Influence of cultural cognition, social aspect of culture, and personality on trust

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Trust is a critical variable in military operations, be it trust in leadership and trust among team members. Trust can become complicated as operations cross-national borders. The purpose of this series of studies is to examine the trust process across cultures comparing the United States, Malaysia, and Australia. The study found country differences in Analytic-Holistic thinking, preference for Power Distance, need for cognition and trust propensity. Firstly, in terms of race differences within Malaysia, only differences were found in openness to experience and power distance, suggesting similar patterns amongst Malaysians in most of the variables of interest in the study. In terms of analytic-holistic thinking, it was found that Malaysia was more holistic followed by Australia and US whereas for Power Distance, Malaysia was the lowest followed by Australia and then US. Need for cognition was such that Australia was higher than US while US had higher trust propensity scores when compared to Malaysia and Australia. For countries higher in analytic thinking, there was a higher tendency to rate applicants with higher ability as more trustworthy; however, US rated applicants with higher benevolence as more trustworthy when compared to Malaysia, contradictory to present review of literature. On a whole, Malaysia was observed to be generally low on trust. Power Distance was the main contributor for higher trust in ability and cultural dimensions were found to predict integrity significantly whereby higher Need for Cognition and Power Distance were associated with higher trust in integrity. Power distance seemed to be the stronger predictor for trust in this study. Findings were discussed in terms of in-group and out-group differences, attributes of Generation Y, and trust climate.
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Influence of Cultural Cognition, Social Aspect of Culture, and Personality on Trust

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Abstract:

Trust is a critical variable in military operations, be it trust in leadership and trust among team members. Trust can become complicated as operations cross-national borders. The purpose of this series of studies is to examine the trust process across cultures comparing the United States, Malaysia, and Australia. The study found country differences in Analytic-Holistic thinking, preference for Power Distance, need for cognition and trust propensity. Firstly, in terms of race differences within Malaysia, there were only differences in terms of openness and power distance, suggesting similar patterns in most of the variables of interest in the study. In terms of analytic-holistic thinking, it was found that Malaysia was more holistic followed by Australia and US whereas for Power Distance, Malaysia was the lowest followed by Australia and then US. Need for cognition was such that Australia was higher than Australia while US had higher trust propensity scores when compared to Malaysia and Australia. For countries higher in analytic thinking, there was a higher tendency to rate applicants with higher ability as more trustworthy; however, US rated applicants with higher benevolence as more trustworthy when compared to Malaysia, contradictory to present review of literature. On a whole, Malaysia was observed to be generally low on trust. Power Distance was the main contributor for higher trust in ability and cultural dimensions were found to predict integrity significantly whereby higher Need for Cognition and Power Distance were associated with higher trust in integrity. Power distance seemed to be the stronger predictor for trust in this study. Findings were discussed in terms of in-group and out-group differences, attributes of Generation Y, and trust climate.

Keywords: analytic-holistic thinking, need for cognition, power distance, trust
INTRODUCTION

Trust is found to be a critical factor driving human behavior in both work and interpersonal interactions. Each individual is born with the innate need to form mutually protective alliances (Mikulincer, 1998) and trust is an essential condition in the development of the feelings of security and commitment (Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985). As the workforce increases in terms of diversity with people from different backgrounds working together, trust is therefore needed as a binding mechanism in enabling different individuals to collaborate (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). The changing concept of the present workplace whereby participative management styles are promoted as well as the incorporation of self-directed work teams highlights the importance of trust due to the inevitable interaction between team members which is bound to increase with the implementation of these management approaches. Hence, it is important to understand the many factors can influence trust from the broader aspect such as cultural differences (Klein et al., 2011) to the individual aspect such as mood (Stokes et al., 2010).

Previous research by Mayer, et al. (1995) has found three trustworthiness elements that influence the development of trust in interpersonal situations: ability, benevolence, and integrity. Yet, few studies have looked at how culture may shape trust perceptions of an information source and how this influences the three trustworthiness indicators. The focus of this research is to look at different cultural aspects affecting trust. Specifically, understanding the cognitive aspect and social aspect of cultural differences may provide a deeper understanding on how they may affect trust during multinational collaborations. In addition, personality associated with information processing such as the need for cognition may also impact the relationship between trust and cognitive load. Research on how these factors or the combination of these factors affecting different trust indicators during trust development and acquisition is limited. The goal of this research is to provide a broad view on how these factors affect trust.

The overall goal of the larger research study is to evaluate the relative strength of Mayer’s trustworthiness indicators (ability, benevolence, and integrity) in both collectivistic and individualistic cultures. Klein (2004) had suggested several cultural dimensions that differentiate nations on cognition and social interaction. The research herein examined the influence of Analytic-Holistic thinking (a cultural cognition) and Power Distance (a social aspect) on trust, and the influence of the need for cognition on the relationship between cognitive load and trust.

Trust and Trustworthiness

The integrative model of organisational trust, as developed by Mayer et al. (1995, p. 712), defined trust as “the willingness of a trustor to be vulnerable to the actions of a trustee based on expectations that the trustee will perform a particular action important to the trustor”, regardless of one's ability to control or monitor the other party. According to the proposed model, perceptions on an individual’s degree of trustworthiness will have an effect on the extent to which the trustor is willing to trust (Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007). This ultimately affects the overall trust a trustor has towards a particular trustee; or in other words, affects the amount of trust the trustor place upon the trustee. One’s degree of trustworthiness is measured through the perception of the three most prevalent components as noted by the researchers- namely, (1) Ability - the extent to which the trustee is perceived to possess a set of skills, competencies, and characteristics that enables him or her to have influence within some specific domain; (2) Integrity - “the extent to which a trustee is perceived to adhere to a set of acceptable principles” (Poon, 2012, p.397); and (3) Benevolence - “the extent to which a trustee is perceived to want
to do good to the trustor in their relationship aside from an egocentric profit motive" (Mayer, et al., 1995, p. 718).

Together these three components interactively contribute to the understanding of trust formation between a trustor and a trustee (Mayer & Davis, 1999; Mayer et al., 1995). As an example, under certain circumstances, due to the nature of the task, a trustee’s ability may be highly important as compared to the other two factors. Conversely, when tasks are simpler but politically sensitive, integrity may have a stronger effect on trust as compared to ability. Moreover, some trustors may place greater emphasis on one particular factor as compared to other trustors across various situations.

In this globalised world, diversified workplaces and work teams are no longer uncommon. As a result, in the context whereby interaction is maximised whilst control is minimised, trust is of high importance in promoting and ensuring effective cooperation among individuals from various cultural backgrounds (Mayer et al., 1995; Williams, 2001). Hence, it is of interest to investigate and understand the differences in social and cognition across different cultures and, ultimately, its impact on trust.

Cognitive Aspect of Culture: Cultural Cognition

Analytic-Holistic Thinking

Hofstede’s (1980) pioneer work on national differences identified the concept of Individualism-Collectivism, a social concept, as important for organizations. Later Markus and Kitayama (1991) related Individualism-Collectivism to self-concepts. Individuals from individualistic cultures see the ‘self’ as independent of immediate social environment (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). On the other hand, individuals from collectivistic cultures see the ‘self’ as functioning within the immediate social environment. This has implications on cognition.

Analytic-Holistic thinking is the cognitive manifestation of Individualism-Collectivism. Analytic thinking, as defined by Varnum, Grossmann, Kitayama, and Nisbett (2010, p. 9), is the ability to “focus on a single dimension or aspect (i.e., categorising objects or evaluating arguments) and to disentangle phenomena from the contexts in which they are embedded (i.e., focusing on the individual as a causal agent or attending to focal objects in visual scenes)” whereas holistic thinking is defined as the ability to focus broadly on the “context and relationships in visual attention, categorising objects, and explaining social behaviours” (p. 9). In general, it has been long established that individuals of individualistic cultures tend to think analytically when engaging in cognitive activities whilst individuals of collectivistic cultures engage in holistic thinking (Brewer, & Chen, 2007; Choi, Koo, & Choi, 2007; Varnum et al., 2010).

Analytic-Holistic thinking was speculated to originate from different social and metaphysical systems, and tacit epistemologies (Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett, Peng, Choi & Norenzayan, 2001). Analytic and holistic thinkers differ in the inclusion of context. While analytic thinkers view the world as composed of separate elements that can be understood independently, focusing on objects and dispositions, holistic thinkers focus on the relationships among different elements and context (Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett et al., 2001).

Four components are subsumed under Analytic-Holistic thinking: Attention, Causal Attribution, Tolerance for Contradiction, and Perception of Change (Choi et al., 2007).

**Attention:** Analytic thinkers focus on central features in the field while holistic thinkers include
the field (i.e. Masuda & Nisbett, 2001). **Causal Attribution:** Analytic thinkers focus on dispositions while overlooking situational causes, while holistic thinkers focus on both dispositions and situational causes when they search for explanations (i.e. Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999; Morris & Peng, 1994). **Tolerance for Contradiction** describes the degree in which one tolerates “opposing or contradictory” goals and options (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). Analytic thinkers, low in tolerance for contradiction, differentiate and contrast information to choose the best goal while holistic integrate divergent information to assimilate contradictory positions (i.e. Choi et al., 1999). **Perception of Change** describes beliefs about change: linear by analytic thinkers or as cyclical, non-static patterns by holistic thinkers (Ji, Nisbett, & Su, 2001). For details of these differences, refer to Nisbett (2003). Past research has found differences in analytic and holistic thinking along these dimensions between Western samples, Far Eastern Asian, and South East Asian samples (i.e. Choi et al., 2007; Klein et al., 2008).

**Analytic-Holistic Thinking and Trust**

The focus of this research is to explore the implications Analytic-Holistic thinking has on trust. To date, there is an abundance of research in each of these respective areas; analytic-holistic thinking (i.e., Nisbett, & Miyamoto, 2005) and trust in organisations (i.e., Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007; Dirks, & Ferrin, 2002; Mayer, & Davis, 1999). However, there is a lack of research investigating the direct relationship between analytic-holistic thinking and trust.

Because holistic people focus on background information (Choi et al., 1999) and broader attention focus (Ji et al., 2001), they would consider a variety of information during evaluation of trustworthiness (i.e. benevolence & integrity) whereas analytic thinker’s attention on focal information meant they would select the most important determinant of trust in an application process (i.e. ability). Lin and Klein (2008) discussed the importance of the Analytic-Holistic thinking for sensemaking. Analytic and holistic thinkers bring with them initial understanding influenced by cultural bias during sense-making situations (Lin, 2008). Lin (2010) found that Analytic-Holistic thinking was related to information trust of two organizational scenarios. In each scenario, information about a target person (i.e. education, previous experience, skills, personality etc.) and contextual information (i.e. economic situation, organization history, etc.) were given and participants had to judge the extent they trust the given information. The study found that holistic thinkers had higher information trust. In a similar study, Gelfand, Spurlock, Sniezek and Shao (2000) evaluated information usefulness between Chinese students and American students. Participants were given relational or individual information about a target person across four situations. Chinese students saw relational information such as social groups, family, social class, as more useful for predicting own and target’s behavior, whereas American students favored individual information such as personal accomplishments. Because analytic and holistic thinkers may favor different kinds of information, their judgments of trust are likely to differ.

Liang (2008) conducted a study to identify the effects of analytic and holistic thinking on advertisement information processing among Americans and Chinese students. In Experiment 1, participants were exposed to either analytic or holistic advertisements in regards to a brand new camera and were asked to give their opinions. It was noted that the dominant way of thinking for Chinese is holistic thinking while for Americans analytic thinking. Specifically, Chinese tended to engage in broad cognitive elaboration and generated more product-related thoughts (i.e., price, brand, and availability) when exposed to analytic advertisements as compared to holistic advertisements. When the experiment was extended to manipulating product risks (Experiment 2) and the pieces of information (Experiment 3), both groups still displayed their dominant way of thinking. Americans engaged in more analytic thinking when
faced with high-risk products but no significant differences were found for Chinese between medium and high-risk products, even though Chinese engaged in a little more holistic thinking. Even with additional pieces of information to consider, Americans still engaged in analytic thinking while Chinese used holistic processing. It was concluded that Chinese tended to engage in broader cognitive elaboration and generated more holistic thoughts when exposed to analytic as compared to holistic advertisements whilst Americans are less likely to engage in such thinking patterns.

In another experimental study on influence of culture on negotiation, it was noted that perception of the negotiation structure and behaviour is important in determining the outcome of the negotiation, especially for the Chinese (Ma, Wang, Saeger, Anderson, Wang, & Saunders, 2002). In a win-win situation, Chinese negotiators tend to be more assertive in order to achieve a desirable outcome where both parties benefit. However, if the negotiation is seen to be otherwise (i.e., win-lose), then a less assertive style would be adopted by Chinese negotiators and are more careful to ensure that the other party would not lose face (i.e., embarrassment). Additionally, it was noted that Chinese negotiators appear to place satisfaction towards the negotiation process above economic gains. Researchers explained that when Chinese negotiators invested a significant amount of effort to create a win-win potential and “explicitly exchange information to develop mutual trust, they feel satisfied with the interpersonal relationship” formed as well as the negotiation outcome despite that their individual gains may not be as good as it might have been (p. 181). Comparatively, Canadian negotiators are more aggressive in pursuing their own economic interests even though they could achieve a win-win situation in a less aggressive manner. This is a typical characteristic of individualists whereby their satisfaction towards business negotiation stems mainly from high economic gains or personal outcomes. Therefore, it can be inferred that individuals of cultures that adopts high-context communication styles (i.e., Chinese from China) tend to understand the environment before determining what is needed to be done and how to do it. On the other hand, individuals (i.e., Canadians) of cultures that adopts low-context communication styles tend to focus only on information that are important pertaining to the situation rather than understanding the whole situation or taking into consideration the involved individuals.

Organizational trust could also differ by culture. Schaubroeck, Peng, and Hannah (2013) found that newly recruited U.S. army soldiers tended to develop cognitive-based trust (i.e., ability and integrity) towards their team mates and respective platoon leaders in order to engage and excel in interdependent tasks. It was explained that individuals enter into “relationships with pre-existing cognition-based trust levels and then quickly update these evaluations based on the observations of the trustees’ behavior” (p. 1161). This allows the newcomers to evaluate if the trustees’ knowledge, abilities and behavioral tendencies are suitable for them to develop relationships with; relationships that are characterized by strong sense of mutual obligation.

On the other hand, Wasti, Tan, and Erdil (2011) found that perceived ability, integrity and benevolence were crucial; however, out of the three, benevolence appeared to be the most important factor in trust formation among two highly collectivistic cultures (i.e., Turkey and China). Benevolence was particularly salient in the formation of trust towards supervisors and peers. Specifically, for the Turkish sample, trust formed through benevolence is mostly based on personal intimacy and experiences between the trustors and the trustees whilst for the Chinese, it is based on cooperation and support between trustors and trustees. Wasti and Tan (2010) found that subordinates’ trust in supervisor has consequential affective bases among highly collectivist cultures (Wasti, & Tan, 2010). Specifically, the definition of benevolence is
found to be broader and deeper as it is no longer restricted to the working environment only, but has been expanded to the personal welfare of subordinates.

