**14. ABSTRACT**

The use of guerilla warfare in an insurgency is a typical technique, but not all who use guerilla tactics share the same goals or strategies. For instance, guerilla activity during an insurgency with the goal of removing a government is different than a group using the same tactics to further criminal activity or settle old scores. There is a need to diagnose the guerilla activity in order to understand what is at the root of the visible violence. Misinterpreting a group's motivations and intentions can lead to flawed operations and policies in countering the guerilla activity. Guerilla warfare has its place in American history most notably during the American Revolution and Civil War. This thesis compares the actions of William Quantrill on the western border of Missouri during the American Civil War with that of Francis Marion's during the American Revolution, using modern definitions of insurgency and the writings of 19th Century military theorists. Quantrill's guerilla activities during the Civil War were not the actions of an insurgency. Rather, the group's actions were primarily opportunistic violence, a continuation of previous conflicts using the war as cover for criminal activity.

**15. SUBJECT TERMS**

Guerilla Warfare, William Clarke Quantrill, Quantrill's Raiders

---

**16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. REPORT</th>
<th>b. ABSTRACT</th>
<th>c. THIS PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unclass</td>
<td>Unclass</td>
<td>Unclass</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**

Unclass

---

**18. NUMBER OF PAGES**

69

---

**19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON**

Marine Corps University / Command and Staff College

---

**19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)**

(703) 784-3330 (Admin Office)
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:
DIAGNOSING GUERRILLA WARFARE:
WAS WILLIAM CLARKE QUANTRILL MISSOURI'S FRANCIS MARION?

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF
MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR:
SPECIAL AGENT DARRIN L. FRANKLIN, DOS

AY 09-10

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Donald Bittner, Ph.D., Prof. of History
Approved: [Signature]
Date: 25 August 2010

Oral Defense Committee Member: Richard Dinardo, Ph.D., Prof. of National Security Affairs
Approved: [Signature]
Date: 28 April 2010
DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FORGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.
Executive Summary

Title: Diagnosing Guerilla Warfare: Was William Clarke Quantrill Missouri’s Francis Marion?

Author: Special Agent Darrin Franklin, US Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service

Thesis: Quantrill’s Raiders guerilla activities on Missouri’s western border during the Civil War were not the actions of an insurgency trying to remove a controlling government. Rather, the group’s actions were primarily opportunistic violence, a continuation of a previous conflict using the war as cover for retribution and financial gain.

Discussion: The use of guerilla warfare in an insurgency is a typical technique, but not all who use guerilla tactics share the same goals or strategies. There is a need to diagnose the guerilla activity in order to understand what is at the root of the violence. In today’s environment with guerilla tactics being used in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is obvious that this is a very complicated and contemporary issue. With militant groups using guerilla tactics, each having different reasons and motivations, it can be counterproductive to counter all with the same methods. For instance, guerilla activity in a popular supported insurgency with the goal of removing a controlling government is different than a group using the same tactics to further criminal activity or settle old scores.

Guerilla warfare, what most Americans see as a foreign phenomenon, has its place in American history. Most notably during the American Revolution, in the Carolinas where guerilla tactics in an insurgency assisted the colonies gain independence. Francis Marion, the “Swamp Fox,” used guerilla tactics to assist conventional forces by harassing British outposts and forces in the field. This combined effort was pivotal to American success.

Another instance occurred in Missouri during the American Civil War. At the beginning of the war Missouri was secured for the Union. The pro-southern state government was removed from the capital and, along with conventional military forces, was forced to seek refuge in the southwestern part of the state. This daring move ensured that a vital border state, with significant strategic value, would not come under Confederate control. With this came many problems for the Federal Government in the form of locally generated guerilla warfare. The western counties of Missouri had seen years of violence in a border war with Kansas from approximately 1854 to 1860. With the outbreak of the Civil War in Missouri, like other border states, a window of opportunity arose for the worst elements of society to take advantage of the instability. One of the most famous guerilla groups to arise was “Quantrill’s Raiders.” William Quantrill led a band of guerillas on the western border of Missouri for most of the Civil War and was responsible for the vicious attack on non-combatants in Lawrence, Kansas.

Conclusion: The guerilla actions of Quantrill’s Raiders were purely opportunistic and a continuation of previous conflicts. Based on revenge and the opportunity for financial gain, they used the war as cover. The guerillas operating in this area were consequently renewing or continuing a border war with Kansas and plundering and murdering innocent people along the way. Hence, they were not the actions of an insurgency in support of a larger good, i.e., southern independence.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE GREATS</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEFINING INSURGENCY AND GUERILLA WARFARE</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILITARY THEORISTS ON GUERILLA WAR</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clausewitz, Jomini, and Mao</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCIS MARION AND GUERILLA WARFARE</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVIL WAR IN MISSOURI AND OUTBREAK OF GUERILLA WARFARE</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri Held for the Union</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outbreak of Guerilla Warfare in Missouri during the Civil War</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILLIAM CLARKE QUANTRILL AND GUERILLA WARFARE IN MISSOURI</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furthering the Goal of Southern Independence?</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantrill's Relationship with the South</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantrill's Raiders</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantrill's Activities and Approach</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Lawrence Raid</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confederate Façade and Quantrill's Commission</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting the Confederacy?</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Last Days</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A: Glossary</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX B: The Operational Environment: Physical and Violent</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX C: Map of Missouri and the Surrounding States</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX D: Map of the Western Border Counties</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX E: Major Players</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX F: Chronology of Events</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX G: The Partisan Ranger Act and Order Number 17</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Preface

I have always been interested in military history, particularly the Civil War and the American Revolution. As with the majority of people who have read about the American Civil War, I had only studied the most well known campaigns and generals in the eastern theater. My year at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College (CSC) has afforded me the opportunity of expanding my knowledge of the Civil War in the east while also studying the war in the west. The CSC curriculum also has had numerous blocks of instruction dealing with insurgencies and counterinsurgency operations. The Civil War in Missouri became the perfect subject to combine my interests and that of the CSC academic program.

The U.S. military and international affairs community’s current emphasis on counterinsurgency operations and irregular warfare has created much discussion on the topic. This research follows these lines of discussion in an attempt to flesh out, from history, information that can be beneficial in today’s battlespace. Although primarily thought of as a foreign phenomenon, guerilla warfare is part of American history. During the American Revolution and the Civil War, Americans used guerilla tactics. The particular type of guerilla warfare to be assessed in this paper occurred during the American Civil War along the western border of Missouri. What has been revealed in my research, CSC lectures, and seminars, is that to defeat guerillas one has to understand the operational environment and the participant’s goals, and not just their tactics. Without this knowledge, misinterpreting a group’s motivations and intentions can lead to flawed polices by a force in countering guerilla activities.

This paper looks at the most famous guerilla group in the region, Quantrill’s Raiders, in order to diagnose their activity and motivations. Particular attention is paid to their leader, William Clarke Quantrill. I developed a bibliography of applicable literature, most of which is
secondary sources plus a few primary sources such as the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion.

Quantrill left very few writings during his time as a guerilla and since he did not make it through the war he had no published memoirs. In the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion there is one record penned by him, which is a letter to General Sterling Price in October 1863 (see Appendix H). There are a few guerillas that rode with Quantrill who wrote memoirs after the war. In O.S. Barton's, *Three Years with Quantrill: A True Story Told by his Scout John McCorkle* (1992), the opening commentary from Herman Hattaway suggests that "none of them are free of self-justification." I would add that attempts at capturing the history of guerilla warfare as it relates to its effect on the war tends to lump all such activities together as if all the guerillas in Missouri were fighting as one unit. Notably, this was not the case. Quotes from Quantrill observed during my research where very cavalier in nature and mostly unattributed, thus not included in this project: The two best secondary sources used in this paper are Richard Brownlee, *Gray Ghosts of the Confederacy* (1958), and William Connelley, *Quantrill and the Border Wars* (1910). Others also used were the works of Albert Castel, Edward Leslie, Michael Fellman, and Donald Gilmore.

To frame the issue, background study included the writings of three military theorists (e.g., Clausewitz, Jornini, and Mao) and an actual tactical example from the American Revolution (i.e., Francis Marion). Current doctrine, *FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency* (2006), and two contemporary well known modern writers in counterinsurgency operations (i.e., Bard O’Neill and David Galula) were used to form a working definition of insurgency. This frame work provided a prism of analysis to use to discover if Quantrill’s Raiders were part of an insurgency supporting
the goal of southern independence or simply participating in criminal activity. Stated another way, was William Clarke Quantrill Missouri’s Francis Marion?

The scope of the paper is focused on Quantrill’s activity on the western border of Missouri; it thus excludes other guerilla activity in Missouri during the Civil War. The situation in Missouri during that conflict was amazingly complex with different degrees of warfare throughout the war. The use of conventional forces in Missouri will only be discussed as part of the setting and to provide some background information. The Union Army’s tactics to contend with the insurgent activity will only be addressed in regards to the actions of Quantrill and his men.

I would like to thank all the people who assisted me with this research. Without the support and understanding of my wife, Ashley, and our daughters, Reese and Anna, it would not have been possible to take on such a project. I would like to thank Dr. Brad Wineman, Col. Tom Mintzer (USA) and the staff of the Library of the Marine Corps for all the assistance and guidance they provided. A special thanks goes to my MMS mentor, Dr. Donald Bittner, and Dr. Richard Dinardo, who provided valuable insight to the topic and kept me focused.
"Thunder clouds of this type should build up all around the invader the farther he advances. The people who have not yet been conquered by the enemy will be the most eager to arm against him; they will set the example that will gradually be followed by their neighbors. The flames will spread like a brush fire, until they reach the area on which the enemy is based, threatening his lines of communication and his very existence."

-Carl von Clausewitz

"As a soldier, preferring loyal and chivalrous warfare to organized assassination if it be necessary to make a choice, I acknowledge that my prejudices are in favor of the good old times when the French and English Guards courteously invited each other to fire first, as at Fontenoy, preferring them to the frightful epoch when priests, women, and children throughout Spain plotted the murder of isolated soldiers."

-Antoine-Henri Jomini

"Unorganized guerrilla warfare cannot contribute to victory and those who attack the movement as a combination of banditry and anarchism do not understand the nature of guerrilla action. They say: 'This movement is a haven for disappointed militarists, vagabonds and bandits' ... hoping thus to bring the movement into disrepute. We do not deny that there are corrupt guerrillas, nor that there are people who under the guise of guerrilla indulge in unlawful activities...We should study the corrupt phenomena and attempt to eradicate them in order to encourage guerrilla warfare, and to increase its military efficiency."

