As a result of the 2001 terrorist attacks, the intelligence community organization structure was scrutinized to identify shortcomings. Subsequently with passage of the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, the intelligence community established several intelligence operation/fusion/coordination centers under the Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The ODNI centers complemented other state and local fusion centers under the Department of Homeland Security, and the already present Joint Intelligence Operations Centers at each combatant command under the Department of Defense. These national, civilian, and defense intelligence operation/fusion/coordination centers require an assessment of operational effectiveness and subsequent recommendations to address suspect shortfalls and opportunities to enhance efficiency and alignment of operational assets with center and intelligence community strategic vision. Strategic policy can direct the establishment of the centers, but true operational level coordination is realized through discovery, establishing and maturing working relationships, to facilitate unity of effort. To maximize efficiency and effectiveness, it is suggested a comprehensive baseline review of internal people, process, and technology supporting similar missions across common centers be conducted to standardize, align, and synchronize operations with strategic direction.

Intelligence Coordination, Fusion Centers, NCTC, State and Local Fusion Centers, Intelligence Reform
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

Assessing Intelligence Operation/Fusion/Coordination Centers for Efficiency Opportunities

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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**Executive Summary**

**Title:** Assessing Intelligence Operation/Fusion/Coordination Centers for Efficiency Opportunities

**Author:** Lieutenant Commander Jeff Mauck, United States Navy

**Thesis:** National, civilian, and defense intelligence operation/fusion/coordination centers require an assessment of operational effectiveness and subsequent recommendations to address suspect shortfalls and identify opportunities to enhance efficiency and alignment of operational assets with center and intelligence community strategic vision.

**Discussion:** As a result of the 2001 terrorist attacks, the intelligence community organization structure was scrutinized to identify shortcomings. The 9/11 Commission indirectly labeled the attacks an “intelligence failure” and called for a unity of effort in intelligence analysis and production. Subsequently with passage of the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, the intelligence community established several intelligence operation/fusion/coordination centers under the Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The ODNI centers were quickly complemented with additional state and local fusion centers under the Department of Homeland Security, and the already present Joint Intelligence Operations Centers at each combatant command under the Department of Defense. These ‘national’ level centers are just a sampling of the expanding infrastructure to address strategic initiatives in improving intelligence coordination in a timely manner, as there are many additional centers within the various organizations of the intelligence community both predating and after 9/11.

**Conclusion:** Strategic policy can direct the establishment of intelligence operation/fusion/coordination centers, but true operational level coordination is realized through discovery, establishing and maturing working relationships, to facilitate unity of effort. At the heart of the centers are people, process, and technology that comprise its everyday operation. To maximize efficiency and effectiveness, it is suggested a comprehensive baseline review of people, process, and technology supporting similar missions across common centers be conducted to baseline available resources, identify shortfalls and gaps, standardize, align, and synchronize operations with strategic direction.
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Preface

The U.S. intelligence framework was never designed to be a ‘community’ from inception, rather it has matured and migrated toward that realization as adversaries and threats to the [U.S.] national security have and continue to dictate a centralized focus from the interdepartmental intelligence community. External factors such as a resource constrained environment and the ever increasing globalization that requires swift processing and dissemination of tailored intelligence analysis naturally feeds the desire to establish intelligence operation/fusion/coordination centers, especially from a strategic view. However, with the myriad of organizations and various expertise engrained within resident agency/organization personnel, process, and technologies; intelligence operation/fusion/coordination centers effectiveness and efficiency are a ‘work in progress’.

The intent of this paper is to stimulate consideration amongst ODNI leadership in conducting a baseline of current intelligence community centers to define supporting personnel, process, and technology assets; map people, process, and technology similarities across the totality of centers from the individual to national organization level; and align, eliminate, or modify centers per the center’s contribution to current and projected intelligence priorities. Such a review will force a bottom’s up operational synchronization of people, process, and technology to the strategic intent of the integration of the intelligence community championed by the IRTPA of 2004.
Assessing Joint, National, and Military Intelligence Operation Centers for Efficiency Opportunities

I. Introduction

National, civilian, and defense intelligence operation/fusion/coordination centers require an assessment of operational effectiveness and subsequent recommendations to address suspect shortfalls and opportunities to enhance efficiency and alignment of operational assets with center and intelligence community strategic vision. The security threat environment of the United States forever changed after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. As a result, the intelligence organization structure was scrutinized to identify shortcomings, as it was believed that the intelligence community failed to synchronize available information in a timely manner to predict, identify and prevent the tragedy. The 9/11 Commission indirectly labeled the attacks an “intelligence failure” and called for the development of a “…political-military strategy that relies upon the integration of civilian and military activities in a unity of effort in intelligence to respond to the global threat...”.¹

This collaboration is increasingly demonstrated through the development of intelligence operation/fusion/coordination centers across 17 organizations that comprise the intelligence community (IC). This paper explores how the IC strategic guidance was restructured after 9/11 to encourage the development of intelligence operation/fusion/coordination centers, summarizes center operations, assesses the effectives of operations based on available government reports, and provides recommendations to enhance efficiency and effectives of center operations.

¹ Louise Stanton, The Civilian—Military Divide: Obstacles to the Integration of Intelligence in the United States (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2009), 6.
II. Background

This section provides the scope of the centers described herein, an overview of the intelligence community strategic policy and guidance after 9/11 as related to the centers, and description of the approach used to report center operational effectiveness and develop recommendations.

Since 2001, the intelligence community has undergone organizational restructuring across national, civil, and defense organizations in an attempt to mitigate the intelligence failures of 9/11, furthering intelligence coordination and synchronization efforts against an identified target. The resulting policy and governance instituted after 9/11 formulated a revised intelligence oversight structure and authorities to enhance collaboration across the intelligence community. In response to the reorganization policies and memorandums produced since 9/11, intelligence operation/coordination/fusion centers have and continue to be stood up to improve the collaboration across intelligence organizations addressing national security threats. Open source review of journals and books describing changes in the intelligence community organizational structure since September 2001, were reviewed to assess a sampling of the key intelligence operation/coordination/fusion centers from national, civilian and Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence community members.

