Military and Non-Governmental Organizations have difficulty working together and communicating effectively because their organizational cultures, perspectives, goals, and language are vastly different. By understanding the substantive differences between their respective organizational cultures, and applying basic cross-cultural communication techniques, military leaders can communicate more effectively with civilian partners. Individuals with experience in both the military and civilian occupations can effectively serve as bridges between the two communities. OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT, the mission to assist the Kurds in Northern Iraq in 1991, and OPERATION UNIFIED RESPONSE, the joint, combined, and interagency response to the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, provide case studies to examine the applicability and validity of these ideas.
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:
Military – NGO Interaction:
The Value of Cultural Competence

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Executive Summary

Title: Military – NGO Interaction: The Value of Cultural Competence

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Thesis: Military and Non-Governmental Organizations have difficulty working together and communicating effectively because their organizational cultures, perspectives, goals, and language are vastly different. By understanding the substantive differences between their respective organizational cultures, and applying basic cross-cultural communication techniques, military leaders can communicate more effectively with civilian partners.

Discussion: There are a number of cultural models and cross-cultural communication techniques currently in use. It is not important which model a military leader finds most useful, the basic understanding developed is the same. Culture is a shared understanding of the world, and can be partially understood by outsiders through its symbols, verbal and non-verbal. Words have meanings that are not always the same, even in the same language, and ideas that are self-evident to a military officer may be bizarre to a humanitarian, and vice versa. Military leaders who develop a better understanding of partners in the humanitarian sector have been and will be more effective in complex operations involving civil-military coordination. OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT, the mission to assist the Kurds in Northern Iraq in 1991, and OPERATION UNIFIED RESPONSE, the joint, combined, and interagency response to the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, provide case studies to examine the applicability and validity of these ideas.

Conclusion: Organizational culture is a significant factor in military-NGO communication and coordination. Culturally competent military leaders can enhance their ability to operate in complex civil-military combined operations using cross-cultural communication techniques. Flexibility, understanding, and transparency are hallmarks of a culturally informed approach to collaboration. Individuals with experience in both the military and civilian occupations can effectively serve as bridges between the two communities, facilitating communication and understanding. Military leaders should seek to develop a shared understanding with our partners, employing the cultural skills they have already developed through experience, training, and education.
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Introduction and Thesis

“The greatest problem in communication is the illusion that it has been accomplished.”
-- George Bernard Shaw

“Culture is everything, and affects the civilian-military relationship in profound ways.” Effective communication can be difficult, even under ideal circumstances. Communicating across cultural boundaries only increases this inherent difficulty. Organizational cultures can affect military leaders’ ability to communicate effectively, even when working with US civilians. Although there is extensive literature in the field of cross-cultural communication (CCC), most recent works for practitioners have focused either on the business environment, or on communicating across national cultural divides, rather than the specific concerns likely to arise between, say, the U.S. Air Force and the American Red Cross. There has also been considerable discussion of the value of cultural training and cultural competence* for military professionals, but this debate has not considered the value of cultural competence to improving communication with civilians during complex operations.

This paper reviews some conceptions of culture, and introduces the concepts of cultural competence and cross-cultural communication theory. After introducing the basic concepts, a discussion of their value to civilian-military (civ-mil) cooperation and communication follows. This study focuses in particular on Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), because of their value to complex operations and substantial cultural differences from the military, but the ideas and recommendations should be broadly applicable to civ-mil interactions in general. Case studies of

* Definitions of the term “cultural competence” are still being debated. This paper will use the definition proposed by Brian R. Selmeski (2007):

The ability to quickly and accurately comprehend, then appropriately and effectively engage individuals from distinct cultural backgrounds to achieve the desired effect.

1. Despite not having an in-depth knowledge of the other culture, and
2. Even though fundamental aspects of the other culture may contradict one’s own taken-for-granted assumptions/deeply-held beliefs.
OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT, Northern Iraq, 1991, and OPERATION UNIFIED RESPONSE, Haiti, 2010, examine the value of cultural competence and CCC through real-world examples. The paper concludes with recommendations for individual leaders seeking a path toward greater cultural understanding and improved communication with NGOs and other civil society groups.

The focus of this paper is on concepts that can help military leaders in the field prepare for, and succeed during, complex operations, defined herein as those operations involving ill-defined or “wicked problems” and involving significant interaction with civilian organizations. The perspective presented is that of a practitioner, intended for other practitioners at the operational level. The author has attempted to present these ideas in neutral language, avoiding both military and NGO jargon. The difficulty of this task is itself representative of the scale of the challenge.*

The military will continue to operate both in cooperation and in areas of overlapping concern with civilian organizations, including NGOs, making it important to consider the operational friction generated by breakdowns in these relationships and approaches that may mitigate these challenges. Military and NGO leaders, despite decades of interaction in the field, still have substantial difficulties attempting to work together effectively. Effective communication between these communities continues to be a challenge, due in part to a cultural and perceptual divide that is exacerbated by many military leaders’ lack of understanding of the humanitarian perspective and reasoning (often matched by an equally impressive misunderstanding of military perspectives and motives by humanitarian professionals). By applying the cultural competence and cross-cultural communication skills already extant in the force, plus an elementary knowledge of the humanitarian narrative, military leaders should be able to improve coordination with NGOs and

* The author draws upon a multi-track career, having served in the military as both an Active Duty and a Reserve Air Force Officer, as well as in the humanitarian sector, in disaster relief and international humanitarian engineering.
other civilian organizations, as well as effectively identify when and where coordination or cooperation does, and more importantly does not, make sense.

Culture and Communication Models

“The difference between the right word and the almost right word is the difference between lightning and the lightning bug.”

