**Defense Sector Reform: A Holistic Approach to Defense Development**

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**Abstract**

Defense Sector Reform (DSR) is a conceptual term for the planning and implementation of integrated development of a nation’s armed forces. In concert with social, economic, government, and other security reform efforts, DSR produces a professionalized, civilian controlled military force that can meet the contextual requirements of external and internal national defense. Currently, however, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) lacks a clear and purposeful host nation (HN) defense sector reform policy that properly aligns and integrates with the tenets of Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the achievement of long-term, sustainable host nation development. By implementing several institutional reforms in doctrine, organization, training, and education, the DoD could more effectively support Security Sector Reform within the overall host nation developmental effort and the attainment of U.S. national strategic objectives.

**Subject Terms**

Defense Sector Reform, Security Cooperation, Security Sector Reform, Security Assistance, Security Force Assistance
Defense Sector Reform: A Holistic Approach to Defense Development

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Executive Summary

Title: Defense Sector Reform: A Holistic Approach to Host Nation Defense Development

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Thesis: The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) lacks a clear and purposeful host nation (HN) defense sector reform policy that properly aligns and integrates with the tenets of Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the achievement of long-term, sustainable HN development. Therefore, the DOD should implement several institutional reforms in doctrine, organization, training, and education in order to effectively support SSR in the overall developmental effort and the attainment of U.S. national strategic objectives.

Discussion: The current global strategic environment of failed states and subversive, violent extremism, coupled with a dramatic U.S. economic downturn, has resulted in a strategic paradigm shift towards conflict prevention and conflict mitigation through persistent comprehension engagement with foreign nations. In response, the U.S. Department of State (DoS), as lead agency in Building Partner Capacity (BPC), elevated and transformed its application of host nation development, particularly within the security sector with a concept known as Security Sector Reform (SSR). SSR refers to reform efforts directed at the institutions, processes, and forces that provide security and the rule of law. Currently, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) supports SSR through a variety of security reform programs, most notably Security Force Assistance (SFA), Security Cooperation (SC), and Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Collectively, these programs and a host of others within DoD lack clear supporting/supported relationships that significantly hinders professional understanding and interagency cooperation in support of Security Sector Reform.

The purpose of this paper is to introduce an alternative to current DoD security reform policy known as Defense Sector Reform (DSR) which would provide an overarching framework for security programs and foster subsequent DoD security reform in doctrine, organization, training, and education. DSR is a conceptual term for the holistic planning and implementation of integrated development of a nation’s armed forces in conjunction with other security, governance, economic, and social reforms. DSR would fulfill a doctrinal security development vortex and assist in other required DoD reforms such as the creation of a unified or sub-unified functional command, relevant and informed country assessments, and operationalized training and education.

Conclusion: Defense Sector Reform and associated DoD security development reforms discussed in this paper provide a holistic approach that fosters synergy and increased interagency cooperation to successfully meet the tenets of comprehensive engagement and accomplish U.S. national strategic objectives.
Preface

My interest in this topic originated rather recently while serving as the Executive Officer, 2nd Tank Battalion in 2010. It was during this period our battalion was assigned the mission of providing a Ground Combat Element (GCE) to the division in support of Southern Partnership Station (SPS) 2011. The GCE was a platoon reinforced composed of a mix of TOW and Scout Platoon Marines and sailors who would be executing the mission of security cooperation. Yet, what exactly was “security cooperation” and how do you effectively plan for successful execution of security cooperation.

In discussing the matter with higher headquarters, I realized, as others within the command, that there existed no formal methodology in planning for security cooperation or a host of other security related programs. The best source of information included historical data and After-Action Reviews from previous operations. Therefore, lacking assessments and planning tools we struggled to compile a comprehensive plan that targeted subject areas leading to improved host nation capabilities. In the end, we did what all Marines do…we adapted, overcame, and accomplished the mission.

However, were our efforts and actions during SPS 11 enduring? Were we building lasting partnerships through comprehensive engagement? Time will be the ultimate determiner, but certainly we have areas for improvement in planning and executing security cooperation and other security related programs in an efficient and effective method. I believe the concept of defense sector reform provides us that opportunity for improvement.

