This paper analyzes joint operations of General Grant’s victory during the Vicksburg Campaign and General Banks’ loss during the Red River Campaign. Specifically, the paper focuses on the Union’s military commanders’ unity, or lack of effort, during their respective campaigns, which significantly influenced the outcome of both battles. The analysis concludes that in the absence of formal U.S. military joint doctrine as part of its strategic planning, Union victory on the battlefield was determined largely by the amount of cooperation between U.S. commanders. Unity of command is crucial to joint operations and should not hinge on the personality of the commander. The mutually supportive command relationship of Grant, Sherman and Porter cannot always be guaranteed. A summary of both campaigns emphasize the strategic importance of joint operations and focuses on: 1) command relationships between the Army and Navy; 2) unity, or lack of effort between the commanders at Vicksburg and at Red River; and, 3) the commanders’ personalities as the driving force between victory and defeat. Valuable lessons learned from both campaigns are addressed.

**14. ABSTRACT**

Joint Operations, Unity of Command, Unity of Effort, American Civil War, Vicksburg Campaign, Red River Campaign, General Grant, General Sherman, General Banks, Admiral Porter

**15. SUBJECT TERMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint Operations</td>
<td>Unity of Command</td>
<td>Unity of Effort</td>
<td>American Civil War</td>
<td>Vicksburg Campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red River Campaign</td>
<td>General Grant</td>
<td>General Sherman</td>
<td>General Banks</td>
<td>Admiral Porter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. REPORT</th>
<th>b. ABSTRACT</th>
<th>c. THIS PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unclass</td>
<td>Unclass</td>
<td>Unclass</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**

UU

**18. NUMBER OF PAGES**

40

**19. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON**

Marine Corps University / Command and Staff College

**19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)**

(703) 784-3330 (Admin Office)
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:
JOINT OPERATIONS IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR: BLESSINGS AND BLUNDERS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR:
MAJOR RANDALL K. JONES

AY 11-12

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Pauletta Otis, Ph.D.
Approved:  
Date: 4 April 2012

Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. John W. Gordon, Ph.D.
Approved:  
Date: 4 April 2012
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:

JOINT OPERATIONS IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR: BLESSINGS AND BLUNDEANS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR:

MAJOR RANDALL K. JONES

AY 11-12

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Pauletta Otis, Ph.D.

Approved: _____________________________________________________________

Date: ___________________________________________________________________

Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. John W. Gordon, Ph.D.

Approved: _____________________________________________________________

Date: ___________________________________________________________________
Executive Summary

Title: Joint Operations in the American Civil War: Blessings and Blunders

Author: Major Randall K. Jones, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: Although the Union’s military did not have a written joint doctrine during the Civil War, the Union’s military commanders' unity of effort during their respective campaigns significantly influenced the outcome of battles, as seen in the successful Vicksburg Campaign and in the disastrous Red River Campaign. Therefore, this paper contends that the United States (U.S.) military needed to establish a joint doctrine as part of its strategic planning and not leave cooperation between Union commanders to chance.

Discussion: This paper analyzes joint operations of General U.S. Grant’s victory during the Vicksburg Campaign and General Nathanial Banks’ loss during the Red River Campaign. Specifically, the paper focuses on the Union’s military commanders' unity, or lack of effort, during their respective campaigns, which significantly influenced the outcome of both battles. The analysis concludes that in the absence of formal U.S. military joint doctrine as part of its strategic planning, Union victory on the battlefield was determined largely by the amount of cooperation between U.S. commanders. Unity of command is crucial to joint operations and future campaigns should not hinge on the personality of the commander and whether or not he or she feels the need to support a sister service. The mutually supportive command relationship of Generals Grant and Sherman and Admiral Porter cannot always be guaranteed.

A brief summary of both campaigns emphasize the strategic importance of joint operations and focuses on: 1) command relationships between the Army and Navy; 2) unity, or lack of effort between the commanders at Vicksburg and at Red River; and, 3) the commanders’ personalities as the driving force between victory and defeat. Valuable lessons learned from both campaigns are addressed and applied to future United States’ joint strategic naval and ground operations.

Conclusion: General Grant’s Vicksburg Campaign is considered by many scholars to be the “most brilliant campaign ever fought on American soil” and is regarded as one of the decisive moments in the American Civil War. Conversely, General Bank’s Red River Campaign is considered by scholars to be a “colossal failure for the Union in a year of glittering triumphs on all other fronts.” These campaigns illustrate that a Union commander’s commitment to unity of effort, personality, and cooperation, in the absence of an established military joint doctrine that is mandated today, was often the key to Union victory (or defeat).
DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTION</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disclaimer</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Union Strategy: The Anaconda Plan</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A New Union Strategy</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collapse of the Peninsula (Eastern Theater)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicksburg: The Key to Victory</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red River: One Damn Blunder after Another</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lessons Learned</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix A (Map of Vicksburg Campaign)</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix B (Map of Red River Campaign)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgements

First and foremost I would like to thank my Lord and Savior Jesus Christ for all the blessings bestowed upon me and my family, who gave me the strength to persevere, and for placing the right individuals in my path to mentor and assist me with this thesis.

This thesis would not have been possible without the persistence and support of my principal mentor, Dr. Pauletta Otis. Her professional guidance and common sense approach has been invaluable on both an academic and a personal level, for which I am extremely grateful. I also thank my second mentor, Dr. John W. Gordon, whose great teachings, sage advice, and American Civil War expertise, helped develop and shape my ideas from the early stages of research into a successful written form. I am indebted to him more than he knows.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Patrice Scanlon, my writing mentor and friend, whose delightful personality and detailed knowledge of research and writing has guided me along the way. Her encouragement, patience, and helpful suggestions during times of frustration have left a deep impression on my life. I would have been lost without her.

Lastly, I would like to thank my loving wife, Jennifer for supporting and encouraging me to pursue this degree and my mother, Phyllis Jones Bickford, who taught me that I “can do all things through Christ who gives me strength.” Without the prayers and encouragement of my wife and mother, the two most influential women in my life, I would have missed a valuable opportunity and not pursued this master’s degree.
INTRODUCTION

During the American Civil War, joint operations were critical to President Abraham Lincoln and the Union Military’s strategic success in ultimately defeating the Confederacy. Although the Union’s military did not have a written joint doctrine during the war, the Union’s military commanders' unity of effort during their respective campaigns significantly influenced the outcome of battles, as seen in the successful Vicksburg Campaign and in the disastrous Red River Campaign. Therefore, this paper contends that the United States (U.S.) military needed to establish a joint doctrine as part of its strategic planning and not leave cooperation between Union commanders to chance.