Branzei, Vertinsky, and Camp II (2007) conducted a study on attributions of trustworthiness to unfamiliar trustees among Japanese and Canadians undergraduate business students. No significant differences were found in the extent to which Canadian and Japanese trustors rely on dispositional signs when attributing ability to an unfamiliar trustee in cross-culture encounters. Specifically, none of the dispositional signs (i.e., professional designation and, relational or task focus) affected the Japanese’s assessment of the trustees’ ability. This shows that dispositional signs inform the trusting choices of individualists, but less for collectivists. This is because collectivistic cultures such as Japan- of which discourages the display of individual differences – emphasises more on connections with others. In this study, trust is also measured through contextual signs (i.e., predictability- dissimilarity and thwarted connection; benevolence- relational reputation and token control efforts). It was found that dissimilarity in the system of social norms governing trustees’ interactions and symbolic actions that may ruin trustees’ connection with trustors’ are more likely to hinder trust formation in collectivistic than individualistic culture. In other words, collectivists may either automatically screen trustees based on signs of similarity or screen them out if initial relational expectations are thwarted. Additionally, Japanese trustors were also significantly more likely to infer benevolent intentions when trustees provide them the opportunity to verify relational expectations (i.e., repeatedly testing the quality of the bond). It was noted that both Japanese and Canadian trustors were equally less likely to trust potential partners who had a questionable relational reputation. Thus, it can be concluded that trustors are more likely to respond using culture-consistent signs (i.e., Canadian- ability; Japanese- benevolence) and neglect inconsistent ones when assessing the degree of trustworthiness of an unfamiliar individual.

In summary, it can be inferred that individuals of individualistic culture focuses on perceived ability more when determining the overall degree of trust when compared to collectivistic cultures. As mentioned, one of the highly valued feature of individualism is individual achievement; therefore, in an organisational setting, the level of skills and abilities that one possesses will be the most single important component to determine trust towards trustee (especially co-workers and subordinates) as it informs the trustor whether this trustee is able to complete the given tasks in an independent and appropriate manner. Similarly, trust is high when followers perceived leaders to be highly competent (Dirks, & Ferrin, 2002).

For individuals of collectivistic culture, all three attributes of trustworthiness seems to be equally important which supported the notion of collectivists being holistic thinkers- perceive and interpret their surrounding environment relationally. Additionally, it can be noted that collectivists tend to trust individuals who have high level of benevolence as this factor appeared to play a more crucial role in trust formation between leaders and followers. One possible reason is that collectivists view themselves as part of a bigger system where cooperation and teamwork is highly promoted, and therefore benevolence informs both leaders and followers their respective degree of willingness to go beyond what is required of them professionally and personally in which such spill over is highly undesirable in individualistic cultures. This is also partly to maintain a harmonious working environment and relationship which is highly valuable and important to collectivists (Wasti et al., 2011).

**Hypotheses:**

1. Participants from a collectivistic culture will have higher holistic thinking compared to participants from individualistic cultures.
2. The higher the analytic thinking (lower holistic thinking scores) the higher the trust rating of applicants with higher ability.

3. The higher the holistic thinking the higher the trust rating of applicants with higher benevolence.

Social Aspect of Culture

Power Distance

Power Distance is a dimension that can be seen in work or social relationships between people of different ranks when an unequal distribution of power is considered normal (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede, 2003a; Merritt & Helmreich, 1996). The first emergence of the power distance theory or the concept of power distance was by Mulder in 1958 (Bruins & Wilke, 1993) and was measured based on the imbalance of power with regards to an individual with high power and an individual with low power in the society (Tastan, 2013). According to Tastan (2013), power distance is one of the Hofstede’s (1980) dimension which has been used to classify and explain cross cultural communication behaviours and tendencies as well as values related to work and organisations in the world.

Many variations of the definition of power distance have emerged or developed due to vast research using this concept. However, many researches have defined power distance based on Hofstede’s (1980) conceptualisation, which is based on how an individual perceives and interprets the hierarchical gap between a person who is in authority and their subordinates (Islamoglu & Boru, 2005). Specifically, power distance has been defined as the degree to which an individual who has a lower power submit to the actuality that power is not distributed equally in organisations, relationships, or institutions; it is associated with inequality in the social aspect, including the different levels of authority one individual tends to have over the other (Casimir, Waldman, Batram, & Yang, 2006; Tastan 2013). Hence, Power Distance describes the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally.

Power distance is commonly divided into two categories, namely high power distance and low power distance (Tastan, 2013). Where power distance is high, in general, there is more bureaucracy or hierarchy. High Power Distance people see a clear distinction between themselves and those who are above or below them socially, politically, or at work where professional status, social hierarchy, and family connectedness are likely to provide power independent of individual merit (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 2005). They expect people with power to provide leadership and make decisions displaying acceptance for the inequality in power by showing respect and obedience to people of higher statuses. This causes them to be compliant to their superiors as they tend to assume a paternalistic or autocratic relationship: they usually do not anticipate being involved in the decision making process, and therefore would also not put much effort into trying to influence this process as they are comfortable with the idea that the superiors are the ones who call the shots (Hofstede, 1980). This is also because, more often than not, little information is available to the people lower in the hierarchy as only higher ranked managers in the organization use information to make major decisions. Hence, subordinates tend to depend on their supervisor for direction, planning, and decision (Yates & Lee, 1996).
Where power distance is low, the relationship is more egalitarian (Tastan, 2013). Lower Power Distance displays equality in power whereby people are expected to listen to others and ideas are evaluated based on content and merit and not rank or professional and social status. Subordinates prefer consultative decision styles and interdependence between supervisor and subordinates. Information is available to people of all rankings throughout the organization. When an important situation arises, individuals with low power distance would not hesitate to voice out their opinions. Owing to this, these individuals naturally have the opportunity to cultivate closer relationships with their superiors when compared to individuals in high power distance societies as the latter tends to perceive that there should be a safe distance from their superiors. This is a possible influencing factor of one’s levels of trust in their superiors, co-workers, or subordinates (Lam, Schaubroeck, & Aryee, 2002). Lower power distance national groups also tended to emphasize more on open communication (Shane, 1994); they judge themselves and are judged by others based on accomplishments. Hence, an information provider whose has higher ability will be judged as trustworthy.

Countries thought to be high in power distance (both real and perceived) include those in Asia, South America, and the Middle East (Hofstede, 2001). Differences in Power Distance has influence on work behavior (Hofstede, 1980), aviation (Merritt & Helmreich, 1996), and global-software development lifecycle (Yeo, 2001).

**Individualism-Collectivism, Power Distance, and Trust**

This research also explores the implications Power Distance has on the three trustworthiness elements (ability, benevolence, and integrity). Earley (1986, as cited in Costigan et al., 2006), has concluded that two of Hofstede’s (1980)’s cultural dimensions which is power distance and individualism-collectivism are key factors that influence employee’s trust in their supervisors. In addition, trust has been identified to play a central role in effective leadership (Costigan et al., 2006). Primarily, the array of previous research has classified Malaysia as high power distance with collectivistic culture (PDI: 104), and the United States and Australia as low power distance with individualistic cultures (PDI: 40 and PDI: 36 respectively) (Islamoglu & Buro, 2005; Matsumoto & Juang, 2011).

Wang and Clegg (2002) reviewed previous research on national values of power distance with regards to trust, comparing Chinese and Australian managers in their study. The review found that Australian managers demonstrated higher values of trust and moderate levels of cooperation when compared to Chinese managers. Wang and Clegg (2002) argued that the existence of dominant hierarchical social values as well as higher power distance (as observed in the Chinese culture) correlates with a lower level of trust, causing the Chinese managers in the study to have lower levels of trust as compared to the Australian managers. The traditional social system of China which is based very much on hierarchical values (as perceived by the father being the ‘head’) is fostered since young in the Chinese culture. As such, individuals unconsciously accept control and respect due to hierarchical position and trust is built based on the individual who is in ‘power’ (Mente, 1994, as cited in Wang & Clegg, 2002). Shenkar (1993, as cited by Wang & Clegg, 2002) found that Chinese managers were keener to establish close relationships with higher managements, but because of hierarchical values, it was not ideal for them to show trust in the subordinates as they believed it will weaken their status among their subordinates and those who are of lower status as compared to them. Hence, it is possible to conclude that Chinese people would exhibit higher trust towards individuals who are higher in the hierarchy, and lower trust towards individuals who are lower in the hierarchy. In comparison to Hong Kong managers, Wang and Clegg (2002) reviewed that Australian and American managers were more creativity and achievement oriented as compared to Hong Kong.
managers, suggesting that Australian and American managers tended to value performance and abilities more as compared to Hong Kong managers.

Hypotheses:

4. Participants from collectivistic culture will have higher power distance compared to participants from individualistic cultures.

5. The lower the Power Distance (i.e., Western cultures) is likely to select supervisor with high ability for themselves compare to the higher Power Distance.

Personality Related to Information Processing

People differ in their propensities for processing and evaluating information (Anderson, 2002). They may prefer different forms of data and information, like different sources, and handle unreliable information in different ways. In addition, making sense out of this information can be overwhelming especially during high cognitive load. Personality differences can influence how people handle information during high cognitive load and have implication on decision effectiveness (Anderson, 2002; Davenport & Prusak, 1998). This research will explores Need for Cognition as a personality factor that may contribute to our understanding of how people evaluate trustworthiness information during trust process, particularly when faced with varying levels of cognitive load.

Need for Cognition

The need for cognition describes the amount of thought an individual typically puts forth in daily activities (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). Individuals high in intrinsic motivation to exercise their mental faculties are characterized as high in need for cognition (chronic cognizers) whereas individuals low in intrinsic motivation to engage in effortful cognitive endeavors are characterized as low in need for cognition (chronic cognitive misers) (Cacioppo et al., 1996).

These individual differences were found to influence the acquisition or processing of information relevant to dilemmas or problems. High levels of cognition were found to be negatively related to the tendency to ignore, avoid, or distort new information (Venkatraman, Marlino, Kardes, & Sklar, 1990). They sought out, scrutinized, and used relevant information when making decisions and solving problems more than did people with low need for cognition (Berzonsky & Sullivan, 1992).

Cognitive Load

The Cognitive Load Theory (CLT; Sweller, 1988) proposes that one’s working memory capacity is limited (i.e., duration and amount of information held), especially when processing novel and unorganized information. When approaching task, individual will thus allocate cognitive resources to ensure that their mental effort is not expended beyond the means of available working memory (Schnotz & Kurschner, 2007). Cognitive load refers to the working memory capacity required for learning or performing a particular task (Sweller & Chandler, 1994; Sweller, van Merrienboer, & Pass, 1998). Studies on cognitive load are mainly conducted within the educational and instructional design context (Jones et al., 2010; Ozcinar, 2009), while only few explore cognitive load and need for cognition together.
Generally, participants subjected to higher cognitive load had lesser cognitive resources to reflect on their decisions, thus would fail to process all available information, aside from being more impulsive and less analytical (Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2003). It is therefore common for individuals under high cognitive load to resort to strategies which allow them to expend least effort, such as shifting the more resource-demanding controlled processing to less effortful one (e.g., De Neys & Schaeken, 2007; Roßnagel, 2004).

Studies of dual-process models could instantiate such shift in information processing. Highlighting an individual’s two basic cognitive architectures, the dual-process model also serves as an avenue to explain how the imposition of cognitive load impacts information processing. For example, studies conducted within the vein of moral judgment found that the imposition of cognition load (password-like characters recall) impacted the deliberative controlled information processing (i.e., effortful utilitarian judgment), with stronger preference over automated information processing (i.e., involuntary deontological judgment; Conway & Gawronski, 2013). Studies on stereotypes also found greater usage of mental shortcuts under demanding situation (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987). Controlled/ Analytic processing (e.g., stereotype suppression and correction) requires cognitive resources (Burgess, 2010; van Knippenberg, Dijksterhuis, & Vermeulen, 1999), thus high cognitive load was found to impact stereotype inhibition response, predicting poorer performance on stereotype inhibition task (i.e. increased usage of automated, clinically-irrelevant stereotypes such as race in Burgess, 2010). On the other hand, the automated/ heuristic processing (i.e., comprises of prototypical knowledge structures) is said to be relatively fast and effortless (West, Meserve, & Stanovich, 2012). This is helpful and adaptive when synthesizing array of information from the complex reality (Bargh, 1989; Lippman, 1922, in Spears, Haslam, & Jansen, 1999), as they serve as energy-preserving tools that simplify information processing; conserve resources for more pressing issues. This is particularly so when individuals are confronted with cognitively-taxing situation (e.g., load) or the lack the ability or motivation to think deeply (Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). In general, studies found more stereotypical responses in high cognitive load than low cognitive load suggesting automated/heuristic processing (i.e. Chun & Kruglanski, 2006; Fiske, 2004; Sherman, Lee, Bessenoff, & Frost, 1998).

Need for Cognition, Cognitive Load, and Trust

A final focus of this research is to explore the implications culture and need for cognition has on trust through its influence on cognitive load. In the present study, individuals of different cultures and their evaluation of trust when subjected to cognitive load were examined. Based on the earlier review that stereotypes/ mental heuristics facilitate resource conservation, it is therefore speculated that with the presence of cognitive load, participants in the current study would rely on their mental shortcuts. Specifically, participants would fall back to their cultural stereotypes; the well-learned, frequently rehearsed, and thus high accessible knowledge structures (Chiu, Hong, Morris, & Menon, 2000). In addition, individual cognitive factor, the need for cognition, is predicted to further influence the use of controlled versus automated processing in impression formation (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Struthers & McMinn, 2012).

Various dual-process models which contrast the controlled and automatic processing were said to be driven by motivation (e.g., personal relevance; Fiske, 2004; see Macrae et al., 1994). Earlier, Cacioppo and colleagues (1996) suggested that for both individuals with high and low need for cognition, their motivation to think would be impacted by situational factors (e.g., distraction). Dickhauser and Reinhard’s (2006) study on the need for cognition and participants’ tendency to infer expectancy of success found that participants with high need for cognition tended to infer success from specific self-concept (i.e., subject or task specific
perception of ability), while those lower in need for cognition from general self-concept (i.e., general perception of ability). However, when cognitive load was introduced, participants were found to use more general self-concept in inferring expectancies of success, independent of need for cognition. They shifted from a controlled to an automatic information processing system. These studies suggested that cognitive load affected cognitive motivation, resulting in lower motivation to think even for individuals with high need for cognition.