I would like to thank the faculty and staff of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College for their guidance, support, and honesty while researching and writing on this topic. Specifically, I thank Dr. Richard DiNardo who served as my Master in Military Studies (MMS) mentor for his candor, dedication, and understanding throughout this process. Additionally, the staff at Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG) who provided a wealth of resources on policy and doctrine, as well as informative contacts within the U.S. Department of State.

Finally, I would like to thank my lovely wife, Tanya, and my son, Everette, for their sacrifices during the research and writing of this paper. Their support and understanding throughout this period was immeasurable and I am indebted to them for their sacrifices.
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INTRODUCTION

Defense Sector Reform (DSR) is a conceptual term for the planning and implementation of integrated development of a nation’s armed forces. In concert with social, economic, government, and other security reform efforts, DSR produces a professionalized, civilian controlled military force that can meet the contextual requirements of external and internal national defense. Currently, however, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) lacks a clear and purposeful host nation (HN) defense sector reform policy that properly aligns and integrates with the tenets of Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the achievement of long-term, sustainable host nation development. By implementing several institutional reforms in doctrine, organization, training, and education, the DoD could more effectively support Security Sector Reform within the overall host nation developmental effort and the attainment of U.S. national strategic objectives.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The current strategic operating environment of the 21st century poses several unique security challenges to the United States. The environment is one characterized by failed states, violent extremists, and other state and non-state actors fostering radical ideologies that promote fear, terror, and global instability. Globally connected, these organizations and states coordinate and collaborate, both internally and externally, and seek proliferated destructive technology to carry-out catastrophic operations detrimental to U.S. security and prosperity. This environment includes a continued “evolution to a ‘multi-nodal’ world characterized more by shifting, interests-driven coalitions based on diplomatic, military, and economic power, than by rigid
security competition between opposing blocs.”¹ Currently, the situation has created “the inability of many states to police them effectively or to work with their neighbors to ensure regional security represents a challenge to the international system.”²

**STRATEGIC PARADIGM SHIFT**

In order to meet these strategic challenges to U.S. national security, and within the confines of fiscal constraints, the U.S. adopted a strategic policy that seeks to achieve objectives through greater global engagement and partnership. Historically, such efforts included many former Warsaw Pact states and states in South America, Africa, and Asia. The completion of the nation-building effort in Iraq in 2011 and the continued nation-building efforts in Afghanistan forms the apex of these developmental efforts. However, former Defense Secretary Robert Gates has written, “repeating an Afghanistan or an Iraq—forced regime change followed by nation-building under fire—probably is unlikely in the foreseeable future. What is likely though, even a certainty, is the need to work with and through local governments to avoid the next insurgency, to rescue the next failing state, or to head off the next humanitarian crisis.”³

The 2010 *National Security Strategy* (NSS) identifies “Pursuing Comprehensive Engagement” as one of the four elements of the U.S. approach to national security.⁴ Comprehensive engagement is defined as a whole of government approach to “the active participation of the United States in relationships beyond our borders.”⁵ Its success is dependent upon:

“….the effective use and integration of different elements of American power. Our diplomacy and development capabilities must help prevent conflict, spur economic growth, strengthen weak and failing states, lift people out of poverty, combat climate change and epidemic disease, and strengthen institutions of democratic governance. Our military will continue strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security
forces, and pursue military-to-military ties with a broad range of governments.”

Comprehensive engagement with a whole-of-government application as the “means” provides a potential for a coordinated and collaborated approach with bilateral or partner nations and/or international organizations to achieve greater global security. Comprehensive engagement serves as the strategic “ways” and promotes conflict prevention, or the strategic “ends” through increased global cooperation and engagement. Conflict prevention is “employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and, when necessary, military means to monitor and identify the causes of conflict and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities. Activities aimed at conflict prevention are often conducted under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. Conflict prevention can include fact-finding missions, consultations, warnings, inspections, and monitoring.