--Mark Twain

Culture can be defined as “an accumulated pattern of values, beliefs, and behaviors, shared by an identifiable group of people with a common history and verbal and nonverbal symbol systems.” In addition to nations, identifiable groups in the preceding definition could include ethnic groups, religious groups, military services, government agencies, or NGOs. Individual members of these sub-groups are influenced by both their national culture and the unique culture of their organization.

Military organizations represent a culturally distinguishable group, whose non-verbal symbol systems include crests, patches, medals, rank insignia, haircuts, and salutes. Verbal symbols, the unique words and acronyms commonly referred to as “military jargon,” are often unintelligible to outsiders. Even within a military service, there are substantial differences in culture and language between branches, as described by an Army chaplain:

All soldiers are familiar with the use of military acronyms which [sic] in our world act as code words. The uniqueness of this code language is evident in the fact that military spouses often do not understand what their husbands are talking about when they talk about their work… With each change of location I had to [learn] new acronyms to be able to communicate in addition to the acronyms, which were understood army wide. Engineers for example used code words which[sic] I had never heard as a tanker chaplain. As soldiers we understand the success of the mission depends on soldiers understanding the meaning of code words. Code words are equally important when you cross cultural boundaries.

9
While many NGOs may not have the depth of history common to military organizations, they have their own unique verbal and nonverbal symbol systems, grounded in their unique missions, and informed by their own history and worldview. The International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC) is an excellent example, with a long and distinguished history, a set of core ideals enshrined in its seven fundamental principals, and emblems that are some of the most recognizable in the world.* These systems are often very different from those in the military culture and there is considerable diversity within the humanitarian community itself. Organizational and cultural differences that may seem minimal to a military observer can have dramatic effects on a NGO’s interest and ability to cooperate with military forces. Doctors Without Borders, commonly referred to by its French name, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), may seem very similar to the ICRC to a military officer, but important differences in mission and culture mean that it will not coordinate with military forces.10

An individual’s cultural influences form a layered system, and the more layers we can understand, the better we can understand that individual. When focusing only on national culture and excluding the influence of organizational culture, we are only seeing the most obvious level. Consider the case of an Air Force pilot, whose cultural influences include, at a minimum, the cultures of the United States, the military, the Air Force, aviation, operations, and finally the community of aviators that fly his or her particular aircraft, in addition to any familial, ethnic, religious, or other influences. In this way, culture can be understood as a set of overlapping “frames of reference [that] help make sense of the world for us.”11 As we expand our view to include additional influences, we can improve our understanding of those we work with from different

* The unique position of the ICRC in the humanitarian community means that the term NGO is not necessarily appropriate. It is a part of the international system, independent from any national government. The ICRC is also often confused with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and the National Red Cross Societies. See Appendix A – The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
There are two broad approaches to cultural training, culture general and culture specific. A culture general approach seeks to develop a strategic attribute, which will allow personnel to rapidly adapt to unfamiliar situations. The primary requirement for the development of general cultural competence is an understanding of an individual’s own culture and biases. For military leaders who have developed a general cultural competence, what is required is a paradigm shift to the mindset of considering civ-mil interaction from a cultural perspective and the application of this skill set to military-NGO interactions. The intent of culture specific training is knowledge of a specific foreign culture and an understanding of how to interact with it.

In the case of NGOs, culture specific training should go beyond simple lists of “dos and don’ts,” although even this would be a step forward. The path toward a cultural understanding of humanitarian partners could be as simple as inviting NGO representatives to appropriate training exercises, and brief lectures on subjects such as the international humanitarian system or the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Cultural understanding allows a leader to ask the right questions, and understand that the answers will vary based upon the situation and organization. “Decision making is story-telling,” and if a military leader understands the humanitarian story, she will be able to make better decisions.

Identity theory posits: “communication and culture are seen as inextricably intertwined.” The field of cross-cultural communication, also referred to as intercultural communication, developed to explore this linkage. The interdisciplinary tools and techniques of CCC, drawn from psychology, sociology, cultural studies, anthropology, and communication, can improve a leader’s ability to communicate across cultural divides. Military red teams use similar techniques to understand and predict the behavior of enemy, neutral, and allied behavior during
planning, war-games, and operations.* Indeed, the first step for any red team should be a literature search aimed at understanding “the story behind the situation.”† Military leaders who understand the history and perspective of the civilian organizations that they encounter will be much better positioned to communicate effectively and positively influence the relationship.

Military leaders should not expect to become cultural chameleons that can blend seamlessly into another culture, but instead should focus on developing an ability to communicate clearly and meaningfully across cultural boundaries. Communication is a four-step process, requiring the sender to encode the message, transmission, decoding by the receiver, and a feedback loop wherein the sender verifies that the message was received and interpreted correctly.16 Military readers may recognize a similarity to John Boyd’s Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop, and cultural understanding was also essential to Boyd’s model, illustrated in Appendix B. The environment also influences communication, and communicating effectively will clearly be more difficult in the fast-paced, uncertain, and high-stress environments that characterize complex operations. Therefore, to be effective, a communicator needs to understand his own cultural biases, the medium of communication, the cultural background and beliefs of the receiver, evaluate the receiver’s understanding of the message, and adapt as the situation and message continually evolve.

* Reference Appendix B for visual representations of the communication process
† In the case of NGOs and other humanitarian actors, an excellent starting point is “A Memory of Solferino,” written by Henri Dunant, the founder of the International Committee of the Red Cross, available for download at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p0361.htm.
NGOs and the Military

“It is not our purpose to become each other; it is to recognize each other, to learn to see the other and honor him for what he is.”

