**REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE**

PUBLIC REPORTING BURDEN FOR THIS COLLECTION OF INFORMATION IS ESTIMATED TO AVERAGE 1 HOUR PER RESPONSE, INCLUDING THE TIME FOR REVIEWING INSTRUCTIONS, SEARCHING DATA SOURCES, GATHERING AND MAINTAINING THE DATA NEEDED, AND FILLING OUT THE FORM. SEND COMMENTS REGARDING THIS BURDEN ESTIMATE OR ANY OTHER ASPECT OF THIS COLLECTION OF INFORMATION TO THE ADDRESS BELOW.

**REPORT DATE**
27-04-2012

**TITLE AND SUBTITLE**
Stability in the Black Sea Littoral Region: Focus on the Montreux Convention

**AUTHOR(S)**
LCDR Adam J. Kruppa, USN

**PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**
USMC Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Quantico, VA 22134-5068

**PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER**
N/A

**SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**
N/A

**SPONSOR/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER**
N/A

**ABSTRACT**
For thousands of years the Black Sea has been the crossroads of east and west civilizations. Many armed conflicts have occurred throughout the area and along the maritime entrance to the Black Sea, the Turkish Straits. Since the dawn of sail, control of the straits has been the center of gravity for hundreds of conflicts and the region's stability in the 21st century is significant to many international nations and organizations, as involvement and economic growth continue to expand. The growing interest in the region's stability continues to hinge on control of maritime traffic and restriction of non-local warships. This research paper looks at the current access regulation to the Black Sea, the Montreux Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits, and how it maintains stability in the Black Sea littoral region.

**SUBJECT TERMS**

**SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:**
Unclass

**LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**
Unclass

**NUMBER OF PAGES**
43

**NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON**
Marine Corps University / Command and Staff College
STABILITY IN THE BLACK SEA LITTORAL REGION: FOCUS ON THE MONTREUX CONVENTION

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

LCDR ADAM J. KRUPPA, USN

AY 11-12

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Edward Erickson
Approved: ____________________________
Date: April 17, 2012

Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Pauletta Otis
Approved: ____________________________
Date: April 2012
Executive Summary

Title: Stabililty of the Black Sea Littoral Region: Focus on the Montreux Convention.

Author: LCDR Adam J. Kruppa, United States Navy

Thesis: Maintaining the Montreux Convention maintains stability in the Black Sea Littoral Region.

Discussion: For thousands of years the Black Sea has been a crossroads of east and west civilizations. Many armed conflicts have occurred throughout the area and along the maritime entrance to the Black Sea, the Turkish Straits. Since the dawn of sail, control of the straits has been the center of gravity for hundreds of conflicts from the Persians, the Battle of Troy, the Expansion of Alexander the Great, the route of the Crusaders, and as a backdoor operation for World War I allies. The Black Sea region’s importance and stabilization in the 21st century is just as significant to many international nations and organizations as increased involvement and economic growth continue to expand. The growing interest in the region’s stability continues to hinge on control of maritime traffic and restriction of non-local warships. This paper looks at the current access regulation to the Black Sea, the Montreux Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits (Montreux Convention) and how it will maintain regional stability.

Conclusion: The continued developments in the region reflect the growing partnerships in the region, but are overshadowed with exponential energy resource advancement and exploration. Although opening the Black Sea can be viewed as stabilizing, access by national and/or ethnic rivals into the central bridge between east and west could spark a clash of civilizations that the BSLR has not witnessed in over 500 years. Just as the presence of Iranian warships in the Eastern Mediterranean has concerned western military leaders, the presence of American, Israeli, or Chinese warships conducting regular patrols off the coast of Ukraine or Georgia may cause increased regional concern. Such a decision would isolate the BSLR members from their neighbors that they have been heavily reliant upon for local security and regional stability for centuries.
DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DISCLAIMER</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPORTANCE OF THE REGION</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMIC GROWTH</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANTI-ACCESS</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONTREUX CONVENTION: FORCE FOR STABILITY</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONTREUX – LIMITING ACCESS</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURKISH INTERESTS</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGIONAL RELATIONSHIPS AND PARTNERSHIPS</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRADE INTERESTS</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHALLENGES FOR STABILITY</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCEIVED EXPANSIONIST THREATS</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENERGY SECURITY AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENVIRONMENTAL AND MARITIME SAFETY</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>END NOTES</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 1: TURKISH STRAITS TREATY TIMELINE</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX B: TURKISH STRAITS BODIES OF WATER MAP</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX C: EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO MEMBERSHIP MAP</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX E: TURKISH CRUDE OIL PIPELINE MAP</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to acknowledge all those that have assisted me in this project: my research mentor Edward Erickson, Ph.D., Pauletta Otis, Ph.D., LtCol John Dobes, and the staff at the Gray Research Center in Quantico, Virginia. Thank you for your guidance and support.

I would also like to acknowledge my wife Suzanne and sons Kyle and Jayce for your continued support in my endeavors to complete this study. Your love and sacrifice of time and shared chores eased the challenges of this paper and I am forever indebted to you.
INTRODUCTION

For thousands of years the Black Sea has been a crossroads of east and west civilizations. Many armed conflicts have occurred throughout the area and along the maritime entrance to the Black Sea, the Turkish Straits. Since the dawn of sail, control of the straits has been the center of gravity for hundreds of conflicts from the Persians, the Battle of Troy, the Expansion of Alexander the Great, the route of the Crusaders, and as a backdoor operation for World War I allies. The Black Sea region’s importance and stabilization in the 21st century is just as significant to many international nations and organizations as increased involvement and economic growth continue to expand. The growing interest in the region’s stability continues to hinge on control of maritime traffic and restriction of non-local warships. This paper looks at the current access regulation to the Black Sea, the Montreux Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits (Montreux Convention) and how it will maintain regional stability.

For over seventy-five years, the straits have been controlled by Turkey, deemed the authority by the thirteen signatories of the Montreux Convention, whom regulate all non-local warship transits into and out of the Black Sea. As the gatekeeper, Turkey upholds the role as initial stabilizing country for the region as stipulated in the Montreux Convention while balancing it’s role as a bridge-nation between the east and west economic interests, strategic policies, and partnerships. These Black Sea regional partnerships have grown in the area and are complementary to outside alliances and unions wishing to implement policies within the region. In pursuance of expanded alliances and unions, many international organizations now include many new member countries, regarded as from the “Wider Black Sea Area” (WBSA). Despite the attempts to include “Black Sea” members, participant countries vary extensively from organization to organization and have created a unique multi-lateral partnership map on the
region. This paper will default to the membership of the six coastal countries as defining a Black Sea Littoral Region (BSLR) unless otherwise indicated.

