WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME: WHERE AND HOW DOES THE MILITARY FIT IN?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategic Studies

by

LEAH B. HALLER, MAJOR, US ARMY
B.A., University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, 2002

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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Whole of Government Approach to Transnational Organized Crime: Where and How Does the Military Fit In?

Transnational crime is a recognized threat to national security, mostly due to their relation to terrorist organizations. The President has called for a Whole of Government approach to combatting the threat from Transnational Organized Crime (TOC). The Strategy written in 2011 illustrates the differences of TOCs in the different geo-political regions, however, it does not illustrate in detail the varying degrees of influence the military, and specifically the Army, will have in each of these regions, as a part of the whole of government principle. The focus of this study is on identifying the role of the Army in combating TOC. It will identify the role of the TOC in the growth of terrorist organizations, and identify when is the best time to affect criminal organizations to protect our national interests.
Name of Candidate: MAJ Leah B. Haller

Thesis Title: Whole of Government Approach to Transnational Organized Crime: Where and How Does the Military Fit In?

Approved by:

Jack D. Kem, Ph.D., Thesis Committee Chair
Brian Leakey, M.S., Member
LTC Michelle M. E. Garcia, M.S., Member

Accepted this 12th day of June 2015 by:

Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D., Director, Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME: WHERE AND HOW DOES THE MILITARY FIT IN? by MAJ Leah B. Haller, 72 pages.

Transnational crime is a recognized threat to national security, mostly due to their relation to terrorist organizations. The President has called for a Whole of Government approach to combatting the threat from Transnational Organized Crime (TOC). The Strategy written in 2011 illustrates the differences of TOCs in the different geo-political regions, however, it does not illustrate in detail the varying degrees of influence the military, and specifically the Army, will have in each of these regions, as a part of the whole of government principle. The focus of this study is on identifying the role of the Army in combatting TOC. It will identify the role of the TOC in the growth of terrorist organizations, and identify when is the best time to affect criminal organizations to protect our national interests.
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<td>AFL</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Liberia</td>
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<td>DIME</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

America’s role in the world, from its inception, has been to be the country that looks forward, not back... Europeans and others often love to make fun of American optimism and naïveté—our crazy notion that every problem has a solution, that tomorrow can be better than yesterday, that the future can always bury the past. But I have always believed that deep down the rest of the world envies that American optimism. It is one of the things that help keep the world spinning on its axis. If we go dark as a society, if we stop being the world’s “dream factory,” we will make the world not only a darker place but also a poorer place.

—Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat

Problem Background

The concept of Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) as a threat to national security began in the 80’s along with the end of the cold war (Edwards and Gill 2003, 13). The arrests and deaths of the leaders of the United States organized crime syndicates along with the amendment of prohibition laws weakened the stronghold of organized crime within the U.S. borders. However, crime was still rising, and the globalization of nations and their interactions brought organized crime to an international level (Edwards and Gill 2003, 8).

The changes in U.S. national strategy after the devastating events of September 11th were numerous and profound. “Initially it seemed that the impact of the attacks . . . and the subsequent ‘war on terrorism’ might return TOC to the relative obscurity it had enjoyed prior to 1991” (Edwards and Gill 2003, 4). However, that was not to be. Transnational Crime and its link to terrorist organizations and funding became a much bigger threat to our nation. Because of this, the Commander in Chief has developed a
new strategy to combat the particular difficulties in dealing with TOC. “The expanding size, scope, and influence of transnational organized crime and its impact on us and international security and governance represent one of the most significant of [the] challenges [of the 21st century]” (Obama 2011).

The concern over TOC is the convergence of criminal organizations, transnational movement, and the occasional mutual benefit they receive from alliance to terrorist organizations. This Strategy against this threat is “organized around a single unifying principle: to build, balance, and integrate the tools of American power to combat transnational organized crime and related threats to national security—and to urge our foreign partners to do the same” (Obama 2011, 1).

Along with an emphasis on this emerging threat, the U.S. national strategy addresses these problems by using a whole of government approach. Though the military will not take the lead in this effort, the role of the military will be one of support. The problem is how the U.S. military will effectively integrate with the strategy, or whether or not the military should be involved at all in this mission. The emergence of Regionally Aligned Forces for the military also presents a challenge for inter-cooperation amongst Combatant Commanders (COCOM), as TOC by its definition works beyond the boundaries of nation-states. If the military participates in a whole-of-government approach, the regional alignment of forces must be considered. Coordination will occur at the strategic level, and areas such as logistics and intelligence will require multiple coordinated efforts in order to be effective. This is normal during many different operations; the question is whether the cost-benefit is good enough to warrant such an effort.
Problem Statement

Transnational crime is a recognized threat to national security, mostly due to their relation to terrorist organizations. The President has called for a Whole of Government approach to combatting the threat from Transnational Organized Crime (TOC). The Strategy, written in 2011, illustrates the differences of TOCs in the different geo-political regions. There is a brief description of what the current threat trends are, and a cursory explanation of how to combat their influence in those regions. It does not discuss in detail the varying means to achieve these ends. For instance, what type of influence the military, specifically the Army, will have in each of these regions as a part of the ‘whole of government’ approach. The focus of this study is on identifying the role of the military in combatting TOC. It will identify the role of the TOC in the growth of terrorist organizations, and identify when is the best time to affect criminal organizations to protect our national interests.

Purpose of the Study

Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) affects United States National interests in a multitude of ways as illustrated in The Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. One of these effects is the ability to delay the formation of Democratic institutions in new or weaker nation-states. Two characteristics of international crime are exploiting the differences between countries to further their objectives, and attempting to gain influence in government, politics, and commerce through corrupt as well as legitimate means (Obama 2011, 3-4). International crime directly hinders the formation of a free nation in that it corrupts leadership, denies the security of its populations, and prevents freedom of action.
A recent case study on Kosovo and Liberia addresses the impacts of TOC on peacebuilding efforts by the international community (Teran 2007). The main concern of TOC in the United States is twofold, their relationship to terrorism, and their ability to slow down or hinder the forming of nations and those nations Democratic growth. The U.S. Army has the role of defending the security of the United States, as well as promoting peace internationally. Therefore, the Army should have a clearly defined mission against TOC, which complements the whole government approach, and supports peacebuilding in post-conflict nations.

The current strategic approach to combatting terrorism does not clearly identify the role of the Army. In order to properly affect TOC using the military the strategy must include an operational approach that ties in with military made plans. This approach should address clear ends, ways and means to accomplish this goal, and the measures of effectiveness must include the effects on terrorist organizations, and the benefits to the establishment of democratic institutions in these nation-states.

**Research Questions**

The primary question for this thesis is “Does the military have a role in combatting transnational organized crime?” If the answer is yes, the military must then determine what that role will be, and who will ultimately be responsible for the mission of the military. Finally, this thesis will identify the strength and resources that the military will provide in order to follow through with the intent and validity of the primary question. Is this a mission that should be included in the general tasks and purposes of the military? Some questions that have to be answered in relation to organized crime are the
U.S. shared definition of these organizations, and what is the U.S. national security threat that TOC poses?

Significance

Understanding that transnational crime is a direct threat to U.S. national interests, and that TOC is often a confluence of additional threats, such as terrorist organizations is important to understanding the interest the U.S. has to combatting TOC. Targeting TOC’s is important to assist regional stability, promote strengthening of nations, and defend the United States against growing threats. But who will take on this daunting task?

In the United States, it is the responsibility of law enforcement to defend against criminal organizations of every kind, domestic or international. When the U.S. works with partner nations, or helps an unstable region, the policies of that nation may not be the same. Oftentimes the military is required to combat crime, especially when those criminals are highly organized, well-funded, established in the local communities, and have connections to other criminal organizations, and work cross borders.

This case study will assist in understanding how governments have dealt with TOC in the past, where they have been successful, and when the nation applies a whole of government approach. This will help shape the concept of whole of government approach to TOC, and identify the roles of the military specifically.

Limitations

The use of case studies to define the whole of government approach will constrain this thesis to a qualitative approach. While quantitative analysis may assist in evaluating the success of differing approaches to combat TOC, this study is focused on defining the
role of the military in the whole of government approach. Qualitative analysis provides a better in-depth look at lessons learned from previous experiences to determine a future course of action.

TOC is an ongoing problem, so new information is developing throughout this study. The cutoff for research used in the project is February 2015. Anything of ultimate relevance after that will be annotated in the conclusion, but not addressed in depth. Because this is an ongoing threat, the primary purpose of this project is to define the capabilities and desire of the United States to combat TOC, and therefore will be applicable for some time without real-time case studies included.

**Delimitations**

This study is limited to the specific regions addressed in the case studies. It would be next to impossible to research every area that is dealing with a problem in TOC, nor is every TOC organization a direct threat to U.S. National interests. This thesis will not address TOC organizations that are not capable or willing to coordinate their efforts with terrorist organizations, as that is the immediate threat addressed by the President in the NDS.

