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14. ABSTRACT The students and staff of the 1932-1933 Field Officers' Course, in Quantico Virginia, attempted to revive the development of the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations, which had stalled from 1931 to the beginning of 1933. The students were formed into committees and subcommittees. These committees were expected to study the Gallipoli Campaign and determine the lessons "to be learned" by the United States Marine Corps. The students successfully determined many lessons "to be learned" by the Marine Corps. Some of these lessons "to be learned" became part of the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations and were tested during Fleet Landing Exercises and proved on the battlefield during World War II. Collectively, the twenty Marines and three sailors of the 1932-1933 Field Officers' Course successfully achieved the expectations set out for them in Instruction Memorandum Number 10.
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1932-1933 Field Officers' Course:
Lessons “To Be Learned”

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AUTHOR:
Major John A. Fallon

AY 12-13

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Edward Erickson, PhD
Approved: [Signature]
Date: 2 May 2013

Oral Defense Committee Member: Paulette Otis, PhD
Approved: [Signature]
Date: 2 May 2013
Executive Summary

Title: 1932-1933 Field Officers’ Course: Lessons “To Be Learned”

Author: Major John A. Fallon, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: The 1932-1933 Field Officers’ Course was successful in determining the lessons “to be learned” because their study of the Gallipoli Campaign and subsequent recommendations helped shape both the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations and the curriculum of the Marine Corps Schools.

Discussion: The study of the Gallipoli Campaign by the 1932-1933 Field Officers’ Course was an attempt to revive the development of the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations which stalled from 1931 to the beginning of 1933. Student committees were formed and expected to study the Gallipoli Campaign and determine the value to the Marine Corps. The students and staff of the 1932-1933 Field Officer’s Course, in Quantico Virginia, studied the Gallipoli Campaign with the intent of determining the lessons “to be learned” by the United States Marine Corps. The students exhibited various levels of creative and independent thinking skills in their analysis of the Gallipoli Campaign, but for the most part their research helped to develop the amphibious doctrine that would be tested in fleet landing exercises and proven on the battlefield during World War II. The development of this amphibious warfare doctrine helped to ensure an enduring mission for the United States Marine Corps.

Conclusion: The 1932-1933 Field Officers’ Course was successful in determining the lessons “to be learned” because their research and recommendations helped shape both the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations and the curriculum of the Marine Corps Schools.
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Preface

I lived in Australia for over two years and admired the subtle humility they have about their national identity. On ANZAC Day, April 25\textsuperscript{th}, the Australian national pride is unbridled. I was intrigued by their national character, which is often attributed to that fatal day on the beaches of Gallipoli. I decided to do my thesis paper on the relationship between Gallipoli and the United States Marine Corps. I spoke to Dr. Edward Erickson and he suggested that I should look into the Marine Corps Schools study of the Gallipoli Campaign and the relationship to the development of the 	extit{Tentative Manual for Landing Operations}. The officers of the 1932-1933 Field Officers’ Course successfully determined many lessons “to be learned” from the study of the Gallipoli Campaign. I’d like to thank Dr. Erickson for his guidance and patience as I stumbled through the research process and for opening my eyes to the splendor of archival research. I’d also like to thank my family for their patience, understanding, and support during this process.
Introduction

The development of the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations stalled from 1931 to the beginning of 1933. The 1932-1933 Field Officers’ Course revived the development of the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations, through the study of the Gallipoli Campaign. The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools, Colonel Ellis B. Miller, released Instruction Memorandum Number 10, which tasked the officers of the 1932-1933 Field Officers’ Course to study the Gallipoli Campaign. Instruction Memorandum Number 10 stated, “The course will be conducted by lectures, delivered by members of the Schools staff, and research work, performed by committees of students of the Field Officers’ School.”¹ By today’s standards, there is nothing unique about military students performing research on a historical campaign but this was a foreign concept to most of the officers in the 1932-1933 Field Officers’ Course. This is evidenced in Lieutenant Colonel E.W. Sturdevant’s final report to the Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools in which he stated, “to most of them (students) historical research was an entirely new subject”.² In the 1932-1933 Field Officer’s Course, the students accomplished more than lectures and historical research on the Gallipoli Campaign. The student committees formed with the following expectations, “Committees are expected to study, not merely the facts of the Gallipoli Campaign, but those facts in relation to strategy or tactics of the phase of the campaign assigned them; that is, if the military or naval activity under consideration succeeded or failed, what was the cause of the success or failure; what principles and methods are illustrated and what lessons can be derived from the campaign of value to the Marine Corps”.³ Colonel Miller tasked the students to predict the lessons “to be learned” and determine which lessons were “of value to the Marine Corps”.⁴ The students and staff of the 1932-1933 Field Officer’s Course, in Quantico Virginia, studied the Gallipoli Campaign with the
intent of determining the lessons “to be learned” by the Marine Corps. It is important to note that the task was not to discover “lessons learned” during the Gallipoli Campaign but rather to discover what the Marine Corps needed in order to execute these operations in the future. The students exhibited various levels of creative and independent thinking skills in their analysis of the Gallipoli Campaign and their research contributed to the amphibious doctrine that was tested in fleet training exercises and proved on the battlefield during World War II. Moreover, the development of this amphibious warfare doctrine ensured an enduring amphibious mission for the Marine Corps. The 1932-1933 Field Officers’ Course successfully determined the lessons “to be learned” because their research and recommendations shaped both the **Tentative Manual for Landing Operations** and the curriculum of the Marine Corps Schools.