On the other hand, several studies posited that individuals with high need for cognition have more cognitive resources available (i.e., greater working memory capacity; Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008; Kuo, Horng & Lin, 2012), and thus less likely to be overwhelmed by information. For instance, Putrevu and colleagues (2004) found need for cognition to moderate the effect of advertisement (e.g., visual, informational) complexity. Specifically, consumers with high need for cognition were less likely to experience information overload. Using the Cognitive Load Theory (Sweller, 1988), the intensity of load relies on number of elements needed to be processed simultaneously in working memory (Sweller et al., 1998). Hence, individuals of high need for cognition, with their inclination to seek out, acquire, and reflect on information as well as thought (i.e., metacognition; see Wu, Parker, & de Jong, 2011), construct more complex cognitive schemata (i.e., single entity with various interactive elements) which facilitate information assimilation. When they encounter a highly complex schema, it could be dealt as one element instead of scattered pieces of information, leaving more working memory capacity for handling task at-hand and possible load concurrently (van Merrienboer & Sweller, 2005). In short, cognitive load has little impact on chronic cognizers.

All these different studies thus necessitate further research to better elucidate the relationship between cognitive load and need for cognition. In the past, need for cognition has been explored in various contexts (see Kuo, Horng, & Lin, 2012). However, there is no research to-date studying the interplay between individual difference (i.e., need for cognition), cognitive load, and judgment for trust. The present study seeks to further understand the influence of cognitive load and need for cognition on trust judgments.

Hypotheses:

6. The influence of culture on trust will be different under different condition of cognitive load.

7. Under conditions of high cognitive load, there will be a larger effect of cultural tendencies on trust (i.e., preference for ability in analytic cultures and preference for benevolence in holistic cultures) for those low in need for cognition.
Method

Experimental Design
The proposed study used a 2 (Cognitive load) x 4 (Trust Indicator) x 3 (Culture) mixed design where cognitive load of high and low load and trust indicators of ability, benevolence, and integrity are within design variables. The between groups are national group from Malaysia, the United States, and Australia.

Participants

**Overall sample.** A total of 405 participants were recruited for current study. Two participants were excluded as their data was incomplete. The final data used were 403 participants with 42.7% of males and 56.3% of females (missing value: 0.9%) whose age ranged from 18 to 48 years old ($M = 20.77$, $SD = 3.47$). See Table 1 for more details.

**Australia.** A total of 72 participants, comprised of 90.3% males and 9.7% females whose age ranged from 20 to 29 years old were recruited ($M = 21.67$, $SD = 1.75$; Table 2). Of all, 51.4% were non-natives, 23.6% were native, and 20.8% were near natives (missing value: 4.2%). 48.6% were college seniors, followed by 23.6% of college juniors and 1.4% of college sophomores (missing value: 26.4%). See Table 1 for more details.

**Malaysia.** Of 179 participants recruited, mostly were females (72.1%) while the remaining were males (27.9%), whose age ranged from 18 to 34 years old ($M = 20.46$, $SD = 1.87$; Table 2). In terms of ethnicity, 38% were Chinese, 29.6% were Indians, 26.8% were Malays, and 5.6% of others. Most were university students (first year: 33%; second year: 19.6%; third year: 25.1%), with 22.3% of pre-university students. See Table 1 for more details.

**Within country analysis -** A total of 169 Malaysians participants’ data from the original 179 was used for analysis in this study. Ten were excluded from analysis as they do not fall under the category for race comparison. There were 47 (31.5%) males and 122 (68.5%) females with an average age of 20.39 years (SD = 2.06). In terms of ethnicity, there were 48 (28.4%) Malays, 68 (40.2%) Chinese, and 53 (31.4%) Indians. Of the participants, 40 (23.7%) were from pre-university level, 54 (32.0%), 32 (18.9%), and 43 (25.4%) were from Year 1, 2, and 3, respectively.

**United States.** 152 data was collected from the US, of which 37.5% were males, and 59.9% were females (missing value: 2.7%). Age ranging from 18 to 48 years old ($M = 20.72$, $SD = 5.16$; Table 2), the sample comprised of 56.6% of Caucasians, 23.7% of African Americans, 7.9% of Asian Americans, 5.3% of Latino Americans, and 2.6% of Pacific Islanders (missing value: 3.9%). Most were college freshman (65.1%), followed by 19.7% of college sophomores, 7.9% of college juniors, 4.6% of college seniors, 0.7% who were in military, and 1.3% of others (missing value: 0.7%). See Table 1 for more details.
Table 1

Demographic Characteristics of Participants (N = 403)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Malaysia</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 - 19</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>52</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 29</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>70.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 39</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>40 - 49</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic Status</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Sophomore</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Junior</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Senior</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>80.6</td>
<td>146</td>
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</table>

Note. Missing cases were excluded from the table.

Applicant tool and Stimuli

The Applicant Screening Tool is a self-designed web-based tool that has a similar interface to social website like Facebook. Participants were asked to engage in an applicant screening process where they viewed potential job candidates and reviewed the applicants’ virtual resume, which includes standard experiential data, interest statements, and referential data provided by previous supervisors. Applicants’ ability, benevolence, and integrity (i.e., trustworthiness indicators) were manipulated through referential data inserted into the tool as well as through narratives provided by the applicants. Each applicant was described by previous supervisors as being high or low on one of the trustworthiness indicators.
This tool consists of three tasks. In Task 1, participants were presented with applicants’ virtual resume which includes information on Education, Experience and Volunteer Experience and Personal Interest. Participants were to complete the trustworthiness and trust questions listed at the bottom of the screen for each applicant, and a total of four applicants. In Task 2, participants were to select applicants into positions. A summary of the four applicants’ resume were provided on the same page and participants were required to select the applicant that was deemed suitable for three positions (i.e., your supervisor, other’s supervisor, and co-worker) provided on the right side of the screen. In Task 3, participants have to rank the applicants from best to worst in the aforementioned three positions. Participants completed the three tasks in each version of the tool.

The Applicant Screening Tool has two versions (i.e. low and high cognitive load conditions), and participants were required to evaluate on both. One of the versions has notification feature that pops up at the lower right hand corner of the screen when a new resume arrives. Participants have to decide whether to add the resume to the desired queue within 4 seconds (High Cognitive Load). The other version does not have this feature of popping notification of resume (Low Cognitive Load). After each version of this tool, participants were presented with a review of their performance: number of applicants that were rated, selected and ranked, and feedback on accuracy of resumes queued.

**Manipulation of trust indicators**

There are eight applicants to be rated in the Applicant Screening Tool. Three trust indicators were manipulated in which the applicant is either described by previous supervisors as being high on one indicator, either, ability, benevolence, or integrity trustworthiness indicator. There were two applicants for each indicator making two applicants described as high ability, two with high benevolence, and two with high integrity. Two additional applicants had a mixture of neutral and low descriptions of trust indicator making them neutral applicants. The eight applicants were divided to two sets where each set consists of one applicant with high ability, one with high benevolence, and one high integrity, and one neutral applicant. Each set was used either within the High Cognitive Load or Low Cognitive Load condition. The presentations of the applicants’ sequence were random within each cognitive load.

**Measures**

**Analytic-Holism Scale.** Analytic-Holism scale (AHS; Choi, Koo, & Choi, 2007) was included to measure an individual’s Analytic-Holistic thinking. This scale consists of 24 items measuring the four components of Analytic-Holistic thinking (six items per component) on 5-point Likert scale from 1(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Six items were reversed coded items. Choi and colleagues reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .73 for the overall scale, and .67, .76, .71, and .71 for Attention, Causal Attribution, Contradiction, and Perception of Change subscales, respectively. For current study, the Cronbach’s alpha for the overall scale was .63, and the subscales of Attention, Causal Attribution, Contradiction, and Perception of Change were .60, .59, .40, and .50 respectively (see Table 2). An average score of the overall items and average score for each subcomponent were used for analyses with higher scores indicating stronger holistic thinking tendency. See Appendix A for measure.

**Need for Cognition.** In order to measure the need for cognition, or an individual’s tendency to engage in and enjoy thinking, the short form of the Need for Cognition Scale (NfCog; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) was used. It consists of 18 items on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Half of the items were reverse-scored items. The scale has high
internal consistency, ranging from .83 to .97 (Cacioppo et al., 1996). The short form correlated with the long form at .95. The scale has a Cronbach alpha of .90 (Cacioppo et al., 1984) and a seven-week test-retest reliability of .88 (Sadowski & Gulgoz, 1992, in Cacioppo et al., 1996). For current study, the Cronbach’s alpha was .79 (see Table 2). An average score of the all items was used for analyses with higher scores indicating higher need for cognition. See Appendix B for measure.

**Power Distance.** A scale to measure Power Distance was used in this study. This was adapted from Hofstede’s (1980) and Trompenaars, & Hampden-Turner (2005). There were 19 items on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). For current study, the Cronbach’s alpha was .63 (see Table 2). An average score of the all items was used for analyses with higher scores indicating preference for higher power distance. See Appendix C for measure.

**General Trust Scale.** The 6-item Yamagishi & Yamagishi’s (1994) General Trust Scale, GTS was used to measure cross-cultural differences in trust propensity. It is rated along a 5-point strength of agreement scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), with scores averaged to form the generalized trust scores. The scale has acceptable internal reliability (i.e., ranged from .70 to .78; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994) in addition to successfully predicting individual’s behavior in trust situations, demonstrating predictive validity (see Yamagishi, Kikuchi, & Kosugi, 1999). For the current study reliability was .82 (see Table 2). See Appendix D for measure.

**Mini-International Personality Item Pool.** The 20-item Mini-IPIP (Donnellan, Oswald, Baird, & Lucas, 2006; Appendix E) is the brief version of its 50-item predecessor IPIP (Goldberg, 1999, in Donellan et al., 2006). Anchored on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), the 20-item Mini-IPIP comprises of five subscales with four items loaded within each subscale. Excluding the Intellect/Imagination subscale (Openness) (i.e., three reversed keyed items), the remaining subscales of Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Neuroticism contain equal number of positively and negatively keyed items. The 20-item Mini-IPIP has high convergent correlations (i.e., .85) with the 50-item IPIP, while its subscales have acceptable internal reliability (i.e., α ranged from .62 to .77; Baldasaro, Shanahan, & Bauer, 2013; Donnellan et al., 2006). For current study, the Cronbach’s value for overall scale was .58, with .65, .69, .47, .53, and .67 for Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness subscales, respectively (see Table 2). An average score for each subscale was used for analyses with higher scores indicating stronger personality on those subscales. See Appendix E for measure.

**Positive Affect Negative Affect Scale.** The 20-item self-report PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) measures participants' affective responses. It consists of 10 descriptors for each of the positive and negative affect scales, respectively. Rated on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely), both the positive and negative affect scores can be derived by totaling respective scale's items. A higher positive affect score indicates higher level of positive affect, and likewise for the negative affect scores. Both the positive and negative affect scales have high internal reliability, with positive affect scale’s ranging from .86 to .90, while the latter .84 to .87. Current study adopted five items each from both affect scales, summing up to 10 items. The PANAS was used before both the experimental tasks (i.e., low or high cognitive load condition), and at the end of the tasks. Internal reliability for State affect T1, T2, and T3 are .67, .74, and .73, respectively (see Table 2). See Appendix F for measure.
**Trustworthiness.** Current study employed Mayer and Davis’s (1999) scale to measure respondents’ perception towards each job applicant’s ability, benevolence, and integrity. Only 16 of the original 17 items were used where one integrity item “The applicant’s actions and behaviors are not very consistent” was dropped. The words “top management” was reworded into “job applicant” for this study. There were six ability items, five benevolence items, and five integrity items. The items were included as task-embedded surveys, where respondents were required to reason their degree of agreement from 1(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Mayer and Davis reported high internal reliability for all trustworthiness factors; Ability, .85 to .88, Benevolence, .87 to .89, and Integrity, .82 to .88. For the current study reliability was calculated for each of the eight applicants and were averaged; Ability, .88, Benevolence, .82, and Integrity, .77 (see Table 2). See Appendix G for measure.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale’s Internal Reliability (Cronbach’s α) (N =403)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analytic-Holism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causal Attribution</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contradiction</td>
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<tr>
<td>Perception of</td>
</tr>
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<td>Change</td>
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<td>Need for Cognition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Power Distance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust Propensity (GTS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mini-IPIP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Openness</td>
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<td>Neuroticism</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* indicates that reliability was calculated for each of the eight applicants and averaged

**Trust Instrument.** Mayer and Gavin’s (2005) 10-item trust instrument (TI; Appendix H) was included as task-embedded surveys, measuring trustor’s willingness to trust the trustee, or in the context of current study, participants’ willingness to trust the job applicants. Thus, the words “supervisor” was reworded into “job applicant” for this study. The TI is rated on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). TI score is obtained by summing up all items, with higher scores indicating higher trust relationship perceived by the participants. Mayer and Gavin reported the scale’s internal reliability to be acceptable (α = .81). For the current study reliability was calculated for each of the eight applicants and were averaged; .68 (see Table 2). An average trust score was computed for applicants with high ability, high benevolence, high integrity, and neutral applicant, higher scores indicating higher trust for each characteristic of those applicants. See Appendix H for measure.
Procedure

Upon arrival to the experimental room, participants were presented with consent forms that briefly described the study and their rights as a participant. After obtaining consent, the experimenter instructed each participant to sit at a specific computer station and follow the online instructions. Participants first completed a brief background survey on the computer. The background survey included questionnaires such as Analytic-Holism Scale (Choi et al., 2007) - 24 items, Need for Cognition (Cacioppo et al., 1984) - 18 items, Power Distance (adapted from Hofstede’s, 1980; Trompenaars, & Hampden-Turner, 2005) -19 items, General Trust Scale (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994) - 3 items, Mini-IPIP (Donnellan et al., 2006) - 20 items, and demographics - 7 items.

Then, participants reviewed a training video that provides a brief introduction on the tasks followed by instructions and demonstration of the tasks. Participants were told that they will evaluate a new applicant’s screening tool, which will be used by the human resource department and potential employers. There were two versions, depicting the low and high cognitive load conditions with a total of three tasks in each version. In the high cognitive load condition, participants were given 4 seconds to add the desired resume (i.e., human resource manager) to the queue while attempting the experimental tasks. The other version does not have this feature of pop-up notification of resume (Low Cognitive Load Condition). Participants were required to verbalize their actions, feelings and thoughts while completing the three tasks and their verbal responses were recorded. Prior to responding to the tasks, participants were given time for clarification.