Scope.

The intelligence operation/fusion/coordination centers selected are a representative sample, not an exhaustive and complete list, chosen to highlight the cross section of intelligence operation/fusion/coordination centers in operation across national, civilian, and the DoD intelligence organizations.
Intelligence Community Strategic Policy and Directives.

After 9/11, demands for intelligence reform were taken more seriously, though the "executive branch remained opposed to change." ² “Public voices and members of Congress were objecting to "business as usual" in light of the greatest intelligence failure since Pearl Harbor”.³ Several key policies and directives contributed to the first major reorganization in U.S. intelligence structure, which both directly and indirectly led to development of intelligence operation/fusion/coordination centers to facilitate cooperation and collaboration across the intelligence community to meet strategic policy intent. Below are summaries of the major policy and directives that have helped shape the current state of the intelligence community.

_U.S. Patriot Act of 2001_

The Patriot Act of 2001 provided Federal officials increased authority to track and intercept communications both for law enforcement and foreign intelligence gathering purposes. The Secretary of Treasury is given regulatory power to address corruption in U.S. financial institutions involved in money laundering. Of interest to establishing intelligence operations/coordination/fusion centers, the Act specifically “encourages cooperation between law enforcement and foreign intelligence investigators” and “financial institutions and law enforcement agencies to share information concerning suspected money laundering and terrorist activities”.⁴

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³ Ibid, IX.
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 established a Senate confirmed position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) that is not affiliated with any other member of the intelligence community. This position allows the DNI ability to oversee, manage, improve information sharing, and encourage unity and integration across the intelligence community. The DNI develops and determines the annual budget for the National Intelligence Program (NIP) budget and ensures its effective execution. Also, the DNI may establish national intelligence centers as he/she deems necessary to ensure that competitive analysis and varied perspectives are brought forward to develop sound analysis for policy makers. The 2004 IRTPA made changes to the overall structure of the intelligence community, but did not change the basic functions of the intelligence community agencies.

Executive Order (EO) 12333, as updated in 2008

Originally signed by President Ronald Reagan in 1981, Executive Order 12333 “outlined a leading role for the DCI in developing the budget, reviewing requests for the reprogramming of funds, and monitoring implementation.” Executive Order (EO) 12333 was updated and signed by President Bush in 2008 to reflect the new structure of the intelligence community per the 2004 IRTPA. The revised EO encouraged analytical competition amongst elements in the intelligence community by assigning intelligence functional and mission managers across the organizations, but provided limited detail in direction of activities and operations amongst the intelligence community. Table 1 provides

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5 Ibid, 569-571.
a summary of the 17 organizations that comprise the intelligence community; their associated
category of national, civilian or defense; and their intended intelligence functions per EO
12333.

**Table 1: U.S. Intelligence Community (IC)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)</td>
<td>National Intelligence Organization</td>
<td>Directs, oversees intelligence programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)</td>
<td>National Intelligence Organization</td>
<td>Lead agency for collecting and analyzing human intelligence (HUMINT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security Agency (NSA)</td>
<td>National Intelligence Organization</td>
<td>Collects, coordinates, directs, and performs specialized operations mainly through signal intelligence (SIGINT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)</td>
<td>National Intelligence Organization</td>
<td>Conducts research and development, acquisition, launch, and operation of overhead reconnaissance systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA)</td>
<td>National Intelligence Organization</td>
<td>Provides geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) for national security objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)</td>
<td>DoD Intelligence Organization</td>
<td>Provides all source military intelligence to policy makers; Directs and manages DoD intelligence collection requirements for HUMINT, measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) and analysis for SIGINT and GEOINT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the State Department</td>
<td>Civilian Intelligence Organization</td>
<td>Provides analysis of global issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army, Air Force, Coast Guard, Navy, and USMC Intelligence</td>
<td>Military Service Intelligence Organizations</td>
<td>Focus on operational and tactical issues per service specific mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
<td>National Intelligence Organization</td>
<td>Serves as a Federal criminal investigative and domestic intelligence agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Enforcement Agency</td>
<td>Civilian Intelligence Organizations</td>
<td>Law enforcement agency that collects and analyzes information on drug trafficking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Energy, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence</td>
<td>Civilian Intelligence Organization</td>
<td>Analyzes foreign nuclear weapons, materials and energy security issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Treasury Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence</td>
<td>Civilian Intelligence Organization</td>
<td>Counters international financial networks that support terrorist organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Homeland Security Office of intelligence and Analysis</td>
<td>National Intelligence Organization</td>
<td>Focuses on threats to border security, critical infrastructure, domestic extremists, suspect travelers entering U.S., and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) issues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Joint Publication 2-01 Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, January 5, 2012

Joint Publication 2-01 provides doctrine for joint and national intelligence products and services in support of joint military operations. Key to joint intelligence operations is Secretary of Defense’s Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOC) Execute Order (03 Apr 06), which directed the establishment of Combatant Command JIOCs, a Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Center (DJIOC) at the Defense Intelligence Agency, and U.S. Forces Korea. “Each Combatant Command; United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), a subunified command under United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and the United States Forces Korea (USFK), a subunified command under United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), operate JIOCs in order to interlink operations, planning, and all-source intelligence capabilities in support of the command mission.” As per JP 2-01, joint intelligence organizations provide the Combatant Command and subordinate joint force with a common, coordinated intelligence picture by fusing national and theater intelligence, law enforcement, and counter intelligence (CI) information. The JIOCs provide the DoD and DNI the structure to integrate joint planning, operations, and intelligence at the national, combatant command, and operational levels.