-Mao Tse-tung
INTRODUCTION

The U.S. military and international affairs community's current emphasis on counterinsurgency operations and guerilla warfare has generated much discussion on this topic. The use of guerilla warfare in an insurgency is a typical technique, but not all who use guerilla tactics share the same goals or strategies. There is a need to diagnose the guerilla activity in order to understand what is at the root of the visible violence. In today's environment with guerilla tactics being used in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is obvious that this is also a complicated and contemporary issue. Using the same methods to oppose the actions of all the different militant groups in theater can be counterproductive. For instance, guerilla activity in a popular supported insurgency with the goal of removing a controlling government or seizing power is different than a group using the same tactics to further criminal activity or settle old scores.

Trends and concepts have been recognized and developed based on both counterinsurgency operations conducted by the U.S. government overseas and historical examples of other states far away from our shores (i.e., Algiers, Indochina, Philippines). However, guerilla warfare, which most Americans view as a foreign phenomenon, is in reality part of the American military tradition. For example, during the American Revolution, the "Swamp Fox," Francis Marion a South Carolina militia leader, used guerilla tactics to assist Continental conventional forces by harassing British forces in the Carolinas.

Another instance occurred in Missouri during the American Civil War. At the beginning of the war the Federal Government secured the state of Missouri for the Union. The pro-southern
state government was removed from the capital at Jefferson City and, along with assorted pro-
southern conventional military forces, was forced to seek refuge in the southwestern part of the
state. This daring move ensured that a vital border state, with significant strategic value, would
not come under Confederate control (see Appendix B). With this came many problems for the
Federal Government in the form of locally generated guerilla warfare.

Missouri’s western counties had experienced years of violence before the rebellion in a
border war with Kansas, commonly referred to as “Bleeding Kansas.” This indoctrination to
violence along with a large population of military-aged men not joining the Confederate Army
provided the seeds for future guerilla activity. One of the most famous groups to arise was
“Quantrill’s Raiders.” William Quantrill led a band of guerillas on the western border of
Missouri for most of the Civil War, with their most notorious feat being the attack on the city of
Lawrence, Kansas on August 21, 1863. However, Quantrill’s guerilla activities on Missouri’s
western border during the Civil War were not the actions of an insurgency trying to remove a
government or establish a new state. Rather, the group’s actions were primarily opportunistic
violence, a continuation of previous conflicts using the war as cover for retribution and financial
gain.

DEFINING INSURGENCY AND GUERILLA WARFARE

There are numerous issues to understand when conducting operations against guerillas.
One is determining the group’s ultimate goal. Guerilla activity cannot be diagnosed by tactics
alone. That said, it is obvious that terminology is important in order to differentiate between
guerilla warfare, which is a tactic, and a true insurgency with its specific political goals. This is
as complicated now as it was for the Federal Government during the American Civil War.
During the conflict, Francis Lieber addressed the subject of “guerillas” in order to provide a
legal framework in dealing with such activity. Lieber described the term “guerilla” as being irregular to all that is considered a legal and normal means of conducting war. It is used primarily because those resorting to it lack the “ability” to fight a regular war. Lieber identified and used various terms (e.g., freebooter, brigand, and marauder) that have been associated with guerillas, all of which have a level of criminality associated with them except for one: “partisan.”

A partisan fights in conjunction or “part and parcel” with a standing regular army using guerilla tactics.

The terms insurgency (insurgents) and guerilla war (guerillas) are not necessarily synonymous. Two of the most respected contemporary insurgency specialists are Bard O’Neill and David Galula. O’Neill, a scholar, began his work on insurrections in the 1970’s and describes an insurgency as, “a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of Politics.”

O’Neill provides an example describing the actions of the southern states during the American Civil War as the “Secessionist” type, who “seek to withdraw from the political community of which they are formally a part.”

David Galula, former French officer turned scholar, states that an, “insurgency is a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order.”

The Counterinsurgency (COIN) Manual, FM 3-24, describes an insurgency “as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.... Stated another way, an insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established
government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.”

Ultimately “Political power is the central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies; each side aims to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate.” O’Neill, Galula and the current counterinsurgency manual describe an insurgency as political and has a larger purpose other than just violence or banditry. These contemporary theorists reflect the characteristics of 20th and 21st Century irregular conflict.

MILITARY THEORISTS ON GUERILLA WARFARE

Clausewitz, Jomini, and Mao

Carl von Clausewitz’s, an experienced staff officer with the Prussian and Russian Armies in the early 1800’s penned one of the most highly regarded works on military theory and conflict. In On War, he addressed guerilla warfare, in Book Six, Chapter 26, “The People in Arms.” Although he admits that it is “simply another means of war,” the theorist adds that it should be used as a last resort. Clausewitz stresses that this type of war, “insurrections,” should be used in conjunction with conventional forces and as part of an overall campaign under a commander. Furthermore, he proposes that guerillas should be augmented with embedded regular soldiers to boost morale and provide the necessary guidance. Clausewitz makes the point that without the influence of the regulars the “people” would not evolve to be a serious threat. There is also a notion of progression, a process in which the guerillas move from just nibbling “at the shell and around the edges.” As Clausewitz eloquently wrote, “the fog must thicken and form a dark and menacing cloud out of which a bolt of lightning may strike at any time.” In the process the insurgents, working with regulars and under the overall commander, grow and slowly take on larger operations at the enemy’s rear and flanks.
Antoine-Henri Jomini, writing in the 1800's with the experience of being a staff officer in the French Army under Napoleon Bonaparte, and, as with Clausewitz, in the Russian Army also wrote one of the most referenced works on military theory. Today, his theory's and definitions resonate through modern doctrine. Like Clausewitz, he, approached guerilla warfare in terms of an insurrection or national uprising. Jomini speaks to the people's war when discussing wars of opinion, wars of conquest, national wars, and civil and religious wars. Jomini describes such warfare, over religious or political beliefs, as bringing out the “worst passions and become vindictive, cruel, and terrible.” In regards to national uprisings he states that, “the consequences are so terrible that for the sake of humanity, we ought to hope never to see it.” Jomini’s thought on the subject of guerilla warfare appear to mainly advise to avoid a “people’s war” and sees it as something that should not occur. He mentions that for guerillas to be successful, it requires regular troops as either in support of or as a means to “rally the people.”

Mao Tse-tung, writing from the personal experience of organizing a revolution in 1930's China, wrote what is described as the “theory and doctrine of revolutionary guerilla war.” This model has been followed by many communist insurgencies in Asia, and Central and South America. Mao describes guerilla warfare in conjunction with ideological revolution and advises that guerilla activities alone are not the tactics that win the war. His three phases lay out a prescriptive progression for the removal of an existing government and the seizure of political power to produce significant change. The first phase discusses that point in which the movement is unable to compete with the governments forces and must use this time building the organization and gaining support. The second phase, at which time the opposing force is comparable to the insurgents, is the onset of active resistance and guerilla tactics are used against the government. When the insurgents are stronger or equal to that of the government’s forces,
the guerillas move to conventional warfare and their priority is the nation’s military forces, which is the third phase.28 The key to Mao’s theory is that guerilla warfare is only a means, a part of the process, leading to the final political goal: seizure of power. Likewise if there are setbacks at any stage there sequences can be reversed to a previous phase.29

**FRANCIS MARION AND GUERILLA WARFARE**

One of the most famous guerilla fighters in American history is Francis Marion.30 Marion saw his first military experience with the local militia in South Carolina fighting Indians in 1761.31 When hostilities began with Great Britain, South Carolina raised two regiments of militia and Marion was elected captain and later promoted to major. Marion’s forces were part of the colonists’ defense when the British unsuccessfully attempted to capture Charleston Harbor on June 28, 1776.32 Marion was later made a lieutenant colonel after the “South Carolina regiments entered the Continental establishment.”33

Having failed to suppress the rebellion in the north, the British military leaders changed strategy, attacked in the south, and once again moved on Charleston. Hence, Sir Henry Clinton laid siege to the city in 1780 and eventually it and its defenders surrendered.34 Because of an injury Marion was evacuated before the surrender and luckily escaped this disaster.35 Shortly thereafter Marion gathered what forces he could and “rode north to join an American army rumored to be enroute to the Carolinas” led by General Horatio Gates.36

Gates gave Marion command of patriot militia in the Pee Dee region and tasked him with destroying boats located on the lower Santee River meant for British egress.37 However, the British would not need to egress; Gates was decisively defeated at the battle of Camden and eventually relieved by General Nathanael Greene.38 Marion however, remained in the field with his patriot militia and, along with similar other forces, kept the British occupied while the
Continental Army regrouped. Marion harassed British Army forces and loyalist militias with ambushes and raids after which his men quickly melted back into the countryside. Marion’s reputation grew with each success in frustrating the British. One of the British soldiers meant to stifle Marion’s activities was the infamous Banastre Tarleton. Tarleton, known for the slaughter of surrendering continental soldiers, gave Marion the nickname “Swamp Fox” due to his elusiveness.

After General Greene arrived in the Carolinas he began coordinating actions with the militia forces in South Carolina with Marion being one of the most prominent. With Greene now in command of the Continental Southern Army, Marion assisted in achieving that Army’s objectives in the theater. Greene combined the forces of Marion with that of a Continental Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Henry Lee’s. Lee and Marion continued to use guerilla tactics of raids and ambushes, as British strength in the Carolinas slowly waned.