Conflict prevention has several inherent advantages. First, conflict prevention is an economically prudent method to deter aggression and prevent major combat operations or civil war that ultimately results in human suffering, severe infrastructure damage, and collapse of vital governmental institutions. Second, while effective conflict prevention objectives may initially require considerable amounts of investment in time, people, and program funds, the long-term cost-benefit to the nation is substantial when one considers the extensive rebuilding efforts, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan, after major combat operations. Third, conflict prevention has the added benefit of pooling allied, coalition, partner, and national/international support because it stops short of major combat operations, is widely recognized by the U.N., and reduces political risk in garnering public support. Lastly, conflict prevention derailed the long-term effects of potential ethnic, tribal, or religious atrocities and fosters relationship building through the collective attainment of agreed upon goals and endstates.
In accordance with the 2010 NSS paradigm shift, the U.S. Department of State (DoS), as the lead agency in response to political and security crises and conflicts, recognized development as the central pillar in any effective, comprehensive engagement strategy by stating in the 2010 QDDR:

“We start by embracing crisis and conflict prevention and resolution; the promotion of sustainable, responsible, and effective security and governance in fragile states; and fostering security and reconstruction in the aftermath of conflict as a central national security objective and as a core State mission that must be closely supported by USAID and many other U.S. government agencies.”

The key enabler to successful government, economic, and social reform within a host nation is a stable, accountable, and effective security apparatus. As such, DoS, in conjunction with U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) implemented the concept of Security Sector Reform (SSR). SSR is seen as the direct response to national security guidance and is defined as
“a set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice.”\textsuperscript{10} It is an overarching term that includes the integrated activities in support of:

- Defense and armed forces reform
- Civilian management and oversight
- Justice
- Police
- Corrections
- Intelligence reform
- National security planning and strategy support
- Border management
- Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR)
- Reduction in armed violence

Although an evolutionary outgrowth of traditional security sector involvement that included security assistance, foreign internal defense (FID), and the sale or financing of arms and equipment dominated the Cold War period, SSR serves as a remedy to the failures of militaries in the past to effect rapid developmental success.

SSR was first posited by Claire Short, the first minister of the United Kingdom (UK) Department for International Development (DFID), entitled “Security, Development and Conflict Prevention” in 1998.\textsuperscript{11} This document sparked a flurry of debate on security reform and initiated a series of convergent approaches within the United Nations (UN), World Bank, European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), international and non-governmental organizations, and national development agencies, such as the United Kingdom’s Department for Internal Development (DFID) and the U.S. DoS. Collectively, these organizations shaped a holistic, coherent developmental policy that “included the reallocation of resources from defense towards civilian security and development objectives.”\textsuperscript{12}

The U.S. DoS serves as the lead agency in SSR within the USG for initiatives and oversight for policy and programmatic support and lead for integrated USG reconstruction and
stabilization efforts.13 Supporting efforts within SSR include U.S. AID which “supports
governance, conflict mitigation and response, reintegration and reconciliation, and rule of law
programs aimed at building civilian capacity to manage, oversee, and provide security and
justice.”14 DoD also fulfills a support mission in defense reform, restructuring, or re-
establishment of the armed forces and the defense sector across the operational spectrum.
Coordination is conducted at the departmental level and through country teams consistent with
the Chief of Mission authority. The guiding principles of effective SSR include:

- Host Nation (HN) ownership
- Incorporate principles of good governance and respect for human rights
- Balance operational support with institutional reform
- Link security with justice
- Foster transparency
- “Do No Harm” mentality

Expounding on the established concept, DoS chartered a “Way Forward” that includes eight
critical objectives for enhancing Security Sector Reform. Of particular interest to the DoD is the
current initiative to rebalance the Civilian Response Force which fulfills six developmental skill
groups, in order for the DoS to “work closely with the Department of Defense to ensure that
military assistance is informed by broader foreign policy goals.”15

- Adopt an integrated approach to security and justice sector reform
- Support host nation ownership
- Link security and justice initiatives to governance and development approaches
- Emphasize civilian policing
- Ensure whole-of-government effort
- Build implementation capacity
- Expand knowledge base to support effective programming
- Build human capital

The U.S. DoS and supporting agencies phase these guiding principles through a program
methodology that includes coordinated assessment, planning, training, implementation, and
monitor and evaluation. Collectively, through critical SSR design that includes proper
sequencing and prioritization, the U.S. DoS achieves SSR objectives based on country context and circumstances. The concept of SSR transforms traditional forms of sector security into a holistic and integrated method focusing on cooperation, partnership capacity, stabilization and reconstruction, and engagement. In the end, the objective of SSR within the USG is to “design, develop, and deliver foreign assistance such that it promotes effective, legitimate, transparent, and accountable security and development in partner states.”

