Advance Warning And Risk Evaluator (AWARE): Background, Preliminary Findings, and Way Ahead

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BACKGROUND

Army commanders have tremendous responsibility but limited awareness of their Soldiers’ patterns of troubling and positive behavior. This limited visibility negatively affects readiness, performance, well-being, career progression, security, and good order and discipline. If commanders cannot identify the most effective response, some of these issues may deteriorate toward suicide, high risk behaviors, and insider threat. Limited visibility may also cause Soldiers with excellent potential to be overlooked, not retained, or not developed to their full potential. This is a complex challenge, but it may occur in part because key information, stored in local records, does not transfer with Soldiers when they change units.

HIGHLIGHTS

Local, temporary records likely contain information needed by gaining commanders. Improving access to counseling statements from Soldiers’ previous units should help gaining commanders identify and manage Soldiers who may pose threats or have great potential for success in the Army. To accomplish this objective, paper counseling statement records could be digitized and stored in a centralized repository for the Army Commander’s Dashboard. This would help commanders track individuals of concern, manage risk, identify promising Soldiers, and make effective personnel decisions that increase protection, mitigate insider threat, build and sustain a high-quality force, and hold subordinate leaders accountable for Soldier development. This could also be a partial response to recommendation 2.9 from the Fort Hood review. Access to local records would reflect a significant change in command philosophy and Army operations. Additional research is needed to support these changes.
ARMY commanders have limited visibility into their Soldiers’ patterns of negative and positive behaviors. This affects readiness, performance, well-being, career progression, security, and good order and discipline. If commanders cannot identify the most effective response, some of these issues may deteriorate toward suicide, high risk behaviors, and insider threat. Limited visibility may also cause Soldiers with excellent potential to be overlooked, not retained, or not developed to their full potential. This complex challenge may occur in part because key information, stored in local records, does not transfer with Soldiers when they change units. Improving commander access to counseling statements should help gaining commanders identify and manage Soldiers who may pose threats or have special potential for success in the Army. Paper counseling statements could be digitized and stored in a centralized repository for the Commander’s Dashboard. This would help commanders track individuals of concern, manage risk, identify promising Soldiers, and make effective personnel decisions that increase protection, mitigate insider threat, build and sustain a high-quality force, and hold subordinate leaders accountable for Soldier development. This could also be a partial response to recommendation 2.9 from the Fort Hood review. Access to local records would reflect a significant change in command philosophy and Army operations. Additional empirical support is needed to support these changes.
PREFACE

As our military draws down from over a decade of war, it rebuilds in preparation for future national security threats that are increasingly complex and dynamic. Shaping the Joint Force of 2020 requires seeing where change is needed for building readiness to meet these challenges. One such change may be the type of information that gaining commanders receive regarding their incoming military personnel. Within the Army context, the Advance Warning And Risk Evaluator (AWARE) project highlights the importance of access to local, temporary, paper-based personnel records for the gaining chain of command. This report lays the groundwork for follow-on efforts to focus on counseling statement records and introduces new possibilities for improving commander decision making and risk assessment processes.

Eric L. Lang
Director
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

Army commanders have enormous responsibility but limited visibility into their Soldiers’ patterns of troubling and positive behavior. The inability to see these behavioral patterns negatively affects readiness, performance, well-being, career progression, security, and good order and discipline. Without effective and timely commander interventions, some of these personnel problems can spiral downward to suicide, high risk behaviors, and insider threat. On the other hand, Soldiers with excellent potential may be overlooked, not retained, or not developed to their full potential. This complex challenge may arise in part because key information, stored in local records, does not transfer with Soldiers to their next duty location.

The Advance Warning And Risk Evaluator (AWARE) project aims to help commanders identify and manage Soldiers who may pose threats to themselves, to others, to national security interests, or who may have great potential for success in the Army, by improving commander access to high value, local records retained by Soldiers’ previous chain of command.

PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

The AWARE project found that:

- Some of the best indicators of threat to self, others, or national security interests may not be in automated databases. Instead, they are likely to be found in local, temporary records that do not transfer with Soldiers to their next duty location.

- Commanders need to see patterns of behavior and context in order to make good decisions about current personnel problems and assist Soldiers with career development.

- Improving commander access to high value, local records retained by Soldiers’ previous chain of command should help gaining commanders identify and manage Soldiers who may pose threats, or who may have special potential for success in the Army.

- Counseling statement records are likely to contain information reflecting that Soldiers are troubled and in some cases may be the only record of the misconduct. Counseling statements also contain positive information about Soldiers, but it is less likely to be documented than troubling behavior.

- Soldiers with behavioral problems from past commands can be paired with strong noncommissioned officer (NCO) leaders who could provide mentorship and development resources.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

IMPROVING COMMANDER ACCESS TO COUNSELING STATEMENT RECORDS

Counseling statement records, which are currently paper records, could be digitized and stored in a centralized repository for the Army Commander’s Dashboard. This should improve commanders’ ability to track individuals of concern, manage risk, identify promising Soldiers, and make effective personnel decisions that increase protection, mitigate insider threat, build and sustain a high-quality force, and hold subordinate commanders and NCOs accountable for Soldier development. The retention period for counseling statement records would be extended, but these records would not become part of the permanent personnel record.

This idea could serve as a partial response to recommendation 2.9 from the Final Recommendations of the Fort Hood Follow-on Review (2010), which calls for a solution to improve commander visibility into Service member behavior, particularly behavior that undermines good order and discipline or indicates a potential insider threat to DoD and its personnel. Granting gaining commanders access to counseling statements from Soldiers’ previous chain of command would reflect a significant change in command philosophy and Army operations. Additional research is needed to validate this requirement.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## INTRODUCTION
- BACKGROUND .......................................................... 1
- CHALLENGE ............................................................ 1

## OBJECTIVE ........................................................................ 3

## METHODOLOGY ................................................................... 4
- LITERATURE AND DATA SOURCE REVIEW ......................... 4
- INTERVIEWS ................................................................. 4

## PRELIMINARY FINDINGS .................................................. 6
- INDICATOR AND DATA SOURCE COMPARISON .................. 6
- INTERVIEW THEMES ........................................................ 7
  - High Value Local Records ........................................ 9
  - The Whole is Greater than the Sum of Its Parts ............ 13
- CONCLUSION ............................................................... 14

## CURRENT STATUS OF AWARE ....................................... 15
- BRIEFING TO ARMY STAKEHOLDERS ............................ 15
  - Commander’s Dashboard ............................................ 16
  - Proposed Secretary of the Army Directive Authorizing Army Law Enforcement Data Sharing ............................................. 17
- IMPROVING COMMANDER ACCESS TO COUNSELING STATEMENT RECORDS ................................................................. 17
  - Significant Change in Command Philosophy and Army Operations ................................................................. 18
  - Potential Response to Fort Hood Follow-on Recommendation 2.9 ................................................................. 19
  - protecting Against Unintended Negative Effects ............ 21

## NEXT STEPS ..................................................................... 23

## POTENTIAL FUTURE EXPANSIONS .................................. 24

## REFERENCES ................................................................. 25

## APPENDIX A: POLICY AND OTHER SOURCES USED ........  A-1

## APPENDIX B: COUNSELING STATEMENT RECORD - DA FORM 4856 __B-1

### LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>A Selection of Interview Questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Paraphrased Statements from Interviewees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### LIST OF FIGURES IN APPENDICES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B-1</td>
<td>DA Form 4856—August 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

Army commanders have lawful authority over and responsibility for a broad spectrum of subordinate behavior. In addition to accomplishing the unit’s mission, commanders are responsible for ensuring unit readiness, health, well-being, morale, cohesion, and discipline. In order for commanders to meet these challenging objectives, they must identify and manage assigned personnel who may be safety or security risks to themselves, to others, to Army, or to Department of Defense (DoD) interests. For example, commanders are responsible for maintaining good order and discipline within their unit, which requires monitoring and appropriately addressing behavioral issues and disciplinary problems as they arise.