The researcher’s experience is dealing with terrorist organizations and targeting insurgencies as a military intelligence officer in the Armed Forces. Organized crime is often targeted as a financial resource for belligerents. The researchers experience in the military and observations with border patrol introduced the need to further study this topic and further define the role of the military in combatting TOC.
Theoretical Framework

This research project will use case studies from four different examples, regionally in Mexico and Colombia, and internationally in Western Africa (Liberia and Nigeria) and Kosovo to describe the different threats TOC presents. After identifying the threat, each case study looks at the methods used to combat these threats. The evaluation criteria will focus on each specific case to determine the validity of the case study results and whether or not it will apply to multiple circumstances. Finally I will look at the resources available, specifically military, to combat those threats, whether or not they have additional requirements that may conflict with the mission of TOC; and how best to use them without further straining an already heavily burdened defense system such as the U.S. military. The majority of the case studies come from military databases, specifically DTIC online library resource, with a few sources found on a google search.

Operational Definitions

There are a number of terms that need to be defined within the context of the topic. These definitions are:

Instruments of National Power: The ability of the US to advance its national interests is dependent on the effectiveness of the United States Government (USG) in employing the instruments of national power to achieve national strategic objectives. The appropriate governmental officials, often with NSC direction, normally coordinate the employment of instruments of national power. These are Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic (DIME) (Department of Defense 2013, xi).

Interagency Coordination: Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense,
and engaged U.S. Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. See also international organization; nongovernmental organizations (Department of Defense 2015, 123).

**Transnational Organized Crime:** refers to those self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate transnationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary and/or commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means, while protecting their activities through a pattern of corruption and/or violence, or while protecting their illegal activities through a transnational organizational structure and the exploitation of transnational commerce or communication mechanisms (Obama 2011, intro).

**Whole of Government Approach:** Strengthening national capacity involves departments responsible for security, and political and economic affairs, as well as those responsible for development aid and humanitarian assistance. Whole of government embraces adaptive organizations to assist in any mission, and visualize the intent of the national security strategy to shape their capabilities. The military is not only responsible for conventional missions, but stability operations, and support for civil authorities at home (Obama 2010, 14).

**Summary**

In order to survive as a global leader, the U.S. must use the whole of government approach effectively; every department should work to accomplish the goals in a symbiotic manner, and eliminate planning in a vacuum. This becomes increasingly important as the resources available become constrained. In the current economic situation the military is facing, it becomes increasingly important to maximize the
capability of all the nations’ organizations. The whole of government approach, if done properly, can accomplish this. If conducted poorly, however, this concept can lead to duplication of effort, isolation, and confusion.

Chapter 2 will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each case study and the resources used to understand and strengthen each case. This chapter will be organized parallel to chapter four, and will address the importance of the research in framing the problem and identifying conclusions.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction
The intent of the literature review is to help frame the investigative process to answer the question “Does the military have a role in combatting transnational organized crime?” There is a consensus among the sources that a whole-of government approach to TOC is essential in achieving some success. The questions arise in how to frame such an approach so that it becomes a feasible and acceptable plan, and what means are used in order to achieve the goals. There is also some discrepancy as to what those goals are. As part of the thematic analysis, this thesis uses multiple sources related to TOC from around the world, and examines four specific case studies of regions that have been struggling to overcome their own problems with criminal organizations. These case studies demonstrate possible solutions to TOC, and evaluate lessons learned from unique situations. While each case study does not necessarily focus on the military role against TOC, most of the literature deals at least partially in military affairs, and consolidating each idea will help to form the concept of how the military operates in this strategy.

There is one intentional exclusion in the course of the research of organized crime in the U.S. During the turn of the century, the United States organized crime institutions, or mafia, did not fit into the criteria for TOC analysis. While they operated outside of national boundaries, their case is unique enough that it does not apply to a general strategy against TOC. The cases and sources used vary greatly in order to create a general trend of combatting TOC. This will create a basis for the best method to combat TOC worldwide, and determine if the military is included in that best method. This will also
have to include the degree that TOC is a threat to National Interests, and at what level it no longer becomes a threat.

There have been numerous sources created in relation to TOC, with complete books written on the subject. All sources deal with identifying exactly why TOC is a problem, and the majority of the sources agree that most transnational criminal organizations have at least some ties to the terrorist world. Each of these sources attempt to answer the ambiguous nature of transnational criminal organizations. Some of the specific issues they address, for instance, are (1) what constitutes a TOC, (2) when a TOC falls under international legal consideration, and (3) how to combat TOCs. The answers to these questions vary slightly with each literary source, so it is important to define TOC for the purposes of common understanding. After creating this shared understanding, this thesis attempts to illustrate how the U.S. will use their influence in the international community not just for immediate national interest, but further strategic requirements as well.

The first part of this chapter will look at defining the concept of transnational organized crime using international and local sources combined and begin a cursory look at the strategies hypothesized in each source. The second part will look at four distinct case studies: Colombia, Mexico, Liberia and Kosovo. Each case study has multiple sources to provide an unbiased look at the region.

Transnational Organized Crime in the U.S., Europe, and Abroad

The research paper “The United States Military’s Role in Combating Transnational Organized Crime” by Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Boston researches the role
of the military in combatting TOC. He particularly looks at the current United States policies on combatting TOC, and attempts to translate them into operational plans implemented at the Ground Combatant Commander (GCC) level. This will be the basis for bridging the gap from strategic to operational level understanding.

His discussion of the *confluence* of Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCO) and Violent Extremists Organizations (VEO) help to frame his theory that the Department of Defense (DoD) has a valid role in the targeting and elimination of these organizations. LTC Boston attempts to clarify not whether the military has a role, but what that role should be, specifically what type of supporting role the GCCs will have in combatting TOC. “This ad-hoc policy without fiscal authority may not be successful in promoting unity of effort, better sequencing of operations, synchronized security cooperation, and other initiatives” (Boston 2013, 7).

There is also the very real threat that criminal organizations provide much of the funding for terrorist organizations and activity. Therefore, to some degree every VEO has some ties to TOC or is conducting or orchestrating their own criminal activities to help pay for their attacks. Therefore, any nations that can decrease the amount of criminal activity conducted within their borders can decrease the threat of terrorist organizations developing a foothold.

Generally financed under Title 22 USC, the international assistance budget finances foreign military financing, International Military Education and Training, international narcotics control and law enforcement, and peacekeeping operations.49 However, none of the authorities described above permit the United States Military to advise or assist partner nation dual use forces or law enforcement agencies outside of Plan Colombia or named conflict zones in Iraq and Afghanistan. (Boston 2013, 7)
The *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime*, written into policy by President Obama, talks about the need of the military to support defense against TOCs as part of a whole of government approach. Boston posits that the strategy is too generic, and therefore is not useful to the military Combatant Commanders (COCOM). Boston’s thesis attempts to bridge the gap between the strategic plan of the white house to an operational and actionable plan for the COCOMs. This thesis is not as concerned about the actionable concepts of TOC combat, but the role of the U.S. military in executing defense is key to understanding why the whole of government approach is important, and whether it is worthwhile.

The documents *National Security Strategy* and *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security* are the current security strategy for national security and combatting terrorism. The *National Security Strategy* of 2015 directly addresses the threat of TOC against our National interests. In the *National Security Strategy*, President Obama outlines four enduring national interests: security, prosperity, respect for universal values, and the shaping of an international order that can meet the challenges of the 21st century. “The expanding size, scope, and influence of transnational organized crime and its impact on U.S. and international security and governance represent one of the most significant of those challenges” (Obama 2015, 10).

*The Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime* identifies the “convergence of transnational threats that has evolved to become more complex, volatile, and destabilizing” threat to the U.S. This compels the administration to address these issues with some priority. An Interagency Threat Mitigation Working Group is
responsible for prioritizing TOC networks for targeting in the interest of national security. The prioritized networks receive a strategy for mitigating the threat once they identify the TOC networks. There are 56 priority actions in the Strategy to Combat TOC; all of them use a whole of government approach.

The book *Transnational Organized Crime: Perspectives on Global Security* is a good starting point for understanding the history of Transnational Organized Crime. This compilation of articles discusses the origins of TOC, how it became an internationally recognized threat, how it has historically been dealt with the effectiveness of the combat strategies against TOC. Ultimately, this book uses strategic conferences and policies to identify what the TOC threat is specifically for the European Union. The example from Europe can assist the U.S. in determining whether TOC is a threat to national security, or if the security of a nation creates the demand for criminal organizations in the first place. If crime is merely an extension of organized society, how does a nation combat that? In addition, is it even a threat worth addressing? These compiled articles work to answer these and other questions using the Post 9-11 symposium and the experts involved to come to the best conclusions. Finally, these articles discuss the importance of intelligence organizations and international criminal law policies as the primary combatants to TOC.

**Case Study: Colombia**

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the third largest department in the government today. They have the auspicious job of protecting our borders without the assistance of the military due to Posse Comitatus. There is one exception: Plan Colombia. This concept is a success story of how the whole of government concept can lead to a
marked decrease in violence, crime, and terrorism in an unstable nation with a weakened government.

A few sources such as *Democracy and Plan Colombia* and *Colombia’s Catastrophic Success* discuss the implications of why the anti-crime campaign was so successful in Colombia, eluding to its ties to the counter-insurgency campaign as a source of power and resources necessary to combat the drug trade. A few other sources such as *Plan Colombia: The Hidden Front in the U.S. Drug War* and *The Geopolitics of Colombia* tend to argue that the success claims may be premature, and that while improvements have been made there is still very much a clandestine presence of illicit activity and threat to the security of Colombia. Finally, the question brought up is what is the U.S. goal in Colombia? Is it to stabilize the country, or to prevent the drugs from entering the U.S.? This question applies to all regional nations dealing with criminality, but not as much the international examples.