**History**

Prior to the United States declaration of war on Germany in WWI, there was much discourse about the mission of the United States Marine Corps. In 1916, Major John H. Russell, who later became the Commandant of the Marine Corps, suggested in a *Marine Corps Gazette* article that the Marine Corps lacked a mission.⁵ In response to his assertion, Major Earl “Pete” Ellis wrote a rebuttal piece, in which he suggested the Marine Corps did have a mission and if Russell did not believe it, he should look to the Marines in the West Indies as an example.⁶ The employment of the Marine Corps during World War I provided little opportunity to establish a unique mission that separated the Marine Corps from the army. The establishment of the Field Officers’ Course in the 1920’s, the successor of which is currently referred to as the Command and Staff College, indicated the importance the Marine Corps placed on training officers.⁷ The Marine Corps tried to professionalize the military and they modeled the Field Officers’ Course on the army schools of the time. The professionalization was guided by two key elements taken
from Napoleonic tradition which were, “military schools and a literature on warfare to guide officers in their studies.”

The discourse about the mission of the Marine Corps continued in the interwar years, which proved a critical time for the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps tried to establish a mission focused on “seizing and holding advanced naval bases”. The Marine Corps, under the direction of the General John A. Lejeune, conducted an amphibious landing exercise in Hawaii in 1925. General Lejeune wanted to prove to the United States Army that larger than brigade size landings were possible. Although simulated, this landing provided the proof of concept for large amphibious landings and the Marine Corps pursued this mission in doctrine and academia. The army was satisfied to have the Marine Corps take the amphibious landings mission but less than twelve years later, General Douglas MacArthur “tried to absorb the Marine Corps into the Army in 1933 and assume a greater role in landing operations.” This caused friction between the two services and the Marine Corps fortified a stronger relationship with the United States Navy by establishing the Fleet Marine Force in the autumn of 1933. The Marine Corps reorganized into the Fleet Marine Force which was considered, “the most crucial turning point in Marine Corps history”. This reorganization established the “appropriate command and administrative relations between the Fleet Marine Force and its parent body the United States Fleet.” The significance of the Fleet Marine Force was that fact that it would fall under “the operational control of the Fleet Commander when embarked on vessels of the fleet or engaged in fleet exercises afloat or ashore.”

Major General John H. Russell, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps in 1933, advocated amphibious landing operations. The fact remained that the Marine Corps had little experience in amphibious landings and “many military writers concluded that crossing a hostile
beach was no longer feasible”. The British abandoned the concept of amphibious landings, but the Marine Corps remained confident that beaches, similar to those at Gallipoli, could be “seized and secured.” The interwar years provided an opportunity for the exploration of new technology in aviation and new landing craft. The Marine Corps embraced the new technology and reinforced their amphibious doctrine.

The development of the amphibious warfare doctrine started well before the study of the Gallipoli Campaign by the Field Officers’ Course in April, 1933. The development of the tentative landing doctrine began in 1931, with the appointment of the Landing Operations Text Board. Due to constant interruption caused by the Marine Corps’ occupation of Nicaragua, the work on the tentative landings manual was sporadic. In 1932, the Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools was Brigadier General James C. Breckinridge. He changed the structure of the Marine Corps Schools to be less like the army schools and more focused on amphibious warfare. He wrote, “To meet the changes of the year 1932-1933, it will be necessary to create a new and entirely different sort of Field Officers’ class for that year.” Brigadier General Breckinridge’s strategic vision of the Marine Corps Schools was soon realized in the 1932-1933 Field Officers’ Course.