History has revealed the importance military commanders place on unity of command. That is, commanders believe that if an army is to be successful on the battlefield then unity of command is a crucial element to executing the operation. For example, during the American Revolutionary War, General George Washington, Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army, stated as his fourth rule of military guidance to be that “nothing is as important in war as an undivided command.”3 Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of France during the French Revolution, echoed this same principle in his Sixty-Fourth Maxim, which was “Nothing is more important in war than unity of command…you should have one army on one line led by one commander.”4

So too, the Vicksburg and Red River Campaigns provide excellent examples of unity of command, using complex joint operations that involved naval and ground forces. However, the lessons learned is that one campaign ended in success and, respectively, the other in failure because the Vicksburg Campaign commanders executed unity of effort, but the Red River Campaign commanders did not. By studying military campaigns, such as Vicksburg and Red
River, military commanders can learn how historical operations helped shape joint military doctrine and can gain operational insights into the campaigns’ successes or failures. As retired U.S. Army General John M. Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, suggested, “Knowing the past and being able to use its lessons are major responsibilities of all military professionals.”

To illustrate the use of the unwritten joint concept, this paper analyzes General Ulysses S. Grant’s victory during the Vicksburg Campaign and General Nathaniel Banks’ loss during the Red River Campaign. Specifically, the paper provides a brief summary of both campaigns that emphasizes the strategic importance of joint operations to the Union military forces, while focusing on: 1) command relationships between the Army and Navy; 2) unity/lack of unity of effort between the commanders at Vicksburg and Red River; and, 3) the commanders’ personalities as the driving force between victory and defeat. Lastly, the paper provides lessons learned from both campaigns.

BACKGROUND

During the American Civil War, President Lincoln and his generals faced a significant strategic issue of how to employ the U.S. Navy in support of Union ground forces against the Confederacy. Although the Union had a near monopoly on naval sea power, the Navy was ill prepared for its new role as “invader” and “aggressor” near the start of the Civil War. That is, after the War of 1812, the Navy’s primary mission remained as coastal and commerce protection. Although naval ships supported diplomacy, suppressed piracy in the Caribbean, and obstructed slave trade off the African coast, the Navy was limited in its support of merchant class ships as defined by U.S. Federal regulations. More importantly, these coastal and commerce experiences did little to teach naval officers how to command squadrons of vessels, exploit strategic and
tactical capabilities, or gain proficiency in handling the transportation of sizeable forces. From 1812 to 1861, the Navy was not assigned any strategic U.S. national roles.

However, at the onset of the Civil War, President Lincoln and the Union needed a consolidated plan to bring the joint strength of the Army and Navy together in a concerted effort to defeat the Confederate rebellion and restore the Union. President Lincoln and his war time cabinet only needed to look to General Winfield Scott’s victory in Mexico City that occurred 15 years earlier during the Mexican-American War, a two-year armed conflict from 1846 to 1848 between the U.S. and Mexico over the annexation of Texas, to find the consolidated plan.

The Battle of Mexico City

During the Mexican War, and especially at the Battle of Mexico City in 1847, joint operations between the U.S. Army and Navy took a step in the right direction when General Winfield Scott, Commander of Union forces in Mexico and commanding officer of the largest amphibious force at that time, executed a bold move landing 12,000 amphibious U.S. troops at Vera Cruz, Mexico. Upon the troops’ landing General Scott marched inland to Mexico City, Mexico’s capital, which ultimately forced an end to the war. General Scott’s amphibious landing, although unopposed by the Mexicans, illustrates a level of organizational and logistical competence between the Army and Navy that had never been achieved in a previous U.S. amphibious operation. Likewise, the Navy’s proficiency in blocking ports, transporting troops, and supporting operations ashore during the Mexican-American War demonstrated the value of sea power and, for the first time, established the Navy as a national asset.

Command Structure

The president sits at the top of the military command structure and is bound by the U.S. Constitution to be the commander-in-chief of all forces. He is responsible for establishing
national strategic policy and advising his commanders on the best way to carry out that policy. As commander-in-chief, the president is not expected to direct day to day affairs of the military; however, because President Lincoln had a firm grasp of military strategy, more so than many of his generals, his constant intervening into military matters proved vital to Union success. 

Nevertheless, the Union’s command structure also significantly hindered the Army and Navy’s ability to conduct successful joint operations because as military historians note:

The handicaps of inexperience and a still “amateurish” approach to war might have been more quickly overcome had the Union forces not been burdened by the awkward command structure. 

The Army’s “awkward” command structure was managed by the senior major general who was appointed at the executive level. The general-in-chief appointment held no legal status and the power of the position rested solely with the individual’s grade and rank. The Navy’s structure was even more disorganized. Within its command structure, no single Navy admiral was in charge of naval operations. In other words, no Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) position existed to coordinate joint operations directly with the Army’s general-in-chief. This inability to synchronize efforts among the services was compounded by the fact that not only was there no one person in charge of the Navy, but also neither service had support staffs to plan and organize joint efforts.

To complicate matters, wedged between the President and his ranking service chiefs were the Secretaries of War and Navy. The Secretary of the Navy acted much like today’s Chief of Naval Operations and was often the only government official to coordinate directly between President Lincoln and the squadron naval commanders. Although the Navy secretary position proved valuable to President Lincoln’s administration, the Secretary of War position proved worthless, as it had no clear cut roles and responsibilities. Too often, the position’s value to the
President’s cabinet depended on the individual occupying the position. For example, at the start of the Civil War, Simon Cameron held the office but proved weak, ineffective, and dishonest. Within a year his incompetence and involvement in a corruption scandal led to Secretary Cameron resigning in disgrace. Edwin M. Stanton, who replaced Cameron, entered the office with an effective management style that greatly aided the development of the Union war machine. In sharp contrast to Cameron, Secretary Stanton possessed honesty, foresight, and strong leadership skills. Although, Secretary Stanton was abrupt and domineering at times, he became one of President Lincoln’s most influential cabinet advisers.

1860 and the Beginning of the Civil War

When President Lincoln was elected to office in 1860, the nation’s political landscape was tumultuous and at boiling point. During his Inaugural Address, the new president mixed toughness with words of peace when he pleaded, “[T]here needs to be no bloodshed [among the Northern and Southern states],” but indicated that he intended to enforce the Constitution and the laws of land by holding, occupying, and possessing federal property in the South. He also implored the South to reconcile when he stated:

In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The government will not assail you. You have no conflict, without being yourselves the aggressors.