U.S. MILITARY STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

As would be expected, “Pursuing Comprehensive Engagement” in the interests of conflict prevention had a corresponding effect on overall U.S. military strategy as well. The 2008
National Defense Strategy (NDS) specifically states that the DoD will strengthen and expand alliances and partnerships, and integrate and unify our efforts with partners, allies, and international and multilateral organizations. The long-term vision was reinforced in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that included “Rebalancing the Force” (building the security capacity of partner states), “Strengthening Relationships” (strengthening key relationships abroad), and “Reforming How We Do Business” (reforming security assistance).

In fact, the emphasis on comprehensive engagement ultimately resulted, per the 2008 Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), in a shift from contingency-based (a focus on how to respond to a crisis around the world) to a strategy-based (a focus on shaping a world favorable to long-term U.S. interests) planning. These strategic documents, along with the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and Defense Planning and Programming Guidance (DPPG), provided unity of action in the attainment of national strategic objectives.

However, unity of action within the whole-of-government approach to Security Sector Reform has not translated into successful unity of effort among the various U.S. Departments of State, Defense, and Agency for International Development. As a supporting role within SSR, the DoD has struggled to properly nest programs and activities under the holistic developmental concept of SSR. Within the 2011 NMS, such shortcomings are acknowledged within the activities of security assistance, which is “a group of programs through which we provide defense articles and services to international organizations and foreign governments in support of national policies and objectives.” The NMS stated:

“To improve the effectiveness of our security assistance, our internal procedures need comprehensive reform. To form better and more effective partnerships, we require more flexible resources, and less cumbersome processes. We seek authorities for a pooled-resources approach to facilitate more complementary efforts across departments and programs, integrating defense,
diplomacy, development, law enforcement, and intelligence capacity-building activities.”

Security assistance, however, highlights only one aspect of a DoD security development lexicon framework that is purposely relational and highly functional, but ultimately dysfunctional in strategic application. The lack of a hierarchical, supporting/supported task approach to terms and definitions results in unnecessary complexities to the Geographic Combatant Commanders effective execution of host nation security development and increased risk to resource shortfalls that facilitate persistent engagement. Rather than properly align recurring capabilities to congressionally-mandated funding and statutory authorities within a nesting hierarchy, the DoD has created a myriad of doctrinal terms and definitions that are commonly misunderstood and incorrectly applied is security reform. For example, consider the most commonly confused definitions of HN defense development security related terms:

**Security Cooperation (SC):** activities undertaken by the DoD to encourage and enable international partners to work with the U.S. to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered security assistance programs, that: build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operation; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.

**Building Partner Capacity (BPC):** assisting domestic and/or foreign partners and institutions with the development of their capabilities and capacities – for mutual benefit – to address U.S. national or shared global security interests.

**Security Force Assistance (SFA):** The DoD activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.

**Foreign Internal Defense (FID):** participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.
The publication of the 2011 *Security Force Assistance Lexicon Framework* attempted to assist “Service representatives expressed confusion with lexicon, taxonomy, and frameworks used to describe SFA, SC, BPC, FID, etc.” However, while the paper provides some clarity to the proposed endstates of each program from a strategic perspective, it fails to justify the notion of a supported/supporting hierarchy of terms and falls short of proposing an overarching, doctrinal, umbrella term that adequately informs the DoS Security Sector Reform model. If institutional knowledge is lacking internally, how can DoD realistically assume to generate a purposeful, synergistic and integrated, security development program that can be truly synchronized by DoS in implementing SSR? However, the concept of Defense Sector Reform (DSR) provides an integrated and holistic alternative to this current dilemma.

**DEFENSE SECTOR REFORM**

As noted previously and with a clearer understanding and intent of SSR, it is critical to understand and analyze the proposed concept of Defense Sector Reform. First and foremost, DSR is not security cooperation, security assistance, or security force assistance. These programs and assistance, independently executed, may not address corruption, human rights abuses, or have the ability to forecast future internal conflict within a host nation. Rather, these programs and missions would be considered tools in support of DSR and an overall Security Sector Reform strategy.