1932-1933 Field Officers’ Course

It is important to understand the complexity of the 1932-1933 Field Officers’ Course. The structure of the 1932-1933 Field Officers’ Course was like no other because the staff and students were “merged in one body for study and research.” Additionally, there were two weaknesses in the design of the 1932-1933 Field Officers’ Course in relation to the study of the Gallipoli Campaign. The first was the limited amount of time allotted to the students to research and write their reports. In a single month the students read, analyzed, wrote, and submitted their
sub-committee reports. The respective committee chairperson reviewed each report before they passed them on to Lieutenant Colonel Sturdevant. The second weakness was the lack of variety in the required reading for the study of the Gallipoli Campaign. Each student was issued “a copy of the British Official History of the Gallipoli Campaign.” They read this book, which was published in 1929 and then the second volume which was published in 1932, in two weeks time. The staff selected this book because it was “the latest and believed to be the most accurate publication on the subject”. The official history, written by Cecil Faber Aspinall-Oglander, remains a credible source today, though it is now found under the title, *Military Operations: Gallipoli Volume I and II*. Instruction Memorandum Number 10 offered a bibliography with other available works for reference but time was limited. It is evident that Lieutenant Colonel Sturdevant was concerned about the lack of variety in required reading, in two separate reports. The first was in the student opinion section in which a student suggested, “more opportunity be afforded to study the Turkish defense”. This opinion was reinforced by Lieutenant Colonel Sturdevant in his summary of the student recommendations in which he stated, “I am in sympathy with the idea that more opportunity should be afforded to study the Turkish defense.” Such a book was available, German General Otto Liman von Sanders wrote a book, *Five Years in Turkey*, published in 1929. This book was available to the students, but there was little time to take on additional reading. The study of the Gallipoli Campaign seemed an impossible task for the students based on the limited time to research and the limited resources of historical information on amphibious landings. However, the students of the 1932-1933 Field Officers’ Course accepted the challenge and contributed to the shaping of amphibious warfare doctrine and the future of professional military education in the Marine Corps. One of Lieutenant Colonel Sturdevant’s lessons “to be learned” was in the context of the course itself.
He thought variety was an important part of historical research because it helped to avoid a one-sided view of the subject. One of Lieutenant Colonel Sturdevant’s lesson “to be learned” was that a variety of source material was critical to understanding the complexity of historical research and equally important to facilitate critical thinking.

During the course, the staff conducted preliminary and topical lectures and the student committees researched various aspect of the Gallipoli Campaign. The student committees were assigned as follows; Committee I (Naval Activities, six officers assigned), Committee II (Landings and Turkish Defense, four officers assigned), Committee III (Signal Communications, four officers assigned), Committee IV (Naval Gun Fire, three officers assigned), Committee V (Intelligence, one officer assigned) and finally Committee VI (Service of Supply, five officers assigned). After one month, the committees and sub-committees briefed their respective topics and submitted written reports. The following paragraphs are based on some of the committee reports of the 1932-1933 Field Officers’ Course listed above.

**Communication**

In Supplement C, to Committee Report III, Captain T. F. Joyce took a unique approach to the task of “what lessons can be derived from the Campaign of value to the Marine Corps”. He titled his conclusion and recommendation section, “Lessons to be learned by the Marine Corps”. His approach looked beyond the lessons learned and looked into the potential future of the Marine Corps. Captain Joyce made several recommendations for the Marine Corps. The first lesson to be learned was a “greater requirement for Signalmen in expeditionary operations”. Captain Joyce suggested the communication issues during the Gallipoli landings were related to a lack of manpower, which is why he suggested more signalmen for expeditionary operations. Attributing a military failure to the lack of manpower is a consistent
theme in military operations, but rarely holds up to much scrutiny. Like Captain Joyce, the Marine Corps recognized a problem but approached the solution differently. The Marine Corps recognized some truth in the lack of manpower but the interwar years and manpower reductions did little to help the situation. Rather than add personnel, who did not exist, the Marine Corps needed to restructure a more efficient organization. The 1934 draft of the *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations* specifically separated the scope of communication between the landing operation and other standard naval communications.\(^{34}\) The 1934 draft *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations* mandated a relationship between the communications officer of the Landing Force and the communications officer of the Naval Attack Force. The communications officer of the Landing Force became the technical advisor to the communications officer of the Naval Attack Force.\(^{35}\) There was no increase in manpower but rather an establishment of a proper relationship. The 1934 draft *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations* also established a communication plan for landing operations. This communication plan established the specific requirements for platoon, company, and battalion size elements and also ensured organic and portable assets were available at the lowest levels.\(^{36}\)

