Air Force Security Forces developed professionally between 1947 and 2012. Analyzing this development in terms of professionalism's expertise, responsibility, and corporateness characteristics as theorized by Samuel P. Huntington, yields helpful insights for current and future-generation leaders. Huntington theorizes that professionalism within a profession is characterized by expertise, responsibility, and corporateness aspects. Using Huntington's professionalism theory, this analysis examines professionalism in Air Force Security Forces. Security Forces expertise developed as career field leaders constantly sought to match a body of knowledge to the roles and missions of Security Forces. With regard to responsibility, contemporary threats in each period affected Security Forces value to the Air Force and the communities it served. World events, notably terrorism and the Global War on Terror, required Security Forces to grow in this professionalism characteristic to very high levels by the end of this analysis' final period. Corporateness grew substantially early in this analysis and then regressed as a Security Forces division between law enforcement and security specialties occurred. However, similar to other analyzed characteristics, continued leadership effort in all periods produced an overall corporateness gain.
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Air Force Security Forces Professionalism: Insights for Leaders

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Executive Summary

Title: Air Force Security Forces Professionalism: Useful Insights for Leaders

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Thesis: Air Force Security Forces developed professionally between 1947 and 2012. Analyzing this development in terms of professionalism’s expertise, responsibility, and corporateness characteristics as theorized by Samuel P. Huntington, yields helpful insights for current and future-generation leaders.

Discussion: Samuel P. Huntington defines a profession as, “a peculiar type of functional group with highly specialized characteristics.” He theorizes that professionalism within a profession is characterized by expertise, responsibility, and corporateness aspects. Using Huntington’s professionalism theory, this analysis examines professionalism in Air Force Security Forces. Security Forces expertise developed as career field leaders constantly sought to match a body of knowledge to the roles and missions of Security Forces. Expertise varied at times especially going into and out of war periods; however, it continued to improve throughout each analyzed period. Responsibility also varied. Contemporary threats in each period affected Security Forces value to the Air Force and the communities it served. World events, notably terrorism and the Global War on Terror, required Security Forces to grow in this professionalism characteristic to very high levels by the end of this analysis’ final period. Corporateness grew substantially early in this analysis and then regressed as a Security Forces division between law enforcement and security specialties occurred. However, similar to other analyzed characteristics, continued leadership effort in all periods produced an overall corporateness gain.

Conclusion: From this analysis, three themes arise to provide useful insights for leaders. First, to provide enhancement in professionalism’s expertise characteristic, leaders must identify a profession’s primary role and align expertise-building opportunities to it. Second, to generate increased value and responsibility in a profession, leaders must identify areas of value to communities; then capitalize on them. Finally, to improve essential corporateness within a profession, leaders must create and merge an outward and inward identity. Leaders should consider these insights when developing professionalism in organizations. Additionally, professional development methodology is worthy of continued study and research to ensure leader insights remain current in a dynamic world.
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DISCLAIMER

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Preface

With over twenty thousand members, Air Force Security Forces represents the largest single Air Force Specialty and constitutes nearly ten percent of the Air Force total population. This fact alone renders study of its development interesting and useful. However, its existence as a perceived ground force within an air force also renders its development analysis worthy. By careful study of Security Forces history, both written and oral, contemporary leaders will find useful insights and gain the wisdom needed to make a positive difference for the men and women protecting, defending, and fighting to ensure the United States Air Force remains the most dominant Air Force in the world.

This analysis was enabled through the contributions of several individuals. Special thanks to Dr Pauletta Otis who served as a mentor and advisor for this project and to Dr Linda Di Desidero who expertly assisted in focusing the method and organization of analysis. In addition, Air Force Colonel (ret) Mat Mateko deserves special recognition for his advice and assistance in gathering data and sources and for sharing his experiences from many years of service to the Air Force and Security Forces. Also, Air Force Colonel (ret) Mel Grover’s insights from his time spent in Vietnam and beyond as a key Security Police leader are especially appreciated. Finally, special thanks to my family for enduring the many hours this analysis required.
INTRODUCTION

With the introduction of air power to the US military capability set, protection of air bases including personnel and weapon systems was required. To meet this requirement, the Air Force needed a professional security and police force. This unique force, known as Air Police (1947-1966), Security Police (1966-1997), or Security Forces (1997-present) faced complex challenges in identifying exactly what its roles were and how to fulfill them as a ground force within an air force. It needed to grow in professionalism to gain the credibility required to meet the demands of its country, its service, and the communities it protected. Analyzing the professionalism development that followed this need is useful. Looking at Air Force Security Forces' professionalism through the lens of Samuel P. Huntington's professionalism theory, including its responsibility, corporateness, and expertise characteristics, reveals the challenges and successes of the career field’s professionalization from 1947 through 2012 and yields helpful insights for current and future-generation leaders. These insights enable leaders to understand how professionalism grows, what hinders its growth, and how to overcome challenges to professionalism.