Intelligence Operation/Fusion/Coordination Centers

As a result of the 2004 IRTPA and aforementioned policy and directives, intelligence organizations have instituted several national, civilian and defense intelligence operation/fusion/coordination centers. The following centers serve as the representative sample for review and analysis in this paper:

7 CJCS, Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) Execute Order, 031640Z APR 06
Methodology and Approach.

The aforementioned intelligence community strategic policies and directives establish the premise for intelligence operation/fusion/coordination centers at national, civilian, and defense intelligence agencies. Describing intelligence priorities, organizational contrasts between civilian and military intelligence activities, and funding allocation amongst the centers provides the overall strategic vision of the centers. To understand the functional landscape of the selected centers, the following parameters are defined: office of primary responsibility, source of funding, intelligence functional responsibilities, date established, physical location, justification for establishment and resulting products. Strategic policy and directives sow the seed for growth of intelligence operation/fusion/coordination centers, and reviewing functional landscape provides basic operational reference. Open source research identified government reports that assessed the operational performance of the centers. Documented government assessments at the operational level coupled with scholarly and intelligence professional perspectives of efficient intelligence operations, yielded recommendations to maximize efficiency and effectiveness of intelligence operation/fusion/coordination centers with available IC resources and capabilities.
III. Analysis.

This section provides an overview of how intelligence priorities are determined to address policy maker needs, the organizational and leadership construct amongst military and civilian intelligence entities, how funding is managed across the IC, functional landscape of the centers, and assessment of the centers operational effectiveness.

Intelligence Priorities

Intelligence is information collected, processed, analyzed, and tailored by intelligence professionals, for decision or policy makers to meet stated or understood needs. Therefore, intelligence priorities are directly linked to the present concerns of policy makers and not necessarily forecasted areas of concern that may have a potential for significance, especially in a resource constrained environment.

Since the Cold War and after 2001, our intelligence priorities have gone from a known suspected adversary (focus on Soviet nuclear attack), to an unknown adversary with unknown intentions, and unknown means, and methods to attack U.S. national security interests. Accordingly, “Intelligence agencies exist for at least four major reasons: to avoid strategic surprise, to provide long-term expertise, to support the policy process, and to maintain the secrecy of information, needs, and methods.” The latest ODNI Fact Sheet notes that the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) “establishes Intelligence Community priorities with clear and measurable goals and objectives” and has “created the Intelligence Community Executive Committee (EXCOM) to ensure full coverage of key intelligence priorities and eliminate duplication of effort.”

10 Ibid, 2.
Historically, competing priorities across 16 different organizations, with different leaders, policy makers, missions, funding sources, and customers has presented a challenge; however, with the establishment of the DNI position and the ODNI framework, better coordination is possible. Under the IRTPA of 2004, the National Security Council establishes policy and intelligence priorities and “the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) should be the final adjudicator within the intelligence community, but the director’s ability to impose priorities on a day-to-day basis across the entire intelligence community remains uncertain” as more issues, demand more competitive prioritization, and less scrutiny of the actual issue. ¹²

To address policy maker concerns after 2001, the intelligence community had to demonstrate their focus on counter terrorism, specifically the intent to synchronize community efforts; hence the policy direction of the IRTPA of 2004 to establish the NCTC, NIC, and ONCIX under ODNI. Other intelligence operation/fusion/coordination centers have followed suit at the national level down to lower echelons. These centers have a common theme of collaboration or fusion in their stated mission and vision, but by existing at varied echelon levels across varied organizations, with varied missions and requirements, are more apt to be coordinated vertically within their parent organization than horizontally across other IC organizations.

With the best of intentions, collaboration centers were directed at the strategic level, but at the operational and tactical level it takes time to effectively and efficiently refine people, processes, and technology to facilitate a collaborative environment across 16 intelligence organizations.

In an age of unobstructed communication and globalization via the internet and phones, adversaries can instantly solicit, coordinate, and pose threats. The intelligence community must

collaborate effectively and ensure information is shared in a timely manner. Once an intelligence priority is provided, the intelligence analysts working it, and the policy maker endorsing it, are often reluctant to admit the issue is no longer an issue. “Even if the requirements are reviewed and re-ranked periodically, such as the six month review in the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), they remain snapshots in time.”\textsuperscript{13} In addition to static, responding to ad hoc priorities forces the intelligence community to chase the problem rather than address it efficiently with an agile, flexible use of resources—people, process, and technology. Therefore, intelligence operation/fusion/coordination centers must foster a collaborative, flexible environment of resources across the IC to generate relevant, timely, and high quality intelligence products. This was exemplified as DNI Mike McConnell testified in 2008:

\textit{We have focused [on] the DNI’s role as the integrator of the community. We seek to create efficiencies and improved effectiveness in shared services like security clearances, information-sharing, information technology, and communications, but still promote an environment where the elements of the community serve their departmental responsibilities. This integration model of governance across the departments is still being defined because, quite frankly, we are in new territory for U.S. intelligence, something that has never been tried before, balanced with the need to have strong departmental intelligence elements in each department.}\textsuperscript{14}

**Civilian and Military Organizational and Leadership Construct**

Per the ODNI Fact Sheet, the current DNI James Clapper has “refocused its Core Mission to “Lead Intelligence Integration” with a Vision of a Nation made more secure because of a fully integrated Intelligence Community.”\textsuperscript{15} Specifically the DNI performs the following functions:

- \textit{Serves as the President’s principal intelligence advisor;}
- \textit{Oversees the National Intelligence Program budget ($54.6 billion in FY2011);}

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid, 58.
• Establishes Intelligence Community priorities with clear and measureable goals and objectives;
• Sets direction through policies and budgets;
• Ensures integration of IC personnel, expertise, and capabilities;
• Provides leadership on IC cross-cutting issues; and
• Monitors IC agency and leadership performance.\textsuperscript{16}