Attempts to revise the Montreux Convention could seek to grant non-local navies free access to the Black Sea so that their presence could support strategic interests in the region. Any revision that provides further access would challenge the stability in the region since littoral and neighboring countries have perceived multiple and varied threats of expansion. With energy security concerns and rampant transnational crime projected to increase the BSLR will continue to require centralized control of both the straits and within the Black Sea. These concerns challenge regional stability, in addition, to environmental and maritime safety risks caused by increased maritime congestion in the Turkish straits. Although there have been no contemporary requests to modify the Montreux Convention, doing so would challenge the stability of the region.

IMPORTANCE OF THE REGION

INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT

The Turkish Straits represent the access to a region that is a cornerstone of stability and security between Europe and the East. The region has vast natural resources along with strategic transport and energy corridors; each a hallmark of political, military, economic and other national power interests. Stability in the region is determinate to stability throughout Euro-Asia and has extended a dialogue for the expanding Euro-Atlantic institutions from west to east toward unification of Europe. It is important to put into context the vast area that the Black Sea Region covers including littoral and neighboring countries. As seen in Appendix C, six littoral states share the coast of the Black Sea, yet when discussing the stability of the region and the definitive players in economic prosperity and east/west alliances it is imperative to include
international organizations and neighboring nations such as Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece, and Serbia as both their proximity and involvement in the region are steady.

The BSLR has fostered multi-partnerships to address economic concerns of the WBSA and the Black Sea Economic Council (BSEC)\(^4\) which was initiated in 1992 to: uphold values of good neighbors, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights; opposition to violence, aggression, lawlessness, and terrorism; and transform the region into a region of peace, freedom and stability to facilitate integration with Europe.\(^5\) The BSEC (in which many EU states have observer status) has forged partnerships that strive to strengthen BSLR neighbor relations.\(^6\) The states of the BSLR all are UN members and NATO affiliated, either as members or Partnership for Peace (PFP) members.\(^7\) Two of the nations are EU members with a third recognized as an EU candidate (Turkey) although her future membership is continually debated.\(^8\) The Caspian region routinely discusses Black Sea regional issues such as future trade agreements and a proposed Eurasian-Balkan region,\(^9\) as it continues to experience economic development and rapid gravitation to NATO.\(^10\)

BSLR countries host international conferences focused on regional partnerships to integrate EU policies to municipalities while insisting on future security partnerships to protect economic interests (such as EU fishing policies). The United States routinely conducts multi-lateral discussions in the BSLR and in September 2011, POTUS met with the Romanian President to sign a missile defense deployment agreement. With NATO and EU westerly expansion to improve relations, the region has implemented energy initiatives, policies, and programs including: the Baku Initiative, the INOGATE program (an effort to integrate oil and gas to Europe),\(^11\) upgrading the infrastructure of the Baku-Sup’sa and the BTC oil and BTE gas pipelines; border management; environment research, science and education; and establishment
of TRACECA. The upcoming 2012 NATO summit will include over fifty countries and the stability of the BLSR will be important topic (as in previous summits). With mention of expected proposals for greater NATO-Russian cooperation and the recommendation for inclusion of Georgia into NATO, foreign policy and security discussions will continue to include the Black Sea region.

**ECONOMIC GROWTH**

According to the World Bank, the region is one of the most dynamic in the world. Known globally as a fertile area, the countries of the BSLR and their immediate neighbors are home to immense amounts of crude oil, natural gas, wheat, corn, and barley; with large projections of undiscovered resources. In 2011, Turkey recorded its largest export earnings (18% or $135 billion) while Georgia’s economic growth increased to 6.8%. In 2011, the Bulgarian city of Varna observed record maritime freight traffic of grain and fertilizer exports while planned maritime terminal developments will strengthen future export predictions in the region. The region has seen dramatic increases in wheat exports including: increased Ukrainian wheat production occurring each year since its independence and 2011 wheat exports ranked sixth in the world. Caspian regional countries and Ukrainian combined grain exports (20% of world’s grains shipped from the Black Sea) ranked first and third in global barley and corn exports, while in 2010, Austria invested fourteen billion Euros to support a thirty-three percent increase in exports to the region.

From 2011-12, each BSLR country authorized offshore exploration of oil and gas and has allowed various corporations (*Lukoil, Chevron, Exxon, Shell, Naftogaz, Gazprom*) to start investing in exploration for future resource export. 2011 and 2012 offshore natural gas explorations have discovered major gas deposits off both Romanian and Bulgarian coasts.
amount of crude oil sent through the straits has increased each year to include over 150 million tons (three million barrels per day) in 2011 of which 40% was consumed by European countries. Projected global demand of both oil (approximately 70% increase by 2020) and natural gas (1/3 of EU natural gas arrives from Ukrainian pipes) and the challenge of a landlocked Caspian Sea, will result in increased petroleum exports and a continued focus of energy security in the Black Sea.

Given the increasing partnerships and fertile abundance, it is no surprise that natural resource control is a concern in the region. One factor that obliged Georgia to yield to Russian military and political demands to join the CIS (or face Abkhazian military operations on its soil) was its dependence on Russia for 85 percent of its energy. As the EU looks for diverse power sources, the BSLR will continue to provide electric, natural gas and crude oil to Europe and around the world. This reliance creates a dependent relationship with east and west states that increases regional economic development, yet stifles relationships (if seen as monopolistic) during crisis’s such as; harsh winters when Russian energy companies have admitted to lowering or shutting off power sources to Europe; the drying up or freezing of the Danube; and congestion in the Turkish Straits; resulting in increased grain costs and jeopardize future trade in the BS. This highly fertile region should not see a decrease in exports in the near future and has caused many BSLR countries to propose new approaches to more efficient and safe means of transporting these economic goods to include the recent Turkish acceptance of a “South stream” under-sea natural gas pipeline and an additional Turkish canal from the Sea of Marmara to the Black Sea.
ANTI-ACCESS

“The ability to ensure operational access in the future is being challenged—and may well be the most difficult operational challenge U.S. forces will face over the coming decades.”

“Assured access: The unhindered national use of the global commons and select sovereign territory, waters, airspace and cyberspace, achieved by projecting all the elements of national power.”

– U.S. Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) of 17 January 2012

As recently as February 2012, Russia has protested U.S. warship access, despite the United States invitations to conduct multi-lateral exercises in the Black Sea. The Russian fleet in Sevastopol, and the changing nature of Russo-Turkish relations have continued to affect the region’s stability and in turn, impacted global politics. Moscow’s strategic view of the Black Sea should not be underestimated; Prime Minister Vladimir Putin declared that the “Azov–Black Sea basin is in Russia’s zone of strategic interests”; the Black Sea, he explained, “provides Russia with direct access to the most important global transport routes, including economic ones.” Granting non-BSL warships access is acutely sensitive to countries that have a long history of brokering with Turkey to ensure that anti-access treaties are active, such as concern that adversaries are not given access to Russian waters.

