REGIONALISM AND SECESSION

by

Joseph F. Leavitt

March 2015

Thesis Advisor: Carolyn Halladay
Co-Advisor: Donald Abenheim

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
Catalonia and Bavaria today cling tightly to their linguistic distinctiveness, their cultural traditions, their culinary specialties, and their political particularity. Even after the passage of some centuries, these regions have not yet amalgamated into the nation states that contain them. And yet, Bavaria’s stubborn regionalism does not translate into any real longings for secession, whereas many Catalonians struggle actively and adamantly for autonomy. Why are there strong independence movements in Spain, but not in Germany? How have state formation and the relationship between the center and the region affected independence movements?

This thesis provides a historical analysis of Bavarian and Catalan regionalism and argues that autonomy mitigates secession if the predominant state has accommodated sub-state regionalism. This thesis explains that the EU can either strengthen or weaken regional governments, depending upon the nature of the relationship between the regional governments and their associated national government. This thesis argues that the security of both a newly independent state and its parent government is worse off in the short term; the severity of the security situation depends on the nature of the divorce.
REGIONALISM AND SECESSION

Joseph F. Leavitt
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 2006

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2015

Author: Joseph Leavitt

Approved by: Carolyn Halladay
Thesis Advisor

Donald Abenheim
Co-Advisor

Mohammed Hafez
Chair, Department of National Security Studies
ABSTRACT

Catalonia and Bavaria today cling tightly to their linguistic distinctiveness, their cultural traditions, their culinary specialties, and their political particularity. Even after the passage of some centuries, these regions have not yet amalgamated into the nation states that contain them. And yet, Bavaria’s stubborn regionalism does not translate into any real longings for secession, whereas many Catalanians struggle actively and adamantly for autonomy. Why are there strong independence movements in Spain, but not in Germany? How have state formation and the relationship between the center and the region affected independence movements?

This thesis provides a historical analysis of Bavarian and Catalan regionalism and argues that autonomy mitigates secession if the predominant state has accommodated sub-state regionalism. This thesis explains that the EU can either strengthen or weaken regional governments, depending upon the nature of the relationship between the regional governments and their associated national government. This thesis argues that the security of both a newly independent state and its parent government is worse off in the short term; the severity of the security situation depends on the nature of the divorce.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION AND THESIS STATEMENT ........................................................................1

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION ..............................................................................2

C. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................................................................3

1. Autonomy and Secession ..................................................................................................................5

2. Origins and Causes of Regional Movements in Spain and Germany ..............................................7

3. Local, Regional, and National Identity during Hitler’s Germany and Franco’s Spain .....................10

4. Regional Representation in the European Union and its Effect on Regional Independence Movements .............................................................................................................................12

D. HYPOTHESES AND EXPLANATIONS ..............................................................................................13

E. ROADMAP .........................................................................................................................................14

## II. GERMAN REGIONALISM

A. INTEGRATING GERMAN REGIONS: GERMAN UNIFICATION UP THROUGH WORLD WAR I (1806–1914) .........................................................................................................................17

1. Kulturnation ........................................................................................................................................18

2. Preservation of Subnational Institutions .........................................................................................21

3. How Heimat Mediated the Local and the National .......................................................................24

B. EXPLOITING CULTURAL REGIONALISM (1933–1945) ..................................................................26

1. Location-Based Identity in Nazi Germany .......................................................................................28

2. Demystifying Nazi Centralism .........................................................................................................29

C. RETURN TO REGIONALISM (1945–PRESENT) .............................................................................31

1. Protection of Bavaria’s Regional Autonomy in Germany’s Post-War Institutional Framework .................................................................................................................................32

2. How Bavaria’s Economic Transformation Reinforced its Regional Particularity .......................34

D. CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................................................36

## III. SPANISH REGIONALISM

A. THE SPANISH EMPIRE: THE WEAK KNOT FOR AN INTERNALLY HETEROGENOUS STATE .................................................................................................................................38

1. Tying the Knot: The Foundations of the Empire ...............................................................................38

2. Straining the Knot: The War of Spanish Succession (1702–1714) .................................................39

3. The Knot Unravels (1808–1898) .......................................................................................................40

4. Failed Attempts to Retie the Knot (1909–1942) ...............................................................................41

B. CASTILIAN HEGEMONY AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CATALONIAN IDENTITY .................................................................43

1. Early Attempts at Centralization ......................................................................................................44

2. Castilian Language becomes Anti-Catalan .....................................................................................45

3. The Failed Hopes of 1812 ...............................................................................................................46
4. Francoist Spain 1939–1975 .................................................................49
C. FAILURE TO ACHIEVE A COMMON NATIONAL VISION ..............50
D. THE RISE OF CATALANISM AND THE TURN TOWARD SECESSION .................................................................55
   1. 1898–1936: The Rise of Catalanism ...........................................55
   2. The Turn toward Secession: 1978 to the Present ......................57
E. CONCLUSION ...............................................................................60

IV. DOES THE EUROPEAN UNION STRENGTHEN OR WEAKEN REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS? ..................................................61
A. SPANISH INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK BETWEEN REGIONS AND THE CENTER ..............................................62
B. HOW EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HAS AFFECTED REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS IN SPAIN ........................................66
C. GERMAN INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK BETWEEN THE CENTER AND REGIONS .............................................68
D. HOW EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HAS AFFECTED REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS IN GERMANY ............................70
E. CONCLUSION ............................................................................72

V. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF SECESSION ..................................75
A. THE DIFFICULTIES OF ASSESSING THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF AN INDEPENDENT CATALONIA ....................77
B. CATALONIA’S PROBLEMATIC ENTRY INTO NATO AND THE EU ............................................................81
C. CATALONIA: INTERNALLY DIVIDED ON DEFENSE .............83
D. THE DIFFICULT PROSPECTS OF BUILDING AN AUTONOMOUS DEFENSE CAPABILITY ........................................84
E. THE EU IS STILL DIVIDED ON SECESSION WITHIN EUROPE .....87
F. CONCLUSION ............................................................................88

VI. CONCLUSION ...........................................................................91
A. WHY BAVARIAN AND CATALAN REGIONALISMS TOOK DIFFERENT PATHS ..................................................92
B. REGIONS AND THE EU .................................................................94

LIST OF REFERENCES .............................................................................97
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ......................................................................107
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I could not have completed this thesis without the support of several people. I am indebted to my wife for taking care of our children while I was focusing on my thesis. Without her support, I would have been unable to complete this thesis.

I am also indebted to my two advisors, Dr. Carolyn Halladay and Dr. Donald Abenheim, who provided invaluable feedback and advice. I would also like to thank Professor Yost for providing me feedback on the security aspects of my thesis. Finally, I must thank all of the staff at the graduate writing center who assisted me throughout the process.
I. INTRODUCTION

Nationalism as guiding political idea is alive and well in a united Europe, which in the year 2015 shows troubling signs of a return to the bad old ways of the 19th and the 20th centuries. The character and nature of nationalism pose a challenge for students of security studies unfamiliar with how nation states have developed from their origins in the pre modern political order. The 18 September 2014 Scottish referendum on independence, spearheaded by the Scottish Nationalist Party, is but one recent example of its continued relevance. The violent fate of eastern Ukraine and claims of the vitality of “New Russia” in the year 2014 are yet another. Nationalism continues to work in different ways in different parts of Europe, however—even among places with comparable experiences of thwarted or deferred national independence which nonetheless in the present and recent past have not garnered headlines in US defense circles as has been the case recently in Eastern Europe. Yet these other examples are compelling and require analysis.

For example, unlike the mutually agreed Scottish referendum, Catalonia held a non-official referendum on independence in defiance of Spanish authorities on 9 November 2014. Bavaria, a subnational political, cultural, and economic state within Germany within ancient and proud lineage, possesses no meaningful independence movements on par with what is seen elsewhere in Europe, and even as close by as in the South Tirol in Italy.

Some three centuries earlier, in 1714, Catalonia lost its independence, as it had joined the losing side during the War of Spanish Succession. In 1866, Bavaria lost its de-facto independence as it was on the losing side of the Austro-Prussian war. Today, both regions maintain high degrees of distinct historical, social and cultural identity and are among the strongest-performing regions in their respective countries. Yet while millions of Catalonians—out of a population of just 7.5 million—have demonstrated in the streets for independence for the last few years on 11 September, the day Catalonia lost its
autonomy, no similar independence movements exist in the Germany of 2015,¹ even though regionalism thrives in the Federal Republic and the ideal of a German citizen’s home town, or Heimat, remains a touchstone of contemporary political and cultural identity.

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION AND THESIS STATEMENT

Catalonia and Bavaria today cling tightly to their linguistic distinctiveness, their cultural traditions, their culinary specialties, and their political particularity. Even after the passage of some centuries, these regions have not yet amalgamated into the nation states that contain them. And yet, Bavaria’s stubborn regionalism does not translate into any real longings for secession, where Catalonians struggle actively and adamantly for autonomy. Artur Mas, the president of Catalonia’s Convergence and Union (CiU) political alliance and Catalonia’s regional government, pushed for a referendum on independence to take place on 9 November 2014 and continues to support Catalan self-determination. Why are there strong independence movements in Spain, but not in Germany? How have state formation and the relationship between the center and the region affected independence movements?

This thesis argues that autonomy mitigates secession if the predominant nation state has accommodated sub-state regionalism. Even if a state or locality has lost its independence by integration into a larger nation-state, the newly incorporated state will not inevitably long for its former independence. If the unifying state has respected existing political and cultural institutions, at least in a significant manner, the newly integrated state is likely to maintain associational regionalism and not exclusive regionalism.

B. **SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION**

Nationalism can be a unifying force or an exclusionary force in mass politics and a cause of war in the worst case, depending on how the nation state constructs its identity. If the nation state can foster an inclusive form of nationalism, which accommodates subnational identities, the potential exists to overcome the perils of nationalism—dangers that often lead to military conflict. At the supranational level, the European Union (EU) has the potential to influence subnational movements. If the EU understands the nature of subnational regionalism and subnational identities feel like the EU represents their interests, then the EU may be able to play a role in mitigating secessionist tendencies. Thus, a better understanding of the features of government, ideas, society, mass politics, and even the fact of luck that differentiate independence-seeking regionalism versus association-seeking regionalism. An understanding of these forces, so little in evidence in the making of policy in many places in conflict in the last 20 years in Europe, the Middle East as well as Asia and beyond, will better position governments and policy-makers as well as those charged with the execution of policy at the operational level to understand and manage secessionist regional movements and ultimately to prevent or mitigate potentially violent conflicts, unlike what has transpired in 2014 in Ukraine and what took place in earlier epochs in the two areas under inquiry here.

C. **LITERATURE REVIEW**

Many recent academic works focusing on nationalism have diminished or neglected the role of regionalism. Additionally, the regional variants of National Socialism in Germany and Francoism in Spain have received little attention with regard to how they influenced regional separatist movements. Scholars from the late 19th century declared sub-state nationalism extinct due to the rise of the industrial revolution’s new “socio-economic divisions” that rendered territorial, cultural, and national forms of

---

allegiance obsolete. More recently, Celia Applegate provided a detailed analysis on how the focus on the nation state in the inter-war period and postwar period led to the relegation of regions to the domain of “amateur” studies. This exclusive focus on the nation state has underplayed, if not obscured, the impact of regionalism shaping national societies and identities. Even with the rise of modernization theory in the 1960s and globalization-related studies in the 1990s, subnational units continue to be overlooked.

Current scholarship addresses the continued authority of the nation state even if it has become more integrated into such supranational institutions as the European Union. After the end of the cold war, numerous scholars attempted to predict what the end of history would look like. Samuel Huntington argues that while scholars have predicted various forms of international relations, from the “return of traditional rivalries between nation states” to the “decline of the nation state,” future fault lines will be between “civilizations,” suggesting a relegation of the nation state as a merely an input to what constitutes a civilization. In Europe today, the nation state continues to play a paramount role, but regional representation in the EU coexists with nation state representation, even if not as influential. Yet “regional representation within the European Union has received little attention.” Regional movements, conditioned by national pressures, have persisted and often demanded increased autonomy or independence from their national governments. The European Union’s multilayered governance structure, however complicated, may serve as a modern governance example that successfully manages internal representation from subnational regions to national governments, while at the same time being perceived by outsiders as a supranational, unified civilization. If the EU can effectively manage competing levels of governance, it has the potential to act as a


counter-weight to nation-based conflict, including nationalism-inspired independence movements.

1. **Autonomy and Secession**

   No consensus has emerged to explain the presence or absence of independence movements in Western Europe. Some authors have argued that autonomous sub-national communities are more likely to secede than those communities that lack autonomy. Others argue that autonomy quells the urge for secession by providing a mechanism for the state to adjudicate potentially problematic issues. David S. Siroky and John Cuffe argue that the binary notion of autonomy—either having it or not—is too simplistic and fails to provide sufficient specificity to develop an empirical hypothesis. In their article “Lost Autonomy, Nationalism and Separatism,” Siroky and Cuffe argue that a more nuanced division is necessary, one that accounts for the way that a region came to its current status. They categorize groups into formerly autonomous, never autonomous, and lost autonomy, and conclude that groups that have lost autonomy are two times more likely to seek secession than never autonomous groups. (They define autonomy as “a form of internal self-determination that provides a group with actual powers and resources for self-governance within a state.”) However, given that Bavaria and Catalonia lost independence, rather than autonomy as the authors mean it, they would not exactly fit into Siroky and Cuffe’s model. The authors do not differentiate between lost autonomy and lost independence, which could have different results. Bavaria and Catalonia, which are currently autonomous, were previously independent and would not initially fall into the lost autonomy category. Thus, Bavaria and Catalonia may not be fully explained by Siroky and Cuffe’s model. Indeed, Siroky and Cuffe acknowledge further research is needed to investigate the causal mechanisms that underpin separatist

---


9 Ibid., 2.


11 Ibid., 2.
movements.12 This thesis expands on Siroky and Cuffe’s framework by including formerly independent states Bavaria and Catalonia and by arguing that the center-periphery relationship has been a determinant factor in sovereignty seeking regional movements.

One might expect that with this model, several previously independent territories that were subsequently annexed to Prussia in 1866 would have pursued separatism, yet no widespread opposition emerged in this wave of annexations and “sub-state regionalism” rarely developed in these annexed territories.13 Bavarian regionalism, which had both political and cultural aspects, persisted after German unification, but the political aspects of Bavarian regionalism harkened back to historical memories rather than present realities. This nostalgia of an earlier epoch maintained a sense of “uniqueness and independence even after their statehood had disappeared.”14

Furthermore, German Romantic authors, notably Johann Gottfried Herder, propagated the concept of Kulturnation, a nation with a common culture, which would later be used by German nation-builders to unify a diverse Germany on the basis of a common language, shared ethnic heritage, and cultural affinities.15 In Spain, by contrast, a comparable concept may have been less effective in assimilating the peripheral regions, such as Catalonia, amid the more muscular centralizing tendencies of successive Spanish governments, most obviously during the Franco regime.

Jaime Lluch establishes a critical distinction between “association-seeking” and “sovereignty-seeking” subnational movements and provides a theoretical framework to explain why these movements take different paths.16 He goes further to apply this framework to account for the differing national movements in the Basque Country and

14 Ibid., 94.
Spain. Though his focus is on the origins of these movements, he argues that the
Convergence and Union coalition in Catalonia “does not propose independence from
Spain.”17 He argues that because Catalan nationalism was more dependent on sound
economic relations with Spain, the Catalan elites could only advocate for a Catalan
nationalism that was interoperable with Spanish nationalism.18 Economic transformation
in the Basque country, by contrast, displaced a larger share of the agrarian population,
leading to a stronger social base that advocated for separatism and a rejection of Madrid’s
capitalist policies.19

However, the nature of Catalan nationalism has changed in recent years.
Montserrat Guibernau provides a theoretical framework that explains the evolution of
Catalan nationalism to Catalan secessionism.20 Asier Blas adds to this framework by
emphasizing the economic and fiscal problems which have aggrieved Catalonía’s sense
of victimization and driven Catalonía’s nationalism from the “voice option to the exit
option.”21

2. Origins and Causes of Regional Movements in Spain and Germany

Much of the literature that explores the origins of regionalism examines data
qualitatively using tools such as the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) database or the
Minorities at Risk (MAR). While these sources are useful to derive more broad
conclusions, few works offer qualitative comparisons regarding the origins of sub-
national regional movements. Rune Dahl Fitjar measures the variance of regionalism over
time and space, using empirical data, and then supports her argument by examining
regional movements within the United Kingdom and Norway.22 She concludes that
“regionalism is likely to be more prevalent in regions with a regional language, a high

18 Ibid., 209.
19 Ibid., 216.
22 Rune Dahl Fitjar, The Rise of Regionalism: Causes of Regional Mobilization in Western Europe
level of economic development and highly regionalized party systems, and which are closely integrated into the European Union.”

Montserrat Guibernau explains why nations without states in Western Europe have recently emerged as sub-state political forces by exploring the forces of globalization, devolution, and transnational identities.

Guibernau concludes that a type of “emancipatory nationalism” has emerged that allows for nations without states to determine their political future. In Catalonia, Guibernau argues that this process has emerged due to the rise of democracy, which allows people to express themselves without fear and the failure of the Spanish state to allow for further devolution.

More specifically, Joose Augusteijn and Eric Storm’s *Region and State in Nineteenth Century Europe* provide robust foundations to explore the origins of regional and national movements in Spain (chapter 8) and Germany (chapter 6). In chapter 6, Siegfried Weichlein explains how German regionalism varied from other European regionalisms. First, German regionalism was multilayered; it corresponded both to a form of subnational regionalism and also regionalisms within historic German states, such as Bavaria.

Second, cooperative federalism—a development after 1848, which allowed German states and their associated dynasties to maintain an administrative function, mitigated secessionist tendencies. In chapter 8, Josep Fradera explains that regionalism in Spain was held together by Spain’s overseas empire. However, Spain’s failure to effectively integrate its colonies—a lynchpin of Spain’s continental unity—led to the unraveling of its empire. The final blow to Spanish unity, the loss of Philippines and

---


26 Ibid., 391.

27 Siegfried Weichlein, “Regionalism, Federalism, and Nationalism,” 95.

28 Ibid.


30 Ibid.
Cuba in the Spanish American War, weakened Spanish unity and allowed cultural regionalism to become increasingly politicized. Thus, while Germany both integrated and to some degree kept intact dynastic state infrastructures, Spain failed to effectively nationalize internal regions. When the Spanish empire came crumbling down in 1898, so too did any appearances of national unity.