Captain C. D. Sniffen mentioned the same issue in Supplement A, to Committee Report III. He wrote, “Joint comprehensive Navy and Marine Corps communications and liaison plans should be prepared and issued for the study of all concerned. These plans should definitely cover the respective spheres of responsibility for the intercommunication between ships, between ships and shore, and on shore, both front to rear and laterally, including naval and artillery gunfire control communications”\(^{37}\) Captain Sniffen understood the complexities of communications during amphibious landing operations. The lesson, to be learned by the Marine Corps, was the importance of the communication during amphibious operations. This is an
important concept because it established unique and distinguishable roles for the Navy and the Marine Corps during amphibious operations. The 1934 draft *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations* emphasized the importance of communications in order for an operation to be successful. Captains Joyce and Sniffen understood the issues of communications in the Gallipoli Campaign and they identified and suggested these same issues were lessons to be learned by the Marine Corps. They were correct in their assertion because the Navy and Marine Corps established a relationship between the communications officer of the Naval Task Force and communications officer of the Landing Force.

**Training**

Training is an essential part of the military and an integral part of preparing for operations. This concept remains consistent with amphibious landing operations. However, in 1933, there was no Marine Corps doctrine on amphibious landings making it nearly impossible to conduct consistent training, particularly complicated amphibious landings. One of the consistent themes in many of the supplemental reports on the Gallipoli Campaign was a requirement for combined training. Captain Joyce wrote that a lesson to be learned by the Marine Corps was “Maneuvers and landing partied with the fleet would be very valuable training for Marines.”\(^38\) He is not alone in his assessment on this particular issue. In supplement B of Committee Report III, Captain E. L. Mullaly made a similar suggestion when he stated “It is to be hoped that in the near future the Navy may find it convenient and important to include in the annual training schedule of the fleet a scheme of having practice landing operations including the use of covering fire.”\(^39\) Captain Mullaly also wrote “Joint maneuvers of this kind would be of estimable value to both services by developing team work between the Navy and Marine Corps to a greater degree than has hitherto been attainable and will better prepare us to accomplish our
mission in the first line of defense with our Navy.” There was little mention of training in the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations and the manual seemed to assume that training is part of the standard operating procedures for landing operations. An example of this assumption is represented in the following from the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations, “prior to the issuance of a landing schedule for a specific operation, most of the detailed plans can be prepared, and training conducted for the debarkation and movement from ship to shore.” Captains Joyce and Mullaly recognized the importance of combined training exercises in order for an amphibious landing to be successful. They successfully predicted the lesson to be learned for the Marine Corps because this training soon became embedded in the Fleet Landing Exercises. In the early spring of 1935, the first Fleet Landing Exercise was conducted and this became a standard training exercise for the Navy and Marine Corps in the years following. These combined Navy and Marine Corps Fleet Landing Exercises consisted of daily debarkations on to boats and maneuver to the shore. The exercises were intended to “test doctrine and organization, refine landing force staff work, stimulate the evolution of landing craft and radio equipment, underscore the need for improved naval gunfire and air support, and give practical experience to the services involved.” Captain Joyce’s and Captain Mullaly’s recommendations became embedded annual exercises in which the Marine Corps would, “hold maneuvers in conjunction with the fleet.” The Fleet Landing Exercises that took place between 1935 and prior to the start of World War II were essential in preparing the Navy and Marine Corps for the island hopping campaign in the Pacific. Captain Joyce and Captain Mullaly were successful when they suggested that combined training was a lesson to be learned by the Marine Corps.
**Professional Military Education**

Captain Joyce’s final recommendation about the lessons to be learned for the Marine Corps was the practical application of the lessons learned in the academic environment. He believed that studies, like that of the Gallipoli Campaign, were valuable to officers as they returned to their respective units. He suggested “the students attending this school (Field Officers’ Course), leave with the determination to put into execution what they have learned in the school, the Marine Corps need have no fear of not being well prepared for any future emergency.” This concept was particularly important during the interwar years when money was limited and only a few officers were able to attend school. This reflected the very ethos of the professional military education for the Marine Corps, to teach Marines lessons they will find useful in the execution of their responsibilities in the operating forces. Colonel Miller was clear in his purpose and expectation of the study of the Gallipoli Campaign which is evidenced by the following, “to train them (students) in military research; and to provide the Schools and through them the Marine Corps with material of value on a campaign which is in many respects of the type we are expected to be experts in.” To put this into perspective, the students of the Field Officer’s Course were aware of the value of their studies and military education. The most valuable lesson to be learned for the Marine Corps was the need to stimulate the minds of its officers. This can be seen today by the significant investment the Marine Corps places on professional military education.