Personnel issues requiring commander attention can range from relatively minor misconduct (e.g., showing up late to formation) to more serious violations that are punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ; e.g., sexual assault, making disloyal statements). Because commanders operate in fast-paced work environments with limited time and resources, when they are notified of a personnel problem they must efficiently and accurately assess the situation (investigate) and then identify the most appropriate response (adjudicate). In order to do this effectively, they must be able to: (1) access relevant information about their personnel that is accurate, complete, and timely; (2) synthesize the information to understand the context in which the incident occurred; (3) determine if the incident is the first occurrence of that behavior or part of a larger pattern, and (4) accurately judge the risk posed by the personnel problem.

Commanders are authorized to employ a number of tools to address personnel issues, but they strive first to help the Soldier and then to hold the Soldier accountable. They are trained to use their discretion and best judgment in determining how to deal with each issue.

CHALLENGE

Commanders have limited visibility into their subordinates’ patterns of troubling and positive behaviors. The inability of commanders to see these patterns negatively affects readiness, performance, well-being, career progression, security, and good order and discipline. The negative issues are amplified for gaining commanders and compound over time as Soldiers change units, deploy, re-enlist, and separate from military service.1 If not addressed in an appropriate and timely manner, some of these personnel problems can escalate to suicide, high-risk behaviors, and insider threat (e.g., workplace violence, terrorism, unauthorized

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1 This concern about separation is important because as the Army draws down its end strength, large numbers of active duty members will enter veteran’s status over the next 5 years and be serviced by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. With an already high rate of veteran unemployment, homelessness, and suicide, this is a significant societal issue.
disclosure of classified information, espionage). On the other hand, Soldiers with excellent potential may be overlooked, not retained, or not given development opportunities that maximize their full potential.

Notably, some decision-making situations may be more challenging than others for gaining commanders. For example, if a Soldier is engaging in egregious violations of the UCMJ or emerging as a consistent rule-breaker shortly upon arriving at a new unit, the commander might already have all the information needed to determine the most appropriate response to the situation. However, if the Soldier’s behavior appears to be a minor offense or, according to him or her, it was committed due to neglect or immaturity, commanders might feel they do not have all the required pieces of information to make an informed decision.
OBJECTIVE

The objective of the Advance Warning And Risk Evaluator (AWARE) project is to help commanders at different levels of command (i.e., company, battalion, brigade) identify and manage Soldiers who may pose threats to themselves, to others, to Army, or to DoD interests, or who may have great potential for success in the Army. Specifically, the AWARE project aims to assist commanders by improving their access to high value, local records retained by Soldiers’ previous chain of command.
METHODOLOGY

The target population of focus was active duty, junior enlisted personnel (i.e., specialists and below in the Regular Army) in the garrison environment. This group was selected because of its large size and source of concern for commanders. The AWARE project used two concurrent methodological approaches, described below.

LITERATURE AND DATA SOURCE REVIEW

The Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) conducted an extensive literature review focused on identifying indicators of workplace violence, suicide, disregard for security rules, espionage, and terrorism. These outcomes were judged to be critically important to the Army. Behavioral manifestations and other background factors predictive of these outcomes were examined and documented. A number of different sources were reviewed such as: (1) DoD reports, (2) Fort Hood reports, (3) seminal Army reports on suicide prevention and health promotion (i.e., “Red Book” and “Gold Book”), (4) academic journals, and (5) DoD and Army regulations and policy (see Appendix A for a list of key references consulted during the literature review and throughout the course of the project).

In addition, PERSEREC staff explored potential data sources that may house these risk indicators. A complete list of Army Systems of Records Notices (SORNs) accessible through the Defense Privacy and Civil Liberties Office (DPCLO) website was generated and categorized based on potential relevance to the outcomes of interest (i.e., workplace violence, suicide, disregard for security rules, espionage, and terrorism). Each SORN was also coded on parameters such as data storage media (e.g., electronic, paper), records stored, population, authority, purpose, and data storage location. Databases housed in the Person-Event Data Environment (PDE, described later in this report) were also examined, categorized, and added to the final list, for a total of 309 entries.

Indicators and available data sources were then juxtaposed to understand whether some of the relevant indicators associated with threats to self, others, Army, or DoD interests could be found in databases. This analysis was performed to determine the extent to which high-value information that commanders need may already be available in electronic format.

INTERVIEWS

PERSEREC staff conducted interviews with 40 participants who represented current and former commanders at various levels of command, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), personnel records specialists, researchers working on related topics, and subject matter experts with expertise in insider risk, threat assessment, and suicide prevention. PERSEREC staff created scripts consisting of open-ended questions to guide the interviews, which generally lasted between one and three hours. Interview participants were provided with a brief description of the project.
and then asked a series of questions regarding their perspective on information, data sources, and tools that might help commanders identify and manage Soldiers who may pose a threat to themselves, others, Army, or DoD interests. They were also asked additional questions tailored to their specific expertise. Table 1 lists a sample of interview questions.

PERSEREC researchers then performed a thematic analysis of the interview data by grouping participants’ responses into the following categories: (1) scope of risk outcomes that AWARE should cover, (2) target recipient of warning information, (3) existing Army records and tools, (4) Army culture, and (5) civil liberties, privacy, and information protection. This analysis was done to synthesize a large amount of interview data and to identify themes.

Table 1
A Selection of Interview Questions

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<td>(1) When considering Army personnel records, what would you consider to be the best sources of behaviors associated with insider threats?</td>
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<td>(2) What obstacles limit your ability to document problematic behaviors?</td>
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<td>(3) Could you provide an example of a situation where you had a junior enlisted Soldier who you were concerned might be a threat to themselves, others, or DoD?</td>
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<td>(4) How is information about negative behavior of Soldiers (use specific terms if possible) currently documented in the local records?</td>
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<td>(5) We are interested in the concept of “fresh start.”</td>
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PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

This section presents the findings from the indicator and data sources analysis, as well as the interviews. Due to the large volume of interview data, only key findings are presented. Important conclusions drawn from the analyses are presented in the callout boxes in the margins.