Well aware that whoever fired the first shot would lose the moral high ground, President Lincoln was determined not to initiate the seemingly unavoidable conflict with the South and labored to avoid using the phrase “War Between the States.” However, in April of 1861, the Civil War officially began with the South’s attack on Fort Sumter in South Carolina. The “firing on the flag” (i.e., the seizure of U.S. Federal property) and surrender of the fort produced a “volcanic upheaval” in the North causing Northerners to unite and rally behind the President’s
call for troops to preserve the Union. Although the “War Between the States” had begun, both the North’s and South’s leadership expected hostilities to be short-lived because the new Confederate States of America only had to prove that it could defend Southerners and their property as an independent nation whereas President Lincoln had to quell the rebellion and re-affirm Federal Government authority over the seceded states. As a result, the Confederacy took a defensive stance while the Union embraced an offensive strategy.

**INITIAL UNION STRATEGY: THE ANACONDA PLAN**

In the spring of 1861, General Winfield Scott, President Lincoln’s then-Commanding General of the Army and successful commander during the Mexican-American War, developed the Anaconda Plan as the Union’s initial strategy for suppressing the Southern rebellion. General Scott envisioned using a joint naval and ground force to strangle the Confederacy on all sides. The plan consisted of three essential elements: 1) conduct a naval blockade of all Southern ports to weaken the Confederate economy, 2) capture the Mississippi River to split the Confederacy in two, separating the western Rebel states – Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas – from the Confederate Capital of Richmond, and 3) support land-based operations by amphibious assault, naval gunfire, and troop transport. General Scott based his plan on his previous warfighting experiences and success with joint operations during the Mexican War. General Scott believed his plan would bring the Civil War to an end with the least amount of bloodshed between the states, which was politically attractive for the president.

Unfortunately, many Union leaders perceived a significant problem with General Scott’s plan because it required extensive time to mobilize, train, and equip the 60,000 naval and ground forces needed to implement the strategy. Union leaders believed that sending naval forces down the Mississippi River to halt the buildup of Confederate forces was militarily passive and lacked
aggressive action. What Northerners demanded was a vigorous prosecution of the war and an immediate attack on the South. Because President Lincoln’s cabinet split evenly on the plan’s value, he concluded that General Scott’s plan did not answer the public’s “Forward to Richmond” battle cry or its desire to end the war quickly. Therefore, President Lincoln did not approve General Scott’s plan and endorsed an alternative strategy proposed by General Irwin McDowell, Commanding General of the Army of Northeastern Virginia.

General McDowell’s strategy called for the Union Army to strike south towards the Confederate capital of Richmond and conduct an overland campaign. Advocates of General McDowell’s strategy believed the South would collapse once a few Rebel strongholds were seized. Unfortunately, this scenario did not occur because actions of an inexperienced army and its commander, pressure from Northern politicians and populace, and an ill-planned operation resulted in a Union catastrophe on July 21, 1861 at the First Battle of Bull Run. The Union’s defeat was humiliating and forced General Dowell’s army to retreat to Washington to establish defensive positions around the Capital. More importantly, the defeat was a startling “wake up call” for the President and the North that a victory against the South would be long, brutal, and anything but easy. Even the New York Times captured the essence of the “wake up call” when its editors wrote:

It is pretty evident now that we have underrated the strength, the resources, and the temper of the enemy. And we have been blind, moreover, to the extraordinary nature of the country over which the contest is to be waged, - and to its wonderful facilities for deterrence.  

Following the defeat, President Lincoln outlined the painful lessons learned into a coherent, future, military plan. He recognized that a change in Union strategy was needed and therefore ordered General George B. McClellan to Washington to command the Army of the Potomac.
A NEW UNION STRATEGY

On November 1, 1861, President Lincoln accepted General Scott’s resignation and appointed General McClellan as General-in-Chief of the Union Army. General McClellan’s appointment signified a pivotal shift in the Union’s grand strategy expansion. The new general-in-chief envisioned using joint operations as the building blocks of a comprehensive plan to paralyze the South. However, unlike General Scott’s plan, which relied on the slow and uncertain process of blockade, General McClellan intended to deliver a decisive blow to the heart of the enemy by attacking Confederate lines of communication concurrently. As clearly outlined by historian Rowena Reed in her book, Combined Operations in the Civil War, General McClellan proposed:

using the great water highways of the South. Penetrating deep into the Confederacy along the Mississippi, the Tennessee, and the Cumberland rivers, Federal armies could seize the great East – West rail lines connecting the Mississippi Valley with the Atlantic and Gulf seaboard, and with Virginia. Pushing into North Carolina sounds and up the Roanoke and Neuse rivers, they could disrupt Richmond’s lines to the Deep South and force the Confederate army in Virginia to disperse for lack of supplies….Seizure of the rail junction at Mobile would disrupt communications between middle Tennessee and Western Mississippi. To free themselves from this death grip, Southern generals would have to hurl their men against strongly fortified positions which could not be invested while protected by Union warships or gunboats.15

General McClellan’s grand plan was largely based on historical lessons from Napoleon Bonaparte’s early campaigns. General McClellan, who was often referred to as “Young Napoleon” by seniors and subordinates alike, learned to have a deep admiration for naval sea power, unlike Napoleon.

On June 24, 1812, Napoleon was forced to march his army deep into Russian territory and fight the enemy on its terms because he failed to recognize the importance of maintaining control of the seas, which ultimately led to the collapse of his forces. Napoleon abandoned his
objective of a decisive engagement with the Russians and forced them to fight. Although Napoleon gained his objective by capturing Moscow, the victory came at great cost, the collapse of the French Army (350,000 soldiers died). In contrast, Napoleon III’s strategy during the Crimean War of 1854 focused on maintaining control of the seas. Instead of invading deep into Russian territory again, Napoleon III maintained control of the Baltic seas, which allowed him to select the theater of operations thereby forcing the Russians to fight on his terms. As a result, the French along with their British allies were able to secure sea lines of communications and force the Russians to sue for peace.16

As a military strategist, General McClellan knew the Union Navy could do more than block ports or demolish Confederate commerce. If used correctly, the Union Navy could transport significant portions of the Army of the Potomac quickly and unexpectedly to strategic objectives within the Eastern and Western Theaters and then support land based operations until Union victory was achieved. Joint operations were a key element of General McClellan’s strategic offensive plan to defeat the South without risk to Union lines of communications.

As General McClellan continued to rebuild the Army of the Potomac and prepared to launch a massive joint campaign on the Virginia Peninsula, Union naval leaders devised their own campaign plans to conduct operations against the Confederate-held city of New Orleans in an attempt to open the Mississippi River. In late 1861, Navy Secretary Gideon Wells, Assistant Secretary Gustavus V. Fox, and Admiral David D. Porter arrived in Washington to discuss their proposal with President Lincoln and General McClellan.