-- Herman Hesse

Military forces are organized, trained, and equipped primarily for war fighting, not for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) missions. Humanitarian organizations, alternately, are designed to accomplish very different missions, and their culture, structure, history, doctrine, and organization makes them uniquely well suited for tasks for which the military is not designed. Winston Churchill stated this idea more eloquently: “Those who can win a war well can rarely make a good peace and those who could make a good peace would never have won the war.” The potential synergies between military forces and NGOs should drive leaders to consider how best to leverage the unique strengths of each community. Military leaders who are able to communicate, cooperate, and operate effectively with and alongside NGOs will enable both communities to act more effectively and allow the military to focus on what it does best, fight and win wars, and provide security.

Language is one of the most direct approaches to understanding another culture and can play a role in civ-mil misunderstandings, not because of a lack of foreign language competency, but because familiar words have unexpected meanings. To improve communication and reduce misunderstandings within the military, DoD maintains several publications, including Operational Terms and Graphics, that ensure when an airman or marine uses a term, it means the same to him as it does to the soldier to whom he is speaking. When interacting with civilian organizations, this shared understanding can break down, as it does when discussing coordination. * To a military officer

* Attempts have been made to develop lexicons for interagency and civ-mil operations, but unlike Operational Terms and Graphics, they are not authoritative, nor do they necessarily represent consensus definitions. Examples include
coordination implies “command and control of a given situation,” whereas most civilians consider it to mean, “meeting or talking and sharing information.”

Without an understanding of humanitarian language, military leaders run the risk of being “divided by a common language” from potential partners in NGOs. For example, almost any NGO leader would bristle at the suggestion that their organization could be a “force multiplier,” but that is exactly the language that many in the military culture continue to use. By recognizing the importance of independence and neutrality in most humanitarian organizations, military officers could, instead, find language that is more suitable. Consider this alternative to the statement “I see you [NGOs] as force multipliers.:

We have shared interests in security, stability, and reducing violence amongst the population. Your organization’s work will achieve objectives that both of our organizations hold in common. For that reason, I would like to support your work and remove any roadblocks that I can.

The second statement is considerably longer, but effective cross-cultural communication sometimes requires breaking ideas into simple, direct, language that is appropriate to the audience and the situation. The revised statement avoids the implication that the NGO will work to achieve military objectives, and the idea that the two organizations “have the same goals.”

Even perfect communication, however, does not eliminate the differences between the military and NGOs.

NGOs, like the military, have cultures and structures that reflect their organizational history, the type of work that they specialize in, their overarching beliefs about the world and their place in it, and hard-won pride in their achievements. The idea, expressed by some military authors, that NGOs should surrender their independence or “subordinate their charter” in order to work

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* This is another linguistic landmine that military leaders frequently step on.
with militaries or conform to national political schemes is fundamentally flawed. The NGO community is able to do things that the military cannot precisely because of the aspects of their organizations that military leaders can find particularly frustrating.

For many non-governmental organizations, maintaining their independence and neutrality through strict adherence to their charter and principles is a definitional aspect of their organization, as well as the only defense that they have in dangerous areas, as described by Nicholas de Torrente, Executive Director of MSF in the United States:

For us, *these principles have an operational value*. They help us gain access and reduce security risks enabling us to deliver much-needed assistance in volatile and sensitive environments. They support us as we try to overcome natural suspicion and potential belligerence towards foreigners and outside groups coming in and proposing to help. By definition, this is a suspect activity in many contexts. In our experience, the most effective way to gain acceptance and a measure of trust in conflict settings is to have a very clear and transparent humanitarian identity. When we can achieve that, it enables us, most of the time, to cross lines of division and reach those who are left out or discriminated against, those at the bottom of everyone else’s lists for assistance, and those against whom violence is being committed.27

A military author suggesting that NGOs discard this essential characteristic is like a civilian telling the military to abandon its weaponry. Even if military forces can provide protection to cooperating NGOs, this protection would be limited by time and space – military forces cannot be everywhere that NGOs are working, and military involvement may undermine the operations of some humanitarian organizations.

Suggestions that the military can best serve in a “help the helper”28 role, imply that NGOs don’t understand the value of working with the military. To the contrary, “humanitarians do, in fact, recognize the ability to deliver aid more efficiently through such cooperation.”29 Unfortunately, military leaders tend not to understand the legitimate concerns of humanitarian organizations regarding cooperation or coordination with military forces. A common misperception is that if military leaders “could communicate more effectively to their humanitarian NGO partners that they
were, in fact, seeking the same ends, they could ease resistance.” This perspective misses a critical point, because many communications failures arise from the “fundamentally different perspectives” of military and NGO leaders, not in any failure to clearly elaborate the military’s position, or the benefits that military support could offer.

Military leaders do not necessarily need to accept the priorities and perspectives of humanitarian organizations, but they must understand humanitarian thinking and the “humanitarian’s hierarchy of interests” if they wish to operate successfully in coordination with them. Military and humanitarian goals and ideal end states will often differ, and the goals, missions, and capabilities of every NGO are not the same. Military leaders who understand these essential realities, and develop a more nuanced understanding of humanitarian organizations should be much more effective in identifying points of convergence that could allow for collaboration. In the OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT case study, the Civil Affairs officers were successful in part because of their understanding of the cultures and perspectives of both the population and the humanitarian actors.

Military culture tends to be “conservative, rooted in history and tradition, based on group loyalty and conformity and oriented toward obedience to superiors.” NGOs have varying degrees of history and tradition, but are generally more flexible and focused on the future. The humanitarian ethos is based around the concepts of humanity and equality, and NGOs tend to reflect these beliefs in their flatter organizational structures, and a more egalitarian and less deferential culture. Because of these deep cultural differences, even when goals and desired outcomes appear to align, military leaders need to avoid the “false consensus” trap, and realize that potential NGO partners may not necessarily share in the conclusions that seem obvious to them. Equally important, military officers must not make the mistake of assuming that if one NGO or humanitarian organization holds a given

* See Appendix C for a graphical representation of The UN’s Humanitarian Cluster System, which gives a good overview of the diversity in the humanitarian system.
position, that there is any consensus among similar groups.