METHOD

To build a solid foundation for this analysis, key terms and theories used in conducting it need clarification. Huntington defines a profession as, “a peculiar type of functional group with highly specialized characteristics.”¹ All US Armed Services are members of the profession of arms, which meets this definition of a profession. Professionalism, however, is variable within a profession.² For this reason, measuring it requires a defined structure to facilitate solid conclusions.
Samuel P. Huntington proposed a theory for defining and evaluating professionalism in his 1957 book, *The Soldier and the State*. Huntington defined professionalism using expertise, responsibility, and corporateness as its characteristics. The first characteristic, expertise, addressed the body of knowledge for a profession and to what extent the profession codifies this knowledge. In this analysis, expertise includes the technical and theoretical aspects of Security Forces including its training methods and venues as well as doctrine. The second characteristic, responsibility, referenced a profession’s value to a community and to society. It also addressed a profession’s level of ideals and to what extent these drive behavior. In this analysis, examining responsibility focuses on Security Forces value to the Air Force and the community it serves. The third characteristic, corporateness, addressed a profession’s unity, traditions, and common identity. This analysis focuses on aspects of Security Forces unique identity and actions taken to sustain it. Huntington also proposed that professionalism moved on a continuum from unprofessional to highly professional, depending on the degree to which these three characteristics exist in a profession. He suggested that few professions possess professionalism at its highest level but that most have some degree of professionalism.

In this analysis, Huntington’s theory is used to evaluate how Security Forces developed professionalism throughout its existence from 1947 through 2012. Huntington’s work set the stage for follow-on theories concerning professionalism. Theorists such as sociologist James Burk and military historian Allan Millet later proposed more lengthy theories and described additional professionalism attributes; however, they contain the basic concepts from Huntington’s original theory. Moreover, US Army and Air Force professional military education venues reference Huntington’s theory in profession of arms curriculum to describe professionalism at not only the officer level, but also at the NCO level, and not only for
describing individual professionalism, but also for describing institutional professionalism. Therefore, the professionalism characteristics Huntington proposed form logical breakouts for measuring Security Forces professionalism development.

This analysis examines Security Forces in terms of these professionalism characteristics in four periods. First, 1947-1960 covers the newly formed Air Police and contains Korean War and Cold War events. Second, 1961-1989 contains events of the Vietnam War, portions of the Cold War, and the post-Vietnam years and how they affected Security Police. Third, 1990-2000 covers Desert Storm and the years leading up to our most recent conflicts as Security Police became Security Forces. Finally, 2001-2012 contains the Global War on Terrorism, and addresses a Security Forces transformation.

Within each period, the analysis looks at the expertise characteristic by analyzing Security Forces’ body of knowledge (or doctrine) and training. It analyzes the responsibility characteristic by looking at Security Forces roles and their value to various stakeholders during each period. Finally, it analyzes corporateness by studying actions taken to create a distinctive Security Forces identity. Research involved analyzing a collection of social science works, historical accounts of each period, and personal interviews. Additionally, Defenders of the Force: The History of the United States Air Force Security Forces, 1947 – 2006, a report commissioned by Headquarter Air Force A7S and compiled by Col. (Ret) James L. Conrad and Col. (Ret) Jerry M. Bullock, provided substantial source material for this analysis. From these works emerge valuable insights for leaders and an impetus to continue Security Forces professional development by continuously improving all three characteristics of professionalism.
AIR POLICE BEGINNINGS (1947-1960)

On 18 September 1947, the Air Force became a separate service within the Department of Defense (DoD) and faced the challenge of establishing and developing professional Air Police. Personnel levels dropped dramatically after World War II, then rose dramatically during the Korean War, and with its conclusion, once again dropped. Throughout these fluctuations, Air Police did not have a standardized doctrine or training venue. In only seven years, Air Police training schools changed locations and curriculums three times. Local units often bridged training gaps with non-standard curriculum. This made ensuring expertise and a written body of knowledge challenging for Air Police leaders. In addition, responsibilities and roles were confusing. For Air Police, knowing exactly what their roles and responsibilities were while the Air Force experienced shifting priorities was difficult. Finally, Air Police leaders sought to create a distinct identity for Air Policemen including developing distinct uniforms and insignias. This era begins the evolution of professionalism for Air Police; it is clear that, with regard to the three areas this analysis details, Air Police leaders faced challenges.

Expertise

Initially, the U.S. Army took responsibility for training members of the new Air Police field. However, the Air Force provided Air Police personnel to assist the Army in conducting training and in establishing curriculum. As Air Police assigned manpower increased from 10,000 to 39,000 during the Korean War, the Army’s Military Police school at Fort Gordon, Georgia, was not adequate to handle the volume. Because of this, many Airmen arrived at Air Police units with no specialty training. To compensate for this lack of training, several units
built their own training programs. Though in some cases this proved effective locally, it resulted in a non-standardized body of knowledge for Air Police.

By 1950, leaders directed Air Training Command to fix the problem by establishing a suitable four-week course at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, to train Air Police. This course standardized knowledge but had faults. Field units complained that the course put “too much emphasis on training films, and too little on practical application.” Still others had concerns that the course was overly aggressive in teaching use of force skills. Eventually, the course extended to six-weeks and, by mid-1951, 1,500 Air Police graduated from the school. This coupled with some members continued attendance at the Army’s MP school at Fort Gordon, mitigated the lack of specialty training for new recruits. The nature of training under varied cadre, did not fully standardize a body of knowledge for the career field.