The DNI is not connected to any intelligence agency, but oversees the intelligence community through a large staff. Under the IRTPA of 2004, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) “continues to control much of the intelligence community on a day-to-day basis [more so] than does the DNI”.\textsuperscript{17} However, much of the responsibility for defense intelligence continues to reside with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI), an office established in 2002; therefore, the SECDEF and the DNI are likely “to have the same level of interest in intelligence”.\textsuperscript{18}

In a compromise to pass the 2004 IRTPA, specific language in the legislation provides that the President:

“\textit{shall issue guidelines to ensure the effective implementation and execution within the executive branch of the authorities granted to the Director of National Intelligence by this title and the amendments made by this title, in a manner that respects and does not abrogate the statutory responsibilities of the heads of the departments of the United States government concerning such departments}”.\textsuperscript{19}

This provision distinguishes roles for the DNI pertaining to operational control of DoD agencies. “The result has been that the DNI must accept the separate responsibilities of these agencies within DOD and within the national intelligence community”.\textsuperscript{20}

DoD and civilian intelligence agencies differ in authority, mission, and culture. Civilian agencies tend to be more focused on a particular aspect of intelligence (i.e., law enforcement,

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} Mark M. Lowenthal, \textit{Intelligence from Secrets to Policy} (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2006), 31.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid, 32.
human intelligence, etc.), whereas DoD is broader in mission and execution. The DoD intelligence organizations “are involved in all types of intelligence collection—national, foreign, counterintelligence, and military…[to address] current, estimative, critical, and warning needs]…at the strategic, operational and tactical levels”.21 To accomplish these taskings, the DoD is armed with a wide range of intelligence assets from space to human to technical.

Reviewing the composition and missions of the intelligence community, most organizations are military oriented, which possess the broadest capabilities and also happen to be the “primary consumer of intelligence”.22 However, “…federal law prohibits close interactions between the military and civil agencies; interaction between the two sectors is not allowed except in special circumstances concerning domestic violence threats.”23 For example, “several issues spill over into the domestic realm—economics, narcotics, crime, and terrorism—thus curtailing the activities of much of the intelligence community and creating confusion and competition between intelligence and law enforcement agencies.”24 Considering our intelligence reorganization as a ‘work in progress’, Dr. Mark Lowenthal, President and CEO of the Intelligence and Security Academy, LLC summarizes the challenge as “simply put, the intelligence community is faced with a range of work that the United States has not conducted before, especially on itself as the analytical target. What about doctrine and process?...Specifics about intelligence sharing, particularly between the [Central Intelligence Agency] CIA and [Federal Bureau of Investigation] FBI, remain largely unknown although most observers agree that major improvement have been made since 2001.”25

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22 Ibid, 90.
23 Ibid, 86.
Funding

One of the challenges in passing IRTPA of 2004 was consensus on funding, particularly control of the intelligence budget. On one side were those that argued that the DNI should have execution authority over the National Intelligence Program (NIP) budget, while others that championed politically, advocated for certain national intelligence organizations (NSA, NGA, NRO) to maintain control over their budget. In the end, the DNI develops and determines the NIP, based on intelligence agency submissions. The military commanders retain the ability to ask for national intelligence support when needed. “This has been an area of growing controversy as the senior military commanders have increasingly come to treat national intelligence assets as their own”.26

All intelligence funding is sourced from Congress. “The Senate Intelligence Committee has sole jurisdiction over only the DNI, CIA, and the NIC. The Senate Armed Services Committee has…oversight of all aspects of defense intelligence.”27 “The House Intelligence Committee has exclusive jurisdiction over the entire NIP—all programs that transcend the bounds of any one agency or are nondefense—as well as shared jurisdiction over the defense intelligence programs.”28

Military Intelligence Program (MIP).

The DoDD 5205.12, Military Intelligence Program (MIP), states “the MIP consists of programs, projects, or activities [that] support the Secretary of Defense's intelligence, counterintelligence, and related intelligence responsibilities in order to provide capabilities to meet warfighter operational and tactical requirements”.29

27 Ibid, 47.
28 Ibid, 48.
Organizations that are typically funded through the MIP component include: “the OSD; Military Departments; the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM); the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA); the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); and the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS)” 30 The MIP Component Manager, who is responsible for managing the MIP resources per Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) guidance and policy, within his or her respective organization, is assigned by DoDD 5205.12, the Secretary of a Military Department, or Commander, USSOCOM.31

**National Intelligence Program (NIP).**

Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 104, Budgeting for Intelligence Programs,32 provides policy guidance for execution of the NIP. The Director, National Intelligence (DNI) National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) is the foundation document for budget decisions. NIP reflects the priorities and vision identified in strategy. The ICD applies to the Intelligence Community (IC), as defined by the National Security Act of 1947. The aggregate amount appropriated to the NIP for Fiscal Year 2012 was $53.9 billion.33

**Center Description and Composition**

Lower echelon intelligence operation/fusion/coordination centers do not invite as much scrutiny and review as the national level centers, established in support of the intelligence reform. Therefore, the centers highlighted in Table 2 served as the representative sample for

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30 Ibid, 1.
31 Ibid, 1.
open source research of government assessment reports to determine feedback on their operational performance since inception.