Historically, Grotius Mare Liberum (1609) argued that the sea is an international territory and that all nations are free to use it for trade. Although resisted by many seafaring nations (such as Great Britain’s competition with the Dutch), this early legal definition evolved into the contemporary notion of Freedom of the Seas. Since land is less than two nautical miles from both the Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits and the Black Sea is surrounded by land on 99% of it’s coast, the geographic uniqueness has contested the applicability of Mare Liberum and access
through the Turkish Straits for centuries similar to the contests for territory in the Kingdom of Troy and the Byzantine Empire. Initial formal regulation of the Turkish Straits was a product of the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kaimardji (1774) in which the Ottoman Empire agreed to grant Russian commercial vessels transit access through the straits. England became guarantor of this no-warship access treaty and their bi-lateral relationship with the Ottoman’s continued into the 19th century and included additional agreements to restrict warship access through the straits (with the exception of Russian security vessels, as required.) A brief conflict between the two nations terminated the agreement in 1807, yet was again updated in the Treaty of the Dardanelles that proclaimed Royal Navy protection of the Ottoman Empire and limited warship passage subject to the Sultan’s approval.

“the occupation of [Taiwan Straits] by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.”
- President Harry Truman, 26 June 1950

As noted in the JOAC, western military strategy is developing concepts to oppose anti-access and area-denial (A2AD) security approaches. With fewer forward-deployed forces to defend U.S. strategic interests and to protect the bases necessary for the flow of reinforcements into a theater, it has become conceivable that a relatively weak power could adopt and execute a strategy that successfully interferes with the U.S. military’s ability to project power. Denial of access cannot be considered a new strategy as German submarine operations in the North Atlantic in World War II focused on preventing the deployment of U.S. forces in Europe. The response to anti-access policies is receiving negative western response including revised national security strategies and the restructuring of defense forces.

As written, the Montreux Convention is a standing anti-access treaty that condones the regulation of warships through the Turkish Straits and into the Black Sea for the protection of the
Those countries that protest the continued use of A2AD, such as the United States, must be prepared for a possible foreign policy conflict, if condoning anti-access while supporting the Montreux Convention. Although only discussed with regards to the Pacific region, A2AD must be viewed globally as the Black Sea and wider area are involved in a foreign policy debates including the deployment of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems in Eastern Europe and the presence of US Navy BMD capable ships in the Black Sea. Access to the Black Sea determines the ability of the warships to actively defend against ballistic weapons and will be an imperative for U.S. Navy BMD deployments and thus will pressure diplomatic solutions to U.S. access to the Black Sea.

**MONTREUX CONVENTION: FORCE FOR STABILITY**

**MONTREUX – LIMITING ACCESS**

In 1936, the Convention of Montreux was the final treaty signed to restrict passage in the Turkish Straits. Signed by Bulgaria, France, United Kingdom (including Australia and Cyprus), India, Greece, Japan, Romania, Turkey, U.S.S.R, and Yugoslavia, the Convention stipulates transit restrictions and grants Turkey full control of the straits (to include denial of non-Black Sea country warships) while removing the demilitarization status of the Straits. The treaty grants free access to all commercial vessels and Black Sea nation warships, but restricts non-Black Sea nation warships from entry into the sea without the prior-approval from Turkey. Similar to other choke point regulations, warships from outside the Black Sea (pending tonnage limitation) are authorized to enter the Black Sea via the Turkish Straits, for a 21-day maximum duration, which is to be requested at least eight days in advance.

The treaty categorizes warships and stipulates passage regulations pertaining to these categories for both local (BSLR) and visiting navies. Of the tonnage maximums set forth in
Articles 14 and 18 of the treaty, non-Black Sea warships are restricted to a 30,000 ton aggregate within the Black Sea at any time. The treaty stipulates warship transits in the Straits are restricted to nine warships and 15,000 ton aggregate maximum. Although the treaty delineates that capital ships may extend beyond the 15,000 ton maximum (with caveats), the use of capital ships in current naval fleets is almost non-existent and has been item proposed for revision. Aircraft carriers and submarines are specifically restricted from access through the straits, although port calls to Turkish cities within the straits may be permitted. Over the seventy-five years, many technological advances such as anti-surface missiles, anti-air missiles, cruise missiles and ballistic missile defense missiles have provided new capabilities to warships, yet without a revision of the Montreux Treaty the clear delineation of these capabilities will still fall under the subcategories of warships based on ship size, ship speed, gun armament, and aircraft launching capabilities.

The Montreux Convention was written with twenty-year expiration and five-year amendment periods which could have been initiated by any of the original signatories. The treaty requires a two-year advanced notice of denouncement, in which a conference would be held to discuss a new treaty yet despite various requests for revision no organized abrogation is pending. An amendment to the Montreux would involve an affirmative vote of five nations (including Turkey) whereas in 1936 it only required two nations plus Turkey.

Many contemporaries argue that the Montreux is obsolete since the admittance of new weaponry including ship borne attack and nuclear missiles, differing criteria of ships (quantitative and qualitative), missing regulation to the safe transit of ships, international law changes, safety of the Turkish shore, and pollution regulation. Additionally, humanitarian
passage is reflected in the Montreux Treaty, but revising the terminology and tonnage limits to modern standards listed such as the following from Article 18;

“[T]he Turkish Government will immediately inform the other Black Sea Powers of the request for authorization, and if the said Powers make no objection within twenty-four hours...the Turkish Government shall...inform the interested Powers of the reply”

may have prevented the stoppage of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) into the Black Sea, notably the assistance during the 2008 South Ossetia conflict, in which U.S. HADR was denied access by Black Sea powers (vis-a-vis Russia). Despite the prevention of HADR, the U.S. Department of State “had consultations in full respect for the Montreux Convention” and had “no choice but to honor the Montreux Convention.” This acceptance of the Montreux Convention as a sacred access treaty reflects the stable force inherent in the document, as countries like the United States are forced to abide by internationally approved treaties signed and supported by democratic states, even with other geopolitical ramifications.