The shared U.S.-Mexico border is an immediate threat area for crime. U.S. strategy towards combating TOC puts emphasis on the role of Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and protecting our Homeland in particular. Cilluffo addresses the problems in Mexico in his article “The Hybrid Threat Crime, Terrorism and Insurgency in Mexico” of protecting its own interests, and defending the border. It also addresses the symbiotic relationship of crime, terrorism, and insurgency.

Cilluffo posits that the successes in Colombia could potentially translate to Mexico. He also suggest that the efforts in Mexico should be more pronounced as the proximity lends more weight as a national security threat to the United States. The ability to enact a plan such as Plan Colombia would require a reliance and assessed strength in
the Mexican government itself that it can both stand up for itself and be strong enough to govern, and that they are willing to cooperate with such an intrusive involvement of the U.S. Perhaps the biggest problem is that there is no dedication in Mexico right now to remove criminal organizations from their footholds in the nation, as they are responsible for 19-35 billion dollars of commerce.

**Case Study: Mexico**

*U.S.-Mexico Defense Relations: An Incompatible Interface* talks about a disparity in the role of the military to combat crime within a nation. In Mexico, the president has assigned the mission of combating the DTOs and organized crime to the military. This can cause a problem when working with our Mexican counterparts, because we do not and should not use the military when combatting crime within our borders. The FBI and homeland defense become increasingly important to demonstrate the proper methods of dealing with DTOs and crime. Because the military is the lead in Mexico, the U.S. military should provide a training and mentorship partnership, similar to Plan Colombia.

*Partnering With Mexico to Fight Transnational Organized Crime* provides a legal prospective to combat criminal organizations. This instrument of power must be considered in any whole-of-government approach, and this periodical offers a good example of a success. The constraint is that it does not demonstrate how that means can tie in to the rest of the instruments of power, or show interagency communication.

*Organized Crime and Terrorist Activity in Mexico: 1999-2002* sets the stage for understanding how organized crime is linked to terrorism in Mexico, and the threat to national interests because of it. It does not provide recommendations or even comments.
on how to combat the criminal organizations or to break the ties with terrorism that are increasing in scope.

MAJ Juan Nava did a research paper that talks about the possibility that the increase in criminal activity in Mexico is not a threat to national security and interests; rather it is a by-product of the Mexican government strength and solidification of control over their nation. If this is the case, then he posits in this article, *Narco-Crime in Mexico: Indication of State Failure or Symptoms of an Emerging Democracy?*, that combatting TOC is not of national interest in this case.

**Peacebuilding and Organized Crime: The Cases of Kosovo and Liberia**

This is a case study of two emerging democratic nation-states and the role that organized crime plays in challenging peace and stability before, during, and after the conflict. This document addresses the responsibilities of the United Nations and peacekeeping operations.

There are different categories of organized crime addressed in the case study. This demonstrates the unique position of TOC in each instance. Each circumstance is unique, so the criminal organizations are unique. However, even in these two very different areas, similarities emerge that can help determine what organizational characteristics the U.S. can target in order to prevent their operations. While there are many trends, each organization works differently. To truly combat TOC, it must be dealt with as each individual case, and no worldwide strategy will prove to eliminate TOC from existence.
Conclusion

There are a great many book and articles written on transnational organized crime. Most attempt to define the threat, and determine how to eliminate the threat using local law enforcement agencies and an advisory role. The primary role of the military is not to advise law enforcement, though some of that is done as a part of stability operations. Some law enforcement organizations have strict rules preventing them from training with military personnel in order to prevent militarization. So does the military have a role in combatting TOC? This thesis will attempt to answer that question in the upcoming chapters. Chapter 3 will discuss the methodology used to answer the primary and secondary questions.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Instead of starting from theories and then testing them, research is increasingly forced to make use of inductive strategies: in the process, “sensitizing concepts” are required for approaching the social context to be studied. But here, theories are developed from empirical studies.

—Uwe Flick, An Introduction to Qualitative Research

Does the military have a role in combatting transnational organized crime? The best answer for this question is derived from a thematic approach to historical precedence in the United States and elsewhere. There is a great importance to studying previous examples of combating TOCs, even outside the U.S. to determine if there are any significant lessons learned from the case studies. This can give U.S. a perspective on how TOCs are combated by other nations, whether or not the use of the military is a force multiplier or a hindrance to effective defense. This chapter will help identify what method is used to answer the question of whether or not the military has a role in combating TOC and determine what that might be.

“The goal of research . . . then is to discover and explore the new and to develop empirically grounded theories” (Flick 2014, 16). The problem identified in this thesis is that National Strategy on Combating Terrorism does not clearly illustrate a role for the military. In order to determine if the military has a role and what that role should be, I will examine case studies that address TOC, and see if previous cases have lessons learned that could be applied to the current situation. This thesis will look at examples Mexico for its proximal threat to the U.S., and examples of other countries to see the
relevance of using the military to combat these organizations, and how effective they will be in deterring other threats.

After gathering the historical data, it will be important to determine the legitimacy of the findings; how they can be applied to the role of the military. Dr. Jack Kem writes in his book, *Planning for Action: Campaign Concepts and Tools*, that there are three factors for Coalition Forces to determine the legitimacy of accomplishing the national strategic end state. First, any operation should reinforce authority of the host nation and international community. Second, it must be conducted according to international laws and treaties of the U.S. and coalition partners. Finally, the operation must be conducted under U.S. law.

These criteria can be applied to the way coalition or U.S. forces will operate against TOC. Each of the case studies examined will include using these legitimacy criteria to evaluate and rank the operations in each region. Once legitimacy has been determined, the case studies will be evaluated based on their capacity to combat TOC, and finally, how the military is used to achieve that.

**Data Collection**

There are so many references on TOC already built, as it has become a joint venture for the world’s nations to overcome since the fall of the Berlin Wall (Edwards and Gill 2003, 3). The United States is at the forefront of policy making, due to the internal struggle and ultimately overcoming the organized crime syndicates operating out of their own borders. The current U.S. policies have been updated since the terrorist attacks on the twin towers, and are the basis for this research project to define the strategies currently used in combatting TOC.
This thesis will use the literature available on TOC, along with the current U.S. administrations’ policies to determine the outcome of this strategy, whether it is valid, or whether it should consider modification. This thesis will also look at the current economic situation in the U.S. to determine the priorities of this threat in line with other national security interests and determine whether strategies can be used in conjunction, or reduced effort will produce the desired end state.

**Data Analysis**

This data will be analyzed using historical precedence, and a thematic analysis of separate cases using textual evidence from multiple sources. The variety of the sources will assist in developing emerging trends that can apply to different and future scenarios. The military uses an Operational Approach to help conceptualize and attain a desired end state for a mission (Department of the Army 2012, 4-2). Using the Army design methodology, chapter 4 will describe the current operational environment of U.S. policy against TOC. Then will look at four separate case studies as geographical lines of operations (LOO) that have been used in the past to achieve a desired end state for those specific regions. Finally, it will look at those desired end states to determine if there is one strategic end state that defines U.S. national interests. In addition, this will help to answer what the role of the military will be in combatting TOC. The overall conclusion of all case studies uses the evaluation criteria as illustrated below in order to answer whether or not the military has a role in combatting TOC and help determine the best course of action for the future. After the analysis of each case study using the following chart, Chapter 5 will address the role of the military and will look at conclusions based on
these cases, the relevance to the primary question, and recommendations for the way ahead.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Questions for the U.S. military role in combatting Transnational Organized Crime</th>
<th>1-weakest 5-strongest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. military presence in the country with direct relation to combatting TOC</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. military presence in the country to combat insurgency/terrorism</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. military assistance to DOS, Interagency, local government</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Source*: Created by author.

This table asks three important questions to answer whether the military has a role in combatting TOC. First, Whether or not the military has a direct role in the mission of combatting TOC. This would include operations against personnel, organizations, funding, or equipment that directly supports or is a member of organized crime. The second question addresses the indirect effects of the U.S. military against TOC through operations against insurgent or terrorist groups in the region. These operations may include attacking TOC groups, but only in relation to their association with the insurgent or terrorist group in question. Finally, the last question addresses logistic support,
information sharing, or lending of equipment or personnel to support an interagency-led whole of government effort against TOC.

These three questions will determine to what level the military is involved. The scale of involvement is 1-5, with 5 as the strongest support. This allows for a degree of support, even if it is not a full effort. 5 would be support from multiple branches, or more than a Division-level of support (approximately 3000+ people). 4 is below division but above battalion. 3 is unit level support below battalion level numbers, approximately 1000 personnel. 2 is individual augmenters, and 1 is no support at any level. Once numbers are assigned to each case study, the larger numbers will determine which case studies have demonstrated the highest use of military, and depending on their success rate, will determine whether the military’s role in combatting TOC is useful.