For both versions, in Task 1, participants would first be presented with the job applicant’s virtual resume (i.e., information on education, etc.), followed by responding to the trustworthiness and trust questions presented at the bottom of the applicant screening tool. The participants evaluated four job applicants before proceeding to the next task. In Task 2, participants would select the applicants into positions (i.e., your/ participant’s supervisor, other’s supervisor, and co-worker) that were deemed suitable and rate for confidence level of selection, after evaluating the applicants’ resumes. Participants were also required to briefly justify their decisions. In Task 3, participants would rank the applicants into the three positions, ranging from best to worst. Lastly, participants were presented with a review of their performance: number of applicants that were rated, selected and ranked, and feedback on accuracy of resumes queued. Participants repeated these tasks with another version of the tool. The estimated completion time for the background survey and tasks was approximately 1 hour to 1 hour 30 minutes. Participants were compensated with RM80.00 for their participation.
Results and Discussion

There are four parts of analyses for this study. First, the cultural variations in Analytic-Holistic thinking, Power Distance, Need for Cognition, Trust Propensity, and Personality were compared across participants within Malaysia. This was followed by analysis of cultural variations in Analytic-Holistic thinking, Power Distance, and the Need for Cognition of participant cohorts from the different nations. Third, the influence of national differences on trust was explored. Lastly, the influences of cultural variations in Analytic-Holistic thinking, Power Distance, and the Need for Cognition on trust were examined. For simplicity, each result analyzed is followed by a discussion. For each part, a general discussion will be included.

Part I: Within Malaysian Differences

Why is there a need to examine within country differences?

We could argue that Malaysia is very different from the nations where these cross-cultural researches were conducted (i.e. US, Korea, Japan). Many of the countries in which the research was conducted are rather homogenous in their ethnic composition, while Malaysia is a complex society with various interacting ethnic groups that differ in their traditions, values, languages, education, and socialization. Moreover, the history of colonization of Malaysia by Portuguese, Dutch, British and, later, the Japanese, had exposed Malaysians to many different cultures, languages, and governmental structures (Jali, 2003). During the British colonial government, the English language was the primary language of education. This exposed Malaysians to Western education. In addition, the Chinese and Indian communities also established schools in their respective languages. This development in formal education shapes a person’s thinking (Luria, 1976). Luria proposed that the introduction of formal education increases the use of logical reasoning. In addition to formal education, different languages were used as a medium of teaching. Because language has an impact in the way we think (Ji, Zhang, & Nisbett, 2004), it has implication on the cognition of Malaysians.

Research Question: Are there differences between Malay, Chinese, and Indian Malaysians on Analytic-Holistic thinking, preference for power distance, need for cognition, trust propensity, and personality?

Analytic-Holistic Thinking

Result. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the three different ethnics (i.e., Malays, Chinese, and Indians) on means score of analytic-holism scale. High means score of analytic-holism scale signifies high level of holism. No statistically significant difference was found between Malays, Chinese, and Indians on the means score of analytic-holism scale, \( F(2, 166) = .80, p = .453 \).

In terms of the subcomponents of analytic-holism scale, no statistically significant difference was found in attention; \( F(2, 166) = 1.57, p = .211 \), causality; \( F(2, 166) = .78, p = .462 \), tolerance for contradiction; \( F(2, 166) = .97, p = .382 \), and perception of change; \( F(2, 166) = .62, p = .538 \). Therefore, it can be inferred that Malays, Chinese, and Indians do not differ much in thinking patterns. See Table 3 for details.

Discussion. Thus far, there are no known studies found by the researcher that have investigated the differences between Malays, Chinese, and Indians in analytic-holistic thinking (Lin, 2012). Therefore, this is the first study to have compared the differences between the three
major ethnics in Malaysia. In general, the results indicated that Malays, Chinese, and Indians assumed similar thinking patterns; specifically holistic thinking as indicated by the high composite means score of analytic-holism scale.

The similarities in holistic thinking can be explained through their respective cultural teachings. Malays and Chinese, since young, have been taught by their parents to see the self as a whole and are taught to see the self in relation to others (Noor, 2009). Malays cultural teachings promotes kindness towards others and doing good deeds for others, while Chinese cultural teachings are deeply rooted within the Confucius philosophy which promotes harmony, goodness, humanity, togetherness, and respect; to name a few (Nisbett et al., 2001; Noor, 2009). While for the Indians, it is reflected through their religious teachings (i.e., Hinduism) which heavily emphasizes the self in relation to others (Flood, 2009; Zawawi, 2008). Specifically, the concept of karma is rather important to the Indians as they believed that their actions and behaviours in their present life will affect their next cycle of life (i.e., either a good life or a difficult life). Therefore, through each of these respective cultural teachings, one will soon learn to perceive and analyse events, situations, or information in a wholeness manner, especially when taught since young.

Moreover, using Hall’s (1959) low-context high-context culture, the three major races are subjected to high-context culture. Although less is known about Hindi, studies indicated that Malay language and Mandarin Chinese (Salleh, 2005) suggested them to be analogous (i.e., high context) language, whereby meaning of utterance lies within the spoken context. This is consistent with holistic thinking pattern in which the context of where one is embedded is important. This is in support of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis which suggested that individuals of different cultures think differently just because of the nature, structure, and function of their respective languages (Matsumoto & Juang, 2008). Hence, the similar structure and nature of language may facilitate similar thinking patterns of Malays and Chinese.

**Power Distance**

**Result.** In order to analyse the Malaysian ethnic differences in power distance, a One-Way ANOVA was used. The analysis found that there was a significant difference between the different ethnics in Malaysia with regards to power distance, $F(2, 166) = 6.60, p = .002$. Further Gabriel post-hoc analysis indicated that Malays ($M = 2.47$ vs. $M = 2.28; p = .002$) and Indians ($M = 2.42$ vs. $M = 2.28; p = .03$) were significantly higher than Chinese in power distance. No significant difference was found between Malays and Indians with regards to power distance. See Table 3 for details.

**Discussion.** The present study found that there is a significant lower power distance among the Chinese in Malaysia when compared to Malays and Indians. Though there are particularly limited studies conducted on power distance with regards to the Malaysian context comparing ethnic differences, the findings of this study is consistent with Lim (2001)’s study on work-related values of the three major races in Malaysia which found that Malays tended to have a higher power distance as compared to Chinese, albeit the results being not significant. Lim (2001) attributed this to the Malay tradition which emphasizes respect for hierarchy, which is consistent with being undeniably loyal to their superiors. Hence, the Malays may generally tend to opt to assume a safe distance from their superiors which they perceive is more appropriate, thereby reflecting a higher power distance. The Chinese, on the other hand, tended to emphasize more on individual growth (Zawawi, 2008). Zawawi’s contention is consistent with humanistic psychology views which propose that life is not just about meeting one’s immediate needs, but rather, individuals are naturally motivated to continuously improve and develop.
themselves (Burger, 2008). Hence, the Chinese in the study might have a higher motivation to pursue personal growth, and therefore ‘go against’ the supposed power distance norm. This is explicable as the Malaysian Economic Policy does not favor the Chinese community, and therefore the Chinese have to strive for their own survival (Lim, 2001). With regards to the Indians perceiving a higher power distance as compared to Chinese, there are almost no studies done on this. However, one possible explanation is the Indian caste system, a detailed, stratified social hierarchy which distinguishes the social structure of India, dictating one’s occupation and social status. Though this is not currently the practice of the urban Malaysian Indians, according to Vijayanath, Anitha, Vijayamahantesh, and Raju (2010), these social constructs “seem to have a stranglehold on human thought”. Hence, there is a possibility that these traditions still subconsciously exists among the Indians in Malaysia as well, therefore causing a preference for higher power distance.

Need for Cognition

Result. One-way ANOVA was used to explore for Malaysia’s ethnic differences on need for cognition scores. Results indicated that the need for cognition scores for Malay, Chinese, and Indian did not differ; Welch’s $F(2, 109.42) = 1.35, p = .257$. Therefore, it can be inferred that Malays, Chinese, and Indians in this sample did not differ much in their need for cognition.

Discussion. One possible interpretation could be that the three major races are exposed to the common situational factor that influences need for cognition, specifically, culture. Participants being the 3rd or 4th generation living in Malaysia may be well integrated in their patterns of thinking. Triandis and Suh (2002) proposed that ecology shapes culture, and culture impacts societal members’ personality development. For example, the three major races are culturally primed by the common predominating holistic culture, promoting interdependent self-constructs and holistic cognition (Yama & Zakaria, 2012). In the same vein, exposure to common situational factors such as education context (i.e. similar entry requirements for college) could possibly render no difference on need for cognition between the groups in this sample. In a study investigating the effects of socialization, social class, and race of undergraduates on need for cognition, it was found that faculty socialization did not enhance the first-generation college students’ NFC, compared to those whose parents received college education before. Also, the Asian/ Pacific Islander were generally found to have lower gains in their NFC, after controlling for sex, ACT, pre-test NFC scores, and institutional type (Padgett et al., 2010). This study suggests that when there are similarities in demographic characteristics there is little diversity in need for cognition scores. For current study, participants of different races were mainly recruited from a university located in the Selangor state, thus rendering no racial differences in the need for cognition scores.

Trust Propensity

Result. One-way ANOVA was used to explore for Malaysia’s ethnic differences on trust propensity scores. Results indicated that there was no significant difference on trust propensity scores between the Malay, Chinese, and Indian, $F(2, 166) = .51, p = .603$. Therefore, it can be inferred that Malays, Chinese, and Indians in this sample did not differ in their general trust propensity. See Table 3 for details.

Discussion. The finding in terms of difference in trust among different ethnicities is consistent with Lim (2001). Lim (2001) found no significant differences between Malays and Chinese in work-related values as both the ethnic groups shared similar cultural values, especially maintaining harmony environment and relationship. Noor (2009) explained such finding is
because, through their respective teachings, Malays (i.e., ‘budi’- kindness and good deed) and Chinese (i.e., ‘ren’- goodness and humanity) are thought to see “the self as holistic” and are “socially constructed and dependent on others” (p. 167). Thus far, only Zawawi (2008) reported trustworthiness as one of the shared organisational values between Malays and Chinese, and it’s considered to be a highly valuable trait. Consequently, because of the similarities in guiding principles (i.e., ‘budi’- Malys; ‘ren’ from Confucianism- Chinese) between Malay and Chinese, it may explain the similarity in trust propensity.

Although there is lack of studies on Malaysian Indian population, however, it can be speculated that Indians, too, engage in a similar trust attribution process like Chinese. The Indian way of life is in accordance with their religion whereby in Hinduism the self is deemed to be important in relation to others. The concept of karma is seen as one of the important component as it is believed that one’s reincarnation is highly dependent upon one’s conduct in the present life (Flood, 2009; Zawawi, 2008). This concept is being expressed in the way they behave (i.e., respect and consideration towards others, courteous, gratefulness, and kindness) towards others and therefore, the emphasis on interpersonal relationships is rather high (Narang, & Singh, 2012). Rashid and Ho (2003), in their study of business ethics and ethnicity, noted that the business trends of Malay and Indian businesses are slowly adopting the business trends of Chinese due to their dominant role in this sector. This suggests a direction of integration in practices which could also influence similarity in the trust process.

Personality

Result. One-way ANOVA analyses were used to examine differences in personality among the three ethnic groups in Malaysia. There was a statistically significant difference in Openness among Malays, Chinese, and Indians, $F(2, 166) = 8.98, p < .001$. A Gabriel post-hoc analysis indicated a statistically significant between Chinese and Malays ($M = 3.38$ vs $M = 3.81$, $p = .002$), and between Chinese and Indians ($M = 3.38$ vs $M = 3.82$, $p = .001$), whilst no significant difference was found between Malays and Indians ($M = 3.81$ vs $M = 3.82$, $p = .999$). Consequently, it can be infer that Malays and Indians are higher in their Openness to Experience as compared to Chinese. No statistically significant differences were found among the three ethnic groups in Extraversion; $F(2, 166) = 1.21, p = .300$, Agreeableness; $F(2, 166) = .16, p = .850$, Conscientiousness; $F(2, 166) = .31, p = .733$, and Neuroticism; $F(2, 166) = .36, p = .695$. See Table 3 for details.

Discussion. Generally, it was found that Malays scored the highest in Openness, while Chinese was found to be the least open among the three different ethnic groups. Therefore, Malays, as compared to Chinese, has higher degree of tolerance towards ambiguity, hence are more open (Cheung et al., 2008). One possible explanation for such finding may lie within the different perception of openness. Mastor, Jin, and Cooper (2000) conducted a study to identify Malaysia Malays personality profile. In their study, Malays were found to score fairly low in openness to values while scored averagely in openness to aesthetics, actions, and ideas. Mastor et al. explained that Malays, in general, viewed openness differently whereby one’s actions and judgments are highly depended and inseparable from the Islamic teachings. Malays consider themselves to be open when behaving in accordance with Islamic teachings while closed when behaving against the teachings of Islam. However, in general, Malays are generally open and are interesting in making their life interesting as long as it does not go against Islamic teachings (Sulaiman, 1981 as cited in Mastor et al., 2000). Cheung et al. (2008) noted for Chinese culture, openness cannot only be described as the degree of one’s openness to new ideas and interests, as in the Western studies, but it must also include their relationship with other people as interpersonal orientation plays an important role in understanding and
explaining Chinese personality. Therefore, for Malaysian Chinese openness may not only consist of open to new experience but also in relation to others, thus resulting in low score in openness as compared to Malays.

Additionally, Indians were found to be more open than Chinese, while both Malays and Indians are found to have similar level of openness. Perhaps, like Malays, Indians' definition of openness differs from the Chinese concept of openness, in that openness for Indians are deeply rooted within the teachings of Hinduism. As mentioned that Hinduism is not merely a religion for Indians but rather it is their way of life (Hinduism, 2013). Hindus are generally encouraged to seek for multiple sources to enhance and better oneself (Hinduism, 2013) and, like the Malays, it should not go against the teachings of Hinduism.

Table 3  
Ethnic Group Comparison on Analytic-Holistic thinking, Power Distance, Need for Cognition and Trust Propensity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Malay</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>F (2, 166)</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall Analytic-Holistic thinking</td>
<td>M=4.18</td>
<td>SD=.27</td>
<td>M=4.21</td>
<td>SD=.27</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causality</td>
<td>M=3.96</td>
<td>SD=.51</td>
<td>M=4.01</td>
<td>SD=.39</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention</td>
<td>M=3.34</td>
<td>SD=.658</td>
<td>M=3.54</td>
<td>SD=.60</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance for Contradiction</td>
<td>M=4.00</td>
<td>SD=.47</td>
<td>M=3.95</td>
<td>SD=.48</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of Change</td>
<td>M=5.44</td>
<td>SD=.49</td>
<td>M=5.34</td>
<td>SD=.48</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Distance</td>
<td>M=2.47</td>
<td>SD=.28</td>
<td>M=2.28</td>
<td>SD=.32</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for Cognition</td>
<td>M=3.37</td>
<td>SD=.43</td>
<td>M=3.21</td>
<td>SD=.57</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Propensity</td>
<td>M=2.94</td>
<td>SD=.79</td>
<td>M=3.00</td>
<td>SD=.77</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness</td>
<td>M=3.81</td>
<td>SD=.70</td>
<td>M=3.31</td>
<td>SD=.73</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscientiousness</td>
<td>M=4.00</td>
<td>SD=.47</td>
<td>M=3.95</td>
<td>SD=.48</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraversion</td>
<td>M=3.17</td>
<td>SD=.95</td>
<td>M=2.96</td>
<td>SD=.82</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreeableness</td>
<td>M=3.82</td>
<td>SD=.62</td>
<td>M=3.88</td>
<td>SD=.52</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neuroticism</td>
<td>M=3.07</td>
<td>SD=.74</td>
<td>M=2.95</td>
<td>SD=.74</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: * uses Welch’s F as the homogeneity of variance assumption is violated.
General discussion on the Malaysian differences

As Malaysia is a multiracial nation, research should first determine if different ethnic groups have different cognitive styles, social power distance, trust propensity and personality. Because of the many differences in daily practices such as religion, tradition, language, and schooling, it is important to establish differences in cognition, social and personality of interest in this study. Malaysia’s ethnic composition provides an opportunity to understand this area of research because of its racial diversity and cultural richness. To date, previous studies involved a Malay group sample (Klein et al., 2008) and a predominantly Chinese group sample (Lin, 2004) which limit the conclusion of these studies. In the present study, these groups are to some extent equally sampled.