Defense Sector Reform can best be defined as “fostering a transparent national defense establishment, under democratic control, that can assemble and maintain appropriate military capabilities to respond proportionately and competently to legitimate national defense needs in ways that support national development” economically, socially, and politically. The goal of
defense sector reform “is to establish institutions that are well-led, honest, impartial, regarded as legitimate by the population at large, and committed to protecting and serving the entire population under the rule of law and with respect for human rights.”

The defense sector within the SSR paradigm can be divided into three main categories that include the ministry, oversight institutions/agencies, and operational-level security forces. The ministries, such as defense and/or interior, develop, manage, and implement defense policy. Institutional oversight within a civilian-controlled, democratic nation includes a legislative body and internal ministerial oversight structures. Finally, the operation-level forces include the regular armed forces of the state, but also state sponsored paramilitary forces, custom and immigration services, intelligence services, and other organizations that defend the state and its people.

Defense sector reform presents an array of challenges that will inevitably vary from host nation to host nation. In many instances engrained defense institutions and processes the ensured political power and financial advantages, will be resistant to any defense reform that threatens the status quo. Therefore, a purely operational defense reform, such as that offered by SC, SA, and SFA, will prove insufficient for lasting change. Narrowly defined DSR planning, therefore, “will likely impair a country’s ability to build transparent, accountable, and efficient public institutions in general, and may also interfere with the larger economic recovery or development process.”

As a recent RAND Occasional Paper astutely noted:

“underdeveloped military establishments can be at the root of these security-development difficulties, owing to their failure effectively to manage national defense, their domestic political machinations, their involvement in the abuse of human rights, and their siphoning-off of scarce resources…Military establishments that do not follow a democratic model can undermine security directly by being threatening or being unprofessional and weak, and indirectly by dashing prospects for development, which fosters security.”

"
So, how does the U.S. DOD implement DSR in a contemporary context? The current U.S. DoD efforts in Liberia as part of Operation ONWARD LIBERTY and the greater international effort under the auspices of the United Nations provides several compelling examples of DoD and DoS policy failures in sector security reforms at the operational and strategic levels. The lessons derived from Liberia should serve to inform policymakers for the need of defense sector reform.

**LIBERIA: A CASE STUDY**

The Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) was raised in 1962 from the original Liberian military that was established in 1908 as the Liberian Frontier Force. During the First and Second Liberian Civil Wars, the AFL became entangled in the conflicts, and has lost the trust of the Liberian public and lost many of its operational and institutional capabilities. The Second Civil War (1989-2003) displaced nearly one-third of Liberia’s population and resulted in the death of nearly 250,000 people. Under the dictatorship of Charles Taylor, Liberia dissolved as a recognizable state institution, with nearly 85 percent of the adult population unemployed and 80 percent living below the poverty line. The Government of Liberia (GOL), with U.S. assistance in SSR development as mandated by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2003) for Liberia and UN Security Resolution 1509, is in the process of reforming, retraining, and re-equipping the AFL. The AFL’s primary mission is to defend the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Liberia, including land, air, and maritime territory, against external aggressions, insurgency, terrorism, and encroachment. In addition, the AFL shall respond to natural disasters and engage in civic works, as may be required or directed.

The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) currently performs the mission and tasks of the AFL. The GOL and AFL aspire to relieve UNMIL of its national defense responsibilities as
soon as possible. UNMIL is in the transition phase of their operations and will soon begin the withdrawal phase, conditions permitting.

LIBERIAN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM LESSONS

Many would argue that the current U.S. effort in security reform and defense reform in Liberia is strictly a unique situation dependent on the specific time and the environment. Some DoD analysts suggest that Liberia is in the backwater of U.S. strategic priorities, with a preponderance of resources and manpower dedicated to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, Liberia considered low priority for support, which resulted in dysfunctional and inept planning and implementation of DSR. Furthermore, those same pundits would argue that the situation in Liberia is the exception-to-the-rule with respect to future SSR and DSR U.S. developmental efforts, a state that experienced near total collapse in all essential services and governmental institutions.