TURKISH INTERESTS

Two of the Montreux Convention’s signatories, Romania and Bulgaria (both EU), would most likely promote western-supported revisions, but any revision is limited, in that, the convention gives unique powers to Turkey on amending warship transit categories and has full veto amendment power for the applicable Articles 14 and 18. This legal authority along with full control of territory on the straits’ shores, Turkey maintains geopolitical and geostrategic power over the access to the Black Sea. As a western-looking nation, Turkey’s political compass must consider the pull from east and west to appease the international interests in securing the sea lanes of communication and the littorals in the Black Sea. One of the responsibilities of its recent western partnerships, Turkey has to balance its commitments between EU military operations and Article V (NATO) missions. The over-the-horizon EU commitments take the
Turkish Navy amongst the global commons in support of freedom of navigation and free enterprise, yet this same coalition backing contrasts with Turkey’s opposition to NATO naval exercises in Black Sea, which threaten Turkish control espoused in the Montreux Treaty. This conflict is what places Turkey in a power position to control Black Sea access, as it is constrained by its own limitations set by striving to maintain local security for the Black Sea while promoting NATO-inspired freedom of navigation throughout the remainder of international waterways.

From the Edirne Treaty to the Convention of Sevres (see Appendix A), access to the Turkish Straits swung from full restriction to full access, as European powers (Britain and France) negotiated with the Ottoman Empire, while Russia simultaneously brokered for restricted local (BSLR) warship access. Although international signatories agreed upon the open access of all warships in the Convention of Sevres, the treaty ultimately failed ratification as political and military relationships were driven by Turkey’s straits interests. During the World War I peach process, Turkey expressed dire concerns over the Convention of Lausanne’s new international control of the straits and the fact that no League of Nations members were guarantors. Nine years after the Convention of Lausanne, Turkey joined the League of Nations and with ongoing security concerns immediately proposed a straits regulation revision, resulting in the Montreux Convention in 1936.

Previous attempts to instill international control of the straits have failed and to expect an easing of decision making for future international bodies to resolve is wishful thinking. The alternative to a future controlling organization would be to rescind the convention and remove all control, yet this places straits’ congestion and daily hazardous risk upon the Turkish waters and shores without security or regulation. Recent maritime disasters including major oil spills and
tanker collisions in the Black Sea have strengthened Turkey's concerns over ecological dangers to its shoreline and led Turkey to justify a unilateral decision that went into force in the summer of 1994 (following the tragic collision of the tanker *Nassia*) to impose stringent restrictions on tanker traffic in the Straits.\textsuperscript{56} Turkey submitted Maritime Traffic regulations that stipulated that ships with dangerous cargo should inform the Turkish authorities of their intention to pass through the Straits 24-hours in advance and while they were in passage, no other ship would be allowed to pass through the Straits, speed would be limited to ten knots, and overtaking would be forbidden. In addition to controlling pace of the straits and reserving the right to close the Straits temporarily for various activities such as: fire fighting, sounding, sports and scientific activities, rescue operations or anti-pollution projects; the ships are advised to abide by the new traffic separation schemes put in place by the Turkish authorities\textsuperscript{57} and accepted in 1995.\textsuperscript{58} The control administered by Turkey since the signing of the Montreux Convention establishes a central authority responsible to resolve issues in the Turkish Straits and a representative to discuss strategic imperatives.

In addition to Turkey’s geographic concerns, internally Turkey is considering a second Chinese-built, Black Sea coastal nuclear power plant,\textsuperscript{59} a third bridge over the Bosphorus and a Presidential-proposed Istanbul canal to be built by 2023 all of which involve international investments. But beyond geographic concerns, Turkey is amidst various international political considerations that access has impact upon. Successful cooperation between United States and Turkey on development projects such as the BTC and South Caucasus gas pipelines and agreements on southern corridor linkages to the Caspian Region\textsuperscript{60} requires further political cooperation. Future partnering to support agreements may result in increased combined-military exercises to foster interoperability and improve security capability.
Continuing conflicts pose threats to regional security and stability in the region including: Armenia-Azerbaijan tensions over Nagorno-Karabakh; Georgia and secessionist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia; Russian protracted conflict in Chechnya; self-proclaimed Transnistrian Republic threatening the territorial integrity of Moldova; and the Georgian-Ajar conflicts. Each of these conflicts could be affected by the precedent set in the Kosovo settlement in regards to an international collective solution. In Nagorno-Karabakh, a process within the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has yet to come to a solution and is no closer to resolution than it was a decade ago. The multi-lateral approach is not working for frozen conflicts, while others view the omission of key nations as reason for low momentum in resolving these conflicts (i.e. Turkey’s role). Relations between Turkey and Armenia are critical throughout the Black Sea and Caspian region, yet Turkey opposes all Russian peace settlements. This defiant act foreshadows extended geopolitical stresses between the BSLR and Caspian region with regard to Russian sensitivity to Caucasus energy and Turkey’s threat. Although this is seemingly frozen, human rights violations during the South Ossetia war were cited as a Russian responsibility for the prevention of human rights violations of 100,000 displaced personnel in Georgia. In support, NATO sailed through the straits under Montreux, but under Russian pressure, Turkey abruptly denied U.S. support ships access citing Montreux restrictions.

REGIONAL RELATIONSHIPS AND PARTNERSHIPS

Despite the EU not extending Schengen visa-free travel to Romania, it’s President has recently urged the EU to send positive acceptance signals to it’s neighbor Turkey in an effort to transform the “region into an area of stability, prosperity and security is top priority”. With stronger ties to Turkey the EU would benefit from more maritime access in the Black Sea as it
could continue to develop it’s integration strategy with members, candidates, and others nations important to the Black Sea synergy initiative. Through persistent maritime presence, the EU could leverage the access to strengthen ties and persuade nation publics to modify contentious political decisions, such as the Ukrainian imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko or the Turkish human rights stance on Kurds but in doing so would challenge the partnerships shared by BSLR countries and ongoing initiatives to strengthen the region’s security.

To address security challenges the BSLR countries have joined with Turkey to form the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR). Created in 2001, this force is a regional initiative to increase interoperability and promote stability and peace in the maritime domain. Over the past decade, BLACKSEAFOR has conducted combined military capabilities to include SAR, HADR, environmental protection, goodwill visits, and United Nation (UN) charted tasks (combating asymmetric threats and prevention of terrorism, WMD proliferation, and illicit trafficking.) Responding to NATO’s OPERATION ACTIVE ENDEAVOR (OAE), and in support of UN Security Council resolutions to combat terror, in 2004 Turkey initiated OPERATION BLACK SEA HARMONY (OBSH) as a complement to OAE which has developed into a robust regional operation in support of security and stability. OBSH’s mission is to maintain maritime situation awareness, enable the identification of suspect vessels, and conduct MSO presence in vital SLOCs to include the “smooth flow of shipping through the Turkish straits, as well as, maintaining navigational order along the vital sea lines of communication in the Black Sea maritime domain” until a maritime force is able to assume security duties on a permanent basis. With the success in OBSH it is the wish of many NATO nations to extend BSLR to work with NATO’s OAE. Both OAE and OBSH cooperate through
information exchange and the transfer of suspect ships shadowing between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, as an effort to build capacity between NATO and BSLR navies.