As Air Police began involvement in Korea, further complications appeared. With the Air Force’s responsibility to protect air bases, the Korean War brought more challenges to Air Police expertise. Air Police training did not adequately cover air base ground defense and Airmen found themselves in Korea without the proper skills to defend against ground attacks. Once again, individual organizations addressed the problem in isolation. Strategic Air Command (SAC) addressed the training need most effectively by setting up a specialized training course at Camp Carson, Colorado, in 1951. This school taught the basics of air base ground defense including operations outside the perimeter fence. Additionally, SAC developed a written “Concept of Surface Defense Operations” to codify necessary ground defense ideas.

Despite SAC’s work, a staff study conducted by the Air Provost Marshal’s staff in June 1951 found that even following more than a year of war, “the USAF has no stated policy, nor adequate tactical training doctrine…for the establishment of local ground defense at air bases.”
The SAC concept was a logical place for the Air Force to look for solutions to this problem. In August 1951, the Air Staff reviewed the SAC concept and found it acceptable doctrine for use Air Force wide. In 1952, to standardize this body of knowledge, Air Training Command established the Air Base Defense School at Parks Air Force Base, California. In 1954, the Air Provost Martial staff published Air Force Regulation (AFR) 125-46 to establish procedures for referral of all Air Police activities to the school at Parks. The Air Staff charged the school with “tactics, doctrine, equipment, and technique” development for the career field. This act further standardized an Air Police body of knowledge. Even so, with the end of the Korean War and subsequent force draw down, leaders perceived a need to refocus Air Police expertise.

In the post Korean War years and with the Cold War further developing, different needs emerged. In this new environment, budgets and manpower were cut. However, intelligence agencies reported increasing sabotage threats toward Cold War resources by small enemy groups. This drove a need for efficient use of resources along with internal security and anti-sabotage expertise. To re-posture Air Police to meet this need, leaders ordered Air Police to emphasize police and security training and move away from ground defense training to better focus efforts. To comply with this direction, in 1956, the Air Base Defense School at Parks was closed and a new Air Police school stood up at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, co-located for efficiency with the Air Force Basic Military Training School.

The new course at Lackland was one week shorter than the previous course and emphasized Air Police and Security skills necessary to meet the new internal security and anti-sabotage focus. The shorter course deemphasized ground defense expertise and established it as an on-the-job trainable (OJT) skill for line units as part of their ancillary training requirements. The Lackland course also took over the role of establishing standardized knowledge for Air
Police. AFR 205-5, Internal Installation Security documented this new Air Police posture and served as the standard for training Air Police and for securing air bases including the Air Force’s nuclear weapons. This guidance illustrates the last undulation of professional expertise development for Air Police during this period.

Responsibility

Developing the responsibility characteristic of professionalism means establishing the value of Air Police to the Air Force. This process was challenging. An example of the limited value the Air Force placed on early Air Police is evident in the fact that it chose pilots with little or no Military Police experience to lead the young career field versus available officers experienced in provost duties. These leaders emerged from the pilot excess created after World War II. These excess pilots took charge of Air Police units for career broadening experience. Also demonstrating a lack of value is the fact that the Air Force considered Air Police in the lowest category of career fields with regard to necessary aptitude. The inexperienced Air Police leaders lamented over this problem. For instance, in January 1952, the commander of the 93rd Air Police Squadron pointed out, “The caliber of personnel assigned to Air Police duties is of low intelligence quotient which is no fault of the individuals themselves ….” Additionally, in April 1952, the commander of the 28th Air Police Squadron observed, “The majority of these Airmen are immature and do not have the aptitude for Air Policemen …” These facts demonstrate a lack of value placed on the Air Police career field by the Air Force. However, other factors during this period did improve this characteristic of Air Police professionalism.

Air Police value to the Air Force grew later in this era due to significant world events. First, the significant number of air bases in Korea during the war brought forth a high demand
for Air Police.\textsuperscript{39} Personnel and resources on air bases in Korea needed security and protection from anticipated attacks. The Air Force mission depended on unhindered use of its airpower, including its bases. Fortunately, attacks on air bases during the war were minimal; however, a demand still emerged, and with it, more value and responsibility for Air Policemen. Second, the Cold War and the increasing U.S. nuclear arsenal required unprecedented security. The Air Force had the lead in safeguarding these weapons.\textsuperscript{40} Retired Colonel and noted Air Force Historian Flint O. Du Pre perfectly summarizes the status of Air Police in this era in a December 1956 Air Force Magazine editorial in which he writes, “The increasing importance of the Strategic Air Command, the Air Defense Command, the Tactical Air and the Supporting Commands, has magnified security problems and elevated the AP to a vital position.”\textsuperscript{41} With this vital role, the responsibility characteristic of professionalism improved.

\textit{Corporateness}

Improving corporateness by creating a distinct identity for Air Police in this era was an obvious need. As part of agreements after the Air Force became a separate service, the Army designated 22 former Army Military Police Companies for transfer to the Air Force.\textsuperscript{42} This transfer was set to take three months; however, in actual execution, it took nearly five years.\textsuperscript{43} After 16-months the term, “Air Police” became common terminology for members of the units transferred to the Air Force.\textsuperscript{44} In the meantime, where Air Police did not exist, Air Force units utilized Army MPs to provide provost functions.\textsuperscript{45} This restricted development of a distinct identity for Air Police in these early years. Leaders needed to find ways to create this identity to improve the corporateness characteristic of professionalism.
One event that helped improve identity for Air Police was the creation of a distinctive uniform. The early Air Police uniform resembled the Army Military Police uniform except for different rank insignias. In 1950, the Air Force Chief of Staff provided the momentum to change this when he gave his intent that, “Air Policemen, when on duty and in contact with the public, be distinctly and uniformly dressed.”