INDICATOR AND DATA SOURCE COMPARISON

Information was gathered from authoritative sources to explore evidence-based indicators\(^2\) of personnel who might be threats to themselves, others, Army, or DoD interests. Wherever possible, the research team focused on behavioral indicators because, unlike mental and cognitive processes, these can be observed by peers and leadership. The final list contained 74 indicators of workplace violence (e.g., making inappropriate references to guns, or ominous/specific threats), 77 indicators of suicide (e.g., feelings of hopelessness about the future; talking or writing about death), 38 indicators of disregard for security practices (e.g., involvement in security violations; hacking activities), 78 indicators of espionage (e.g., unexplained visits to foreign embassies; working outside normal duty hours), 40 indicators of terrorism (e.g., expressing hatred of American society; overt preparation for death), and 9 high-risk personality characteristics (e.g., psychopathy, malignant narcissism, borderline personality disorder).

Historical, contextual, and mitigating factors were also identified for each risk outcome because they represent important variables that can increase or decrease the probability that a certain indicator will lead to the risk outcome. For example, historical factors associated with suicide include prior suicide attempt and history of intentional self-harm behavior. An individual who is suddenly feeling hopeless about the future, who also possesses these historical factors in his or her background, may be at an increased risk for committing suicide. Contextual factors for suicide represent variables endemic to the individual’s personal and work life such as stressful family events and dangerous work environment, which may increase the likelihood that an individual will commit suicide. On the other hand, ongoing compliance with treatment plan, social adjustment skills, and positive family relationships are mitigating factors that may reduce the likelihood that an individual will commit suicide.

The research team next juxtaposed the identified indicators with the available electronic Army data sources catalogued on the DPCLO website to determine the degree of overlap. The researchers found that many of the behavioral indicators

\(^2\) Note that although the identified indicators may provide a useful starting point for understanding behaviors of potential concern, a report recently released by the Defense Science Board Task Force, *Predicting Violent Behavior* (2012), cautions against their widespread usage. The task force found that indicator lists are most effective in the hands of trained threat management professionals because the risk of misuse and false positives is unacceptably high when used by laypeople.
that are highly predictive of high-risk behaviors, in particular those that capture
the subject’s behavior, behavioral changes, or situational stressors, are not likely to
be captured in electronic databases.

INTERVIEW THEMES

Interviews revealed that many of the indicators are likely to be found in local
command records, which are largely paper-based. These files do not transfer with
the Soldier upon changing duty assignments. As a result, upon changing units, each Soldier
receives a “clean slate” in respect to concerning behaviors that may have occurred at the
previous duty station and were documented only in local records. To this end, these local
records may represent a rich source of public and private behaviors that are frequently
observed by leadership and reported by colleagues, but do not transfer with the Soldier upon departure from the unit.3 Table 2 contains key paraphrased statements made by interview participants that illuminate the importance of local records in capturing high-risk behaviors.

Some examples of high-risk behaviors that may be found in local records include
aggressive behavior such as intimidation, preoccupation with violent themes,
harassment or bullying that does not reach the level of a UCMJ violation, feelings of
being victimized, drastic changes in belief systems, new or increased sources of
stress at home or work, changes in behavior or appearance, and abnormal sleep
patterns. Other behaviors may be even more subtle and, in the absence of other
risk factors, not seem serious on the surface (e.g., change in weight, eating too
much or too little). Nevertheless, when aggregated, these indicators may form a
pattern suggesting that a Soldier may be troubled and at risk of inflicting harm to
self or others. Without access to local records from previous units, not only are
commanders unable to see the overall picture of both bad and good behaviors, but
they are also unable to determine whether a recent issue is an isolated incident or
part of an emerging or chronic pattern of misbehavior.

3 Local records are not included in a Soldier’s permanent personnel record (i.e., Army Military Human Resource Record, AMHRR; Army Regulation 600-8-104, 2012) or other digital records that follow Soldiers to their next duty location.
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

Table 2
Paraphrased Statements from Interviewees

(1) A soldier can get into a spiraling down pattern, bad things piling up and not solving the problems, and then it is time to move on, the paperwork resets, and the person does not get help and the next commander starts over with the person. There is no warning to the next commander.

(2) Commanders have discretion whether to pass along negative information to the next duty station or to keep it local because there is no formal regulation to offer guidance on this issue. Often commanders choose not to send the information along because it is too much work.

(3) Because records of adverse incidents do not follow the person on frequent moves, people get a clean slate, but the commander is left wishing for background on some of the people coming into the command.

(4) You can telephone back to the previous duty station and talk to people there who knew a person of concern, but all those people will leave over the next two years. Then the commander has to do the synthesis himself in order to be acquainted with potential problems.

(5) There is a tendency in the military to “handle things at the local level” and not get entangled in the bureaucracy if it can be avoided.

(6) Event-based counseling records would be most relevant for capturing behaviors associated with insider threat.

(7) The mentality has been to give soldiers a clean slate when they PCS, but this has to change.

(8) The best source of information regarding how well a soldier is likely to do at a new duty location is the first 30 days at that new location, and this is when the NCO would need relevant prior information about the soldier so they could incorporate that information into reception-integration counseling.

(9) The AWARE project could focus on event-oriented counselings for behavioral issues, disciplinary problems and actions, non-judicial punishment, letters of reprimand.

Importantly, the interviews also revealed that local records may also be a productive source of positive information about Soldiers (e.g., instances of exceptional performance or resilience), which can be useful for mitigating negative information and helping commanders identify Soldiers with excellent potential. For example, if a Soldier has a history of disciplinary violation yet recent local records indicate that he or she has shown great determination to recover from adversity, this information may indicate to the gaining commander that the potential risk has been mitigated. Additionally, positive information captured in local records may give commanders insight into a Soldier’s strengths, assist with making determinations regarding optimal assignments, and improve retention.
The finding regarding the salience of local records does not minimize the importance of records stored in electronic databases, which represent a critical and complementary source of data regarding high-risk behaviors. The major difference, however, is that data stored in electronic databases frequently reflect the more obvious and direct signs that an individual may be a high risk. For example, Army databases that capture information regarding a Soldier’s past criminal history, absence without leave, and drug offenses are important for assessing whether that individual may be a potential threat. These data differ from the more subtle behavioral indicators of risk stored in local records, which capture behaviors that may not have reached criminal levels, or levels requiring documentation in electronic databases.

A related theme that surfaced from the interviews was that the high operations tempo (OPTEMPO) of recent years has exacerbated behavioral problems seen among Soldiers. Numerous deployments and personnel shortages occurring in times of war, coupled with difficult economic times, have placed great strain on Soldiers, and, importantly, have created lower thresholds for what constitutes acceptable conduct. Consistent with the literature (e.g., Red Book, 2010; Gold Book, 2012), commanders and NCOs who participated in the interviews have repeatedly stated that they observed a higher rate of misconduct in recent years, which they attributed to the high OPTEMPO.

**High Value Local Records**

Interview results further clarified that the richest sources of high-risk behavioral information for junior enlisted soldiers are likely to be stored in local records of counseling statements, non-punitive disciplinary measures, and summarized proceedings of nonjudicial punishment.

