The purpose of this study is to identify cultural considerations that impact security cooperation operations with South Sudan, particularly the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). Given the complex operational environment of South Sudan, U.S. war-fighters must conduct an in-depth cultural analysis, beyond a cursory overview, that takes into account not only the demographics of the organization but also the historical events that have influenced it as well as how it is influenced by the environment in which it exists in order to prepare to conduct effective security cooperation operations in South Sudan. The author addresses the significance of South Sudan to U.S. interests and potential military operations in the country. The author then conducts a cultural analysis using the T.R.I.P.L.E. framework as taught in USMC Command & Staff College. The most challenging issues identified through the cultural analysis were militia integration, reducing inter-tribal conflict, and minimizing negative identity factors that are rooted in the history of the SPLA such as “Dinka domination” and human rights violations. The author concludes the study with recommendations for improving cultural understanding for the full spectrum of military operations.
CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR
SECURITY COOPERATION OPERATIONS IN SOUTH SUDAN:
UNDERSTANDING THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY (SPLA)

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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AY 11-12
DISCLAIMER

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Cultural Considerations for Security Cooperation Operations in South Sudan: Understanding the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)

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Thesis: Given the complex operational environment of South Sudan, U.S. war-fighters must conduct an in-depth cultural analysis, beyond a cursory overview, in order to prepare to conduct effective security cooperation operations in South Sudan.

Discussion: This study starts by identifying the significance of analyzing South Sudan, particularly the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, as it relates to protecting U.S. interests. These interests include combating terrorism through the denial of safe havens in failing states and bolstering democratic states. The potential for operations in South Sudan are complicated by a diverse and dynamic operational environment. A review of applicable DOD doctrinal publications, and directives as well as Department of State references focuses the effort of the subsequent cultural analysis by identifying the most likely security cooperation activities to be carried out by U.S. war-fighters, specifically United States Marines. The result: training and education missions.

The cultural analysis resulted in the identification of a number of potential obstacles to assisting the host nation in transforming the SPLA into a professional conventional national armed force. The most challenging issues were militia integration, reducing inter-tribal conflict, and minimizing negative identity factors that are rooted in the history of the SPLA such as “Dinka domination” and human rights violations.

These issues are addressed from the U.S. war-fighters perspective in considerations analysis and the recommendations are provided for preparing U.S. forces for operations in this culturally diverse environment. The considerations are divided into two categories: considerations for preparing the U.S. personnel and considerations for executing the mission. Given the issues revealed in the analysis, with respect to both categories of considerations the emphasis must be placed on ethical leadership training in the context of South Sudanese culture.

Conclusion: A cursory review of cultural factors is inadequate to prepare for effective execution of security cooperation operations. In order to develop a genuine understanding of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, an in-depth cultural analysis of the organization must be conducted that takes into account not only the demographics of the organization but also the historical events that have influenced it as well as how it is influenced by the environment in which it exists.
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PREFACE

Cultural understanding of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in the Republic of South Sudan is a relevant and dynamic topic. My initial interest in this subject is tied to my personal desire to serve in U.S. Africa Command. Having been recently assigned a STRATCOM joint billet, I find the process of conducting a cultural analysis is relevant to my future assignment. The importance of the topic lies in the pursuit of U.S. interests on the continent of Africa and the uniqueness of studying a new country, i.e. the Republic of South Sudan in its first year of independence after separation from Sudan. The significance is additionally elevated by the October 2011 announcement of deployment of U.S. forces to the country.

The approach I used was an in-depth historical cultural analysis of the South Sudanese armed forces. This analysis was focused by reviewing the applicable DOD, Joint, and Marine Corps security cooperation publications. I restricted the scope of this analysis to security cooperation operations because I believe this type of operation is the most likely for U.S. forces in the near future in South Sudan. Hence, this paper only addresses cultural factors with respect to the South Sudan Armed Forces.