**Assessment and Effectiveness**

**ODNI National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)**

The Congressional Research Service report, *Intelligence Reform After Five Years: The Role of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)*, dated June 22, 2010 provides an assessment of how the ODNI responded in response to the authorities and policies of the IRTPA of 2004, that created the DNI position and office. Since NCTC was established as a result of the IRTPA of 2004, the report highlights reviews of NCTC performance. Specifically, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) assessment of NCTC performance in response to an attempted terrorist attack of an airplane destined to Detroit, MI in December 2009. The assessment of the intelligence analyses, “criticized the NCTC, CIA, and NSA in particular for failing to disseminate and effectively analyze available information. Although only an unclassified summary of the report has been released, the committee concluded that the “NCTC was not adequately organized and did not have resources appropriately allocated to fulfill its missions.” Members of the committee continued criticizing NCTC for “failure to understand its fundamental and primary missions”, specifically citing “existing technologies in the ODNI that greatly limit the ability of analysts to undertake searches of multiple databases.”

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Table 2: Sampling of Intelligence Operation/Fusion/Coordination Centers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization Name</th>
<th>Office of Primary Responsibility</th>
<th>Source of Funding</th>
<th>Functional Responsibility</th>
<th>Date Est.</th>
<th>Geographic Location</th>
<th>Charter/Justification for Existence</th>
<th>Communication Across Internal &amp; External Stakeholders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)</td>
<td>ODNI</td>
<td>NIP</td>
<td>“Gather and analyze terrorism-related data from across the U.S. government for policymakers, and conduct overall strategic planning against specific terrorist targets”</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2004 IRTPA; Presidential Executive Order 13354, August 2004</td>
<td>More than 30 intelligence, military, law enforcement and homeland security networks are collocated in one location to facilitate information sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC)</td>
<td>ODNI</td>
<td>NIP</td>
<td>“Coordinates and identifies intelligence gaps in the U.S. effort to monitor counterproliferation activities”</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Congress directed</td>
<td>Incorporates representatives from 17 different national and military organizations to counter proliferation of WMD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX)</td>
<td>ODNI</td>
<td>NIP</td>
<td>Counterintelligence center that employs CI specialists across the IC</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>2004 IRTPA</td>
<td>Annual Foreign Intelligence Threat Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Intelligence Council (NIC)</td>
<td>ODNI</td>
<td>NIP</td>
<td>Center for medium and long term strategic thinking</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2004 IRTPA</td>
<td>National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36 Eric Rosenbach and Aki Peritz, *Confrontation or Collaboration? Congress and the Intelligence Community*, (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 2009), 14.
38 Eric Rosenbach and Aki Peritz, *Confrontation or Collaboration? Congress and the Intelligence Community*, (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 2009), 14.
39 Ibid, 14.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization Name</th>
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<th>Source of Funding</th>
<th>Functional Responsibility</th>
<th>Date Est.</th>
<th>Geographic Location</th>
<th>Charter/Justification for Existence</th>
<th>Communication Across Internal &amp; External Stakeholders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA)</td>
<td>ODNI</td>
<td>NIP</td>
<td>No operational mission; “invests in high-risk/high-payoff research programs that have the potential to provide our nation with an overwhelming intelligence advantage over future adversaries”</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Works with academia and industry for new technologies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information Sharing Environment (ISE)</td>
<td>ODNI</td>
<td>NIP</td>
<td>“Coordinate and facilitate the development of a network-centric ISE”</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>2004 IRTPA</td>
<td>Work with national, DoD, state, and local reps to determine interoperability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| State and Local Fusion Centers | DHS | DHS HSGP (FEMA) | Share intelligence between state, local, and Federal officials to “detect, disrupt, and respond to domestic terrorist activities” | 2003 | Over 70 state and local fusion centers | Congress directed | • “Nearly third of all reports (188 out of 610) never published within DHS”  
• “Some terrorism-related reporting also appeared to be a slower-moving duplicate of information shared with the NCTC through a much quicker process run by the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center” |

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44 Ibid, 1.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Organization Name</th>
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<th>Communication Across Internal &amp; External Stakeholders</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Terrorist Screening Center</td>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>NIP</td>
<td>Consolidated database of “information about those known or reasonably suspected of being involved in terrorist activity”</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6</td>
<td>Consolidated watchlist of known and suspected terrorists</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center and Joint Intelligence Operations Centers</td>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>MIP</td>
<td>“Plan, prepare, integrate, direct, synchronize, and manage continuous, full-spectrum Defense Intelligence Operations in support of the Combatant Commands (COCOMs)”</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>DIOCC at DIA, and JIOCs at each unified combatant command and at U.S. Forces Korea</td>
<td>SECDEF Directive</td>
<td>Intent is to coordinate and prioritize intelligence requirements across COCOMs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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ODNI National Intelligence Council (NIC)

The Congressional Research Service report, *Intelligence Reform After Five Years: The Role of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)*, dated June 22, 2010 also cites an assessment of the NIC’s performance. The report references ODNI staff input suggesting that, although the DNI establishes broad priorities for intelligence collection, “*ODNI has little capability to monitor fast-changing shifts in collection efforts and even less capability to direct modifications to take account of fast-breaking situations. According to Mr. [Patrick] Neary…[the NIC]…remains a simple staff element, conducting manual data calls and reliant on the voluntary compliance of the large collection agencies. There is no real-time feed (or operational status) of SIGINT [signals intelligence], HUMINT [human intelligence], GEOINT [geospatial intelligence], or even open source information into the NIC-C. There is no comprehensive collection dashboard display, no 24-hour operational capability, and no immediate mechanism to issue directive changes*.” 48

DHS State and Local Fusion Centers

The United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs *Federal Support for and Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers Majority and Minority Staff Report*, released October 3, 2012, determined “that DHS’s work with those state and local fusion centers has not produced useful intelligence to support Federal counterterrorism efforts”. 49

48 Richard A. Best. *Intelligence Reform After Five Years: The Role of the Director of National intelligence (DNI)*, CRS Report for Congress R41295. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 22, 2010), 8, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R41295.pdf. Note: At the time of publication in March 2010, Mr. Patrick Neary, was a current ODNI official, that wrote in the CIA’s official publication, *Studies in Intelligence*, a distinctly negative assessment of the work of the ODNI and the changes that resulted from the implementation of the IRTPA of 2004.