As mentioned in Berry’s (1976) Ecocultural Framework, ecology and child-rearing practices can affect the way we see the world. Different ethnic groups, whose ancestors are from different regions of the world may have different child-rearing practices that could influence behaviour and cognition. Differences in religious beliefs, values, languages and education systems may contribute to the many differences among the ethnic groups in Malaysia. However, despite historical and origin differences, this study found many more similarities than differences among the major ethnic groups in Malaysia. One of the reasons could be the integration after many generations of living in the same ecocultural environment had integrated each other’s ways of thinking. While each traditional practice remained, cognitive and social practices differences were less visible. In addition, the Malaysian sample consisted of students with similar demographic characteristics. These similarities as well as similar shared cohort experiences such as education system, political environment, and technological exposure may render similarity in thinking patterns. In future studies, inclusion of participants with varied background such as different age groups, professions, living in different locations of residence, etc. may find different patterns of thinking among different ethnic groups.

In conclusion, it is important to establish within country similarities that may affect national comparisons later in this study. Rather than assuming similarities among Malaysians, the present finding suggests similar patterns in most of the variables of interest in this research. This establishes some validity in combining the different ethnic groups as Malaysians for further comparison with different national groups.

Part II: National differences on Analytic-Holistic thinking, Power Distance, Need for Cognition and Trust Propensity

Hypotheses 1 and 4 examined national differences in Analytic-Holistic thinking, its subcomponents and Power Distance, respectively. Here, both the US and Australia represents Individualistic culture and Malaysia represents collectivistic culture. In addition, national differences in Need for Cognition and Trust Propensity were also explored.

Analytic-Holistic Thinking

H1: Participants from a collectivist culture will have higher holistic thinking compared to participants from individualistic cultures.

Result. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the mean scores of three different countries (i.e., United States of America (US), Australia, and Malaysia) on Analytic-Holistic thinking style. There was a significant difference in the Analytic-Holistic scale scores for the
three countries; $F(2, 400) = 68.28, p < .001$. A Hochberg post-hoc test indicated that the mean score for Malaysia was significantly higher in holistic thinking than Australia ($M = 4.18$ vs $M = 3.95, p < .001$) and the US ($M = 4.18$ vs $M = 3.83, p < .001$). Australia was significantly higher in holistic thinking than the US ($M = 3.95$ vs $M = 3.83, p < .014$).

This pattern of significant difference was reflected in the four sub-domains of Analytic-Holistic scale; Attention, $F(2, 400) = 19.02, p < .001$, Causality, $F(2, 400) = 50.46, p < .001$, Tolerance for Contradiction, Welch’s $F(2, 181.66) = 11.53, p < .001$, and Perception of Change, Welch’s $F(2, 181.99) = 24.56, p < .001$. See Table 4 for details.

Post hoc analysis found that Malaysians and Australians were higher on Attention subscale compare to Americans. No difference were found between Malaysian and Australian. For Causality, Malaysians focus on both situational and dispositional causal attribution more than Americans and Australians. Australians were also more situational and dispositional focused than Americans. For Tolerance for Contradiction, Malaysians have higher tolerance for contradiction than Australians and Americans. Americans have higher tolerance for contradiction than Australians. For Perception of Change, Malaysians have a more cyclical view about change compare to Australians and Americans. No difference was found between Australians and Americans.

Therefore in general, Malaysians prefer to focus more attention on the whole rather than on specific information, consider both dispositional and situational causes when searching for explanation, tend to integrate divergent information to assimilate contradictory positions, and maintain a cyclical view which assumes constant changes when predicting future events.

Discussion. Malaysia was categorised as a highly collectivistic country with the individualism index value of 26, as identified by Hofstede (2001). Therefore, it is not surprising that Malaysians tend to be more holistic in their thinking as compared to Americans (IDV: 91) and Australians (IDV: 90) who are highly individualistic; therefore, tend to be analytic in their thinking. This pattern of thinking is reflected in high mean scores by Malaysians as compared to Americans and Australians in overall Analytic-Holistic thinking and all the four sub-domains of Analytic-Holistic scale. This finding supported Hypothesis 1. In the attention domain, it was noted that Malaysians reported preference for object-field relations as compared to Americans. Like other collectivistic countries, Malaysians tend to consider both the individual dispositional factors and situational factors presented in the surrounding environment; thus, considering a greater amount of information before making a final conclusion on particular events or situations (Lin, 2010). Whilst Americans and Australians tend to maintain a linear perspective, Malaysians reported a cyclical view when predicting future events. Lastly, it was also noted that Malaysians reported high level of tolerance for contradiction.

Malaysia, despite having three major different ethnicities (i.e., Malays, Chinese, and Indians) living together, is a rather harmonious country in which each ethnicity respects one another. On the surface for many outsiders, the respective cultural values of Malays, Chinese, and Indians may seem different from one another however, the difference is, in fact, not as vast as it seems to be (Noor, 2009; Sarachek, Hamid, & Ismail, 1984; Zawawi, 2008). This is because the core emphasis of each of these respective cultural values is relationship with others (i.e., ‘budi’ value which means kindness and good deed for Malays, harmony from
Confucianism for Chinese, and karma for Indians). Additionally, since the independence of Malaysia in 1957, the government has invested significant effort in educating, promoting and maintaining the harmonious lifestyle among Malaysians.

Therefore, as in accordance with the social orientation hypothesis which suggested that the way one perceives and interprets one’s surrounding environment is dependent on the person’s culture social orientation (Varnum et al., 2010; Matsumoto, & Juang, 2011). Thus, it can be assumed that Malaysia’s social orientation is interdependent in which its cultural values foster a broad sense of attention on functional relationships. Choi, Dalal, Kim-Prieto, and Park (2003), and Choi and colleagues (2007) noted that thinking patterns of individuals from a particular country is influenced by the country’s cultural values. They explained that because Asians (including Southeast Asians), in general, maintained the belief that all elements are inter-related and inter-connected with one another in an ever-changing state which led them to perceive, analyse, and attribute events or situations in a holistic manner (see Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001 for detail).

Additionally, there was no statistically significant difference found between Malaysia and Australia in the attention domain of Analytic-Holism scale. This is a rather interesting finding given that Australia, like America, is a highly individualistic country with the individualism index value of 90 (Hofstede, 2001). One of the possible explanations is that Australians may have learnt to see the bigger picture like Asians through interaction. Australia is a popular destination for migration and education among Asians; therefore places such as Perth, Sydney and Melbourne are highly populated by Asians (Australia’s Population, 2012; Australia Censes Statistic, 2012). Spencer-Rodgers, Williams, and Peng (2010) suggested the possibility for members of the same cultures to differ in the level of cultural construct (i.e., holism) and that it can be caused by a number of factors (e.g., social arrangements and belief systems). Hence, maybe through social interactions with Asians, Australians in these areas may have learnt not to limit their locus of attention to only objects but may have learnt to view the objects in relation to the context in which there are embedded in, despite being analytic thinkers. As the data of the Australian sample are collected in a location with diverse cultural groups, consequently this can be a probable explanation to the finding that Malaysians and Australians tend to view objects in relation to its context.

**Power Distance**

H4: Participants from a collectivistic culture will have higher power distance compared to participants from individualistic cultures.

**Result.** A One-Way ANOVA was used to analyse the differences between the US, Malaysia, and Australia with regards to power distance. The analysis found that there was a significant difference between the different countries with regards to power distance, $F(2, 400) = 100.83$, $p < .001$. Post hoc using the Hochberg test found that there was a significant difference in power distance between the US and Malaysia ($M = 3.00$ vs. $M = 2.55$, $p < .001$) as well as the US and Australia and Malaysia ($M = 2.70$ vs. $M = 2.55$, $p = .001$). Malaysians had lower power distance than the US and Australia. The Australian also had significantly lower power distance compared to the US ($M = 2.70$ vs. $M = 3.00$, $p < .001$). In this study, Malaysians have the lowest power distance, followed by Australians, and then Americans. See Table 4 for details.

**Discussion.** The present study found significant differences in Power Distance among the 3 samples, but in an opposite direction than expected. Hence, Hypothesis 4 was not supported. The analyses were consistent with previous research to a certain extent. Firstly, the results
reflected that there is a significant difference between the United States and Australia in terms of power distance whereby Australia exhibited a lower power distance when compared to the United States, which was consistent with Hofstede’s initial study on the power distance dimension of cultural variability. However compared to Hofstede’s initial study, an astonishing finding here is that Malaysians were found to exhibit a lower power distance when compared to Australians and Americans which entirely conflicts existing research that has been done on power distance. Previous research has found Malaysia to be a high power distance country (PDI=104) compared to Australia (PDI=36) and the United States (PDI=40) (Hofstede, 2003b). There are a few possible explanations for this opposite direction in the current finding. First, according to Tuleja (2009), in terms of politics, one characteristic of low power distance societies is that changes made in the government are through a democratic process whereby individuals get to vote and voice out their opinions. This is a characteristic of the United States, Australia, and also Malaysia. Second, from the social aspect, lower power distance societies try to minimise or bridge the gap between the educated and uneducated as well as the poor and wealthy (Tuleja, 2009). This is typically the case in Malaysia whereby the less privileged are provided with government aids such as free education, scholarships, as well as financial assistance for education. When viewed from these perspectives, Malaysia exhibits characteristics of movement from a high power distance society to a low power distance society.

Lastly, a study conducted by Kueh and Boo (2007) on the influence of individual-level cultural dimensions (power distance, collectivism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance) with regards to Generation Y expectations in terms of consumerism also found contradictory results with Hofstede’s country scores in terms of Power Distance. They found that Generation Y was lower on power distance. The authors opined that the findings were not astonishing as the data collected for Hofstede’s study was during Years 1967-1973. Hence, it is possible that a large majority of the participants were from Generation X. The present study’s data was collected in 2011 to 2012 while Kuehn and Boo’s study was conducted in 2007 whereby a large majority of the participants were from generation Y, hence the differences in roles and upbringing (e.g. being more proactive in voicing out one’s opinions, emphasis on gender equality) of the current generation may have led to a different perception of Power Distance.

These differences are further supported by a study conducted on 504 Auckland employees by Cennamo and Gardner (2008). According to Cennamo and Gardner (2008), different generations were introduced to work at differing points in their lives which may influence their work values. For example, those from Generation X may have had to start working at a younger age because of poor family wealth, but those from Generation Y tend to begin working at a later stage in life whereby a large majority only had their first full-time job after completing tertiary education. This has implication on work values as it changes the meaning of work values such as status-related values (e.g. influence and recognition), freedom-related values (e.g. working hours), and social values (e.g. relationships with supervisors or peers) (Cennamo & Gardner, 2008; Harding & Hikspoors, 1995). Cennamo and Gardner’s (2008) study found significant generational differences between Generation Y (as categorised in the study as those born between Years 1980 – 2000) and Generation X (born between Years 1962 – 1979) in terms of individual values with regards to freedom and status. Specifically, Generation Y placed higher importance on status and work values such as freedom as compared to Generation X. It is possible that Generation Y may feel status is a priority as this provides visibility, therefore attracting potential progression and marketability in the workforce (Riordan, Griffith, & Weatherly, 2003). Though this may seem to indicate that Generation Y would prefer a higher power distance due to their emphasis on influence and recognition, it is important to note that it is also through a closer relationship with one’s superiors that they are able to learn more and be entrusted with greater responsibilities by their superiors thereby
gaining influence and recognition. This is consistent with the characteristics of low power distance cultures as aforementioned whereby consultative decision styles and interdependence between supervisor and subordinates is a key component in low power distance cultures in which promotes a closer relationship between supervisors and subordinates (Lam, Schaubroeck, & Aryee, 2002). These findings could be generalised to explain the differences in Power Distance across different generations as well. As work values gradually take a shift, it is undeniable that one’s perception of Power Distance would change with time in order to achieve the best fit for one to obtain their goal or even to thrive and survive in the workforce.

Additionally, according to Hofstede (2003b), Power Distance was found to have a significant linear relationship with national wealth ($r = -.65$) as measured by a country’s Gross National Product (GNP). This means that when national wealth increases, Power Distance decreases. GNP takes into account GDP (Gross Domestic Product) as well as the income earned by residents in a country. According to The World Bank (2013), Malaysia’s GNP as of Year 2012 is at 305 Billion USD and the Gross National Income per capita (GNI) was approximately 16,270 USD. At the time Hofstede conducted his study on the Malaysian population which was around 1967-1973, at its peak, Malaysia only had a GDP of 8.2 Billion USD. Though earlier data could not be obtained, in 1980, Malaysia only had a GNI of 1,820 USD. Furthermore, the percentage of poverty in Malaysia in Year 2004 has also been reduced from 5.7% to 1.7% in Year 2012 (The World Bank, 2013). As can be seen, there is a significant immense increase in national wealth then and now, including the reduction of poverty. Therefore, using Hofstede’s findings, it is reasonable to generalise that due to the improvements of national wealth in Malaysia when Hofstede conducted his study and now when the present study is conducted, this may have caused differences in Power Distance as reflected in the results of this study. Nevertheless, these explanations are tentative, while able to point to lowering preference of power distance, it does not conclusively explain the reversal of preference of power distance between Malaysia compared to Australia and the US.

Need for Cognition

Result. Using One-way ANOVA to analyse differences in need for cognition between Malaysia, Australia and the US, the analysis show national differences on need for cognition scores, $F(2, 400) = 7.33, p = .001$. Hochberg post-hoc procedure indicated that Australia has higher need for cognition scores than the US ($M = 3.29$ vs $M = 3.16, p = .001$). There was no significant difference in need for cognition scores between Malaysia compared to Australia and the US. See Table 4 for details.