Celia Applegate, in *A Nation of Provincials*, provides an authoritative work that analyzes the meaning and evolution of *Heimat* in Germany by focusing on the Rhenish Pfalz and using it as a lens to understand how a larger sense of German *Heimat* may be understood. She explains the relationship—however problematic—between the region and the nation and how this connection acted as a bulwark to keep the German nation unified against centrifugal pressures.\(^31\) While she acknowledges that “German national consciousness could not have spread” without such physical manifestations of the industrial revolution as railroads, she rejects the proposition that a specific type of “rationality and progressivism” is inherent in this national consciousness.\(^32\) Rather, the persistence of the notion of *Heimat*, which emphasized local customs, coexisted and interoperated with a larger sense of German consciousness.\(^33\)

Katharine D. Kennedy contributes to understanding regionalism in Southern Germany.\(^34\) She rejects the argument that cultural regionalism in Southern Germany at least until 1914 had become nationalized by explaining that local authorities still controlled school curricula which emphasized Bavaria’s *Heimatkunde*. Textbooks in Bavaria after German unification still focused on the “cult of the regional monarch,” which “overshadowed the imperial cult.”\(^35\) The Bavarian Minister of Education, Johann von Lutz, had to remind school officials in Lower Franconia that Bavaria was “no longer

---

32 Ibid., 12.
33 Ibid., 13.
35 Ibid., 16.
an independent country.” Kennedy challenges the degree to which volkish ideology had penetrated Bavarian historiography, by demonstrating that at least until 1914 no national curriculum existed throughout Germany. She concludes by arguing that a more uniform version of German history came to Southern Germany not from a top-down mandate, but from an eventual push by educators to create a “more teachable, interesting, and patriotic curriculum for young children.”

Angel Smith describes how Catalonia’s political regionalism became radicalized in the second half of the 19th century. He explains that political and cultural regionalism in Catalonia, which emphasized Catalonia’s uniqueness as a special nation, combined in the 1880s to demand for increasing political devolution—a theme that has remained at the center of Madrid-Barcelona relations since then.

3. Local, Regional, and National Identity during Hitler’s Germany and Franco’s Spain

Claus-Christian W. Szejnmann and Maiken Umbach challenge the prevailing view that National Socialism relied largely on a national framework of spatial identity. Rather, they explore how “Heimat, region and empire were constantly imagined, constructed and re-moulded through their relationship with one another.” Similarly, Xosé Manoel Núñez and Maiken Umbach in “Hijacked Heimats: National Appropriations of Local and Regional Identities in Germany and Spain, 1930–1945” explain how both Franco and Hitler often promoted cultural regionalism while suppressing political regionalism, which they viewed as potential threats to their national visions. Rather than homogenizing the entire nation state, both rulers made a “clear

36 Kennedy, “Regionalism and Nationalism,” 16.
37 Ibid., 19–20.
38 Ibid., 26.
40 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
distinction” between “cultural diversity, which could be embraced and manipulated, and centrifugal political forces, which were repressed because they clashed with the strategic and economic objectives” of their regimes.43

In Nazi Germany, Hitler viewed the solution to Bavaria’s hatred of Prussian hegemony as a Germany of regions.44 Rather than espousing Berlin to be the capital of a centralized Germany, Berlin, according to these authors’ interpretation of Mein Kampf, would serve as the capital of a “distinctly Prussian region…which can happily coexist with the peculiarities of other German regions.”45 The Nazi regime embraced regional dialects, as long as they were not linked to political projects.46

Franco’s Spain was not so different. While it is true that Franco’s regime placed restrictions on cultural expressions, including the use of local languages, there was not always uniform opposition to the use of minority languages—especially if their use could be appropriated for Franco’s nationalizing project. 47 In contexts where local language use was prohibited, de facto opposition varied depending on the degree to which Franco perceived it as a threat. Thus, the publication of “religious and folkloristic literature in regional languages” was not only sometimes unopposed, but also re-appropriated for national propaganda.48 Iconic images from Spanish regions, such as the monastery of Montserrat in Catalonia, were reprinted on postage stamps in an attempt to appeal to the regions and to prevent internal secessionist movements.49

Carmen Ortiz explains how Franco—through the use of folklore and aesthetics—on the one hand sought to gain broad support by recognizing different regions, while at

44 Ibid., 304.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Núñez and Umbach, “Hijacked Heimats,” 301.; The authors explain that local implementation of these restrictions, however, increased the view held by minorities that Franco’s regime suppressed regional languages.
48 Núñez and Umbach, “Hijacked Heimats,” 301.
49 Ibid.
the same time ensuring Castilian regionalism’s hegemony.\footnote{Carmen Ortiz García, “The Uses of Folklore by the Franco Regime,” \textit{Journal of American Folklore} 112 (Autumn 1999): 479–496.} She finds that the Spanish concept of the nation is similar to Hitler’s, which views peasants as “the founding-stone of the whole nation.”\footnote{Ibid., 488.} This focus on the individual and the individual’s unity with the nation allowed Franco to depoliticize regionalism by focusing on cultural aspects, rather than political aspirations.\footnote{Ibid.} The regime’s romanticized image of a countryman was used as a vehicle to gloss over class differences and “regional contradictions.”\footnote{Ibid., 479.} By emphasizing the peasant, who theoretically could be from any region, the regime grounded itself with a sense of legitimacy.\footnote{Ibid., 490.} Yet, despite the idealized image of the peasant, the hegemony of Castile was undisputed. Castilian was a marker of how Spanish one was, similar to how the term, \textit{das Germanische}, or “Germanness,” indicated how German one was.\footnote{Ibid., 489.}

4. Regional Representation in the European Union and its Effect on Regional Independence Movements

Few works, if any, have addressed whether regional representation in the EU has specifically increased the collective mobilization of particular independence movements. However, several works explore the general impact of regional representation in the European Union. Andjelka Pantovic and Mwita Chacha argue that sub-national regions have gained increasing influence in the European Union.\footnote{Andjelka Pantovic, “The Economic Impact of the European Union on Subnational Separatist Sentiment,” (Honors thesis, University of Colorado Boulder, 2014): 1–58.; Mwita Chacha, “Regional attachment and support for European integration,” \textit{European Union Politics} 14 (June 2013): 206–227.} Rune Dahl Fitjar suggests that the European Union has empowered some regional movements at the expense of national capitals.\footnote{Fitjar, \textit{The Rise of Regionalism}, 21.} Jeffery Charlie suggests that EU regional representation has remained
insignificant. Some authors suggest regional representation in the EU has actually disempowered regional movements.

While most authors agree that regional representation is not as influential as national member-state representation, there exists no consensus on whether regional representation in the EU has been to the detriment of national representation or whether regional representation serves as a way to fulfil regional political representation and potentially subdue sub-national demands for increased autonomy or independence. Fewer works examine the specific influence of the European Union on particular regional movements. Angela Bourne examines how the EU has Basque political regionalism, but few other comprehensive works examine the specific effects of particular regional representation within the EU. Further research is needed to assess which theoretical approaches of regional representation within the EU best explain the German and Spanish political regionalism.

D. HYPOTHESES AND EXPLANATIONS

There are three general hypotheses that may account for the stronger independence seeking movements in Spain and the weaker ones in Germany. First, Germany’s federal structure, which has allowed regions to maintain significant cultural, fiscal, and political autonomy, may have led to a more cooperative relationship between the periphery and the center, mitigating separatist tendencies. Prussia annexed regions that already exhibited strong political institutions and thus could not unify all of Germany devoid of significant resistance unless it recognized and respecting—to some degree—regional power structures. Thus, while regionalism persisted in Germany, it may have become more compatible with German nationalism because people in the regions


61 Augusteijn and Storm, Region and State; Daniel Ziblatt, Structuring the State: The Formation of Italy and Germany and the Puzzle of Federalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).
conceived their *Heimat* as Germany. In Spain on the other hand, most political power, especially after 1812, was centered almost exclusively in Castile. Madrid may have viewed Catalanian and Basque nationalism as threats not compatible with Spanish nationalism.

Second, the centuries-old decline of Spain’s empire, particularly after 1898, left the nation demoralized and may have enabled and inspired regional movements, particularly in Catalonia and the Basque country to demand increased autonomy or independence from Madrid. In contrast, Germany was rising in economic and political power at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century. The Spanish Civil War left the country in disarray and led to the emergence of a dictatorship that sought to keep the country together. Franco’s suppression of Catalan and Basque nationalism may have further radicalized these movements, leading to their reemergence after his death.

Third, the degree to which regions in Spain and Germany possess fiscal autonomy may be a contributing factor towards political regionalism and secession. Economic inequality alone may not cause secessionism, but it may exacerbate cultural and political tensions. By the latter half of the 19th century, Catalonia, and to a lesser extent the Basque country, became leading economic regions in Spain. The disproportionate fiscal burden held by Catalonia may have radicalized Catalan nationalism. One factor that may have kept Bavarian nationalism as association-seeking rather than sovereignty seeking may have been Bavaria’s relatively high fiscal autonomy.

**E. ROADMAP**

Chapter II explains how Bavarian regionalism, despite its unique characteristics, interoperated with and was accommodated by German nationalism. Chapter III explains how Catalanian regionalism evolved from association seeking to exclusive regionalism due to the increasing hegemony of Castilian political and cultural institutions. It also argues that despite recent trends towards devolution, Madrid’s efforts have not been

---

63 Ibid.
consistent and significant enough to mitigate strong secessionist trends in Catalonia. Chapter IV argues that the European Union can either strengthen or weaken political regionalism, depending on the relationship between the center and the periphery. Chapter V argues that the short-term security situation in any newly independent country and its former country will be worse off.
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
II. GERMAN REGIONALISM

The Federal Republic of Germany today, as its name and constitution implies exhibits high degrees of regional diversity, but it has no strong secessionist movements. This fact has been scarcely the result of chance, but rather of deliberate customs, traditions, politics, and sensible federalist actions and unique circumstances that enabled the German nation state to accommodate regionalism. The pluralism of politics and culture that is core to Germany’s regionalism have mitigated secessionist tendencies and increased the German state’s long-term unity, although today’s Germany since 1990 has hardly been the norm for a longer historical period.

German regionalism’s nature is best understood by examining three distinct periods. The first period, spanning from before German unification to the outbreak of World War I, formed the latter two in terms of Bavarian autonomy. The second period, which spans the duration of Nazi Germany (1933–1945), sheds light on how the state exploited—but did not completely eliminate—cultural regionalism. The final period of this chapter examines post-World War II Germany, which preserved and enshrined German regionalism.

A. INTEGRATING GERMAN REGIONS: GERMAN UNIFICATION UP THROUGH WORLD WAR I (1806–1914)

Up to and shortly after German unification in 1871, three characteristics enabled German nationalism to more effectively integrate the several regions: cultural-linguistic unity, preservation of regional structures, and the importance of one’s locality or region in understanding the German nation state. The most salient fact is the legacy and custom of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, a state on the medieval model, whose diversity was legion and which was able to operate on a political basis that became obsolete in the course of the late 18th century before the First Reich was finally abolished by Napoleon on 1806 with the abdication of the Habsburg emperor from his medieval German mission. Habsburg had been the leading dynasty, but only one of many. Its
character was central to this legacy of pluralism in what finally became Kleindeutschland in the hands of Bismarck.

Culture and language as these became tools or even weapons of politics acted as catalysts for Germany’s nation-building project by bridging estate and later class divides and promoting the German language and culture, regardless of locale, as a unifying identity. Rather than eliminating and stamping out in some centralized form the pre-existing regional institutions that had been resistant to German unification, as it could have done, Prussia tolerated them, although the Catholic Church was at times an exception to this generalization in the 19th century. Prussia’s preservation of regional structures, not the least because it was itself, a state made up of widely different regions and areas with distinct culture and tradition, facilitated regional support for Germany’s nation state and allowed Prussia to leverage existing institutions of state, culture, society and economy to consolidate Germany’s stability. In light of the growing German nation state with varying regional cultures, the experiences and attachment to one’s ancient, traditional and even apolitical homeland in the sense of mass politics acted as a lens from which to understand and reconciles Germanness with enduring regional affinities. Understanding the presence, absence, and characteristics of these formative features of German nation-building sheds light on how Germany developed into a centralized, totalitarian “Hitler State” (which, itself, was really not as centralized and unitary as its name betrays) and how Germany returned to become an integrative federation that accommodates regional diversity.65

1. Kulturnation

While Germany did not become a nation state until 1871, German nationalism still managed to spread via the reaction to French reason, Napoleon, and via the transition from folklore to propaganda and mass movement that is typical of central and eastern Europe. This phenomenon was largely due to the influence of German nationalists and patriotic groups in a nation in which the book became an object of national respect, as

well as music and art, with a nationalistic character in answer to fashion and customs from east and west. Furthermore, their writings could reach a wide audience given that literacy in German territories by the middle of the 19th century had reached 75 percent.\textsuperscript{66} The \textit{Kulturnation}, a concept formulated by philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder as early as the 1760s, was born in Germany. With the French Revolution as a model, in the 1810s, romantic elites realized that, in order to succeed as a nation, they would have to build solidarity through common cultural experience and the German language.\textsuperscript{67}

The rise of a standardized German language also helped achieve a degree of cultural unity. Low German, which possessed a substantial literature in the early Middle Ages, was overtaken by the use of High German in the latter part of the Middle Ages, as this was the language used in the imperial Court and in influential German states.\textsuperscript{68} The publication of Martin Luther’s Bible and associated doctrinal publications in the early 1500s accelerated the demise of Low German. At the same time, Luther’s publications split German populations between the forces of the Catholic Church and the Protestant Reformation, which would lead to the Thirty Years War.\textsuperscript{69} From the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 to the end of the 18th century, German language was simply a form of communication; any sense of a German-nation united by a common language was an abstract idea for another century and a half.\textsuperscript{70}

While the literature and market for High German had become more widespread, it was not until the end of the 18th century when German nationalists deliberately attached the use of High German to the national movement in the face of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic conquest of western Germany and beyond.\textsuperscript{71} While the study of

\textsuperscript{66} Hagen Schulze and William E. Yuill, \textit{States, Nations, and Nationalism: From the Middle Ages to the Present} (Oxford, UK; Blackwell, 1996), 148.; By comparison, literacy in Spain in the same period was less than 25 percent.


\textsuperscript{69} Schulze, \textit{States, Nations and Nationalism}, 131.

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 131.

\textsuperscript{71} Chadwick, \textit{The Nationalities of Europe}, 20.
regional German dialects, such as Low German, was an area the German regional studies experts focused on, the use of Low German, which resembles Dutch, as a national language would not have been allowed by German nationalists.72 “As a new professional liberal class emerged in the 18th century, so too did a national form of German literature develop.73 By the early 19th century, this new social class, by rejecting France’s ‘cultural hegemony,’ not only helped cement the adoption of the German language, but also helped to create a “uniform standard of taste and judgment.”74 The German dialect had coalesced by this time and German elites deliberately published works to create a common cultural understanding.75 This national literature reached larger audiences by the mid-19th century amidst a growing sense of national consciousness facilitated by an increasingly literate and mobilized public. Thus, despite persisting regional differences, the adoption of a standardized language affirmed national unity, even in the absence of a nation state.

The gymnastics movement, which arose in the early 19th century, was one German nationalist idea for achieving cultural unity across class and regional divides. In 1811, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, a leading bourgeois figure in the national movement against the French, developed a gymnastics organization that unified Germans against a foreign enemy and overcame internal estate and later class divides.76 Gymnastics was not just a sport; “gymnastics were supposed to train fighters for the liberation of Germany.”77 Jahn argued that his gymnasts had to be ready to fight against the French occupiers.78 Foretelling the writings of Carl Schmitt, a German political theorist of the Nazi era and thereafter, Jahn understood that these gymnasts, his “freedom fighters,” derived their

72 Chadwick, The Nationalities of Europe, 20.
73 Schulze, States, Nations and Nationalism, 132.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
77 Ibid., 28.
78 Schulze, States, Nations and Nationalism, 165.
value from the “real possibility of physical killing.”"79 “The new, mandatory gymnast uniform was designed not only to enhance a gymnast’s performance, but to tear down any class divides; it mattered not whether you had high social status or not—what mattered was that you were a German.”80 Jahn knew that allowing gymnasts to differentiate themselves along estate lines would hinder German unity and cause division within the German nation.

Nationalist movements in Germany unified people against a common enemy while suppressing internal divisions. Jahn understood the importance of friend-enemy groupings as Carl Schmitt later wrote at the end of the Weimar Republic and on the eve of the Third Reich in The Concept of the Political: “the intensification of internal antagonisms has the effect of weakening the common identity vis-à-vis another state” and therefore the basis for violent conflict would unfold internally rather than directed against a foreign enemy.”81 In 1817, when young German nationalists held a festival at Wartburg Castle, nationalism overcame internal divisions.82 Protestants and Catholics attended each other’s worship services, showing that German patriotism was more important than religious differences.83 Even Jews, in the midst of growing anti-Semitism, partook in Christian ceremonies.84

2. Preservation of Subnational Institutions

While the Kulturnation helped create the idea of a unified German nation, it was Prussia’s preservation of certain regional structures that enabled it to create an inclusive and stable state. German unification, though driven by Prussia, retained key features of the order from the First Reich as well as the reordering of the central European system from Napoleon through Metternich. Bavaria’s transformation from a region that had

80 Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses, 38.
81 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 33.
82 Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses, 77.
83 Ibid, 77.
84 Ibid., 77–78.
adhered to the south German and Catholic orientation hinging on Vienna and Habsburg to a kingdom that accepted it shows how Germany’s nation-building project successfully incorporated existing political structures in contrast to the epoch of conflict in which Prussians and Bavarians had fought each other in the period 1618–1648 as well as in the intervening conflicts in which Prussians had fought the Saxons and the Habsburgs. While Bavaria’s defeat in the 1866 Austro Prussian War may have weakened its position to resist German unification, Bavaria’s successful integration into Germany was not guaranteed. Even after Bavaria’s defeat, politicians (such as Joseph Edmung Jörg, the leader of the Bavarian Patriot Party) argued that joining Germany “might undermine the very existence of Bavaria.” At the same time, Bavarian nationalists recognized that voting to remain outside of the new Reich would mean disintegration; sub-state regions in Bavaria, such as the Palatinate, felt sympathetic towards German integration.

Additionally, the revolutions of 1848 illustrated that the ruling order of the Metternich system, established to protect the status quo restored after 1815, had failed; among Bavarian elites with their Habsburg orientation as well as their Catholicism, there was a widespread fear of the “impending danger and decline” of the “European system of states.” These elites may have found that a negotiated accession union with Prussia may have been in their best interests to promote their regional autonomy as in times past when they had been a leading dynasty of the Old Reich.

While the imminent Franco-Prussian War likely pushed Bavaria to either accept a negotiated union with Prussia or a “forced ‘union’” with France, the Bavarian parliament and King only accepted a union with Prussia after they ensured that “the Bavarian crown would still be sovereign…and would control its own military.”

86 Ziblatt, *Structuring the State*, 55.
89 Ziblatt, *Structuring the State*, 56.
Bavaria integrated into the Second German Reich with many of its institutions intact in 1871. This sense of “cooperative federalism,” which began to emerge after the failed national revolutions of 1848, allowed historic German polities such as Bavaria to maintain authority. Bavaria was still able to implement federal policies, even if the power of the states remained with the regional monarchs—a fact that socialists resented, and one that left a deep ideological divide between socialists and conservative federalists. Rather than suppressing Bavarian regionalism, Prussia accepted Bavarian regionalism as a constituent part of the German Reich—a Reich which derived as much of its power from its constituent states as it did from Prussia. Furthermore, Bavaria, like other member states, maintained influence in the German Reich via the Bundesrat, a territorially based legislative body at the federal level, through which it was able to defend its autonomy. Even under Bismarck, the “Iron Chancellor,” known for unifying German under the force of the state, many states preserved their traditional autonomies in key areas of government and society as well as economy. Bismarck’s deliberate but judicious national unification project is evidenced in a letter he sent his representative in Munich in 1869:

That German unity could be promoted by actions involving force, I think is self-evident…A voluntary intervention in the evolution of history, which is determined by purely subjective factors, results only in the shaking down of unripe fruit, and that German unity is no ripe fruit at this time leaps, in my opinion, to the eye…The ability to wait while conditions develop is a requisite of practical policy.