**Counseling Statements**

According to Army Field Manual 6-22 (2006), NCOs are responsible for developing their Soldiers in the rank of E-1 to E-4 by counseling them at least once a month. NCOs conduct regular counseling sessions to help their Soldiers achieve personal and professional goals and to assist them with correcting problematic behavior. Counselings can follow both positive (e.g., instances of superior performance) and negative (e.g., misconduct) events. DA Form 4856 is used to record the content of the counseling sessions. Its newest version was released in August 2010. The form is available either in Portable Document Format (PDF) or Extensible Forms Description Language (XFDL) format via Lotus Forms/Pure Edge. The PDF can be printed and filled out by hand, whereas the XFDL is fillable and uses Lotus Forms/Pure Edge Viewer.

The DA Form 4856 (see APPENDIX B) consists of four parts: (1) Administrative Data, (2) Background Information, (3) Summary of Counseling, and (4) Assessment of the Plan of Action. Personal details such as name, rank, social security number,
date, organization, and name and title of the counselor go into the “Administrative Data” section. Specific facts about the purpose of the counseling session or a description of the incident go into the “Background Information” section. The third section, “Summary of Discussion,” contains key points that were made during the counseling session, a proposed plan of action with steps for how to address the issue, the signature of the individual counseled, and an outline of the NCO’s responsibilities for assisting the Soldier in the given situation. Finally, the fourth section, “Assessment of the Plan of Action” consists of a summary of a follow-up assessment that occurs at a later time, which describes the extent to which the counseled Soldier carried out the plan of action.

The current process mandates that the counseling forms are retained at the local command for one year after the Soldier changes units, after which they are destroyed. Notably, the Soldiers themselves also receive a copy of the DA Form 4856 after each counseling session, but interviews with Army leadership indicated that Soldiers do not voluntarily provide these records to their next command, especially if they contain negative information. Interviews revealed that counseling records represent rich sources of data regarding behaviors of potential security and safety concern, and potential warning signs of insider threat. Frequently, these behaviors may not involve UCMJ violations, and consequently may never result in subsequent punishment under UCMJ. As a hypothetical example, if a Soldier is fascinated with weapons and holds a grudge against a supervisor, he or she may be counseled by an NCO but not be given any formal punishment. In this case, the counseling statement would be the only record of the troubling behavior.

Counseling statements also contain positive information, such as instances of superior performance, leadership, and courage. Interview findings also indicated that soldiers are less likely to be counseled in response to positive events compared to negative events, although this may vary based on the leader and command climate.

**Non-punitive Disciplinary Measures**

According to Army Field Manual 27-1 (1992), commanders, unit leaders, and NCOs must deal with a broad spectrum of misconduct. The most serious cases are civilian and military crimes, such as homicides, assaults, drug-related offenses, and desertion. Less serious civilian and military offenses are loosely described as minor offenses. The least serious are minor acts of misconduct, frequently linked to neglect, immaturity, or laziness, which may not even rise to the level of an offense. These may be addressed without the necessity of punishment through non-punitive disciplinary measures, which allow the leader to correct Soldiers and return them
to duty without serious blemish to their record (which would happen if they were subjected to nonjudicial punishment).

Depending on the situation, some combination of the following non-punitive disciplinary measures may be warranted, including withholding of privileges, admonitions and reprimands, corrective counseling (described above), corrective training, administrative rank reduction, revocation of security clearance, bar to reenlistment, and Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) reclassification. In addition:

- Privileges directly related to the misconduct may be withheld to maintain good order and discipline. It does not appear that withholding of privileges is documented anywhere.

- Oral and written admonitions and reprimands may be issued as administrative corrective measures. An administrative admonition or reprimand must contain a statement that it was executed as an administrative measure and not as punishment under UCMJ, Article 15 (Army Regulation 27-10, 2011). Written admonitions and reprimands may be filed in a Soldier’s Army Military Human Resource Record (AMHRR) if they are issued by any commander in their chain of command, school commandants, any general officer, or an officer with court-martial authority. However, if they are issued by an immediate supervisor, they cannot be filed in the AMHRR.

- Corrective training can be used for Soldiers who need additional instruction in a certain area. In Army Field Manual 27-1 (1992), commanders are urged to note deficiencies corrected with training and instruction in a Soldier’s record, and to consider such deficiencies closed incidents.

- Enlisted personnel can be reduced in rank for convictions by civilian courts or for inefficiency. Reduction for a conviction is initiated by submitting a memorandum to the Soldier’s personnel section and requesting publication of reduction orders. Soldiers being reduced for inefficiency must be notified in writing.

- Security clearances may be revoked or suspended, per written communication with the Central Clearance Facility (CCF).

- Soldiers may be barred from reenlistment for character deficiencies, conduct, attitude, proficiency, and motivation. DA Form 4126-R must be completed to summarize the basis for a bar to reenlistment.

- Reclassification of an awarded MOS may be recommended if a Soldier does not efficiently perform technical, supervisory, or other requirements.

Although the types of misconduct that are addressed with non-punitive disciplinary measures usually involve minor acts of neglect and immaturity (e.g., attendance and performance problems), aggregated over time they may yield a portrait of an unreliable individual who feels that he or she is above all rules. However, these
non-punitive disciplinary measures remain in local records if they were issued by an immediate supervisor.

**Summarized Proceedings of Nonjudicial Punishment**

According to Army Regulation 27-10 (2011) and Army Field Manual 27-1 (1992), commanding officers may impose nonjudicial punishment (i.e., Article 15) upon Soldiers who commit minor UCMJ offenses within their units for which non-punitive disciplinary measures are considered inadequate or inappropriate. To be punished under an Article 15, Soldiers must violate the UCMJ. However, the UCMJ violation must be minor in order for nonjudicial punishment to be appropriate. All circumstances surrounding the offense and the personal history of the offender should be considered.

The first step is for the commander to conduct a preliminary investigation to become sufficiently informed to make an appropriate disposition of the incident. The next step is to determine the appropriate level of punishment. Nonjudicial punishment can be administered in three forms, which differ in severity of imposed punishment and in how the record can affect the Soldier’s future in the Army (i.e., whether it is kept local or filed in the AMHRR). For the purposes of this report, only the locally stored nonjudicial punishment proceedings, referred to as summarized proceedings, will be discussed.

Punishment under summarized procedures does not exceed 14 days of restriction, 14 days of extra duty, an oral reprimand or admonition, or any combination of these. The accused must have reasonable time (normally 24 hours) to decide whether to demand trial or gather matters for defense, extenuation, and mitigation. He or she has no right to consult with legal counsel or to have a spokesperson at the proceedings. He or she also may not request an open hearing. Summarized proceedings are recorded on DA Form 2627-1, typically with handwritten entries. The DA Form 2627-1 remains in the local unit personnel files for two years or until the Soldier transfers out of the unit, whichever occurs first.