The complexity of political decisions in international organizations are challenged with the addition of military component (even if innocent) into the situation. The establishment of U.S. military bases in Bulgaria and Romania signals the American geostrategic stake. The U.S. naval presence in the Black Sea pursues coalition building intended to secure foreign policy objectives through influencing allies, reducing risk of conflict, improving interoperability, and allowing states to act jointly against common threats. An important vehicle for coalition building in the Black Sea has been, SEA BREEZE, a joint and combined military maritime and land exercise with the principal goal of enhancing the interoperability and maritime capabilities of Black Sea states. Ukraine sees multinational exercises like SEA BREEZE as aiding its own foreign policy objective of NATO membership, demonstrating progress in military modernization, and increasing interoperability with NATO forces. The region continues to work multi-laterally with NATO through interoperability exercises, such as EXERCISE JACKAL STONE, which brought over ten participating international militaries to the region for the largest Special Operations exercise of its kind. As BSLR countries work to improve interoperability, they understand that NATO membership provides a sense of clarity and predictability to future conflict roles yet these partnerships are limited in scope to the relationships built locally. No diplomatic partnership in the Black Sea region will be successful without the full support of BSLR neighbors and the allowance of uncontrolled non-black sea navies’ access through the Turkish straits will conflict with the strategic interests of Russia and Turkey and will further devalue important regional partnerships.
TRADE INTERESTS

Numerous developments in the BSLR include port terminal upgrades, new international airports, coastal cities and ports, and entry of large capacity tankers, these allow Caspian and Asian countries access to European trade through the Black Sea. In 2012, Kazakhstan representatives met with the Bulgarian Energy Minister to discuss expanding oil transit and supply in the Black Sea. With seventy percent of Kazakhstan gas sent to Europe, Bulgaria has expressed openness to build coastal terminals to receive Kazakhstan oil and gas (while Ukraine is hoping to set up a grain pool with Kazakhstan.) To the west, Lukoil is installing meters on its crude oil refineries in Burgas to calculate tax and cost while electronic billing systems in ports streamline the increased commerce. With the potential to be second largest port of the EU, Romania is working with Korea to build a new LNG terminal. To the north, Ukraine has agreed to have a BSTD bank (which brings the Euro) and is planning a deep draft port to outrival Constanta, connect with its railway, and provide less offshore reliance. Russia is also looking to develop oil infrastructure further as it coordinates with Exxon to build a LNG plant in the Kara Sea in hopes of future oil and gas explorations discoveries. Tourism is expected to be an increasing market for the region as it continues to be a popular European summer destination and also as Russia will host the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi while two of the host cities for the 2018 World Cup are in the immediate proximity of the Black Sea (Sochi & Krasnodar.) The continued developments in the region reflect the growing trade interests in the region, but are overshadowed with the exponential development of energy resource development and exploration which require continued energy security.

Not surprisingly, oil trade by ship is a large economic force in the region and although the Bosphorus is congested daily by petroleum tankers, large developments including the North
Stream and South Stream gas diverts and new oil and gas pipelines through Turkey (shown in Appendices D and E) are planned to ease congestion. But as innovative projects are proposed to decrease export by sea, the fertility of the region is attracting Caspian and Middle Eastern countries to export oil and gas through the Black Sea despite stressing the maritime traffic. As a staple of many of the countries’ economies, exporting these natural resources relies heavily on infrastructure including ports (such as Novorossiysk and Sup’Sa) and pipelines like the Blue Stream and the future South Stream natural gas pipelines providing gas directly from Russia to Turkey and Europe.\textsuperscript{79}

The BSLR must foresee future foreign policy issues in the middle east as a consequence of its borders, trade agreements (oil, gas, rail), and military support. Multiple eastern countries are interested in future regional business ties such as Cypriot oil exploration, Iraqi oil export, recent Turkish nuclear power plant negotiations with China, and a proposed Iranian oil refinery in Bulgaria. The BSLR countries are keen to partner with Caspian countries, as Russia (despite the recent signing of the CSTO) is losing its grip on energy control in this fertile area and Caspian countries are anxious to connect with global markets, especially Europe.

\section*{CHALLENGES FOR STABILITY}

\subsection*{PERCEIVED EXPANSIONIST THREATS}

Free access for all warships into the Black Sea is perceived as a kindle to thaw Cold War tensions, as Russia has openly protested against United States and other allies’ maritime access, as well as, missile defense programs in the BSLR and Eastern Europe. Although designed as a defensive system, the presence of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capable warships would further aggravate this sensitive issue as uncontested access of these mobile systems may be
perceived as preemptive. In addition to BMD threats and despite existing Russia-EU relationship,\textsuperscript{80} NATO operations in the Black Sea pose an expansionist threat to the region.

Although Turkey has been pressured to accept warship access, NATO expansion into the region does not pose an actual military or naval threat as much as a threat of growing democracy to Russian security, stability, sovereignty, and status. Russia’s foreign policy is of multi-polarity and equates to the antithesis of partnership, i.e. rivalry, due to its decreasing regional influence.\textsuperscript{81} Russian interests in the BSLR are centered on its perceived predominant diplomatic role, while maintaining hegemony over regional energy and military coalitions. Russia looks to prevent NATO expansion while struggling against terrorism and fundamentalism in the region\textsuperscript{82}, forcing a reliance on strong partnerships to sustain balance. Yet it’s the deep regional relationships that form diplomatic agreements which transcend outsider initiatives, regardless of rhetoric from other unilateral talks. Russia has shown throughout history that defense of its area of influence holds primary strategic concern. The Soviet navy quickly reverted to aggressive naval tactics during perceived increased rivalry, such as the multiple Cold War incidents involving forced collisions between Soviet and U.S. warships near Sevastopol, and warship’s employing harassing, collision courses towards U.S. warships in the Dardanelles.\textsuperscript{83} Recently, Russia displayed this foreign policy bi-polarity as it proposed to be exempt from NATO mutual ship inspections, although diplomatically Russia would agree to such cooperative activities.\textsuperscript{84}

To strengthen anti-access acceptance, Russia supports the BSLR collective security response, BLACKSEAFOR. Amongst increasing piracy and illegal trafficking in the region, Turkey and Russia strongly advocate an organic security organization. By operating with an understanding that there are only risks (not threats) in the Black Sea, collective security with strong Turkish maritime jurisdiction is more vital then ever to the BSLR countries. Turkey and
Russia have both expressed that external intervention is not conducive to the region’s security and that the two current approaches are sound. The first approach follows a collective security approach that “Transnational threats should be responded by transnational security”\(^85\) while the second approach focuses on regional maritime security as complementary to Euro-Atlantic security.\(^86\) Any attempt by non-black sea navies to access the regional waters and establish maritime security would threaten this collective agreement on appropriate security. The advent of OBSH has resulted in an acceptance by BSLR countries that the operation is a productive counter-terrorist effort (as a response to NATO’s absence) and will maintain regional security without outside intervention. Notwithstanding unknown future threats and the region’s unmeasured capability to prevent such attacks, BSLR countries support continued operations of the BLACKSEAFOR while maintaining the importance of data sharing with NATO so as to support both security approaches.