While Bavaria lost its independence by joining the North German Confederation in 1871, Bavaria retained a subnational infrastructure and a significant degree of


91 Additionally, the threat of market domination was largely absent as Bavaria had joined the German customs union, the Zollverein, prior to political integration. Furthermore, regional education and research institutes, which Prussia preserved, allowed smaller producers “to remain competitive in increasingly interconnected markets.” See Gary Herrigel, Industrial Constructions: The Sources of German Industrial Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 116–117.

92 Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses, 18.

autonomy. This factor allowed for a smoother integration into the German nation state. In the end, Prussia assessed Bavaria’s strong regionalism less as a threat and more as an institution for building German unity. While Bavaria maintained its regional pride, the negotiated integration of Bavaria into the Reich mitigated Bavarian regionalism from becoming sovereignty-seeking.

3. **How Heimat Mediated the Local and the National**

The German concept *Heimat*, or ancient and traditional homeland as in the French term Pays and with its later associations of blood and soil concepts of the nation state, allowed Germany to more effectively integrate regions into the nation state of the Second Reich. Germany had a long history of regionalism derived from the First Reich, which was manifested most prominently in the 19th century Heimat movement—a movement that allowed regions to be the manner by which people associated themselves with the nation state in an individual manner. Heimat helped bridge the divide between the traditional premodern, Habsburg oriented particularism of the various German states and the idea of a larger nation state as nationalism emerged in the later part of the 19th century in Central Europe.

There were two ways by which Heimat became catalyst for German integration, while at the same time maintaining varying degrees of local autonomy. First, people understood that Heimat was a pillar of the German nation state once it actually began to exist in 1871. Germans began to see the nation’s “imagined community” through the lens of everyday interactions in their locality. As Maiken Umbach and Claus-Christian W. Szejnmann explain, “Heimat became a way of making one’s attachment to the nation thinkable, configuring identity not as the property of an individual but as a cultural construct.” Each province became the manifestation of the greater German nation state,

---

94 For a more comprehensive explanation of Heimat and the Heimat movement, please refer to Chapter I.


allowing for regionalisms to coexist and become, for many, the “iconography of German nationhood.” 98 The Heimat movement, much like the gymnast movement transcended class and political lines, but was as much a thing of literate middle class of the 19th century as anything. It provided a sense of connection and belonging to the German nation through the region in their rich variety. While the experience of Heimat, which emphasized local particularities, may seem incompatible with a larger sense of national unity, Heimat actually linked people’s everyday experiences, however different, with a larger sense of Germanness as the German Reich in the 19th century secured its place in popular allegiance in contrast to earlier, premodern forms of estate-based affiliation and old regime political roles within the estates as a subject of the two leading estates.

German patriotism’s regional variance was perhaps most evident in Bavaria in the years after the Second Reich came into existence. After German unification, as part of the genius of Bismarck’s constitution, “state ministries of education had full authority to determine curricula and approve textbooks for the elementary schools of their states.” 99 Rather than establishing a common, centralized German historiography on, say, the French or Hungarian models of the 1880s or so, and definition of patriotism, the curriculum in Bavaria reflected its own particularities drawn from tradition. For example, it was not required to adorn each classroom with Germany’s ruling Kaiser, Wilhelm II. 100 Even in the early 1890s, the “cult of the regional monarch” in Bavaria overshadowed “the imperial cult,” which became aggravated in the 1890s. 101 Bavarian textbooks often glorified historic Bavarian rulers and omitted certain Prussian aspects of German unification, as one might expect, and had previously been the case with Habsburg with Bavaria’s leading role in the First Empire. 102 In fact, several years after German unification, the Bavarian Minister of Education, Johann von Lutz, had to remind provincial officials teaching a curriculum that “Bavaria was no longer an independent

---

98 Umbach and Szejnmann, Heimat, Region, and Empire, 4.
100 Ibid., 16.
101 Ibid.
102 Kennedy, “Regionalism and Nationalism,” 16.
country.” As Abigail Green notes of Hans-Michael Körner’s work on Bavarian history lessons, “the efforts of the Bavarian government to promote a sense of the state as a meaningful cultural unit actually intensified over time.” Though Bavarian curricula still emphasized Bavarian history in the early 1900s, students learned that history as an integral part of Germany’s historiography. Rather than being forced to accept a Prussian-centric account of German history, nationalist curriculum came from teachers within Bavaria, who were likely swept up in the rising current of German nationalism, and wanted to teach Bavarian history in this context.

Heimat also forged German unification through its politicization of citizens. Early nationalists transformed the concept of Heimat from an apolitical term associated with the locality (such as its beauty) to a term that became an explicit tool, allowing the nation state to extend its political reach as was the norm in the age of the nation state. Even by the mid-1820s, Heimat allowed the Bavarian, and by extension the German state, to “reproduce itself at the local level.” By the early 1830s, Bavarian statesmen were praising the romantic image of the hometown while also leveraging its appeal for political purposes. Romanticism and the Biedermeier epoch were closely linked. Bavarian politicians further used Heimat in order to “obscure any chasms between small local worlds and the larger ones to which the locality belonged.” Heimat’s cultural appeal was matched by the political utility it provided Bavarian and later German politicians who used it as a bridge between the nation state and the local.

B. EXPLOITING CULTURAL REGIONALISM (1933–1945)

The image of Germany and its regions was radicalized in National Socialism, and the fact that the movement had its chief origins in Bavaria is of great relevance for this

103 Kennedy, “Regionalism and Nationalism,” 16.
106 Ibid., A Nation of Provincials, 9.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid., 10.
inquiry. After Germany’s massive mobilization of the First World War and its subsequent defeat, Germans longed for the spirit of 1914 and people’s community in the face of defeat and the deprivations of the years 1918–1923. While the organic, apolitical attachment to Heimat may have been overtaken by a growing nationalization of many Germans, the identification with regional polities had remained a strong factor in the interwar period. The two schools of thought posed no contradiction for most with a nationalist bent, whereas as those who looked to a supranational idea of communism or Catholicism, or Zionism were at odds with such an ideal.

Unlike much of post-World War II historiography which tends to characterize the Nazi regime as “national, monolithic and driven by the singular will of the Führer,” the internal structure of the Nazi state was never as unitary as it professed to be, and the role of Bavaria in the epoch until 1933 as well as thereafter speaks amply to this fact.

While many aspects of Nazi Germany did become increasingly centralized, regional particularisms were initially accommodated and widely tolerated in order to increase support for the Nazi regime. That many of the leading Nazis were Bavarians and continued to embody an attachment to home and hearth, as well as a not even thinly veiled particularism is a truth to any serious student of the Third Reich. Hitler’s patience with Julius Streicher in Franconia is an example of this out of many that can be said to have existed in the Third Reich, where particularism in a brown shirt well thrived beneath the glittering exterior of the regime seen each September in Nuremberg at the party congress.

Even in lower Bavaria, which was among the least supportive districts for the NSDAP, nearly 40 percent of Bavarians cast their vote for the NSDAP on 5 March 1933, only four days before the coup which deposed the Bavarian Land government. There was no significant opposition to Hitler’s leadership by 1935. In order to expand his political power, Hitler leveraged the German attachment to spatial identity and the


associated regional party institutions to create a hybrid regime that had elements of both centralism and regionalism.

1. **Location-Based Identity in Nazi Germany**

The Nazi regime understood that Germans identified strongly with their locality and region. To be sure, the organization of the party state in the Third Reich was centralized, the new Gaue, which replaced the traditional sub divisions of the nation state on the total party principle, generously and completely borrowed from past practice about regionalism. This role especially was to the benefit of Bavaria, which had a pride of place as the home of National Socialism and the site of its most sacred events, although Berlin and Prussia also formed a significant part of the Nazi pantheon and historical heritage. The Nazis could easily adopt the term Heimat to gain popular regional appeal. Like a Trojan horse, the Nazis used Heimat’s established appeal, which invoked rural and moral ideals, to introduce their more radical, anti-liberal ideology as set against urban areas and cosmopolitan Jews and others who had no Heimat and never could have a Heimat. As Celia Applegate notes, “whatever independence from the state the idea of Heimat still had by the end of French occupation [after World War I], they lost after 1933.”

Regional identities played an important part in constituting support for Nazi power; it was the Nazi’s ability to accommodate regional diversity that allowed Germans with strong regional attachments to support an inherently nationalist party.

While the Nazi regime outlawed other political parties, viewing them as a threat to their power, it allowed for cultural variation across German Gaue, or Nazi superior regional administrative districts under the party’s Reichsleitung. For example, the Gauleiter in Gau Schwaben, Karl Wahl, exploited the particular sense of Bavarian Swabian (versus Württemberger Swabians) as an integral part of a pluralistic German Volk, consisting of several German tribes and the ancient constituent clans of Bavaria in the Middle Ages. Thus, the cultural particularism of this section of Bavaria’s Heimat

---

113 Nunez and Umbach, “Hijacked Heimats,” 296.
was tolerated and leveraged in order to promote an integrative character of German Gaue and regions. Unlike the early German romantic, Johann Gottfried von Herder, who viewed nations as unique but equal, Hitler associated the nation with racial and cultural supremacy and executed racist policies to prevent racial degeneration. If you were not part of the German Volk, you were violently excluded or eliminated from the “local and regional Volksgemeinschaft.” Bavarians, however, were among the leaders in creating this policy and Bavarians flourished in many aspects in their Gaue and their respective roles in the III. Reich, so that none of the separatism that festered in the Weimar Republic operated at all.

2. Demystifying Nazi Centralism

Bavarians were largely opposed to a Prussianized version of German nationalism and did not view Bavarian expressions of regional identities as incompatible with Germanness. Rather than homogenizing German regions into one form of Prussian-dominated nationalism, Hitler viewed sub-state allegiance as an integral part of what constituted the whole web of German nationalism and used his appeal to emotions and identity to further increase his influence. Thus, he articulated his view of “Berlin as the heart of a distinctly Prussian region, with its own authentic traditions, which can happily coexist with the peculiarities of other German regions.” The Nazi regime attempted to forge German unity “without surrendering the personalities of the regions, and to create plurality without particularism.” While Hitler did not reject the Volkish ideas of early nationalist writers such as Johann Gottfried Herder who promoted the idea of a common German Volk united in spirit in language, Hitler understood that he would more


116 Umbach and Szejnmann, Heimat, Region, and Empire, 29.; Even the theoretically equal German people’s community, or Volksgemeinschaft, developed regional hierarchies, particularly as the Reich expanded eastward into Poland. Please see Chapter 4 of Heimat, Region, and Empire for additional information.


118 Núñez and Umbach, “Hijacked Heimats,” 304.

119 Ibid.
effectively gain regional support by “leveraging pride in regional folklore and customs” for his political agenda.\textsuperscript{120}

While Hitler’s regime did have many elements of central control, such as the Reich Ministry for Information and Propaganda,\textsuperscript{121} these centralizing measures were developed because for these measures they were the most practical manner to implement his increasingly radical visions. The Nazi state, or nation state, was constructed on dual pillars of the existing national and Länder bureaucracy as well as the NSDAP national territorial structure of Reichsleitung downward to the city block. Hitler understood that the former Länder, the traditional heirs of what had been the political order of the First Reich, were the most practical way to achieve his political objectives. The Nazi seizure of power worked in large measure through these very Länder governments, which became vehicles of dictatorship. Since 1934, Hitler began diminishing the role of the Reichstatthalter (Reich Governor), who were associated with the central state as they reported to the Interior Ministry, in favor of the Gauleiter, who were the senior regional NSDAP provincial leaders versus the Kreisleiter, Ortsgruppenleiter and Blockleiter.\textsuperscript{122} The Gauleiter often had more direct access to the Führer than did the Reichstatthalter.\textsuperscript{123} Thus, Hitler could more effectively communicate his desires through his direct regional party representatives rather than through the more bureaucratic side of the Nazi party state which retained former ministerial structures with a continuity of personnel from the pre 1933 regime. Accordingly, many Gauleiter also served as Reichstatthalter. By 1938, at which time the Gleichschaltung had been completed and Hitler was Führer in full glory, the supremacy of the Gauleiter over regional state officials was clearly evident in a letter written by Josef Bürckel, of left Rhenish Bavaria (Pfalz) who refused to take orders from any Reich Ministry official.\textsuperscript{124} While the Nazi state is hard to categorize, particularly as it varied over space and time, by 1940, the role of the Reichstatthalter and

\textsuperscript{120} Núñez and Umbach, “Hijacked Heimats,” 306.
\textsuperscript{121} Broszat, The Hitler State, xvii, 115.
\textsuperscript{122} Núñez and Umbach, “Hijacked Heimats,” 306.
\textsuperscript{123} Broszat, The Hitler State, xvii, 115.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 124.
the Gauleiter in several regions had been incorporated into a single person who often reported directly from his region to the Führer himself.\textsuperscript{125}

\textbf{C. RETURN TO REGIONALISM (1945–PRESENT)}

After the Second World War, the Allied governments and West German political actors decried the perils of German centralization and sought to institute a federal structure containing strong autonomous regions. Advocates of regionalism in both East and West Germany argued that their Heimat was only a “victim of the crimes of the past 12 years” and never an “accessory” to them even if this description omitted the large popular support of the Nazi party in many German regions in the south and in the east.\textsuperscript{126}

While certain Bavarians could well assert that they may have been more resistant than other German regions towards the NSDAP, large minorities of Germans had cast their vote for the Hitler’s party as early as September of 1930, from 12 percent in Lower Bavaria to 27 percent in Schleswig-Holstein.\textsuperscript{127} Despite Bavaria and many other regions’ open support or not for the Nazi regime and varied regional levels of support for a Prussian-led German unification,\textsuperscript{128} allied policy-makers largely oversimplified the regional differences in Germany, other than breaking Austria free of the Reich, blamed the Prussian state as “always having been a bearer of militarism…in Germany” and effectively dissolved Prussia.\textsuperscript{129} This fact ignored in 1947 that Prussians until 1932 had done more to resist Nazi encroachment on German democracy than had other Länder in the Weimar Republic. Germans and allies alike viewed a kind of democratic rediscovery of particularism as the building blocks of German society that could rid Germany from

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{125} Broszat, \textit{The Hitler State}, 124.
\item \textsuperscript{127} Broszat, \textit{The Hitler State}, xvii.; It should be noted that these elections were in the aftermath of the stock market crash.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Daniel Ziblatt provides measures of prenational unification support by region in appendix A of his book, \textit{Structuring the State}; While Prussia led the drive for unification, several regions openly supported Prussia’s plans.
\item \textsuperscript{129} Hans A. Frambach, \textit{Great Nations in Peril—Rise and Fall of Prussia} (Springer International Publishing: 2015), 21.
\end{itemize}}
the legacy of Nazism and restore healthy social and political mores.\textsuperscript{130} Such was especially the case with the rise of Christian Democracy in West Germany, with its Rhenish and Bavarian centers of gravity in the new Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The allies did not need to artificially create regions—although they made the new states of Baden-Wuerttemberg and North Rhine Westphalia (even if Germany did experience revisions to its territory after both World Wars), but with the order to the constitutional authors at Chiemsee to create a new federal and democratic order they succeeded in reviving this federal structure in a manner that seemed less than possible when such work began in 1948. The result was the restoration of Länder regional governments that eventually emerged as strong, political, social, and economic actors under a federal framework.

1. Protection of Bavaria’s Regional Autonomy in Germany’s Post-War Institutional Framework

The U.S. military government, not the least because many in its number were German émigrés in olive drab, with a deep knowledge of the German past, understood Bavaria’s unique cultural and political particularities and sought to empower Bavaria as a region within a newly established German Federation as soon as practicable. Further, Bavaria in the American mind embodied what Franklin Roosevelt held up as the pre-industrial, anti-Prussian Germany of before 1871, which he recalled from his youth. Rather than dictating how the Bavarians should govern themselves, the U.S. Military Government established a legal framework that permitted Bavarians to rule themselves, only intervening when required to prevent extremism.\textsuperscript{131} The authors of the Basic Law met also in Bavaria in 1948 to work on the document, which imbibed the genius of the location, with the tolerance and measure that had characterized Bavaria in its best moments in the 19th century and even in the old Reich, while fully eschewing the sources of totalitarian extremist of the early 20th century as visible in such men as Hitler, Himmler and Streicher.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{130} Applegate, \textit{A Nation of Provincials}, 229.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Once the Basic Law took shape and the FRG came into existence, the strongest constitutional framework that enshrined regional rights in the post-Second World War Period was the establishment of the Bundesrat in the West German Basic Law. This other house of the West German parliament paid tribute to the Länder and their role in parliamentary democracy, and also took more than a page from the former constitutions houses of the estates and nobles reaching back to the First Reich.

Established in 1949 under the purview of Allied military control, the Bundesrat was re-established to create a federal model, which could protect regional autonomy from centralization and allow a place for regional politics in the young FRG. However, rather than just being an executive form of territorial representation as it existed under the First German Reich, the Bundesrat was now a representative “chamber within the federal parliament” endowed with the necessary constitutional protections in the Basic Law that prohibited the over centralization of government power that had begun in 1914 and reached its awful climax after 1933.

While some aspects of West German industry and labor had experienced centralizing tendencies beginning in the late 1950s and continuing through the 1980s, political and cultural regionalism have remained strong forces that have substantiated the protection of Länder autonomy in the Basic Law and have shaped the relationship between the federal government and the regions.

Central to the core of the FRG in its infancy until about 1963 was Christian Democracy and Social Democracy, both as anti-communist answers to the past and present. The heart of Christian Democracy in its two variations, the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union, were the Rhineland and Bavaria. Analyzing how the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU), which has governed Bavaria for the vast majority of post-Second World War history, has been integrated into the FRG while at

---

134 Ibid., 262.
the same time maintaining strong regional affiliation provides insight into why Bavaria has not sought secession.

The CSU has achieved and maintained considerate political and cultural autonomy since its founding in 1945 out of the tradition of Catholic and Bavarian particularist parties that had formerly existed. The CSU has mobilized the territorial attachment of Bavarians to create a unique party. The CSU, a sister party of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) that operates in the remaining German Länder, may be understood, in addition to its anti-Nazi, Bonn is not Weimar role, also as a “nationalist party that seeks to secure an autonomous Bavarian Heimat.”135 However, while the CSU seeks to defend Bavarian interests, it has not pursued independence from Germany as may have been the case in earlier times; rather it has “supported a strong type of federalism, based on maximum decentralization of authority to the Länder and a more powerful Bundesrat.”136 Furthermore, while it defends regional autonomy in the Bundesrat, it has also leveraged its connection and power within the CDU as a mirror of Bavaria’s role in the political culture of the FRG overall in order to into “participate in federal politics…and to fill Cabinet posts.”137 The CSU’s political success at both the Land and federal level is reflected by its ability to command over half of the vote since 1969.138 In summary, though Bavaria maintains no special status in the German constitution,139 the FRG has successfully accommodated Bavarian political and cultural regionalism, mitigating any strong secessionist tendencies.