Finding sources was a challenge for two reasons: 1) the short history of South Sudan as a nation and 2) the fluidity of the situation in the South Sudan. I was able to overcome this challenge by looking at references on Sudan as the South operated with varying degrees of autonomy since Sudan’s independence in 1956. Additionally, I found the reports of International Governmental Organizations, National Governmental Organizations, and other humanitarian agencies provided the granular details of what is happening “on the ground”. It is also worth noting that this study is current as of the spring of 2012; this is significant given how quickly the environment of South Sudan is changing.
Possible follow-on work for others includes a detailed cultural analysis for the South Sudanese people relevant to other types of operations from the perspective of the war-fighter as well as an evaluation of South Sudan neighbors influence on South Sudan considering many of them share the cultural factor of being members of the Nilotic ethnic group. I would like to thank my wife, Shawn, for her unwavering support. Additionally, I would like to thank my mentor, Dr. Donald F. Bittner, for his guidance and counsel.
INTRODUCTION

“Our military will continue strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties with a broad range of governments.”

-- President Barack Obama

In the latest published National Security Strategy, the President commented on the need for more military engagement by United States in order to build stability abroad in an effort to ensure stability at home. His guidance has been received and apparently understood as it is exemplified in the objectives of all of the geographical combatant commanders. A review of every geographical combatant commander’s priorities reveals a task of theater security cooperation missions.

The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) is the geographic combatant command responsible for South Sudan. Of the five strategic objectives identified to accomplish the mission of AFRICOM in its fact sheet, three of those objectives can only be realized through security cooperation. Those objectives are as follows:

1) Assist African states and regional organizations in developing the will, capability, and capacity to combat transnational threats such as terrorism, piracy, and the illicit trafficking of weapons, people, and narcotics

2) Assist African states and regional organizations in developing the capacity to execute effective continental peace operations and to respond to crises

3) Encourage African militaries to operate under civilian authority, respect the rule of law, abide by international human rights norms, and contribute to stability in their respective states

Security cooperation operations are implied throughout the objectives by the use of words “assist”, “develop capacity” and “encourage”. Additionally, the remaining objectives can be indirectly influenced through security cooperation.

On July 9, 2011, South Sudan became an independent state. Subsequently, President Obama committed US military forces and materiel to security cooperation efforts in South
Sudan. Then in October 2011, U.S. troops were committed to Central Africa to serve as advisors in the region’s fight against Lord’s Resistance Army. In early January 2012, the nation’s commitment in the region increased when the President authorized weapon sales to South Sudan. Weapon sales are one aspect of security cooperation.

The focus of this paper is to examine the cultural considerations necessary to effectively conduct security cooperation missions in South Sudan. Given the complex operational environment of South Sudan, U.S. personnel must conduct an in-depth cultural analysis beyond a cursory overview. This is necessary in order to prepare to conduct effective security cooperation operations in this country. A cultural analysis will not dictate specific actions by the force but rather provide a comprehensive framework that will inform his decision making. Because military to military interaction is at the heart of security cooperation, the focus of analysis should be limited to the host nation’s armed forces and the factors that influence the actions of those forces. The military thus plays an integral role in the “whole of government” approach in pursuing United States foreign policy objectives.

SIGNIFICANCE

The Department of Defense conducts a wide variety of activities in Sub Saharan Africa in support of U.S. national interests. These operational activities may include, but are not limited to, humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, counterterrorism efforts, sanctions enforcement, non-combatant evacuations (NEOs), and Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIOs). These efforts are under the purview of AFRICOM. Strategically, South Sudan offers global trade interests for the United States, particularly oil. Additionally, before secession, the former larger Sudan had long been thought of as a breeding ground, training area, and safe haven for extremist organizations. The last Quadrennial Defense Review asserts that the United States’ efforts to
address transnational challenges in the region “will hinge on partnering with African states… to conduct capacity building and peacekeeping operations, prevent extremism, and address humanitarian crises.”

Given the cultural diversity of the Republic of South Sudan, the un-informed security cooperation force could be at a disadvantage. If engaged, failure to understand the complexity of the operational environment will ultimately lead to the force failing to positively influence an already contentious situation. If this occurred, it could result in a failed state with the United States Government being partly blamed for its failure.