Admiral Porter had no appetite for naval blockade duty; therefore, he developed a plan to capture New Orleans by reducing Rebel forts defending the city using a flotilla of mortars commanded by Admiral David G. Farragut. Admiral Porter believed that once the forts were
destroyed and isolated, the city would surrender and the North would gain valuable access to the Mississippi River. Secretary Wells advocated that Admiral Porter’s proposed mission was nested within General McClellan’s overall strategy for an expedition from southern Illinois travelling down the Mississippi River. Knowing Union troops would be required to occupy New Orleans once it fell, President Lincoln deferred to General McClellan “to find out if we [the Union army] can’t manage to get some troops” to support the operation. 17

At first General McClellan was hesitant to advise the President to approve the operation because he envisioned at least 10,000 Union troops were needed to secure New Orleans if and when it fell and an additional 50,000 troops were needed to exploit the victory, a number too large to support since he was organizing for operations in the Eastern Theater (Virginia). Admiral Porter however was convinced that the Navy could capture the forts and the city alone and only needed support from the Army to reinforce the fallen city once it was under Union occupation. As General McClellan’s concerns were addressed by Admiral Porter, General McClellan embraced the plan for three main reasons: 1) President Lincoln and the Navy wanted to execute this mission, 2) the Union could achieve an element of surprise by attacking from the south instead of the north, and 3) if the mission succeeded, the Army would share in the glory for reinforcing the occupation of New Orleans. Eventually, General McClellan agreed the plan was “absolutely essential for success” and was not a “detriment to the expedition” but instead provided support to his overall strategy. 18 Upon President Lincoln’s final approval of the plan, Union military engagement on the western seas began.

**COLLAPSE ON THE PENINSULA (EASTERN THEATER)**

Although Union progress in the Western Theater was made with Admiral David G. Farragut’s successful capture of New Orleans and General U.S. Grant’s combined victories at
Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, “the defeat on the Peninsula [Eastern Theater] devastated Northern morale.” As historian Doris Kearns Goodwin writes, “In Washington, columnist Cara Kasson observed the frustration written on every face, manifesting an anxiety greater than the aftermath of Bull Run, ‘for the present repulse is more momentous.’” 19

On July 14, 1862, the North was at an all time low. The aftermath of the Peninsula defeat, as well as several missed opportunities by the Union military leadership, put President Lincoln under immense pressure from Congress, his administration, the public, and the press to turn the Union war effort around. Regardless of politicians, Union generals, and cabinet members pointing fingers, trying to blame someone for the North’s calamitous failures, President Lincoln faced the harsh realization that the ultimate authority for military action or inaction was his alone. As commander-in-chief, all responsibility rested solely on his shoulders, “and as always, the President refused to let subordinate[s] take the blame for his own decisions.” 20

Many citizens and public officials called for General McClellan’s relief as Commanding General of the Army of the Potomac and Secretary Stanton as Secretary of the Army. In spite of the uproar, Lincoln was determined “…to make up his mind ‘calmly and deliberately’, to adhere firmly to his own opinions, and neither to be bullied or cajoled out of them.” His decision was made: Secretary Stanton remained as the Army Secretary, General Halleck was the new general-in-chief of the Army, and General McClellan retained his position as Commanding General of the Army of the Potomac. Refusing to surrender to the doom of defeat and determined to lift himself and the Union out it, President Lincoln summoned General Henry Halleck to Washington to replace General McClellan as the general-in-chief of the Army. Although General Halleck’s appointment was met with widespread approval, the public’s outcry for change was heard.
General Halleck, known as “Old Brains” among his colleagues, was considered an expert in military affairs and was widely respected by the Washington elite. General Halleck was expected to provide leadership and motivation to his subordinate generals and to coordinate aggressive Union actions across the Eastern and Western Theaters to help turn the Union’s war effort around. Unfortunately, General Halleck turned out to be a high-paid administrative clerk as historian Rowena Reed point out:

Halleck’s summon to Washington to become general-in-chief…did little to improve the situation. His promotion left Grant in charge of a truncated western department [.] Characteristically, Halleck left no orders…not a written instruction, or apparently a verbal order about Vicksburg or cooperation with the Navy on the Mississippi.21

More importantly, though, General Halleck failed to grasp the potential of joint Union amphibious operations, and his appointment brought a dramatic shift in military objectives. For example, General Halleck believed that amphibious (coastal) operations were a waste of time and manpower and instead fixated on the military principal of massing forces at decisive moments on the battlefield. He felt Union forces could be employed more efficiently on two main land fronts; thus, he shifted thousands of Union troops to focus on operations in Arkansas, Tennessee, and Kentucky at the expense of on-going operations in the Western Theater to open the Mississippi. Reed again highlights General Halleck’s demoralizing impact on Union operations: “Under his disingenuous leadership, operations in the West were misdirected and fragmentary [and] in the East[,] Halleck…was obsessed with the safety of Washington….22 General Halleck’s obsession to defend the Capital, failure to control his subordinate leaders, and overall ineptness resulted in the breakdown of Union joint strategy on the Western front and crushing defeats in the East.
The constant humiliating losses by General McClellan’s, Pope’s, Burnside’s, and Hooker’s armies in the Eastern Theater at the hand of General Robert E. Lee once more affected Northern support for the war, the Army of the Potomac, and President Lincoln. The Union needed a victory, as war fatigue started to overtake the North. Furthermore, the Union losses reconfirmed President Lincoln’s belief of the importance of the West and the need to control the Mississippi River, as outlined in General Scott’s original Union strategy to win the war -- “The Anaconda Plan.” Control of the Mississippi River would give the Union a strategic advantage in the Western Theater.

**VICKSBURG: THE KEY TO VICTORY**

Vicksburg, Mississippi was strategically significant for both the North and South because it sat on the shore of the Mississippi River, a logistically important waterway that each party needed to control if it was to defeat the enemy. Confederate President Jefferson Davis referred to the city as “the nail-head that held the South’s two halves together” and considered the city as “the Gibraltar of the Confederacy.” President Lincoln also recognized Vicksburg’s strategic importance, and during a meeting with his military officers pointed to the city on a map and charged, “Let us get Vicksburg and all that country is ours. The war can never be brought to close until that key is in our pocket.” As a result, the U.S. military realized it needed to establish a joint doctrine as part of its campaign planning to establish a single authority, one Union commander in charge of all army and naval forces with the sole focus of capturing Vicksburg and controlling the city’s littorals. Unfortunately, no single command authority was established and cooperation between Union commanders was left to chance, as illustrated below.