By 1951, this distinct dress became a blue tunic with bloused pants and black boots along with black leather gear. To provide further distinction, Air Police wore a white cover on their garrison caps along with an Air Police brassard on their shoulder. Typically, Air Policemen did not like the brassard portion of the uniform due to its difficulty to wear. This led to another important identity development.

In 1959, Air Police began wearing the newly designed Air Police Shield as an additional boost to professionalism. Most Air Policemen wanted to remove the military police style brassard; however, more importantly they felt having a badge as a professional marker offered a unique identity and enhanced a professional image to the public. Leaders labeled the Air Police Badge as an Air Police Shield to represent the protective Air Police mission more closely. This distinctive item proved very significant to Air Police identity. To illustrate, fearing Air Police would abuse their authority with the shield, Air Force leaders issued them to Air Police Squadron Commanders and charged them with ensuring proper use of the shield’s authority. As a result, these commanders restricted wearing of the shield to “on-duty” only. Although this did demonstrate a potential lack of trust by leaders, it also demonstrated the new seriousness of Air Police identity and represented a growing recognition by the Air Force of this identity.

By the end of this period, the creation of a distinct Air Police identity gave a boost to professionalism. From a brand new career field with no distinct identity, Air Police improved in
corporateness and began to establish an enduring identity to the new Air Force. This, in turn, generated improved professionalism.

1961-1989: AIR POLICE TO SECURITY POLICE

Just as the 29 years in this period hold remarkably significant events in US history, they also hold events significant to the professionalization of Air Police. While continuing to develop the relatively new Air Force in the midst of the Cold War, Air Force leaders faced the huge challenge of the Vietnam War. These challenges included determining a clear role and focus for Air Police. Aiding in this, in 1966, leaders changed the Air Police title to Security Police to more accurately capture the developing role of the career field. Regardless, the Vietnam War and its aftermath served as an impetus for Security Police professionalism development. Analysis of this period demonstrates an overall advance in professionalism, but not a steady one. The three characteristics of professionalism were not always strongly present; however, leaders worked continuously to professionalize the force and, by the end of this period in 1989, Security Police, men and women, improved in professionalism.

Expertise

Due to a post Korean War draw down, Air Police were victim to funding restrictions that necessitated training adjustments. Congressional urging in the late 1950s resulted in the Air Force cutting Air Police manpower and resources by twenty percent. The effects of these cuts on Air Police expertise development began emerging in 1961. To balance limited resources with maintaining the new focus on internal security, by the end of 1961, Air Police leaders directed removal of nearly all air base defense curriculums from initial skills training. Additionally by
the end of 1961, Air Police officers received classroom-only instruction on weapons with no “live-fire” training, and enlisted members fired plastic reusable bullets propelled by only a primer at short ranges. These are just two examples of training and expertise degradation prevalent early in this period. By the time Air Police were active in Vietnam, the lack of training was very evident.

The 1964 attacks on Ben Hoa Air Base just north of Saigon provide evidence of expertise problems. At Ben Hoa, Vietnamese Communist troops attacked and killed four U.S. personnel, wounded 30, destroyed five and severely damaged eight of the 20 B-57 bombers on the base. The Air Police there were ill prepared and unsupported by their Vietnamese hosts. Later in the war, the Seventh Air Force Chief of Security Police summarized the problem by stating, “Security Policemen in Southeast Asia are the combat infantrymen of the USAF, yet while the Army is required by law to give an infantryman twenty-two weeks of specialized training prior to assigning him to Vietnam, the USAF expects a Security Policeman to do the same basic job…with ten days of generalized training.” With over 2,000 Air Police serving in Vietnam by late 1965, the only training they received prior to their deployment was M-16 Rifle qualification and an opportunity to watch a short film on Southeast Asia.

Eventually, in-country training and establishing a specialized air base defense unit mitigated this problem. Air Police commanders in Vietnam realized they had to, “turn these Cold War sentry guards into some sort of combat Airmen.” Commanders took opportunities as they found them with ranges and training venues with the Army or Marines to train units on weapons and tactics necessary to defend Southeast Asia Air Bases.

In 1966, Security Police leaders established the 1041st Security Police Squadron based upon recommendations from higher headquarters inspections of Southeast Asian Air Bases. The
1041st was a highly specialized squadron and consisted of 266 specially trained Air Policemen dedicated to providing internal and external air base defense. They were also capable of training other in-country Air Police units. Though Army and Air Force disagreements over who held responsibility for external defense limited utility of the 1041st “outside-the-wire,” the unit still proved highly effective and provided training to units desperately in need of it in Vietnam.

This shift from an internal security to a base defense focus during the Vietnam War marked just the first change for Air Police during this era. Between 1961 and 1989, five significant role and focus shifts affected the career field’s body of knowledge. This nearly constant shifting rendered training standardization problematic. From internal security in the early 1960s to ground defense in the Vietnam era to traditional police work in the post-Vietnam years and then finally to an anti-terrorism focus in the 1980s, leaders were hard pressed to match these focus areas to the actual expertise of the career field. This hindered professionalism development. Simply, a single body of knowledge and focus did not exist long enough to standardize it for the profession. The career field struggled with improving its expertise; however, challenges with regard to the responsibility characteristic of professionalism also existed.