One of the most remarkable aspects of the study of the Gallipoli Campaign by the 1932-1933 Field Officers’ Course was the shaping of the Marine Corps Schools and their impact on the future curriculum. Captain J. Tildsley articulated this best when he wrote, “The Gallipoli Campaign, was in many respects, the type of venture that the Marine Corps may, at any time, be
called upon to engage in. This we know; but considering the multitudinous other duties that we are required to perform, how can we expect to become proficient in this most difficult of wartime operations. The answer seems to us to be; the Marine Corps Schools.”48 He valued the Marine Corps Schools because it gave officers the opportunity to discuss, debate, and develop doctrine. He understood this was difficult to accomplish in the fleet because of the other daily distraction of primary duties and functions. He then further wrote in reference to the Marine Corps Schools, “The Corps must look to them (schools) for guidance, not only as to the current principles and techniques of landing operations, but for its proper indoctrination as well.”49 The lesson that Captain Tildsley thought was to be learned by the Marine Corps was the importance of the education towards its future. The Marine Corps understood the investment in professional military education is equally important to operational experience. The students of the 1932-1933 Field Officers’ Course recognized this and it still is true today.

**Human Factors**

In Supplement B to Committee Report I, Lieutenant P.R. Sterling took a unique perspective on the lessons to be applied to the Marine Corps. He provided a naval perspective on human factors as they applied to amphibious landings. He stated “the cramping of troops and boat crews into small craft for a period of hours before landing, produces a nervous fatigue which is probably beyond even the imagination of those who have never tried it.”50 He asserted the Marine Corps must make considerations for the welfare of the troops in amphibious operations. Lieutenant Sterling recognized, during his study of the Gallipoli Campaign, the physical and psychological welfare of the troops were interdependent. This concept became part of the *Navy Landing Operations Manual (Fleet Training Publication 167)* evidenced in the following, “in the determination of the troop and cargo capacity of a transport, consideration
should be given to the necessity of avoiding undue crowding, particularly on long voyages and under adverse weather conditions.” In 1933, not much was known about the psychological effects of warfare and Lieutenant Sterling was ahead of his time as he predicted a lesson to be learned by the Marine Corps. He believed the physical and psychological welfare of the Marines and sailors was extremely important and how those interdependencies affected operations. Lieutenant Sterling was correct when he suggested a lesson to be learned for the Marine Corps was to take care of the troops prior to landing or they may become ineffective.

**Initiative**

In supplement A to Committee Report II, Captain F.C. Cushing made several recommendations that proved valuable to the Marine Corps. His first point was somewhat obvious but still necessary for exploration. He stated a landing at the wrong place “may be fatal to the entire plan of subsequent operations” His suggestion that it “may be fatal” assumed there was a possibility of success even if the landing force was in the wrong place. The Marine Corps understood these situations might occur during the execution phase and though they could not plan for every scenario they could adapt to the situation at hand. This manifested itself in the text of the *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations* in the following, “if a unit is landed on the wrong beach, its commander will initiate such action as will best further the general scheme of maneuver.” This brought up two important points to be learned by the Marine Corps. The first was a commander must have the initiative to adjust to a changing situation. The second and more important lesson to be learned was that the commander must have a working knowledge and understanding of higher headquarters mission and intent. Captain Cushing may have stated the obvious but the Marine Corps thought it was important enough to put in the *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations*. 
Fires