**USMC SECURITY COOPERATION GUIDANCE**

Before starting the cultural analysis, it is necessary to identify the most likely operations in which the war-fighter will be committed and their associated objectives in order to focus the analysis on the most relevant cultural attributes. DOD Directive 5132.03, “DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation 2008”, establishes the responsibilities of DOD subordinate organizations and agencies with respect to security cooperation. In this document, the Secretary of Defense delegated most of the high level supervisory responsibilities, including establishing priorities and guidance, to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Within the DOD, the “Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF)” provides specific security cooperation guidance as it identifies the “goals and activities for specific regions”. The joint publication, *Joint Operations*, JP 3-0 (2011), defines the full spectrum of operations in which a joint force may be employed. This includes security cooperation and military engagement.
However, the joint publication, *Foreign Internal Defense*, JP 3-22 (2010) is more appropriate for this study as it identifies and enumerates security cooperation activities. JP 3-22 identifies the following security cooperation activities: Multinational Education, Multinational Exercises, Multinational Experimentation, Multinational Training, Counternarcotics Assistance, Counter / Nonproliferation, Defense and Military Contacts, Defense Support to Public Diplomacy, Facilities and Infrastructure Projects, Humanitarian Assistance, Intelligence Cooperation, Information Sharing, International Armaments Cooperation, and Security Assistance.\(^{11}\)

The activities that a Marine Corps force most likely will undertake in support of the SPLA are multinational training and education, defense and military contacts, intelligence cooperation, information sharing, and security assistance. This document distinguishes **SECURITY ASSISTANCE** from **SECURITY COOPERATION**. This is important because the terms are often used interchangeably. **SECURITY ASSISTANCE** is a subset of **SECURITY COOPERATION**. Security assistance is mostly “directed at bolstering capabilities to defend against external threats” while security cooperation is focused on all threats.\(^{12}\) Foreign Internal Defense, a subset of security cooperation, is also a viable mission for a Marine Force. The reader should refer to Appendix B for definitions of these operational terms.

All of the aforementioned references inform the overarching Marine Corps guidance document regarding security cooperation, Marine Corps Order 5710.6A, “USMC Security Cooperation (2006)”. This document identifies the following priorities for Marine Corps security cooperation activities:

(a) Maintain or increase access to littoral areas.
(b) Maintain and enhance existing training opportunities and develop new training opportunities for U.S. Marine Corps forces.
(c) Conduct activities with allies and other potential partners (emphasizing USMC counterpart services) to build partner capacity, increase understanding, provide assistance in transformation efforts, support greater interoperability with U.S. forces, and accurately communicate U.S. objectives and intent.\textsuperscript{\textdegree}3

Another relevant Marine Corps publication is Marine Corps Order 4900.3A, “Marine Corps Security Assistance and Related International Programs (2001)”. This publication identifies International Military Training and Education (IMET) as one of the six major security assistance programs.\textsuperscript{\textdegree}4 This is the most applicable program with respect to the SPLA. Although this implies that Marines would conduct security assistance operations, this cannot be confirmed without further analysis.

While these publications provide valuable guidance with respect to security cooperation, references from the Department of State would better identify the potential missions in South Sudan. Susan D. Page, U.S. Ambassador to South Sudan, provided relevant information during her confirmation hearing to Congress in 2011. Ambassador Page identified various challenges to the newly independent state. These include “internal conflict and violence incited by former military commanders and political actors”, “the regional threat posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army”, and “the establishment of a strong economic and development foundation also will be critical to the long term success of South Sudan”. However, her most insightful comment was the need to support “international partner efforts to help transform the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) into a sustainable and professional military that operates under civilian control and respects human rights.”\textsuperscript{\textdegree}5 Based on all the aforementioned guidance, Marines need to be able to assist in the building of the armed forces of South Sudan in defense of the new state against both external and internal enemies; the latter could include local and regional militias. Given the identified threats, the accurate characterization of potential operations is security cooperation vice security assistance or foreign internal defense exclusively.
CULTURAL ANALYSIS