Threats to Validity

The research included in this thesis was chosen to limit as much as possible the threats and biases that are inherent in all hypothesis. While there is some selection bias based on the content available and the author’s familiarity with certain cases, the cases selected are as random as possible and encompass as many regional differences as possible within the time constraints. These cases are all in different stages of progress, since the war against TOC will never completely conclude. Some of the case studies are at a further phase of completion and stability than others; therefore, historical context is a threat to validity. The cases were chosen based off their contemporary validity and similar development, however so any threat to validity should be minimal.
Conclusion

In conclusion, this study will attempt to use the most comprehensive look at regional and international historical precedence for combatting TOC to determine what courses of action are successful, and determine how the U.S. should approach any further criminal organizations. The evaluation criteria for this determination comes from filling out the chart in table 1 for each case study individually. The filled out tables will then apply to a conclusion and recommendations that will be addressed in the final chapter. Chapter 4 will frame the problem, analyze the data available regarding the problem, and begin formulating conclusions and assessments of the problem.
CHAPTER 4
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Introduction

This chapter will begin to answer the primary question of does the military have a role in combatting TOC. The world is merging. People all over the world are connected to each other by means of the internet, and access to all manner of worldly goods gets easier every day with new technologies. Along with this beneficial access comes the threat of criminal activities that spread as fast as legitimate organizations. Organized crime destabilizes nations, the economy, and threatens the safety of those nations it operates out of, but also can threaten anyone else with illicit behavior of its members or associates.

The role of the military in combatting TOC is limited to the treaties and cooperation effort of each nation involved. There can be great coordination, such as Plan Colombia (Cilluffo 2011, 9); or there can be unsuccessful attempts such as in Mexico (Deare 2009). The U.S. is limited in what it can accomplish on its own, and therefore the U.S. cannot create an independent operational approach to combat TOC. In fact, the best course of action for the U.S. military would be as an extension of a World Power, i.e. they should encourage other nations under their influence to prioritize the targeting of TOC as the best effort to modernization and empowering their own borders. This may eliminate direct influence, but will lead to greater stabilization in the global regions involved.
Operational Environment: Current U.S Policy against TOC

The 2015 *National Security Strategy* (NSS) lists a number of top strategic risks to our national interests. One of those top risks is the “Significant security consequences associated with weak or failing states (including mass atrocities, regional spillover, and transnational organized crime)” (Obama 2015, 2). Along with this document, the U.S. administration published a document specifically detailing the strategy to combat TOC. Because of globalization and the partnership of nations, TOC is a considerable threat to the national interests of the United States diplomatically, informationally, militarily, and economically.

Transnational organized crime is a prevalent response to poverty, weakened governments and corruption within a region. The NSS initially identifies each specific TOC threat by region. There is a chapter on each region and the specific threats identified currently, though the strategy of each TOC organization will have similarities that span beyond each region. For instance, the Middle East region focuses on the terrorism threats and instability. There is a correlation with violent extremists organizations and cross-border criminal organizations whether they are working together, supplying VEOs or merely benefiting from the instability that VEOs create in an area to profit. This relationship, if it can be found, can sometime be exploited in order to weaken the TOC stronghold on the region, pressuring them to decrease their presence, or even sometimes in rare cases prevent their influence outright.

Violent extremists exploit upheaval across the Middle East and North Africa. Fragile and conflict-affected states incubate and spawn infectious disease, illicit weapons and drug smugglers, and destabilizing refugee flows. Too often, failures in governance and endemic corruption hold back the potential of rising regions. (Obama 2015, 1)
The NSS argues that the United States responsibilities include international security because it “serves our interests, upholds our commitments to allies and partners, and addresses threats that are truly global” (Obama 2015, 7). “Truly global threats,” or achieving international security, includes diminishing the capacity and influence of TOC. International threats in the NSS are broken down by regions, and operate in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere, and in Europe.

The European Union mostly deals with United States responsibilities in Europe internally, as they are capable for the most part of taking care of their own problems. This means the policy in with relation to Europe is to “bolster the capacity of the U.N. and regional organizations” in order to demonstrate U.S. support of what is already being done against the threat of crime. That is not to say that the U.S. would not intervene on behalf of an ally to assist in the stability of the European stage, rather that the strength of the alliances in Europe lend very well to self-governance.

The increasing interdependence of the global economy and rapid pace of technological change creates shared benefits and vulnerabilities, as interconnected systems and sectors are susceptible to the threats of climate change, malicious cyber activity, pandemic diseases, and transnational terrorism and crime. The U.S. must remain aware of the changing environment in Europe, and keep close watch on the weakening state that could threaten the economic boom Europe has experienced since adopting the Euro. However, military intervention in the European theater more so than the current advisory role is highly unlikely as a source to combat TOC.

Other global regions are not as cooperative as the European Union. Some regions are not equipped to deal with any large-scale well-organized threat such as organized
crime without substantial assistance. If the nations threatened by criminal organizations and instability cannot defeat these organizations on their own, but are making a conscious effort to do so, than it is the responsibility of the United States to assist their efforts. The President “welcomes the constructive contributions of responsible rising powers,” and makes it his policy to “partner with those fragile states that have a genuine political commitment to establishing legitimate governance and providing for their people” (Obama 2015, 10). The strategy for doing this is not completely clear, but that may be due to the ambiguous nature of the unstable regions, and the need to evaluate each case individually. “Indeed, in the long-term, our efforts to work with other countries to counter the ideology and root causes of violent extremism will be more important than our capacity to remove terrorists from the battlefield” (Obama 2015, intro).

In Africa, many of the states of the region have spent generations embracing organized crime and illicit activity as a method to govern and control their nations. Democracy is a relatively new concept for most, and the amount of cultural diversity within each nation makes popular acceptance difficult without fear and intimidation. However, there are states that are attempting to fight those norms and institute democracy. These are the nations that the U.S. will support, and “strengthen the operational capacity of regional organizations like the African Union (AU) . . . and help African countries rapidly deploy to emerging crises” (Obama 2015, 11). These unions and alliances are integral to the successful cooperation over the international community.

Organizations like the AU are fledgling compared to the European Union; however, they are serving the same purpose. Until they have established a certain amount of legitimacy, they will not be able to perform the duties that are required in order to
achieve and maintain stability. One big block to this stability is the amount of trust that is lacking across borders. Until the African nations are willing to freely share information and resources, then the AU is merely a shadow regime.

In Asia, it is much the same situation. “We are committed to strengthening regional institutions such as ASEAN, the East Asia Summit, and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation to reinforce shared rules and norms, forge collective responses to shared challenges, and help ensure peaceful resolution of disputes” (Obama 2015, 11). Again, there is a great lack of trust between the nations in the Pacific preventing international discourse.

More locally, certain countries in South America are corrupt at the highest level, and therefore assistance will not work until a massive institutional change has occurred. In these circumstances, “targeted economic sanctions will remain an effective tool for imposing costs on irresponsible actors and helping to dismantle criminal and terrorist networks” (Obama 2015, 4). Areas where collaboration is possible are vulnerable countries like Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, where criminal syndicates are threatening government institutions. The NSS takes seriously the effects of corruption against global stabilization. This is a serious threat that occurs over the entire globe, and that is not easily defeated. Transnational organized crime by its nature is nearly impossible to eradicate, because it preserves itself by moving across borders, and strengthening its numbers in weaker states.

The corrosive effects of corruption must be overcome. While information sharing allows us to identify corrupt officials more easily, globalization has also made it easier for corrupt officials to hide the proceeds of corruption abroad, increasing the need for strong and consistent implementation of the international standards on combating illicit finance. The United States is leading the way in
promoting adherence to standards of accountable and transparent governance, including through initiatives like the Open Government Partnership. We will utilize a broad range of tools to recover assets stolen by corrupt officials and make it harder for criminals to hide, launder, and benefit from illegal proceeds. Our leadership toward governance that is more open, responsible, and accountable makes clear that democracy can deliver better government and development for ordinary people. (Obama 2015, 21)

“Through risk-based approaches, we have countered terrorism and transnational organized crime” Cooperation with our state partners, assisting emerging powers, and alliances are the primary method of dealing with criminal organizations, and these can be categorized as the diplomatic instrument of power. However, other instruments of power are also used in certain circumstances. The U.S. government uses economic powers to reward and punish organizations as necessary. Conducting targeted sanctioning allows the U.S. to prevent funding to corrupt organizations, and put pressure on governments to fight against the corruption within their borders. The ability to support those organizations making a genuine effort to promote democracy and improve the populations’ situation is imperative to help smooth the operations in these emerging democracies. These economic assists can operate “in ways that enhance commerce, travel, and tourism and, most fundamentally, preserve our civil liberties.”

The NSS discusses various diplomatic and information instruments of power at the nations’ disposal. One particular instrument of power that is not technically part of DIME but is considered a very powerful tool for the nation is the legal system, and its expansion to an international law. Every member of an alliance or participant in defending national security must understand the implications of the legal system. These are the recognition of local law, and the need to follow international legal requirements as well. Any U.S. intervention into a sovereign state cannot ignore the local laws, unless
they clearly violate international law or a higher moral code as defined by the international coalition for the responsibility to protect (Obama 2015). If that nation has laws that prevent stabilization, such as suppression of human rights, then they have to be overturned. The U.S. must be able to counter transnational security threats while “respecting human rights and the rule of law” (Obama 2015, 27).

Our military will remain ready to deter and defeat threats to the homeland, including against missile, cyber, and terrorist attacks, while mitigating the effects of potential attacks and natural disasters. Our military is postured globally to protect our citizens and interests, preserve regional stability, render humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and build the capacity of our partners to join with us in meeting security challenges. (Obama 2015, 7)

The role of the military in criminal procedures is a very delicate situation in many countries. There is also international law that restricts operations outside of the scope of combat. “The decision to use force must reflect a clear mandate and feasible objectives, and we must ensure our actions are effective, just, and consistent with the rule of law.” The military has many opportunities to prevent and deter aggression and threats if they target organized criminal institutions. Using deterrence, cooperation efforts, humanitarian assistance, enforcement of sanctions, and training the military plays a key role in preventing the need for conventional military operations. The military will not take a lead role in any of these operations, but due to the size and resources of the military, they can make a big difference.