Although capturing Vicksburg was always a key to winning the Civil War, as outlined in both Generals Scott’s and McClellan’s Union war strategies, its strategic location on the
Mississippi River was logistically significant to both the armies by the winter of 1862. In particular, Union control of the Mississippi River would reopen a vital avenue of commerce for the North, allowing agricultural supplies to reach world markets, which would enable the North’s economy to thrive in support of the war effort. More importantly, however, Union control of the river would split the Confederacy in two: sever a vital Confederate supply route from Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas; and, “effectively seal the doom of Richmond.”

The Union military further enhanced Vicksburg’s vital role when Admiral David G. Farragut, commander of the Western Gulf Blockading Naval Squadron, after successfully capturing New Orleans, sailed his fleet of cruisers and gunboats up the Mississippi River in an attempt to capture Vicksburg by naval bombardment in May 1862. Unfortunately, Admiral Farragut could not penetrate the “Hill City” because Vicksburg sat on a coastal bluff with narrow and winding ridges more than 200 feet above the river, and Confederate forces fortified these defensive positions. Specifically, the Confederates used existing railroads to ship artillery guns from other locations in the Confederacy to defend Vicksburg. Due to the naval gun’s inability to elevate to fire on the Confederate batteries and the Confederate forces’ strong defensive positions, the North’s initial efforts to capture Vicksburg ended in failure.

Refusing to concede, General Grant attempted a bilateral offensive operation late in December 1862 that split the Army of Tennessee between himself and Major General William T. Sherman. General Grant led half the army overland from Tennessee into northern Mississippi with the intent to draw Confederate forces into the northern section of Vicksburg, while General Sherman maneuvered the remaining portion of the army down the Mississippi River to seize Vicksburg. This operation also ended in failure when the Confederate Calvary exploited General
Grant’s extended lines of communications and destroyed Union supply and railroad lines, forcing General Grant to retreat to Tennessee.

After several more unsuccessful experiments, including a series of disastrous bayou operations to capture Vicksburg, General Grant reached a defining moment in his military career. General Grant knew that if Union forces were to succeed and the tide was to turn in favor of the North, he had to launch a *joint* land and naval effort against the fortified city.\(^ {28} \) The major problem the Union faced was how to reach Vicksburg, since the rugged terrain to the north was comprised of a network of low lakes, streams, and dense swamps covered with thick vegetation. Thus, if General Grant attacked from the north, before Union forces could engage with General John C. Pemberton’s Rebel army, his troops would have to spend a vast amount time and energy trying to get past the ruthless terrain. However, if General Grant attacked from the east, his forces would avoid the cruel terrain and be deep in the South’s backyard, but would have to deal with an enemy populace and extended supply lines susceptible to Confederate attacks. Any western movement by Grant’s army would cause his troops to contend with the Mississippi River prior to attacking Vicksburg, which previous attacks proved to cause significant supply issues.\(^ {29} \) With pressure mounting from President Lincoln, General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck, and Northern public support for a Union victory, General Grant carefully considered each option to defeat Pemberton, capture Vicksburg, and deliver a Union victory.

Ultimately, General Grant devised a final *joint* plan to march his army south on the western side of the Mississippi River; then, at Grand Gulf, move his Union army into Mississippi using Admiral David D. Porter’s troop transport ships, while at the same time using a diversionary force to keep General Pemberton’s attention away from the main effort (see map, Appendix A). However, Admiral Porter’s fleet had to successfully maneuver into position to
meet up with the Union Army. Although Admiral Porter was skeptical of the plan, he never thought twice about providing support to the operation because General Grant asked for his help. Stating his support for General Grant, during a conversation with the Secretary of the Navy after the battle, Admiral Porter commented, “So confident was I of the ability of General Grant to carry out his plans when he explained them to me that I never hesitated to change my position from above to below Vicksburg.”

Therefore, in late April 1863, Admiral Porter’s naval fleet successfully ran “the [South’s] gauntlet” on the river, withstanding punishing artillery fire and suffering only minimum losses. The fleet was located below Vicksburg, well positioned to begin an amphibious landing of General Grant’s army across the river and onto Mississippi soil to begin the campaign to seize and capture the City of Vicksburg. Once the landing was complete, Admiral Porter sustained the operation by providing sea-based logistics and naval gunfire support to the Union army, as well as maintaining open lines of communications along the Mississippi River.

Over the course of seventeen days, General Grant maneuvered his forces over 200 miles inland under heavy enemy fire, claimed victory for five separate battles, captured the state capital (Jackson, Mississippi), and pushed General Pemberton’s forces back into the defenses of Vicksburg. American Civil War historians, such as Michael Ballard and Terrance Winschel, refer to this period as “the blitzkrieg” of Grant’s Vicksburg Campaign. As such, General Grant’s campaign highlights the very best in Army and Navy joint operations along with the unity of effort concept.

After General Pemberton’s surrender and the Union controlled Vicksburg, General Grant and Admiral Porter met briefly for warmhearted wishes and to reflect on their accomplishments as a joint force. General Grant expressed his thoughts in an after-action report this way:
Thankfulness for good fortune in being placed in co-operation with an officer of the Navy [Admiral Porter]. The admiral and his subordinates have ever shown the greatest readiness in their co-operation, no matter what was to be done or what risk to be taken, either by their men or their vessels.30

General Grant ended his report saying that without the swift and affable support of Admiral Porter, the Union landing at Bruinsburg could have ended in humiliation, if not defeat. General Sherman echoed General Grant’s admiration and gentlemanly affection for Admiral Porter and vowed unending support for the admiral saying, “To me it will ever be a source of pride that real harmony has always characterized our intercourse, and let what may arise, I will ever call upon Admiral Porter with the same confidence as I have in the past.”31 Although General Sherman and Admiral Porter never participated in another joint operation together, the two remained close friends, often seeking advice and direction from one another on military and personnel matters.

Admiral Porter also expressed the significance of the leader’s accomplishments in his after-action report to the Secretary of the Navy, stating the capture of Vicksburg was “one of the greatest military achievements ever known.” He credited the victory to General Grant’s leadership, aggressive approach to warfare, and grasp of joint operations.

**RED RIVER: ONE DAMN BLUNDER AFTER ANOTHER**

Although no single command authority was established during the Vicksburg campaign, Union commanders executed unity of effort largely because commanders had similar personalities, deep respect for one another, and were willing to cooperate with each other. The Red River Campaign was the exact opposite of Vicksburg. There was mutual hatred between commanders, personality conflicts, and a mindset of everyman for himself, especially among the Union commanders. For these reasons, the U.S. military again needed to establish a joint
doctrine, as part of its campaign planning for Red River, and not leave cooperation between Union commanders to chance.