Marion was a continental soldier who turned to guerilla warfare based on the situation in his area of operations. Marion’s activities were in accord with what Clausewitz described as the key to successful guerilla warfare. He fought to further the goal of American independence and was under the guidance of Generals Gates and Greene during their respective campaigns. Marion’s irregular forces operated in conjunction with and under the guidance of General Greene and were most effective. With the proper guidance and goals there was order in Marion’s operations. But what of William Clarke Quantrill’s activities in Missouri eighty years later; were they comparable? Was Quantrill a Missouri version of the “Swamp Fox” fighting to further the goal of southern independence in the American Civil War, or was he something else?
CIVIL WAR IN MISSOURI AND THE OUTBREAK OF GUERILLA WARFARE

Missouri held for the Union

After the attack on Fort Sumter, President Lincoln requested the states, including Missouri, to furnish troops in order to suppress rebellion. After the pro-southern governor refused, federal forces took action to secure Missouri for the Union. The St. Louis Arsenal was secured, Camp Jackson seized, and the pro-southern members of the state government chased out of the state capital to the southwestern part of the state. Once consolidated, the pro-southern military force, the Missouri State Guard was reinforced with that of forces from the Department of the Trans-Mississippi. These forces defeated the Union Army at the battle of Wilson’s Creek and the Missouri State Guard followed up this success with a victory at the battle of Lexington. The Union Army then regrouped and drove the Missouri State Guard out of the state and into Arkansas (See Appendix B for details on Missouri and the operational environment from statehood through the first year of the Civil War). With the Confederate forces of the Trans-Mississippi Department now primarily regulated to actions south of Missouri, a window opened for other types of violent activity.

Outbreak of Guerilla Warfare in Missouri during the Civil War

Irregular warfare in the western theater of the Civil War came in a few varieties. As historian Richard Brownlee notes in Gray Ghosts of the Confederacy, there were organized units sent out with missions from military commanders, “while others came into existence spontaneously in response to local conditions.” Initially in Missouri Sterling Price, commander of the Missouri State Guard, was primarily responsible for the first type. After being forced out of the state, Price “sent recruiting officers into central and northern Missouri” to build support.
While behind Union lines, these men were to continue “the burning of the railroad bridges and destruction of the telegraph lines.”

General Henry Halleck, who replaced General John Fremont as the Union commander of the Department of the West in November 1861, became frustrated with the guerilla activity and stated “there is no alternative but to enforce martial law.” which had been proclaimed by his predecessor in August 1861. Combined, this would be the beginning of the use of guerilla tactics in Missouri and the anti-guerilla operations against them. Halleck enacted General Order Number 32, first policy regarding the use of counter-guerilla tactics, and stated that guerrilla’s “are guilty of the highest crime known to the code of war and the punishment is death.” General Halleck’s order specified actions to take against those who conducted sabotage on the railroads and telegraphs. Those who are “caught in the act will be immediately shot.... Those accused of these types of actions will be arrested and placed in close confinement until his case is examined by a military commission.” Other sections note that those who live in the area where there has been destruction, either the citizens and/or their slaves will be forced to make the repairs and possibly pay a fine. Anyone having information on guerilla activity and not reporting it to Union authorities would also be considered a criminal.

The Confederate government developed its own policy regarding guerilla warfare. In April of 1862 the Confederate Congress passed the Partisan Ranger Act (see Appendix G). President Jefferson Davis gave Department Commanders the authority to recruit troops for use in irregular warfare. The Act did stipulate some controls, including a statement that these units “are subject to the same regulations as other soldiers.” It is important to note that there were numerous guerilla fighters operating during the Civil War who resorted to irregular warfare tactics. Like
Missouri, the other border states were experiencing the use of guerilla tactics. Virginia had possibly the most famous and effective: John Mosby, who was considered to be a Partisan Ranger using guerilla or irregular tactics. Notably, he also followed the rules of war.\(^5\)

In the west, Confederate General Thomas Hindman from the Department of the Trans-Mississippi believed this Act meant he could use guerilla bands for actions in Missouri. Hence he followed the Partisan Ranger Act with General Order No. 17 in July 1862 (see Appendix G).\(^6\) As Brownlee opined Hindman “felt it should be liberalized a bit, and adapted a little more closely to local conditions.”\(^5\) Davis did not envision the war in Missouri being conducted by “partisans” as was the case during the summer of 1861. On December 3, 1861 President Davis had related to Missouri’s representation to the Confederate States Congress, “The Federal forces are not hereafter, as heretofore, to be commanded by path-finders and holiday soldiers, but by men of military education and experience in war. The contest is therefore to be on a scale of very different proportions than that of the partisan warfare witnessed during the past summer and fall.”\(^5\)

Despite the intent of Davis, Hindman’s use of guerillas would take its toll on the people of Missouri by arousing the abilities of violent gangs roaming the western border.\(^5\) His activities brought to the forefront the other variety of guerilla fighters in which Brownlee eludes, including Quantrill’s Raiders.

**WILLIAM CLARKE QUANTRILL AND GUERILLA WARFARE IN MISSOURI**

**Furthering the Goal of Southern Independence?**

In order to diagnose the guerilla warfare in Missouri, specifically the activities of Quantrill’s Raiders, one must understand the motivations and the goals of the group and not just
their tactics (i.e., guerrilla). Can it be classified as an insurgency as defined previously where there was a larger political goal (i.e., southern independence)? Or, more basic, were the guerrillas acting under a commander in campaigns to achieve its goal as per the concept articulated by Clausewitz? The goal of the Confederacy was that of southern independence, to separate from the Union, in what FM 3-24 describes as a “national insurgency.” Were Quantrill and his band of guerrillas the equivalent of Francis Marion fighting for American independence from the British? Or were they what Jomini implies, part of a degeneration from order to chaos and violence? In order to contemplate the motives and goals of Quantrill and to determine his devotion to the cause of southern independence, Quantrill himself needs to be addressed.

Quantrill’s Relationship with the South

Quantrill was not a southerner and his activities were not based on a shared passionate ideology over the issue of slavery or quest for southern independence. Quantrill, unlike some of the members of his guerrilla band, “was not a southerner and never lived in the south.” Born in Ohio, he moved to Kansas in 1857 in the middle of the “Bleeding Kansas” period. Quantrill farmed in Kansas, then followed a group to Utah but returned to Kansas in 1859. Quantrill was educated and began teaching school, as he had done while living in Ohio. The school closed after one year and in 1860 Quantrill found himself associating with abolitionists in Kansas.

At this time, Quantrill also went by the alias Charlie Hart. As Brownlee describes “he seems to have roamed the border with free-soil toughs who made a living by gambling and theft.” These characters were known for raiding Missouri towns “to get slaves or live stock, kidnap a free negro in Kansas, or plunder people of property anywhere.” This group was in it for money and committed crimes in both Missouri and Kansas. He received money for returning slaves to Missouri and freeing slaves to the safety of Kansas.
The culminating event, and Quantrill’s new status in Missouri, occurred in December 1860. Quantrill “joined five young Quaker abolitionists from Lawrence on a slave-stealing ‘freedom raid’ into Jackson County, Missouri.” The goal was to remove the slaves at Morgan Walker’s farm. Quantrill, however, turning on his abolitionist friends, “traitorously rode to the Walker farm” and made contact with the residents. He advised the farm’s inhabitants of the operation and mentioned their foe were men led by James Montgomery, well known Kansas Jayhawkers. He devised a plan with the Walker’s to ambush the group upon their arrival. Thus, on December 10th Quantrill led the group to the Walker farm where the abolitionists were attacked. A few members were killed on the spot and the Walkers, with Quantrill joining them, hunted down a few of the others. Quantrill’s actions at the Walker farm gained him a level of notoriety in Jackson County, Missouri. Exploiting his success, Quantrill then invented a story to bolster his new found status. He told the people in the area that he was from Maryland, a slave state unlike Ohio, and had been traveling to Pike’s Peak with his brother when he was a victim of an attack by Montgomery. Furthering the lie, he advised that he was later able to infiltrate Montgomery’s group intent on revenge, which enabled him to conduct the act of betrayal at the Walker farm.

Quantrill had seen active military service at the beginning of the war first riding with a company of Cherokee Indians under command of a friend, Captain Joel Mayes. Captain Mayes would later dissolve his unit into General Ben McCulloch’s command in Arkansas. When General Price is pushed into southern Missouri his forces were joined with those of McCulloch and the Confederates defeated Brigadier General Nathaniel Lyon at Wilson’s Creek. Price would then split with McCulloch and briefly advance in Missouri at which time Quantrill joined
Price as a private. But like many other members of Prices force’s (Missouri State Guard) Quantrill left the army when Price’s army left Missouri.\textsuperscript{76}

There is little evidence that Quantrill was sympathetic or had any enduring ties to the south. This is in contrast with Francis Marion, a native South Carolinian.\textsuperscript{77} He fought as part of the local militia in campaigns against the Indians.\textsuperscript{78} Being a wealthy landowner and militia leader Marion was elected to the South Carolina Congress.\textsuperscript{79} This is in contrast with Quantrill’s background, motives, and actions.

**Quantrill’s Raiders**

What about the men who followed Quantrill? Looking for the motivations and goals of Quantrill’s men and how the band began sheds light on whether or not their goal was to further the cause of southern independence. Quantrill’s men mainly came from Missouri and, as with Quantrill, many were former members of Price’s forces, the Missouri State Guard, during the first few months of the war but had deserted when Price left the state for Arkansas.\textsuperscript{80} Few desired to fight in Confederate conventional forces when given the opportunity, especially if that meant leaving the state for campaigns to the east or south. Price’s conventional forces leaving the state and the violence of the “Bleeding Kansas” period fresh on Kansans and Missourians minds thus provided a window of opportunity to enact revenge, and exacerbate the instability in the region for personal gain.

The western border of Missouri was soon occupied by volunteer troops from Kansas, officially sanctioned Jayhawkers. The first to take advantage of the situation was Charles Jennison, who in the summer of 1861 raided the towns of Morristown and Harrisonville, Missouri, intent on plunder.\textsuperscript{81} Later in the summer and fall, Senator James Lane of Kansas, commanding the “Kansas Brigade,” continued the assault on the populace which he viewed was
a mission of "suppressing secessionist sentiment in western Missouri." Both Jennison and Lane were active participants of violent activity during the border war and were despised by those on the western border of Missouri. On September 23rd Lane’s forces attacked the town of Osceola, Missouri. His men “robbed the bank, pillaged stores and private houses, and looted the courthouse.” On September 29th Lane joined up with General John Fremont, then commanding in Missouri, to pursue Price in his retreat. Historian Albert Castel quoted a member of Lane’s Brigade regarding the march following Price: “Our march through Missouri was noted for nothing very remarkable except that our trail was marked by the feathers of secesh poultry and the debris of disloyal beegums.” Missourians on the border with Kansas were feeling the pain of retribution by old foes from the border war and also the mistreatment of Union soldiers.