2. How Bavaria’s Economic Transformation Reinforced its Regional Particularity

Bavaria’s economic transformation in the years following the Second World War enabled Bavaria to assert its cultural and political regionalism, which have likely


137 Ibid., 85.

138 Ibid., 86.

139 Hepburn and Hough, “Regionalist Parties,” 80.
mitigated strong calls for Bavarian secession, in two ways. First, “fiscal responsibilities were divided between the Federal Government and the various Länder.” This feature allowed for Bavaria to adopt policies and solutions to its particular problems. Additionally, the significant degree of economic autonomy allowed for regional governments to support local industries. At the same time, the federal framework was tailored for “neoliberal, noninterventionist policies” that allowed for regional diversity. This setup allowed for small and midsized regionally-oriented producers, which often specialized in local crafts to coexist with larger, private industrial firms. Traditional businesses were not subsumed by the introduction of large-scale industrialization. Rather local governments mediated economic development and helped promote a sense of inter-firm collaboration. While the post-Second World War FRG economic structure did allow for market capitalism, West German capitalism of the social market economy emerged as a distinct form of capitalism that did not eliminate regional social and political traditions; Bavaria remained distinctly Bavarian.

Second, Bavaria benefited significantly from the timing of its industrialization, which in turn reinforced Bavarian regionalism by strengthening its economy. From the creation of the German state to the Second World War, Bavaria’s economy remained largely agricultural and less commercialized than most other German regions. Because of this, Bavaria benefited greatly from the technology transfer it inherited or adapted from German or foreign sources. The eclipse of Berlin as well as of Saxony as high tech and industrial cores of the Second and Third Reichs, meant in the early cold war a great benefit for Bavaria, especially as concerned the auto and aerospace branches. As

140 Herrigel, Industrial Constructions, 259.
141 Ibid., 255.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid., 20.
145 Ziblatt, Structuring the State, 55.; Herrigel, Industrial Constructions, 468.
146 Herrigel, Industrial Constructions, 21.
companies began relocating to Bavaria, many Germans were lifted out of poverty. Ethnic Germans, who were displaced or expelled from their homes in the aftermath of the Second World War, flocked to Bavaria to take advantage of this economic opportunity, filling auto, aerospace and arms factories and strengthening Bavaria’s economy while supporting its regional particularity which also greatly profited from the rise of European tourism, where parts of Bavaria that had suffered in poverty became prosperous from mass tourism that became the norm from the 1950s onwards.

D. CONCLUSION

German regionalism during the mid- to late-19th century coalesced to become an integrating force for national unity. Rather than subjugating Bavaria, a region with cultural and political institutions that had initially resisted German unification, Prussia incorporated it as an integral part of the German Reich. Bavarian cultural identity did not contradict a larger notion of national unity. Heimat acted as a tool for Bavarians to reconcile their regional differences with a larger sense of national identity. Hitler understood the appeal of Heimat and leveraged it to solidify his power. By allowing a measure of cultural diversity throughout the Länder, he increased his influence, facilitating the abolition of political opposition. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the allied powers and many Germans called for the restoration and strengthening of regional autonomy in order to prevent another “Hitler State.” The structure of the Federal Republic of Germany, which enshrines significant regional autonomy within a Federal framework, successfully integrates German regions and allows for cultural and political diversity. The tradition of Bavarian regionalism as an integral part of the German nation state has so far alleviated strong calls for Bavarian secession.

---

147 Herrigel, Industrial Constructions, 21.
III. SPANISH REGIONALISM

The seeds of Catalonian regionalism were planted in an environment similar to that of Bavarian regionalism. Catalonia was independent before being incorporated into a larger state structure, as was the case with Bavaria. People in both regions had a distinct regional identity in addition to a larger notion of national identity. Why then does Bavarian regionalism continue to be compatible with German nationalism, whereas Catalan regionalism first demanded autonomy and now seeks independence? This chapter argues that Castile—due to both deliberate policies and unplanned reasons—never effectively integrated Catalonia. While the Spanish empire’s deterioration certainly impeded its nation-building objectives, the decline itself was not directly responsible for Spain’s failed nation-building project and the rise in Catalan regionalism.

This chapter is divided into four thematic sections that interoperate and explain how Catalan regionalism has evolved into a movement seeking sovereignty. First, the foundation of Spanish unity was its dynastic union and the pursuit of empire; this delayed the need for the Spanish monarchy to build internal solidarity within its regions. For over two centuries, Catalonia maintained its own institutions apart from Castile. Second, the delayed consolidation of Spanish territories made internal cohesion increasingly difficult, often driving Castile to force Catalonia into submission. In turn, this caused Catalonia to turn away from Castile. Third, Spain failed to develop a common sense of national identity that could overcome regional or political divides. The combination of these factors led to the fourth and final theme—the rise of Catalanism, which Raymond Carr explains, is the notion that Catalonia is “a separate entity, either of race or of culture and tradition, demanding special treatment.”\(^\text{149}\) Spanish attempts at devolution have been insofar unsuccessful in mitigating Catalan demands for independence.

A. THE SPANISH EMPIRE: THE WEAK KNOT FOR AN INTERNALLY HETEROGENOUS STATE

Spain’s imperial decline itself was not a direct cause for its failed nation-building project and the rise in Catalonian regionalism, but it allowed for regionalist sentiment to grow. Each consecutive loss of Spain’s colonies struck a progressively stronger blow at the physical and emotional bonds that held Spaniards together. The decline of the empire led to a waning sense of solidarity. Small difficulties that Catalonia previously endured in exchange for access to imperial markets and potential influence in Madrid became increasingly problematic, leading to confrontations between Castile and Catalonia. This section explores the foundations of Spain’s empire and assesses the impact that imperial losses had on the Spain’s unity.

1. Tying the Knot: The Foundations of the Empire

Any sense of shared Spanish identity hinged upon the people’s connection to the unified crown and its associated empire, rather than on institutional ties. In 1469, Ferdinand of Aragon married Isabella of Castile to form a new dynastic union.150 This union, which led to Spain’s greatest power and influence during its golden age (1517 to 1665), precluded the need for Spanish monarchs to internally consolidate their territories, failing to develop a strong notion of national identity.151 Catholicism, the only common religious and political institution served as the foundation for the unity of these two kingdoms. Furthermore, Catalonia like the other two territories comprising the Aragonese crown, maintained its own institutions.152

One factor that may have created resentment from the start was that Castile was the dominant partner in the marriage. The relationship favored Castile, and Castile’s political leaders initially made no attempt to integrate Aragonese people or institutions.

While the Crown of Aragon in the early 16th century began a slow recovery, “after centuries of expansion followed by a period of decay,” beginning a slow recovery, Castile, as John Huxtable Elliott notes, entered a “period of economic and military expansion.”153 Despite their strength, many Castilian nobles were jealous of the Catalan autonomy. Queen Isabella opined, as translated by Elliott, that “it would be better to reduce the Aragonese by force than to suffer the arrogance of their Cortes.”154 Though she did not forcefully subdue the Kingdom of Aragon, this mentality, likely held by many Spanish nobles, reduced the trust between the two kingdoms and hindered future joint endeavors. Many Catalans perceived Castile’s attempts at nation-building, regardless of Castile’s intentions, as punitive measures. By the second half of the 16th century, Castilians were beginning to take the most prominent positions in government, causing Catalans, as Elliott explains, to shut “themselves off from any possibility of future cooperation with the Crown.”155 The economic benefits of the New World also fell largely to the Crown of Castile, which administered the American possessions, given that Aragon and Castile remained separate but in name only.156

2. **Straining the Knot: The War of Spanish Succession (1702–1714)**

The War of Spanish Succession (1702–1714), an international and civil war over the line to the Spanish throne, delivered a major blow to Spain’s empire and cracked the weak bonds of unity between Catalonia and Castile. Over a decade of war resulted in, as Altamira indicates, “huge losses in men and treasure, and the consequent delays in development of national enterprises.”157 Perhaps more importantly, Spain lost a significant portion of its empire. Philip V, the successor to the Spanish throne, had to relinquish control of Spain’s possession in Italy and Sardinia, which had belonged to the

154 Ibid., 15.
155 Ibid., 18.
156 Ibid., 25.
Crown of Aragon, to the Holy Roman Empire. Spain also lost Gibraltar and Menorca to the British. The war bankrupted Spain and destroyed its agriculture and industry.

The empire, which acted as a weak basis for internal unity, began to crumble. The Spanish Monarchy, rather than building internal solidarity on something other than empire, undertook policies that, as Rafael Altamira explains, “plunged Spain into new wars which the nation seemed little able to carry on.” Another implication of Spain’s focus on its overseas empire was that Castile neglected Catalonia’s specific economic interests. For example, Castile failed to protect Catalonia’s Mediterranean trade routes from pirates, which led to increasingly problematic relations between the two regions. Finally, whereas the Catholic Monarchs Isabella and Ferdinand shared a common enemy, namely their perceived threat of Islam and Judaism, by the 18th century Castile and Catalonia had no clear sense of common enemies.

3. The Knot Unravels (1808–1898)

Spain’s War of Independence (1808–1814) dealt a huge blow to its empire, both physically and mentally. Not only did the war demolish its economy, but it also curtailed its global influence and prestige. Furthermore, Spain’s American colonies were beginning to fight for independence, sparking revolutions that a weakened-Spain could hardly forestall. By 1825, Spain had lost most of her American colonies. With Spain’s diminished overseas holdings, Catalonia became more dependent on Iberian markets. In order to achieve cheaper foreign goods, the Spanish state in 1869 enacted free-trade

158 Altamira, A History of Spain, 424.
161 Altamira, A History of Spain, 428.
162 Hansen, Rural Catalonia, 39.
163 Mark Lawrence, “Peninsularity and Patriotism: Spanish and British approaches to the Peninsular War, 1808–14,” Historical Research 85, no. 229 (August 2012): 455.
165 Hansen, Rural Catalonia, 45.
measures—policies that threatened Catalonia’s bourgeoisie, which had until then enjoyed state protection from free market forces. Despite the severe imperial losses Spain suffered in the beginning of the 19th century, these losses would not be as monumental as the Spanish American War of 1898.

The Spanish American War, known in Spain as *El Desastre*, or The Disaster, forever put Spain’s imperial ambitions, the weak knot tying Iberian Spain together, in the past. More importantly, secessionist movements in Cuba and the Philippines, as Josep Fradera explains, threatened Spain’s “credibility in international affairs, a crucial component in underpinning state power.” Thus, the Catalan bourgeois, who had until then benefited from protectionist measures and believed in creating a strong industrial state, turned inward, seeking economic diversification to increase their autarky. The Catalan bourgeoisie, disillusioned by the central government’s weakness, positioned itself as an alternative source of political and cultural identity.

4. **Failed Attempts to Retie the Knot (1909–1942)**

Early attempts to recover from El Desastre backfired. In 1909, when reservists were mobilized to reinforce Spanish troops fighting in Morocco, a popular uprising in Barcelona threw the town into a week of anarchy. Spanish Prime Minister Antonio Maura responded harshly, executing five of those presumed responsible. Maura, facing increasing opposition for his response to what became known as the Tragic Week in Catalonia, was forced to resign and could no longer implement his “conservative nation-

---

166 Hansen, *Rural Catalonia*, 45.; Carr, *Spain*, 11.; The free trade policies would be revoked in 1891 under growing Catalan pressure, as Carr explains on page 539.


168 Ibid.


171 Ibid.
“building” programs, even if the Moroccan campaign was a nominal success.\textsuperscript{172} The Tragic Week became a mobilizing cause for Catalanism and an impediment to mobilizing Catalans in support of Spain’s national projects.\textsuperscript{173}

A final attempt at recovering from the progressive loss of Spanish colonies occurred during the Second World War. While Spain officially remained neutral, Franco, who had received support from the Nazi regime during the Spanish Civil War, believed in, as Stanley G. Payne notes, “retaining what little remained of the Spanish Empire, and of adding to it as circumstances permitted.”\textsuperscript{174} The view Franco and his regime had on Spain’s empire is evident in an article written in a Falangist newspaper written on 1 April 1942, published in Jaen, which states:

España cuando regó con su sangre las rutas del mundo, recogió la cosecha de su imperio. Pero la grandeza ganada con la sangre de aquellas gloriosas generaciones fue despilfarrada porque otras sin temple y sin nervio, a la sombra plácida del rico botín regatearon cobardes la que preciso verter para mantener íntegra la enorme herencia.

[As Spain watered the routes of the world with its blood it harvested results in its empire. Nonetheless the greatness achieved by the blood of those glorious generations was frittered away as those who followed lacked the nerve and determination to maintain that heritage, preferring instead to relax in the comfort of accumulated treasure, they failed to carry out that necessary investment.]\textsuperscript{175}

Franco viewed the Blue Division, a group of Spanish volunteers, some of whom were pressured, as the embodiment of Spain’s blood, glory, and spirit, capable of expanding Spain’s values and influence in Europe. Franco deployed these soldiers to the Eastern Front to fight against an atheist Communist regime to defend what he viewed as Spain’s romanticized conservative and catholic past. Whereas propaganda of the time insisted that Iberian blood would not freeze on the Eastern Front, the reality was that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{172} Storm, “The Problems of the Spanish Nation-Building,” 152.
\item \textsuperscript{173} Ibid., 153.
\item \textsuperscript{174} Stanley G. Payne, Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany, and World War II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 11.
\item \textsuperscript{175} Diario de Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las J.O.N.S, Jaén, Spain, April 1, 1942, 7. Quote translated by author.
\end{itemize}
many volunteers were dying of frostbite, if not due to sickness or battlefield casualties.\textsuperscript{176} As the tide of war turned toward the Allies, Franco distanced himself from the Nazi regime.\textsuperscript{177} Franco’s quest for empire could no longer be used as a tool to unite Spaniards given Hitler’s fall from power and the development of the post-Second World War international framework, which reflected the principles of democracy and rejected imperialism.\textsuperscript{178}

B. CASTILIAN HEGEMONY AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CATALONIAN IDENTITY

Deliberate centralizing policies enacted by Castile and perhaps more importantly how they were perceived and then recalled by Catalans, led to continuously problematic relations between the two regions and created a schism that Catalan nationalists would begin exploiting in the last part of the 19th century. The increasingly distrustful relationship between Castile and Catalonia and the differing visions each had on the nature of the Spanish state led to almost persistent conflict, beginning at least as early as the 1640s when Catalans revolted against the Spanish crown. Castile began to view Catalonia as a threat, regardless of whether or not it was. Likewise, Catalonia viewed Castile’s centralizing efforts, as tools to oppress Catalonia’s cultural and political identity. This section explores how Spain’s attempts to centralize the state led to antagonistic relations between Castile and Catalonia. Understanding this section provides context for the next section, which explains why no shared sense of Spanish nationality emerged.

\textsuperscript{176} Payne, \textit{Franco and Hitler}, 152.

\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., 253.

1. Early Attempts at Centralization

The first attempts at economic centralization took place under the reign of Charles V (1516–1556).179 The Spanish state, in the midst of the growing economic burdens of imperial expansion and military conflict, and not to mention the increasingly rebellious territory of the Spanish Netherlands, looked inward to raise taxes.180 While Castile was paying for nearly three quarters of the economic costs of Spain’s empire in the early 16th century, Aragon was paying for only one percent.181 While Spanish kings could bypass the Court in Castile to impose taxes, Aragon’s strong constraints on monarchical power prevented Spanish kings from extracting resources from Aragon without the consent of its Courts.182 This would lead to a confrontation in which Charles’s successor, Philip IV, would send his advisor, Count-Duke of Olivares, to force Catalonia to contribute to Spain’s empire economically and to provide soldiers for Spain’s army.183

Count-Duke Olivares’s efforts to compel Catalonia to contribute to state coffers and policies, beginning in 1622, clashed with Catalonia’s closely regarded political autonomy and led to increasingly problematic relations between Madrid and Barcelona.184 Additionally, Count-Duke Olivares used Catalonia as a staging ground for Spain’s war against France in 1639.185 He forced Catalonia to contribute troops to support the King’s war, causing widespread resentment. Additionally, he used the presence and quartering of troops to compel the Catalan Cortes (Catalan parliament) to contribute money to the state treasury.186 Olivares’s policies were rejected by the

179 Medrano, Divided Nations, 29.
180 Ibid.
181 Ibid., 30.
182 Medrano, Divided Nations, 29.
183 Ibid., 30.
184 Hansen, Rural Catalonia, 39.
185 Medrano, Divided Nations, 31.
186 Ibid.
Aragonese Cortes and the people, who murdered the Spanish Crown’s regional official, Santa Coloma, and revolted against the Crown’s presence in Aragon.\textsuperscript{187}

The Spanish Crown ultimately subdued the region by force. However, the division between the Kingdom of Aragon and Castile became obvious. Portuguese nobles, after witnessing this discord, declared their independence from Spain in 1640.\textsuperscript{188} In 1659, after years of fighting, Spanish statesmen concluded the war with France.\textsuperscript{189} Spanish authorities ceded some Catalan territory to France but cemented their juridical authority over the remainder of Catalonia.\textsuperscript{190}

The War of Spanish Succession (1702–1714) resulted in the loss of Catalonia’s institutions. The war, which was instigated by rival claims to the Spanish crown, left Catalonia and Castile on opposing sides. Castilian nobles supported Philip V while Catalonia’s aristocrats supported Archduke Charles. Philip V, who acceded to the throne, abolished Catalonia’s long-established constitution in what are known as the Nueva Planta decrees in retribution for having sided with Charles.\textsuperscript{191} He replaced Catalanian laws with Castilian ones, seeking to establish a centralized form of government.\textsuperscript{192}

2. Castilian Language becomes Anti-Catalan

Until the mid-17th century, Catalan, Castilian and Latin were used interchangeably in court documents.\textsuperscript{193} Even in everyday communication, many people often switched between these languages without, as David Laitin explains, “traumas of any sort.”\textsuperscript{194} After the establishment of Spanish juridical authority over Catalonia in 1659, Catalan elites understood that in order to win court cases, which would now be

\textsuperscript{187} Medrano, *Divided Nations*, 31.
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{190} Laitin, Solé, and Kalyvas, “Language and the Construction of States,” 8.
\textsuperscript{191} Altamira, *A History of Spain*, 426.
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid.
resolved in Castilian courts, they had to become masters of formal Castilian and be familiar with Castilian culture.\textsuperscript{195} While the use of Catalan never disappeared, particularly among the masses, fluency in formal Castilian had become increasingly widespread in the latter half of the 17th century. By the beginning of the 18th century, fluency in Castilian was perceived by many Catalans as a sign of refinement and class.\textsuperscript{196} Even during the War of Spanish Succession, more than 90 percent of the anti-Philip propaganda was written in Castilian, illustrating that Catalans did not initially associate the use of Castilian as being anti-Catalan.\textsuperscript{197} The consequences of the war of Spanish Succession (1702–1714) drastically changed the perception of Castilian in the eyes of many Catalans.