Behaviors typically addressed with summarized nonjudicial punishment, by definition, constitute minor violations of UCMJ that occur for the first time. Some examples of these behaviors may include disrespect toward a superior, failure to obey orders or regulations, absence without leave, and public intoxication. Importantly, just as in the case of non-punitive disciplinary measures, these behavioral acts may signal that an individual is willing to break rules and use and abuse others. In particular, a full portrait of an individual may only emerge when a commander can examine summarized records of nonjudicial punishment over time and from all previous duty stations. Presently, summarized records of nonjudicial punishment remain in local records and do not transfer with the Soldier upon leaving the unit. Therefore, in theory, an individual could commit minor offenses at various past duty stations, and each time receive a fresh start upon leaving the unit. A longitudinal examination of this person’s past local records would be
particularly useful for making an accurate risk assessment and identifying him or her as a potential threat.

**The Whole is Greater than the Sum of Its Parts**

A consistent theme that emerged from the interviews was that when a Soldier acts out, gaining commanders want to know whether an act of misconduct is the first occurrence of a problem or part of a pattern of misbehavior. In parallel, the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force report, *Predicting Violent Behavior* (2012), reached a similar conclusion by noting that “strands of information which in isolation may be of dubious relevancy when shared, compiled, and analyzed may present a compelling case for intervention” (p. 33).

Since they lack access to local records from past units, commanders largely rely on information available through electronic databases. They may also informally contact the leadership at the Soldier’s previous unit to gather additional information. After conducting an informal investigation, gaining commanders often learn that the Soldier in question has in fact acted out in the past. Commanders expressed a strong desire to have this information available to them up front without having to go to great lengths to gather and synthesize it.

Commanders also noted that possessing early warning information about a particular Soldier upon arrival at the unit would allow them to pair troubled Soldiers with strong NCOs who could help correct their problems. If troubled Soldiers are aided early on and developed by leadership to the fullest extent possible, not only might they cease to act out, but there will be significant cost avoidance by averting the need for punishment or separation. Also, in the case of potential suicide, detection of early warning signals preemptively could mean that a Soldier could be directed to treatment early and helped before reaching a final stage of desperation, hopelessness, and a decision to take their own life. Similar arguments could be applied to the case of workplace violence: an individual with a history of disgruntlement toward the Army could be helped and held accountable, if appropriate, early on before hurting others. Research with military samples has consistently shown that individuals who feel disconnected from colleagues, friends, and family are more likely to hurt themselves or others (e.g., Bryan, Morrow, Etienne, & Ray-Sannerud, in press; Defense Science Board Task Force, 2012), so by giving this group attention early on, leadership will be able to sound the alarm earlier and prevent potential threats.

Improved access to local records from previous commands will also help commanders identify soldiers with great potential for success in the military, as counseling statements, for example, capture positive information such as instances of superior performance and leadership. Being able to discern good Soldiers from
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

deadwood Soldiers will become particularly important with the impending drawdown of the military forces that requires the Army to cut active duty strength by nearly 50,000 Soldiers over the next five years (Tice, 2012). Commanders will need greater situational awareness of their subordinates’ patterns of troubling and positive behavior, so that they can make accurate decisions regarding personnel readiness, well-being, and career progression.

CONCLUSION

Interviews, as well as the literature and data source comparison, revealed that commanders presently lack full situational awareness regarding Soldiers’ past history of misconduct, which reduces their ability to manage threats. This historical information is stored in local records and later destroyed after a Soldier leaves the unit. As a result, Soldiers receive a fresh start upon changing units, which is especially advantageous for individuals with acts of misconduct from various past assignments that, when aggregated, convey a portrait of a troubled Soldier who is a serious risk. Lack of access to local records limits leadership’s ability to preemptively identify and assist individuals who are at risk.
BRIEFING TO ARMY STAKEHOLDERS

The AWARE project was briefed to key Army stakeholders, the Army Protection Program (APP). The APP was established in January 2011 to improve risk management regarding the safety and security of Soldiers, Army Families and civilians, infrastructure, and information. As described in Army Directive 2011-04 (2011), the functional elements of protection initially include: Emergency Management, Computer Network Defense, Continuity of Operations, Critical Infrastructure Risk Management, Operations Security, Antiterrorism, Fire and Emergency Services, Force Health Protection, High-Risk Personnel, Law Enforcement, Information Assurance, and Physical Security. Because AWARE aims to improve commanders’ ability to identify and manage Soldiers who may pose threats to themselves, to others, or to national security interests, it is a natural fit with several APP elements, such as Army Health Promotion and Risk Reduction/High-Risk Personnel (i.e., suicide prevention) and insider threat mitigation capabilities. The APP is also responsible for ensuring all approved recommendations of the Fort Hood Army Internal Review Team (2010) are coordinated for implementation by the Army.

General oversight of the APP is provided by the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) (ASA(M&RA), while the Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), G-3/5/7 is the Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) staff lead for the APP. In turn, the DCS, G-3/5/7 established the G-34 to implement the APP. Because protection is complex and involves many different Army agencies, the APP Board of Directors (BOD) was established as the senior-level collaborative forum to ensure protection policies and resources have been synchronized, prioritized, and coordinated. The APPBOD is supported by the General Officer Steering Committee (APPGOSC) and the Council of Colonels (APPCoC).

AWARE was briefed to the APPCoC on 25 July, 2012. The briefing covered the challenge faced by commanders, project goal, preliminary findings, anticipated end state, process, proposed way ahead, and project sponsorship. The APPCoC authorized PERSEREC to collect additional data (e.g., field interviews) and vet the resulting requirements through the APPBOD. In addition, they requested PERSEREC integrate AWARE efforts with other APP initiatives, specifically the Commander’s Dashboard led by G-1 and efforts by the Office of the Provost Marshall General (OPMG) toward a proposed Secretary of the Army (SA) Directive authorizing criminal history background checks on Soldiers using Army law enforcement systems. The APPCoC also requested that PERSEREC coordinate with the G-2 Security Resiliency Program and DoD-led Defense Security Enterprise Architecture (DSEA). The Commander’s Dashboard and OPMG law enforcement data sharing initiative are described below.

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4 The APP pertains to non-warfighting functional elements of protection.
CURRENT STATUS OF AWARE

Commander’s Dashboard

The Commander’s Dashboard is an information management tool that will integrate information regarding known high risk behaviors, risk factors, and personnel factors in one easily accessible place. The impetus for the Commander’s Dashboard is the alarmingly high suicide rate in the Army, described in the Army Health Promotion Risk Reduction Suicide Mitigation Report 2010 (i.e., “Red Book”, Department of the Army, 2010) and Army 2020 Generating Health and Discipline in the Force Report 2012 (i.e., “Gold Book”, Department of the Army 2012). Currently, there are an unwieldy number of disparate databases, tracking mechanisms, and data points, and commanders only receive information regarding unit level high risk behavior. This tool will help company and battalion level commanders identify specific at-risk Soldiers sooner and mitigate negative behaviors that affect readiness, such as alcohol abuse or criminal behavior. The dashboard will expand the existing Army Risk Reduction Program (RRP) to meet these immediate commander needs by facilitating holistic understanding of critical behaviors affecting readiness, including patterns of those behaviors over time. Although only company and battalion level commanders will be able to drill down to Soldier level data, all commanders, Army leadership, programs, and agencies will have access to their respective aggregate level data and trends.