Captain Cushing also wrote in his report that the “lack of proper artillery support for the advancing infantry may jeopardize the success of the attack.”54 The use of combined arms was not a new concept but Captain Cushing believed it was important to ensure the concept carried through to amphibious operations. There were several references to the employment of artillery in the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations such as, “early entry into action of land-based artillery and aircraft may be necessary in order to provide adequate support for the main landing or the operations on shore.”55 Lieutenant Colonel Sturdevant understood the course was designed to study those elements that “differentiate Gallipoli from purely land operations”.56 Artillery was one of those elements that applied to both land operations and amphibious landing operations. Conceptually the use of artillery for amphibious operations remained consistent with land operations. The struggle with amphibious operations became the “how and when” artillery should be brought into the fight. Captain Cushing suggested artillery should be sequentially close behind the initial waves to support the advancement of troops. He also stressed the importance of controlling these troops after landing and pushing to the objective quickly which is evidenced in the following, “Control of troops and coordination in attack after landing is as essential as getting on the beach”57 and “The vital necessity of pushing toward their objective promptly after landing.”58 Captain Cushing believed the lesson to be learned was the effective use and timing of artillery in amphibious operations was important. It was not enough to rely on naval gun fire, which was used sparingly during the assault phase of the Gallipoli Campaign. He wanted to ensure the Marine Corps did not overlook the importance of artillery in the conduct of amphibious operations and getting the artillery ashore early required many logistics resources.

Enemy Defenses
Captain Cushing was also assigned “Turkish local defenses” as part of his campaign study.\textsuperscript{59} Captain Cushing made several recommendations about the Turkish defenses. Captain Cushing and Lieutenant Colonel Sturdevant made it clear in their reports that more time was needed to focus on that area. Captain Cushing thought the Turkish defenses should, “take full advantage of the knowledge of the terrain and road net in placing reserves so as to meet enemy landings at the earliest minute with superior force.”\textsuperscript{60} This was an important a great point from the defensive perspective because it allows the defense to be mobile. This mobility would then allow the defense to concentrate forces once the amphibious landing began. Captain Cushing also wrote, “deny landing beaches that are suitable by terrain and weather conditions, by proper disposition of automatic weapons.”\textsuperscript{61} Captain Cushing suggested that suitable landing beaches are predictable based on intelligence and those beaches should, in turn, be heavily defended. This was an interesting observation because it allowed for the offense to assume that unsuitable landing beaches will not be heavily defended. Clarification for this assumption came when he wrote, “Don’t discard a landing beach as impossible of enemy use because of difficult terrain features.”\textsuperscript{62} Captain Cushing understood the limitations of resources and manpower. He did not suggest that all beaches must be defended but they all should be considered in the planning process and, at a minimum the defense must, “endeavor to prevent surprise landings by efficient coastal observations.”\textsuperscript{63} Captain Cushing recommendations were not new to warfare but he adapted them to go with amphibious landings. His ideas and recommendations remained important because of their simplicity. The Marines development of the \textit{Tentative Manual for Landing Operations} is best described in the following, “the genius of the Marines and the real advance in amphibious operations that the Tentative Manual represented lie not so much in the conceptual improvements in the landing arts but rather the painstaking and careful expansion of
already existing ideas into a body of doctrine.” The lesson to be learned by Captain Cushing was that no detail should be overlooked when developing doctrine and what already exists can be expanded upon to become more useful, particularly in regards to amphibious landings.

**Reserves**

Major J.C. Fegan was the chairman of Committee II. He analyzed the subcommittee reports on landings and made quite a few observations and conclusions. One of his first conclusions was the following, “the necessity for having attacks carried out in a coordinated and simultaneous fashion, giving especial consideration to the employment of reserves.” Major Fegan understood the importance of the reserves in amphibious landing operations. The reserves were to be used to exploit success on the beach. They should not be used to reinforce failure on a heavily defended beach. These concepts are mentioned in the *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations*. “In order to exploit quickly the successes gained by leading battalions, reserve units must be available for prompt landing.” The manual also stated, “In order to facilitate control, reserves are preferably embarked in relatively large boats.” The lesson to be learned by the Marine Corps was the employment of reserves in amphibious landings is critically important. Amphibious landings provided a unique maneuver capability to the commander because he has the ability to employ the reserves to the desired objective to exploit success.

**Evacuation of Casualties**

Major Fegan considered the “Evacuation of casualties” as one the lessons to be learned from the Gallipoli Campaign. One of the issues during the Gallipoli Campaign was the failure to include the medical officer in the planning process. This led to several issues with the evacuation of casualties. The importance of the evacuation of casualties also made it into the *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations* as evidenced in the following, “The medical plans
must provide for the evacuation and hospitalization of sick and battle casualties, including captured enemy casualties. In addition to the personnel and materiel of medical units attached to the landing force and for normal fleet requirements, the medical plan should provide for the following. Major Fegan successfully provided this lesson to be learned by the Marine Corps because the back up of casualties on the beach was significant for physical and psychological reasons. A plan must be established to care for the wounded that maximizes the use of boat space.