However, the above events suggest that Liberia represents exactly what U.S. and DoD policy planners are most likely to encounter in future SSR efforts; that include post-colonial, post-civil war states, fraught with corruption and inept leaders who exploit oligarchy authority and natural resources to their own benefit, yet to the detriment of the region as a whole. Civil wars that quickly and abruptly excel beyond attempts at conflict prevention and engulf neighboring countries, such as the case of Sierra Leone during Liberia’s First and Second Civil War. A current effort that employs mandated assistance from the U.N and U.S., as well as a host of national and international governmental/non-governmental organizations. Together, operating in the most austere conditions and within an environment that is poverty stricken, absent of internal and external security and that is politically, socially, and economically unstable. Collectively,
these characteristics are exactly what should be expected in the current and future strategic environment.

The Liberian SSR provides ample evidence of the deficiencies of the current U.S. DSR efforts within that country. Initial strategic decisions were derived from a preliminary assessment survey conducted in the spring of 2004 by U.S. European Command and accompanied by DoS contractor representatives DynCorps and Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE). The assessment concluded a lack of DoD manpower capacity to fulfill the requirements of the Liberia DSR mission and in cooperation with the DOS awarded a technical and logistical support contract to DynCorps and PAE for recruit vetting, recruit training, NCO training and officer training, and collective company training. However, the contract with DynCorp and PAE quickly expanded, as the preliminary assessment failed to account for required DDR operations and AFL infrastructure repairs and construction to meet the most basic of training requirements.

Additionally, the awarding of civilian contractors to train, equip, advise, and mentor the AFL raised concerns over local ownership. U.S. contractors, while many former military, are not U.S. service members and do not have the latitude to make necessary adjustments or concessions in favor of the host nation. In this case, strict compliance, as mandated within the existing Indefinite Deliverables/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract, provided little deviation from the existing contract. In essence, “Liberian civil society questioned the program’s effectiveness, the role of U.S. companies, and the degree of Liberian involvement in shaping the program.”

Another issue with the Liberian DSR model included the absence of a Liberian National Security Strategy until 2009 which only served to undermine U.S. DSR programs from achieving HN unity of effort and integrating the AFL within the greater SSR model of the U.N. Lastly, the absence of a recognizable National Security Council (NSC) and a National or Joint Command
within the AFL have hindered efforts at resource prioritization and budget allocation; resulting in unsynchronized, mismanaged, and deluded programs and initiatives.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As noted in “Strategic Relevancy”, current U.S. national strategy emphasis “cooperation”, “engagement”, “partnership” and “conflict prevention”. The DoS and USAID, as outlined in the 2010 QDDR, has already begun the process of institutional reform that should gradually lead to increased developmental capabilities, particularly within SSR, and properly align necessary resources to support overall development. These initiatives of the DoS, coupled with situations similar to those in Liberia such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, and Sierra Leone, offer compelling evidence for the DoD to initiate similar institutional reforms. In order to meet the holistic needs of comprehensive DSR at the strategic level, DoD requires a reorganization of existing agencies and departments, a consolidation of security related doctrine, education and training, and a fully integrated planning approach to fulfill the need of a consolidated, coherent, and integrated DSR policy within DoD that will serve to optimize strategic policy and planning in the attainment of U.S. strategic objectives.

Doctrinally, DoD would be well served to adopt the term “Defense Sector Reform” within its policy and doctrine lexicon. The tenets of DSR would promote a holistic and integrated approach in support of Security Sector Reform within the DoD and DoS establishments, as well as other supporting external agencies and legislative and executive bodies. DSR, by its term and definition, signals a clear policy, doctrine, and training separation from pre/post Cold War defense reform programs and initiatives which is essential for a whole-of-government approach in integrating DSR within the political, social, and economical developmental spheres. DSR provides a term and definition that is recognizable with the DoS and U.S. AID SSR strategy and
within the greater global community of organizations such as the U.N., NATO, EU, and other regional security organizations; providing compelling justification in the establishment of a common language and understanding in the execution of operations that will entail immense multilateral, multinational, and inter/intra agency coordination and collaboration for mission accomplishment.