Despite the de facto practice in which Catalans used Castilian in court cases, the Nueva Planta decrees mandated the use of Castilian. This requirement to exclusively use Castilian turned the language into more than a medium of communication; it helped Catalans become more aware of their own language, which Catalans increasingly identified with.\textsuperscript{198} Though it would not be until the second half of the 19th century for the Catalan masses to feel a distinct sense of nationhood, Catalan nationalists used the Nueva Planta decrees and the language divide to help mobilize the masses towards their political aims. The language battle between Castilian and Catalan continues to this day.\textsuperscript{199}

3. The Failed Hopes of 1812

Perhaps the most potential for constructing a modern Spanish state that incorporated the role of historical regions such as Catalonia, while maintaining Spanish unity, was during the aftermath of the Spanish War of Independence. Regional governments and resistance movements played a role, however consequential, in

\textsuperscript{196} Ibid., 11.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{198} Ibid., 22.
expelling French forces in the absence of the Spanish monarchy. Fernando VII, with the support of the army, deposed Carlos IV for his unpopular policies and alliance with the French in March of 1808. 200 While the Spanish government had initially supported the French in a war against Portugal, France later invaded Spain. Napoleon forced Fernando VII out of power in favor of his brother, Joseph Napoleon Bonaparte.201 The rise of juntas, or local councils, in the midst of the Spanish government’s collapse, led some to believe that the constitution of 1812 would reflect the prominence of regional decision-making structures in the new government. The new constitution, however, failed to incorporate the role juntas undertook in the civil war and also neglected the political institutions of historical regions, such as Catalonia.

Perhaps the most important legacy of 19th century liberalism was, as Raymond Carr explains, that liberals,

in spite of lip-service to the ideal of the medieval municipality, accepted two propositions: that the Cortes, as ‘sole representative of the sovereign nation,’ must enforce a uniform and centralized system and that, within this system, the municipalities were ‘subalter corporations.’ This conception of the relationship between local and central government, derived from the French model, stamped the whole subsequent history of Spain.202

The destruction of historical regions, such as Catalonia, and their replacement by centrally-controlled administrative regions was a vision held by many liberals and some conservatives.203 These Spaniards sought to establish not only political unity, but also to consolidate Spain’s culturally distinct regions in order to transform Spain into a modern state.204 Despite the nominal presence of administrative regions, including Catalonia, in political coalitions throughout the 19th century, Catalonian elites were largely

200 Lawrence, “Peninsularity and Patriotism,” 454.
201 Ibid.
203 Catalonia was divided into four administrative regions.
underrepresented and excluded from decision-making processes in Madrid. The differences between the liberal ideals of the constitution, which promised inclusive and equal representation, and the shortcomings of its de facto implementation undermined the relationship between the Catalonia and the state. Growing challenges came not only from politicians in Madrid who advocated for a federal state, given the historic autonomy of the various Spanish kingdoms, but also from the periphery.

Catalan nationalists began to condemn the liberal state’s failure to address local Catalan interests and viewed centralized liberalism as another tool to destroy Catalonia’s historic political institutions. In a literary work written in 1843, titled *Recuerdos y Bellezas de España*, or Memories and Memories of Spain, the Catalan authors criticize Spanish statesmen who were making the whole country uniform and destroying sacred local traditions. Most Catalan regionalists in the mid-19th century did not demand independence but rather that Madrid respect Catalonia’s unique cultural and political identity. Many Catalan elites, as Angel Smith notes, argued that “regional patriotic sentiment would both feed into and also enhance Spanish national identity.”

However, Spain’s governments in the 1850s continued to view Catalonia as a threat, sometimes equating criticism with rebellion and evoking the revolt of the Catalans of 1640 in order to justify their policies. Madrid responded to perceived Catalonian threats by increasing centralization and military rule over Barcelona. Thus, Catalans nationalists began looking away from Castile and to Catalonia’s past—to its ancient institutions—as an inspiration for Catalonia’s future.

---

210 Ibid., 1.
211 Ibid., 101.
212 Ibid., 102.
4. **Francoist Spain 1939–1975**

Francisco Franco, who ruled Spain from 1939 to 1975, centralized Spain into a unitary state, even though he embraced the use of some regional iconography in legitimizing his regime. While Franco’s regime recalled the greatness and unity of Spain under Queen Isabella of Castile and King Ferdinand of Aragon, he abolished any political regionalism that threatened his vision of a unitary Spain. Franco viewed regional separatism, and especially Catalanism, as a threat to Spanish unity and carried out a nationalist program that suppressed Catalan identity, language, and Catalan institutions.\(^{214}\) As Carmen Ortiz explains, Franco’s regime tried to legitimize its centralization of power by basing its legitimacy on unity of the Spanish people symbolized by the Spanish peasant.\(^{215}\) Yet the contradictions between the regime’s rhetoric and its policies were apparent. In Catalonia, Franco required the Institute for Catalan Studies to be renamed the Institute for Mediterranean Studies and ensured that any folklore or cultural studies did not pose a challenge to his regime.\(^{216}\)

Despite Franco’s attempts to homogenize Spain, he could not eliminate Catalan regionalism. The only place where some degree of regime-independent, social interaction could take place was in the Catholic Church of Catalonia.\(^{217}\) Ironically, Franco’s regime, which fused Catholicism with nationalism, allowed Catalan regionalism to seek refuge in the Catalan Catholic Church, an institution that Catalanism had previously rejected.\(^{218}\) Through the Church, as Andrew Dowling notes, Catalanism practiced a strategy of accumulating “small concessions, which through their piecemeal nature the regime found difficult to rescind.”\(^{219}\)

---


\(^{216}\) Ibid., 482.

\(^{217}\) Ibid., 490.


\(^{219}\) Ibid., 5.
More importantly, Catalan regionalism spread to larger audiences and emerged as a strong political and cultural movement by the end of Franco’s regime. While Franco did provide some decades of political stability and economic progress as well as improvements in literacy, his authoritarian rule became synonymous with Spanish national identity and regional identities only became more resistant to national integration.\textsuperscript{220} As Hansen noted, writing in 1977, the Catalan people, regardless of their class, felt like a “people alienated from Spain and sorely oppressed by the central government.”\textsuperscript{221} Thus, the regime’s centralizing policies provoked a strong opposition from Spain’s regions, particularly in Catalonia, a sentiment that would be leveraged for building political regionalism and demanding autonomy in the decades following Franco’s rule.

C. FAILURE TO ACHIEVE A COMMON NATIONAL VISION

In the aftermath of the Spanish American War, in which Spain lost its colonies, the future integrity of Iberian Spain was at stake. Given the deterioration of Spain’s empire, it became increasingly important to establish a shared sense of national identity that could keep peninsular Spain together. However, as discussed in the previous section, the hopes of a constitutional nation failed to materialize. Problems that could have previously been resolved without much difficulty reemerged and were now perceived as “intolerable” given that the feeling of national solidarity had disintegrated.\textsuperscript{222} The failure to establish a strong common cultural understanding, or \textit{Kulturnation}, allowed for Catalanian identity to increasingly become a separate and exclusive one that closely aligned with political independence.

Despite more than three centuries of statehood by 1800, Spain remained a heterogeneous society with varying laws, languages, currencies, weights and measures, customs duties, and jurisdictions—all challenges to the development of a common

\textsuperscript{221} Hansen, \textit{Rural Catalonia}, 24.
\textsuperscript{222} José Ortega y Gasset, \textit{España Invertebrada: Bosquejo de Algunos Pensamientos Históricos} (Madrid: Calpe, 1921), 53.
understanding of the Spanish nation.\textsuperscript{223} The Spanish author Pablo de Olavide, writing in the late 18th century remarked that “each province, each school, each profession focuse[d] on itself, forgetting the rest of the nation.”\textsuperscript{224} Rather than feeling as Spanish citizens, everyone only thought of themselves and how they were different from others.\textsuperscript{225} By the late 18th century, social divides remained very clear-cut even between a growing middle class that had become wealthy and the aristocracy, with few institutions, organizations, or ideologies to bridge social divides.\textsuperscript{226} Thus, the country became subject to the competing factions of small bodies and classes fighting against each other.\textsuperscript{227} As Javier Varela points out, “love for one’s fatherland [was] extinguished and the idea of the nation never [took] root.”\textsuperscript{228}

Failed attempts at homogenizing the masses in the 19th century were rooted in several sources. Perhaps the most problematic was Spain’s ineffective educational system. The municipal governments, starting in 1857, were responsible for elementary education.\textsuperscript{229} Often underfunded, these schools had a limited ability to improve Spain’s literacy rate.\textsuperscript{230} One official estimate in the same year calculated that there was a shortage of 27,000 schools in Spain.\textsuperscript{231} Consequently, Spanish citizens could not feel the benefits of state-run schools that could have developed in them a sense of common civic loyalty. Likewise, the state could not effectively use schools to inculcate civic or cultural patriotic values into its youth. Spain’s literacy rate in the mid-19th century was under 25 percent.


\textsuperscript{224} Varela, Nación, Patria y Patriotismo, 36 (quote translated by author).

\textsuperscript{225} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{226} Altamira, \textit{A History of Spain}, 463.

\textsuperscript{227} Varela, \textit{Nación, Patria y Patriotismo}, 36.

\textsuperscript{228} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{229} Storm, “The Problems of the Spanish Nation-Building,” 144.

\textsuperscript{230} Ibid.

and even by 1900, less than half of the population could read or write. The fact that most Spaniards could not read or write likely helped foster a climate of corruption in local government officials, given that citizens had little understanding of government laws and were thus unable to stand up for their rights and hold state administrators accountable.

After El Desastre of 1898, the public increasingly began to demand educational reform as a method to prevent national degeneration. If this collective realization had come in the midst of the Spanish War of Independence, it may have been more successful; however, by the early 20th century, the animosity between competing political parties and ideologies had reached a boiling point. There could still be no consensus on the character of national education, as an ideological divide between “neo-catholicism and anticlericalism” hampered attempts at finding common ground to develop a national educational program. This failure to achieve consensus undoubtedly limited the degree to which a common Spanish national idea could be shared by the inhabitants of its territory. Moreover, the Catholic Church, an institution that often marked the dividing line between liberals and conservatives, ran many of the schools in the country during the 19th century.

Another problem that Spanish nation-building suffered from was the lack of national symbols. Cathedrals stood as a monument to a strong Catholic past, but Spanish elites could not agree on a new national symbol to mobilize the masses. Unlike Germany, there were no large-scale monuments to Spanish unity or resistance to French occupation that could rally the masses in support of national aims. Additionally, Spanish nation-builders failed to capitalize on the national feelings that arose in the midst and in the aftermath of the Spanish War of Independence. The war did, however, achieve some degree of national unity. Both conservative forces supporting the Catholic Church and the King and liberal forces seeking to build a constitutional nation could find solidarity in

233 Boyd, Historia Patria, 41.
234 Ibid., 50.
their struggle against France’s occupation. Francisco Goya’s painting of France’s brutal suppression of Madrid’s resistance fighters, which took place on 3 May 1808, helped establish a common understanding of the conflict as a war of independence. Yet the Spanish nation remained divided about how to reconstruct the state in the war’s aftermath. While the conflict may have provided an abstract notion of national unity in opposing Napoleon, Spanish nationalists were unsuccessful at mobilizing these feelings to develop a program that could achieve some degree of political consensus. The constitution of 1812 ended when the deposed King Fernando VII, with the support of the Army, abolished the Cortes and returned to power. Both conservatives and liberals reinterpreted the war throughout the 19th century to fit their political agendas. Rather than seizing Spanish opposition to French occupation as a basis for building modern Spanish nationalism, the country remained divided. Whatever little shared spirit existed in the struggle against French occupation faded, leaving Spanish nation-builders unable to forge a sword of modern Spanish nationalism that could unify Spain culturally and provide a basis for national projects. Yet Catalan nationalists would establish a national Catalan day in the late 19th century that recalled Barcelona’s struggle against Castilian occupation. Failure to establish a middle ground or consensus on how to organize the Spanish state would lead to multiple conflicts throughout the 19th century.

Continual turmoil, fueled by ideological divides, hampered Spanish nation-building throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries by conflicting ideologies. Placing the Patria, or Fatherland, above class or political divides was not successful given that there were no strong voluntary associations or patriotic groups that glorified the Spanish nation. The Spanish state had existed for centuries and modern Spanish nation-builders only began to seriously recognize the need to adopt a new national program in the

---

235 Lawrence, “Peninsularity and Patriotism,” 454.; The Army, beginning with Count-Duke Olivares and continuing through until Franco, also became an institution associated with the Monarchy and military dictatorships and was therefore likely to be less popular among liberal Spaniards and Catalanists. Rather than acting as a unifying, state institution, it acted for some time as an ideological force to support conservatism.

236 Lawrence, “Peninsularity and Patriotism,” 457.


238 Lawrence, “Peninsularity and Patriotism,” 457.
aftermath of El Desastre of 1898. However, Catalan nation-building had already begun in earnest before the 20th century. By the second half of the 19th century, there was a surge in Catalan regionalism as evidenced by the rise in regionalist associations. These Catalan associations focused on regional culture and developed the idea of a cultural nation, or *Kulturnation*, which overcame class divides and formed a basis from which liberal and conservative Catalanists could negotiate, even if their ideology was separate.

In 1888, Catalanists supported the construction of a statue of Rafael Casanova, a Catalan hero wounded by Castilian forces in the War of Spanish Succession. Conflicts between Spanish authorities and Catalanists over this statue represented a larger societal divide. In order to help solidify regionalist sentiment, Catalan nationalists, as Carr notes, “invented the fiction of a Castilian ‘nationalism,’ of a dominant Spanish state.” Catalan cultural solidarity presented a challenge to Spanish nation-builders, who were delayed in developing any similar sense of cultural unity.

Spanish efforts at developing a sense of citizenship in the form of a constitutional nation, or *Verfassungsnation*, were hindered by continual political conflict, government instability prior to Franco’s rule, and the absence of valued state institutions that all Spaniards could appreciate. The Army, beginning with Count-Duke Olivares and continuing through until Franco, became an institution associated with the Monarchy, the Church, and military dictatorships and was therefore less popular among liberal Spaniards and Catalanists. Rather than acting as a unifying, state institution, it acted for some time as an ideological force to support conservatism. As Eric Storm explains, a system of political clientelism developed in the 19th century, which led ordinary citizens to view the “state in a negative way.” Paying taxes did not guarantee the construction of local infrastructure. As Storm explains, the building of local projects, whether it be a

---

240 Hansen, *Rural Catalonia*, 52.
school or road, as Storm explains, depended upon the relationship between local politicians and their personal networks.244

The state also faced difficulty in building national infrastructure. Constructing railroads in Spain was twice as expensive as in other “great iron centres,” as Carr notes, and the Spanish state may have been reluctant to integrate regions which it thought could pose a threat, leaving many regions isolated.245

D. THE RISE OF CATALANISM AND THE TURN TOWARD SECESSION

The Spanish American War—The Disaster—provided an opportunity for Catalanists to achieve political autonomy. Politicians in Madrid who for so long had attempted to build a centralized state realized they had fallen short of their nation-building efforts. Spanish politicians could no longer ignore the rising current of Catalan regionalism, which was demanding autonomy from Madrid. This section explores the origins of Catalanism from the end of the Spanish American War to the start of the Spanish Civil War (1898–1936) and continues with an analysis that attempts to unravel why Catalanism, which had previously only demanded autonomy, now calls for independence.

1. 1898–1936: The Rise of Catalanism

Catalan nationalism began to mobilize the masses towards political aims towards the end of the 19th century. An increased interest in Catalonia’s cultural particularism arose in the 1840s, but this movement consisted of a small number of Catalan academics.246 This early literary movement also had no associated political programs that advocated a destiny separate from Spain. This movement had no intent being incompatible with Spanish nationalism, even when it looked back centuries before to an

246 Ibid., 540.
era when Catalonia possessed its own political institutions.\textsuperscript{247} It would not be until the 1880s, with Catalan nationalists such as Valentín Almirall, that a sense of Catalan identity, separate from Spain would begin to spread more broadly.\textsuperscript{248} Almirall helped instill an increasing awareness of Catalanian national identity and argued that Catalans were slaves of Castile being “governed in an alien tongue.”\textsuperscript{249}

The Spanish-American War and its implications, as Carr explains, “had its profoundest effects in Catalonia, where it turned Catalanism from a minority creed into the vehicle for generalized protest.”\textsuperscript{250} Thus, Catalan political movements began to seize on the growing disillusionment with the Spanish state to push their own regional agendas. The \textit{Lliga Regionalista}, the combination of right-wing Catalanian candidates that formed a political party, capitalized on this sentiment. The \textit{Lliga}’s policies marked a departure from potential cooperation with the central government, as hoped for by many in the early 19th century, to a more radical position by the early 20th century.\textsuperscript{251} The \textit{Lliga Regionalista} exploited growing Catalanian consciousness and the perceived failure of Madrid to address Catalan concerns to further its political objectives. Founded in 1901, the party claimed that “there can be no political peace in Spain…until our problem is settled; which is to say, until Catalonia’s claim to self-government is satisfied.”\textsuperscript{252}

The inability for Catalan regionalists to consolidate on either side of the political spectrum mitigated their ability to influence the Spanish government. In first decade of the 20th century, the division between “realists” who would make deal with Spanish state and the “all or nothing” nationalists limited the political success of their political objectives.\textsuperscript{253} Prime Minister Maura understood the need to work with Catalonia, but

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{249} Ibid., 544.
  \item \textsuperscript{250} Ibid., 539.
  \item \textsuperscript{251} Lecours, “Regionalism, Cultural Diversity and the State in Spain,” 219.
  \item \textsuperscript{252} Altamira, \textit{A History of Spain}, 601.
  \item \textsuperscript{253} Carr, \textit{Spain: 1808–1975}, 551.
\end{itemize}
internal divisions within Catalanism precluded acceptance of an immediate solution. By 1914, however, the Lliga Regionalista, a political coalition of conservative forces, had achieved the establishment of the Catalan *Mancomunidad*, a measure of limited local government for Catalan provinces.\(^{254}\) Yet the victory of the Lliga was seen by the left-wing Catalan nationalists as a scheme between the conservative forces in Catalonia and those in the Spanish government. Left-leaning Catalan nationalists dismissed the Mancomunidad as a tool to institutionalize the “permanent denial of the rights of Catalonia.”\(^{255}\)

Primo de Rivera, a military dictator who ruled from 1923 until 1930, revoked the Mancomunidad in 1925.\(^{256}\) The Lliga, which had supported Primo de Rivera, found itself subject to his harsh repression. Primo de Rivera’s repression of Catalan culture only further mobilized Catalan nationalism.\(^{257}\) Additionally, Castilian intellectuals became increasingly critical of his policies and agreed that Catalonia’s cultural and linguistic identity should be protected.\(^{258}\) After Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship ended and was replaced by the Second Spanish Republic in 1931, Catalonia regained both political and cultural autonomy.\(^{259}\) Yet for an increasingly vocal number of Catalanists, this autonomy was insufficient; only a Catalan state as a republic within a Spanish federation would be adequate to protect Catalonia.