In retaliation for Lane and Jennison’s actions local Jackson County citizens set up small vigilante “minuteman” organizations to counter the Jayhawker raids. Quantrill and his new associate, Andy Walker, roamed the county fending off Jayhawkers while setting up the base for Quantrill’s Raiders. Those that joined this band did so for many personal reasons. Some had scores that needed settling with the Kansas Jayhawkers and Union forces occupying the state. This was the case with Coleman Younger, the famous post Civil War outlaw, whose family fortune was stolen by Jayhawkers and his father killed by Union soldiers. Cole’s younger brother, Jim, would soon join as well. Riley Crawford was another whose father was murdered by Jayhawkers, and joined Quantrill at the behest of his mother. The family of another famous post Civil War outlaw, Frank James, due to his previous relationship with the Missouri State Guard, was continuous victims of “the most brutal treatment from the Union troops.” Frank James joined and was followed by his brother Jesse in 1864. The nature of guerilla warfare attracted another type of people who were “the worst elements of the border society as it gave
opportunity for robbery and unwarranted cruelty." Brownlee gives the examples of Bill Anderson and Archie Clement, who were known for murder and the scalping of their victims. Their fight started out locally and initially was based on the need for either “protection or revenge.” But what started out as need for retribution devolved into something even worse and definitely not for the goal of Confederate independence.

The Civil War provided great instability in Missouri and Quantrill took advantage of the situation. As one Union commander wrote “I have seen this infamous scoundrel rob mails, steal the coaches and horses, and commit other similar outrages upon society.” Further noting the “families of Union men are coming into the city to-night asking of me escorts to bring in their goods and chattels, which I duly furnished.” With his attacks against Kansas Jayhawkers and pro-Union Missourians, Union forces responsible for security in the region began hunting Quantrill and his men. This added official Union forces to the enemy list of Quantrill.

But were their actions against Kansans and pro-Union citizens of Missouri being conducted to further the goal of southern independence? General Price had requested troops from Missouri to fight for the Confederacy, almost begging in November 1861 stating “I must have 50,000 men. Now is the crisis of your fate; now the golden opportunity to save the state; now is the day of your political salvation.” The opportunity to fight for the southern cause was there, but few Missourians answered his call. This is also the timeframe Private Quantrill deserted with approximately five months total of active service.

**Quantrill’s Activities and Approach**

Quantrill’s band grew in numbers and became bolder in action as the war progressed. Quantrill’s Raiders usually numbered from 40 to 200, with the exception of the Lawrence Raid in August 1863, for that raid Quantrill had a group numbering 450 – 500 men. One of
Quantrill’s Raiders first acts was an assault on the town of Aubry, Kansas, in March 1862. Jennison had two months earlier attacked the towns of Dayton and Columbus, Missouri. This retaliatory foray into Kansas was the norm for Quantrill’s men as they “looted the place of all they could carry, and burned one house.”93 An official Union report added that several citizens were murdered in the raid.94 The commander of the Missouri State Militia (MSM), recognizing the escalation of violence involving both Jenison and Quantrill, went to work on bringing order. Charles Jennison was arrested and a notice sent out requesting that the people of Jackson Country “leave law enforcement to the Missouri State Militia.”95 Whether or not the Kansas Jayhawkers actions were being curtailed, Quantrill had no intention of stopping the violence and looting, using the thin veil of “southern protectorate” as a cover. This attempt to ease the anger of those on the western border, and the men who followed Quantrill, failed to quiet them. Disregarding any attempt at some sort of reconciliation, Quantrill’s reply was in the form of a threat to Union sympathizers in Jackson County.96

As Quantrill’s group grew in 1862, so did their reputation with their exploits reaching officers of the Trans-Mississippi Department in Arkansas. Throughout the rest of the summer of 1862 Missouri would receive members of Trans-Mississippi (i.e., Joe Shelby, Upton Hayes, Joseph Porter) attempting to recruit soldiers and wreak havoc while in the state.97 By direction of General Hindmand, Colonel Upton Hayes was to “liaison with Quantrill” in Jackson County.98 In the process Quantrill gained a questionable field commission under the pretense of the Partisan Ranger Act (see details on page 18). After the Confederate regulars sent by Hindman returned to Arkansas, more independent action would continue until winter. This included raids into Olathe and Shawneetown, Kansas. At both places they killed civilians, looted the stores, and burned houses.99
The Lawrence Raid

During the spring of 1863, Quantrill’s Raiders began conducting raids just as in the previous year. Knowing that Quantrill’s band had the support of locals throughout Jackson Country, Union authorities implemented new polices. General Thomas Ewing Jr., commanding officer of the District of the Border, began arresting civilians believed assisting the guerillas. On August 14th in Kansas City a makeshift prison collapsed killing five female prisoners. One of the dead women was the sister of “Bloody Bill” Anderson, a prominent member of Quantrill’s band. There were others victims related to members of Quantrill’s group. On August 21st Quantrill and the largest group of guerillas he ever assembled at one time, approximately 450 men, attacked Lawrence, Kansas. “In two hours at least 150 male citizens” were killed, stores were looted and buildings burned.

Union Captain Sidney Clarke, present during the raid, described what he witnessed: “The attack was made by the notorious guerrilla chief Quantrill, with a force of about 300 men, at sunrise on the morning of Friday, the 21st instant. The guerillas entered the city from the south, and at once commenced an indiscriminate murder of its citizens. The work of death was continued for three hours, and whenever a citizen made his appearance, or escaped from a burning building, he was shot down in the streets.” Captain Clarke then continued: “With the exception of those who were shot down in attempting to escape, the citizens were first robbed and then murdered. Up to the present time 150 dead bodies have been found, and many more will doubtless be found in the ruins... The value of the property destroyed will reach $2,000,000, and the money secured by the guerillas cannot be less than $100,000.”

Quantrill’s Raiders were not acting under the “same regulations as other soldiers” as the Partisan Ranger Act specified (see Appendix G). A little over a month after the Lawrence Raid,
Quantrill penned his first and only documented official correspondence to the Confederate Army (see Appendix H). The report describes, in pseudo military fashion, a detailed account of a successful attack on Union forces at Baxter Springs. Quantrill signed the correspondence, "Colonel, Commanding," and alluded to a few of his guerillas with the rank of "captain." As Brownlee observed, Quantrill failed to mention one word regarding the Lawrence Raid, one of the most notorious events in American history. The last sentence in the correspondence stated "At some future day I will send you a complete report of my summer's campaign on the Missouri River." The killing of 150 non-combatants, the theft of approximately $100,000 and damage to property in the millions, seemed to be something Quantrill was holding back on explaining to the Confederate government.

Acts of retribution was their cause, along with plunder. As John Moore, former Confederate Colonel, tried to justify in the Confederate Military History of Missouri, "the guerillas simply paid back the insults and wrongs to which they and their families and their friends were subjected. They fought in the only way in which they could fight, and they fought to kill." This is a fairly glowing defense, considering the people they killed were civilians and the plundering that ensued.

Confederate Facade and Quantrill's Commission

Can it be assumed that if a guerilla group operated during a civil war would share the same goal as the conventional forces they claimed to support? Was this the case with Quantrill, when in a few instances he operated with the Confederate Army? Did he share the same goal of southern independence as did the conventional forces?

General Hindman, in a desperate attempt to raise an army in the depleted Trans-Mississippi, took liberties outside the laws of the Confederate Government. This included his
interpretation of the Partisan Ranger Act. In the summer of 1862 he published General Order No. 17 and sent a group Colonels in his command to Missouri to recruit and attack what targets were available (see comments on page 16). While doing so his men reached out to the likes of Quantrill and combined together attacked targets of opportunity, most notably Independence and Lone Jack, Missouri. Hence, in accordance with Hindman's order, Confederate Colonel Gideon Thompson made Quantrill a Partisan Captain, with a few in his band being named Lieutenants, most notably, Bill Anderson.

There are two reasons Quantrill wanted to be covered via the Partisan Act: one was to gain the resources of the Confederate Army and the other was notoriety. Ultimately, it was financially beneficial for Quantrill to be associated with the Confederacy. Quantrill needed chaos and lawlessness to conduct his kind of activity just as during the border conflict before the war. With Confederate forces operating in Missouri, this happened. There was more money to be had when the forces of guerillas were used in conjunction with Confederate regulars. For example, just prior to Quantrill's decision to be a "Confederate Partisan" he was given "much of the loot" from the combined attack on Independence, Missouri.

Quantrill also enjoyed the idea of being recognized. During an attack on Olathe, Kansas in September 1862, shortly after receiving his "commission," observers noted as him strutting "around the streets displaying his Confederate commission and asking old acquaintances to call him Captain." Furthermore, Quantrill would not be satisfied with the mere rank of captain. That autumn he went to Richmond to seek a colonel's commission believing that it would be conferred and that he would be treated as some sort of hero. It is uncertain whether he was given the rank or not, but after that trip he referred to himself as a Colonel in official correspondence to General Price.
At one point, General Price attempted to mitigate Quantrill's reputation after the Lawrence attack, via verification of his status. Price requested information from Governor Thomas Reynolds (Confederate Missouri Governor in exile). Reynolds replied stating that “Quantrill was not, and had never been, a military officer of the state of Missouri” and that Quantrill “was not known as a Confederate officer at the Trans-Mississippi Headquarters.” Regardless, Quantrill would be referred to as captain or colonel in Confederate correspondence after the summer of 1862.

Supporting the Confederacy?

Quantrill’s rank and status in Confederate States Army is to say the least questionable, but his willingness to support the Confederacy and the goal of southern independence is even more so. After his “commission” as a Partisan Captain, Quantrill toted the title but did not assist the Confederacy when requested.