Weak institutions, high crime rates, powerful organized crime groups, an illicit drug trade, lingering economic disparity, and inadequate education and health systems all combine to create very volatile situations that prevent stability in regions around the globe. “We have an opportunity—and obligation—to lead the way in reinforcing, shaping, and where appropriate, creating the rules, norms, and institutions that are the
foundation for peace, security, prosperity, and the protection of human rights in the 21st century.”

It becomes the obligation of the United States to help promote stability. Not just in regions of known terrorist activity, but also in emerging democratic states that require assistance to achieve stability. In addition, the United States has an obligation to help prevent atrocities in the international community, and support the UN as an international authority. “We will continue to insist that governments uphold their human rights obligations, speak out against repression wherever it occurs, and work to prevent, and, if necessary, respond to mass atrocities . . . Defending democracy and human rights is related to every enduring national interest.”

The National Security Strategy discusses terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, climate threat, environment, economy, resources, and criminal organizations. While criminal organizations is the last threat listed, they are a more significant threat than some listed before them. Criminal organizations are prevalent in many of the other key issues to regional stability. There is a direct link to terrorism with funding. There is a threat of unstable actors using weapons of mass destruction to further destabilize the internationally community. Criminal organizations use their environment and scarce resources to control regions through the black market trades, and withholding of resources to convince the population. While national security does not rely on eliminating crime, organized criminal organizations are of a strategic interest and are essential units within a systems perspective when analyzing national security.
Line of Operation 1: Colombia Case Study

Colombia is a case study in the success of a using a whole of government approach to combatting TOC. Plan Colombia is a program developed by the United States to diminish the drug trade in Colombia and prevent smuggling into the U.S. from the source. The concept behind Plan Colombia was to eradicate coca fields with aerial herbicides, though it quickly morphed into much more. The success rate of destroying the coca fields was not very good. “Plan Colombia is also a wider strategy to contain and undermine the appeal of the Colombian revolutionary advance in other Latin American countries” (Petras 2001, 34).

The U.S. clearly has strategic interest in the political, economic, military and informational dealings of South America. In order to maintain stability in the region, the U.S. promotes their agenda of Democratization, and with that comes the need for military assistance. Plan Colombia as it has become is a good example of whole of government cooperation. However, it is not necessarily a whole of government approach to organized crime. It is more an example of how a counter-terrorist mission can exploit criminal activity to weaken the terrorists’ resolve.

Plan Colombia is an adaptive strategy to an earlier plan to eradicate drugs from South America. “In the 1980’s and early 1990’s, U.S. assistance helped reduce coca production in Peru and Bolivia. Undeterred, however, the coca growers moved to Colombia, where the narcotraffickers were already in place” (Fratepietro 2001, 19). This unique situation; where growers are now co-located with traffickers; makes the mission more complex. The eradication of poppy fields is not enough to deter the traffickers themselves, and their influence on local farmers will keep the supply chain despite the
efforts of the U.S. or Colombian government. Thus, the strategy in Colombia has changed from merely field eradication to counter-narcotics networks.

This change in mission extends the influence of the military presence in Colombia. “Since the guerrillas are associated with the coca producing regions, this line of argument proceeds, Washington has directed its military advisory teams and military aid to destroying what they dub the ‘narco guerrillas’” (Petras 2001, 31). Colombia is recognized as a vital interest to the U.S. Because of that, the stability of Colombia, the strength of the government, and the safety of the people are part of the U.S. national interest. “A stable and democratic Colombia is a national interest of the United States, primarily because of the threat of drugs, and the tremendous impact that associated narco-terrorism could have on the nation” (Waggett 2004, 1).

The original condition in Colombia included a massive drug problem, issues with corruption within the government, and two growing revolutionary groups emerging as a direct threat to the stability and governance in Colombia. The U.S. desired end state began as an eradication of the coca fields, and quickly extended to include counter-narco-terrorism and nation building. The approach to this end state on the U.S. side was Plan Colombia. Any measures of effectiveness must take into account the root cause of the change, whether it was due to the U.S. intervention and influence, or more of a localized shift in attitude.

“Over the past decade, kidnappings have dropped by 95 percent to about 200 per year. Murders are down by half, tracking at a rate last seen in 1984” (Crandall 2014, 59). There is decidedly an argument that Colombia is a success. Moreover, the amount of change that has occurred may just be the best that anyone can hope for in a globalized
society where crime has no borders. There will always be violence, but for the most part, Colombia is stable.

Any story about Colombia's "revolution of sorts" is inescapably tied to the deep and controversial role the United States has played in the country, especially since the advent in the late 1990s of the multibillion-dollar military and economic aid package known as Plan Colombia. While the Plan was deeply flawed, needlessly narcotized by America's obsession with its "war on drugs", the now ebbing strategy can itself be considered a catastrophic success, of sorts. (Crandall 2014, 63)

According to Crandall in this statement, the United States unnecessarily focuses on the drug war, and the real successes were in supporting the counter-insurgency. While this is an interesting theory, it is remiss to suppose the amount of support received by the U.S. would have been the same if there was no direct threat to the U.S.’s own national borders. That is the threat of the drug trade. That is why the U.S. got involved in the first place.

He acknowledges this, somewhat cynically, in the following paragraph:

U.S. congressional debate over the policy was driven more by the need for politicians to score political points in their home districts than by sober foreign policy analysis. Members of Congress bickered from day one over the composition of the assistance package, something they could not as easily have done if the United States had launched a small war on the FARC. (Crandall 2014, 63)

Interestingly, the post 9/11 focus on counter-insurgency was applied to Plan Colombia. This increased aid to the country and gave the military the resources they needed to bolster the security of the region. “With its educated political class, entrepreneurial genes and vibrant urban-based civil society, Colombia was especially well suited to be a "client" government partner to the United States” (Crandall 2014, 65). The war on drugs became a catalyst for U.S. intervention in Colombia. The results were a more stable government, a robust policing system backed by U.S. dollars and technology that is able to attack the enemy at its source, and the ability for local and foreigners alike to move
through Bogota without the ever-present fear of kidnappings or worse. Plan Colombia did not, however, eradicate or even greatly reduce the drug trafficking capabilities of the criminal organizations operating in South America.

“If we were to judge U.S. counter-narcotics efforts in Colombia by their effect on the war on drugs in Latin America, we would have to conclude that they had fallen short” (Crandall 2014, 61). This statement echoes in many of the readings on Plan Colombia. The narcotics trade too easily moves from one country to the next, particularly in South America. In fact, America assists the drug trade inadvertently by being one of the largest customers. While the local drug trade becomes weaker, the international trade is hardly reduced at all, since traffickers can merely move on to another less stable area in the region, such as Mexico.

Table 2. Colombia Evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th align="left">Evaluation Questions for the U.S. military role in combatting Transnational Organized Crime</th>
<th>1-weakest</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5-strongest</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td align="left">U.S. military presence in the country with direct relation to combatting TOC</td>
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<td>X</td>
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*Source: Created by author.*
In the case of Colombia, there is a strong presence of military support and direct attacks against criminal organizations. These criminal organizations are synonymous with the insurgent and terrorist organizations that are covered under the second most important strategic risk as identified in the *National Security Strategy*: direct “Threats or attacks against U.S. citizens abroad and our allies.”

**Line of Operation 2: Mexico Case Study**

Mexico is a very different case than Colombia. Most researchers concluded that so far the fight against crime in Mexico has been a failure. Recently the United States has collaborated with the government of Mexico to attempt to control cross border drug smuggling. This was not even possible just a short while ago because of how embedded the corruption was in the Mexican government. Many analysts assessed that Mexico was a lost cause, and would soon be run by the criminal organizations within the country.

As of 2001, 19-35 billion dollars’ worth of drug related commerce was generated in Mexico. This amount of revenue gives the cartels freedom to combat any opposition to their control, and prevent democratic institutions from taking hold. Along with drugs, there is a myriad of human rights violations and the threat of terror. These are a direct threat to U.S. national security since the U.S. shares a border with Mexico, and part of U.S. national interests to maintain regional stability (Cilluffo 2001, 5).

The largest discrepancy between Colombia and Mexico is the declaration of insurgency. Colombia’s drug trade is intertwined with the terrorist organizations within Colombia. Fighting the drug trade included dispatching the FARC, so the whole of government approach includes the U.S. military in a primary role. In Mexico, the cartels have avoided political affiliation or aspirations, they are merely drug cartels. Their only
engagement with government is corruption and threats to ensure freedom of maneuver throughout the country and even across the United States border. The U.S. does not recognize any organized terrorist threat significant enough to threaten national security, and therefore the focus is on the cartels and the anti-drug campaign itself. Some argue that this is the reason that Mexico has thus far been a failure (Cilluffo 2001, 1-10).

U.S. strategy has always been tied to the local government and its legitimacy.