This tool will integrate data from various Army databases owned by the Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP), Family Advocacy Program (FAP), Army Community Service (ACS), OPMG, and U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM). Other sources of data will include the Integrated Total Army Personnel Database (ITAPDB) and the Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS). G-1 is the office of primary responsibility for the Commander’s Dashboard, but it is a collaborative effort involving many Army stakeholders and agencies.

Because commanders have an acute and immediate need for increased awareness of Soldiers who are at-risk for suicide and other risky behaviors, G-1 is aggressively pursuing an interim solution. The near-term plan leverages the Army Analytics Group (AAG), which operates the PDE. The PDE is a collaborative data sharing environment, jointly sponsored by the Army, Navy, and the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), that encrypts, links, de-identifies, and stores data from across DoD for approved research purposes. Modifications to data use agreements (DUAs) and SORNs are underway to allow these data to be used operationally by the interim Commander’s Dashboard (i.e., PII data). While the long-term vision is for a net-centric dashboard with near real time data feeds and risk algorithms, the interim tool will provide a bridge to that future state.

5 The AAG reports directly to the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (DUSA) and provides technical guidance and solutions for a wide variety of data-centric problems in the Army, such as workforce forecasting, logistics, decision support for senior leaders, medical studies, human resource analysis, and risk assessment.
Proposed Secretary of the Army Directive Authorizing Army Law Enforcement Data Sharing

One of the most pressing information gaps for commanders concerns criminal history information, which helps identify high-risk Soldiers. Current Army policy does not allow commanders to access information regarding a Soldier’s criminal history. Instead, commanders are only notified of a criminal history when a new criminal investigation is initiated. However, the majority of Soldiers who commit multiple felonies do so within a relatively short period of time; approximately 60% of Soldiers who committed multiple felonies committed the first two offenses within the same year (Gold Book, 2012). This information gap likely exacerbates the suicide problem in the Army, as approximately 25% of Soldiers who committed suicide had been subjects of founded criminal investigations (Red Book, 2010). This presents a strong argument in favor of proactively providing criminal history information to gaining commanders so they can immediately provide support during this potentially unstable period.

OPMG initiated an effort to reduce this information gap with a new SA Directive (2012) that would allow criminal history reports to be given to gaining brigade commanders for all unit personnel upon in-processing. Criminal history would be provided by Army law enforcement systems and limited to founded offenses⁶ within the past 5 years from the date of in-processing. This directive will help commanders identify Soldiers who need assistance from community and/or family service providers, or who must comply with existing intervention or treatment program requirements. It is pending a decision from the SA, and if approved would allow this information to be included in the Commander’s Dashboard.

These criminal history reports also contain commanders’ adjudications of the criminal conduct.⁷ In certain cases, commanders might use nonjudicial punishment or non-punitive disciplinary measures to correct the misconduct. The APPCoC noted that this SA directive would therefore increase commander awareness of those local files. To avoid duplication of effort, the AWARE project focuses on improving commanders’ access to counseling statement records retained by Soldiers’ previous chain of command.

IMPROVING COMMANDER ACCESS TO COUNSELING STATEMENT RECORDS

Counseling statement records are currently created in paper form and stored in local, temporary files, which do not transfer with Soldiers to the next unit. These

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⁶ Founded offenses are criminal offenses adequately substantiated by police investigation as a violation of the UCMJ, the United States Code (USC), state and local codes, foreign law, international law or treaty, regulation, or other competent policy.

⁷ Commanders are required to return DA Form 4833, Commander’s Report of Disciplinary or Administrative Action, to the Army criminal investigating authority after they take adjudicative action. DA Form 4833 is then stored within the subject’s criminal history record. See the Red Book or Gold Book for a discussion of challenges with this process.
CURRENT STATUS OF AWARE

records could be digitized and stored in a centralized repository for the Commander’s Dashboard. Commanders would then have greater awareness and ability to track individuals of concern, manage risk, identify promising Soldiers, and make effective personnel decisions that increase protection, mitigate insider threat, build and sustain a high-quality force, and hold subordinate commanders and NCOs accountable for Soldier development. It should be noted that including positive behaviors in the tool would be an expansion of the Commander's Dashboard, which would enable commanders to make more holistic and balanced personnel decisions.

In the scenario described above, the retention period of counseling statement records would be extended (e.g., for 5 years). The records would not become permanent, however. The AMHRR, a permanent personnel record, is not intended to maintain the kind of information recorded in counseling statements. No evidence suggests that it would be appropriate to include counseling statement records in the AMHRR.

**Significant Change in Command Philosophy and Army Operations**

Including counseling statement records from previous duty locations in the Commander’s Dashboard would require a considerable shift in command philosophy and Army operations. Many local records such as counseling statements stay local because the leader creating the record believes the issue has been resolved; the Soldier has been developed, corrected, or rehabilitated, so there is no reason to forward this information to the Soldier’s new unit. The counseling session, and associated record, has served its purpose. The Soldier gets a clean slate and an opportunity for a second chance.

However, troubling behavior may resurface in the next unit. For example, a Soldier counseled for alcohol issues might show intermittent improvement but slip back even deeper after changing duty assignments. The gaining chain of command would have zero awareness that this Soldier needs to be paired with a strong leader and unit, and possibly connected with ASAP. Instead, they will only become aware of the incoming Soldier’s issue once a new incident has already occurred and destructive habits have solidified further. This is not a fresh start for the Soldier. On the other hand, if the gaining commander knew the incoming Soldier had minor alcohol issues, these preventative steps could be taken upon in-processing. Arguably, that is the fresh start because the Soldier is immediately set up for success rather than failure.

Because trust between Soldiers and their Army leaders is fundamental, these changes must not erode that trust. Instead it must strengthen trust. Considered more broadly:

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8 The Commander's Dashboard requires electronic data sources.
“A positive relationship with the American people based on mutual trust and respect is the life-blood of the Army Profession. The Army builds and sustains such trust through the active and continuous presence of the essential characteristics of the Profession. Only by military effectiveness, performed through honorable service, by an Army with high levels of trustworthiness and esprit de corps, and with members who steward the Profession’s future and self-regulate the Profession to maintain its integrity – can the Army be a military profession that the American people trust to support and defend the Constitution and their rights and national interests.” (The Army Profession, 2011)

This change in command philosophy should not mean, however, that Soldiers must have “zero defects” to be successful in the Army. On the contrary, the perception that any known defect will hurt a Soldier’s career may already exist and fuel stigma regarding help seeking. This could dissuade Soldiers from seeking the help they need, which allows the situation to deteriorate. A zero defects expectation may also deter others from reporting serious behavior, such as those required by the Army’s Threat Awareness and Reporting Program (TARP, Army Regulation 381-12, 2010), (e.g., expressing a duty to engage in violence against DoD or the United States in support of an international terrorist cause, or repeated involvement in security violations). Rectifying the zero defects perception will require trust that issues will be handled appropriately. This will no doubt be challenging, particularly in light of the forthcoming downsizing of the force.