2. **The Turn toward Secession: 1978 to the Present**

The end of Franco’s regime led to a new constitution that permitted a degree of devolution while at the same time maintaining national unity. This ambiguity, which does not clearly define a federal or unitary state, has led autonomous communities such as Catalonia, who had lost autonomy during Franco’s reign, to resume their pursuit for autonomy. Rather than providing equal autonomy to all Spanish regions, the constitution


\(^{255}\) Ibid.

\(^{256}\) Dowling, *Catalonia since the Spanish Civil War*, 22.

\(^{257}\) Ibid.

\(^{258}\) Ibid.

\(^{259}\) Ibid.
provides different paths to achieve autonomy, often resulting in statutes of autonomy with differing degrees of devolution, which in turn has caused some contempt between the autonomous communities.

Support for Catalan independence has grown from 14 percent in 2005 to nearly 50 percent in 2013. In about same time period, the percentage of Catalans who consider themselves as only Catalan (and not Spanish) has grown from 14 percent to 22 percent. This change can be attributed to four main reasons. First, the Spanish government failed to negotiate with Catalonia about increasing its autonomy in the early 2000s, beginning with the Partido Popular (PP), Spain’s national center-right party. The PP viewed Catalan demands for greater autonomy with contempt and Catalonian politicians again felt mistreated by the central government. The leader of the center left party, the PSOE, despite claims to address Catalonia’s political demands, also failed to address or implement Catalan political demands.

Second, Catalonia’s 2006 Statute of Autonomy, which passed the Catalan parliament and later the Spanish parliament, was largely struck down by the Spanish Constitutional Court in 2010, after legal challenges were raised from both the PSOE and the PP, as well as from other regions. In the four years it took the court to decide on the case, the Catalan government endorsed a series of provocative measures, such as the holding of non-binding referendums on secession. The court struck down many provisions of the statute, including one that sought to recognize Catalonia officially as a nation, which led to strong nationalist demonstrations in Catalonia that benefited from the


263 Guibernau, “Secessionism in Catalonia,” 381.

mobilizing and organizational power of Catalan regional associations.\textsuperscript{265} Even if the court’s decisions were framed in the context of the Spanish constitution, the history of the relationship between the state and Catalonia framed the context for interpreting how to react to the court’s decision.

Third, the growing economic downturn led Catalans to increasingly resent the fiscal arrangement they have, in which Catalonia contributes more to the central government than it receives.\textsuperscript{266} Some Catalans also point out that Catalonia should have stronger fiscal powers, similar to those held by the Basque Provinces.\textsuperscript{267} Catalan nationalists exploited these factors and combined them with historical grievances, real or imagined, to broaden the appeal of sovereignty-seeking Catalanism. Thus, for the last several years, millions of Catalans have demonstrated in support of independence on Catalonia’s national day, 11 September, a day which recalls the abolition of Catalonia’s autonomy and institutions in the War of Spanish Succession.

Finally, the Catalan media has largely sided with the momentum of the independence campaign and other voices have largely been silenced or misrepresented.\textsuperscript{268} For example, in a survey conducted on 9 September 2013, 50 percent of Catalans believed in a federal solution for Catalonia. However, as Manuel Cruz implies, the media discounted these numbers and associated them to the Spanish conservative party, the PP.\textsuperscript{269} Catalan media outlets failed to portray that there is a large minority of Catalans who do not support the PP and remain only in favor of increased

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{note265} Spanish Constitutional Court Judgment No. 31/2010 of June 28, accessed on 18 February, 2015, http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/jurisprudencia/restrad/Paginas/JCC2862010en.aspx; The court allows for the term Catalan nation to be used as long as it has no legal value.; Dowling, “Accounting for the Turn,” 222.
\bibitem{note266} Guibernau, “Secessionism in Catalonia,” 383.
\bibitem{note268} Manuel Cruz, \textit{Una Comunidad Ensimismada: Diez Años de Escritos Sobre Cataluña} (Madrid: Los Libros de la Catarata, 2014), 112.
\bibitem{note269} Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
autonomy and not independence. Catalan nationalists, aided by the media, can build on real or imagined historical grievances to send ominous messages to suggest that their language is in danger or that Catalonia itself could disappear. Though there is a significant minority of Catalans who favor increased autonomy over independence, as surveys attest, they are likely afraid to speak out so as to avoid being stigmatized.

E. CONCLUSION

As José Ortega y Gasset, the Spanish liberal philosopher noted, just as Spain was built by Castile, Spain was also dismantled by Castile. Initially the force behind a union that surpassed regional particularisms for the greater good of imperial Spain, Castile became jealous and threatened by them, abandoning them and failing to understand their developments. National institutions, such as the Catholic Church and the Monarchy, no longer acted as unitary forces but as self-absorbed establishments, acting in the name of national unity. In their place, no national symbols or programs arose to unite the Spanish people.

As Spain’s overseas empire began peeling away, Castile looked inward and feared Spain’s internal dissolution. However, Castilian nation-builders were delayed in recognizing the need to develop a form of cultural or civic unity. The more they delayed, the harder national problems became to solve, leading Castile to strengthen its resolve in stamping out what it viewed as threats to national unity, namely Catalonia. Yet Castile’s attempts at centralizing Spain to prevent its further dissolution only weakened it by watering the seeds of Catalan nationalism. The heavy burden of Spain’s history frames the mindsets of many Catalans and has made honest negotiation with the state challenging. At the same time, political leaders in Madrid often view increasing Catalan autonomy as a threat and sometimes fail to make pragmatic decisions or gestures that could build trust and establish a dialogue from which to address one another’s demands.

270 Manuel Cruz, Una Comunidad Ensimismada, 112.
271 Ibid., 88.
272 José Ortega y Gasset, España Invertebrada, 55.
273 Ibid., 56.
274 José Ortega y Gasset, España Invertebrada, 56.
IV. DOES THE EUROPEAN UNION STRENGTHEN OR WEAKEN REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS?

Spain and Germany are among a small minority of countries within the European Union that possess legislative and policy-making powers at the sub-national, or regional, level. While the European Union (EU) has increased the formal influence of regions in non-institutional bodies, such as the Committee of the Regions, the extent to which regions have increased their political influence within EU institutions has been conditioned by national governments, as the latter remain the most important political actors within the EU.\(^{275}\) In Spain, the antagonistic relationship among the autonomous communities (ACs), as well as between the ACs and the state, has limited AC influence at the EU level. In contrast, the cooperative form of federalism both across the German Länder, and between the Länder and the central government in Germany, has allowed regional governments and the German central government to maintain their political influence. This chapter argues that while regional governments have become increasingly active in the European Union, their influence has been dependent on the nature of their relationship with their central government. This relationship is also fundamentally contingent on the intergovernmental institutional framework existing in the member-country.

Consensus exists among European Union scholars that the nature of the state, and by extension sub-state power, has been changing; how it has been changing remains contested.\(^{276}\) Two main theories provide divergent insights. The first, as explained by Andrea Noferini et al., argues that the recentralization of policy to the EU level gives the central government more power over regional governments. Because regions do not have

---


276 Andrea Noferini, Susana Beltran, and Mirna Nouvilas, “Does the EU Empower (or Disempower) the Position of Regional Governments? Some evidence from the Participation of Spanish Autonomous Communities in the Council of the EU” *Regional Studies Association Annual International Conference 2010*, 5.
the same influence as the nation states in the EU, central governments can “re-appropriate” any devolved competencies from their regional governments.277 Conversely, the other main theory suggests that the EU’s promotion of subsidiarity and the new opportunities for regions in the EU has given them new influence, such as the ability to open offices in Brussels to promote their particular interests and the ability to conduct a form of foreign relations.278 Furthermore, European scholars such as Simona Piattoni explain that regions, in some cases, have been able to bypass national governments as they acquire new influence.279 While both of these arguments provide critical insight into how the EU empowers (or disempowers) regional governments,280 understanding the institutional framework in the relevant member-country helps reveal which theory is most compatible.

This chapter begins by addressing how the European Union has allowed regions to increase their voice in EU decision-making. It then examines the institutional framework that has shaped regional power in Spain, giving particular focus to Catalonia. By extension of this framework, the chapter contends that though ACs have increased their representation at the EU level, their influence has only increased as allowed by the Spanish government. The second half of the chapter introduces the notion of cooperative federalism in Germany and how this concept has enabled regions to maintain their influence at the national, and by extension, supranational levels of government.

A. SPANISH INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK BETWEEN REGIONS AND THE CENTER

The Spanish Constitution affected the nature of regions in three ways: the nature by which regions inherit and keep power, the relationship between regions (horizontal relationship), and the relationship between the center and the region (vertical


278 Noferini, Beltran, and Nouvilas, “Does the EU empower (or disempower) the position of regional governments?,” 7.

279 Ibid.

280 Ibid., 1.
relationship). The first significant milestone in the history of modern Spanish regions, the Spanish constitution of 1978, foresaw the potential devolution of some powers to autonomous communities (*comunidades autónomas*). However, two main problems arose due to the nature of the constitution. First, while the constitution did specify twenty-two relatively undisputed powers over which ACs could have jurisdiction, it left room for the ACs to amend their statutes of autonomy—after a waiting period of five years—to potentially gain more significant powers.\(^{281}\) While this agreement is understandable given the fragile transitional period, which had its number of difficulties including an attempted coup, the failure to delineate the full possibility of new competencies of the ACs left resolution to a future date. This quandary left Spanish regions to their own devices to see how much power they could wrest from the central government.\(^{282}\) The Spanish Constitutional Court, which derived its power from and became largely influenced by the central government, was left to arbitrate disputes between the two polities.\(^{283}\) Meanwhile, the constitution explicitly prohibited any sort of federation of autonomous communities.\(^{284}\) Thus, the line of demarcation of what powers could be exercised by ACs would be fought between Madrid and the ACs, and between the ACs themselves.

The second constitutional problem was the fact that Article Two distinguished between the self-government of regions and nationalities. This nuanced yet important distinction had significant implications. Historical nations, such as Catalans, would be able to receive “fast track” processing for autonomy, while non-historical regions, such as Andalucía, would be on the “slow track” for autonomy.\(^{285}\) This differentiated status created division not only between the three historical nations (Catalonia, the Basque

---


282 Noferini, Beltran, and Nouvilas, “Does the EU empower (or disempower) the position of regional governments?,” 9.


Country, and Galicia) and the remaining regions but between the historical nations themselves. For example, the Basque country has received more fiscal and legislative powers than the other historical communities due to the constitutional provision and its unique statute of autonomy. Catalonia’s aspirations have instigated other ACs to demand similar privileges. This has led to what Tanja Börzel calls, “cada uno por su cuenta,” or “every man for himself,” which implies that each AC is to fend for itself.

When Madrid created what are known as sectorial conferences to coordinate relations between the central government and the ACs, Catalonia and the Basque country appealed to the Spanish Constitutional Court as they argued that this would remove “all autonomy from the new ACs.” While these conferences were declared constitutional as a forum for discussion, they were viewed by many ACs as way for the central government to control the ACs, rather than to foster genuine relations. While the Spanish Senate does have some members (58 of 266) from the AC assemblies, they operate along political, not territorial lines; the effectiveness of senate reforms aimed at promoting AC prominence in both EU and state affairs has been viewed by scholars as an important first step but largely inadequate. Bilateral commissions, which Madrid established to manage technical aspects of devolution, have served to “pacify” ACs rather than to seek to alter the “institutional landscape.”

---


287 Börzel, States and Regions in the European Union, 102.


Article 145 of the Spanish Constitution prohibits formal horizontal agreements between ACs unless they are approved by the Spanish legislature. Even if the legislature was willing to approve any formal cooperation between the ACs, it would be difficult for the ACs to reach a strong consensus given the wide variance in Statutes of Autonomy between them. The Basque country’s privileged status, for instance, makes it less dependent and willing to seek to establish informal or formal horizontal cooperation.293 Likewise, it is less reliant on vertical integration, or cooperation with the central government, as it possesses the capacity to implement many of its own policies independent of Madrid’s control. Failure to establish horizontal links across regions limited the degree to which Spanish regions could balance their power with Madrid and curtailed their influence in the EU.

In the period between 1978 and 2005, ACs concluded a total of only 20 horizontal agreements.294 Though such scholars as María Jesús García Morales argue that there has been a recent increase in horizontal agreements.295 The Catalan regional government’s attempt to reform its statute of autonomy, in which it declares Catalan as the language of “preferential use in Public Administration” and highlights Catalonia’s uniqueness as a nation in an attempt to derive additional powers, has increased tensions between Catalonia and other ACs and between Catalonia and the central government.296 Furthermore, the Spanish Constitutional Court’s refusal to recognize Catalonia as a nation and the rejection of Catalan as a preferential language in official government forums has sparked a radical backlash by Catalan nationalist parties and has moved center parties to adopt a more nationalist position as evident by the recent push from Catalan political parties on holding an independence referendum.297

293 Börzel, States and Regions in the European Union, 112.
294 Morales, “Intergovernmental Relations in Spain,” 98.
295 Ibid.
B. HOW EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HAS AFFECTED REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS IN SPAIN

European integration allowed the central government to prevent a further devolution of powers to the regions. Because EU policy was initially considered foreign relations, the Spanish state held the sole right to negotiate and implement EU policy.\(^{298}\) In order to prevent their perceived loss of power due to European integration, ACs such as Catalonia attempted to circumvent Spain’s central government and establish direct ties with the EU.\(^{299}\) Catalonia was among the first ACs to establish representation in Brussels in 1986, even though its presence would not be legitimized by Spanish regulation until 1994.\(^{300}\) Furthermore, Catalonia resorted to a strategy of “constitutional conflict” to prevent the state from seizing what it perceived to be its prerogatives.\(^{301}\) However, ACs like Catalonia that attempted state-bypassing were mostly unsuccessful.\(^{302}\) Even after the Spanish Constitutional Court declared that EU matters were not strictly under the domain of foreign relations and that ACs could certain specified policies, ACs did not have the capacity to challenge the authority of the central government in dictating how to implement EU policy.\(^{303}\)

Recent court decisions have suggested that Spain may allow for increased AC influence in the EU. In 2010, the Spanish Constitutional Court ruled that direct bilateral

\(^{298}\) Börzel, States and Regions in the European Union, 104.; Noferini, Beltran, and Nouvilas, “Does the EU empower (or disempower) the position of regional governments?,” 11.

\(^{299}\) Börzel, States and Regions in the European Union, 107.

\(^{300}\) Noferini, Beltran, and Nouvilas, “Does the EU empower (or disempower) the position of regional governments?,” 19.; Catalonia’s attempt to bypass the central government is still relevant today as evidenced by Catalonia’s Secretariat of Foreign and European Affairs’ recent attempt to seek EU support for its independence referendum, accessed February 13, 2015, http://premsa.gencat.cat/pres_fsvp/docs/2014/01/02/18/16/73ebbfa1–2499–47c8–9df5–70adf0032a04.pdf.

\(^{301}\) Börzel, States and Regions in the European Union, 107.

\(^{302}\) While the dependent variable in this case is not the same as in than in Michaël Tatham’s article “With or Without You? Revisiting Territorial State-Bypassing in EU interest representation,” Journal of European Public Policy (2010) (in this case I refer to Catalonia as a region instead of a subnational political party), the conclusion in Tatham’s article (page 92) which suggests that “devolution of powers increases the frequency of co-operation and decreases that of bypassing,” is relevant.

\(^{303}\) Börzel, States and Regions in the European Union, 105.; Börzel also indicates that unlike other countries in the EU, Spain accepted all of the EU’s legislation or acquis communautaire at once, burdening the central government with implementation. Upon Spain’s accession to the EU, regional governments would have lacked the institutional capacity to implement EU policy.
(Autonomous Community to European Union) participation could be authorized when it solely affects the “Autonomous Community in question and not the others.”304 However, even if there is an issue where the matter would solely affect one AC, the Spanish Constitutional Court has made clear that “in no event is the central government bound by the opinion of the Autonomous Community.”305 In contrast, as will be explained later, German Länder have the ability to compel the central government to adopt their opinion.

Two of the most important EU institutions and bodies where ACs have potential for indirect and direct influence, respectively, are the Council of Ministers (CoM) and the Committee of Regions (CoR). Since Maastricht, ACs have had the ability to nominate a representative to the Spanish delegation, which if approved by the appropriate sectorial conference, has the possibility to participate in four of the ten Council Configurations.306 While AC representation in council configurations is an important symbolic step, their influence at this stage is limited as they can only speak if the subject matter being discussed falls within the domain of the ACs, if there is consensus among the ACs and if permitted by the head of the Spanish delegation.307 Though AC representatives also take place in working groups and preparatory sessions for the councils, the lack of any horizontal institutions to coordinate and negotiate AC positions limits their influence.

Autonomous Communities have direct representation in the Committee of Regions; Artur Mas, the president of Catalonia’s regional government, was one of its members.308 The Lisbon Treaty increased the influence of the CoR, as noted by two important powers. First, while the CoR has no right to veto legislation, the three main EU


305 Morales, “Intergovernmental Relations in Spain,” 104.


307 Noferini, Beltran, and Nouvilas, “Does the EU empower (or disempower) the position of regional governments?,” 29.

308 European Union, Committee of Regions, Members and Alternates, accessed 1 October, 2014, http://memberspage.cor.europa.eu/Result.aspx?f=0&s=0&o1=0&o2=0&o3=0; Mas was one of 21 Spanish representatives in the CoR.
institutions must consult the CoR when making a law with a regional impact.\textsuperscript{309} Second, the CoR has the right to appeal EU legislation to the Court of Justice if the legislation violates the principle of subsidiarity.\textsuperscript{310} However, the CoR is not an EU institution, and despite the increased role given to regions after the Lisbon Treaty, the CoR still lacks institutional power or sufficient institutional integration to decisively shape legislation. Additionally, because the CoR does not take a position on how member-states are divided internally, countries with a prevalence of devolved powers (such as Spain and Germany) are mixed with those that have predominantly administrative regions under central government control, potentially thwarting regional government influence.\textsuperscript{311}

C. GERMAN INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK BETWEEN THE CENTER AND REGIONS

While both Germany and Spain have high degrees of decentralization, Germany’s constitutional framework sets it apart. The necessity of both horizontal and vertical relationships between the Länder and the federal government fosters a sort of “cooperative federalism” that maintains a balance of power between the Länder and the federal government.\textsuperscript{312} Vertically, the Länder differ from the Spanish ACs in two ways. First, whereas ACs have fought Madrid for devolved powers embodied in the various statutes of autonomy,\textsuperscript{313} German Länder have their own devolved powers enshrined in their regional constitutions.\textsuperscript{314} The German Federal government possesses those authorities that the Länder have provided it via the German Basic Law, Germany’s

---


\textsuperscript{310} European Union, Committee of Regions, A New Treaty, 2.

\textsuperscript{311} Noferini, Beltran, and Nouvilas, “Does the EU empower (or disempower) the position of regional governments?,” 24.


\textsuperscript{313} Some ACs, such as Catalonia, have a constitutional provision in addition to a statute of autonomy.