Then, during the fall and winter of 1862-1863 the Confederate Army attempted to rein in Quantrill all the same time as he began to lose control of his Raiders. Fighting in Arkansas, Quantrill’s men began to desert since there was no chance for plunder when working with the regular forces. Quantrill’s own obsession with being recognized by the Confederate Army, and the army’s view that Quantrill should fight with the regulars took its toll as well. By 1863 some of Quantrill’s best guerillas started making bands of their own. Men like George Todd and Bill Anderson, led their smaller separate groups throughout the rest of the war. Major General Theophilus Holmes, Hindman’s replacement, Commanding the Trans-Mississippi Department, in the summer of 1863 gave his assessment of the results of such activities: “the effects of the partisan and guerilla warfare now waged in Missouri is only to entail new persecution and misery on our friends there, without advancing the cause one jot or tittle.” In August 1863
Quantrill led the Lawrence raid, after which while heading south for winter quarters in October 1863 had a small success against Union forces at Baxter Springs. Together, this was his sole contribution to guerilla warfare in Missouri in 1863.\textsuperscript{121}

While in Texas, during the winter of 1863, the Confederate Army attempted to find a place for Quantrill but also realized they had no control over these guerillas. Brigadier General Henry McCulloch, Texas Sub-District Commander, hearing of Quantrill’s actions, had his doubts as he stated to the Assistant Adjutant-General: “It may be said that Quantrill will help you. That may be true in part, but I have little confidence in men who fight for booty, and whose mode of warfare is but little, if any, above the uncivilized Indians.”\textsuperscript{122} In November 1863 Lieutenant General Kirby Smith, Commanding the Trans-Mississippi Department, advised McCulloch, to use Quantrill in capturing deserters in the region.\textsuperscript{123}

Throughout the winter McCulloch would see firsthand that Quantrill was not there for the cause. By February 1864 McCulloch was ready to have Quantrill and his men arrested for failure to follow orders and other crimes his men were committing while in friendly lines. McCulloch noted that, “Quantrill will not obey orders and so much mischief is charged to his command.”\textsuperscript{124} He further ranted “Whenever orders have gone to them they have some excuse, but are certain not to go.” McCulloch added “every man that has any money about his house is scared to death.”\textsuperscript{125} Quantrill’s Raiders spent their time in winter quarters robbing the people of the south. In April 1864 McCulloch was still dealing with guerilla issues in his district. He reported, “Captain Quantrill’s command has been a terror to the country and a curse to our land and cause in this section, and I never have been able to control them, because I have not had troops that had the moral and physical courage to arrest and disarm them.”\textsuperscript{126}
The Last Days

In the fall of 1864 General Price, former Missouri governor and former commanding officer of the old Missouri State Guard, made one last effort to take back Missouri. He believed that he could move into Missouri and collect thousands of people from the countryside to join in the campaign but this never came to fruition. By then Quantrill was no longer the guerrilla leader he was in 1862-1863 and did very little in the campaign other than “freelance plunder.” Price’s campaign ended with a terrible defeat at the battle of Westport. As for Quantrill he relocated to Kentucky were his was killed by Union soldiers in June 1865.

CONCLUSION

How does Francis Marion compare with William Quantrill? Marion’s activities in South Carolina followed the lines of what Clausewitz later postulated as the proper way to use guerrilla or partisan warfare. Marion fought under the authority and guidance of both Generals Gates and Greene during their southern campaigns. His operations were focused on military objectives furthering the goal of American independence. Marion used the tactics later proscribed by Mao, pre-dating his writings, although not for the type of political goals Mao envisioned. Marion’s activities were controlled by proper leadership, guidance, and augmentation of regular forces as Clausewitz professed. Thus, the worst passions, emotions, and violence implied by Jomini were avoided.

Modern doctrine defines an insurgency as political in nature used “as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict”. Marion, as a colonial political figure, had a vested interest in American independence, stability, and order; his actions as a soldier and guerrilla fighter were synonymous.
Today, Marion is regarded as an American hero and regarded as one of the great military leaders in American history.

In contrast, William Quantrill has a dark reputation and is viewed as a villain to most who know of his actions in Missouri. Quantrill himself had little to no ties to the south or the southern cause of independence. The Civil War provided an opportunity for him to gain fame and carry on his criminal adventures as he did before the war. The men who joined Quantrill had felt the pain inflicted from old enemies and by an unsympathetic federal military. Others who joined were just like Quantrill and saw an opportunity for adventure and plunder. Quantrill and his men did not seek service in the Confederate Army nor contribute to key campaigns outside the state of Missouri.

Although at times it would appear that Quantrill’s guerilla band was acting in conjunction with conventional forces or under orders of Confederate authority, this was a superficial façade. Especially notable, no real shared strategy existed. Quantrill did not raid towns along the border based on the needs of the Confederacy; he based such “operations” on retribution, accessibility, and plunder. For the most part, Jefferson Davis did not think highly of Quantrill’s type of fighting and only the lower level commanders (e.g., Hindman and Price) would use them as a desperate last resort in a desperate theater. The relationship with Confederate units was purely ad hoc and a desperate move by operational level military commanders seeking to take advantage of the Raiders violent capabilities and networks of support. They shared the same enemy, but not necessarily the same goals. Quantrill operated in an area characterized by instability, chaos, and disorder; the addition of Confederate and Union forces helped enhance those conditions. The guerilla actions of Quantrill’s Raiders were purely opportunistic and a continuation of previous conflicts. They were based on revenge and the opportunity for financial
gain, using the war as cover; they were not the actions of an insurgency in support of a larger good, i.e., southern independence. The guerillas operating in this area were consequently renewing or continuing a border war with Kansas, with additional actions spanning the spectrum from plundering to murder; or, as Jomini feared, a descent into violence, chaos, and disorder.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bleeding Kansas</strong></td>
<td>A period of time from 1854 to 1861 on the Missouri – Kansas border where pro-slavery and abolitionists groups conducted violent raids back and forth across the border. Each entity was trying to secure Kansas for their side of the political issue and determine Kansas’ status as a free or slave state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Border Ruffians</strong></td>
<td>Generic term used to represent the people from Missouri and Kansas who conducted raids on both sides of the border in the 1850’s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bushwhackers</strong></td>
<td>Pro-southern bands, primarily from Missouri, who attacked abolitionists and unionists using guerilla tactics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guerillas</strong></td>
<td>Bushwhacker, Jayhawker, Red legs or any group in Missouri and Kansas using the common unconventional guerilla tactics of hit and run raids and ambushes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jayhawkers</strong></td>
<td>Unionist bands, (federal government) primarily from Kansas who attacked southern sympathizers and rebels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Missouri Militia</strong></td>
<td>Union version of the former Missouri State Guard (see Missouri State Guard).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Missouri State Guard</strong></td>
<td>Organization under the authority of the pro-southern governor in 1861. Had victories against federal forces early in the war at Wilson’s Creek and Lexington. Soon disbanded, some went east to fight with their commander General Sterling Price when he joined the Confederacy and subsequently transferred to campaigns in Mississippi. Most returned home to Missouri, many of whom would become guerillas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enrolled Missouri Militia</strong></td>
<td>Raised by the governor’s office in August 1862 to assist in security and counter guerilla actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Red Legs</strong></td>
<td>Former Jayhawkers, wearing red leggings, who became known as the most notorious of the guerilla fighters on the border.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B

The Operational Environment: Physical and Violent

The Missouri Compromise of 1820 admitted Missouri into the Union as a slave state and restricted slavery to those parts of the United States south of 36 degrees and 30 minutes latitude (Missouri's southern border). This legislation balanced the country with equal number of slave to free-state representation, as Maine entered the Union as a free-state when Missouri did so as a slave state. A geographical complication also arose as Missouri had most of its border contiguous with free-state territory. Missouri was now geographically and politically in the middle of the most divisive issue in American history.\textsuperscript{130}

Missouri was primarily settled and established by southerners. As Michael Fellman has written, "in the 1850's approximately 75% of Missourians were of southern ancestry."\textsuperscript{131} Although Missouri was a slave-state, it was not comparable to other southern states. From 1810 - 1860 the population in Missouri grew rapidly, and after 1830 the number of non-slave holding whites increased.\textsuperscript{132} With this, the percentage of slaves in Missouri declined as it became less of a slave-state in practice every year from 1830 - 1860 (see Table).

**Free and Slave Population growth in Missouri 1810 - 1860\textsuperscript{133}**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Slaves</th>
<th>Percentage of Population Free (including free blacks)</th>
<th>Percentage of Slaves in Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1810</td>
<td>20,845</td>
<td>3,011</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1820</td>
<td>66,586</td>
<td>9,797</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>14,0455</td>
<td>25,091</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1840</td>
<td>38,3702</td>
<td>57,891</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>68,2044</td>
<td>87,412</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>1,182,012</td>
<td>114,931</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Between 1850 and 1860, Missouri began to build an economic relationship with the northern states and Europe. An accelerating factor occurred when the railroad reached St. Louis.
in 1853. In 1860 the railroad system was expanding, telegraph lines followed it, and the numerous miles of navigable river provided lines of communication for the growing state and western territories (including the free state of Kansas). The railroad system branched out like tentacles from St. Louis as lines reached south to Ironton (iron and lead mines) and Rolla, west through the state capital to Sedalia and then to the western border, and north joining the Hannibal to the St. Joseph line at Macon; as this occurred the developing infrastructure crossed the entire state. A water transportation system also existed, the Missouri River ran, west to east, through Kansas City (Jackson County) to St. Louis meeting the Mississippi River. While the Mississippi River runs along the entire eastern border of the state. South of Cape Girardeau the Ohio River converges with the Mississippi River.