Less of a response to a specific request for fusion centers, and more of a reaction to the 9/11 Commission 2004 report that highlighted the failure of intelligence to horizontally and vertically collaborate in a timely manner. Supporters of fusion centers interpreted the Commission findings as a need to enhance information sharing and seek Federal support for fusion centers.

In 2004 DHS was working with 18 state and local intelligence and fusion centers, and as of October 2012, there were 77 fusion centers in “nearly every state and most major urban areas”. Funded through the DHS HSGP, “FEMA provides roughly $800 million annually to states and municipalities for the broad purpose of “building and sustaining national preparedness capabilities”.

The report provides an alarming review of DHS state and local fusion centers, ranging from poor management of funds, inadequate reporting, training shortfalls, and lack of adherence to legal and policy guidelines. “Reviewing 13 months’ worth of reporting originating from fusion centers from April 1, 2009 to April 30, 2010...nearly a third of all reports – 188 out of 610 – were never published for use within DHS and by other members of the intelligence community, often because they lacked any useful information, or potentially violated Department guidelines meant to protect Americans’ civil liberties or Privacy Act protections”. The report provides numerous disturbing examples and quotes from actual staff and leadership citing mismanagement and lack of mission execution.

50 United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Federal Support for and Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers Majority and Minority Staff Report. (3 OCT 2012), 12, 6.
51 Ibid, 24.
52 Ibid, 2.
In regards to funding, the report notes that DHS was “unable to provide an accurate tally of how much it had granted to states and cities to support fusion center efforts, instead producing broad estimates of the total amount of Federal dollars spent on fusion center activities from 2003 to 2011, estimates which ranged from $289 million to $1.4 billion”\(^{53}\) A summary of some of the major findings included:

- Reporting from fusion centers was often flawed, and unrelated to terrorism.
- Some reports had “nothing of value.”
- If published, some draft reporting could have violated the Privacy Act.
- Most fusion center reporting related to drug smuggling, alien smuggling or other criminal activity.
- Terrorism-related reporting was often outdated, duplicative and uninformative.
- DHS intelligence reporting officials who repeatedly violated guidelines faced no sanction.
- DHS did not sufficiently train its fusion center detailees to legally and effectively collect and report intelligence.
- Short-staffing and reliance on contract employees hampered reporting efforts.
- Reporting officials aren’t evaluated on the quality of their reporting.
- A hastily-implemented and poorly coordinated review process delayed reporting by months.
- Retaining inappropriate records is contrary to DHS policies and the Privacy Act.
- Problems with DHS reporting are acknowledged, but unresolved.\(^{54}\)

To address the findings, the report “recommends that Congress and DHS revisit the statutory basis for DHS support of fusion centers in light of the investigation’s findings. It also recommends that DHS improve its oversight of Federal grant funds supporting fusion centers; conduct promised assessments of fusion center information-sharing; and strengthen its protection of civil liberties in fusion center intelligence reporting.”\(^{55}\)

\(^{53}\) Ibid, 3.
\(^{54}\) Ibid, 26.
\(^{55}\) Ibid, 4.
FBI Terrorist Screening Center (TSC)

The U.S. Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requestors, *Terrorist Watch List Screening, Opportunities Exist to Enhance Management Oversight, Reduce Vulnerabilities in Agency Screening Processes, and Expand Use of the List*, assessed screening activities from December 2003 to May 2007. The “GAO examined (1) standards for including individuals on the list, (2) the outcomes of encounters with individuals on the list, (3) potential vulnerabilities and efforts to address them, and (4) actions taken to promote effective terrorism-related screening”.

The report noted that there was substantial progress since 9/11 in the consolidation and coordination of multiple disparate lists, but also identified some shortfalls, to continue progression. Compiling information from NCTC and the FBI, the TSC “consolidates this information into a sensitive, but unclassified watch list and makes records available as appropriate for a variety of screening purposes.” The watch list provides law enforcement and intelligence agencies the ability to respond to and collect information to assess threats. The TSC provides daily records from the watch list to agencies, but some reports do not make the transition due to information technology (IT) program incompatibilities, differing agency missions and protocols for screening. These differences have permitted “some subjects of watch list records to pass undetected through agency screening processes, and not be identified, until after they had boarded and flew on an aircraft or were processed at a port of entry and admitted into the United States”.

The TSC and agencies are addressing these deficiencies and vulnerabilities through IT name matching improvements and watch list quality assessments. The report notes shortfalls in

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57 Ibid, 3.
58 Ibid, 2.
strategy and implementation plans; clear lines of authority and responsibility; clear leadership and governance structure; delay in removal—since “any individual reasonably suspected of having links to terrorist activities” can be nominated and remain on the list until determined not a threat; and performance evaluation criteria.

**DIA Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center at DIA and Joint Intelligence Operations Centers at each of the Combatant Commands**

The U.S. DoD Office of Inspector General conducted an *Assessment of Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center*, December 6, 2010, which is classified, thus unavailable for reference. The DoD Memorandum that establishes the establishment of the Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center states that the “DIOCC will form a support relationship as an interagency partner with the National Intelligence Coordination Center (NIC-C). The DIOCC will align its operations with the NIC-C providing an integrated defense intelligence functional capability set that leverages the full range of Intelligence Community (IC), DoD, domestic, and coalition resources and activities”. However, the “DIOCC will not fundamentally alter the authorities, responsibilities and tasks assigned to combatant command JIOCs in the JIOC execute order (EXORD)”.

Based on structured alignment of JIOCs to the DIOCC, the individual mission and priorities of combatant commands, service and combatant command specific tools, databases, and IT service architectures; the JIOCs are likely challenged to integrate horizontally across other combatant commands and vertically to the DIOC and ultimately to the national intelligence community.