**Intelligence**

In today’s world, one of the most important warfighting functions is intelligence. It was surprising that only one Marine was dedicated to the study of intelligence during the 1932-1933 Field Officers’ Course. In the Committee V Report, Captain T.B. Gale wrote, “All necessary or available intelligence should be gathered, a preliminary study made and outline of plans completed, before embarking upon a landing attack.” This was based on the poor and hastily made plans leading up to the Gallipoli Campaign. The *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations* stressed the importance of the intelligence plan. This was evidenced by the following excerpt, “The intelligence plan.--After making a study of existing data on the proposed theater of operations, an intelligence plan should be prepared in which is listed the additional information, naval and military, required for the conduct of the operation. This intelligence plan forms the basis for determining the size, composition, and tasks of the reconnaissance force dispatched to the theater of operations for the purpose of collecting the necessary information.” Captain Gale believed the lesson to be learned by the Marine Corps was the importance of intelligence.
The Gallipoli Campaign was riddled with mistakes to include “faulty doctrine, ineffective techniques, poor leadership and an utter lack of coordination between the services.” One of the more tactically obvious mistakes was the lack of maps. Unfortunately for the allies they “had only a 1905 hand-book on Turkey and a map which was vague and - it was later discovered – inaccurate” In his Committee V report, Captain Gale pointed out this deficiency and wrote “Accurate maps are necessary to gain the utmost benefit from the advantage or disadvantages of the terrain” He wanted to ensure the Marine Corps was aware of this lesson and took appropriate action to prevent similar issues in the future. The importance of maps shows up in the new amphibious warfare doctrine as evidenced by the following, “Topographic maps, as accurate and complete as the existing data permit, should be made available prior to embarkation for all units engaged in the operation.” Captain Gale suggested that maps are an important element for the commander to understand the terrain.

**Surprise and Deception**

Captain Cushing suggested, “A surprise landing places the defenders at a great disadvantage.” There are obvious advantages of surprising the enemy and Captain Cushing recognized the Marine Corps must exploit those advantages. One of the difficulties of surprising the enemy was keeping the attack plans a secret. Famously, extremely poor operational security on the part of the British, fully alerted the Ottoman well in advance of the landing. Captain Cushing believed there was a balance between maintaining surprise and informing subordinates about the plan. Surprise cannot be done to the detriment of the subordinate commanders. This was best articulated by Captain Gale when he wrote, “In any operation involving surprise, sufficient secrecy should be maintained to keep your intentions from the enemy, but it should not be maintained to such a degree as to keep your intentions from your subordinate leaders.
Secrecy must have a happy medium.”78 This concept was also evident in the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations. It stated, “The principle of surprise.--In the execution of the intelligence plan for a specific landing operation, care must be taken not to divulge the intentions of the attacker, and certain landing areas and beaches, which are not to be used, should be reconnoitered as thoroughly and with the same means as those at which landings are planned”.79 Captain Cushing suggested the lesson to be learned by the Marine Corps was there must be a balance between subordinate commanders being informed and maintaining secrecy. This supports an earlier concept in that if Marines landed in the wrong beach, the commander must have the knowledge of the mission to adapt to the circumstances.

Another lesson to be learned by the Marine Corps was the use of deception. Major Fegan recognized that amphibious landings provided a unique opportunity for the commander to use deception. He wrote, “the importance of making diversions realistic, in order to be effective”80. During amphibious landings the commander could use a diversion to prevent the enemy from realizing the objective. The purpose would be to get the enemy to commit land forces to a location and then maneuver to the planned objective. This proved important in future amphibious landings.

Reconnaissance

Captain Gale also mentioned the importance of reconnaissance during amphibious operations. He stated, “Good air reconnaissance should be available in all landings. Ground reconnaissance from ships will generally be unsatisfactory”81. Captain Gale suggested there was more potential for air reconnaissance than the small role played in the Gallipoli Campaign. Captain Cushing also mentioned the following in his Committee II Report, “Adequate reconnaissance by all possible means is imperative.” 82 Captains Gale and Cushing recognized
the potential for reconnaissance in amphibious operations. The Marine Corps incorporated these ideas into the *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations* as seen in the following, “Tactical reconnaissance of the enemy positions should be continuous throughout the various phases of the actual landing, paying particular attention to enemy troop movements and the location of his reserves. Planes assigned liaison, artillery, and contact missions will establish and maintain communication with the units they are supporting and furnish the commanders thereof with pertinent information.” Captains Gale and Cushing believed the lesson to be learned by the Marine Corps was the availability of aircraft and other technology enhanced the reconnaissance capability of the Marine Corps.