In 1854, Congress passed the Kansas – Nebraska Act and with that came the concept of “Popular Sovereignty” and through this the nullification of the Missouri Compromise’s delineation provisions. In accordance with the idea of “Popular Sovereignty,” the people of a territory would decide whether it would be a free or slave state. This, in theory, permitted slavery above 36 degrees and 30 minutes latitude. Although intended to be a democratic solution that would satisfy all, the legislation in fact further divided the nation and threw Missouri and Kansas into the political (and literal) battleground pertaining to the issue. Now it would be a race for northerners and southerners into Kansas and each had a different agenda. Missouri slaveholders had a special interest in this issue, but were not overly concerned until “free-soilers” and abolitionists began to populate the territory. Missourians then began to suspect that these people traveling on the assistance of northern abolitionists were not there to settle and farm but to occupy Kansas for free-soil politics. Then rumors arose that these migrants from the north
were carrying rifles and not plows.\textsuperscript{139} Also, outside abolitionists had a tendency to consider and treat all Missourians as "poor white trash," "Slavocrats," and "Border Ruffians."\textsuperscript{140}

This period on the Kansas-Missouri border between 1855 and 1860 is commonly referred to as "Bleeding Kansas." Raids back and forth across the border were common by both sides, "driving off settlers, burning, looting, and plundering."\textsuperscript{141} In May 1856 a large force of Missourians attacked Lawrence and destroyed the Free State Hotel. In retaliation, abolitionist John Brown and his men killed five pro-slavery men in what is referred to as the "Pottawatomie Massacre."\textsuperscript{142} In May 1858 a group of pro-slavery Missourians, in what is known as the "Des Cygnes Massacre," placed some free-soilers in front of a firing squad and killed five.\textsuperscript{143} These back and forth revenge killings, thievery, and sabotage thus became common. Some well known "Jayhawker" leaders that transcended the "Bleeding Kansas" period were either used as regular Union forces or sanctioned guerillas fighting in Missouri. James Lane, James Montgomery, and Dr. Charles Jennison continued their raiding tactics into Missouri throughout the Civil War.\textsuperscript{144}

**Missouri held for the Union**

After the attack on Fort Sumter, on April 15, 1861 President Lincoln requested each state to provide troops for the emergency. Missouri’s quota was 3,123.\textsuperscript{145} Governor Claiborne Jackson vehemently advised Washington that Missouri would not be supplying the Union with military forces in order to coerce southern states.\textsuperscript{146} Regardless of the Governor’s position, Captain Nathaniel Lyon, U.S. Army, and Francis Blair, the Federal Government’s representation in the state, asked for and were allowed to use this quota to raise and arm forces in St. Louis.\textsuperscript{147} Concurrently, the pro-southern leadership in the state government prepared for what it deemed a possible federal invasion while securing Missouri for the Confederacy. Governor Jackson, unable to pass a military bill, used his legal powers to arrange for the State Militia under General
D.M. Frost to stage his forces near the St. Louis Arsenal, as a “training camp,” at what became known as Camp Jackson.\textsuperscript{148} The Governor also sent representatives to meet with Jefferson Davis to acquire equipment to be used to secure the arsenal at the appropriate time.\textsuperscript{149}

On May 10\textsuperscript{th} Lyon surrounded Camp Jackson and forced the highly outnumbered Frost to surrender.\textsuperscript{150} In the middle of this, as the State Guardsmen were being marched through town, a crowd gathered. As Colonel Thomas Snead later wrote “Most of the crowd sympathized with the prisoners, and some gave expression to their indignation. One of Lyon's German regiments thereupon opened fire upon them, and twenty-eight men, women, and children were killed.”\textsuperscript{151} The following day there were more riots and more civilian deaths. The State Assembly gave Governor Jackson the power he needed to prepare the Missouri State Guard. The Governor placed Sterling Price, former governor of Missouri, in charge.\textsuperscript{152} Price and the Federal Department Commander, General WM. Harney, made an effort at conciliation and by May 21\textsuperscript{st} had negotiated an agreement to keep the peace.\textsuperscript{153}

Nonetheless, this period of conciliation was short lived. Blair, through his connections in Washington, arranged for Lyon to be promoted and had General Harney removed on May 30\textsuperscript{th}.\textsuperscript{154} On June 11\textsuperscript{th}, General Price and Governor Jackson met with Blair and the newly promoted, General Lyon. After a few hours Lyon, antagonized by any debate or aspect of limitations imposed upon the federal government in the state, angrily ended the meeting.\textsuperscript{155} Lyon immediately gathered his forces and marched on the Missouri Capital of Jefferson City. With this, the pro-southern members of the government moved to the southwestern part of the state.

**Conventional Warfare in Missouri**

Conventional warfare in Missouri primarily occurred during the first year of the war with the two most well known battles occurring at Wilson’s Creek and Lexington. In June, General
Ben McCulloch was in northern Arkansas organizing troops to march in to Missouri. McCulloch's mission was to assist the pro-southern government in Missouri and General Price's State Guard, then in the area of Springfield. Confederate forces set up camp at Wilson's Creek on August 6th while Union forces, under Brigadier General Nathaniel Lyon, assembled at Springfield. Although outnumbered, Lyon moved out on August 10th to conduct a surprise attack on the combined Confederate forces. After initial success, the federal attack stalled and by mid-morning General Lyon was killed in battle. Within two hours after Lyon's death, the Union force retreated to Springfield and the battle was over.

General Price parted ways with McCulloch's forces following the success at Wilson's Creek. He then marched his State Guard forces to northern Missouri. The objective was the Federal Garrison in the town of Lexington, located on the south bank of the Missouri River. On September 18th, Price surrounded the small group of Union soldiers, who used a local college as a fort. Union forces surrendered after a three-day battle and siege of the college. Shortly after this victory, General John Fremont, Union Department of the West Commander, consolidated his forces and drove Price out of the state and into Arkansas.

General Price and the State Guard were absorbed into the Confederate Army and moved to other areas of operation in the Trans-Mississippi Theater. However, numerous State Guardsmen, not wanting to fight elsewhere, deserted the army and returned to their homes in Missouri. In September 1864 Price made one more attempt to pry Missouri from the Union, but was defeated at Westport. This ended conventional operations in the state.
Map of Missouri and Surrounding States

APPENDIX C

Map of Missouri and Surrounding States

160 Battle of Wilson's Creek Aug 10, 1861

Springfield
Wilson's Creek

Miles 100

Missouri

Arkansas

Iowa

Illinois

Kansas

Nebraska

Indian Nations
APPENDIX D

Missouri and Kansas Border Region and Quantrill's Area of Operations¹⁶¹
APPENDIX E

Major Player Photographs and Biographies

Quantrill, William Clarke
- Also known as Charlie Hart, born in Canal Dover, Ohio he moved to Kansas in 1857 in the middle of the “Bleeding Kansas” period. Quantrill was a school teacher by trade. While in Kansas he ran with a group of criminals playing both sides of the border war. After running into trouble with law in Lawrence, Kansas, he moved to Missouri using a diabolic move, turning traitor on a group of abolitionists, to gain the trust of the people in Jackson County, Missouri. At some point in Quantrill’s life he became a good shot with a pistol and an excellent horseman. He influenced many in Missouri and initially took up the role as protectorate of Missourians on the western border. Soon his guerilla band would be known for plunder and murder. It is said that he received a captain’s commission with the passing of the Partisan Ranger Act, although he would later claim to be a colonel. After four years of guerilla warfare he lost control of his band and left for Kentucky where he was shot by a Union soldier and eventually died from his wounds on June 6th, 1865.

Marion, Francis
- Marion to a first generation planter family in South Carolina. At fifteen years of age Marion became a sailor with his first and last experience culminating into a shipwreck that almost saw him die of starvation and exposure. Marion worked his family’s plantation and in 1773 purchased his own. Being a wealthy landowner and militia leader, Marion was elected to South Carolina’s First Provincial Congress in 1775. When hostilities began with Great Britain, South Carolina raised two regiments of militia and Marion was made a captain and was part of the defense when the British unsuccessfully attempted to take Charleston Harbor in 1776. Marion spent the last few years of the war conducting guerilla operations in the Carolinas under the guidance both General Gates and then General Greene.
**Anderson, Bill**\(^{165}\) - Nicknamed “Bloody Bill” for his actions as a guerilla during the war, most notably atrocities committed at Lawrence, Kansas in 1863 and Centralia, Missouri in 1864. Anderson spent most of the Civil War as one of Quantrill’s lieutenants.

**Blair, Frank**\(^{166}\) - A Republican politician in St. Louis before the war and one of the architects solidifying the plan with Nathaniel Lyon to secure Missouri for the Union. Blair had close ties to Washington, D.C. and the Lincoln administration.

**Fremont, John**\(^{167}\) - At the beginning of the war Fremont was given command of the Department of the West. Fremont, while in command in St. Louis, enacted martial law and issued his own emancipation order for the state. He was quickly relieved by President Lincoln after having command for less than six months. Fremont was responsible for many missteps in those crucial first few months of the war in Missouri.

**Lyon, Nathaniel**\(^{168}\) - A U.S. Army Captain stationed in Kansas prior to the Civil War, he was eventually sent to St. Louis, Missouri to guard the federal arsenal. Francis Blair and Lyon teamed up and took steps to keep Missouri in the Union. Lyon seized the Missouri State Guard at Camp Jackson, which later caused a riot, during which civilians were killed. However, this action ensured the arsenal would not fall to confederate sympathizers. Soon after Lyon was promoted to Brigadier General and would lead forces overrunning the pro-southern state government. Lyon was killed in action at the Battle of Wilson’s Creek.
Price, Sterling¹⁶⁹ - General Price was a former governor of Missouri and commanded the Missouri State Guard after the U.S. Army seized Camp Jackson. He led the Missouri State Guard to early victories at Wilson’s Creek and Lexington. Price was later made a general in the Confederate Army fighting in Arkansas and Mississippi. In 1864 Price led one last foray into Missouri, but failed to pry loose the Union hold on the state.
### APPENDIX F

**Chronology of Events**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 10, 1821</td>
<td>Missouri admitted to the Union as a slave state and Maine was admitted as a free state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 30, 1854</td>
<td>Kansas – Nebraska Act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1856</td>
<td>Free State Hotel in Lawrence, KS destroyed by pro-slavery Missourians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1856</td>
<td>Pottawatomie Massacre - Abolitionists killed five pro-slavery Missourians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>William Quantrill moves to Kansas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1858</td>
<td>Des Cygnes Massacre - pro-slavery Missourians killed five free-soilers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1860</td>
<td>Abraham Lincoln elected president of the United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 10, 1860</td>
<td>Morgan Walker Farm – Quantrill turns traitor on abolitionists in Jackson County, Missouri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 20, 1860</td>
<td>South Carolina secedes from the Union. Other southern states will soon follow throughout the winter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 4, 1861</td>
<td>Abraham Lincoln inaugurated President of the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 12, 1861</td>
<td>Confederates attack Fort Sumter and Union forces surrendered on the 14th.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 15, 1861</td>
<td>President Lincoln calls for States to provide troops to put down rebellion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 17, 1861</td>
<td>Governor of Missouri, Claiborne Jackson, refuses to provide troops to be used against the seceded states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 10, 1861</td>
<td>Camp Jackson, Missouri State Guard training site near the St. Louis Arsenal, is captured by Union forces. A riot follows with the death of numerous civilians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 11, 1861</td>
<td>General Price and Governor Jackson meet with Captain Nathaniel Lyon at the Planter House Hotel at which time negotiations break down and Union forces physically secure Missouri for the Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 11-17, 1861</td>
<td>Lyon's forces chase Governor Jackson and General Price out of the state capital to the southwest part of the state. (Battle of Booneville)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 10, 1861</td>
<td>Confederate tactical victory at Wilson's Creek, Nathaniel Lyon killed in action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 13-20, 1861</td>
<td>Missouri State Guard victory at the Battle of Lexington.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 23, 1861</td>
<td>Jim Lane's Jayhawkers burn down Osceola, Missouri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October/November 1861</td>
<td>Quantrill leaves Price's forces and returns to Jackson County.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 10, 1861</td>
<td>Quantrill and Andy Walker gather to fight off Jayhawkers at the Stone residence near Blue Springs, Missouri. The beginning of Quantrill's Raiders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1862</td>
<td>Quantrill's Raiders attack Aubry, Kansas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1862</td>
<td>The Confederate Congress passes the Partisan Ranger Act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 18, 1862</td>
<td>Palmyra Massacre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 22, 1861</td>
<td>General Halleck issues General Order No. 32 prescribing the punishment for guerillas, and their supporters, operating in Missouri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 21, 1863</td>
<td>Missouri guerillas, led by William Quantrill, sacked Lawrence, Kansas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 25, 1863</td>
<td>Union officials issue General Order Number 11, which ordered certain western Missouri border counties evacuated in an attempt to remove the guerilla threat to Kansas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 16, 1864</td>
<td>Price moves back into Missouri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 27, 1864</td>
<td>Battle at Centralia and guerilla atrocities (Bill Anderson's Raid)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 23, 1864</td>
<td>Price defeated at Westport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 6, 1865</td>
<td>William Clarke Quantrill dies in Kentucky</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX G