Discussion. As mentioned earlier, there was a dearth of studies researching on the need for cognition, and current study would be the first in exploring national differences on need for cognition. The findings could be understood in terms of the micro (i.e., personality) perspective. Sadowski and Cogburn (1997) found that need for cognition was positively correlated with the big-five factor model’s openness to experience (i.e., measured by NEO-FFI). Indeed, there was national difference on openness to experience in current study, $F(2, 400) = 19.08, p < .001$. Hochberg post hoc indicated the US was lower in Openness compared to Malaysia ($M = 3.29$ vs $M = 3.65, p < .001$) and Australia ($M = 3.20$ vs $M = 3.66, p < .001$). No statistically significant difference was found between Malaysia and Australia in openness. Higher openness to experience in the Australian sample is consistent with higher need for cognition in the Australian sample compared to the US sample.

Also, studies in the past suggested that higher educational attainment might imply the presence of need for cognition (Haug et al., 2010; Struthers & McMinn, 2012). By examining
participants ranging from high school to post-graduate, Butler and Moran (2007) found that there was significant difference in NFC between different educational levels. Specifically, higher NFC was related to higher educational level. For current study, it was hard to determine if education level per se contributed to the observed pattern in the NFC scores, in that Australia topped, followed by Malaysia, and lastly, US. The descriptive statistics however, demonstrated that the Australian sample was constituted of university students, with almost half (48.6%) comprised of senior year students. It is conceivable that the students are required of more advanced, critical, and sophisticated thinking skills, compared to those, such as freshman or pre-university students predominating the Malaysia and US samples.

**Trust Propensity**

**Result.** Using One-way ANOVA, there was national difference on trust propensity scores, \( F(2, 399) = 15.80, \ p < .001\). Hochberg post-hoc procedure indicated that the US has higher trust propensity scores than Malaysia (\( M = 3.43 \) vs \( M = 2.94, \ p < .001\)) and Australia (\( M = 3.14 \) vs \( M = 3.43, \ p = .025\)). There was no significant difference in trust propensity scores between Malaysia and Australia. See Table 4 for details.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4</th>
<th>Country Group Comparison on Analytic-Holistic thinking, Power Distance, Need for Cognition and Trust Propensity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Analytic-Holistic thinking</td>
<td>3.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causality</td>
<td>3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention</td>
<td>3.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance for Contradiction</td>
<td>3.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of Change</td>
<td>5.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Power Distance</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for Cognition</td>
<td>3.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Propensity</td>
<td>3.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* * uses Welch's F as the homogeneity of variance assumption is violated.

**Discussion.** The findings on trust propensity indicated that the US has higher trust propensity compared to Malaysia and Australia. In line with this finding, Huff and Kelley’s study (2003) recruiting bank managers across seven nations (i.e., six Asian nations, with Malaysia included and two states in the US) also found that US has higher levels of trust propensity compared to those in Asia.

Such finding could be understood using Inglehart’s World Values Survey (WVS, 2012). Two value dimensions of cross-cultural variation are derived from the WVS: (1)
Traditional/secular-rational dimension (i.e., reflects ideals about community which emphasize on constraint). Societies with lower secular-rational scores are instantiated by emphasis on religion, deference to authority, as well as adherence to absolute standards (e.g., reject abortion) and traditional family values (e.g., reject divorce), and (2) Survival/self-expression (i.e., reflects ideals about individuals with the emphasis on choice). The survival value is manifested via pursuit of physical and economical security (i.e., materialism). Once physically and economically insured, the societies would gradually shift towards self-expression values (post-materialism). Here, societal members focus on self-expression, quality of life, and subjective well-being, prioritizing individual autonomy, tolerance of diversity (e.g., foreigners), and environmental protection. The US had highest mean score in this respect (i.e., 1.76), demonstrating high self-expression values, followed by Australia (i.e., 1.75), and lastly Malaysia (i.e., 0.09; data collected in year 2006, WVS, 2012b). In the WVS, self-expression values create a conducive atmosphere for interpersonal trust. The self-expression values’ order where the US is highest is consistent with the current study where the US was the highest in the trust propensity.

The change in trust through self-expression values could be understood from the socio-economical perspective. As aforementioned, societies which have satisfied the material needs would shift their priority to post-materialistic values, such as subjective well-being. Thus, study (Paldam, 2007) found that income (i.e., specifically Gini index) and life satisfaction best accounted for nation’s average generalized trust (a.k.a., G-trust). Members of such societies depend less on in-group individuals as a function of pursuing security, rather, cooperative experience with out-group members take place, which promotes interpersonal trust (Delhey & Welzel, 2012; Gelfand, Bhawuk, Nishii, & Bechtold, 2004, as cited in Costigan et al., 2006). According to the WVS interpersonal trust index, Australia scored the highest, followed by the US and Malaysia. However, that the US has shown a systematic increase in self-expression value since year 1981, whilst Australia’s decreased after year 1995, such was in line with current finding that the US scored highest on trust propensity, followed by Australia, and lastly Malaysia.

**General Discussion of National Differences in Cultural Dimensions**

In general, significant differences were found between the US, Australia, and Malaysia in terms of overall analytic-holistic thinking styles (including the 4 subscales: causality, attention, tolerance for contradiction, perception of change) whereby Malaysia was more holistic followed by Australia and then US; opposing results were found for power distance where Malaysia was the lowest followed by Australia and then US; Australia reflected a higher need for cognition than US while US was observed to have higher trust propensity scores when compared to Malaysia and Australia.

Firstly, for analytic-holistic thinking, Choi and colleagues (2007) attributed the Asian holistic thinking to the Asian thinking patterns which maintained a belief of inter-relations and inter-connectivity with each other in an ever-changing state, leading them to analyse, perceive, and attribute situations or events in a holistic manner, consistent with the social orientation hypothesis. For power distance, the opposing results could be attributed to various causes. Primarily, the Malaysian government’s efforts in bridging the gap between the rich and the poor have led to a lower perceived power distance in Malaysia between the educated and uneducated as well as the privileged and less privileged, when viewed from the social aspect. This is also consistent with Hofstede’s (2003b) findings on the negative linear relationship between power distance and national wealth. When national wealth increases, power distance decreases. Hence, when viewed from these perspectives, Malaysia reflects a low power distance society. For need for cognition, Australia had a higher need for cognition as compared
to US. As this was this first study that investigated national differences in terms of need for cognition, there is limited literature to explain the results. Nonetheless, previous studies have proposed that educational attainment might suggest the presence for the need for cognition (Struthers & McMinn, 2012; Haug et al., 2010). In the present study, the Australian sample constituted the highest percentage of senior year university students; hence, it is possible that the differences found were due to educational level as proposed. However, more research is needed in order to conclude if the higher need for cognition reflected by Australia (as compared to US) in the present study is a result of educational attainment. With regards to trust propensity, US has a higher trust propensity when compared to Malaysia and Australia which was consistent with the WVS whereby US scored the highest followed by Australia and Malaysia.

Part III: National differences on Trust

Hypothesis 2, 3, and 5 compares country differences on trust. Hypothesis 2 and 3 are related to conceptualization of Analytic-Holistic thinking related to trust. Here, both the US and Australia represent analytic thinking samples while Malaysia represents holistic thinking sample. Hypothesis 5 is related to conceptualization of Power Distance related to trust. Here, both the US and Australia represent lower Power Distance samples while Malaysia represents higher Power Distance sample (rationale of division uses Hofstede’s Power Distance Index).

H2: The higher the analytic thinking the higher the trust rating of applicants with higher ability.

Result. A One-Way ANOVA was used to analyze the differences between the US, Malaysia, and Australia with regards to trust on applicant with high ability. The trust rating scores is the average rating on trust items of two applicants described with high ability. The analysis found that there was a significant difference between the different countries with regards to trust rating of applicants with high ability, \( F(2, 400) = 32.70, p < .001 \). Hochberg post hoc indicated significant differences between Malaysia compared to the US (\( M = 4.20 \) vs. \( M = 4.76, p < .001 \)) and Australia (\( M = 4.20 \) vs. \( M = 4.61, p < .001 \)), with both US and Australia rating higher on trust for applicant with high ability. There was no significant difference between the US and Australian samples (\( p = .25 \)). See Table 5 for details.

Discussion. The analysis indicated that nations that are hypothesized to be analytic in their thinking will have preference for applicant described with ability. Hypothesis 2 is supported. As in accordance with social orientation hypothesis, analytic thinkers are influenced by the independent social orientation patterns which help fostering their tendency to focus on a specific dimension or aspect in the area of evaluation and categorisation (Matsumoto & Juang, 2011; Varnum et al., 2010). The societal norms and values of such social orientation heavily promote and support individual uniqueness, personal achievement and initiative (Branzei et al., 2007; Doney, Cannon, & Mullen, 1998). Therefore, when engaging in the process of attributing trust, ability is highly salient as greater value is attached to personal achievements and initiatives. Consistent with literature review, Americans and Australians was found to be more analytic as compared to Malaysians. Such finding is not surprising given that America is an achievement-oriented society in which individual achievements are typically encouraged and honoured (Spence, 1985). For analytic thinkers like the Americans, ability reflects the applicants’ competence to complete the given tasks – especially tasks with high complexity – as according to the expectations imposed by the trustor. Hence, it can be concluded that Americans tend to attribute higher trust rating towards applicants with higher ability.
H3: The higher the holistic thinking the higher the trust rating of applicants with higher benevolence.

Result. A One-Way ANOVA was used to analyse the differences between the US, Malaysia, and Australia with regards to trust on applicant with high benevolence. The trust rating scores is the average rating on trust items of two applicants described with high benevolence. The analysis found that there was a significant difference between the different countries with regards to trust rating of applicants with high benevolence, $F (2, 400) = 15.09, p < .001$. Hochberg post hoc indicated significant a difference between the US compared to Malaysia, with the US rating higher on trust for applicant with high benevolence compared to Malaysia ($M = 5.13$ vs. $M = 4.70$, $p < .001$). There were no significant differences between the US and Australian samples ($p = .13$) and the Australian and Malaysian samples ($p = .07$). See Table 5 for details.

Discussion. In this study, Malaysia which is hypothesized to be holistic in thinking should rate applicant with benevolent to be more trustworthy. The result indicated otherwise. Malaysian had rated applicant with high benevolence to be less trustworthy compared to the Americans. Hypothesis 2 was not supported. While many studies emphasized the importance of interdependent social orientation on harmony, connectedness, and relatedness (Matsumoto & Juang, 2011; Varnum et al., 2010), and thus would value benevolence. Benevolence, therefore should be highly valued as it allows one to gauge applicants’ overall behaviours in relation to others to ensure and maintain harmonious relationships among one another, which ultimately results in cooperation. This typical pattern was not found in the present study. Such outcome may be explained from the point of in-group and out-group members. It has been well established within the literature view that individuals have high tendency to trust others who they perceived to be similar to them (i.e., cultural background, work values, ethnicity and etc.) (Hui, 1990; Nishishiba & Ritchie, 2000). In a similar fashion, collectivists perceives themselves as high performers when working with in-group members while working alone alongside with out-group members might result in low work performance (Earley, 1993). It is probably that the information pertaining to benevolence intentions of applicants with high benevolence may not have matched the trustors’ set of benevolence intentions. Therefore, trustors may have viewed such applicants – despite of their high benevolence intentions – to be out-group members as his or her benevolence intentions are not similar to the trustors’. Malaysian participants do not know the applicants, hence, applicants are considered as out-group members. Out-group members are treated with more competition, less benevolence in their intention. Additionally, Malaysian participants do not know the applicant, hence considered them as out group members and treated them with more competition and less benevolence in their intention.

Additional Analysis: Trust in Integrity

Result. A One-Way ANOVA was used to analyse the differences between the US, Malaysia, and Australia with regards to trust on applicant with high integrity. The trust rating scores is the average rating on trust items of two applicants described with high integrity. The analysis found that there was a significant difference between the different countries with regards to trust rating of applicants with high integrity, Welch’s $F (2, 181.76) = 22.28, p < .001$. Post hoc Games-Howell indicated significant differences between Malaysia compared to the US ($M = 4.60$ vs. $M = 5.08$, $p < .001$) and Australia ($M = 4.60$ vs. $M = 4.93$, $p = .004$), with both US and Australia rating higher on trust for applicant with high integrity. There was no significant difference between the US and Australian samples ($p = .36$). See Table 5 for details.
Table 5
National Comparison on Trust: One Way ANOVA Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust Indicators</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Malaysia</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>F (2, 400)</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High ability</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>32.70</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High benevolence</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>15.09</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High integrity</td>
<td>5.08</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>22.28*</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High neutral</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * uses Welch’s F as the homogeneity of variance assumption is violated.

Discussion. With regards to integrity, Malaysians again rated lower trust compared to Americans and Australians. Research had found individualists to be highly motivated by self-interest and thus may pursue personal goals that are inconsistent with others. To attain one’s personal goals it is not uncommon that some people may behave in a way that prevent or thwart another’s pathway to goal attainments (Doney et al., 1998; Nishishiba & Ritchie, 2000). The results indicated that Malaysians adopt a more individualist approach when rating trust on integrity. As explained above, they may have view applicant as an out-group member, hence, adopting a more competitive approach towards the applicants they were rating.

H5: The lower the Power Distance (i.e., Western cultures) is likely to select supervisor with high ability for themselves compare to the higher Power Distance.

Result. A Chi-square test was used to analyse the differences between the US, Malaysia, and Australia with regards to the likelihood of supervisor with high ability being picked as supervisor for themselves. Here selection of supervisor is coded for either a high ability supervisor is selected or not selected. As participants had to make this selection twice, once under low cognitive load and one under high cognitive load, two Chi-square results are presented.

Under condition of low cognitive load, the analysis found that there was a significant difference between the different countries in regards to likelihood of selecting an applicant with high ability, X^2 (2, n=403) = 9.03, p = .011, Cramer’s V = .15. Cramer’s V indicates a small effect size. Malaysia is less likely than the US and Australia to select an applicant with high ability for themselves, 54.7%, 62.5%, and 75.0%, respectively.

Under condition of high cognitive load, the analysis found that there was a significant difference between the different countries in regards to likelihood of selecting an applicant with high ability, X^2 (2, n=403) = 13.69, p = .001, Cramer’s V = .18. Cramer’s V indicates a small effect size. Malaysia is also less likely than the US and Australia to select an applicant with high ability for themselves, 52.5%, 67.1%, and 75.0%, respectively. See Table 6 for details.
Table 6
National Comparison on Selection of Supervisor for Self

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Malaysia</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Cognitive Load</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>9.03</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Selected</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>25.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>High Cognitive Load</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>13.69</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Selected</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Discussion  Participants from lower power distance nations (US and Australia) found those with ability to be more trustworthy than those from a higher power distance nation. They are more likely to select applicant with this characteristic as their supervisor. Hypothesis 5 is supported. The results were consistent with previous studies that show lower power distance to evaluate others based on content and merit (i.e. Tastan, 2013). The study by Wang and Clegg (2002) on Australian and American managers found that both Australian and American managers valued creativity and achievement more when compared to Hong Kong managers. This suggest that Australian and American mangers tended to be more performance and ability oriented than Hong Kong managers.