\textsuperscript{314} Arnold, “The Intergovernmental Relations in Federal Systems,” 40.
constitution.\textsuperscript{315} Second, whereas Spanish ACs have no de-facto vertical territorial institution to represent themselves vis-à-vis the central government, German regions have significant power in the Bundesrat, one of Germany’s two legislative bodies, the other being the Bundestag. Especially after the Lisbon Treaty, which emphasized the principle of subsidiarity in order to counter euroskepticism (and possibly to offset the EU’s recognized democratic deficit), the Bundesrat has served as a strong conduit for regional government representation in the EU.\textsuperscript{316}

Horizontal cooperation in the Länder is markedly different. Unlike the Spanish constitution that restricts horizontal cooperation, German Länder frequently pass inter-Länder treaties. Additionally, the German Basic Law, unlike the Spanish constitution, identifies all of Germany’s Länder without conferring any special status among them.\textsuperscript{317} While historical Länder, such as Bavaria, maintain their unique constitutions, the equal treatment of Länder in the Basic Law has enabled more horizontal cooperation. Because the rights and the recognition of the self-governing Länder were already recognized from the outset of Germany’s Basic Law in 1949,\textsuperscript{318} the need for Länder to compete horizontally and vertically was mitigated. Whereas Spanish autonomous communities have been characterized as “every community for itself,” which has impeded the rebalancing of power in the face of European integration, Börzel characterizes German Länder’s horizontal relationships as “Gemeinsam sind wir stark,” or “together we are strong.”\textsuperscript{319} While regions fought European integration in order to maintain their historical rights, the Länder’s cooperative federalism better enabled them to preserve their regional influence as they more successfully interacted both horizontally and vertically.

\textsuperscript{315} Arnold, “The Intergovernmental Relations in Federal Systems,” 40.


\textsuperscript{319} Börzel, States and Regions in the European Union, 102, 51.
D. HOW EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HAS AFFECTED REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS IN GERMANY

Whereas Spanish regulation has only recently considered the representation of regions within the framework of European integration, German agreements, from as early as 1957, have established the understanding that the German Federation is acting on the behalf of the Länder “when negotiating or signing foreign treaties.”\(^{320}\) Due to the institutional strength of German Länder, as evident both with their horizontal linkages and their weighty vertical influence via the Bundesrat, they have maintained their regional powers or increased their influence at in the EU. When the Christian Social Union (CSU), the most significant party in Bavaria in the last several decades, felt that the EU was encroaching on Länder rights, it organized with other German states and amended the constitution to protect regional interests.\(^{321}\) The amended article 23 of the BL states that the “Länder shall participate in matters concerning the European Union” via the Bundestag and Bundesrat.\(^{322}\) Furthermore, it asserts that the Federal Government “shall keep the Bundestag and the Bundesrat informed, comprehensively and at the earliest possible time.”\(^{323}\) As early as 1992, German Länder ministers created a committee to coordinate Länder strategy in response to EU integration; their focus on the principle of subsidiarity is manifested in EU law today.\(^{324}\) The CSU conditioned its support on EU integration with the preservation of regional autonomy.\(^{325}\) Thus, German Länder responded to EU integration by collectively asserting and reinforcing their role in the Bundesrat, a body where unlike in Spain, the German regions maintain joint decision-making authority.

There are several important differences between Germany and Spain with regard to their influence in the EU. While Spain introduced a General Commission of ACs in

\(^{321}\) Hepburn, Using Europe, 117.
\(^{323}\) Ibid.
\(^{324}\) Hepburn, Using Europe, 117.
\(^{325}\) Ibid., 118.
attempt to make up for the lack of territorial representation in central government decision-making, this commission maintains “neither the composition nor the functions required” to empower the ACs and remains “listless and weak.”

Furthermore, a second Spanish commission that was supposed to inform ACs and the Spanish Senate regarding EU legislative proposals has been “limited by a dependence on the government’s willingness to supply meaningful information” and its “influence on government policy” has been minimal.

By contrast, the Bundesrat possesses both a Committee on European Union Affairs and a Chamber for European Affairs, which have gained significant legislative standing particularly after Germany’s ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, allowing for greater regional involvement in EU affairs. Germany, unlike Spain, has reformed its constitution in response to EU integration and has anchored regional government representation into its institutional culture of cooperative federalism.

While some scholars argue that regional parliaments in Germany have lost some influence vis-à-vis the European Union, regional representation in the executive form, such as the Bundesrat, has persisted and decisively impacts EU policy, particularly when it relates to regional competences.

For example, when the EU CoM is discussing matters such as culture and education, a Land minister will be sent to represent Germany’s Länder but the minister is not required to mirror the position of the Federal


327 Bourne, The European Union , 52.


330 Börzel, States and Regions in the European Union, 89.; Schneider, Rittberger, and Wonka, “Adapting to Europe?,” 16.; Recent works such as Timm Beichelt’s 2012 article entitled “ Recovering Space Lost? The German Bundestag’s New Potential in European Politics” argue that the Bundestag is reasserting itself on the EU stage. While Beichelt does not imply regional parliaments have gained strength, the fact that every Länder has representatives in the Bundestag might, by extension, give German regions more influence.; Deutscher Bundestag, Members of the Bundestag and representatives of the Länder, accessed on 22 September 2014, https://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/bundestag/elections/federal_convention.
government. If the matter being discussed is an administrative one that affects the competencies of the Länder, Germany’s appropriate federal minister must “follow the position of the Federal Council” which is binding with a “two-thirds majority vote.”

E. CONCLUSION

On the whole, European integration has affected regions differently. In Germany, the Länder have fought back in response to European integration. In Spain, some regional competencies, for which the regions had fought, are now mediated largely via the central government with little regional input. The degree to which regions in Spain and Germany have become empowered or not has been shaped by the institutional differences anchored in their respective constitutional frameworks and how these constitutions have adapted or failed to adapt to meet the challenge of European integration. German Länder, which have had a more cooperative relationship between themselves and with the central government have been able to maintain their voice in the EU. In contrast, Spanish regions have faced difficulty inheriting or keeping devolved powers in light of the centralizing pressures of the European Union.

Though the EU does allow for some direct regional representation in the CoR and in some aspects of the CoM, the CoR has limited influence in the EU and the influence in the CoM is dependent on the prerogatives of the central government. Though Spain operates similar to the federalist system in Germany, it lacks the associated constitutional framework and territorial setup that Germany has which has allowed regions to balance centralizing tendencies. Improving horizontal cooperation across Spanish ACs may improve their collective ability to exert vertical influence at the state and EU level, but it will be a difficult task transitioning from a culture of competitive regionalism to a concept of cooperative federalism. Because the nation state is still the dominant player in the European Union, the degree to which regions are empowered or disempowered is associated to the relationship between regions and their central government. For regions


332 Ibid.
to acquire more influence in the EU, they should not look to the EU, but to their fellow regions and to their central government.
V. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF SECESSION

At the end of the Cold War, regional movements, often based on ethno-linguistic or cultural grounds, transformed into sovereignty-seeking forces, resulting in the establishment of several new states, mostly in Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{333} Many of these states, such as the Baltic States, subsequently joined the European Union and NATO. Yet none of these new states emerged as successor states from either the European Union (EU) or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. Recently, subnational, sovereignty-seeking movements have arisen in NATO and EU member-states such as Spain. These movements present the EU and NATO new challenges. Catalonia held an unofficial referendum on 9 November 2014 and plans to use parliamentary elections in September 2015 as a de facto poll on independence.\textsuperscript{334} An independent Catalonia would present an unprecedented situation for the European Union and NATO. Never before has an EU or NATO country split with both parts seeking continued membership.\textsuperscript{335} While Catalonia’s November 2014 consultation was non-binding, the ramifications of any subsequent successful referenda would have repercussions not only in Spain but also across Europe and other international institutions.

While the Spanish Supreme Court rejects any official or unofficial Catalan referendum, Catalonia’s independence movement persists. The potential security consequences of separatist movements within NATO and EU countries have received relatively little analysis, with discussions often taking a back-seat to economic issues. Even fewer sources exist that explore the security implications of a non-consensual divorce within a NATO or EU country, as would be the case with Catalonia. What are the security implications of secession within NATO and EU countries, and has an official or

\textsuperscript{333} The Baltic States in 1990; Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia in 1991; Bosnia Herzegovina, the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1992; Montenegro in 2006, and Kosovo in 2008.

\textsuperscript{334} Daniel G. Sastre, “Artur Mas Afirma que la Decisión del TC Evidencia que el 'Unico Camino' para la Consulta es el 27-S,” El Mundo, February 25, 2015, http://www.elmundo.es/cataluna/2015/02/25/54edc583e2704ee0538b4598.html

\textsuperscript{335} Graham Avery, “Independentism and the European Union,” European Policy Brief (May 2014), 2.; NATO has never faced such a situation. The Czech Republic and Slovakia separated and only subsequently joined NATO and the EU.
unofficial understanding regarding secession emerged within these organizations? This chapter analyzes the security implications of any Catalan secession and argues that Catalonia’s divorce from Spain is likely to result in short-term security reductions for both Barcelona and Madrid.336

While the Spanish Supreme Court declared Catalonia’s 2014 consultation illegal, the security issues will remain relevant if the underlying reasons for attempted divorce are not addressed. Catalan politicians vociferously denounced the Spanish state’s decision to deny the legal merit of the referendum and have raised the issue to the European Union.337 Despite Spain’s Constitutional Court decision on February 24, 2015 which concluded that Catalonia’s government does not have the authority to hold any future referendum on independence, Catalonia’s president has vowed to continue fighting for the right to decide.338

This chapter analyzes the security implications through the lens of five security dilemmas. First, it acknowledges that balanced rhetoric and documentation regarding Catalonia’s potential secession is absent, pushing debate to the margins, making balanced estimates on future defense scenarios difficult. Second, it contends that the potential relationships between this would-be independent state and international security organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) are more problematic than independence leaders suggest. Third, it argues that secession will severely limit the capability of the armed forces for the dyad in Spain. Fourth, it argues that Catalonia is internally divided on the nature of any future defense capabilities. Fifth, it explains that the EU’s continued silence on secession has been more problematic than it had hoped for. Rather than strictly remaining neutral, EU politicians have made varying statements that have been extrapolated and interpreted by both pro-

336 This chapter does not take any normative position, but rather seeks to focus exclusively on the security implications of independence, whether it is mutually agreed upon or not. It does, however, argue that the nature of divorce, whether civil or not, will impact post-independence security for both sides.


and anti-secession advocates as official policy to further their own agendas. To mitigate security vulnerabilities for all polities, central governments and the EU should acknowledge the presence of strong independence movements and try to manage them in a pragmatic manner.

A. THE DIFFICULTIES OF ASSESSING THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF AN INDEPENDENT CATALONIA

The Spanish government regarded the Catalonia referendum as unconstitutional and illegal. Given that official debate or negotiation in Spain is absent, unofficial rhetoric often becomes more extreme and crowds out more moderate voices. This lack of pragmatic debate on devolution or proposals to reform the constitution—at least from the Partido Popular, which currently holds majorities in both legislative chambers—pushes the debate to the margins, preventing a balanced assessment of the potential security implications of Catalan secession.

Spain’s refusal to recognize the legality of Catalonia’s independence movement provides little insight into Madrid’s future relations with a newly independent Catalonia. Under Article Eight of the Spanish constitution, the Armed Forces have a mission to defend Spain’s territorial integrity and constitutional order.339 While Miquel Sellarès, director of the Center for Strategic Studies of Catalonia, maintains that the Spanish army would “not dare” to deploy the army to intervene in Catalonia, statements made by Spanish government officials do not seem to rule out this option.340 Spain’s foreign minister José Manuel García Margallo states that Madrid has the right to use the “full force of the law” to ensure that no referendum will be held and reiterates Spain’s constitutional right to suspend Catalonia’s regional government.341


However, Madrid refrained from deploying military forces to Catalonia, opting instead for the legal suspension of Catalonia’s referendum. Nonetheless, Spain could theoretically deploy its military to uphold Article 155 of the Spanish constitution, which states that the Spanish national government, if unable to reach a satisfactory resolution with the autonomous community, maintains the right to forcefully compel that community to comply with Spanish national interests. Yet, even if Madrid opted to deploy its military police or military to prevent Catalan secession, it is questionable whether it would be a “massacre” as Sellarès claims. Until now, Spanish politicians have mostly refrained from making overt military threats to Catalonia, preferring to pursue legal or political options. The conservative party, the PP, has called for the president of Catalonia’s regional government, Artur Mas, to resign. The Spanish Constitutional Court declared the 9 November 2014 consultation unconstitutional and has also deemed any future Catalan referenda illegal. The situation will become increasingly problematic and make security analysis even more challenging with no certainty regarding the circumstances of any potential divorce.

Scant professional literature exists regarding the security implications of secession. The only Catalan regional government source that discusses security and defense matters regarding independence is a document published in Catalan on 28 July 2014, which remains vague on specific defense plans. This document seems to indicate that Article 42 of the treaty of the European Union, which provides for a common security and defense policy, is a sufficient security guarantee for an independent

Catalonia. The Catalan government has released several white papers regarding possible transitions into a newly independent state while Madrid, understandably, has not published any analysis on a sovereign Catalonia. While the most recent Spanish National Security Strategy identifies Gibraltar as a source of friction between Spain and the United Kingdom, the potential secession of Catalonia is not explicitly mentioned. Likewise, the Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos (Spanish Strategic Studies Institute or IEEE) has not published any reports that directly address the security implications of a potential Catalonian secession. Thus, specific information on the security implications of Catalonian secession is limited to non-governmental spheres such as political groups, think tanks, and civil society.

The Assemblea Nacional Catalana (Catalan National Assembly or ANC), a political organization advocating independence, has published a defense analysis of an independent Catalonia, but it hardly touches on any specific defense or security issues. The Catalan Security Studies Institute has published documents regarding security aspects of independence, but it remains unclear as to who authored these documents and whether consensus exists within Catalonia for its proposals. The state of the Catalonian armed forces is hard to judge as literature regarding the required or probable defense capabilities of an independent Catalonia is scant.

Civil debate in Catalonia seems dominated by Catalan nationalists. Catalan nationalist groups sometimes denigrate civil organizations that oppose independence. For example, the Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (Initiative for Catalonia Greens or ICV)

---


accused the Societat Civil Catalana, a group that is against secession, of having links to fascism.\footnote{351 Toni Bolaño, “Yo soy de Societat Civil Catalana,” Societat Civil Catalana, March 13, 2015, https://societatcivilcatalana.cat/es/news/yoso-de-sociedad-civil-catalana-xd0h .} Catalan nationalists can silence voices that oppose independence by incorrectly depicting support for Spanish unity as support for Spain’s suppression of Catalan autonomy. Help Catalonia, a nationalist Catalan think tank on defense, has a bold mission statement on its website that states, “Denouncing the silent war Spain is waging against Catalonia.”\footnote{352 “Spanish Government insist on comparing Catalan independence movement with Nazism,” Help Catalonia, December 3, 2014, http://www.helpcatalonia.cat/2014/12/spanish-government-insist-on-comparing.html .} The website also features articles in which the authors claim that Spanish politicians have equated Catalonia’s independence movement with Nazism.\footnote{353 Ibid.}

Alex Calvo and Pol Molas, two Catalan security analysts, characterize Spain as a rogue state, asserting that Spain is “Europe’s North Korea.”\footnote{354 Alex Calvo and Pol Molas, “Asset splitting: Should Catalonia Take Over Spanish Air and Naval Systems?,” Center for Strategic Studies of Catalonia, http://www.ceee.cat/catala/articles/asset-splitting-should-catalonia-take-over-spanish-air-and-naval-systems/ .} Sellarès, the head of the Center for Strategic Studies of Catalonia, argues that the Spanish government is deliberately infiltrating Catalonian police forces to foment trouble within the region.\footnote{355 Miquel Sellarès, “Security and Defense” Interview. Minute 10:58, accessed on March 2, 2015, http://ambindependencia.cat/en/seguretat-i-defensa-2/ .} Thus, the loudest voices that Madrid hears from Barcelona are the nationalist ones. This likely leads Madrid to react in a less conciliatory manner. The nature of the relationship between Madrid and Catalonia leads to exaggerated and one-sided assessments and the impasse provides an opportunity for inflaming Catalonia’s wounded nationalist rhetoric.\footnote{356 The debate on independence is not only between Madrid and Barcelona, but also within Catalonia itself. Purportedly Catalanian websites such as http://dolcacatalunya.com/ provide a pro-unification voice to the debate.}

Nationalist rhetoric has also shown that the debate over the distribution of military assets and liabilities could be problematic. A group of Catalanian lawyers working for the Catalan National Congress published a report rejecting payment for any burden of Spanish debt, arguing that Madrid has long plundered Catalonia financially, receiving
nothing in return. To make things more contested, these lawyers argue that Catalonia should still receive 16 percent—a number corresponding to Catalonia’s percentage of Spain’s population—of state property, including military assets. A more recent publication by Catalonia’s regional government discusses several scenarios but seems to reference other situations that may not be the right precedent. For example, the document references the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a model for the distribution of assets and liabilities, a problematic comparison at best.

B. CATALONIA’S PROBLEMATIC ENTRY INTO NATO AND THE EU

Catalonia has appealed to numerous international organizations in order to increase international support for its independence campaign. More than 200 Catalan politicians working in municipal, regional, national, and EU governments have signed a petition requesting support from the EU, the UN, and the OSCE. Yet Catalan efforts have not been successful in guaranteeing commitments of support from any significant number of European leaders. The Latvian minister, who had initially offered tentative support to Catalonia’s bid for independence, reneged on his hypothetical support after being summoned by Spain’s foreign minister to explain his position. Given that Madrid and Catalonia have been unable to reach any consensus, Catalonia might resort to a unilateral declaration of independence.

However, any unilateral declaration of independence will almost certainly leave Catalonia outside the collective security guarantees of NATO and the European Union. Thus, the few existing Catalan sources on security, which claim that Catalonia’s security

358 Ibid.
would be guaranteed by either of these organizations, make problematic assumptions. The ANC argues that because Spain is part of the EU, Catalonia would remain a member of the EU and be integrated into the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) with some assistance from the European Defense Agency. Likewise, this political group argues that Catalonia, in accordance with prevailing legal doctrine, would automatically retain NATO membership since Spain is a NATO country. Some Catalan security analysts, including Calvo and Molas, have argued that NATO needs Catalonia as much as Catalonia needs it, insisting that the region would be a vital pillar of NATO. Similarly, Miquel Sellarès argues that because of Catalonia’s geostrategic importance, it will be hard for NATO to exclude an independent Catalonia. These assumptions are problematic at best.

Statements from Sellarès seem to discount numerous assertions, from the president of the EU Council to the NATO secretary general, which have unequivocally stated that Catalonia would be excluded (at least initially) from the European Union and NATO, respectively. While the EU has the potential to “conclude international agreements” with states that are not universally recognized, any such association agreement with Catalonia is not likely to be an assurance of future membership. Although the EU’s recent association agreement with Ukraine, arguably a country with greater strategic importance, may deepen political and economic ties, any official

---


363 Ibid.


membership prospects are likely to take decades, given Ukraine’s unresolved territorial disputes. Kosovo’s failure to join either NATO or the EU—despite some efforts at more extensive cooperation—also demonstrates that Catalonia’s potential non-consensual divorce would be problematic regarding EU or NATO membership aspirations.