Responsibility

Security Police’s value to the Air Force was questioned in this period. An excerpt from 315th Security Police Squadron Commander Major Milton Kirste’s end-of-tour report illustrates this problem. In the report he stated, “Because our initial training costs are lower and our need for significant numbers of technically capable careerists is less than in some ‘more demanding’ career fields, personnel planners have determined it more prudent to man the security police field
with greater numbers of lower ranked and experienced, and consequently lower paid, enlisted men.” Whether real or perceived, this comment reflects circumstances unhelpful to developing professionalism’s responsibility characteristic. Convincing the Security Police career field it was valuable to the Air Force was difficult when the Air Force sent signals it did not see Security Police as a priority.

The Air Force continued to task leaders without Security Police experience with leading the career field. The practice of placing excess pilots in command of Security Police units for career broadening opportunity continued in this period and did little to show value for Security Police and grow its level of responsibility. Regardless, senior Security Police leaders did not recognize a problem with this practice in stating, “It is our general opinion that their [excess pilots] integration into our field has been an advantage which we have effectively used and that their entry is not a threat to the careers of our officers nor a threat to the status of our profession.”

Major Wayne C. Collins, 3rd SPS Operations Officer highlights the seriousness of the problem in his January 1969 end-of-tour report:

I came to Vietnam as a security police officer with no idea of what a security police officer was supposed to do. I was taken from another career field, given no training, and shipped to one of the most important bases in Southeast Asia where I was responsible for the protection of over 5,000 lives and millions of dollars in vital equipment. Even though the base and I have survived so far, I still believe the assignment was a mistake. It could have been a tragic mistake.

This evidence points at a number of obstructions to professional development for the career field; however, for the purposes of this analysis, this finding demonstrates an Air Force lack of value
for the career field. However, in other ways the Air Force did demonstrate its value for Security Police.

Regardless of these problems, the lessons learned during the experiences of Vietnam and the post-Vietnam era highlighted the value of Security Police to the Air Force. Despite a lack of standardized training and while typically under resourced, Security Police units successfully fought off numerous ground attacks in Vietnam. Their performance during the 1968 Tet Offensive was praised universally and transformed its image from a police and security organization to one of the Air Force’s infantry. This generated a sense of pride but also increased the value of Security Police to the Air Force.

In the latter portions of this period, the growth of terrorism around the world generated more responsibility and a new role for Security Police. For the military, terrorism began getting close attention with the early 1970s bombings by the Red Army Faction of military targets in Heidelberg and Frankfurt. The Air Force set an objective to put in place, “practical security measures against the possibility of terrorist attack, sustainable over a programmed period, without inordinate expenditure of men and money.” To accomplish this, the Air Force looked for Security Police leadership and which helped institute an enduring role for Security Police. Throughout this period’s latter portion, terrorism continued to gain the world’s attention. For the Air Force particularly, terrorist attacks in Germany on Ramstein Air Base in 1981 and Rhein-Main Air Base in 1985 emphasized the vital role of Security Police. With this vital role came an increase in responsibility and, with regard to this analysis, a necessary professionalism growth.
Corporateness

The career field’s name change and subsequent division are key corporateness aspects of this period. The name change in 1966 from Air Police to Security Police captured the increased focus on internal security and air base protection while at the same time highlighting the police role. However, with this updated role and new title, an invisible line emerged between law enforcement expertise and security expertise. In 1971, leaders decided to divide Security Police into two Air Force Specialties, Law Enforcement, and Security. The division’s intent to improve technical competence in each area by providing a sharper focus was controversial. Some leaders believed it created potential manpower inefficiencies and that it was divisive to the career field. Law Enforcement Specialists required higher Airmen Qualification Test scores than Security Specialists. This had a stereotypical demoralizing effect on the Security Specialty and created essentially a “class” gap in the career field.

In 1975, as a partial result of the gap between the Law Enforcement Specialty and the Security Specialty, a protest emerged. The event occurred at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, when 25 African-American Security Specialists locked themselves in the installation’s dining hall and demanded to meet with the installation commander. Their complaints primarily surrounded the “class” gap in Security Police. As Security Specialists, they complained of police brutality and that Law Enforcement Specialists unnecessarily used Military Working Dogs on them. They claimed that, “they were made to see themselves as inferior to Law Enforcement Specialists who had nicer uniforms, more training, and generally better duty conditions.” Obviously, for what improvement the career field specialization made, it also initiated a Security Police corporateness breakdown. Debate continued over the issue in this period; however, other developments mitigated its impact and helped develop corporateness.
Security Police leaders continued to enable image and identity boosts for the career field. In 1975, the dark blue beret became the official headgear of Security Police. This uniform item replaced the much-disliked white covered garrison hat and provided strong distinction for Security Police. In the same year, Security Police leaders authorized a specialty badge to provide further distinction making Security Police the first non-rated specialty to possess such a badge. Additionally, in 1975, leaders removed the restriction on the wear of the Security Police Shield and allowed members to wear it at all times when in uniform. Finally, in 1976, as a move to strengthen Security Police heritage and identity, leaders established the Security Police Museum on Lackland Air Force Base. These positive actions taken in 1975 and 1976 represented significant corporateness development for Security Police. These actions also provided enduring professionalism through creation of a very distinct identity.