Partisan Ranger Act and Order Number 17

O.R.--SERIES IV--VOLUME I [S# 127]
CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, REPORTS, AND RETURNS OF THE
CONFEDERATE AUTHORITIES, DECEMBER 20, 1860-JUNE 30, 1862.--#44
GENERAL ORDERS No. 30.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
ADJT. AND INSPT. GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Richmond, April 28, 1862.

I. The following acts, having passed both Houses of Congress, were duly approved by
the President, and are now published for the information of the Army:

AN ACT to organize bands of partisan rangers.

SECTION 1. The Congress of the Confederate States of America do enact, That the
President be, and he is hereby, authorized to commission such officers as he may deem
proper with authority to form bands of partisan rangers, in companies, battalions or
regiments, either as infantry or cavalry, the companies, battalions or regiments to be
composed each of such numbers as the President may approve.*

SEC. 2. Be it further enacted, That such partisan rangers, after being regularly
received into service, shall be entitled to the same pay, rations and quarters during
their term of service, and be subject to the same regulations as other soldiers.*

SEC. 3. Be it further enacted, That for any arms and munitions of war captured
from the enemy by any body of partisan rangers and delivered to any quartermaster
at such place or places as may be designated by a commanding general, the rangers
shall be paid their full value in such manner as the Secretary of War may prescribe.

Approved April 21, 1862.

*Authors emphasis
HDQRS. TRANS-MISSISSIPPI DISTRICT,
Little Rock, Ark., June 17, 1862.

I. For the more effectual annoyance of the enemy upon our rivers and in our mountains and woods all citizens of this district who are not subject to conscription are called upon to organize themselves into independent companies of mounted men or infantry, as they prefer, arming and equipping themselves, and to serve in that part of the district to which they belong.

II. When as many as 10 men come together for this purpose they may organize by electing a captain, 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, and will at once commence operations against the enemy without waiting for special instructions.* Their duty will be to cut off Federal pickets, scouts, foraging parties, and trains, and to kill pilots and others on gunboats and transports, attacking them day and night, and using the greatest vigor in their movements. As soon as the company attains the strength required by law it will proceed to elect the other officers to which it is entitled. All such organizations will be reported to these headquarters as soon as practicable. They will receive pay and allowances for subsistence and forage for the time actually in the field, as established by the affidavits of their captains.

III. These companies will be governed in all respects by the same regulations as other troops*. Captains will be held responsible for the good conduct and efficiency of their men, and will report to these headquarters from time to time.

By command of Major-General Hindman:

R. G. NEWTON,
Assistant Adjutant General.

*Authors emphasis
APPENDIX H

Correspondence between Quantrill and General Sterling Price

O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXII/1 [S# 32]

OCTOBER 6, 1863.--Action at Baxter Springs, Kans.

IN CAMP ON CANADIAN,
October 13, 1863.

I have the honor to make the following report of my march from the Missouri River to the Canadian, a distance of 450 miles:

I started on the morning of October 2, at daybreak, and had an uninterrupted march until night, and encamped on Grand River for three hours; then marched to the Osage. We continued the march from day to day, taking a due southwest course, leaving Carthage 12 miles east, crossing Shoal Creek at the falls, then going due west into the Seneca Nation.

On October 6, about 2 p.m., the advance reported a train ahead. I ordered the advance to press on and ascertain the nature of it. Captain Brinker being in command of the advance, he soon discovered an encampment, which he supposed to be the camp of the train; in this we were mistaken. It proved to be the camp belonging to Fort Baxter, recently built and garrisoned with negroes, 45 miles south of Fort Scott, Kans. When the advance came near the camp they saw that they were not discovered, and they fell back a short distance to wait for the command to come up. I now ordered the column to close in and to form by fours and charge, and leading the head of the column myself with Captains Brinker and Pool,* took about one-half of the column to the encampment which they had discovered, still being ignorant of the fort. This they charged, driving everything before them, and in two minutes were in possession of the fort. The negroes took shelter behind their quarters. Having no support, my men were compelled to fall back. Not knowing myself where the fort was, I moved with three companies--Captains Todd, Estes, and Garrett, in all 150 men--out on the prairie north of the camp, and discovered a train with 125 men as an escort, which proved to be Major-General [J. G.] Blunt and staff with body guard and headquarters train, moving headquarters from Fort Scott, Kans., to Fort Smith, Ark. I immediately drew up in line of battle, and at this time I heard heavy firing on my left, and on riding out discovered, for the first time, the fort, with at least half of my men engaged there. I ordered them to join me immediately, which they did, on the double-quick. General Blunt formed his escort, still in doubt as to who we were. I now formed 250 men of all the companies and ordered a charge. Up to this time not a shot had been fired, nor until we were within 60 yards of them, when they gave us a volley too high to hurt any one, and then fled in the wildest confusion on the prairie. We soon closed up on them, making fearful havoc on every side. We continued the chase about 4 miles, when I called the men off; only leaving about 40 of them alive. On returning, we found they had left us 9 six-mule wagons; well loaded; 1 buggy (General Blunt's); 1 fine ambulance; 1 fine brass band and wagon, fully rigged.

Among the killed were General Blunt, Majors Curtis, Sinclair, and [B. S.] Henning, Captain Tuft [Tough], and 3 lieutenants of the staff, and about 80 privates of the escort. My loss here was 1 man killed (William Bledsoe) and I severely wounded (John Coger).
In the charge on the fort, my loss was 2 men killed (Robert Ward and William Lots­peak); wounded, Lieutenant Toothman and Private Thomas Hill. Federal loss at the fort, 1 lieutenant and 15 privates killed; number wounded, not known.

We have as trophies two stand of colors, General Blunt's sword, his commission (brigadier-general and major-general), all his official papers, &c., belonging to headquarters. After taking what we wanted from the train; we destroyed it, fearing we could not carry it away in the face of so large a force. We then sent a flag of truce to the fort to see if we had any wounded there. There was none.

I did not think it prudent to attack the fort again, and, as we had wounded men already to carry, and it was so far to bring them, [I concluded] that I would leave the fort. So at 5 p.m. I took up the line of march due south on the old Texas road. We marched 15 miles, and encamped for the night. From this place to the Canadian River we caught about 150 Federal Indians and negroes in the Nation gathering ponies. We brought none of them through.

We arrived at General [D. H.] Cooper's camp on the 12th in good health and condition. *At some future day I will send you a complete report of my summer's campaign on the Missouri River.*

Your obedient servant,

W. C. QUANTRILL,
Colonel, Commanding, &c.

Major-General PRICE.

P. S.--In this report I neglected to say that Colonels Holt and Roberson and Captain Tucker, who have been in Missouri on business for the army, were with me, and took an active part in leading the men on the enemy.

*Authors emphasis
Col. WILLIAM C. QUANTRILL,
Commanding Cavalry:

COLONEL: I am desired by Major-General Price to acknowledge the receipt of your report of your march from the Missouri River to the Canadian,(*) and that he takes pleasure in congratulating you and your gallant command upon the success attending it. General Price is very anxious that you prepare the report of your summer campaign, alluded to by you, at as early a date as practicable, and forward it without delay, more particularly so as he is desirous that your acts should appear in their true light before the world.* In it he wishes you to incorporate particularly the treatment which the prisoners belonging to your command received from the Federal authorities; also the orders issued by General Blunt or other Federal officers regarding the disposition to be made of you or your men if taken or vanquished. He has been informed that orders of a most inhuman character were issued. Indeed, he has some emanating from those holding subordinate commands, but wants to have all the facts clearly portrayed, so that the Confederacy and the world may learn the murderous and uncivilized warfare which they themselves inaugurated, and thus be able to appreciate their cowardly shrieks and howls when with a just retaliation the same "measure is meted out to them." He desires me to convey to you, and through you to your command, his high appreciation of the hardships you have so nobly endured and the gallant struggle you have made against despotism and the oppression of our State, with the confident hope that success will soon crown our efforts.

I have the honor to remain, respectfully, your obedient servant,

MACLEAN,
[22.] Major and Assistant Adjutant-General.

*Authors emphasis
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Records, Reports and Essays


Manuals / Doctrine


Secondary Sources

Microfiche


Journal Articles


43


"Order No. 11 and the Civil War on the Border." Missouri Historical Review 57, (July 1963): 357-368.


Books


**Student Papers / Master Thesis**

Franklin, Darrin “Cornwallis On How to Make an Insurgency,” Elective Paper, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Marine Corp University, February 18, 2010.


Rogers, Major (USMC) Shelley. “Francis Marion, the Swamp Fox: American Military in Low Intensity Conflict.” Marine Corp Command and Staff College, Marine Air-Ground Training and Education Center, 1988.

Websites

Civil War St. Louis Website  http://www.civilwarstlouis.com/timeline/index.htm

Missouri’s Civil War Website http://www.mocivilwar.org/home.html


Ohio State University, Department of History, ehistory website, http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/default.cfm.