An appropriate cultural analysis in support of military operations has two parts: (1) the identification of the cultural attributes of the organization or group being analyzed, and (2) how those factors change over the course of time as the environment changes. The second part is particularly true during conflict and periods of transition.\(^{16}\) In the case of studying the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), any research must start with the formation of the SPLA in the 1980s through the dynamic transition of the second decade of the 21\(^{st}\) century. In conducting the analysis, only the cultural factors that influence SPLA soldiers and potential soldiers are relevant. While an analysis of the South Sudanese people as a whole provides some insight, the analysis should be restricted to those factors that affect the mission at hand: security cooperation. For general information and demographics regarding South Sudan, refer to Appendix F. Another significant concept that should be considered before commencing the cultural analysis is the definition of cultural understanding. CAOCL describes degrees of cultural understanding using the analogy of an iceberg. In one year’s time, cultural awareness can be achieved yet this is just the tip of the iceberg. Cultural understanding requires two to five years and cultural competency takes 10 to 30 years.\(^{17}\) Given the expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps, emphasis on the collection and distribution of lessons learned is crucial to building a knowledge base that delves below the surface of the iceberg.

Territory

The cultural attribute of territory is primarily concerned with the physical environment but ultimately interacts with and influences all the other cultural attributes. Territory is not only a place with a functional importance of “home, homeland, and belonging.”\(^{18}\) It also involves determining how the physical environment is used and who has access to its resources. In
analyzing the SPLA, two perspectives are most important: territory of the country and territory of the SPLA itself.

The territory of South Sudan has implications for the SPLA, the country’s legitimate armed force, because it remains contested with Sudan. While South Sudan has its independence, the agreement, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, that led to independence failed to address contested areas. Appendix I explains the CPA. The CPA recognized the boundaries initially established with Sudan’s independence in 1956. Of particular note are the areas of Abyei and the Upper Nile.\(^{19}\) The reasons these areas are contested are their resources, both oil and agriculturally advantageous pasture lands. The map in Appendix G shows the historical boundary and the locations of the resources. The border issue has existed since the end of the first civil war in 1972. The Addis Abada Agreement (1972), the peace agreement that ended the first civil war, had provisions to transfer “certain areas which had been part of the southern provinces before independence in 1956, as well as areas deemed culturally similar to the South.”\(^{20}\) To this day, the border issue continues to affect not only the disputed territory attribute but also the economic and religious attributes for South Sudan.

Documented history of the SPLA reveals the high importance placed on territory. A demonstration of the significance of territory is found in the birth of the SPLA. An additional provision of the Addis Abada Agreement was that Anyanya guerillas, former rebels of the first civil war, would be absorbed into the Sudanese Armed Forces but they were only to serve in the south, their homeland. In January 1983, the 105\(^{th}\) Sudanese Army Battalion refused orders to move north and defected to rebels who opposed the Sudanese government because of its failure to uphold the provisions of the Addis Abada Agreement. The 105\(^{th}\) Sudanese Army Battalion had garrisons at Bor, Pibor, and Pochalla and was commanded by officers from the original
Anyanya. Colonel John Garang, a former Anyanya officer, was sent to Bor to mediate the mutiny but unbeknownst to officials in Khartoum, he was already conspiring with officers in the South Command to defect. By July 1983, he became the united commander of the political and military wings of the newly formed Sudan People’s Liberation Movement / Army.\textsuperscript{22}

The territory attribute played an integral role in recruitment into the SPLA in the early days of its formation. Many of the recruits joined simply to get training and weapons to protect their home areas. A significant number of Dinka recruits from northern Bahr al-Ghazal joined for this reason. Refer to Appendix C for a map depicting the distribution of ethnic groups across South Sudan. While the desire to protect their territory helped in most cases, in others it was a hindrance due to conflicting conditions. Initially, the SPLA sent new recruits to Ethiopia to train and equip but this arrangement left their home areas vulnerable to attacks by militia supporting the northern government. Potential members from the Bul Nuer refused to join the SPLA because of this policy.\textsuperscript{23}

Today, the territory attribute presents an additional challenge for the SPLA: Repatriation of internally displaced persons and/or refugees. As a result of years of war, thousands of people have moved from their home areas. With South Sudan’s independence, it is unclear how many of these displaced persons, whether internally or from neighboring countries, will attempt to return home. The overarching question thus becomes “Who is the rightful owner?” Without the common enemy of the north to force compromise and cooperation, the landownership question could lead to fighting along ethnic and tribal lines. This condition presents a potential internal security threat that must be addressed by the SPLA without discrimination.
Religion

The cultural attribute of religion is concerned with the beliefs that influence a person’s world view. These include the rituals, symbols, and practices associated with a particular system. Religion, as defined by anthropologists, is the “codification of values in a society…with or without a God factor.” This attribute can indeed then influence the attributes of politics, economics, and language.