To be more effective in civil-military operations (CMO), military officers must stop viewing “the NGOs” as a homogenous and unitary group. The differences between and among NGOs and other civilian organizations go well beyond inter-service or even international differences between military organizations. Additionally, unlike military organizations, collections of NGOs do not operate within a unified military-type command and control structure, even in a given area. The following interaction between a NGO official and a military officer in Kosovo perfectly highlights the issue:

“Gentlemen,” said an NGO official with provocation aforethought, “I’m not in your chain of command.” “Then you’re out of control,” shot back one of the officers. “No, I’m a humanitarian professional.”

Although it is impossible to achieve unity of command in a civil-military operation involving non-governmental or private sector entities, it is possible to work towards unity of effort. In fact, rather than a futile quest for unity of effort, military leaders may be better served seeking “harmony of effort,” a situation in which efforts are not well coordinated, but in which effects are complementary rather than counterproductive, and actions that are out of harmony are anticipated, and their effects mitigated. Influence, not authority, is what counts when working with NGOs. Military leaders should consider the immortal advice of Sophocles; “When you cannot enforce, do not command.”

The DoD Guide to NGOs sums up its section on NGOs and the military as such:

When NGOs and U.S. military units have met in the field, the experiences have ranged from positive to extremely difficult or frustrating for both sides. Military attitudes often hold that NGOs are whimsical, small, and lacking of capacity to act in a cohesive or independent manner. NGOs look at the military as cumbersome, risk-averse, and restricted by its geo-political policies or force protection needs. When working within a humanitarian emergency, it often appears that the military and NGOs speak different languages and have widely varying and potentially incompatible missions, capacities, and knowledge. This is not necessarily true, and opinions are changing on both sides.
Closer working relationships and one-on-one interactions between leaders have changed some misperceptions, but perhaps it is true that the military and NGOs have potentially incompatible language and cultures. If so, it is crucial to understand the language of potential partners in the field, as well as their underlying worldviews and motivations. One common take-away from both failed and successful civil-military operations is that it all comes down to the individuals involved. Military leaders who take the time to develop cultural competence and CCC skills, and can apply them in civ-mil interactions, may be the difference between failure and success in future operations.

Individuals who are comfortable in either culture and connect otherwise separate but internally homogenous groups are referred to as “transculturals” in a recent NATO report, “outliers” by Malcolm Gladwell, and “bridge nodes” in graph theory. Because these outliers will sometimes be the only people in an organization who can understand the “deep culture” of another institution, leaders at every level can seek out these outliers to act as “translators” or “cultural ambassadors.” It is important to note that these individuals may not be the most influential members of the organization or the best points of contact, but can still serve as valuable sources of insight.

Military officers have the opportunity to broaden their experience through volunteer service, and learn to see the world through the humanitarian perspective. Military professionals can build personal relationships with humanitarian leaders and engage them in professional discussion and correspondence, developing both understanding and personal connections that could help break down barriers in the field. Other opportunities to develop these skills include advanced degree programs, conferences, and networking events. During OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT, such outliers proved to be extremely important to the overall success of the mission.

The following practical guidelines for military-NGO interaction, adapted here from a similar list of tips for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Multi-National Force
commanders, may prove useful for military leaders working with NGOs or other civil society groups:

1. Develop your knowledge of the humanitarian perspective and major international humanitarian actors (you will see them again).
3. Prioritize relationship building. Mutual respect is key, and one-on-one relationships and (HANDCON)\(^47\) can overcome significant friction.
4. Understand the capabilities, roles, missions, limitations, and restrictions of NGOs in your AO – the differences will be substantial.
5. Do not assume that your way is the only way. NGOs are unlike the military intentionally, and these differences have value.
6. Be careful of acronyms and other jargon. Do not assume that even simple words mean the same thing to you as they do to a humanitarian.
7. Identify and work toward shared goals and outcomes, to the extent possible. It is not always possible to agree on an end state. That is okay, immediate or intermediate goals are often good enough.
8. When possible, create common operating procedures (SOPs). Or, align military operations to support SOPs developed by others. Some NGOs will not be interested in coordination with military forces, even when it appears that their goals are in perfect alignment with yours, but they might coordinate with each other.
9. Understand and accept that the risks and rewards as understood by the military and as understood by NGOs will often be radically different.
10. Unity of command is impossible and unity of effort is an elusive target. Make “harmony of effort”\(^48\) your goal.

**Case Study - OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT**

“Cultural understanding doesn’t just help you achieve your objectives – it helps you discover what your objectives should be.”\(^49\)

-- General Anthony Zinni, USMC

The United Nations authorized the intervention that became OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT in response to the plight of Kurds fleeing the aftermath of the failing uprising that followed Iraq’s defeat in OPERATION DESERT STORM. Coordination between the military and NGOs during OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT was “unprecedented in its scale and scope,”\(^50\)
and the operation is considered to have been a dramatic success. The study that follows is not comprehensive, but instead focuses on important aspects of the military-NGO relationship. Although there is no evidence that the military leaders involved explicitly applied cross-cultural communication techniques to civil-military communication and coordination, this operation nonetheless provides a concrete example of the value of an approach based on the development of a shared understanding of the desired end state and communication strategies based on the development of mutual respect.

In March of 1991, following radio broadcasts by President George H.W. Bush calling for the Iraqi people to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein, the Kurds in Northern Iraq rose up in revolt. Without external support for the Kurds, the heavily armed soldiers of Saddam’s Republican Guard quickly overwhelmed the Kurdish Peshmerga militia. More than one million people fled their homes, with roughly three hundred thousand displaced to Turkey, and another one hundred thousand to the Iraq-Turkey border area. In the words of one observer, “the Kurds were in a humble, humble, situation.”