1990-2000: SECURITY POLICE TO SECURITY FORCES

With the Cold War’s end and the huge successes of Desert Storm, the United States took on an even more substantial role in promoting stability around the world in this period. This consequently translated into a shift in Security Police roles and responsibilities. The shift provided more challenges to developing professionalism; however, as in previous generations, leaders maintained a continued effort to professionalize the force in all three professionalism characteristics.

**Expertise**

At the beginning of the period, Desert Shield and Desert Storm provided new challenges for Security Forces expertise. As in previous eras, in the time between conflicts, Security Police
fell back into peacetime roles and did not focus on ground combat skills in a significant way. Even though, by 1987, all Security Police members attended Air Base Ground Defense Training taught by the U.S. Army at Fort Dix, New Jersey, there was a distinct anti-terrorism focus but not a true ground combat focus.\textsuperscript{71} During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, training in ground combat skills did not meet requirements to defend a base in a wartime environment. The situation was summed up by a flight commander in Saudi Arabia during the operations who stated, “Unfortunately, our peacetime training did not apply to wartime requirements—a situation that created some difficulty and stress.”\textsuperscript{72}

However, in similar fashion as Vietnam training actions, Security Police leaders put their units together and trained ground combat skills and air base defense while deployed. Success in this difficult circumstance created unity in Security Police that outlived Desert Storm. Though these forces did not face large-scale attacks, Air Force and U.S. Central Command leaders noted their efforts at adapting and preparing defenses as “remarkable.”\textsuperscript{73} Regardless, lessons of Desert Storm and more frequent deployments brought about the need for different expertise.

Increased short-notice Air Force deployments around the world generated new needs for Security Police. Protecting Air Force assets in contested and difficult environments required, “rapidly deployable forces equipped, trained, and dedicated to the air base ground defense and force protection missions.”\textsuperscript{74} To meet this requirement, leaders developed the 820\textsuperscript{th} Security Forces Group. This unit provided an expert air base ground defense response for the Air Force to meet its emerging expeditionary needs and provided training opportunities for Security Forces members not previously possible.\textsuperscript{75} Members of this organization routinely attended U.S. Army Ranger, Jump, Pathfinder, and Air Assault Schools in addition to attending the group’s own vast training venues. Though controversial to many due to its draw on overall Security Forces
personnel and resources, it provided a needed capability to quickly protect resources in difficult and dangerous environments.

Responsibility

In this period, the value of Security Police continued to increase. With a new world order forming, operations in Southwest Asia continued as did taskings around the world. The Air Force and its Security Police served in Honduras, Africa, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s. These new and diversified missions required a continued change from a Cold War fixed base organization into an expeditionary organization. However, this new expeditionary security posture levied more risk on the Air Force and Security Police. The tragic 1996 terrorist bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia and subsequent Downing Report that faulted the base’s Security Police commander, resulted in the wing commander’s “promotion hold,” and prompted the Air Force Chief of Staff to retire, provided a tragic boost to Security Forces value and sense of service to the bigger Air Force community. This value was obvious in the Security Forces attention that followed.

The Air Force charged experienced Security Police leaders to leverage lessons learned from the Khobar bombing to prevent future events. By this period, Security Forces leaders were not inexperienced career field outsiders as in some previous periods. Rather, Brigadier General Richard Coleman, with 40 years of Air Police and Security Police experience, served as the career field’s head. His appointment was a testament to the Air Force’s increasing value for Security Forces. Moreover, his actions in the Khobar Towers bombing aftermath generated momentum to develop Security Forces professionalism. In the year following the bombing, Coleman advocated for and received $75 million for Air Force security improvements.
managed external pressures on Security Police organization. This effort manifested itself most clearly in professionalism’s corporateness characteristic.

**Corporateness**

To focus Security Police effort and meet deployment demands, Air Force leaders pressured Security Police leaders to rid themselves of unnecessary responsibilities. Primarily, Air Force leaders wanted Security Police leaders to utilize contracted security and law enforcement personnel to meet home station needs or to eliminate the law enforcement function altogether at certain bases.\(^7\) Perceiving this idea as detrimental to security at Air Force installations, experienced Security Police leaders needed to squeeze all the utility from their limited resources.

To accomplish this, the law enforcement and security specialties merged once again.\(^8\) Moreover, combat arms training and maintenance personnel folded in to the new organization to make further efficient use of manpower.\(^9\) This new organization also needed a unified identity that matched the contemporary mission. Security Police leaders eliminated the word “police” from the career field’s title and replaced it with “forces” believing “Security Forces” to better portray what the mission actually was.\(^10\) Additionally, a new motto backed up the new name, “Defensor Fortis,” or “Defender of the Force,” captured the career field’s base
defense and force protection roles. A Vietnam era insignia of a falcon clutching lightning bolts replaced separate Major Command insignias on all Security Forces berets to demonstrate the unity of Security Forces (see Figure 1). These actions resulted in a new mindset for Security Forces members, improved the corporateness aspect of professionalism, and earned the Air Force support to Security Forces necessary to handle increasing missions and operations tempo.