Nonetheless, some Catalan parties have not discounted Kosovo’s precedent as an option for Catalonia. Catalonia’s nationalist and pro-independence leftist party, the *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (Republican Left of Catalonia or ERC), has argued that if Spain does not accommodate Catalonia’s desire to decide its future, it can follow Kosovo’s model, known as the “via Kosovar.” Another party, the democratic convergence party of Catalonia (CDC), which makes up the majority of the CiU electoral alliance, claimed on 7 March 2015 that Catalonia will be a free nation within the year. The European Union was—and remains—divided with regards to supporting Kosovo’s independence, and any “via Kosovar” option is likely to prove extremely problematic for Catalonia. While the EU and NATO have no explicit policy on internal secessionist movements in their member states, the more likely situation is that Catalonia’s accession into NATO and the EU will be more problematic than independence advocates suggest.

C. CATALONIA: INTERNALLY DIVIDED ON DEFENSE

Catalonian politicians have neither made defense or security issues a priority when discussing independence nor reached a consensus about defense. Among the Catalan public, there is even less awareness of security implications for an independent

368 Bourne, “Europeanization and Secession,” 111.


370 Article 4.2 of the Treaty on European Union does state that the Union “shall respect…the territorial integrity of the State.” However, this theoretically allows the EU to maintain a nuanced position, accepting a potentially independent Scotland, since it is agreed upon by Westminster, and to also respect Madrid’s refusal to recognize an independent Catalonia. See Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, October 26, 2012, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012M0004; Graham Avery, “Independentism and the European Union,” European Policy Centre, 7 May 2014.

83
Catalonia. Artur Mas, President of the Generalitat de Catalunya, suggests that the region will not need an Army since Catalonia will remain part of both the EU and NATO, organizations that share defense resources. On the other hand, the leftist independence-seeking Catalan party, the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), is debating whether to establish an army of 35,000 regulars, a more specialized force which can contribute to collective security, or to establish security guarantees with countries such as France. However, a group of Catalan jurists maintains that any new Catalan republic would not require a military. The only Catalan government report that mentions security and defense remains vague on plans for a Catalan military, indicating the following potential options: militarizing the Catalan police forces, creating a national guard that takes on both civil and military functions, or creating an army. While leaving various options open can be a benefit, if Catalonia secedes from Spain without even having an agreed-upon defense plan, it will be in an extremely vulnerable position.

D. THE DIFFICULT PROSPECTS OF BUILDING AN AUTONOMOUS DEFENSE CAPABILITY

An independent Catalonia would face the task of developing an entirely new defense establishment, a situation which could increase its vulnerability. Catalonia would lose the inherent benefits associated with a common defense, such as cost savings associated with the economy of scale. If Catalonia refuses to pay a proportional share of its debt to Spain, Madrid would be unlikely to provide it moveable defense assets. An independent Catalonia would be challenged to make significant investments in defense,


especially if Catalonia is held to account for its share of Spain’s debt. Political support for Catalan defense spending might be similar to the general trend in Spain, which has seen a sharp decline. Even if Catalonia spends the NATO benchmark of two percent of gross domestic product on defense, as the Catalan defense think-tank Societat d'Estudis Militars suggests, this will likely be insufficient to establish a credible maritime deterrent, particularly if Barcelona receives no assets from Madrid. While Catalonia has two large ports in Barcelona and Tarragona, it possesses no naval bases. Assuming there is political will to build up naval bases in these ports—a problematic assumption given the current economic situation in Spain—there will still be several issues. If Catalonia inherits naval platforms from Spain, it will likely take years to establish support structures, such as skilled maintenance workers, support facilities, and training facilities to keep its ships deployable.

To its credit, the Societat d'Estudis Militars (Society of Military Studies or SEM) recognizes though perhaps underestimates the enormous challenges Catalonia will face for any future independence. In a publication entitled “Dimensions of the Catalan Defence Forces I: Naval Forces,” the group recognizes that in the first several years, Catalonia will “have to improvise with the available resources and personnel.” The authors recognize that the Armed Forces of an independent Catalonia will be largely dependent on foreign advisors. Leading defense countries such as the United States acknowledge Catalonia’s distinctness but advocate resolving Catalan wishes in accordance with Spanish law. Countries that support Madrid’s position (or that do not recognize Catalonia’s right to secede) will likely hesitate to assist building Catalonia’s maritime capability if it unilaterally declares independence. Despite claims by Catalan defense analysts such as Alex Calvo, who argue that Britain and Japan would assist the development of Catalonia’s Navy, these hopes are extremely optimistic and seem to

---


discount the fact that these countries do not officially support Catalonia’s bid for independence. Catalonia has also not had to administer its own security, given that all of its security needs have been managed by Madrid. Catalonia’s unilateral exit would leave few experts within Catalonia that have experience in building a defense establishment from the ground up or in managing one.

An independent Catalonia would also have to create an independent intelligence capability, which could make it more vulnerable to threats in the short-term, particularly if Madrid does not share its intelligence. The group also recognizes that it might take 10–15 years to project “force within a multinational framework.” While having a clean slate is potentially a benefit, as it could allow for specialization, during the transitional period Catalonia would remain vulnerable to security threats.

Catalonia would not be the only actor with increased vulnerabilities. Madrid would also be significantly affected by the loss of Catalonia’s contributions to Spain’s defense establishment. Catalonia, which represents 16 percent of Spain’s population, accounts for about 19 percent of Spain’s gross domestic product. Spain’s defense spending has decreased by 38 percent from 2008 to 2015, with a current defense budget of only 5.7 billion Euros. Catalonia’s exit from Spain would likely mean that Spanish defense spending would suffer a 19 percent budget cut. Even without Catalonia’s departure, Spain’s current military capabilities are deficient. Spain’s defense ministry has pointed out that current levels of defense spending and investment in defense firms have been insufficient to achieve the modernization levels required for the Spanish Armed Forces to execute their assigned missions.


technological edge and are becoming increasingly vulnerable to being taken over by foreign companies. 383 This demonstrates that increasing defense spending has been extremely difficult and that Catalonia’s prospective independence would not only degrade Catalonia’s security situation, but could also significantly impact the remainder of Spain’s military establishment.

E. THE EU IS STILL DIVIDED ON SECESSION WITHIN EUROPE

While Crimea’s referendum and Russia’s subsequent annexation have provided widespread consensus within the EU on what is not a legitimate form of secession, Catalonia’s independence movement illustrates that Europe is still divided. The EU has largely refrained from taking an official policy on secession, a position that Neil Walker terms “conservative neutrality.” 384 This policy, despite its apparent logic, is problematic for several reasons.

First, the absence of official policy or guidelines can lead to different interpretations by EU officials. For example, commenting on Scotland’s hypothetical independence, former EU Commission President Barroso reiterated his predecessor’s opinion that “a new state created by secession from an existing member state would have to apply for membership following dedicated Art.49 route for all new candidates.” 385 Barroso’s replacement, Jean-Claude Juncker, stated that Scotland as an “internal applicant” would already meet “core-EU requirements” and thus constitute a special and separate case, distinct from applicant countries that fell outside EU borders. 386 Thus, Juncker effectively contradicted two of his predecessors. These seemingly inconsistent statements have provided both pro and anti-independence advocates ammunition for their causes. Rather than having no effect on independence movements, contradictory


385 Ibid.

statements, which can be interpreted as official policy, have undermined the EU’s policy to not have a policy on internal secession.

Second, the EU’s silence on secession leaves room for other voices to fill the gap, as has been the case in Catalonia. The Catalan desire to hold a referendum on independence is prohibited by Spanish law. Catalanists are also unable to argue that they have a remedial right to secession, given that Spain is not gravely oppressing them. Thus, one domain where Catalanists have sought to push their cause has been in the EU. The president of Catalonia’s regional government has been lobbying EU officials to support Catalonia’s bid for independence. Rather than adopting a policy that states that subnational movements must reach a consensus with their national governments for increased autonomy or providing for the conditions when the European Union can pressure national governments to allow referenda on increased autonomy or independence, the EU’s silence has been replaced by noise. It seems somewhat problematic that the EU’s policy of “conservative neutrality” can justify two divergent outcomes in regions with similar characteristics; in the case of Scotland, the EU’s policy supports Scotland’s right to decide, while in Catalonia, it accepts Spain’s denial of Catalonia’s self-proclaimed right to decide.

However, the European Union will be unable to adopt a policy without the consent of its member states, several of which have strong secessionist movements in their own countries. Starting a discussion on a policy or framework might be a good first step. The EU’s institutional divisions and the concerns of member states with strong subnational movements will likely prevent the adoption of an official policy. Nonetheless, starting a discussion on the framework regarding internal secession so as to achieve a form of consensus may provide states and subnational actors more certainty and reduce the chances of secessionist movements becoming more problematic.

F. CONCLUSION

An independent Catalonia would undoubtedly face numerous challenges in maintaining the current defense and security capabilities it possesses through its association with the Spanish state. Catalonia’s problematic situation has the potential to
destabilize security and defense in profound ways. Despite Madrid’s nullification of the November 2014 referendum, the Catalan independence movement is unlikely to subside given that both Madrid and Barcelona remain entrenched and fail to communicate effectively. An independent Catalonia would have more trouble addressing its short-term security vulnerabilities due to its more precarious relationship with its prospective former ruler, which increases the uncertainty regarding Catalonia’s future. Unanimous recognition by the European Union is very unlikely for Catalonia, though an associational agreement could be a possibility. Membership in NATO for Catalonia will also be unlikely, unless Spain endorses it, though a partnership agreement could be plausible. The European Union should attempt—however difficult it may be—to develop a more explicit policy or to establish guidelines to manage internal secession, even if its first attempts are only able to establish a lowest common denominator framework, such as the importance of seeking peaceful resolution of national problems. Establishing at least a common framework or consensus on principles concerning secession could reduce uncertainty and mitigate the potential for radicalized secessionist movements.
VI. CONCLUSION

While EU political and economic integration arose as an ideal of policy to prevent war among the nations of the union, in the year 2015, nationalist movements persist and have the potential to become destabilizing in a manner that would have shocked proponents of the European ideal in the 1990s. In this connection, the role of regions in the leading nations of the EU has arisen as a theme of security policy for its comparison and contrast with those parts of Europe that from the 1990s until the present have descended into war, up to and including the Ukraine-Russian conflict.

Regionalists, who had hoped for increased subsidiarity in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty, have seen their ambitions largely dependent on their national governments. The EU Committee of Regions only has a limited capacity to shape regional movements. While some aspects of the EU have become supranational, most of the EU’s decision-making power rests with national governments.

With regard to secession and self-determination, the EU has largely refrained from adopting a policy, which has led to differing outcomes, facilitated by differing national constitutions and courts. The EU’s lack of policy on internal secession has driven EU politicians sometimes to make seemingly contradictory statements regarding secession—no surprise in a political entity as complicated as the EU and in view of the realities of Europe’s past. The EU, by deferring to national governments, has de facto recognized Scotland’s right to decide—a historical region similar to Catalonia—while supporting Madrid’s refusal to allow Catalonia to hold a referendum. Thus, national governments have remained the primary force in shaping the outcome of subnational

movements—an important insight into the making of policy in a time of great stress and strain on nation states in Europe and their citizens.

A. WHY BAVARIAN AND CATALAN REGIONALISMS TOOK DIFFERENT PATHS

On the one hand, Bavarians have largely felt accommodated in modern Germany’s federal structure while Catalans have often felt neglected by the Spanish nation state even since 1975. There are three major differences between Catalanian and Bavarian regionalism that have led to different outcomes. First, Bavaria’s accession to a unified Little Germany in the mid-19th century was a negotiated union on a model of several such mutual pacts of old Europe with their dynastic origins in the First Reich. The German nation state has largely respected, and even celebrates regional political and cultural institutions, treating them as a core element of the nation state. Catalonia’s accession to Spain was due to a dynastic union; as the union weakened, so did the bond between Aragon and Castile. Castile also began viewing Catalonia more as a threat than as a constituent part of Spain and Catalonia also began regarding the state as a threat to its identity. Castile has historically enacted measures that have either weakened or abolished Catalonia’s political and cultural autonomy. Thus, Catalan regionalism became less compatible with state nationalism by the end of the 19th century whereas Bavarian regionalism had become consistent with a larger notion of German nationalism.

Second, Spain had developed no modern sense of national solidarity that could weather difficult crises. Any sense of Spanishness was originally based on the attachment to a dynastic union and empire. When the empire began falling apart, there was no common national language or program to unify the Spanish people as was the case in Spain’s neighbors in the wake of the French Revolution. In contrast, German nationalists from the early 19th century onwards, despite the absence of a unitary, centralized nation state unlike Britain and France, achieved German cultural unification under the ideal of the Kulturnation and then with the blood and iron of Bismarck. Spain, unlike Germany, built few large-scale monuments in the early 19th century that could help foment a shared sense of national identity. Germany, in contrast—with an educated middle class that became the bearer of nationalism as the secular religion of the industrial age—not only
had patriotic groups that helped overcome class and regional divides but also had built “national monuments in stone and mortar.”  

388 Construction for the Walhalla, a national monument to German unity built in Regensburg, began more than forty years before German unification. Spain, on the other hand, had few monuments or national symbols that could memorialize the sentiment felt in the midst of its War of Independence, not the least because it lacked such an educated middle class who flourished in the progress of the 19th century. The largest structures in Spain that had acted as a symbol of the nation, the Catholic Church, increasingly became a contested institution and symbol, and the cosmopolitanism as well as anti-liberal doctrines of the church in the 19th and 20th centuries worked against the forces of nation building.

One contributing factor to Spain’s lack of a common cultural basis was its lack of linguistic unification. Whereas High German had achieved widespread use among educated Germans by the 18th century who were also plentiful in number versus elsewhere in Europe, Castilian during the same period had not achieved a similar measure of language consolidation.  

390 To make matters more problematic, Catalans, who once viewed Castilian as an apolitical mode of communication, later regarded it as anti-Catalan. A contributing measure that hindered Spain’s national unity was the delayed and ineffective role that the state had in education.

German nationalists deliberately leveraged educational institutions and formed organizations and associations to promote their ideals in the upheaval of Napoleonic and Revolutionary Europe and in the decades until 1848. As early as 1806, German nation-builders recognized the importance of education reform as a way to achieve national strength and unity.  

391 Spanish nation-builders were in a slightly different position. Given that Spain had existed for centuries, there may have been a smaller recognition of the need to nationalize the masses in order to achieve political reform. Furthermore, even if

388 Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses, 8.
389 Ibid., 53.
391 Boyd, Historia Patria, 41.
Spanish nationalists tried to spread their message, most people were illiterate and there were few agreed-upon national symbols that could act as a substitute for national literature. Whereas Germany was more than 75 percent literate by the mid-19th century, Spain was less than 25 percent literate.\textsuperscript{392} By 1900, more than 90 percent of Germans were literate compared to less than half of Spaniards.\textsuperscript{393} The majority of Spaniards were illiterate until the 20th century and there was no effective national program to mobilize the masses toward national goals. German national awareness, on the other hand, began to spread long before the presence of a nation state. German authors and nationalists spread a form of German patriotism embodied in the notion of \textit{Kulturnation} that eclipsed class and territorial divides as early as the first decades of the 19th century.

Third, the Spanish state has a long history of centralization and only a recent history of limited devolution in Catalonia. Catalonia has also rebelled against the state’s centralizing policies, often causing Madrid to affirm Spain’s unitary character. Hitler’s centralizing and nationalist measures have been wholeheartedly discredited in Germany, whereas Franco’s legacy is somewhat more contested in Spain. This dichotomy is reflected in Spain’s constitution that affirms its common fatherland and indivisible unity for all Spaniards while at the same time providing means for nationalities and regions to achieve a degree of autonomy.\textsuperscript{394}

\textbf{B. REGIONS AND THE EU}

Whereas Germany’s institutional arrangements accommodate Bavarian representation in the federal government, and by extension at the EU level, Spain’s comparatively more centralized framework has limited Catalonia’s influence in the EU. Without reforming territorial representation in the Spanish government it will be difficult for Catalanian interests to be fully represented in Spain’s government or the EU. The

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{392} Schulze and Yuill, \textit{States, Nations, and Nationalism}, 148; Storm, “The Problems of the Spanish Nation-Building,” 144.
\item \textsuperscript{393} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
institutional setup in Spain likely contributes to Catalonia’s desire to divorce itself from Spain.

However, the security implications of any Catalan secession would be problematic for both Madrid and Catalonia. The Spanish government is prohibiting Catalonia from holding a referendum on independence (whether binding or not) and there is little discussion in Madrid of reforming the constitution. While Catalonia’s independence movement has remained peaceful, the relationship between Madrid and Catalan nationalists has deteriorated, mitigating the chances for a mutually agreed-upon solution. Yet the security situation for an independent Catalonia, particularly if it secedes without Madrid’s consent, will likely reduce its own security. While both sides have largely refrained from resorting to violence in Catalonia, a continuation of the current tension without strong attempts by Brussels, Madrid, and Barcelona to resolve the impasse might allow for more radical nationalist independence groups to gain momentum.

Rather than remaining silent on secession, the EU might benefit from developing pragmatic guidelines that subnational and central governments could agree on. While the EU currently has a limited influence in shaping secessionist movements along its periphery, it still has the opportunity to influence internal secessionist movements. By making future membership in the EU dependent upon a peaceful separation (as might have been the case in Scotland), a principle that national and regional governments might agree upon, the EU has the potential to mitigate secessionist movements from becoming radicalized.

EU member states could take a more pragmatic approach that neither favors nor rejects regionalist aspirations but seeks to understand their root causes and offer solutions. European integration cannot be taken for granted; Europe’s continued stability requires deliberate balance between the principles of territorial integrity and the principle of self-determination. If the EU fails to reach a consensus regarding self-determination and territorial integrity, its influence in shaping international norms will be curtailed. The ambiguity in international law combined with the absence of a European consensus regarding these principles will be exploited by actors who harbor irredentist motives.

“Diario de Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las J.O.N.S” Jaén, Spain, April 1, 1942.


Balín, Mateo. “El Constitucional rechaza un referéndum soberanista en Cataluña sin acuerdo del Estado,” La Rioja, February 26, 2015,


Hernández, “Rajoy Cree que la Sentencia Contra elReferéndum de Artur Mas es Síntoma de que 'Algo Pasa' en Cataluña” *El Mundo*, February 25, 2015, http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2015/02/25/54edc217e2704e41568b4572.html,


Ing, David. “Catalan republic would have no armed forces, says proposal.” IHS Jane’s 360, February 24, 2015, http://www.janes.com/article/49435/catalan-republic-would-have-no-armed-forces-says-proposal,


Mosse, George L. The Nationalization of the Masses; Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich. New York: H. Fertig, 1975.

Noferini, Andrea, Susana Beltran, and Mirna Nouvilas, “Does the EU Empower (or Disempower) the Position of Regional Governments? Some evidence from the Participation of Spanish Autonomous Communities in the Council of the EU” Regional Studies Association Annual International Conference 2010.


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center  
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library  
   Naval Postgraduate School  
   Monterey, California