First, murder, kidnapping, intimidation, corruption, and impunity give the cartels and gangs a de facto veto in the political process and undermine democracy. Second, by violently imposing their influence over bureaucrats and elected officials of the state, the TCO-gang phenomenon compromises the ability of the state to perform its legitimate national security and public service functions. Third, by neutralizing (making irrelevant) government and taking control of portions of a given national territory and performing some of the tasks of government (establishing a criminal version of law and order), the TCO gang phenomenon erodes state sovereignty (control of the national territory and the people in it) and replaces it with a criminal version of law and order. (Cilluffo 2001, 1-10)

The concept in place for Mexico is to treat the cartels themselves as a terrorist threat against the U.S. certain assets cannot be used without title 10 backing, so the justification to use the military is not there. These assets are what could be the tipping point between success and failure in Mexico. Plan Colombia was not entirely successful until after 9-11, when the counter-insurgency campaign was applied to the mission against narcotics traffickers. They are attempting to implement the same policies in Mexico, but cartels are recognized as a criminal element, “not hierarchical organizations. This is not an ideological struggle. This isn’t a religious struggle” (Cilluffo 2001, 6). Therefore, the Title 10 allotments do not apply the same way they would when combatting terrorism or counterinsurgency. Most importantly, any DoD support of counterdrug missions will be
at the behest of the ground component commander and only in support of law enforcement, never as an independent mission (CJCS 2014, A-5).

“Although the DTOs currently only demonstrate the desire to consolidate and expand their narcotics business, the opportunity exists for them to effectively control large areas of Mexico” (Morris 2011, iii). This is the backdoor the U.S. needs to circumvent these problems of including the military in the war against TOC, but will that support the national interests of the nation?

[The] Government of Mexico is waging an historic campaign against transnational criminal organizations, many of which are expanding beyond drug trafficking into human smuggling and trafficking, weapons smuggling, bulk cash smuggling, extortion, and kidnapping for ransom. TOC in Mexico makes the U.S. border more vulnerable because it creates and maintains illicit corridors for border crossings that can be employed by other secondary criminal or terrorist actors or organizations. (DoD 2011, 9)

The threat of TOC is the same as Colombia that illicit activity is free to operate in the country; the difference is the degree of opposition from the local government. Clearly, the Colombian government as a whole did not support the criminal organizations, and worked hard to re-establish security in the country. Until recently, even the heads of state in Mexico were disinclined to fight against the cartels. Now, with growing U.S. interest and support, there is more hope for a return to stability.

The reasons behind the interdependency of the government to TOC are economically related. In 2011, 20 percent of the GDP of Mexico was from the drug trade. When 47 percent of the population lives in poverty, the loss of this income could be devastating to the stability of Mexico (Morris 2011, 2-9). There must be alternatives to the economic opportunities provided by cartels in order to weaken their support and power base within the country. The U.S. assists where it can with trade agreements, but if
there is nothing more lucrative for citizens than entering the drug trade, then that is what they will do.

“Recent history in these three countries has shown that to achieve sustainable long-term progress governments must reinforce security gains with commensurate efforts to build good governance and expand economic development” (Morris 2011, 14). Good governance is the area that the military can best assist. The military support good governance through security operations, training, and equipment.

Technical and financial assistance to the Mexican armed forces increased considerably after 1995, as special forces battalions and elite units were trained by the U.S. military. In the words of former U.S. Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry, the new security relations would be oriented to “cooperate in helping Mexico improve its capabilities to defend its sovereign air and sea space.” (Toro 2006, 12)

The U.S. litigators have been dealing with many of the issues involved in cooperation. For instance, the legal system in Mexico has been unable to work as a cohesive unit in the past due to the mistrust between the investigators and the prosecutors themselves (Pope, 2013, 1). This mistrust stems from corruption, which trouble every partnering community between the U.S. and Mexico: legal, information, military, and law enforcement. Before a true partnership can begin, the trust has to be there. In the meantime, the best course of action for the U.S. is to continue to develop relationships, and promote democratic ideals in the Mexican Government. This course of action will put the military in a secondary or almost nonexistent role. The military will be successful only if they are partnered in some way with a legitimate government entity in the country, and not as a brute force.

With that in mind, historically the military has played a larger role in Mexico due to the operations along the border, and the extension of influence allowed in order to keep the U.S. border states safe. Unfortunately, Mexico is not a stable enough country to
alleviate that pressure, so there are almost two different policies when dealing with the Mexican TOC; one along the border states, and one dealing with states further south. The southern Mexico states do not experience direct influence from the United States. Nevertheless, the border states do, and are therefore less stable. Some argue that the threat of terrorist organizations operating in Mexico require the U.S. to maintain scrutiny on the border, and maintain a policy of control, rather than cooperation (Hazen 2013, 12-14). This creates a conflict with the current Mexican administration, especially since President Nieto’s policy does not include a U.S. military presence in his country other than for training purposes. He has also turned to Colombia as a source for training and cooperation. Though Colombia mirrored many of its policies closely with the U.S., it may be more comfortable for Nieto to rely on his culturally similar partners to the South.

Table 3. Mexico Evaluation

| Evaluation Questions for the U.S. military role in combating Transnational Organized Crime | 1-weakest | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5-
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|---|---|---|---
| U.S. military presence in the country with direct relation to combatting TOC              | X         |   |   |   |   |
| U.S. military presence in the country to combat insurgency/terrorism                     |           |   |   |   | X |
| U.S. military assistance to DOS, Interagency, local government                           |           |   |   |   | X |

*Source:* Created by author.
With all of these considerations, the role of the U.S. military in Mexico is a very delicate one. Though the support of the United States is imperative to the security of Mexico, the current administration is attempting to avoid physical presence and the perception of dependency. The strength of his regime is contingent on the safety of his citizens, and that may not be in conjunction with the U.S. national interests of combatting the drug trade. The previous administration under Calderon struggled greatly when his campaign against drugs increased the death toll and attacks against innocent civilians. Nieto promises safety, but just as Calderon argues, safety does not promise a decrease in illegal activity. This could be a dangerous situation for the U.S. Without a physical presence in Mexico, the U.S. military still has two missions that support U.S. security strategy. They must assist the border patrol efforts to secure the border, and strengthen the Mexican military and law enforcement enough that they are able to operate independently without corruption.

Line of Operation 3: Liberia and Western Africa Case Study

Liberia has to overcome the issues of government corruption before it will be able to effectively combat crime. The smuggling trade for goods, drugs, and people runs uncontested and even sometime endorsed by government institutions. Western Africa is experiencing problems with criminal organizations due to the corruption of the leadership in the region, and Liberia is still recovering from the effects of President Taylor’s term in power from 1997-2003.

Corruption was widespread throughout the years of President Taylor’s rule. The Panel of Experts on Liberia found that there were large diversions of revenues and assets from the Government of Liberia, carried out by President Charles Taylor in partnership with his circle of trusted individuals. (Teran 2007, 24)
This concept of a “circle of trusted individuals” continues to define the certain elite circles in Liberia. They have begun to think of themselves as above the law, or at least entitled to the benefits that they receive from illicit activity. The National Transitional Government of Liberia that took control after President Taylor resigned continued the trade in human trafficking, weapons, and diamonds smuggling. Liberia’s governmental connections to criminal activity changes the dynamic of TOC. If the leadership of the nation endorses the criminal organization, is that activity still considered illegal? This is where the international community gets involved.

There is a regional community interest as well as a global interest in the stability of Liberia. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) goals are to “foster the ideal of collective self-sufficiency for its member states” (ECOWAS 2015). This regional power intends to create a successful GDP that will sustain the West African countries involved, including Liberia. Any illicit smuggling activity will prevent this from happening, and therefore puts pressure on the Liberian government not to support criminal activity. In addition, the United Nations Mission in Liberia, UNMIL, seeks to secure the international interests in Liberia through peacekeeping missions. They have been present in Liberia since they took over the military mission from ECOWAS in 1993 (United Nations 2015).

This external pressure has led to reforms in the Liberian government, and a public outcry against the TOC operating in the country. Much of the stability of the region however is due to the presence of the UN military forces, currently at 7,000 personnel strength (United Nations 2015). They are scheduled to begin a drawdown soon, and this will determine whether or not significant changes within have been made. This would be
a good example of international military intervention providing the stability needed for a country in turmoil to turn itself around; the results of this particular case study however remain to be seen. One thing that is certain, the government of Liberia has made strides in creating a democratic governing body, and there is evidence of the initial attempts to create a strategy; or at least a way ahead; that brings stability, income, and no longer accepts criminal activity such as human trafficking as an acceptable means of sustaining the elite.

Due to its lack of law enforcement capabilities, its susceptibility to corruption, its porous borders, and its strategic location, Guinea-Bissau remains a significant hub of narcotics trafficking on the verge of developing into a narco-state. (DoD 2011, 10)

While not a direct neighbor of Liberia, threats to stabilization can come from any area in the Western African alliance. The danger of the UNMIL drawdown is whether the Liberian government is dedicated enough to continue fighting for fiscal independence, and whether their own military assets will be able to secure the borders and prevent TOC from establishing a foothold into the country. Unfortunately, drug smuggling from Africa will not cease until there is no longer a consumer to cater to, therefore the TOC operating in the area, much like in South America, merely shift their business to the weakest areas they can find.

The threat of TOC will not disappear, the business is too lucrative, especially in areas that are weakened by lack of resources and development. Liberia understands this, and has begun developing a plan to bolster their economy and stabilize the nation in order to prevent organized crime from determining that Liberia is a weak state and prime area to operate. The more stability, the less opportunity TOC will have to utilize West Africa as a smuggling route for drugs and human trafficking. This solution will require
economic reform. While economic and diplomatic growth take the lead in this reform, there is a need for military support to help stabilize and prevent any potential attacks meant to destabilize the region.