2001-2012: SECURITY FORCES

Security Force professionalism reached its highest point since 1947 during this period. The demands of two long wars stretched Security Forces manning and resources, but also fostered professionalism development in an unprecedented manner. This period holds what leaders called, the “Security Forces Transformation.” The transformation made Security Forces a focused expeditionary air base ground defense force. This force could operate inside or outside the wire to accomplish its priority objective to defend bases. Though there were many problems early in this period, the training provided prior to deployment and the experience offered by combat participation eventually yielded a force with remarkable expertise.
Moreover, the threat environment around Air Force bases and communities in this period raised the value of Security Forces and their responsibility. There were no new distinctive uniform items or name changes to provide identity. Security Forces professional development in this period was based primarily upon its significant involvement in long-term combat operations.

**Expertise**

Security Forces faced challenges as it began deploying in support of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Early missions included standard flight line security, law enforcement, and entry control in locations all over Southwest Asia.\(^{85}\) However, the Department of Defense called on the Air Force to backfill stretched Army forces by ordering Air Force units to accomplish Army missions “in-lieu-of” Army forces.\(^ {86}\) These taskings included convoy security and detainee operations missions and put Security Forces in positions for which they had not trained. \(^ {87}\)

An outside-the-wire mission also became critical for Air Force units during this period. As the Army stretched thinner and thinner, it could not fulfill earlier agreements to assist the Air Force with external air base defense.\(^ {87}\) The Air Force needed to accomplish this external mission utilizing its own assets. Standoff attacks on installations and attacks on aircraft from outside the base perimeter as aircraft arrived or departed rendered this external mission critical. However, with the exception of test units and some specially trained Airmen, Security Forces was not ready to take this mission on given its standard training and structure.\(^ {88}\) This served as the impetus for a “Security Forces Transformation.”\(^ {89}\)

This transformation included a priority shift toward improving knowledge and skill in base defense and combat survival. As part of this transformation, Air Force and Security Forces leaders established eight Regional Training Centers (RTC)s to ensure readiness for new missions
and to meet the new priority. In conjunction with the RTCs, the Air Force Security Forces Center (AFSFC) at Lackland Air Force Base served as the overseer and clearinghouse for Security Forces doctrine. In that role, AFSFC standardized training by establishing a Security Forces Master Training Plan and developing a list of common tasks along with conditions and standards for implementing these tasks. Additionally, Security Forces leaders mandated attendance at RTCs prior to Security Forces deployment. This ensured all deploying Security Forces members possessed a common body of knowledge and the skills critical to success in the new combat environment.

With continued threats to bases around the world and a new focus, Security Forces turned to refined expertise found in an integrated base defense concept. This concept took a comprehensive view of base defense beginning well outside the wire and called for a whole base and community effort. The concept emphasized the need to achieve the security effects installation commanders needed rather than complying with checklists that did not account for a commanders’ risk acceptance level. This new methodology was frustrating for many due to its complexity and difficulty in planning. However, to others, it allowed leaders to tap into the creativity and knowledge of Security Forces Airmen. The integrated defense concept proved significant to contemporary Security Forces culture focusing on working smart to protect what needed to be protected while using efficient and effective methods. Moreover, smartly identifying what to protect and how to protect it was essential to meeting new demands brought on by other events happening around the DOD.

A devastating active shooter attack at Fort Hood, Texas, in 2009 revealed the need for additional new expertise for Security Forces. As the integrated defense concept gained momentum, after action reports regarding the tragedy at Fort Hood highlighted areas of concern
for the Air Force. The Security Forces transformation greatly increased skill and knowledge necessary for Global War on Terror support missions; it also led to a steady decline in Security Forces law enforcement expertise and the type of expertise necessary to prevent a Fort Hood type attack. Leaders once again emphasized a Security Forces law enforcement role. With this emphasis, training and resourcing for improving capability in this role soon followed. However, unlike in previously analyzed periods, this additional emphasis did not negatively affect combat readiness. Substantial training investment in combat skills and law enforcement resulted in a wide body of knowledge and expertise for Security Forces. By the end of this period, this expertise significantly contributed to Security Force’s overall professional development.

Responsibility

The value of Security Forces to the Air Force significantly increased after the September 2001 terrorist attacks. When these terrorist attacks occurred, Force Protection Conditions rose quickly, placing many Air Force bases at their highest security level. The heightened state drove massive manpower requirements, in many cases doubling or even tripling the required personnel. Security Forces value to those they served was clear. Maintaining these conditions for long periods was not a planning factor prior to 2001; however, with the magnitude of continuous threats toward Air Force personnel and resources, Security Forces units held to higher force protection postures for months. Requirements to deploy Security Forces assets to meet emerging taskings compounded this problem. Installations activated their augmentation programs, sending many non-Security Forces personnel to help. Additionally, Army and Air Force National Guard and Air Force reserve units provided further relief. Schedules were
difficult with many units having no or very few days off over extended periods. This foreshadowed the characteristics of this period for Security Forces as it faced a decade of challenges in meeting home station and down range requirements. Due to these factors, Security Forces held great responsibility and value in the eyes of the Air Force. In 2006, the Director of Air Force Security Forces summarized this by stating, “we are at the most highly respected height in our career field … we have got more credibility with Air Force senior leaders now than I think we’ve ever had.” The elevated status of Security Forces also provided a nexus for improvements in corporateness.