On July 4, 1863, optimism ran high in the North after hard-fought Union victories at both Gettysburg and Vicksburg a few months earlier. President Lincoln observed first-hand a succession of ineffective commanders who produced a string of humiliating defeats at the hands of a much weaker enemy. Therefore, -- according to historian Michael Forsyth, after enduring three long years of frustration and searching, “Lincoln thought that in Grant he finally had the commander who could bring the Rebels to defeat.”

In the wake of Union triumphs and General Grant’s series of accomplishments in the West, President Lincoln summoned the general to Washington to assume the position of general-in-chief of the Army.

General Grant quickly realized that Union commanders rarely, if ever, used the principle of unity of effort when engaging Confederate forces. Thus, the South was always able to shift forces within its interior lines and reinforce vulnerable positions on the battlefield. In response to the situations, General Grant planned a simultaneous offensive operation, pitting the full weight of the Army of the Potomac against the Army of Northern Virginia in an effort to shatter Confederate lines of communications and expose Rebel weaknesses. General Grant’s plan was fundamentally sound and the President approved it; however, General Grant wasn’t certain that he could execute it because his predecessor, General Halleck, “had already set the wheels in motion for a campaign west of the Mississippi along the Red River.”

After three years of fighting experience, General Grant strongly believed that Union operations in the West would only divert attention and resources from the Union’s main effort in the Eastern Theater. Even if the Union achieved victory by capturing Shreveport, Louisiana the Union triumph would have little to no affect on ending the war. However, if the Confederates
were successful in maintaining control of Shreveport and defeating the Union army in the Western Theater, the damage to the Army and Navy could have significant consequences on the war effort in Atlanta, on Northern morale, and the presidential election. Although General Grant’s intuition was to cancel the Red River Campaign, he allowed it to continue. General Grant’s guidance to the operational commander was essentially get in and get out as quickly as possible.

Red River Campaign Plans

Although the victory at Vicksburg cut the Confederacy in half and the Union controlled the Mississippi River, General Halleck committed 50,000 troops and 30 naval vessels to capture the Confederate controlled city of Shreveport located along the Red River. General Halleck’s motives for approving the campaign were based solely on political, social, and economic reasons as evidenced in historian Gary Joiner’s book, One Damn Blunder from Beginning to the End: The Red River Campaign of 1864. Joiner writes:

The promise of thousands of bales of cotton to feed the starving textile mills of New England and the opportunity to bring Louisiana and Texas back into the Union fired the imaginations of politicians, businessmen, and newspaper publishers. If successful, the campaign would have been completed just in time to affect the fall presidential elections. The prospect of putting tens of thousands of unemployed New England textile workers back on the job again was a powerful magnet for presidential politics.34

General Sherman desperately wanted to lead the campaign because his old friend and former military colleague Admiral Porter was the designated naval commander for the operation. The two men (along with General Grant) were strong allies and their “cooperation [unity of effort] in large-scale projects had proven successful in several operations, particularly at Vicksburg.”35 Although General Sherman lobbied hard for the command, General Grant did not
approve Sherman’s request due to pending operations in Atlanta. Therefore, by default, General Nathan P. Banks was placed in charge.

General Banks was a volunteer commander and considered a strong candidate for the Republican presidential nomination in the 1864 elections. Having served as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives and three-terms as Governor of Massachusetts, General Banks was considered a political heavyweight who understood New England politics. As Joiner writes, “[Banks] was honest but authoritarian, with no tolerance for those questioning his judgment, even career military officers.” Admiral Porter despised political commanders, especially those with little military training like General Banks. Not only did Admiral Porter loathe General Banks’ fickle command style, but Porter also feared General Banks’ seeking a battlefield victory to bolster his presidential aspirations. The consequences could prove disastrous. Even General Sherman feared General Banks, as evidenced when he confided to Admiral Porter that he (Sherman) felt strongly Banks would not hesitate to sacrifice the Navy to save himself and the army if faced with overwhelming adversity during the operation. Therefore, to alleviate his friend’s apprehension and for his own peace of mind, General Sherman assigned 10,000 of his personal troops to his trusted subordinate, General A. J. Smith, with the mission to protect the naval fleet.
during the *joint* operation. Unfortunately, “as it turned-out, the Porter-Smith combination could not secure a victory, only stave off a disastrous defeat.”

General Banks’ grand scheme to capture Shreveport involved a three-prong *joint* attack (see map, Appendix B). First, a *joint* amphibious force consisting of Admiral Porter’s naval fleet and General Smith’s army was supposed to move up the Red River, eliminate Confederate fortifications along the river, and unite with General Banks at Alexandria, which was a major road and river junction in the center of the state. Next, the plan called for General Banks to march 20,000 Union troops overland from New Orleans across southern Louisiana to Alexandria and wait to link-up with Admiral Porter and General Smith’s *joint* force. From there, General Banks was scheduled to proceed overland to Shreveport while Admiral Porter’s naval fleet moved up the Red River to provide fire support for the Union army. Once the *joint* southern force was enroute to Shreveport, the plan called for General Fredrick Steele, Commanding General of the Army of Arkansas and 10,000 Union troops, to depart Little Rock, move across Confederate-held territory, and approach Shreveport from the north to rendezvous with General Banks in his attack on the city.

General Banks’ plan to mass a powerful *joint* force against General Taylor’s Confederate forces was bold, yet, extremely complex. As historian Gary Joiner writes, the complex timing led to the campaign’s failure:

…The very seeds of disaster lay in [Banks’] initial plans. Timing was critical: all three prongs…must arrive at specific points at predetermined dates for the campaign to remain on schedule. The three groups would not be able to communicate directly with one another, and the distance between Steele and Banks was more than 400 miles…[Porter and Smith] would not be able to count on Banks until they meet at Alexandria. If any [group]…were delayed, the entire plan was in jeopardy. Added to all of these uncertainties was the open distrust and skepticism of the leaders [Banks and Porter] for each other.”

25
The operation’s first phase began in early March of 1864, when Admiral Porter’s naval fleet and General Smith’s army transports entered the Red River on schedule. While travelling up the Red River, General Smith’s troops disembarked at Simmesport and conducted an attack on confederate forces at Fort DeRussy while Admiral Porter’s fleet provided naval fire support and destroyed massive Rebel artillery batteries along the Red River. The amphibious force promptly defeated the Confederate fortification and moved quickly to Alexandria to link-up with General Banks.

The crack in the operation occurred when Admiral Porter and General Smith arrived at Alexandria on schedule, but neither General Banks nor his army was to be found. Although Admiral Porter arrived as the Rebels retreated, he did not know the status of the other two planned movements and wondered if General Banks’ “political machinations were taking precedence over his command obligations.” Despite his fury, Admiral Porter was grateful that his good friend General Sherman had good sense and prudence to lend him General Smith and his 10,000 veteran troops.