Organizationally, there is compelling evidence that supports the need for re-organization or restructuring of DoD support institutions to the Functional Combatant Commanders (FCCs) and Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs). Strategic guidance and policy with respect to security cooperation is promulgated by Under Secretary of Defense for policy and specified within the “Guidance for Employment of the Force” or GEF, in addition to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). Collectively, these plans serve as the foundation for the formulation of the GCC, and in some cases FCC, Theater Campaign Plans (TCP), and subsequently the Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) Plans objectives; providing short, intermediate, and long-term objectives. DSCA, as a DoD agency, synchronizes global security cooperation programs, funding and efforts across OSD, Joint Staff, State Department, COCOMS, the services, and U.S. industry. DSCA is responsible for the effective policy, processes, training, and financial management necessary to execute security cooperation within DoD.

However, the strategic re-prioritization to conflict prevention and its inherent emphasis in shaping operations (Phase 0) necessitates the creation of either a unified or sub-unified command under U.S. Strategic Command, organized along a functional basis. The creation of such a command would, with sufficient authority and capabilities to support security cooperation, properly align necessary resources, technical expertise, and centralized planning. The command
would provide “one-stop shopping” across Doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) within the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) in support of the FCCs/GCCs, while still maintaining their necessary flexibility based on geographical area to meet TSC planned objectives and goals. Service component groups or agencies, such as U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC), U.S. Air Force Security Assistance Center (AFSAC), U.S. Navy International Programs Office (IPO), and U.S. Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG) would align under this command to provide service expertise departmentalized based on region or function. Liaisons or support teams from other agencies, such as Department of State, Justice, Treasury, USAID, DEA, FBI, ATF, and other internal, as well as external actors, could be integrated and provide the overarching planning, coordination, and consolidation within the Capital Region to effect timely and efficient response to FCCs/GCCs. A unified or sub-unified command concept, with necessary revisions to Title 10 and Title 22 funding authorities, would have the added benefit of consolidating the various “tools” of security cooperation, security assistance, security force assistance, foreign internal defense, and potential SSTR under the umbrella of DSR and synergize with SSR for precision engagement or development within a host nation.

Another strategic DSR imperative lacking relevancy and integration is the formulation of viable threat assessments that contains a whole-of-government framework approach instrumental to effective defense reform. Strategic assessments provide the baseline for not only operational design, but in the case of DSR, program design. The need for current and accurate assessments is essential “to base security needs analysis; definition and allocation of institutional roles and responsibilities to meet those needs; an appropriate sector structure and chain of command to manage execution of roles and responsibilities; and creating, enhancing, transforming or right-
sizing of forces and support structures to carry them out.” Currently, country assessments are conducted by the various regional service commands through their respective security cooperation agency or group at the request of the GCCs. Typically, the initial assessment is vetted with the Security Cooperation Officer (SCO) or Senior Defense Official (SDO) attached to the U.S. embassy Country Team. These assessments are then forwarded back to the GCC component, analyzed, and consolidated within the J5, Strategy, Plans, and Programs, Security Cooperation Program Division for consideration into the GCC’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP). This document is then harmonized with the Embassy’s Country Cooperation Plan (CCP) and Mission Strategic and Resource Plan (MSRP).

At issue with these assessments is the narrowly defined process for analysis, which is the use of the DOTMLPF format. While the merits for such an assessment model can be clearly understood from a strictly military point-of-view, it is an analysis model more suited to the unilateral, piecemeal approach of SC and SA prior to the end of the Cold War. These assessments fall short in identifying key structural and programmatic defense issues, particularly at the strategic level, which could negatively impact developmental efforts in other domains; which is the nexus of defense sector reform and overall SSR within the developmental agenda. Current development reform efforts in Liberia highlights this issue in which “defense restructuring is proceeding in isolation from ECOWAS security architecture, and does not seem to be based on a thorough analysis of the security dynamics of the Mano River Basin…the AFL is being organized according to an apparently threat-independent approach to defense planning and structuring.”

A recommendation would be to augment the current DOTMLPF analysis paradigm with the Defense Sector Assessment Tool (DSART), in whole or part thereof, as proposed by the RAND
Corporation’s National Defense Research Institute. The DSART consists of six assessments to qualitatively and quantitatively determine the state of a country’s defense sector, its institutions and processes, and its capacity to carry out operations for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, counternarcotics, border and maritime security, counter-piracy, and post-conflict stabilization. The DSART addition, coupled with an integrated, multiagency survey team of requisite experience and rank, would be able to provide the GCCs a more comprehensive and timely assessment in order to develop an informed program design. In turn, when synthesized with other external agencies such as DoS and USAID, could provide a well-informed, synchronized, and integrated overall developmental program.