There are a multitude of reasons for the Sudanese Second Civil War (1983 -2005); one of these was the imposition of shari’a law at the national level in 1983 by Sudanese President Nimairi. A prerequisite to this action was the dissolution of the Addis Abada Agreement which had given the Southern Regional government the authority to withdraw or postpone any bill before the National Assembly which adversely affected “the welfare, rights or interests of the citizens of the Southern Region”. These actions effectively denied the citizens of the south their religious freedom. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) used this grievance, as well as other ones that resulted from the dissolution of the Addis Abada Agreement, to fill the ranks of the SPLA in its infancy.

Without definitive statistics for the distribution of religious affiliation among members of the SPLA, this study assumes that the distribution of religious affliction is directly proportional to the distribution of religious affliction among the entire South Sudanese population. According to the U.S. Department of State, approximately 90% of the population practices Christianity while the remaining 10% practice Islam or some form of traditional belief system.

Many African ethnic groups practice an “Africanized” form of religion in which they blend their indigenous, or traditional, African religious beliefs with fundamental Muslim or Christian customs. Animism and Fatalism are examples of these indigenous belief systems.
Animism is a traditional belief system that regards the world as a product of a complex system of relationships among people, living and dead, animals, plants, and natural and supernatural phenomena. “Fatalism, the belief that life is destined to unfold in a particular way, is inherent in many kin-based and Muslim societies.”

Deeper analysis of the Christian majority reveals that the high percentage (90%) may be a political response in the South’s struggle with the North during the civil war. Commander Lual Diing Wol, a member of SPLA High Command Council, provided the following insight during an interview in June 2003.

In the past, our people never used to talk about being African or Christian or non-Arab because they did not need to prove to anyone what their identity was. People professing Christianity used to go to church when they felt like it and not because they wanted to demonstrate their Christian commitments to anyone. But since 1983, it has become a question of showing the government and its Muslim zealots that we are proud of our identity and do not want anybody to change us. This insistence of northern rulers that our country must become Arab or Muslim has only created a sense of extremism to prove the opposite … before 1983, the churches in the south were not attended that much. Yes, most urban populations professed Christianity but they were not really practicing, but since the introduction of Islamic laws, not only did more people attend church more regularly, conversions to Christianity increased dramatically once people felt that they had to protect their faith.

Based on these comments, religion became a key component of identity. This statement begs the question, “With independence and relief from religious pressure from the north, will South Sudanese revert back to more traditional religious practices?”

While not a part of religion in a western sense, reciprocity should be explained under the religion cultural attribute as a belief. The Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) defines reciprocity as a “mutually understood expectation of a returned favor” that is a moral duty in many African cultures. “If someone helps you, it is your duty to return the service one day. If you help someone, then you are entitled to receive something in return from this
person.” This concept applies to individuals and groups in all segments of urban and rural communities. This is potentially problematic because reciprocity is often seen as corruption by Westerners. Reciprocity in the SPLA will be explored further under the cultural attributes of identity, politics, and economics.

Identity

The Identity attribute is “a self-described set of attributes – usually complimentary – that reflects how people think of themselves – not necessarily what others think of them.” This set of attributes may include race, tribe, blood kinship, religious membership, nationality, and group affiliation. This attribute is intrinsically tied to all the other attributes.

The North’s desires to have Sudan assume the national identity of an Islamic state was a grievance of the South in the Second Sudanese Civil War. Hence, the issue was subsequently used by the South to rally support. Jok Madut Jok made the following statement regarding ethnicity.