The initial US response was non-interventionist, fearing an open-ended commitment and preferring not to violate Iraqi sovereignty. Nevertheless, by 6 April, the scale of the humanitarian emergency had become impossible to ignore, and the US began airdrops of critical supplies to Kurdish refugees in their camps in the mountains. On 11 April, a US Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) arrived at Incirlik, Turkey, to help coordinate the response. A key individual on this team was Frank Cuny, an internationally recognized humanitarian professional and former Marine. Turkey announced its support for the relief effort on 15 April, clearing the path for the establishment of a security zone in Northern Iraq, announced one day later. The mission had three
major components, stabilize the situation, resettle the Kurds in transitional camps in Northern Iraq, and finally return the displaced Kurds to their original settlements.\textsuperscript{55}

On 17 April, Lieutenant Colonels John Petrella, US Army Reserve, and Jean Ronsick, US Air Force, arrived to liaise with the NGOs and Turkish government, respectively. Petrella began hosting coordination meetings between and among the NGOs and other actors in a downtown office building, enhancing the informal coordination that had been taking place. These meetings were all voluntary, based upon the open sharing of information and led by the head of the embassy team. Petrella never sat at the head of the table, attempted to take charge of the situation, or impose military structure and discipline on the meetings or humanitarian actors.\textsuperscript{56} The military provided comprehensive risk assessments, in addition to logistical and airlift support, enabling NGOs to provide relief where it was most needed. Petrella’s success was based on the understanding that “there is no single point of coordination in a system that, by definition, has no structure except for the one that the military artificially, and temporarily, supplies.”\textsuperscript{57}

There were two subordinate task forces under Combined Task Force (CTF) PROVIDE COMFORT: Joint Task Force (JTF) Alpha and JTF Bravo. JTF-Alpha consisted primarily of the 10\textsuperscript{th} Special Forces Group, and operated in the mountainous areas in which Kurds had established camps. “Life-saving is still an inherent skill of soldiering,”\textsuperscript{58} and the initial “stop the suffering”\textsuperscript{59} phase came naturally to the soldiers. Because the Green Berets’ actions were also “pure humanitarian,”\textsuperscript{60} they provided an immediate point of commonality with the NGO workers. The quick action taken by the JTF helped break down stereotypes of the military as a “big, cumbersome bureaucracy that couldn’t move quickly.”\textsuperscript{61} One-on-one interactions steadily increased each group’s confidence in the other.\textsuperscript{62} As important as JTF-Alpha’s initial work in stabilizing the situation in the mountain camps was, this was only the first step in getting the Kurds out of the mountains and back into Northern
Iraq, under the protection of JTF-Bravo.

JTF-Bravo moved its headquarters from Silopi, Turkey, to Zakho, Iraq, on 20 April, and Marines from the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit immediately began construction of Camp # 1. Thanks primarily to Cuny’s input, the camps were located close to the population center of Zakho, allowing tie-ins to municipal services, and increasing the likelihood that residents of the city would return home rather than moving to the camps. The camps were designed in coordination with Kurdish community leaders, flown down from the mountains in military helicopters, in a manner that reflected the importance of family and clan in Kurdish culture. Involving these community leaders in the development of the camps helped the military demonstrate the safety of the area for returnees and most of the consulted leaders quickly moved their families out of the mountains and into the camps near Zakho. As the Kurds moved out of the mountains and into the newly constructed camps, the NGOs followed and increasingly took on the operation and management of the camps and relief delivery, allowing the military to step back.

On or about 2 May, members of the DART and military liaison officers began meeting with NGOs to discuss their movement into Northern Iraq, with the civil affairs officers remaining in the background, allowing the civilians to lead. On 13 May, the UN took ceremonial control of Zakho, and by the end of the month the NGO Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) was ready to take over the distribution of food in the camps. By 4 June the mountain camps were essentially empty. US forces began their withdrawal on 7 June and by the 15th most coalition military forces had been withdrawn.

Somewhat uniquely, in this operation the military and humanitarian communities had a shared understanding of the desired end state from the beginning. More unusually, this end state was actually realized, through relatively well-coordinated combined military and civilian action. One on
one personal interaction broke through stereotypes, and the collaborative leadership styles of the
civil affairs officers were extremely effective. The military and DART were blessed with leaders
who understood the situation, their role in it, and were able to see beyond their own organizational
perspective.

The concept of a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) was still relatively new, and was implemented as a floating, continuous concept of support, rather than a fixed location. From The CTF Commander, Lieutenant General John Shalikashvili, to the local civil affairs officer, most military leaders sought to assist and enable, not control. All coordination meetings were voluntary and military civil affairs officers did not lead them. The embassy team led the meetings in Incirlik, and a humanitarian professional from the International Rescue Committee organized and led the meetings in Zakho. Rather than wait in the CMOC, the civil affairs officers in Zakho met the NGOs on their turf. Coordination in these meetings met the civilian definition, talking and sharing information, and not the military idea of command and control of a situation. When Petrella was asked by senior leaders why his CMOC was not better organized, his response was: “My job is not to take this thing over.”

Civil affairs reservists’ like Petrella maintain civilian careers and are therefore familiar with multiple organizational cultures. They are also “trained to think about other than military considerations in a military environment.” These officers understood that “a liaison does not constitute a relationship.” They also understood the importance of allowing the NGOs to lead and an understanding that the military way was not the only way to get things done. Cuny had been a military cadet at Texas A&M and worked as an engineer before beginning his career as a humanitarian. His experience in the humanitarian sector began in Biafra in 1969, and his experience working with USAID stretched back to 1988’s earthquake in Armenia. The diversity of his career
combined with his personal and professional credibility enabled him to bridge the civ-mil divide, leading General Shalikashvili to describe him as "the expert on almost everything we did… the hero of that operation." As demonstrated by the examples of Petrella and Cuny, professionals with experience in multiple fields are well positioned to lead in complex operations that require an understanding of multiple perspectives, and can bridge the divide between military and civilian organizations.