Influence of Cognitive Load on Trust

Hypothesis 6 compares country differences on rating of trust indicators under different conditions of cognitive load.

H6: The influence of culture on trust will be different under different condition of cognitive load.

Result  A mixed design ANOVA was used to examine if national effect on trust depends on cognitive load. There was no significant interaction of country X cognitive load X trust indicator on trust rating, Pillai’s Trace = .006, $F(4, 800) = .615, p = .65$ and Wilk’s Lamda = .994, $F(4, 798) = .614, p = .65$. There was no significant interaction of country X cognitive load on trust rating, Pillai’s Trace = .000462, $F(2, 400) = .092, p = .91$ and Wilk’s Lamda = 1.00, $F(2, 400) = .092, p = .91$.

There was no significant interaction of country X trust indicator on trust rating, Pillai’s Trace = .014, $F(4, 800) = 1.39, p = .23$ and Wilk’s Lamda = 1.00, $F(4, 798) = 1.40, p = .23$.

There was no significant interaction of cognitive load X trust indicator on trust rating, Pillai’s Trace = .003, $F(2, 399) = .506, p = .91$ and Wilk’s Lamda = .997, $F(2, 399) = .506, p = .91$.

The main effect of trust indicator on trust rating was significant, Pillai’s Trace = .239, $F(2, 399) = 62.64, p < .001$ and Wilk’s Lamda = .761, $F(3, 399) = 62.64, p < .001$. A follow up analysis indicate that there were significant differences within the trust indicators when they are compared to ability indicator. Trust rating were higher for benevolence indicator compared to ability indicator, $F(1, 400) = 115.30, p < .001$, and for integrity indicator compared to ability indicator, $F(1, 400) = 93.52, p < .001$. The main effect of between country on trust rating was significant, $F(2, 400) = 31.18, p < .001$. A follow up analysis indicated that Malaysian was lower in their trust rating compared to the Americans, $p < .001$, and Australians, $p < .001$. No differences were found between Americans and Australians, $p = .099$. The main effect of cognitive load on trust rating was not significant, Pillai’s Trace = .000019, $F(1, 400) = .008, p =
.93 and Wilk’s Lamda = 1.00, \( F(1, 400) = .008, \ p = .93 \). See Table 7 for means and standard deviations and Table 8 for mixed ANOVA results.

Table 7  
*Country comparison of trust under different conditions of cognitive load*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust Indicators</th>
<th>US M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Malaysia M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Australia M</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low Cognitive Load</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High ability</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High benevolence</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>4.95</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High integrity</td>
<td>5.09</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High Cognitive Load</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High ability</td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>4.58</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High benevolence</td>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High integrity</td>
<td>5.07</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8  
*Analysis of Variance Results for Country, Trust Indicators and Cognitive Load Variables*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Df</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
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<td>Between subjects</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>10.161</td>
<td>31.18</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Within subjects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive load</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive load X Country</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust indicators</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>64.68</td>
<td>32.34</td>
<td>80.19</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust indicators X Country</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.443</td>
<td>.611</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust indicators X Cognitive load</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.201</td>
<td>.101</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust indicators X Cognitive load X Country</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.510</td>
<td>.127</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Influence of High Cognitive Load and Need for Cognition on Trust*

Hypothesis 7 examined the influence of culture and individual differences in the need for cognition on trust specifically under condition of high cognitive load.

H7: Under conditions of high cognitive load, there will be a larger effect of cultural tendencies on trust (i.e., preference for ability in analytic cultures and preference for benevolence in holistic cultures) for those low in need for cognition.
**Result**  A mixed design ANOVA was used to examine if there is an effect culture and individual differences in the need for cognition on trust specifically under condition of high cognitive load. A group of low need and high need for cognition was obtained using the median split method. The results indicated that there was no significant interaction of country X need for cognition X trust indicator on trust rating, Pillai’s Trace = .009, $F(4, 794) = .921$, $p = .45$ and Wilk’s Lamda = .991, $F(4, 792) = .920$, $p = .45$.

There was also no significant interaction of need for cognition by trust indicator on trust rating, Pillai’s Trace = .015, $F(2, 396) = 2.96$, $p = .053$ and Wilk’s Lamda = .985, $F(2, 398) = 2.96$, $p = .053$. The test of within subject effect however, indicated a significant interaction, $F(1.952, 774.761) = 3.42$, $p = .033$. A follow up analysis showed that those with high need for cognition rated higher trust for those with high benevolence than those with high ability compared to those with lower need for cognition, $F(1, 397) = 5.43$, $p = .02$. Those with high need for cognition also rated higher trust for those with high integrity than those with high ability compared to those with lower need for cognition, $F(1, 397) = 3.93$, $p = .048$. See Figure 1.

There was no significant interaction of country X trust indicator on trust rating, Pillai’s Trace = .010, $F(4, 794) = .983$, $p = .42$ and Wilk’s Lamda = .99, $F(4, 792) = .98$, $p = .42$. The main effect of trust indicator on trust rating was significant under the condition of high cognitive load, Pillai’s Trace = .159, $F(2, 396) = 37.56$, $p < .001$ and Wilk’s Lamda = .841, $F(2, 396) = 37.56$, $p < .001$. Trust rating were higher for benevolence indicator compared to ability indicator, $F(1, 397) = 62.50$, $p < .001$, and for integrity indicator compared to ability indicator, $F(1, 397) = 58.56$, $p < .001$.

**Figure 1. Trust Indicators on Trust Rating for Different Need for Cognition**
The interaction between country by need for cognition was significant, $F(2, 397) = 4.31$, $p = .014$. The rating for between for those with low need for cognition and those with high need for cognition did not differ for Malaysians and Americans but for Australians, those with low need of cognition have lower trust rating than those with high need for cognition, $p < .001$. This indicates Australian was affected by the cognitive load manipulation while it did not for Americans and Malaysian. See Figure 2.

Figure 2. Country’s Trust Rating for Different Need for Cognition
The main effect of between country on trust rating was significant, $F(2, 397) =28.095$, $p < .001$. A follow up analysis indicated that Malaysians were lower in their trust rating compared to the Americans, $p < .001$, and Australians, $p = .004$. Australians were lower in their trust rating compared to the Americans, $p = .004$. The main effect of need for cognition on trust rating was significant, $F(1, 397) =11.86$, $p = .001$. People for low need for cognition have lower trust rating than those with high need for cognition, $p < .001$. See Table 9 for means and Standard deviations and Table 10 for mixed ANOVA results.

Table 9
Country comparison of trust on the different need for cognition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust Indicators</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Malaysia</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Need for Cognition</td>
<td></td>
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Table 10
Analysis of Variance Test Results for Country, Trust Indicators and Need for Cognition Variables

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Discussion
Hypothesis 7 examines the effect of need for cognition on trust rating under condition of high cognitive load. It was hypothesized that under this condition cultural tendency
for responses will be more evident for people who have lower need for cognition. What this 
means is that if one favor ability, he or she would rate those with high ability to be more trustful 
and would rate higher trust if this person has higher need for cognition than lower need for 
cognition. The finding on the three way interaction did not support this hypothesis. The effect of 
country by trust indicators on trust ratings was also not significant.

Two interactions were significant: Trust indicators by need for cognition and country by 
need for cognition. Those with high need for cognition rated higher trust for those with high 
benevolence and integrity than those with high ability compare to those with lower need for 
cognition. The rating on trust between for those with low need for cognition and those with high 
need for cognition did not differ for Malaysians and Americans but differ for Australians. For 
Australians, those with low need of cognition have lower trust rating than those with high need 
for cognition. This indicates only Australian was affected by the high cognitive load 
manipulation.

The ELM suggests that individuals with high need for cognition are more inclined to use 
logic for reasoning (Petty, Cacioppo & Goldman, 1981, cited in Kuo, Horng & Lin, 2012), 
emphasizes argument’s content, and object’s core attributes (Haugtvedt, Petty & Cacioppo, 
1992), demonstrating the central route of processing. Vice-versa, those on the lower end of the 
continuum are more inclined to engage in the peripheral route, focusing on object’s peripheral 
attributes, thus resorting to less effortful cues such as source of the argument (e.g., expert’s/ 
credible authority’s advice; Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996) and cognitive heuristics 
(Njus & Johnson, 2008). As compared to those with low need for cognition, individuals with high 
need for cognition were found to conduct higher amount of information search regardless of the 
situation (Bailey, 1997, in Wu, Parker, & de Jong, 2011). They also engage in thorough 
information processing by means of taking into account all relevant information before 
conclusion-making (Haugtvedt, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1992; Reinhard & Dickhauser, 2009), instead 
of using heuristics (Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983). Based on the ELM, the current study 
found that those with high need for cognition would engage in central route of processing, 
thoroughly evaluating job applicant’s trustworthiness by considering all aspects of trust 
information presented. Their rating remains higher than those with low need for cognition.

General Discussion for Country Differences in Trust

The present study looked at cultural aspects and individual differences in affecting the 
three trustworthiness indicators (ability, benevolence, and integrity). Overall, the study found 
that countries that are more analytic in thinking were more likely to rate applicants with higher 
ability as more trustworthy, contradictory results were found for benevolence, of which US rated 
applicants with higher benevolence as more trustworthy as compared to Malaysia, and 
consistent with current literature, lower power distance countries (i.e. Australia and US) showed 
preference for applicants with higher ability as compared to Malaysia. From the results, it is 
observed that, on a whole, Malaysia tended to be generally low on trust.

Mayer’s trustworthiness indicators (i.e. ability, benevolence, integrity) focused primarily 
on the dispositional aspect of trust. However, when making sense or making causal attributions, 
previous research has found that Asians required dispositional information as well as situational 
information in interpreting events (Lin, 2008). Hence, as the information provided to participants 
in the study were centralised around dispositional factors, the lack of sufficient information for 
making interpretations may have resulted in the results observed. In addition, in group and out 
group trust is an important factor to be taken into consideration as well. Casimir et al. (2006) has 
highlighted that there is evidence that collectivistic individuals tended to favour certain in-group
individuals as compared to out-group individuals (see also Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990). As the present study did not control for this factor, it is unable to truly conclude if Malaysians in the study rated trustworthiness based on out-group trust; however, it is an important possibility and should not be disregarded. In light of this, a developmental model of trust is needed to provide a more comprehensive view on trust as trust can be developed after an individual becomes a member of a group. On a separate note, the Value for Engagement (VfE) model also highlighted the importance of integrity and transparency in building trust. Nonetheless, in Malaysia, this has not been able to be achieved, especially by the government, as reflected through the increasing corruption and crime rates (Edelman Trust Barometer Malaysia, 2012, 2013, Siddiquee, 2013). This situation in Malaysia is further exacerbated with the implementation of the NEP which reinforces economic inequality, resulting in the impediment of trust.

Another important factor to be taken into consideration is the manipulation of the stimuli in the present study. In this study, Mayer’s trustworthiness indicators were presented individually, of which the stimulus was inclined to solely reflect ability, benevolence, or integrity. Poon (2012) found that in order for trust in supervisor to be high, employees must perceived benevolence to be high as well. Together, ability, trust, and benevolence interacted with one another to predict trust in supervisors. Though a neutral stimulus was also presented in the study to participants, the stimulus was not truly neutral in nature in that the description also included low descriptive of Mayer’s trustworthiness indicators. Hence, future studies might want to include a stimulus that is moderate on all Mayer’s trust indicators which might provide a better and more accurate reflection of a ‘neutral’ stimulus.

Part IV: Cultural variations in Analytic-Holistic thinking, Power Distance, and the Need for Cognition on Trust.

To investigate relationship between the concepts of cultural cognition, social aspect of culture, and personality related to information processing on Trust, these concepts are combined together to predict trust. This also allows for identification of which concepts affect trust the most while considering other concepts.

**Predicting Trust using Analytic-Holistic thinking, Power Distance, and the Need for Cognition**

**Trust (Ability)** A multiple regression was used to examine if the overall Analytic-Holistic Thinking, Power Distance, and Need for Cognition together affect trust for the applicant with higher ability. There was a significant effect in overall Analytic-Holistic Thinking, Power Distance, and Need for Cognition in affecting trust for the applicant with higher ability, $R = .178$, $R^2 = .032$, $F (3, 399) = 4.363, p = .005$. Therefore, the variables together account for 3.20% of the variance in trust for the applicant with higher ability. Power Distance significantly influenced trust for the applicant with higher ability, $B = .142, t = 2.575, p = .010$. With 1 SD increase in power distance, there is an increase by .14 SD in rating of applicant with higher ability. Analytic-Holistic Thinking ($B = -.079, t = -1.492, p = .136$) and Need for Cognition ($B = .050, t = .967, p = .334$) do not have an effect on trust for the applicant with higher ability. Table 11 for multiple regressions and Table 12 for correlations.

**Trust (Benevolence)** A multiple regression was conducted to examine if the overall Analytic-Holistic Thinking, Power Distance, and Need for Cognition together affect trust for the applicant with higher benevolence. There was no significant effect in overall Analytic-Holistic Thinking, Power Distance, and Need for Cognition in affecting trust for the applicant with higher
benevolence, $R = .098$, $R^2 = .010$, $F (3, 399) = 1.295$, $p = .276$. Table 11 for multiple regressions and Table 12 for correlations.

**Trust (Integrity)**

To examine if the overall Analytic-Holistic Thinking, Power Distance, and Need for Cognition together affect trust for the applicant with higher integrity, a multiple regression was used. There was a significant effect in overall Analytic-Holistic Thinking, Power Distance, and Need for Cognition in affecting trust for the applicant with higher integrity, $R = .158$, $R^2 = .025$, $F (3, 399) = 3.394$, $p = .018$. Therefore, the variables together account for 2.50% of the variance in trust for the applicant with higher integrity. Power Distance significantly influence trust for the applicant with higher integrity and was the stronger predictor, $B = .137$, $t = 2.470$, $p = .014$. With 1SD increase in power distance, there is an increase by .14SD in rating of applicant with higher integrity. Need for Cognition also significantly influence trust for the applicant with higher integrity, $B = .119$, $t = 2.296$, $p = .022$. Analytic-Holistic Thinking ($B = .095$, $t = 1.786$, $p = .075$) does not have an effect on trust for the applicant with higher integrity. Table 11 for multiple regressions and Table 12 for correlations.

<table>
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<th>High Benevolence</th>
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<td>$R^2$</td>
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<td>$p$</td>
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Need for Cognition $B = .050$, $t = 1.786$, $p = .075$.
Analytic-Holistic $B = -.079$, $t = 2.296$, $p = .022$.
Power Distance $B = .142^*$, $t = 1.786$, $p = .075$.

* $p < .05$.