Movies


ENDNOTES


5 The topic of insurgency/counterinsurgency, guerilla warfare, asymmetrical warfare and irregular warfare has become a cottage industry in the past seven years due to the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. With this rejuvenated effort to dissect and compare such activity much of the terminology is used inconsistently. There is extensive debate on these topics and at times there is little agreement on the exact definitions used and in what context.


7 Ibid, 9-11.

8 Ibid, 11-12. See also Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Book 6, Chp 26, “People in Arms” regarding guerillas fighting in conjunction with regular forces.

9 During the Civil War the term “insurgency” was either not used or not used in the manner it is today. The term “insurgent” was used. General Halleck used it as synonymous with guerilla as someone conducting illegal activity or violating the laws of war by the nature or method of fighting.


14 Ibid.


16 Ibid, 480-81.

17 Ibid, 481.

18 Ibid, 479-483.


22 Ibid, 29.

23 Hittle, 51.


26 FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, 1-6.

27 Ibid, 1-6, 7.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Darrin Franklin, “Comwallis On How to Make an Insurgency,” Unpublished elective paper February 2010, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Marine Corp University. (author’s possession) Some of the information with references obtained on Francis Marion was collected while working on the Marine Command and Staff College elective, American Revolution: Insurgency vs. Expeditionary Warfare.

32 Ibid, 154.


35 Cate, 155.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Higginbotham, 359-60.


40 Higginbotham, 361. Regarding Tarleton's incident with the Virginia Continentals. After this incident Tarleton was referred to as "Bloody Tarleton."

41 Ibid, 365.

42 Ibid.

43 Gordon, 126.

44 Ibid, 148.


Halleck to McClellan, December 26th, 1861 in O.R. Series I, Vol. VIII, 463-64, and Brownlee, 23.


Ibid.


Robert Mackey, *The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004). Robert Mackey provides a section on John Mosby and guerilla warfare in Virginia. He also provides a section on the guerilla war in Arkansas, discussing General Hindman’s Order No. 17 (as it applied primarily to Arkansas) and the different types/levels of guerillas operating in this area. In Mackey’s work it is apparent that Arkansas was very much like Missouri as far as the indiscriminate destruction and plundering of the populace by guerilla bands is concerned. In both areas Confederate leaders were unable to control the guerilla activity and only added to legitimize the worst of these bands of guerillas; eventually throwing the region into chaos.

Brownlee, 78, Hindman, General Order No. 17, June 17th, 1862 in O.R. Series I, Vol. XIII, 835, and Mackey, 29-31. Mackey discusses General Hindman’s General Order No. 17 and a follow-up order, No. 18, regarding who would control the “Partisans” which did not receive much emphasis by Hindman’s command.

Ibid, 78.

President Davis to Confederate Congressman W.P. Harris, December 3rd, 1861 in O.R. Series I, Vol. VIII, 701, and Brownlee, 77-78, 107. Brownlee relates that Jefferson Davis did not believe in guerilla warfare, but still issued the Partisan Ranger Act. By Davis’ statement it appears that he did not approve of the type of guerilla warfare that was conducted in Missouri and by certain leaders. Davis’ remark regarding “pathfinders and holiday soldiers” adds a little
insight alluding to the type of leadership needed to control such activity. Although the Partisan Ranger Act and additional guidance on who could raise bands of Partisan Rangers gave Hindman the authority, it also prescribed that they “be subject to the same regulations as other soldiers” and even Hindman’s General Order No. 17 mentioned “These companies will be governed in all respects by the same regulations as other troops.” This would not be possible with guerrillas like Quantrill when regulars were not actively supervising. General Hindman was later demoted for among other things “his promotion of guerrilla warfare in Missouri.”

59 Brownlee, 77.

60 FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 3-14.

61 Brownlee, 54.


64 Brownlee, 54-55.

65 Connelley, 105.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid, 120-130.

68 Brownlee, 56.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid, 57.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid. Brownlee suggests that this move was to get out of Kansas because of trouble with the law in that state and make inroads in Missouri.

75 Leslie, 82.

76 Ibid, 82-94.

77 Cate, 153, and Bass, 5-7.
78 Ibid, 153.


80 Brownlee, 57-58.

81 Albert Castel, "Kansas Jayhawking Raids into Western Missouri in 1861," Missouri Historical Review. 54 (October 1959): 2.

82 Ibid, 4.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid, 5.

85 Brownlee, 57.

86 Ibid, 58. Brownlee provides the example of the Stone Residence incident where Quantrill, Walker, and others fought off raiding Jayhawkers.

87 The Outlaw Josey Wales. With Clint Eastwood and Sondra Locke. Directed by Clint Eastwood. Warner Studios, 1976. In one of Hollywood’s attempts at telling the fictional story of guerilla warfare during the Civil War in Missouri, they provide an example of this type of scenario. Clint Eastwood plays the role of Josey Wales, a rural Missouri farmer, whose family is murdered by Kansas Red Legs. After which he joins a guerilla band led by “Bloody Bill Anderson” to avenge their deaths.

88 Brownlee, 60-62. Quotes and subsequent information in this paragraph are from the pages noted.

89 Ibid, 59-60, and Captain William Oliver, report to Pope, February 3rd, 1862 in O.R. Series 1, Vol. VIII, 57-58. Brownlee provides the entire report, on the pages noted, which was sent to General Pope. The term “Union men” is not referring to Union soldiers but the pro-Union citizens in Missouri.

90 Ibid, 22-24. Brownlee also describes that it was hard for recruits to get to Price’s location, but the examples of groups being stopped do not accumulate to the numbers Price thought he would receive. It is also important to know that there was a similar request made in June 1861 and less than 5,000 joined. The political history of Missouri shows that most Missourians were generally Unionist although they shared a southern culture. It was the state government in 1860 – 61 that was pro-southern.

91 Ibid.

93 Brownlee, 63.

94 Connelley, 234.

95 Brownlee, 68. Brownlee obtained this quotation from a *K.C. Journal* article dated April 20, 1862.

96 Ibid.

97 Ibid, 79.

98 Ibid, 92.

99 Ibid, 101-103.

100 Ibid, 116.

101 Ibid, 118.

102 Ibid, 122-125.


105 Brownlee, 131.


109 Brownlee 78, and Hindman, reports of operations May 31st - November 3rd, 1862 in O.R. Series I, Vol. XIII, 30-46, Hindman detailing explanations for his actions regarding the raising of a new army and guerilla activity in Missouri and Arkansas.

Brownlee, 76-79, 95.

Ibid, 99.

Ibid, 95-97.


Connelley 278, and Brownlee, 110-111. Brownlee suggests that Quantrill had gone to Richmond to get a commission as “more than a Captain”, and that he was successful. The evidence used to show that this was a success is official correspondence in 1864, O.R. Series I, Vol. XXXIV/2, pp 957-958, from BG Henry McCulloch regarding Quantrill having a commission from Davis but in the letter refers to Quantrill as a Captain.

Ibid, 278-279, and Quantrill to Price, report on action at Baxter Springs, October 13th, 1863 in O.R. Series I, Vol. XXII/1. Correspondence from Quantrill to General Price regarding his battle at Baxter Springs in October 1863, notably leaving out what occurred at Lawrence the previous August. Quantrill signed it “Colonel Commanding.” Subsequently Price would write to Quantrill referring to him as “Colonel.”

Brownlee 133, from Reynolds Manuscript Collection.

Connelley, 280.


Connelley, 281-283.

McCulloch to Captain Edmund Burke, paragraph regarding Quantrill’s arrival in the AO and possible assistance, November 1st, 1863 in O.R. Series I, Vol. XXVI/2, 378-379.

Smith to McCulloch, regarding the use of Quantrill to find deserters, November 2nd, 1863 in O.R. Series I, Vol. XXVI/2, 382-383.

McCulloch to Major General J.B. Magruder, section regarding Quantrill’s unwillingness to assist in operations, February 3rd, 1864 in O.R. Series I, Vol. XXXIV/2, 941-943.

McCulloch to Captain E.P. Turner, section regarding Quantrill’s actions in winter quarters, April 6th, 1864 in O.R. Series I, Vol. XXXIV/3, 742.

128 FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, 1-1.


132 Ibid, 7.

133 Ibid, 7. Fellman developed a "Blacks in Missouri" Table from the work of Walter H. Ryle, *Missouri: Union or Secession*. The table in this paper was adapted from Fellman’s work highlighting the changes of percentages over time noting free vs. slave.

134 Ibid, 8.

135 Ibid, 7-8.


137 Brownlee, 6.

138 Shortly after the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the settling of Kansas would be a contest between northern abolitionists and pro-slavery Missourians. The Emigrant Aid Societies in the north would recruit people to settle in Kansas with advertisements and would also assist the travel for those who were "free-soilers."

139 Brownlee, 8, and Moore, 3.


143 Denny and Bradbury, 9.

Secretary of War to the States in the Union, Table of quotas, April 15th, 1861 in O.R. Series III, Vol. I, 68-69.

Gilmore, Civil War on the Missouri-Kansas Border, 112.

Ibid, 113.

Ibid, 112.

Ibid, 113-115.

Frost to Lyon, May 10th, 1861 in O.R. Series I, Vol. III, 7. In official correspondence to Lyon Frost stated “SIR: I never for a moment having conceived the idea that so illegal and unconstitutional a demand as I have just received from you would be made by an officer of the United States Army. I am wholly unprepared to defend my command from this unwarranted attack, and shall therefore be forced to comply with your demand.”


Ibid, 265-266.


Ibid, 381-82.

Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. I, 267, “The First Year of the War in Missouri by Colonel Thomas L. Snead.” Lyon ends the meeting by saying “that he would see every man, woman, and child in Missouri under the sod before he would consent that the State should dictate to “his Government” as to the movement of its troops within her limits, or as to any other matter however unimportant. “This,” said he, "means war."


Ibid, this area where the battle took place and where Lyon was killed was latter named “Bloody Hill.”

Ibid, Missouri State Parks and Historic Sites, Battle of Lexington Historic Site, http://www.mostateparks.com/lexington/battle.htm. The Missouri State Park website provides a good description of the “siege” and the use of hemp bales, by Price’s men, as literally rolling cover in order to get close enough for an infantry charge.
159 Ibid.


161 Ibid, 3.


164 Photograph from Bass, opposite page 102.