The lessons of this operation include the importance of developing a shared vision of the end state, resisting the desire to take charge and attempt to impose military structure on non-military organizations, and the value of transparent communication and informal collaboration. Leaders who understood our allies in the humanitarian space were indispensable, despite the attitudes of some senior leaders who dismissed their methods as “touchy-feely” and having “gone native.” Petrella understood, while some of his superiors did not, that the more that the military did, the harder it would be to transition to civilian control and leave. With this understanding, far from being soft and touchy-feely, Petrella’s non-controlling approach was both effective and efficient.

Unfortunately, the military does not seem to have taken these lessons to heart, and this failure of understanding has had a direct and ongoing impact on civil-military combined operations. Rather than adopt the flexible approach to coordination epitomized by this operation, the CMOC is now institutionalized as a place, rather than a concept of support and collaboration. The military continues to attempt to fit NGOs into neat wire diagrams that operate within its command and control structure. Perhaps worst of all, the military frequently insists on attempting to exert control over chaotic situations that would be better suited to the open, collaborative approach epitomized by LTC Petrella.

As stated by one humanitarian professional: “They still don’t get what they did right; they
talk in terms of logistics: the number of tents put up, the number of latrines built. … [T]he military thinks the goal is feeding people, giving medical attention… that’s wrong, they must change the course of conflict in a way that saves lives.”

74 The difference in approach between the holistic, non-linear thinking of a humanitarian, and the linear, focused, logistical mindset that characterizes mainstream military thought is a major factor in communication failures, even during successful operations. These essential differences are also the source of incredible synergies that result from effective coordination between military forces and NGOs. The next case study, OPERATION UNIFIED RESPONSE, shows that the military continues to approach wicked problems and complex operations in the same linear, logistical manner, and that the organizational and cultural differences between the military and civilian humanitarian organizations continue to generate significant friction.

Case Study - OPERATION UNIFIED RESPONSE

On 12 January, 2010, Haiti was struck by a 7.0 magnitude earthquake, killing 230,000, injuring 300,000, and displacing 1.6 million people. 75 The poorest country in the Western Hemisphere even before the quake, Haiti suffered from poor infrastructure, an anemic economy, and lackluster governance. In addition to other damage, the disaster destroyed or badly damaged much of the infrastructure that would be required for the recovery effort, including the power grid, hospitals, government buildings, the road network, seaport facilities, and the airport. Immediately following the quake, the Haitian President declared an emergency and requested assistance from the international community, including a direct appeal to the US Ambassador. USAID was named the lead federal agent for the US combined civil-military mission, designated OPERATION UNIFIED RESPONSE. 76 The USAID DART and two US Coast Guard vessels were on the scene within 24 hours, and by 14 January the US Air Force had secured, and was operating, the airfield at Port-au-
US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) formed JTF-Haiti (JTF-H) to organize the military portion of the response, led by Lieutenant General P. K. “Ken” Keen, who was conveniently already in Port-au-Prince. A US Air Force team, including combat controllers and a Contingency Response Group, began arriving on the 14th, and supplies, personnel, and equipment began flowing in by air. Canadian air traffic controllers simultaneously reopened the airport at Jacmel. Two Coast Guard cutters were already in the area, and four more arrived shortly. On the 16th, the USS Carl Vinson and supporting ships arrived, followed several days later by the USNS Comfort and salvage ships. The Army’s Global Response Force and the Marines of the 22nd and 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (along with their Amphibious Ready Group) composed the bulk of the ground force. In all, roughly 17,000 personnel were deployed by the US military, and another 43 countries also sent military contingents. The UN’s existing mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was made responsible for security, and the US forces were directed to focus on logistics.

Former President Bill Clinton, named special envoy to Haiti by the UN, estimated the number of NGOs and other civil society organizations already present or deployed in response to the disaster at 10,000, but others have speculated that that number might be too low by half. The difference in capabilities was vast, and coordination of relief delivery posed significant challenges. The US military’s control over the movement of supplies, personnel, and equipment into the country caused significant friction between military leaders and outside organizations. With military airlift given priority, and without comprehensive management of inbound aircraft, many civilian flights were unable to land when they arrived at the saturated airport, which caused considerable criticism from some parties, notably MSF. Airlift coordination within the DoD was also challenging, and not

* See Appendix D for JTF and USAID task organizations and a timeline of events for the mission.
nearly as efficient as it could have been, but this fact was lost in the criticism of the military’s handling of the situation. Once in country, logistics remained a problem and much of the emergency response equipment and the deployed field hospitals clustered around the airport because of the difficulty of road transit. ̊

The logistical challenges presented by this operation are exactly the type of problems that the military excels at understanding and overcoming. The organizational and coordination issues encountered were more of a challenge. USAID was designated the lead federal agent, and in theory should have led and coordinated the response. However, the reality on the ground looked more like three parallel responses, led by the military, USAID, and the embassy team. The organizational chart for JTF-H neatly illustrates this point. USAID is placed in a box under the UN, along with NGOs and foreign militaries, and the Embassy is not connected to any other actors. ̊ Unfortunately, this does provide a relatively accurate picture of the initial response, although liaison officers exchanged with other agencies and organizations did eventually mitigate some of the confusion. ̊ JTF-H also established a 30 person Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Cell (HACC) to help interface and coordinate with the myriad other actors involved in the national and international response effort.