Such perceived expansion may increase tensions with Russia’s defense businesses if former Soviet bloc countries were to join NATO and consequently cease defense collaborations, such as the Crimean Black Sea Fleet land lease. Even though contemporary protests such as Ukrainian opposition to the arrival of NATO’s support ship *Advantage*\(^87\) occur, regular NATO and foreign maritime access may compel these CIS states to buy NATO weapons and result in an unanticipated Eurasian arms race.\(^88\) Turkish concerns with Israeli warship activity and naval priorities would also be heightened with free access for Israeli warships to the BSLR. The continued requests for Israeli participation with NATO forces, foreshadows a possibility of future Israeli presence in the Black Sea, as partnerships would likely strengthen and presence could define Israeli expansion to the region.\(^89\) In light of the 2010 Israeli ship boarding of Turkish aid ship off the coast of Gaza strip, tensions would only be heightened by the conduct of
joint combined NATO exercises, such as the March 2012 EXERCISE NOBLE DINA with Greece and U.S. military units in the Black Sea.\textsuperscript{90} Diplomatic and military agreements between Black Sea countries (Bulgaria, Romania, and Azerbaijan)\textsuperscript{91} may invite Israeli naval units to conduct recurring exercises and port visits in the Black Sea if the Montreux Convention was renounced.

Not only is organic perception of threats a force for instability, but similar are the perceptions of non-black sea powers to military presence in the Black Sea. With diplomatic, economic, and security pledges between China and the Black Sea countries of Ukraine, Romania, and Turkey\textsuperscript{92} along with a continued Russian-Chinese partnership future Chinese warship presence in the Black Sea to support mutual naval cooperation, would shift United States foreign policy priorities towards a perceived Chinese threat. As a new hub of European security interests, the Black Sea region poses sustainable development for the wider area\textsuperscript{93} and is vitally important to stability in nearby regions.\textsuperscript{94} With a democratic umbrella, the BSLR collective security approach seeks to expand military cooperation to common energy and transit security.\textsuperscript{95} A strong commonality to regional collective security is the maritime domain. The presence of allied forces assumingly provides security enhancement through: increased response time, persistent presence, and shared intelligence capability. Despite the progress of the region’s collective security approach, the anti-access regulations of the Montreux Convention is the key impetus for successful centralized security and it’s existence foregoes many maritime security disagreements.

**ENERGY SECURITY AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME**

Current security threats in the region include: terrorism, organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, border security, personnel and drug trafficking, piracy and illegal
arms trade, frozen conflicts, and ethnic tensions.\textsuperscript{96} As seen in Appendix D, the construction of the Blue Stream pipeline and approved plan for the South Stream pipeline, the regional naval forces must prepare for increased security of maritime infrastructures and commerce. These energy assets are targets of terrorist and criminal actions that could have a drastic impact on European and global financial systems.\textsuperscript{97} In the maritime domain, a safe transit zone requires proper navigation of vessels and maritime security\textsuperscript{98} of both the Straits and vital infrastructure.\textsuperscript{99} In efforts to enhance maritime security, OBSH and BLACKSEAFOR priorities are aimed at deterring and preventing terrorist threats and illicit activity.

Criminal activity on the Black Sea has had significant impact on the region’s stability and echoes concern into Europe.\textsuperscript{100} Drug trafficking (of which 75\% of drugs in Europe have been tracked to transit through the BSLR,\textsuperscript{101} involves a majority of apprehended traffickers from Russia, Moldova, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, or Armenia, thus mostly from the Wider Black Sea Area.\textsuperscript{102} Black Sea ports including Odessa, Constanta and Varna have been identified as cocaine entry points from Latin America, with nearby Moldova an important location for storage and further processing.\textsuperscript{103} Latin American criminal groups are facilitating and organizing the trafficking of cocaine to the EU (via Turkey) with Georgian and EU citizens recruited by Russian criminal groups.\textsuperscript{104}

In addition to drug trafficking, the Black Sea is evolving into a serious human trafficking region. With trafficking for labor and sexual purposes, citizens of Ukraine, Russia, Romania and Moldova are seeking to enter the EU. With a flourishing cocaine and heroin transport route in Black Sea ports, the EU projection of a Ukrainian visa-free regime and expected approval of Romania and Bulgaria to the Schengen Zone, facilitates trafficking via the BSLR and leads to increased targeting by illegal immigrants and organized criminals.\textsuperscript{105}
Another regional criminal concern is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and as five different smuggling routes are located in the BSLR.\textsuperscript{106} Since 2005, ten radioactive material interdictions and 587 illicit weapons shipments were interrupted at the Ukrainian-Moldovan border. In 2010 alone, Ukrainian border security officials reported a 10 percent increase in interdictions of illicit drugs, radioactive materials, and weapons.\textsuperscript{107} Although U.S. maritime security training and equipment (including maritime radars and ship refurbishment) was provided to customs units in major Black Sea ports at Odessa and Kerch Strait,\textsuperscript{108} the region has no consensus on WMD proliferation security, outside of regional collective security.

As each of these criminal concerns is projected to increase in the BSLR, the modification of the Montreux Convention would jeopardize the centralized control of access that Turkey and other BSLR countries have on seaborne vessels. Despite any increased capability or capacity of non-black sea navies to conduct interdiction operations in the Turkish Straits or the Black Sea, reliance on allies to independently seek out criminal vessels decreases the regional maritime security, as no international, universal data sharing system exists to account for vessels in the Black Sea and criminals apprehended. Without a centralized or collective authority to coordinate and direct maritime operations (such as Turkey or BLACKSEAFOR) the region will experience increased criminal activity and decreased regional stability.