The state [of Sudan], largely controlled by groups that self-identify as Arabs, has sought to forge the Sudanese national identity as ‘Arab’ and ‘Islamic’ while the majority of the population increasingly prefer to identify themselves by their specific ethnic/tribal names or simply ‘African’ or ‘Black’…the state targets the non-Arab and non-Muslim groups for violent absorption into the ‘Arab race,’ or for exclusion from state services if they insist on asserting their perceived racial or chosen religious identity.

This brings to light a subtle difference in how the Western world defines race compared to the Sudanese and the South Sudanese. For these two countries, racial identity is not defined by physical characteristics alone. Rather, it includes religion, economic activities, material conditions, the naming of the people, etc. The conclusion: “race” is not fixed. Given this definition, the racial boundaries are very fluid. “People who may be classed as blacks could also pass as Arabs, while those who have been known to be Arabs could decide to label themselves as
African or black if their political circumstance demanded and allowed it.”34 This concept makes it difficult to characterize groups in South Sudan and makes the Identity attribute one of the most difficult to study or analyze.

Members of the SPLA identify themselves by their tribes which are coupled with a geographic natural environment. The majority of the SPLA are members of the Dinka ethnic group, while the force also has a number of other tribes represented in small numbers, particularly the Nuer tribe. (See Appendix F for a more complete listing of the tribes/ethnic groups)

The organizational identity of today’s SPLA is largely defined by the history of its evolution. First and foremost, the SPLA started as the armed force of the SPLM, an insurgent movement under Dr. John Garang. As an insurgent force, the SPLA conducted operations with extreme brutality against not only the perceived northern aggressors but also against rival militias and civilians. 35 The U.S. State Department 2008 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Sudan stated that women in Southern Sudan face the threat of physical assault from the LRA and sexual assault from the SPLA and the Southern Sudan Police Services (SPSS).36 This demonstrates one aspect of human rights violations that have to be considered. The challenge has become, how do you convert a hierarchical guerilla movement into a national conventional professional armed force when, since its birth, it has operated with impunity? This challenge is exacerbated by the potential for the SPLA to be called upon to operate in a law enforcement capacity given the limited capabilities of the South Sudan Police Service. Given the SPLA’s lack of training in law enforcement, the potential for human rights violations is high resulting in further alienation by the populace, yet another challenge for any security cooperation force. This will need to be addressed in the consideration analysis.
Another part of the SPLA identity is inter-tribal conflict. Throughout the history of the SPLA, various factions have broken away from the SPLM and started their own political movements with associated armed militias. Usually the splits could have been based on differing ideologies; for example, a more inclusive Sudanese government and political process as opposed to secession. However, the divisions often were along tribal lines. President Nimairi and all successive Northern governments exploited these divisions by supplying tribal militias.

Hence, this encouraged conflict against the SPLA based on inter-tribal conflict that existed prior to the Second Civil War. The majority of these previous conflicts were over pasturelands. These internal conflicts were exploited by the Sudanese government. Johnson remarked that “Its [the Khartoum government] aims were two-fold: as a propaganda argument that the war in the South was really a product of internal Southern tribalism, and therefore unrelated to national policies; and as a way of waging war through surrogates…enabling Khartoum regimes …to deny that there was a civil war in the Sudan at all.”37 It is worth noting that the divisions didn’t involve entire tribes but only a collection of clans within a tribe. For example, the Northern government backed “Anyanya-2” movement which drew its support from the Bul Nuer, the Lak Nuer and the Jikany Nuer while other Nuer clans fought alongside the Dinka dominated SPLA.38

The animosity demonstrated by the minority ethnic groups towards Dinka dominated leadership in the South started well before the Second Civil War. In the late 1970s, many Southern Region citizens felt threatened claiming that the numbers of Dinka in the regional government, in the administration, and in the branches of the security forces appeared to be out of proportion to their qualifications and out of proportion to their relative percentage of the total population.39 These thoughts persist today. According to quotes from militiamen in one of
Nenad Marinkovic’s articles, “Almost all South Sudan militias claim that their *raison d’être* for rebellion is fighting the corrupt regime of the SPLM.”\textsuperscript{40} In response to this, the SPLM has taken steps to change the identity of the SPLA and integrate the disenfranchised militia.