Lessons learned from this operation include a shortfall in shared decision making during whole of government operations, the friction introduced by agencies unfamiliar with the international environment, and the difficulty in attaining harmony of effort during a crisis response involving multiple civilian and military organizations. An incredible number of federal agencies played a role in the relief mission, but most of them struggled to coordinate their efforts with the overall response and leverage the military’s logistical capabilities. USAID and the Federal Aviation Administration both delivered equipment that was not certified for air transport to stateside airlift

* See Appendix D – OPERATION UNIFIED RESPONSE
bases, without a clear idea of how to get it delivered to Port-au-Prince. There was substantial confusion and disagreement over priority of military and governmental flights versus non-governmental aid delivery into Port Au-Prince, leading to substantial criticism of the military’s effort to manage inbound airlift. The military demonstrated its ability to react quickly and logistical prowess, as it had during OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT, but an inability to understand the humanitarian perspective prevented JTF-H from realizing the goal of harmony of effort with civilian responders.

Path Forward

*If you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles; if you do not know your enemies but do know yourself, you will win one and lose one; if you do not know your enemies nor yourself, you will be imperiled in every single battle.*

--Sun Tzu

Having considered the impact of organizational culture on civil-military communication and cooperation as well as the preceding case studies, how might a military leader proceed? One good starting point is a technique employed by both military red teams and cultural educators, start by understanding yourself. Ask, simply, “what is my baggage?” The military invests considerable time and effort in attempting to understand our enemies, but if we do not truly know our allies, friends, partners, and ourselves, we will only see half the picture. “[Military leaders] must be able to appreciate the influence of our own cultural narrative and how that narrative influences the way in which we engage with other cultures.”

In an era of complex operations, it is soft skills, not technical excellence, which distinguishes individuals. As important as language proficiency may be, the real key to success in complex operations is “not foreign language skills, it’s the language of the other partners involved.” The Chinese relational philosophy, “seeking common ground on major issues while
reserving differences on minor ones,“87 is one recipe for building synergistic relationships with those different from us. When coordinating with humanitarian organizations, just like when dealing with an international culture, it is possible for leaders to understand the other culture’s worldview, without necessarily adopting it. By understanding the worldview and motivations of potential partners, military leaders are able to focus on where and how we can cooperate and coordinate, rather than becoming frustrated by the times when and places where we cannot work together.

Neither general cultural competence, nor the application of CCC techniques, will lead to complete understanding of, or seamless coordination with, humanitarian organizations. Instead, a reasonable goal is the development of a “third culture”88 based on mutual respect.89 This culture of respect and understanding is absolutely essential to building a more effective working relationship.90 However, it is also essential to understanding when, where, why, and with whom a close working relationship is impossible or inadvisable. By understanding the similarities and differences in organizational missions and cultures, military and civilian professionals can move closer to the “harmony of effort” ideal.

Other authors have noted the value added to military organizations by reservists, who maintain civilian careers in addition to their military service, particularly in civil affairs.91 This point is further driven home by the performance of civil affairs reservists during OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT. Many military organizations have within their ranks individuals who volunteer with humanitarian organizations and bring back to their military organization an understanding of the culture and structure of these organizations. Many NGOs and other civilian organizations are similarly infused with a wealth of former military officers, who could provide a similar benefit to their organizations. These individuals should be utilized as cultural ambassadors who can explain these foreign cultures to their home organizations.92
Military personnel systems currently track joint experience and consider such experience essential for advancement to senior leadership positions. Joint experience does not guarantee that an officer will understand and respect the history, traditions, capabilities, and culture of services other than his own, but it does make such understanding more likely. One of the major challenges in developing and promoting culturally competent leaders is that unlike language skills or technical expertise, general cultural competence is extremely difficult to assess or quantify. However, like joint experience, experience outside one’s primary career field or military specialty code is measurable and trackable on the enterprise level. The Air Force Special Experience Identifiers (SEIs) are one example of a system designed to capture unique experiences. “SEIs are established to identify special experience and training not otherwise identified within the [Personnel Data System]… SEIs can be used to rapidly identify an already experienced resource to meet unique circumstances, contingency requirements, or management needs.”93 Currently, these secondary identifiers are not used in a systematic way to capture experience gained outside the military. Increased and systematic use of this and similar tracking mechanisms would allow military leaders and personnel managers to better understand the experience of their force.

Military officers should seek out those individuals in their organizations who have experience with partner groups and develop connections with former military or reservists within those organizations. NGOs and civilian agency leaders could likewise look for those in their organizations who have military experience, and those with civilian experience within the military organizations that they are working with. Military officers should also seriously consider volunteering with non-profit organizations, especially those that work internationally or specialize in disaster relief. Experience with “the other” is important not simply for understanding that culture, but also because of the personal credibility it can lend an individual in high-stress situations, when
there is limited time to build rapport.\textsuperscript{94}

The 2009 DoD Guide to NGOs identifies NGO logisticians as a more approachable group for military personnel to work with than other NGO staff, because “logisticians often speak the same language as military planners and managers because so much of what military managers do is logistical.”\textsuperscript{95} Ex-military personnel also make up a significant proportion of NGO logisticians, and they are frequently responsible for safety and security as well.\textsuperscript{96} Thus, working with logisticians inside NGOs may provide an adequate shortcut to effective communication once deployed, as well as a more approachable demographic when building rapport and understanding before deployment.

Military and civilian leaders should consider investing some of the time that they spend developing an understanding of international cultures to deepening their knowledge of and familiarity with partner organizations. The information in Appendices B and C should serve as a starting point for further study, but even this minimal knowledge could provide a decent foundation.

Finally, when faced with communication difficulties in high-stress situations, consider the words of a great wartime leader. “Courage is what it takes to stand up and speak; courage is also what it takes to sit down and listen.”\textsuperscript{97} But perhaps the best advice is some of the simplest; “Listen first, speak last.”\textsuperscript{98} Military leaders are action oriented, as we must be, given the nature of our profession, but sometimes the best action we can take is to stop, listen and try to see the world through someone else’s eyes.