ENVIRONMENTAL AND MARITIME SAFETY

In 1936, ship traffic averaged four-five ships per day and Istanbul’s population was 700,000, whereas in 2011 it averaged more than 150 ships per day and population of 13 million, as the third largest city in Europe.\textsuperscript{109} Istanbul has many concerns with regard to congestion in the Bosphorus Straits resulting in catastrophes such as deadly ship collisions and oil spills.\textsuperscript{110} Of the 50,000 vessels transiting per year, 5000 are carrying oil, and it is estimated that 2.9 mil barrels of
petroleum (per day) cross the Bosphorus in a variety of ships including the massive Suezmax tanker. Although harsh weather may cause Turkish authorities to deem the Straits as unnavigable and detrimental to safe navigation, approximately 1.5 million people cross the Bosphorus daily on 1,000 ferry or shuttle boat crossings. In an effort to address all possible crises’ Turkey has instituted new daylight-only transit regulations on large vessels carrying dangerous goods.

With increased maritime traffic, the Black Sea is vulnerable to future oil spills and BSLR countries will be forced to deal with the financial and environmental costs associated, just as in 2011 when Ukraine presented a bill to a grounded Cambodian ships’ company for ten tons of pollution in local waters. Regional stability concerns hinge on the safe transit of maritime trade throughout the BSLR and specifically the Turkish Straits. The BSEC and EU have expressed critical concerns with congestion and environmental safety risks posed by increase seaborne trade both in and through the Black Sea. With affects beyond the region, a collective safety approach including joint and multi-lateral training exercises has been deemed as beneficial but increased interoperability and warship patrols to deter terrorist attacks and increase infrastructure security must be weighed against the geography, shallow depth, and strong currents in the Turkish straits which create a dangerous body of water that increases chance of collision. The uncontrolled presence of military warships would only increase congestion and environmental pollution risk, increased maritime traffic incidents (including search and rescue efforts), and cause continued seaborne delays and diplomatic conflicts. Without the Montreux Convention’s granting of Turkish authority, increased congestion hazards would pose a substantial hazard to vessel safety and environmental safety of Black Sea coasts.
CONCLUSION

As organizations in the region have recently failed to ratify significant security policies, the growth of the various cooperative endeavors solidify the importance of the region and stress the imperative to cooperate in energy trade, security, and environmental protection. The changing relationships and partnerships of the BSLR include neighboring countries such as: Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Serbia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan (all PFP members and members of various international organizations). These neighbors’ partnerships complicate future maritime access strategic decisions as NATO and EU priorities weigh heavily on WBSR cooperative security. As the BSLR countries seek expansion of partnerships (west and east) the various influence groups (including the EU and NATO) understand that the stability for Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East, pivots on security in the Black Sea but must also concede that Black Sea regional collective security is pivotal for future partnerships. The free transit of non-Black Sea Powers’ warships could provide increased security through sheer power projection and multi-lateral maritime training exercise opportunities. These interwoven partnerships bring a complexity to non-local warship access, as each participant must then consider the political ramifications for security cooperation. As BSLR countries consider the implications of EU maritime access to the Black Sea, it will require consideration of a future EU position in which countries may be forbidden to rely on the BLACKSEAFOR (which includes non-EU members) to be the sole responder to future security threats.

Recent international agreements and continued Russian partnerships (PFP and NRC) suggest a possibility that Black Sea warship access could provide further diplomatic gain for the region, yet the long history between Turkish Straits access and foreign maritime forces reflects a very resistant Russian response to opening the straits regardless of the intent. The presence of
non-BSL forces in the region provide opportunities for stronger international relations amongst BSL and facilitate shared intelligence and surveillance capabilities into Black and Caspian regions, but the presence complicates an existing partnership that is disjointed.\textsuperscript{119} The lack of regional leadership\textsuperscript{120} and presence of multi-variant integration obstacles such as: the revival of Russian strategic initiative and strategic discord between United States and major European countries\textsuperscript{121} complicates future partnerships and fogs up clear diplomatic objectives.

The continued developments in the region reflect the growing partnerships in the region, but are overshadowed with exponential energy resource advancement and exploration. Although opening the Black Sea can be viewed as stabilizing, access by national and/or ethnic rivals into the central bridge between east and west could spark a clash of civilizations that the BSLR has not witnessed in over 500 years. Just as the presence of Iranian warships in the Eastern Mediterranean has concerned western military leaders, the presence of American, Israeli, or Chinese warships conducting regular patrols off the coast of Ukraine or Georgia may cause increased regional concern. Such a decision would isolate the BSLR members from their neighbors that they have been heavily reliant upon for local security and regional stability for centuries.
END NOTES