**Course Critique**

In the General Remarks section of his report to the Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools, Lieutenant Colonel Sturdevant critiques the committee reports. He noted the following faults on the written reports, “Failure to stick to the subject assigned, too great detail in narration, lack of logical arrangement, and not sufficient imagination in drawing conclusions.” In today’s environment, these faults are consistent with those seen in military professional education institutions. Of course, some of these faults can be attributed to the short amount of time allotted to finish the assigned reading and complete the reports. He also critiqued the oral presentation of the reports in the following, “Too fast reading, Eyes glued on the paper (one instance), lack of synchronization between texts and slides(one instance), absence of force in delivery, nervousness.” Many of these faults are simple briefing techniques that become better with practice. Again, time constraints were identified as a factor in critiquing the oral presentations. There simply was not enough time allotted to allow the student to fully synthesize all of the information on the Gallipoli Campaign study. The lesson to be learned, according to
Lieutenant Colonel Sturdevant, was of an academic nature. He stated, “In my opinion, the
Gallipoli Campaign should be studied every year by the Field Officers’ Class and if practicable
by the Company Officers…. Gallipoli should always be included in the course”. The Gallipoli
Campaign was studied in officer professional military educations institutions on an annual basis.
It has also migrated to the current Expeditionary Warfare School where it is one of the required
presentations that a student gives in the conference groups.

**Conclusion**

The recommendations of the students of the 1932-1933 Field Officers’ Course were
considered in a conference held in January, 1934. The attendees of the conference commenced
the process of creating the *Tentative Landing Operations Manual*. The conference was led by,
Brigadier General Breckinridge, the Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools, and his assistant
Colonel Miller. General John H. Russell, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps,
“wanted a manual that would indicate to the Navy the broad general part that we should play in
landing operations”. General Russell issued an order for the Marine Corps Schools to
discontinue its efforts with the Gallipoli Campaign and start to produce the “rules and doctrine
covering landing operation”. In 1934, the students and staff produced the *Tentative Manual for
Landing Operations*, which became the doctrine for amphibious warfare in the army, navy and
Marine Corps. The direct connection between the faculty and staff of the Marine Corps schools
system and the development of amphibious warfare doctrine cannot be overemphasized.

Colonel Miller tasked the 1932-1933 Field Officer’s Course to study the Gallipoli
Campaign and determine the lessons to be learned by the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps
allotted the students a limited amount of time to complete the task but the 1932-1933 Field
Officers’ Course successfully determined some of the lessons “to be learned” because their study
and recommendations helped shape both the *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations* and the curriculum of the Marine Corps Schools. Collectively, the twenty Marines and three sailors of the 1932-1933 Field Officers Course successfully achieved the expectations set out for them in Instruction Memorandum Number 10.
Endnotes

1 Ellis Miller. "Instruction Memorandum No. 10." Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps. Coll. HAF, 1.
3 Miller, 2.
4 Miller, 2.
6 Bittner 1989, 2.
12 Atwater, 117.
13 Isely, 33.
14 Isely, 33.
15 Isely, 34.
16 Hough, 13.
17 Isely, 5.
18 Isely, 5.
19 Isely, 5.
20 Miller, 1.
21 Atwater, 78.
22 Atwater, 78.
24 Breckinridge 1932, 2.
25 Miller, 2.
26 Miller, 2.
27 Miller, 3.
29 Sturdevant 1933, 6.
30 Miller, 1.
31 Miller, 2.
Thomas F. Joyce. “Supplement C to Report of Committee III "Signal communications and liaison, between ships and landing forces and between units of forces ashore, including radio, cable, telephone, visual and messenger service, (to include from landing throughout campaign).” 1933. Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps. Coll. HAF, 20.

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C.D. Sniffin. “Supplement A to Report of Committee III "Signal communications and liaison, between ships and landing forces and between units of forces ashore, including radio, cable, telephone, visual and messenger service, to cover the Helles landing through campaign.” 1933. Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps. Coll. HAF, 26.

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Cushing, 37.


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James, 80.
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Sturdevant 1933, 6.
Sturdevant 1933, 6.
Breckinridge 1934, 11.
Bittner 1988, 46.
Bittner 1989, 47.
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