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61 Ibid, 2.
In summary, GAO and CRS reporting on NCTC, NIC, DHS State and Local Fusion Centers and TSC identified the following common discrepancies across the centers:

- Lack of timely, effective analyses of all available information relevant to center mission objectives
- Absence of relevant, synchronized training for staff
- Clear understanding of legal (e.g., civil liberties, Privacy Act, etc.), policy, procedures, and program documentation/guidelines
- Incompatible IT architecture, tools, and technology—delays, hinders, or prevents cross-agency collaboration
IV. **Recommendations.**

Based on results of the government assessment reports, strategic vision and operational construct of the IC, and scholarly and intelligence professional insights; this section identifies recommendations in the categories of people, process, policy, technology, and funding to enhance the centers’ operational efficiency and effectiveness.

Intelligence operation/fusion/coordination centers were initiated and established to promote integration of intelligence collection, analyses, and dissemination, but per the assessments of NCTC, NIC, DHS State and Local Fusion Centers and TSC the following common shortfalls were identified:

- Lack of timely, effective analyses of all available information relevant to center mission objectives
- Absence of relevant, synchronized training for staff
- Clear understanding of legal (e.g., civil liberties, Privacy Act, etc.), policy, procedures, and program documentation/guidelines
- Incompatible IT architecture, tools, and technology—delays, hinders, or prevents cross-agency collaboration

To integrate intelligence activities at the centers, operational level activities must align to the strategic vision. Best explained by then commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, the now Joint Chief of Staff, Gen. Martin Dempsey stated, “The best information, the most important intelligence, and the context that provides the best understanding come from the bottom up, not from the top down.”

Strategic policy can direct the establishment of intelligence operation/fusion/coordination centers, but true operational level coordination is necessary to successfully synchronize operations.

Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of this concept, with emphasis on the push and pull from assets, performing intelligence functions at the centers. The assets or the intelligence community are the “who”, their individual missions the “why”, the centers the “where”, and the

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“how” is the ODNI framework—architecture, policy, standards, priorities, budget, and evaluation; and the catalyst that operationalizes the synchronization of this cycle are the people, processes and technology.

**Figure 1: Recommended Operational-Level View of Leveraging Intelligence Community Assets to Support Intelligence Operation/Fusion/Coordination Centers**

This paper concentrated on select national level centers, but the challenges, shortfalls, and recommendations identified herein, can be applied to civil and military intelligence operation/fusion/coordination centers at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. There are many parallels in intelligence functions performed, resources used, tools, technology, and infrastructure across the various centers.
It is recommended that ODNI conduct a baseline study of the intelligence operation/fusion/coordination centers. A baseline of center operations would provide ODNI and agencies leadership the state of analysis and production, and strengths and weaknesses at the various intelligence operation/fusion/coordination centers. The baseline would identify existing capabilities, shortfalls, identify duplication, gaps in receipt of timely and relevant intelligence, and assess the quality of analysis and dissemination to the right parties. Substantial reductions and savings could potentially be realized, through subsequent recommendations in common intelligence resource and management elements: people, process, policy, technology, and funding.

People.

The unconstrained development of disparate centers across national, civilian, and defense intelligence organizations focuses on varied missions, poses danger in eliminating or not properly addressing an intelligence task that might not ‘align’ to the purview of the center. All of the centers were built on high priority mission of the parent organization. For example, counterterrorism and counter proliferation centers were formed under ODNI. Threats to U.S. national security are constantly evolving, and these fusion and operational centers were built and staffed with subject matter experts to address a focused mission objective (e.g., counter terrorism, etc.). An area of concern, is what happens when the area of focus wanes, is the center eliminated, what happens to resident knowledge, if the center remains open, are valuable analysts and resources being prioritized properly? In a resource constrained environment within a discipline that demands timely, robust analyses; centers must be flexible in their mission have the ability to not only meet the current mission, but have the right skills, ability and fortitude to adapt and meet an unanticipated mission. Using the right mix of interdepartmental analysts across the centers enables such adaptability and competitive analysis.
Experienced intelligence analysts are too valuable to the intelligence community and should therefore, not be constrained by centers or particular organizations, but become assets to the greater intelligence community. For example, key subject matter experts could be assigned to other organizations on a rotational basis, to learn varied capabilities in collection and analysis. Sharing and collaboration fosters improved analytical skills as well as valuable on the job training, knowledge and familiarity in capabilities and culture, all skillsets crucial at the operational level of intelligence. Intelligence analysts possess varied experiences, background and knowledge levels per their respective intelligence specialty (HUMINT, SIGINT, etc.) and parent organization mission’s perspective when coupled with others in a center environment. This theoretically enables the generation of robust interpretation from a holistic view. Also, this cross collaboration of resources in expertise in staff formulates a pool of experts that can be tapped and moved to various intelligence tasks, rather than stove piped per center and organization.

Process.

Analysts assigned at the various centers bring varied levels of knowledge, skills, and abilities to conduct the mission, but often utilize different approaches and methodologies to attain the end product in accordance to their parent organization’s accepted and promoted processes. The centers should capture any variances in process; assess, and identify means to standardize and/or train to best practices obtained from the assessment of these processes. Being cognizant and vigilant in recognizing best practices in process variations across the Intelligence Community enhances interoperability, speeds time of processing, identifies training opportunities, and shortfalls to minimize risks.
Policy.

Though progress is being made in intelligence collaboration, policies need to consider ways to constantly improve operational aspects of intelligence activities at the centers. Different organizations with varied functional INTs (e.g., HUMINT, SIGINT, etc.) support mission activities at the centers and to reach that desired synergy of organizational culture across the various agencies, takes time.