It will be critical to balance the constructive aspects of the Army’s longstanding tradition of giving personnel an opportunity for a fresh start with commanders’ need for greater situational awareness. Prudent consideration of implications for command philosophy, Army operations, and unintended negative effects is needed to ensure changes are necessary and consistent with the Army’s strategic direction (e.g., Army Campaign Plan).

**Potential Response to Fort Hood Follow-on Recommendation 2.9**

Preliminary findings indicated that counseling statement records are likely to contain information indicating that Soldiers are troubled. In many cases, personnel who intend to do harm do not commit a crime but may misbehave in other ways that are noticed by supervisors or commanders. In these instances, counseling statements, created by the supervisor or commander, may be the only record of the misconduct. Retaining counseling statement records for a longer period of time and connecting them across a Soldier’s assigned units should help illuminate patterns of troubling behavior. Although not explicitly stated by the DoD Independent Review of the Fort Hood attack (2010), this idea is consistent with finding 2.9 from that report:
“DoD and Service guidance does not provide for maintaining and transferring all relevant information about contributing factors and behavioral indicators throughout Service members’ careers.”

Corresponding recommendations include:

- **2.9a:** “Review what additional information (e.g., information about accession waivers, substance abuse, minor law enforcement infractions, conduct waivers) should be maintained throughout Service members’ careers as they change duty locations, deploy, and re-enlist.”

- **2.9b:** “Develop supporting policies and procedures for commanders and supervisors to access this information.”

The Secretary of Defense released the Final Recommendations of the *Fort Hood Follow-on Review* in August 2010. Recommendation 2.9 reiterated the importance of commanders having greater visibility into Service member behavior, particularly behavior that undermines good order and discipline or indicates a potential insider threat to DoD and its personnel (Secretary of Defense, 2010). Giving commanders access to counseling statement records from previous duty locations via the Commander’s Dashboard could be a partial response to recommendation 2.9. It approaches the issue from a different perspective, however; rather than assuming this information should travel with Soldiers throughout their military careers (i.e., stored in the AMHRR), critical information documented in counseling statements becomes less local, less temporary, and available to gaining commanders when appropriate9 (Zegart, 2011).

In September 2010, the Secretary of Defense directed the Chiefs of the Military Services and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine procedures for appropriate documentation of behaviors detrimental to good order and discipline, particularly those that could be associated with violence, prohibited activities, and potential harm to self or others. The working group assembled to deal with this issue concluded that current programs, processes, and procedures sufficiently document violent conduct, but several gaps remain: (1) commanders and supervisors lack visibility on patterns of Service member conduct and reporting mechanisms; and (2) clear definitions and procedures for responding to violent behavior are needed (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011). The DSB report (2012) notes:

> “While the PVB TF supports this finding of adequate documentation, documentation without adequate access to the information contained in the documentation does not solve the problem identified by the

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9 In March 2010, the Human Resource Management (HRM) Community of Interest charted a Task Force (Military Personnel Records Information Management, MPRIM) to address recommendation 2.9a. The Task Force concluded that the AMHRR should not be used to track high risk behaviors for increased commander visibility of those indicators (MPRIM Task Force report, 2010).
Secretary. The TF felt more needs to be done to give commanders more visibility into information concerning individuals transferring from a losing location. At present, each new assignment for an individual represents a “clean slate” whereby concerning behaviors is not documented across assignments, patterns get lost, and prevention becomes significantly more challenging” (p. 37).

The DSB report (2012) recommends a threat management approach to address these gaps. Threat Management Units (TMUs) are cross-functional, multi-disciplinary teams of specially trained professionals that work to prevent targeted violence. In the DoD context, TMUs would support commanders and supervisors by assessing and responding to potentially threatening situations. DoD TMUs would likely fill the gaps described above when Service members are engaging in behaviors that would be reported to the TMU (i.e., possible targeted violence). However, it may not be appropriate to engage a TMU when less severe behaviors are observed. In these situations, information recorded on counseling statements or other local records should be retained, provided to the gaining chain of command when necessary, and appropriately addressed. A threat management approach for preventing targeted violence complements commander processes and tools, such as the Commander’s Dashboard.

On the other hand, access to local records, such as counseling statements, might assist TMUs in evaluating risk and response options. The Fort Hood Webster Report (2012) made a similar argument regarding Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) access to local personnel records:

“WFO-TFO did not have access to files maintained locally by Army command. As a result, he was unaware of the Army’s issues with Hasan. We believe that DoD should examine whether DoD participants in the JTTF program should have full access to all DoD personnel records” (p. 80).

DoD may want to consider granting TMU and JTTF staff access to local records such as counseling statements.

**Protecting Against Unintended Negative Effects**

Although improving commander access to counseling statements has great potential to help commanders manage their personnel more effectively and efficiently, all reasonable steps should be taken to prevent unintended negative consequences from materializing. For instance, counseling statements must be protected from unauthorized access, unauthorized disclosure, and other misuse. Procedural and technical safeguards will be critical to ensure all privacy, civil liberties, and other legal and regulatory concerns are adequately addressed. Army leaders will need to be trained in using this information appropriately and must be held accountable for violations. Substantial legal review will be needed to satisfy all of these requirements.
In addition, it is possible that providing counseling statement records to gaining commanders could lead to a decrease in reporting or documentation of incidents in counseling statements. One of the most salient barriers to documenting problematic behaviors is that fellow Soldiers frequently do not report warning signs. Some personnel may be uncomfortable reporting or documenting problematic behaviors because they are concerned the information will be used inappropriately, cause lasting harm to the Soldier, or be unnecessarily harsh. Even when troubling behavior is reported, the leader may hesitate to record it on DA Form 4856. Perceptions regarding the consequences of reporting or documenting problematic behaviors are likely influenced by what has been seen or heard with other cases, so it will be critical to frame these changes as a tool to help develop Soldiers, and not as a way to “blacklist” Soldiers.
Preliminary findings indicated that commanders have limited visibility into their subordinates’ patterns of negative and positive behavior, and that digitizing counseling statement records and storing them in a centralized repository for gaining commanders would address this challenge. However, additional research is needed to demonstrate that counseling statement records contain important and unique information needed by gaining commanders. For instance, a random sample of counseling statement records could be examined to identify positive and negative behaviors that should be retained and shared with gaining commanders. Analysis could also address the prevalence and importance of these behaviors, as well as how commanders intend to use the information. This analysis could focus on active duty, junior enlisted personnel (i.e., specialists and below in the Regular Army) in the garrison environment as these Soldiers are the biggest concentration and source of concern for commanders.