3 Georgia and Ukraine gained independence from Russia in 1991
4 As of 2012 the BSEC includes 12 countries and a Serbian Chairman. www.bsec-organization.org accessed 13 March 2012.
5 Gor, 11
6 Gor, 11
7 James MaCDougall, Black Sea Symposium Remarks, 2007, 10
8 Johan Tornquist. The European Union’s Emerging Military Capability. (Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell, April 2001), 15
9 James MaCDougall, Black Sea Symposium Remarks, 2007, 8
10 James MaCDougall, Black Sea Symposium Remarks, 2007, 11
11 Gor, 6
12 Gor, 26; Yuliya Klymko-Overchenko. European Union Engagement in the Black Sea Region: Efforts to Combat Illegal Migration. (College of Europe Thesis, Bruges Campus, 2008), 38. TRACECA was started in 1993 to link Europe to the caucuses through Turkey and network of transportation development and is an extension of the Major Trans-European Transport Axes to the Neighboring Countries and Regions of which all BSL (minus Russia) and eight neighbors are members.
15 Ambassador Sergiu Celac, Black Sea Symposium Remarks, 2007, 2
16 Including recent loans from Japan.
17 Russia ranks second in the world with the Black Sea as it’s largest export hub
19 Kazakhstan may reach record in 2012.
20 Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits signed at Montreux, July 20th, 1936, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 31, No. 1, Supplement: Official Documents (Jan. 1937);
22 ISS18
23 ISS18
24 Andres 2011, 2
25 Blank 1994, 6
27 Gor, 2
28 Sanders, 67
29 Bulent Gokcicek. The Montreux Convention regarding the Turkish Straits and its importance after the South Ossetia War (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, March 2009), 6-8
30 Guclu, 5
31 Gokcicek, 32
32 James Deaton. The Significance of International Straits to Soviet Naval Operations (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, March 1975)59; Gokcicek, 3
33 Gokcicek, 31
34 Gokcicek, 31
36 Roger Cliff. Entering the dragon's lair: Chinese antiaccess strategies and their implications for the United States. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2007), 14
37 Cliff, 15
38 Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits signed at Montreux, July 20th, 1936, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 31, No. 1, Supplement: Official Documents (Jan. 1937); Deaton, 61; Gokcicek, 34
39 Montreux Treaty
40 Deaton, 61. In the Danish Straits, an eight day notice must be given to Denmark, although if through the Swedish side of the ‘the sound’, free passage is authorized without prior notice.
41 Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits signed at Montreux, July 20th, 1936, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 31, No. 1, Supplement: Official Documents (Jan. 1937);
42 Deaton, 65. In 1951, Japan renounced it’s signatory from the Montreux Convention
43 Deaton, 65
44 Gokcicek, 60
45 Guclu; Vali; Erdorgan; Rozakis
46 Gokcicek, 4, 12-13; Guclu, 4
47 Gokcicek, 47-50,64
48 Matthew Bryza. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs – Situation in Georgia and Implications for the Caucasus. (Foreign Press Center Briefing, Washington, DC, August 19, 2008)
49 Gokcicek, 68
50 Gokcicek, 59
51 Blank, 2006, 53
52 Deaton, 61. Revisions specified that the straits were to be open to all warships (including aircraft).
53 Gokcicek, 33. In the Convention of Lausanne, the Turkish straits remained open to commercial vessels; the shores were to be demilitarized; warships were only authorized access if their size was smaller than the largest fleet of a Black Sea country; and a new international commission was established to supervise vessel transits through the straits.
54 Guclu, 1; Deaton, 61. Although they replied that they would work together (if required) to support future security issues. Although not a participant in the Convention of Lausanne, the U.S. signed a separate treaty with Turkey in 1923 that granted the U.S. full access to the Turkish Straits
55 Guclu, 1
57 Guclu, 5, 7
58 Guclu, 8
59 A Chinese nuclear power plant. A Russian company is constructing the first plant in the southern Turkey.
60 R. Nicholas Burns. Under Secretary for Political Affairs. The Future of the U.S. – Turkey Relationship (Remarks at the Atlantic Council of the United States (ACUS), Washington, DC, September 13, 2007)
61 Overchenko, 20-21; Kempe, 8-9
62 Ambassador Sergiu Celac, Black Sea Symposium Remarks, 2007, 2
63 OSCE is a mixed group of 15 nations headed by three co-chair nations.
64 James MaCDougall, Black Sea Symposium Remarks, 2007, 12
65 Blank, 1994, 12
67 Gokcicek, 47-48. 69,000 metric ton hospital ships were denied.
69 Tornquist, 8
72 Gor, 10
73 RADM Uraz, ISS18, 128
74 Lobree, 8
75 Burns, 2008
76 In the summer of 2006, SEA BREEZE was hosted by Ukraine and the US and conducted off the Crimea with seventeen participating states. It was during a political impasse (absence of a working government or parliament authorization of foreign troops on Ukrainian soil) that, in May 2006, the U.S.-flag merchant ship Advantage
arrived at Feodosiya with five hundred tons of construction material and equipment for use in that year’s SEA BREEZE exercise and eventually ended in local protests and cancellation of the exercise. The cargo was for a temporary multinational training base to be built at Starry Krym in the Crimea by U.S. Marine reservists and Navy personnel but were improperly described as conducting NATO offload. Sanders, 62, 65

Bulgaria which witnessed record airport passengers in 2011 and estimates a 14% increase in tourism in 2012

Blank, 2006, 11

Blank, 2006, 34

SECDEF to POTUS, Feb 67, 1988

Black Sea Symposium Remarks, 2007, 22

ISS18, 220

Sanders, 66-68. During EXERCISE SEA BREEZE the protestors claimed the city a “NATO free area.”


Enhancing Non-proliferation Partnerships in the Black Sea Region, A Minority Staff report prepared for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, One Hundred Twelfth Congress First Session September 27, 2011

James MacDougall, Black Sea Symposium Remarks, 2007, 13

Compared to 2009 levels. Enhancing Non-proliferation Partnerships in the Black Sea Region, A Minority Staff report prepared for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, One Hundred Twelfth Congress First Session September 27, 2011

The EU has new rules for exploration in an effort to prevent another deepwater horizon disaster.
A new action plan for Turkey and Georgian patrol boat training; a proposed regional monitoring center for analyzing economic output and consumption changes; a new five-year visa partnership between Romania and Turkey; and a free trade agreement between Turkey and Ukraine.

The EU in the region consists of Bulgaria and Romania (2007) and a candidate (Turkey). NATO membership includes Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania with remaining countries as NATO PFP (Russia, Ukraine, Georgia).

R. Nicholas Burns. Under Secretary for Political Affairs. The Future of the U.S. – Turkey Relationship (Remarks at the Atlantic Council of the United States (ACUS), Washington, DC, September 13, 2007)
**TABLE 1: TURKISH STRAITS TREATY TIMELINE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1774</td>
<td>Treaty of Kuchuk-Kaimardji</td>
<td>1798</td>
<td>Russia and Ottoman alliance agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1805</td>
<td>Russia and Ottoman alliance agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1809</td>
<td>Russia and Ottoman alliance agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1809</td>
<td>Treaty of Dardanelles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1829</td>
<td>Edirne Treaty</td>
<td>1833</td>
<td>Hunkar-Iskelesi Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1841</td>
<td>London Treaty of the Straits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856</td>
<td>Declaration of Paris</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td>London Straits agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Convention of Sevres</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Convention of Lausanne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>Convention of Montreux</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Potsdam Conference</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>UNCLOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Turkey updates navigation regulations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B: TURKISH STRAITS BODIES OF WATER MAP
APPENDIX C: EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO MEMBERSHIP MAP

APPENDIX D: BLACK SEA NATURAL GAS PIPELINE MAP

APPENDIX E: TURKISH CRUDE OIL PIPELINE MAP

# ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TERM</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGRI</td>
<td>Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania Interconnector gas pipeline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACKSEAFOR</td>
<td>Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSEC</td>
<td>Black Sea Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSL</td>
<td>Black Sea Littoral nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSR</td>
<td>Black Sea Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTC</td>
<td>Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan oil pipeline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTE (SCP)</td>
<td>Baku Tbilisi Erzurum natural gas pipeline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CESDP</td>
<td>Common European Security and Defense Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSFP</td>
<td>Common Security and Foreign Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSTO</td>
<td>Collective Security Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAEC</td>
<td>Eurasian Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECO</td>
<td>Economic Cooperation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUAM</td>
<td>Organization for Democracy and Economic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBSH</td>
<td>OPERATION BLACK SEA HARMONY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEOP</td>
<td>Pan-European Oil Pipeline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAGP</td>
<td>Trans-ASEAN natural Gas Pipeline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTCGP</td>
<td>Trans-Caspian natural Gas Pipeline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRACECA</td>
<td>Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBSR</td>
<td>Wider Black Sea Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Al-Sulimani, Abdullah. *The Scarcity of Water in the Middle East*. Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell, AL. April 2000


Blank, Stephen J. *The NATO-Russia Partnership: A marriage of convenience or a troubled relationship?* Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, November 2006.


Tornquist, Johan. *The European Union’s Emerging Military Capability*. Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell, April 2001