An example of those efforts is exemplified in the amnesty program for militiamen to “come out the bush”. On numerous occasions, “The President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit, has offered amnesty … indicating that he intended to actively pursue reconciliation as a means for dealing with the various rebel elements. President Kiir thus demonstrated that he, perhaps better than anyone else, understands the importance of unity among the South Sudanese, a people with a number of diverse cultures and tribes.”\textsuperscript{41} These offers typically are accompanied with financial incentives and/or positions and promotions within the ranks of the SPLA. However, many distrust the South Sudanese government due to its failure to comply with previous truce agreements. Additionally, SPLA loyalists are unhappy with serving alongside their former bitter enemies but seem compelled to do so in the interest of stability for South Sudan.\textsuperscript{42} Other reasons the militias are not accepting the amnesty offers will be discussed under the attributes of Politics and Economics.

Another attempt to alter the identity of the SPLA was the change of its official name to South Sudan Armed Forces (SSAF). This is one provision of the new country’s transitional constitution. This change was instituted in an effort to separate the SPLA from the SPLM political party. However, the opposition political parties have declared that even after independence, the SPLA (regardless of name) remains to serve the interests of the SPLM and not the country.\textsuperscript{43} Hence, the name change has been ineffective as SSAF is not used by the South Sudanese government, thus the continued use of SPLA throughout this document.
Both sides in the Second Sudanese Civil War utilized child soldiers. Thus, the SPLA has a history of human rights violations in this respect. The CPA called for the demobilization of child soldiers as one of its provisions. The CPA was the first agreement in Sudan history to address the issue of child soldiers. The SPLA was scheduled to complete its demobilization of child soldiers by the end of 2010 and by all indications has so compiled. However, the status of child soldiers in militias is unknown. This is yet another issue that could complicate the integration of the militias into both the SPLA as well as society at large.

A related potential issue for consideration is the second and third order effects of the protracted civil war and the mental states of its participants, i.e. SPLA soldiers, re-integrated militia members, and former child soldiers who have come of age and are serving in the SPLA. Addressing human rights violations and inter-tribal conflict are integral to changing the perceived identity of the SPLA. The challenge: Can a security cooperation force achieve the goal of helping reintegrate the various elements affected by a life of violence associated with the Second Civil War?

Politics

The cultural attribute of Politics is concerned with not only the political and social structures of an organization but all the leadership hierarchies of power, whether formal, ideal, or actual, involved in decision making for the group. Like the Identity attribute, the Politics attribute influences all the other attributes. Like many of the other attributes, the Politics attribute was adversely affected by the dissolution of the Addis Ababa Agreement and the Khartoum government’s failures to fully implement it. Two grievances that ensued were Khartoum’s interference in the selection of the leadership of the Southern Region and the
subsequent dissolution of the regional assemblies and governments.\textsuperscript{47} Thus, the SPLM used their exclusion from the political process as a grievance to help fuel their insurgency.

Given the SPLA started as the armed wing of the SPLM under a single political-military leader, Col John Garang, it is not surprising that the organization is involved and keenly aware of the political process. This presents a challenge to Western armed forces that are clearly separate and subordinate to their political structures. Additionally, as a former insurgent force, the SPLA has little understanding of or respect for the traditional laws of war that have evolved over the past four centuries.

As this attribute concerns power, it is necessary to mention the role of reciprocity in the SPLA. The majority of the SPLA leadership belongs to the Dinka tribe. As a CAOCL study stated, “As of August 2011, key billets in the internal security and other security organ branches were given to members of the Dinka ethnic group. They were given these positions partly to ensure the security of the president, who is Dinka himself, and partly to abide by the old code of reciprocity.”\textsuperscript{48} (See Appendix H for the current slate of SPLA leadership).