In order to capitalize on this new strategic paradigm shift, whether labeled defense sector reform or some type of broadened security cooperation reform effort, the DoD must pursue efforts to operationalize these changes. As Director Michele Flourney, currently the DoD Under Secretary for Policy notes, this will “require solutions that integrate all the dimensions of our national power and influence. We need to take this idea of whole-of-government approaches seriously, and we need to operationalize it in virtually everything we do.”

The higher level of operationalization should include clear DoD policy links nested within other developmental areas supported by the DoS or other developmental agencies. In this case, the DoD, as well as other U.S. governmental departments, would be wise to follow the example of DfiD’s (UK) creation of permanent interagency committees on SSR and the follow-on policy linkages to poverty reduction programs. A similar U.S. policy could be carried forward by DoD in the implementation of SSR/DSR developmental goals within the Millennium Challenge Development program.
Within DoD itself, a coherent DSR policy will lead to proper investment in the education and training of military and civilian personnel, alike, who serve as the “operators” of strategic policy. Current training efforts, under the auspices of DSCA and service enabling security cooperation agencies/groups, have sought a Systems Approach to Training (SAT) largely focused on the individuals, particularly the Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) assigned to the embassies or GCCs. While certainly there is a needed requirement for SCOs, these education efforts have targeted the separate aspects of security cooperation, such as FMS and FMF; failing to fulfill the holistic, long-term goals of actual DSR planning and execution. It fails to fulfill the training and education requirements within the various FCC/GCC and service security cooperation programs responsible for TSC Plans in their respective Area of Responsibilities (AOR).

Lastly, the service commands of DOD, except the Marine Forces Command (MARFORCOM), lack SC Mission Essential Tasks (METs) and associated individual (ITS) and collective (CTS) training standards, yet are currently fulfilling SC missions across the globe. If the strategic paradigm shift is truly towards soft power supported by hard power in conflict prevention or mitigation, then these training standards and requirements are essential for mission success. The challenge for operational commanders will be balancing the core SC tasks with other conventional and irregular warfare missions.

Certainly, DOD strategic policy with respect to achieving a holistic and integrated view of security cooperation is advancing. In *Military Contribution to Cooperative Security (CS) Joint Operating Concept V1.0* (19 Sept 2008), an expanded view of SC known as “cooperative security” was coined, which is a “set of continuous, long-term integrated comprehensive actions among a broad spectrum of U.S. and international governmental and nongovernmental partners.
that maintains or enhances stability, prevents or mitigates crises, and enables other operations when crises occur. At the service level, the U.S. Marine Corps, as designated proponent of SC among all the services, has progressively advanced integrated and interrelated SC planning and execution within the supporting establishments and operating forces. The Marine Corps has sought to strengthen its support to interagency cooperation in a Concept for Unified Action through Civil-Military Integration that seeks “a comprehensive approach through unified action that makes deliberate partners of all instruments of national power.” Finally, in October 2011, the CMC released NAVMC 3500.59A, Security Cooperation (SC) Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual linking strategic to operational capabilities and indentifying the Mission Essential Tasks (METs) of: (1) developing training plans and programs, (2) developing partner nation forces, and (3) conducting/supporting Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) activities.

CONCLUSION

Historically, most security challenges have come from state strength, from aggressive, powerful states overstepping the bounds of international norms and international law. The future of the global security environment will likely be characterized by conflict with non-state actors, violent extremism, and near-peer competition. The USG and DOD will face these challenges while experiencing increasing fiscal constraints. DSR, in support of a greater SSR mission, and similar activities such as SC and SFA, provide a means to prevent or mitigate conflict at a reasonable cost. Building a partner’s capacity often results in more responsible, competent security forces able to reduce a local crisis before it becomes a threat to U.S. interests and requires intervention. DSR, within the greater SSR construct, is intended to prevent conflict, but it also positions U.S. forces for potential military operations by fostering
interoperability with future coalition partners. Through the development of a universally
accepted policy of DSR, organizational structure revisions, effective planning supported by
holistic assessments, and proper education and training of the force, the DOD can meet these
challenges and achieve U.S. national strategic objectives.

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ENDNOTES