**Corporateness**

Service in combat or otherwise difficult down range circumstances improved Security Forces corporateness in this period. After years of deployments, the sacrifices of Security Forces members served as a source of pride that created identity. With nearly 5,000 Security Forces members continuously deployed on six-month rotations, few members did not experience deployment. The career field was known as one of the most frequently and longest deployed in the Air Force. The difficult circumstances and danger of deployment enabled a strong Security Forces service culture and created a common bond with its members. Security Forces did experience combat deployments in each of the previous periods in this analysis; however, the Global War on Terror’s length and magnitude rendered it the most substantial to corporateness development in Security Forces history. Deploying and protecting resources in combat became more than a mission Security Forces trained for; rather, it became what Security Forces actually did. Consequentially, it was the new Security Forces identity and demonstrated improvement in corporateness.
By the end of 2010, Security Forces leadership engrained a single and universal mission in Security Forces by standardizing, “Protect, Defend, and Fight to enable Air Force, Joint, and Coalition Missions” as the official Security Forces mission. This mission evolved after nearly a decade of service in the Global War on Terror and captured the essence of the central corporateness theme in this period. It codified the different aspects of a transformed Security Forces career field and created identity. In addition to this identity forged in combat, a traditional corporateness improvement occurred late in this period.

For the first time in its history, Security Forces initial skills training attained civilian professional accreditation status. As a result of a long-term effort by Security Forces leaders, Security Forces officer, and enlisted initial skills training received Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation Board (FLETA) accreditation in 2012. The FLETA accreditation was key to professionalizing Security Forces with regard to corporateness. This development was directly related to Huntington’s corporateness description in that it “publicly distinguished” Air Force Security Forces from other non-accredited organizations. Accreditation provided an unprecedented credential for Security Forces members and provided assurance to Air Force communities that competent professionals were protecting them.

Security Forces corporateness development in this period was marked by the relatively indescribable bond shared by those who endure long struggles together. This bond created an environment of corporateness unequalled in Security Forces history. In no other period did so many Security Forces members deploy so frequently and for so long. This status rendered unique identity as the salient corporateness feature in this period. However, by also attaining professional law enforcement accreditation in this period, Security forces attained a traditional
corporateness enhancement, developed professionalism, and set the stage for even more future professionalism growth.

CONCLUSIONS

The preceding analysis highlights several insights useful to current and future leaders as they develop professionalism in their professions. It does this by providing examples that enable leaders to understand how professionalism grows, what hinders its growth, and how to overcome challenges to professionalism. To demonstrate the utility of these findings, the following conclusions illustrate a theme with supporting evidence in each of Huntington’s three professionalism characteristics.

**Expertise: Identify a profession’s primary role and align expertise-building opportunities to it.**

Unpreparedness in Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm, and initially in the Global War on Terror is an example of how professionalism suffers when expertise is misaligned with roles. This seems too obvious a conclusion. However, this analysis, in its entirety, provided context that demonstrates how misalignment happens in complex environments. The newly forming Air Force and Air Police had to make many decisions concerning the career field’s direction. Uncertainty regarding responsibility sharing with the US Army and with the new Air Force’s leadership expectations made selecting the right course for expertise development extremely challenging. However, this analysis also demonstrates, by describing Security Forces adaptation to the Global War on Terror, that even in a complex environment, decisive and well-resourced action will yield desired results. This analysis highlights a need for leaders to look for clarity in roles and expertise alignment as quickly as possible.
Responsibility: Identify areas of value to the community; then capitalize on them.

This analysis demonstrates that a profession requires opportunity to increase its value to society, and that when that opportunity arrives, the profession’s members must soundly fulfill their responsibilities. Analysis revealed that in most cases, Security Forces value to the Air Force hinged on world events and the opportunistic missions and roles these events generated. However, this observation does not render leaders helpless to increase a profession’s responsibility.

When opportunities arrive for professions to contribute to those they serve, they must capitalize on them. As the 1990-2000 Security Forces analysis demonstrates, leaders in a profession must leverage opportunity by ensuring members of the profession understand their value. They must also demonstrate this value to decision makers outside the profession who control or contribute to resourcing. These decision makers will then adequately support a profession by understanding its value and its needs. In capitalizing on opportunities, leaders increase the value and sense of responsibility for a career field and thus develop professionalism.

Corporateness: Create and merge an outward and inward identity.

The analysis reveals examples of Security Forces developing an outward and inward identity. Outwardly, leaders strove to create a distinctive appearance for the career field by establishing and subsequently enhancing a distinctive uniform for the career field. They also created symbolic insignias to represent status. This resulted in a strong sense of outward identity. Inwardly, Security Forces identity improved through a sense of pride forged in two wars but then faced a challenge when leaders divided the career field into specialties. This
career field division led to unity loss despite ongoing outward identity efforts. However, when the specialties remerged in the face of difficult deployments and combat, sense of identity improved.

Outward symbols of identity must be backed by an inward sense of identity to generate corporateness. Huntington points out the importance of outward identity in stating, “The line between him [professional] and the layman or civilian is publicly symbolized by uniforms and insignia of rank.”^108 However, as this analysis illustrates, without an inward identity aligned with this outward symbolism, corporateness is difficult to develop and thus professionalism is difficult to develop.

This analysis generates themes useful to leaders in developing professionalism; however, it also highlights the basic importance of professional development itself. Without professionalism, organizations and institutions will struggle to meet society’s needs. Professionalism renders a profession credible and trustworthy, while it also generates and maintains knowledge necessary to carry out important tasks. For these reasons, professionalism development requires continued research to ensure contemporary methods for enhancing it will be effective.

ENDNOTES

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