Currently in Liberia, the U.S. military is operating in 11 different operational missions designed to help stabilize and train the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) (Embassy of the United States Monrovia 2015). Operation Onward Liberty works side-by-side with the AFL to help train and mentor their soldiers and Military Training Teams to provide specific skills to the AFL. The U.S. also brings AFL personnel to the United States for training as well as participation in the State Partnership Program with the Michigan National Guard. The Defense Institution Reform Initiative works with the Liberian Ministry of Defense to provide mentorship with the administration. The U.S. military provides other assistance through logistic support, infrastructure rebuilds, and humanitarian assistance (Liberian Embassy of the United States 2015).
Table 4. Liberia Evaluation

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<th>Evaluation Questions for the U.S. military role in combatting Transnational Organized Crime</th>
<th>1-weakest 5-strongest</th>
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<tr>
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*Source:* Created by author.

The country of Liberia has ties with the United States reaching back to the founding by former U.S. slaves. The United States has since included the stability and growth of Liberia as one of its national interests, and has financially supported Liberia for many years. This support extends beyond economics to military and diplomatic assistance. Liberia does not include much US direct involvement in the country except as a member of the United Nations coalition. This particular UN mission defines the participants in organized criminal activity almost synonymous with terrorist or insurgency groups, stemming from the devastating civil war lasting until 1997.

Stability in Liberia and the greater Western African states is contingent on the support of the international community and specifically the United States. The U.S. military works closely to build the AFL into an independent association. The military
must work closely with the departments of state in order to be effective. Of the utmost importance is that the end state of the United States national interests in Liberia be clear. The U.S. is interested in enabling Liberia to become more independent on the rest of the international community, become stable, and prevent threats in the surrounding Western African nations.

We will build comprehensive partnerships that leverage our land border, maritime, aviation, cybersecurity, and financial sector expertise to counter illicit movement of people, arms, drugs, and money, as well as guard against the criminal facilitation of weapons of mass destruction material and technology. We will work to curb armed robbery at sea and protect fisheries, and continue to implement our Counter-Piracy Action Plan off the coast of Somalia. Consistent with the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, we will support efforts and build partner capacity to combat corruption and instability as well as to combat trafficking in persons. (Obama 2012, 5)

Combatting TOC in Africa will continue as long as there is wording included in the National Security Strategy to prioritize stability in the region. Stability in Africa remains a concern for the U.S. The role of the military is integrated as a whole of government response. Once Africa begins to stabilize, the role of the U.S. will diminish. This is the ultimate goal, to draw down support as the countries become more independent. Though the ideal situation is not to have a military presence in the region, the U.S. military has a role until that is achieved.

Line of Operation 4: Kosovo Case Study

Kosovo is interesting because it deals with the unique situation that the European Union (EU) has developed when dealing with TOC. Kosovo as a country is very new; they split from Serbia in 2008 and had great difficulty getting recognition as a nation, especially from Serbia. Not to mention the leftover problems with ethnicity that caused the rift with Serbia in the first place (Woehrel 2011, 1-2).
Serbia has struggled to become a member of the EU for a while, but issues with ethnic intolerance and recognizing Kosovo as an independent nation has made that difficult. The fact that Serbia and Kosovo are not members of the EU, however, does not prevent their stability from being of interest to Europe, as well as the UN. Because of the unique issues Kosovo faces as a notion not fully recognized, and external threats to stability, the already present regional criminal threats are compounded in their country (Woehrel 2011, 5).

Kosovo’s links to the European Union have established the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) that allows the EU to directly intervene in matters of security and law enforcement as part of the Ahtisaari Plan (Woehrel 2011, 3). On April 30, 2015 the EU and Kosovo signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement that addresses primarily economic concerns but also establishes an agreement for the EU to assist in “developing adequate structures for the police, prosecutors and judges . . . to adequately prepare them for cooperation in civil, commercial and criminal matters, and to enable them to effectively prevent, investigate, prosecute and adjudicate organised crime, corruption and terrorism” (EU 2015, 94).

Since Kosovo is trying to align itself with the EU, there is not a lot of influence from the United States. The Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU does not officially recognize Kosovo as a country, but does outline some of the responsibilities of the EU towards building Kosovo, as long as Kosovo maintains open trade agreements and works towards an end to the ethnic clashes in the region. Title VII of the Stabilization and Association Agreement deals with freedom, security, and justice. The below articles of Title VII address the issues involved in combatting crime:
ARTICLE 89 Money laundering and financing of terrorism The Parties shall cooperate in order to prevent the use of their financial systems for laundering of proceeds from criminal activities in general and drug offences in particular, as well as for the purpose of financing terrorism. Cooperation in this area shall include administrative and technical assistance to Kosovo with the purpose of developing the implementation of regulations and efficient functioning of the suitable standards and mechanisms to combat money laundering and financing of terrorism equivalent to those adopted by the EU and other international fora in this field, in particular the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

ARTICLE 90 Cooperation on illicit drugs The Parties shall cooperate to ensure a balanced and integrated approach towards drug issues. Drug policies and actions shall be aimed at reinforcing Kosovo’s structures for combating illicit drugs and their precursors, reducing the supply of, trafficking in and the demand for illicit drugs, coping with the health and social consequences of drug abuse, as well as at a more effective control of precursors. The Parties shall agree on the necessary methods of cooperation to attain these objectives. Actions shall be based on commonly agreed principles along the lines of the EU Drugs Strategy 2013-2020 and any successor document.

ARTICLE 91 Preventing and combating organised crime and other illegal activities The Parties shall cooperate with the aim of reinforcing Kosovo’s structures for combating and preventing criminal activities particularly organised crime, corruption and other forms of serious crime with a cross-border/boundary dimension. Kosovo shall abide by relevant international conventions and instruments in this area. Regional cooperation in combating organised crime shall be promoted. As regards currency counterfeiting in Kosovo, Kosovo shall cooperate closely with the EU to combat counterfeiting of banknotes and coins and to suppress and punish any counterfeiting thereof. At the level of prevention, Kosovo shall aim at implementing measures which are equivalent to those laid down in the relevant EU legislation, and to abide by the relevant international conventions and instruments related to this field. Kosovo may benefit from EU support for exchange, assistance and training in the protection against currency counterfeiting. (EU 2015, 100-101)

The articles do not however provide a number of troop supports, a timeline of support, or outline in any way the measures of success for this agreement, merely that the EU will be involved in the development of a plan to combat organized crime, particularly corruption and counterfeiting operations.
Historically, the civil war in Kosovo was a threat to U.S. national interests. The U.S. declared the Kosovo Liberation Army. There were indications of funding provided to Al Qaeda and even an association with Osama Bin Laden. The drug and human trafficking, money laundering, and corruption increased greatly after the civil war left a void in control, and since then Kosovo has been attempting to recover. The U.S. provided much of the financial and military assistance needed to return to a state of normalcy, and begin to stabilize the country.

From the U.S., Vice President Joe Biden and former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton both took separate visits to Kosovo to declare U.S. support to Kosovo’s independence, speak with government leaders about continued financial support from the U.S., and offer U.S. assistance in getting Kosovo recognized as a nation and included in the EU. They also stressed that although the U.S. will support Kosovo as a nation, they will not take the lead in any negotiations. This leaves the majority of the support in the hands of the EU, and security assistance with NATO (Woehrel 2011, 8). While there is a U.S. military base still open in Kosovo, there are limited troop numbers, and they are in no way supporting the fight against corruption and crime in Kosovo.
The U.S. has declared its commitment to the independence of Kosovo, and to see it achieve membership in the EU. It has not identified any direct National Interest inside the country, and seems to support this move more under the motive of combating ethnic strife and restoring stability to the region as a whole. While this is of interest to the U.S., the strategy of the U.S. is to observe the process and monitor the advances made, but not to intervene. The U.S. will continue to provide financial support, but the legwork will come from the EU and NATO.

Currently, the NATO Kosovo force (KFOR) is at 4,000-troop strength. Their mission is to return displaced personnel, stabilize the region, defend borders, rebuild infrastructure, defend key infrastructure, eliminate ethnic strife, and train the Kosovo army to take over. TOC is a huge threat in the area, to the stability of the nation, and to

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*Source: Created by author.*
the interests of the EU. Corruption in Kosovo prevents the free trade and trust needed to stabilize the economy, and drug smuggling is a threat to the safety of the country’s population.

The whole of government approach is used in Kosovo, the lead organization is the EU, and military support comes from NATO. U.S. has interest in the prevention of TOC in the region, and has stake in the area. The U.S. in cooperation with NATO will continue to be involved in the situation, but will not take the lead. Military is coordinated to defend against TOC, as they are linked to insurgencies and weaken the borders.