General Banks finally arrived in Alexandria, on March 26, 1864, ten days later and alone. Instead of arriving with his army, General Banks casually coasted into Alexandria aboard the Black Hawk, a transport with the same name as Admiral Porter’s flagship. General Banks was accompanied by newspaper reporters and cotton speculators, confirming Admiral Porter’s suspicions about General Banks’ political machinations taking precedence. General Banks explained that he decided not to endure the long overland march with his army and instead ordered his deputy commander to lead the expedition to Alexandria while he remained in New Orleans to supervise the inaugural festivities for his new Louisiana governor. Admiral Porter was not amused and considered Generals Banks’ tardiness, arrogance, and choice of
transportation a slap in face. Admiral Porter’s and General Banks’ strong-minded wills were destroying any chance for unity of effort between the two officers and the campaign.

When General Banks arrived at the Port of Alexandria instructions from General Grant were waiting for him. The instructions stated that Shreveport must be captured immediately; however, General Grant also stated that “For any reason there was delay in taking [the city] by the end of April…A. J. Smith’s command [must be returned] to Sherman by the middle of the month.” General Banks quickly realized his political future hinged on capturing Shreveport; anything less than a victory would end his presidential aspirations. General Banks’ leisurely approach to the operation was instantly replaced with a sense of urgency, and now he was ready to concentrate the Union’s efforts to take Shreveport, the third step in the overall campaign plan. Unfortunately, the Red River had a say in the matter because the river’s water level dropped at a steady rate at the end of March, which affected the transports’ ability to sail to Shreveport.

As Admiral Porter made his move north to Springfield Landing, forty miles below Shreveport, Generals Banks and Smith marched the Union Army overland. When Admiral Porter arrived at Springfield Landing as scheduled, General Banks was again nowhere to be found. Concerned about the water levels, Admiral Porter continued to move his fleet further up the river towards Shreveport. General Banks failed to make the rendezvous point because he marched his army inland on a single road that stretched troops over twenty miles and separated the mutually supporting effort of the Army and Navy. As historian Chester Hearn writes,

The admiral [Porter] never understood why Banks chose that route, because another road followed the river all the way to Shreveport with good wide fields on all sides and plenty of provisions [however] the answer…lay[s] with Banks, who refused to make reconnaissance, arguing that it would require time he could not spare, and in ignorance took the inland route.
On April 6, 1864, General Taylor’s Confederate forces engaged General Banks’ army forty miles south of the Union objective (Shreveport); and, over the course of two days of fighting at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill, General Banks’ Union Army suffered a disastrous defeat and was forced to retreat to Alexandria.

Once Admiral Porter received news of General Banks’ defeat, the admiral immediately moved the naval fleet to safer water because with General Banks in retreat, the fleet no longer had flank support from General Smith’s troops on shore. Therefore, Admiral Porter reversed course and moved the fleet south toward the Union army’s movement to the rear. Admiral Porter anticipated the confederate forces’ attempt to maintain the initiative and attack the fleet’s exposed flanks in an effort to disrupt the Union’s retreat and destroy as many ships as possible.

Once General Banks decided to retreat, the land campaign was essentially over but Admiral Porter was in the fight of his life because water levels dropped by the hour, the banks of the river were higher than the pilothouses, and confederate snipers took shots at his vessels. When the two men arrived at Grand Encore, a distinctive bluff on the Red River used as a link-up point for Porter’s fleet and Banks’ troops, Admiral Porter realized General Banks had no interest in the admiral’s problems and wrote to General Sherman saying,

Had Banks been victorious, as any ordinary general…we would have had no trouble at all, but he has led all hands in an ugly scrape. I did all I could to avoid going up this river with him, but he would have thrown all the blame of failure on me had I failed to go. I have risked a great deal and hope for a rise of water.41

Admiral Porter also wrote to the Secretary of the Navy, fearing General Banks would attempt another march to Shreveport and strand the navy in shallow water. Admiral Porter argued:

I don’t see why a fleet should not have the protection of the army as well as an army have the protection of a fleet. If we are left here aground, our communications will be cut off and we will have to destroy the vessels.42
After much wrangling between Admiral Porter and General Banks regarding the next action to take, the joint force continued to retreat south past Alexandria towards the Mississippi River. General Banks moved overland and offered no infantry support to the fleet and left Admiral Porter to fend for himself against Rebel attacks. Confederate batteries, snipers, and mines; dropping water levels; and grounded gunboats made the fleet’s retreat a living nightmare for Admiral Porter. Only the creative genius of a Wisconsin engineer officer, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Bailey, saved Admiral Porter’s fleet from total destruction. Bailey developed and implemented a plan to build a dam to raise the water level in the Red River and float residual vessels over the rapids.

The campaign officially ended on May 21, 1864, when the last of Admiral Porter’s vessels reached the Mississippi River. The campaign was one of the most humiliating and disastrous operations conducted by the Union Army. As historian Gary Joiner explains:

The [Red River] campaign that began with such promise ended with nothing to show for the great efforts made by both the U.S. Army and Navy. Wasted opportunities, too much bloodshed, and incredible blunders by Union….commanders….all served to bury the campaign in the dustbin of history – witness the amount of literature other campaigns in 1864 have engendered versus the nearly total neglect of what happened during that long-forgotten spring in the interior of Louisiana.\textsuperscript{43}

Admiral Porter placed full culpability for the humiliating defeat squarely on General Banks’ shoulders, as Banks abandoned the admiral not once, but twice during the operation. The second time resulted in the loss of two transports and over 200 innocent lives. As Admiral Porter fumed in a letter to his old friend, General Sherman, “You know my opinion of political generals…It is a crying sin to put the lives of thousands in the hands of such men, and the time has come when there should be a stop put to it.”\textsuperscript{44} As a testament of General Grant’s and General Sherman’s friendship, loyalty, and sincere feelings for Admiral Porter, both generals
wrote letters expressing their deepest apologies for General Banks’ actions or lack thereof during the campaign and for any embarrassment it caused their old friend. As for General Banks, the failure of the Red River Campaign effectively ended his military career, as well as his political aspirations.

LESSONS LEARNED

The U.S. military’s use of After Action Reports and study of military campaigns has provided valuable information to war planners and commanders for more than 275 years. So too can war planners, commanders, and students of military history learn three key lessons from the Vicksburg and Red River Campaigns about the importance of unity of effort and joint operations for current and future military engagements.