\textsuperscript{1} George Bernard Shaw
\textsuperscript{2} LTC Brian Ellis (Battalion Commander, 1-121 Infantry), correspondence with the author, February 2012.
\textsuperscript{3} The bibliography of intercultural communication at http://my.ilstu.edu/~jrbaldw/LongBib.html provides a reasonable comprehensive sample of the field.
\textsuperscript{6} Author’s observation of military officers at US Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
Transitions Conference, November 2010, and Marine Corps University Command and Staff College Exercises, AY 2012-2013.


21 George Bernard Shaw, widely attributed beginning in the 1940s, e.g. Reader’s Digest (November 1942). Not found in his published works.


25 The alternative statement proposed was evaluated as not perfect, but also not immediately offensive and a reasonable starting point for a conversation, by the members of the academic, military, and humanitarian professionals in attendance.


27 de Torrente. (emphasis added)

28 Seiple, 184.


30 Major, 89.

31 Major, 89.

32 Major, 94.


36 Lawry, 201-202.


39 Lawry, 208.

40 Febbraro et. al., 3-6 – 3-7.


44 The American Red Cross in Greater New York, for example, has several volunteers who are either military reservists or retirees, and can thus understand both the military and NGO perspectives.

45 It has been the experience of this author, both during this research and previously, that members of the humanitarian community are quite willing to share their knowledge and perspectives with military leaders.

46 It is unfortunately common to see military members at such events networking and socializing primarily within their own group, rather than reaching out to humanitarians and other civilians. (This is probably human nature, and humanitarians and academics also often fail to engage with military personnel.)


48 Boyd.

49 General Anthony Zinni, USMC

50 Seiple, 21-22.

51 Seiple, 26.

52 Seiple 34-36.


55 Seiple, 30.

56 Seiple, 42-44.

57 Seiple, 44.

58 Seiple, 39.

59 Seiple, 39.

60 Seiple, 52.

61 Seiple, 39.

62 Seiple, 39-41.

63 The military initially planned to build the camps in a geometric grid, rather than aligning them with population centers.

64 Seiple, 45-49.

65 Seiple, 21.

66 Seiple, 23.

67 Seiple, 57.

68 Seiple, 55.

69 Seiple, 55.


71 Seiple, 55.
72 Seiple, 56.
73 Seiple, 56.
74 Seiple, 52. (emphasis in original)
77 DiOrio, 1-3.
80 Author’s experience while deployed to Homestead Air Reserve Base, Florida as the Operations Officer of an Air Force Contingency Response Element, providing command and control support for OPERATION UNIFIED RESPONSE.
81 DiOrio, 7-9.
82 Various teleconferences and update briefings participated in and witnessed by the author while deployed in support of UNIFIED RESPONSE.
83 Sun Tzu, The Art of War
84 Scoppio, 53.
86 Scoppio, 35.
89 Also sometimes referred to as a “third ear.”
91 Seiple, 55.
92 It is important to note that although these individuals may be the most approachable, and best able to communicate with a military professional, they might not be especially influential in their organization. This lack of organizational status does not in any way mitigate their value as a cultural ambassador.
94 Author’s experience during Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE
95 Lawry, 166
96 Lawry, 166.
97 Winston Churchill, Conference in Washington, D.C.
Appendix A – The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
(http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/general/at_a_glance-en.pdf)

The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement currently has three emblems in use: the red cross, the red crescent and the red crystal.

National Societies must use one of these emblems in order to be recognized as a member of the Movement.

For decades, the red cross and red crescent have been used as universally recognized symbols of assistance for the victims of armed conflicts and natural disasters.

At a diplomatic conference in Geneva in December 2005, states adopted a third Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions.

This allowed for the creation of the red crystal, an additional protective emblem that is designed to make it easier for National Societies, who do not wish to use the red cross or red crescent emblems, to be recognized as members of the Movement.

All three emblems have the same international status and offer the same level of protection under international humanitarian law.

Fundamental Principals of the Global Red Cross Movement
(http://www.redcross.org/about-us/mission)

Humanity

The Red Cross, born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavors—in its international and national capacity—to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting peace amongst all peoples.

Impartiality

It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavors to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give
priority to the most urgent cases of distress.

**Neutrality**

In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Red Cross may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.

**Independence**

The Red Cross is independent. The national societies, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of their respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able at all times to act in accordance with Red Cross principles.

**Voluntary Service**

The Red Cross is a voluntary relief movement not prompted in any manner by desire for gain.

**Unity**

There can be only one Red Cross society in any one country. It must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its territory.

**Universality**

The Red Cross is a worldwide institution in which all societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other.
Appendix B – Communications and the OODA Loop

The OODA Loop (note the importance of feedback loops, culture, experience, circumstances, and the environment on the model)

(https://fasttransients.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/boydsrealooda_loop.pdf)

A Simple Model of the Communication Process


A Systemic Model of the Communication Process

(http://www.whitestag.org/graphics/ggi_loop.png)
Appendix C – The Humanitarian Cluster System
(http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/cluster-coordination)
Appendix D – OPERATION UNIFIED RESPONSE

Comparison of Command and Control as depicted by JTF-H and USAID

![JTF-Haiti Command & Control](www.jfsc.ndu.edu/.../4A_Haiti_HADR_Case_Study_revNov10.pdf)

![Office of the Response Coordinator/Haiti (ORC)](www.jfsc.ndu.edu/.../4A_Haiti_HADR_Case_Study_revNov10.pdf)

Figure 1: ORC organizational and reporting diagram (Source: USAID Haiti Task Team)


Figure 2: Timeline of Events


(http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdaocr222.pdf)
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