**General Discussion on Cultural Dimensions Predicting Trust**

The multiple regressions analysis examined relationship between the cultural dimensions to trust in ability, benevolence and integrity. In regards to predicting trust in high ability, as a set, the cultural dimensions significantly predict ability. Power Distance is the main contributor where higher in power distance is associated in prediction of higher trust in ability. For benevolence, as a set, the cultural dimensions did not significantly predict benevolence. For integrity, the cultural dimensions significantly predict integrity. Two dimensions were significantly related to integrity. Those with higher need for cognition tend to rate higher trust in integrity and those who are higher in power distance also predict higher trust in integrity. In general, Power Distance seems to be important for predicting trust. In this study, power distance is conceptualized as a social dimension while Analytic-Holistic thinking, a cognitive dimension. Developing trust with another person is more related to a social interaction, hence, power distance seems to be the stronger predictor in this study.
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Note: *p<.005, **p<.01

1. Overall Analytic-Holistic Thinking
2. Perception of Change
3. Causality
4. Attention
5. Contradiction
6. Power Distance
7. Need for Cognition
8. Trust (Ability)
9. Trust (Benevolence)
10. Trust (Integrity)
General Discussion

The goal of this study is to evaluate the relative strength of Mayer’s trustworthiness indicators (ability, benevolence, and integrity) between three nations: Australia, Malaysia, and the United States. Specifically, the study examined the influence of Analytic-Holistic thinking (a cultural cognition) and Power Distance (a social aspect) on trust, and the influence of the personality variable need for cognition on the relationship between cognitive load and trust. To achieve this purpose, four part analyses were completed 1) comparison of cultural variations within Malaysia, 2) comparison of cultural variations between nations, 3) the influence of national differences on trust, and 4) the influence of cultural variations in Analytic-Holistic thinking, Power Distance, and the Need for Cognition on trust.

The results indicated not much variation between the different ethnic groups in Malaysia despite their differences in traditions, religions, and languages except for Power Distance and Openness to Experience. The similarity could be due the integration after many generations of living in the same ecocultural environment therefore integrating each other’s ways of thinking as well as the Malaysian sample consisting of students with similar demographic characteristics inferred by shared cohort experiences such as education system, political environment, and technological exposure.

The national differences in cultural variations were more evident. The Analytic-Holistic thinking patterns were consistent with the study’s expectation where Malaysians reflected holistic pattern in their cognition as compared to Australians and Americans. Consistent with conceptualization, there were also no differences between Australians and Americans. Of unexpected findings was the difference in Power Distance, where Malaysians were found to be lower in power distance in this study. Nonetheless, this was consistent with Hofstede’s (2003) study which found national wealth to be negatively correlated to Power Distance, meaning when national wealth increases, power distance decreases. With the reduction in national poverty over the years including marked increases in GDP and GNI in Malaysia which indicates an improvement in national income, it is possible to generalize that Malaysia is indeed moving from a high power distance country to a low power distance country with time.

The results indicated that Malaysians generally rated lower in trust for all indicators of trust. One possible reason is that Mayer’s model focused solely on dispositional trust, leaving out situational trust in the process. Lin’s (2008) study has highlighted that Asians tend to take into consideration situational and dispositional trust when making sense of an event, hence Mayer’s model might not be comprehensive in measuring trust. In addition, in-group and out-group trust is an important factor to take into consideration as well. Trust might be stronger if the applicants are introduced by an in-group member as proposed by Casimir et al. (2006) that there is an indication that collectivistic individuals were more likely to favour a particular in-group as compared to out-group where trust in concerned. Furthermore, according to the Rotter’s predisposition or propensity to trust model (1967), individuals, generally, have different levels of trustworthiness for others which should be fairly stable across time. One’s belief in trustworthiness of another individual is established through one’s early life experiences of the people they trust, as can be conceptualised through infant attachment. This means that if an individual has trust issues during their childhood, it may affect their level of trustworthiness through adulthood as well, therefore influencing their trust ratings in the experimental task that was assigned. Islamoglu and Boru (2005) also found that in situations where necessary information (as perceived by the trustor) on the trustee’s character is lacking, then the trust judgments of the trustor tends to be influence by the trustor’s personal propensity to trust. Nevertheless, if this uncertainty is reduced as a result of additional information provided, then,
the trustor may tend to rely on their personal knowledge and experience in forming their judgments rather than relying on their trusting predisposition. Hence, as each individual differs in the amount of sufficient information they require in making a decision on whether to trust another individual or not, this might explain as to why no significant differences were found since some individuals may perceive the information that is provided in the experimental task as sufficient while others may perceive it otherwise. This may be especially true for holistic thinkers who need more information during sensemaking (Lin, 2008).

In general, there are also differences in rating of trust indicators across all samples. Benevolence and integrity were preferred over ability in this study. Though the type of relationship was not a consideration in this study, the results were consistent with a study conducted by Krot and Lewicka (2012) on different types of relationships such as employee-manager, managers-employees, and employees-co-workers which found integrity to be the most important trust indicator for managers to employees and employees to co-workers while benevolence was important for employee to managers relationships. Knoll and Gill (2011) on the other hand found that ability was the most important indicator in the development of trust between peers or co-workers. Paliszkwiecz (2011) highlighted that it was important to note that only under circumstances whereby co-workers can positively enhance one’s work performance will one trust the judgments and advices provided by their co-workers, especially when working in teams as there is interdependence between members in achieving team goals (see Kiffin-Petersen, & Cordery, 2003). Nevertheless, these studies indicated that ability, benevolence, and integrity differed somewhat depending on the nature of the relationship that the trust is based on.

For future studies, a developmental model of trust is needed to provide a more inclusive view of trust. Trust is not an innate tendency, but rather something that can be developed as an individual becomes an in-group member. As mentioned previously, collectivistic cultures such as Malaysia are defined by their close social networks whereby, in an organization, an individual takes “pride and loyalty” in building close interpersonal relationships with family and close friends (Gelfand, Bhawuk, Nishii, & Bechtold, 2004, as cited in Costigan et al., 2006). Hence, as reflected in the results of this study, the participants were more trusting of their friend and co-workers instead of their supervisors, possibly, due to the closer interpersonal relationships that they are able to foster with them since friend and co-workers were on par in terms of hierarchy of a relationship. This can be further explained by the social exchange theory whereby when an individual voluntarily provides a benefit to the other party, it indirectly invokes an obligation on the other party’s behalf to reciprocate this benefit by providing something beneficial in return (Redman, Dietz, Snape, van der Borg, 2011). As a result, informal “rules of exchange” are determined and this may be used as a norm to interpret future behaviours of the other party (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). As one engages in more exchanges with the other party, trustworthiness is gradually fostered and gathered which is used as a heuristic in facilitating future exchanges with the said individual. Trust is thus developed based on the interest of both parties being fulfilled through this exchange.

In conclusion, this study found some important differences between nations and saw interesting shift in trends of Power Distance for participants from Malaysia. The generalization of these differences to the population in each country is limited as the sample sizes are rather small comparatively and focuses only on a young adult sample. Nonetheless, using this unique sample, we were able to observe the different findings in this Generation Y sample in comparison with previous research with Power Distance.
We could also speculate that trust may not only depend on the characteristics of the trustee but may include broader aspects of the society (i.e. trust climate in the country), situation or context where the trustee is embedded in, and the developmental aspect of trust in regard to development of in-group versus out-group. Future studies should consider these aspects to understand the complexity of trust development in different cultures.
References


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Dickhauser, O., & Reinhard, M-A. (2006). Factors underlying expectancies of success and


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Distribution A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited


Distribution A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.


Appendix A

Analytic-Holism Scale (Choi, I., Koo, M., & Choi, J., 2007)

Instructions: The following statements describe beliefs about the world. Please indicate your agreement with each statement.
(Scale: 1= Strongly Disagree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 5= Strongly Agree)

1. An individual who is currently honest will stay honest in the future.
2. Any phenomenon has numerous numbers of causes, although some of the causes are not known.
3. Everything in the universe is somehow related to each other.
4. We should consider the situation a person is faced with, as well as his/her personality, in order to understand one’s behaviour.
5. Nothing is unrelated.
6. A person who is currently living a successful life will continue to stay successful.
7. Any phenomenon entails a numerous number of consequences, although some of them may not be known.
8. Even a small change in any element of the universe can lead to significant alterations in other elements.
9. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
10. Future events are predictable based on present situations.
11. When disagreement exists among people, they should search for ways to compromise and embrace everyone’s opinions.
12. Everything in the world is intertwined in a causal relationship.
13. It is more desirable to take the middle ground than go to extremes.
14. Current situations can change at any time.
15. The whole, rather than its parts, should be considered in order to understand a phenomenon.
16. It is not possible to understand the parts without considering the whole picture.
17. If an event is moving toward a certain direction, it will continue to move toward that direction.
18. Every phenomenon in the world moves in predictable directions.
19. It is more important to pay attention to the whole than its parts.
20. It is more important to pay attention to the whole context rather than the details.
21. It is desirable to be in harmony, rather than in discord, with others of different opinions than one’s own.
22. Choosing a middle ground in an argument should be avoided.
23. It is important to find a point of compromise than to debate who is right/wrong, when one’s opinions conflict with other’s opinions.
24. We should avoid going to extremes.
Appendix B

Need for Cognition (Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., & Kao, C. F., 1984)

Instructions: The following statements describe individual characteristics. Please indicate your agreement with each statement.

(Scale: 1 = Strongly disagree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 5 = Strongly agree)

1. I would prefer complex to simple problems.
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun.
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities.
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely a chance I will have to think in depth about something.
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
7. I only think as hard as I have to.
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones.
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve heard them.
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.
12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat important but does not require much thought.
16. I feel relieve rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental effort.
17. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it works.
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally.
Appendix C

**Power Distance** (adapted from several sources for present study)

**Instructions:** Imagine yourself in a job setting and rate your agreement with the following items.

(Scale: 1= Strongly Disagree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 5= Strongly Agree)

1. It is important to have a good working relationship with your direct superior.
2. It is important to be consulted by your direct superior in his/her decisions.
3. A subordinate should not be afraid to express disagreement with his/her superior.
4. A structure with a subordinate having two bosses should be avoided.
5. People at lower levels in the organization should carry out the requests of people at higher levels without questions.
6. People at higher levels in organizations have a responsibility to make important decision for people below them.
7. Once a manager makes a decision, people working for the company should not question it.
8. In work-related matters, managers have a right to expect obedience from their subordinates.
9. An organization’s rules should not be broken, not even when the employee thinks it is in the company’s best interest.
10. Managers should make most decisions without consulting subordinates.
11. It is frequently necessary for a manager to use authority and power when dealing with subordinates.
12. Managers should seldom ask for the opinions of employees.
13. Employees should not disagree with management’s decisions.
14. Managers should not delegate important tasks to employees.
15. Most organizations would be better off if conflict could be eliminated.
16. One can be a good manager without having precise answers to most of the questions that subordinates may raise about their work.
17. In order to have efficient work relationships, it is often necessary to bypass the hierarchical lines.
18. I am uneasy in situations in which there are no clear rules or guidelines.
19. Conflicts with our opponents are best resolved by both parties compromising a bit.
Appendix D

General Trust Scale (Yamagishi, T., & Yamagishi, M., 1994)

Instructions: The following statements describe other people. Please indicate your agreement with each statement.

(Scale: 1 = Strongly Disagree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree)

1. Most people are basically honest.
2. Most people are trustworthy.
3. Most people are basically good and kind.

Appendix E

Mini-International Personality Item Pool (Mini-IPIP) (Donnellan, M. B., Oswald, F. L., Baird, B. M., & Lucas, R. E., 2006)
Instructions: Please identify how much the following statements describe you in general.

(Scale: 1= Strongly Disagree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 5= Strongly Agree)

1. I am the life of the party.
2. I sympathize with others' feelings.
3. I get chores done right away.
4. I have frequent mood swings.
5. I have a vivid imagination.
6. I don't talk a lot.
7. I am not interested in other people’s problems.
8. I often forget to put things back in their proper place.
9. I am relaxed most of the time.
10. I am not interested in abstract ideas.
11. I talk to a lot of different people at parties.
12. I feel others' emotions.
13. I like order.
15. I have difficulty understanding abstract ideas.
16. I keep in the background.
17. I am not really interested in others.
18. I make a mess of things.
19. I seldom feel blue.
20. I do not have a good imagination.
Appendix F

Positive Affect Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) (Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A., 1988)

Instructions: Using the following scale, indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment.
(Scale: 1 = Very slightly or not at all, 2 = A little, 3 = Moderately, 4 = Quite a bit, 5 = Extremely)

1. Interested
2. Excited
3. Enthusiastic
4. Alert
5. Determined
6. Distressed
7. Upset
8. Irritable
9. Nervous
10. Jittery
Appendix G

**Trustworthiness** (Mayer, R. C., & Davis, J. H., 1999)

Instruction: Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements in reference to the current applicant.
(Scale: 1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Somewhat disagree, 4 = Neither agree or disagree, 5 = Somewhat agree, 6 = Agree, 7 = Strongly agree)

1. The applicant would be very capable of performing his/ her job.
2. The applicant would be successful at the things he/ she tries to do.
3. The applicant would have knowledge about the work that needs done.
4. I feel very confident about the applicant’s skills.
5. The applicant has specialized capabilities that can increase company performance.
6. The applicant is well qualified.
7. The applicant would be very concerned about my welfare.
8. My needs and desires would be very important to the applicant.
9. The applicant would not knowingly do anything to hurt me.
10. The applicant would really look out for what is important to me.
11. The applicant would go out of his/ her way to help me.
12. The applicant has a strong sense of justice.
13. I would never have to wonder whether the applicant would stick to his/ her word.
14. The applicant would try hard to be fair in dealings with others.
15. I like the applicant’s values.
16. Sound principles seem to guide the applicant’s behaviour.
Appendix H

Trust (Mayer, R. C., & Gavin, M., 2005)

Instructions: Imagine you had to work directly with this person and your success in the company depended on him/ her. Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements in reference to the current applicant.

(Scale: 1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Somewhat disagree, 4 = Neither agree or disagree, 5 = Somewhat agree, 6 = Agree, 7 = Strongly agree)

1. If I had my way, I wouldn’t let this person have any influence over issues that are important to me.
2. I would be willing to let this person have complete control over my future in this company.
3. I would wish I had a good way to keep an eye on this person.
4. I would be comfortable giving this person a task or problem which was critical to me, even if I could not monitor their actions.
5. I would tell this person about mistakes I’ve made on the job, even if they could damage my reputation.
6. I would share my opinion about sensitive issues with this person even if my opinion were unpopular.
7. I would be afraid of what this person might do to me at work.
8. If this person asked why a problem happened, I would speak freely even if I were partly to blame.
9. If someone questioned this person’s motives, I would give him/ her the benefit of the doubt.
10. If this person asked me for something, I would respond without thinking whether it might be held against me.