The most contentious area for policy enhancement is amongst law enforcement, civil, and military entities. As an example, “There are reports that DOD special forces have also been involved in human intelligence collection efforts that are not effectively coordinated [with other agencies]. Some media commentators have pointed to potential conflicts between the office of the USD(I) and the DNI’s office, but there is little official information available publicly”.

A clearinghouse (database) should be established through USD(I) and ODNI collaboration to coordinate, validate, and assign taskings to the appropriate intelligence operation/fusion/coordination center. Such a clearinghouse would have an inventory of current center staff expertise, INT capabilities, technical analysis, and any tools, for two purposes: (1) match incoming requirements to the most applicable center, and (2) identify opportunities to share staff, capabilities, and tools to address prioritized requirements.

To review, assess, and consider modification to policy and guidelines, thought should be placed toward enhancing the role of the National Intelligence Council (NIC). The NIC was established in 1979 and serves “as a bridge between the intelligence and policy communities, a

source of deep substantive expertise on intelligence issues, and a facilitator of Intelligence Community collaboration and outreach". NIC provides a strategic medium to understand analysis being done at the centers, address shortfalls, and make suggestions for enhancing analysis and production.

**Technology.**

Across the intelligence community there are disparate architectures of data storage, databases, libraries, and retrieval mechanisms. To illustrate, it is "possible for a career intelligence official to remain ill-informed, often totally ignorant, of the operations of other offices within his own agency, not to mention the workings of other intelligence agencies throughout the U.S. government."  

DNI should conduct a baseline review of the fragmented databases, libraries, and mediums used to disseminate data across the various centers. The baseline would identify potential areas for consolidation and elimination of redundant and inevitably contradictory databases and libraries to create a common, user-friendly, accessible repository for the greater intelligence community. It is recommended that a standardized, phased framework for the baseline be formulated at the ODNI level. The phased approach will take into consideration such factors as the size, breadth, and scope of the intelligence agency capabilities and how its mission aligns to national intelligence requirements.

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Funding.

Literature reviews indicate many scholars and government officials are quick to suggest the need to increase the budget authority of the DNI over military intelligence funding, anticipating that with formal budget authority over the NIP and MIP, the DNI can better coordinate functions, activities and intelligence production across the intelligence community. “In reality, however” notes former Director, National Security Agency, William Odom “this is not possible because the Intelligence Community is interdepartmental, and it cannot be otherwise.”66 Ultimately the intelligence budget is controlled by Congressional intelligence oversight committees. “The Senate Intelligence Committee has jurisdiction only over the NIP but not the MIP, whereas the House Intelligence Committee has jurisdiction over both sets of programs”.67 The DNI separate from any intelligence agency especially any perceived structural affiliation with the CIA, has allowed a culture shift in the community that enables the DNI to exert influence without perceived bias. The DNI needs to retain full visibility of funding across the intelligence community and authority to influence resource allocation of the budget once adopted by Congress. However, budget execution is at the agency leadership level. Across the intelligence community the differences in missions and capabilities is the strength, and by design who knows best to determine and manage their organizational fiscal responsibility and accountability but the leadership in that organization. “Having two overlapping budget execution authorities trying to manage jointly the spending of the monies not only would inspire endless bureaucratic turf quarrels, it would make responsibility ambiguous and accountability difficult.”68 The key to the progressing closure of the bridge between national, civilian, and

66 Ibid, 62.
defense intelligence budgetary provisions “will depend on effective working relationships”\(^69\) and continued refinements to provisions. For example, the FY2012 Intelligence Authorization bill (H.R. 1892) and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74) provide provisions for the “establishment of Treasury Department accounts to receive funds from defense intelligence elements, the ODNI, and other agencies for authorized programs…[and] bring intelligence budget submissions into alignment with formats established for the Defense Department”.\(^70\) Reviews suggest that these “provisions may provide for better management of intelligence spending and improved congressional oversight”.\(^71\)

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\(^70\) Ibid, 9.

\(^71\) Ibid, 10.
V. Summary

The intelligence community has made great strides in collaboration and coordination as a result of IRTPA of 2004 since 9/11, as apparent in the institution of the intelligence operation/fusion/coordination centers covered in this paper. Common with any reactionary measure, good intentions exist at the strategic level to address the overall issue, but details of how to realize that strategic vision, are left to the discretion of the operators over time. In this case, the operators are the intelligence analysts with their knowledge, skills, and abilities honed from experiences in their parent organization, but brought together in a common intelligence operation/fusion/coordination center to share processes and technologies to address a common target. These centers provide an opportunity to fuse community efforts—working relationships are established; new processes, tools, techniques are learned and shared; and most importantly different perspectives are considered in assessing a common target. The competitive analysis and group thinking qualities engrained through the interdepartmental structure of the intelligence community are our greatest asset.

In a constantly changing ever increasingly technically advancing (e.g., cell phone technology, computers, tablets, etc.), and politically uncertain (e.g., fragile states, etc.) world, intelligence community people, processes, technologies, tools, and policy must constantly adapt, train, and prepare to address threats to U.S. national security interests in this complex environment. Mr. William Odom, former Director, National Security Agency describes addressing these challenges as a lesson and “that there are no easy fixes, that the problems are complex and structural, and that they cannot be reduced to television sound bites”. Therefore, in a resource constrained environment, it is important for intelligence

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operation/fusion/coordination centers to use their people, process, and technologies efficiently and effectively with standardization, alignment, and synchronization to attain the strategic vision, but also be flexible, and visionary enough to address the uncertain threat that is amongst us every day.
## Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear</td>
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<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Combatant Command</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Congressional Research Service</td>
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<td>DIA</td>
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<td>Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center</td>
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USCYBERCOM  U.S. Cyber Command
USFK        U.S. Forces Korea
USPACOM     U.S. Pacific Command
USSOCOM     U.S. Special Operations Command
USSTRATCOM  U.S. Strategic Command
USD(I)      Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
U.S.        United States
Bibliography