Lesson One: One National Strategy to Support Joint Operations

During the Civil War, joint operations encountered many roadblocks because no “one” National Strategy existed for winning the war and Lincoln’s National Strategic Policy did not support joint operations. For example, President Lincoln replaced several commanding generals during his first three years in office before he found a general, General U.S. Grant, who could develop and command a joint operation. Yet, President Lincoln originally appointed a proven commanding general, General Winfield Scott, and then chose not to support him for political reasons. Specifically, when General Scott presented The Anaconda Plan, President Lincoln chose not to approve it because his generals were split on the plan’s value and efficiency. Although General Scott developed and implemented large and successful joint operations during the Mexican-American War, President Lincoln supported the generals who thought the plan would take too long to execute and caved to public opinion that demanded vigorous prosecution of the war and an immediate attack on the South.
Lesson Two: Importance of Organizational Structure to Support Joint Operations

In addition, President Lincoln’s War Cabinet did not include a joint staff structure to help facilitate military actions of the Army and Navy and his theater commanders exhibited little unity of command (The last point is addressed in Lesson Three.). If President Lincoln’s Cabinet structure paralleled the joint operation command structure, then a single admiral would have been in charge of naval operations to organize joint operations directly with the Army’s general-in-chief.

Lesson Three: Unity of Command is Key to Successful Joint Operations

Historical blueprints for joint efforts were established by General Grant and Admiral Porter during the Vicksburg Campaign and provide the foundation for joint efforts used in the U.S. military’s current operational and strategic environments. As General Grant and Admiral Porter demonstrated, understanding sister services’ missions and one’s military counterparts, as well as building strong relationships with those counterparts, leads to greater respect for the diverse talents of each service which, as the Vicksburg Campaign proved, can lead to a successful joint operation.

General Grant’s, Admiral Porter’s, and General Sherman’s military and personal actions defined the very phrase “unity of effort.” These men did not allow personal or service conflicts to interfere with accomplishing their respective missions, especially Admiral Porter whose understanding of the importance of unity of effort and the need for naval logistic and gunfire support for the Army was the common thread in the Vicksburg and Red River Campaigns.

Throughout the Vicksburg Campaign, Generals Grant and Sherman and Admiral Porter worked closely on a variety of options to leverage the combined strengths of their forces. Although Admiral Porter and his Navy Fleet were not under General Grant’s direct command
and the Navy’s mission did not include naval logistics or gunfire for the Army, Admiral Porter made it clear that he would support General Grant whenever and wherever Grant desired because of Porter’s respect for General Grant’s leadership and ability to convey his strategic vision.

General Grant did an exceptional job establishing solid working relationships with General Sherman and Admiral Porter, given their different personalities and backgrounds, and focusing the army commander and navy counter-part on capturing Vicksburg. For example, Generals Grant and Sherman sought Admiral Porter’s operational input when they drafted the final plan for capturing Vicksburg, although Porter was not part of President Lincoln’s War Cabinet. Specifically, General Sherman wrote that “[i]t will be necessary [for you] to engage the Vicksburg batteries until I have broken their inland communications. Then Vicksburg must be attacked by land and river. In this I defer to you.”

Furthermore, while Commanding General of the Union forces, Grant observed unity of command was not practiced by his theater commanders, especially General Banks who constantly clashed with the Red River Campaign commanders. Unfortunately, the commanders’ personalities and respect for sister services were not considered when selecting commanders for or developing the campaign. If personalities and not political gains were considered, General Sherman, or his deputy Major General A.J. Smith, might have led the Red River Campaign instead of General Banks and the proven working relationship and close cooperation that was needed might have effected a successful joint operation and a Red River victory.

**CONCLUSION**

General Grant’s Vicksburg Campaign is considered by many scholars to be “the most brilliant campaign ever fought on American soil” and is regarded as one of the decisive moments in the American Civil War. Conversely, General Bank’s Red River Campaign is
considered by scholars to be a “colossal failure for the Union in a year of glittering triumphs on all other fronts.” As this paper argued and these campaigns illustrate, a Union commander’s commitment to unity of effort, personality, and cooperation, in the absence of an established military joint doctrine that is mandated today, was often the key to a Union victory (or defeat).

This paper argues that the close working relationship among Generals Grant and Sherman and Admiral Porter were vital for conducting capable and coordinated joint operations, especially between General Grant’s land forces and Admiral Porter’s naval fleet during the battle for Vicksburg and for creating a national strategic vision for the Union’s war fighting effort in 1864. As a result of several successful joint campaign experiences (e.g., Forts Henry and Donelson), General Grant developed a deep appreciation and respect for the Navy’s capabilities, as well as the strategic benefits of collaboration with sister services. Unfortunately, Lincoln spent three years fumbling and the Union suffered numerous losses before a national strategic vision and joint operations were developed and implemented to defeat the South.

Generals George Washington and Napoleon Bonaparte believed that “nothing is more important in war than a united command.” General Sherman echoed their belief and reinforced this point when he wrote a letter to Admiral Porter after the Vicksburg Campaign lauding the Union’s use of joint operations and unity of command to forge a strong military and nation. As Sherman wrote:

…God grant that the harmony and mutual respect that exist between our…commanders, shared by all true men of the joint [italics and bold added] service, may continue forever, and serve to elevate our national character….

General Sherman’s letter and message have withstood the test of time; and, if General Shalikashvili’s challenge to learn from past lessons and apply them to issues facing the military today and in the future holds true, then Sherman’s letter should be mandatory reading for future
war planners and commanders. Future joint planners and commanders will do well to heed General Sherman’s guidance on joint operations, which he witnessed first-hand during General Grant’s successful Vicksburg Campaign. Likewise, war planners and commanders would well to heed General Sherman’s opinion of General Bank’s execution of the Red River Campaign, which Sherman described as “one damn blunder from beginning to the end.”
APPENDIX A

Theater of Operations for General U.S. Grant’s Vicksburg Campaign

Sourced from U.S. Department of Interior, National Park Service. *Vicksburg and the Opening of the Mississippi River, 1862-63.* Published by the National Park Service, 1986.
Theater of Operations for General Banks Red River Campaign

Notes

11 Ibid, 328.
12 Ibid, 347.
13 Ibid, 346.
14 Ibid, 376.
16 Ibid, 36
18 Ibid, 73.
20 Ibid 453.
22 Ibid, XiX.
25 Ibid, 2.
28 Ibid, 6.
31 Ibid, 177.
33 Ibid, 3.
34 Joiner, Gary D. *One Damn Blunder From Beginning to the End*. Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003. 35
36 Ibid, 7.
37 Glatthaar, Joseph T. 183.
38 Joiner, Gary D. *One Damn Blunder From Beginning to the End*. Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003. 42, 43.
39 Ibid, 64.
41 Ibid, 253.
42 Ibid, 247.
43 Ibid, 175.
Bibliography