**End State: Whole of Government Approach**

There are only five musical notes, but combinations of these five notes produce more melodies than we can possibly listen to. There are only five colors, but combinations of these five colors produce more varied hues than we can possibly look at. There are only five main flavors, but combinations of these five main flavors produce more flavors than we can possibly taste. Battlefield situations (battlefield勢, shi) involve nothing more than the qi (奇) and zheng (正) forces, but the combinations of qi (奇) and zheng (正) cannot be exhausted. Qi (奇) and zheng (正) forces transform from one into the other and back again, moving in an endless cycle like a ring. Who could exhaust the possible combinations? (Sun Tzu 2005, 57)

The concept of whole of government is not a new idea, Sun Tzu wrote about “Shi”, or the concept of using a full force to defeat an enemy, as a waterfall flows over rock, in all directions, from all angles. Sun Tzu describes the conventional and unconventional forces working together, and whole of government merges the separate agencies of government and instruments of power to create the same result. The governments’ ability to combat any force become greater as the force multiplies, as long as the force being used is integrated and communicative.
Collaboration is the key to combatting TOC. The most profound lesson on eliminating the drug trade and other elements of crime is that as long as there is a consumer, the product will continue to find a way of getting out. The only true attack against TOC would be to eliminate the demand, or the consumer base for criminal activity. Cracking down on the production and distribution of drugs will not prevent TOC operations, only delay and force these organizations to move out of the areas targeted. The best way to combat criminal organizations that operate outside of national boundaries is to strengthen as many nations as possible in the region. Stability of the government, people, economy, and military will shut out the criminal organizations. The more people with jobs and legal opportunities outside of crime, the fewer opportunities criminal organizations will have to grow and recruit.

Role of the Military

In the four case studies, the military was not the party directly responsible party nor was the military the lead organization when dealing with TOC. Some nations, as seen in the case studies, do not have a police force that can combat organized crime, so they use their military in that capacity. When this is the case, it is important that any advisors understand the methodology and culture of the organization they are dealing with, therefore the military may take on a more responsible role. This should be the exception to the rule.

Conclusion

Does the military have a role in combatting Transnational Organized Crime? The answer to the question is yes. That role includes a whole-of-government approach, and
the military will rarely take the lead, except in circumstances where the primary threat is
terrorist or insurgent in nature. Even then, the primary role of the military will be
temporary until the threat is neutralized, then the state, local, or other team building
organization should take over.

Chapter 5 will expand on the answer to the primary question of whether the U.S.
military has a role in combatting transnational organized crime. It will also address the
secondary questions in the conclusions. The conclusions will provide an explanation of
the relevance of this research. The recommendations section will discuss the way ahead
for the military and how this research can be used in the future.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

So does the military have a role in combatting Transnational Organized Crime? The answer is yes, though it is not that simple. The military needs to incorporate into the whole of government approach to provide a comprehensive capability. The military strength against TOC lies in training and intelligence sharing. Sun Tzu had a philosophy for dealing with an enemy that could overwhelm its opponents. The concept of Shi says that all capabilities combined work towards achieving a goal. This is the principal behind the whole of government approach, to create that same force multiplier, to use all means at the U.S. government’s disposal to defeat a complex and numerous enemy.

Conclusions

The U.S. military is a large well funded instrument of power. A significant amount of the government budget is spent on the military specifically, to the detriment of organizations such as the department of state. Whole of government extends the responsibilities of the military beyond the conventional, but this extension can be dangerous. There must be a balance to how many missions the military is involved in, and still be a capable and adaptable force. The more regional threat there is, the more it is important to have a fully ready military force available to neutralize that threat. This capability is diminished each time we add additional missions to the military.

On the other hand, any stability that the U.S. can create globally will help to prevent further threat from those regions. If the military is the discerning factor to success
in stability, then it must involve itself in these additional tasks. The question is whether
the military is the tipping point against transnational organized crime. “A demand for
mafia services originates in the economy, and that state action can foster or hinder such a
demand. The best way to fight the presence of a mafia is to drain the demand for its
services” (Varese 2011, 200). The military is at best a supporter of the attack against
TOC. The case studies revealed that many of the strategies against TOC used the military
to eradicate the drug producing fields. This strategy has caused many problems,
destroying revenue for local farmers, preventing other crops from growing, endangering
the farmers lives with cartels, and it just doesn’t prevent the growth from happening
elsewhere (Morris 2011, 4).

So what is the role of the military in combatting TOC? And who is in charge?
This is a whole of government effort. Knowing that TOC thrives in situations where they
can exploit weakness in the government and control economics, these two areas become
the greatest concern. Building partner capacity will achieve stability and promote legal
and sustainable economic alternatives to crime.

Some of the secondary questions this thesis set out to answer were determining
what the role of the military will be against TOC, and who will ultimately be responsible
for the mission of the military. The role of the military is to support the whole of
government strategy against TOC.

This strategy sets out such an approach to raise international awareness
about the reality of the TOC threat to international security; galvanize multilateral
action to constrain the reach and influence of TOC; deprive TOC of its enabling
means and infrastructure; shrink the threat TOC poses to citizen safety, national
security, and governance; and ultimately defeat the TOC networks that pose the
greatest threat to national security. (Obama 2011, 13)
The natural inclination is to allow law enforcement to lead the strategy against TOC, but the goals of raising awareness, galvanizing multilateral action, and preventing the threat to governance are all matters of state. The military provides assistance to the defense of U.S. citizens, shrinking the threat and defeating networks, in line with international laws and local law enforcement.

Finally, the strength and resources that the military will provide must be identified. These are not limited to troops on the ground. The military can assist in sanctioning criminal organizations and governments that support them, and of course provide logistic support for humanitarian purposes and building democracies. Is this a mission that should be included in the general tasks and purposes of the military? Yes, most assuredly, the military should be empowered to support missions against TOC, and adaptive enough to identify these missions and their roles within them.

Former President Bill Clinton framed the issue of democratization with his “enlargement” strategy, his focus of foreign policy almost strictly economic, and giving attention to democratizing countries while ignoring the more stubborn and instable regions as much as possible. But the “the world [is] still an unstable place no matter how many McDonald’s Golden Arches dotted the planet” (Ambrose and Brinkley 2011, 430). While economics serves best as the “carrot” to entice countries towards democracy, the country cannot ignore the threat on unstable countries, or it will spread and threaten emerging states. That is where the military comes in. When targeting criminal organizations directly, the military will take on more of a lead role through directing operations. However, as the next section will discuss, this role to combat TOC is not and should not be interchangeable with the role to combat terrorism or insurgency.
Recommendations

Much of the language of the National Security Strategy and the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime discusses TOC role in funding and enabling terrorism and insurgency. While terrorism is a real threat, and is foremost in the minds of the post 9-11 United States, the combatting of TOC as a means to destroy or hinder terrorism is not the most direct manner, nor has it been proven very effective. TOC is by itself a threat to national interests, national security, and should be an independent national interest. The threat of TOC is not just that it funds terrorist groups, but that it continues to prevent growth in a weakened nation.

The threat of TOC may be even more detrimental to the success of democratization than the threat of terrorism. TOC by its nature fills a void in organization. This is “organized” crime, this is a group with structure, safety, design, and even provides protection and resources for civilians under its control. Terrorism is terror; the purpose is to prevent stabilization, governance, and protection for anyone. Terrorism is not sustainable, whereas organized crime is, and is therefore a “sneakier,” more dangerous threat.

The beginning of this thesis discussed the shared understanding of what TOC was as an important part to developing a strategy to fight it. This is paramount to the development of coalitions to combat TOC, and the establishment of international laws that define illegal activity to deal with them.

As well as being, in some senses, the ‘home’ of the concept and phenomenon of organized crime, the U.S. has also, since the Second World War, been the pre-eminent source of the idea that criminal law enforcement must dominate approaches to organized crime control. (Edwards and Gill 2003, 3)
The U.S. has been a major player in combatting TOC since the very early stages of the program, and is therefore very influential about how the future will shape new policies. Therefore, the whole of government approach is crucial to providing a comprehensive capability to deter TOC. Building partnership and promoting democratic ideals is the best way to combat TOC in the long run.

Recommendations for Further Research

Each of the case studies in this thesis are ongoing. The results found should not change drastically, as the strategies will not change that much, but particularly the case study in Mexico has already developed new policies during the writing of this research.

While this thesis introduces the idea of a separation between terrorist/insurgency threats and transnational organized crime, the primary question does not address the organizations themselves and their threat levels. There are many questions raised during the course of investigating the primary question. It would be interesting to determine what the actual effect of combatting TOC has against the strength of insurgencies, whether the funding provided by TOC is significant to deter or even defeat regional terrorist threats. Secondly, if the U.S. devised a campaign to combat TOC alone, what would the success rate of that be? Is something like that even feasible?

Further research topics would look at exactly what threat is more of a long-term threat to stability. Terrorism requires a fast response, though there are circumstances when the best fast response may be to do nothing. “In the heightened sense of insecurity since September 2001 it becomes even more important to avoid the simple conflation of various threats into a generalized fear of transnational crime and terrorism” (Edwards and Gill 2003, 278). A final area that this thesis did not address is the role of the military’s
mission command systems to help promote the messaging of the U.S. against these TOC organizations. This is a relatively new area of the military, and the research would be much longer than what should be addressed in this paper, though it is a topic of worth that might be further examined at a later date.

Mafias emerge in societies that are undergoing a sudden and late transition to the market economy, lack a legal structure that reliably protects property rights or settles business disputes, and have a supply of people trained in violence who became unemployed at this specific juncture. (Varese 2011, 12)

In other words, emerging democracies are threatened by Transnational Organized Crime, and require the support of the strongest democracy on Earth, and the strongest military on Earth, to facilitate their unhindered transition to mature democracy.


Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2014. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI), *DOD Counterdrug Support*. Washington, DC, Joint Electronic Library (JEL).


