junk force on 21 February are included in the operation. Primary support bases are the VNN LCU at Chau Doc and the VNN AKL 451 at Ha Tien. Additional staging sights will be established as the tactical situation dictates.

On 19 February the newly arrived junk advisors were given a tour of the Vinh Te Canal by CTG 116.5 and 116.5.2. Discussions with the advisors included operational areas of each element, recognition signals, and operating techniques. Most of the junk operations will be limited to the Vinh Te Canal from Chau Doc to Tien Binh, due to the present low water level. U.S. Navy forces will cover the remaining tactical area.

Although the first mission of the expanded operation entitled TRAN 4 CONDO was conducted when two VNN FCP's, two Command junks, four Kien Giang junks, and 40 Raiders patrolled up the Bach Giang Toanh from Ha Tien on the 8th of February, the newly arrived junks did not commence patrols until the 23rd of February, when they sailed down the Vinh Te Canal toward Tinh Bien. Approximately three and one half miles from Tinh Bien the junks ran aground. When the water level rose again, the junks patrolled eastward with negative results.

Vietnamese Marine Corps

Operating in III and IV CTZ the Vietnamese Marine Corp (VMC) and their U.S. Advisors experienced light enemy contact throughout the month with the exception of the 5th Battalion which experienced heavy fighting in the last days of February.
Brigade "A", comprised of Brigade Headquarters, 1st and 6th Infantry Battalions, and Battery "C", VNMC Artillery Battalion, conducted reconnaissance in force operations under the OPCON of the 25th ARVN Division in the vicinity of Tay Ninh, III CTZ. On 6 February the Brigade moved to Binh Duong Province under the operational control of the 5th ARVN Division and conducted reconnaissance missions there for the remainder of the month with light contact. The 6th Battalion returned to Thu Duc OPCON to JCS and remained there until 10 February when they relieved the 2nd Battalion of Brigade "B" in IV CTZ under the control of the 21st ARVN Division. The 6th Battalion conducted joint riverine operations for the rest of the month with the 21st ARVN, experiencing scattered enemy contact.

Brigade "B" including Brigade Headquarters, the 2nd and 4th Infantry Battalions, and Battery "D" of the VNMC Artillery Battalion conducted riverine/reconnaissance operations in IV CTZ throughout the month under the control of the 21st ARVN Division. Enemy contact was reported as light. The 2nd Battalion, which was relieved by the 6th Battalion on 10 February, returned to their base camp at Thu Duc and remained in reserve until 26 February when the battalion was summoned to reinforce the Long Bien Special Zone in Bien Hoa Province. Battery "D", which was relieved on the 10th by Battalion "B", returned to Saigon for the rest of the month under the Capital Military District control.

The 3rd Battalion was initially in reserve at its base camp at Thu Duc. On 6 February the marines commenced reconnaissance missions in force in Tay

Enclosure (7)
Minh and Binh Long Provinces, III CTZ, OPCON to the 2nd Brigade, U. S. Air Calvary Division. From 8 - 11 February the 3rd Battalion uncovered 12 weapons and munitions caches which were reported to be the largest weapons caches ever discovered by South Vietnamese troops. Included in the caches were 240-mm rockets never seen before in Vietnam. The 3rd Battalion, remaining with the U.S. Air Cavalry in the III CTZ throughout the month, participated in reconnaissance missions with very little additional results.

The 5th Battalion operated under the 18th ARVN Division in III CTZ. Conducting reconnaissance operations, the battalion encountered light contact through 22 February. On 23 February the 3rd Battalion was placed under OPCON of the Long Bien Special Zone by the Commanding General III Corps. While providing security for the Bien Hoa POW Camp and acting as a reserve force for the Long Binh Special Zone, the battalion made contact with NVA regulars on 26 and 27 February. The two day battle was the scene of heavy fighting as 154 of the enemy died and 24 were captured. Friendly casualties included four marines killed and 29 wounded.

Battery "A" of the Artillery Battalion, underwent training at the Duc My Training Center, Duc My, Vietnam, the first part of February and remained at their base camp at Thu Duc under the JCS for the rest of the month.
### VIETNAMESE NAVY:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Daily Average</th>
<th>Searched</th>
<th>Detained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oper</td>
<td>Junk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COASTAL FORCE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>56.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Totals</td>
<td>10,972</td>
<td>156,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#FLEET COMMAND PATROL SHIPS</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIVERINE AREA CRAFT</td>
<td>118.4</td>
<td>117.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#GEN RESERVE FORCES</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>60,761</strong></td>
<td><strong>152,601</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VC/NVA</th>
<th>KIA: 214</th>
<th>Captured: 38</th>
<th>Suspects detained: 8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VNMC</td>
<td>KIA: 28</td>
<td>WIA: 179</td>
<td>KIA: 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Provided 77 gunfire support missions.  
# Includes RAO 27, HTED and RPG 51.

**GROUP 4**  
Downgraded at 3 year intervals  
Declassified after 12 years

**Enclosure (8)**
During the month another step was taken to thwart the persistent enemy propaganda which proclaims that American forces are would-be conquerors who seek to replace the French colonialists. Many signs throughout the country announce the presence of various U.S. installations or truck routes. In the past, these signs have been printed almost exclusively in English. In an effort to maintain the proper GVN/US relationship, all signs were made bi-lingual, with English subordinate to the Vietnamese. In itself, this appears a rather insignificant move, but, in reality, any action that denies the enemy a source of propaganda and, at the same time, enhances the image of the South Vietnamese government with the populace, is important to the psychological operations effort.

Loudspeaker broadcasts continued to be highly utilized this month with an estimated 1100 hours of broadcasts reported. For the most part, these broadcasts have been very effective. On 25 February, PBR's played three hours of broadcast tapes in the Tra Cu District of Vinh Binh Province, stressing the heavy VC battle losses that occurred in that area on the 23rd. The following morning, two males and one female rallied to Coastal Group 36, stating that they rallied as a result of the previous night's broadcasts. Conversely, a Roi Chan who rallied to the USS HUNTSMAN COUNTY (LST 838) on the 18th stated that the PBR broadcasts and
leaflet drops were ineffective in his area (the Cu Lao Dung Island/Long Phu District of Ba Xuyen Province) which is directly across the Bassac River from the first incident mentioned. In part, this apparent contradiction may be explained because the second rallier comes from a VC-controlled area where people are not permitted to pick up or read the leaflets; also, PEB's have recently conducted extensive offensive operations in cooperation with local district forces in that area during the past month.

The period of Tet provided an excellent opportunity for participation in Civic Action. In Danang, the Naval Support Activity provided 1,000 family packages to the mayor of Danang for distribution to needy families. These packages contained rice, cloth and fruit and the contents were purchased on the local market at a cost of 1,200,000 VN$. This act not only helped the poor but also stimulated the local economy. The PCF's of TO 115, in a similar act, presented 125 Tet packages to the village chief of Tra Pho Village (VS530 55) for distribution to his people.

The enemy attacks on 23 February caused a major setback to the Civic Action program in the Danang area. The Civic Action lumberyard, its entire supply of lumber and cement and several vehicles, generators, hand tools and other miscellaneous gear valued at $110,000 were completely destroyed. Every effort is being made to acquire new supplies and equipment to get the program moving again.
UNCLASSIFIED

MEDCAPS during the month were estimated to have treated 23,000 personnel. A total of 30 Hoi Chunks rallied to the Naval Forces.