Field interviews could generate and vet potential solutions. Interviews would need to address a number of important issues, such as the counseling process and DA Form 4856. If counseling statement records are incorporated into the Commander’s Dashboard, DA Form 4856 itself, and the way the NCO completes it might need to be modified. For example, interviews indicated that although it may be important to provide counseling records to the gaining commander, reviewing these records would create a considerable time burden. One possible solution might lie in a filtering system that would parse the counseling records and identify Soldiers who meet certain thresholds. Given the qualitative nature of information that DA Form 4856 gathers, it would be challenging to implement a system of this sort with the current form. Perhaps a web-based DA Form 4856, enhanced with a filtering function, would allow gaining commanders to examine relevant information without the additional time burden. Field interviews could also address where to store data (i.e., centralized repository), how to transmit data to the dashboard, how information should be presented on the dashboard, and how long to retain it (e.g., 5 years).

Careful consideration should also be given to determining who has access to the information and under what circumstances. The DA Form 4856 privacy act statement, DUAs, and SORNS may need to be modified. Moreover, a change to an existing system of records, such as local Army personnel records, may require extra steps and protections for individuals. For example, the Army might be required to institute a process by which individuals can change (or at least appeal) information contained in these files. A Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) may also be required.

A feasible course of action could then be developed and briefed to the APPBOD for their consideration. If approved by the APPBOD, the requirements would be pilot tested in the Commander’s Dashboard, refined, and fielded.
POTENTIAL FUTURE EXPANSIONS

There are a number of ways the AWARE project could be expanded in the future. For instance, the same concept could be expanded to other populations within the Army—NCOs, commissioned officers, warrant officers, Army civilians, National Guard, and Army Reserves. The need for greater commander situational awareness may be especially great with the reserve component. Likewise, AWARE might be applied to the other military services.

The process used in the current project could also be applied to other sources or types of information that commanders need to manage their personnel. There may be a need to integrate and streamline the various data commanders receive and to improve the presentation of that information. Depending on the Army’s vision for the Commander’s Dashboard, data from counseling statement records could be incorporated into risk algorithms for real time risk ratings, alerts, and recommended actions. Information from counseling statement records might also be appropriate for other Army and DoD risk management systems and decisions.
REFERENCES


REFERENCES


APPENDIX A:

POLICY AND OTHER SOURCES USED
DOD ISSUANCES


APPENDIX A


DoD Instruction 1304.23., Acquisition and Use of Criminal History Record Information for Military Recruiting Purposes, October 7, 2005.


DoD Instruction 1308.3., DoD Physical Fitness and Body Fat Programs Procedures, November 5, 2002.


DoD Instruction 5240.10., Counterintelligence (CI) in the Combatant Commands and Other DoD Components, October 5, 2011.


DoD Instruction 6025.18., Privacy of Identifiable Health Information in DoD Health Care Programs, December 2, 2009.

DoD Instruction 6025.19., Individual Medical Readiness (IMR), January 3, 2006.

DoD Instruction 6040.43., Custody and Control of Outpatient Medical Records, June 10, 2004.

DoD Instruction 6043.45., Service Treatment Record (STR) and Non-Service Treatment Record (NSTR) Life Cycle Management, October 28, 2010.

DoD Instruction 6490.05., *Maintenance of Psychological Health in Military Operations*, November 22, 2011.


DoD Instruction 6490.08., *Command Notification Requirements to Dispel Stigma in Providing Mental Health Care to Service Members*, August 17, 2011.

DoD Instruction 6490.10., *Continuity of Behavioral Health Care for Transferring and Transitioning Service Members*, March 26, 2012.


**CJCS ISSUANCES**

CJCS Instruction 3405.01. *Chairman’s Total Force Fitness Framework*, September 1, 2011.

**ARMY ISSUANCES**


APPENDIX A


**REFERENCE LIST USED TO COMPILE INDICATORS**

**SUICIDE**


National Security Affairs. Attachment. Revised adjudicative guidelines for determining eligibility for access to classified information.


WORKPLACE VIOLENCE


ESPIONAGE

Army Regulation 381-12, Threat Awareness and Reporting Program, 4 October 2010.

Department of Defense Directive 5240.06, Counterintelligence Awareness and Reporting (CIAR), May 17, 2011.
APPENDIX A


**TERRORISM**

A. Griggs, personal communication, May 18, 2011.

Army Regulation 381-12, *Threat Awareness and Reporting Program*, 4 October 2010.


R.J. Heuer Jr., personal communication, (n.d.), *List of Terrorism Indicators*.

**DISREGARD FOR SECURITY PRACTICES**


**OTHER DOCUMENTS**


Commission on The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterterrorism Intelligence, and the Events at Fort Hood, Texas, on November 5, 2009. (2012). *Final Report*. Washington, DC: Author. [*This is the Webster report*]


APPENDIX A


Secretary of the Army. (2012) *Memorandum: Draft Army Directive 2012-XX (Secretary of the Army (SA) directive authorizing commanders to receive criminal history reports from Army law enforcement reporting systems).* Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of the Army.


APPENDIX B:

COUNSELING STATEMENT RECORD - DA FORM 4856
DEVELOPMENTAL COUNSELING FORM
For use of this form, see FM 6-22; the proponent agency is TRADOC.

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: 5 USC 301, Departmental Regulations; 10 USC 3013, Secretary of the Army.
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To assist leaders in conducting and recording counseling data pertaining to subordinates.
ROUTINE USES: The DoD Blanket Routine Uses set forth at the beginning of the Army's compilation of systems or records notices also apply to this system.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure is voluntary.

**PART I - ADMINISTRATIVE DATA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (Last, First, Ml)</th>
<th>Rank/Grade</th>
<th>Date of Counseling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Name and Title of Counselor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PART II - BACKGROUND INFORMATION**

Purpose of Counseling: (Leader states the reason for the counseling; e.g. Performance/Professional or Event-Oriented counseling, and includes the leader's facts and observations prior to the counseling.)

**PART III - SUMMARY OF COUNSELING**

Complete this section during or immediately subsequent to counseling.

Key Points of Discussion:

OTHER INSTRUCTIONS

This form will be destroyed upon: reassignment (other than rehabilitative transfers), separation at ETS, or upon retirement. For separation requirements and notification of loss of benefits/consequences see local directives and AR 625-200.

Figure B-1 DA Form 4856—August 2010
### Plan of Action

(Outlines actions that the subordinate will do after the counseling session to reach the agreed upon goal(s). The actions must be specific enough to modify or maintain the subordinate’s behavior and include a specified time line for implementation and assessment (Part IV below).)

### Session Closing

(The leader summarizes the key points of the session and checks if the subordinate understands the plan of action. The subordinate agrees/disagrees and provides remarks if appropriate.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual counseled:</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree with the information above.</th>
<th>Individual counseled remarks:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signature of Individual Counseled:</th>
<th>Date:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Leader Responsibilities:** (Leader’s responsibilities in implementing the plan of action.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signature of Counselor:</th>
<th>Date:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Part IV - Assessment of the Plan of Action

(Does the plan of action achieve the desired results? This section is completed by both the leader and the individual counseled and provides useful information for follow-up counseling.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counselor:</th>
<th>Individual Counseled:</th>
<th>Date of Assessment:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Note:** Both the counselor and the individual counseled should retain a record of the counseling.