This concept has created conflict among the tribes since the inception of the SPLA and continues to do so today with respect to the integration of militias into the SPLA. Lesley Warner, an analyst for the Center of Naval Analyses, estimates that at the signing of the CPA, there were approximately 50,000 members associated with some 60 “other armed groups” operating in South Sudan.\textsuperscript{49} While many of these groups received materiel support from the Khartoum government, it is difficult to determine their loyalty to their former benefactor. But their past relationship undoubtedly poses an issue of trust regarding their integration into the post independent SPLA.
The 2006 Juba declaration was designed to integrate most of the South Sudan Defense Forces (which were aligned with Khartoum during the war and were responsible for some of the worst atrocities on the southern populations during the Civil War) into the SPLA. The majority of these forces were Nuer and enemies of the SPLA. The challenge is reconciling the rift between SPLA loyalists and those who used to fight the SPLA.\textsuperscript{50} Competition between the militia leaders, who eye other leaders’ deals with GOSS, also makes peace talks highly delicate.\textsuperscript{51} Some of the militia leaders have experienced difficulty maintaining control over their field-based units, while among many militia rank and file there is a sense of disconnect from, and even distrust of, their commanders.\textsuperscript{52} These problems may be attributed to the militia leaders negotiating lucrative deals for themselves with no regard for the future welfare of their organization’s other members.

**Language & Communication**

The cultural attribute of Language & Communication involves “the meaning inherent in all forms of communication: language, physical gestures, symbols, colors, music, art, dress, and non-verbal behaviors.”\textsuperscript{53} Even when the formal language is known – the meanings vary across cultural boundaries such as tribal, gender, occupation, and age groups.\textsuperscript{54}

The official language of South Sudan is English, in both spoken and written forms. (See Appendix F for other languages spoken in South Sudan) Prior to independence, Dinka was the second largest language group in the Sudan after Arabic and the largest spoken indigenous language.\textsuperscript{55} Dinka may not have been chosen as the official language in an effort to downplay the influence of the Dinka tribe over South Sudan’s future identity. This choice however creates a new problem. According to the U.S. Department of State, the literacy rate of adults in South Sudan is approximately 27%. What is the likelihood that English will be embraced as the official language without substantial investments in the education programs of the country? Will
not the population revert back to Dinka as the de facto language out of convenience, wasting the investments made to institute English and possibly alienating the populace?

Given the diverse number of dialects spoken within South Sudan, interpreters’ availability, just as in other areas of operation, will likely be a challenging problem.

**Economics**

The Economy attribute is concerned with “the way that people in a culture obtain, produce and distribute physical and symbolic goods (whether food, clothing, cars or cowrie shells).” Therefore, all the attributes are inter-connected, as Dr. Paulette Otis stated: “Economics is complexly related to identity, territory, language, religion and politics.”

The economics attribute presents a dilemma for the SPLA. Oil revenues are hampered by the profit sharing provisions of the CPA with Sudan. Any attempt to renegotiate these financial terms would likely result in increased tension between the two countries. According to the provisions of the CPA, Sudan gets 23% of all oil revenue that crosses Sudan to be exported via Port Sudan. This substantially reduces the funds available to the South Sudanese government.

Financial packages have been used to encourage acceptance of the amnesty offer of the GOSS. However, the government is in the process of trying to reduce the SPLA forces by some 90,000 soldiers because the current South Sudan cannot continue to support a force of 180,000. This adds to the friction between of the SPLA loyalists and the militias.

An unforeseen side effect of offering financial incentives is exploitation of the offer through repeated defections. For example, Peter Gatdet, the militia leader of the SSLM/A, has defected to the SPLA twice; in both instances, he received financial packages. Financial incentives pose problems of their own, as Nenad Marinkovic wrote in August 2011.

His soldiers, who make up the South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army, or SSLM/A, released a press statement that described Gatdet’s peace deal as ‘a defection’ and rejected the ceasefire with the SPLA. The group claimed to have
appointed a new leader, Colonel General James Yoach, and vowed to keep their rebellion going. The SSLM/A also claimed that Peter Gatdet and his close associate and spokesperson, Bol Gatkuoth, were offered large sums of money for their defection and that the group was not included in the ceasefire bargain in any way.59

SPLA loyalists exhibit similar displeasure as they see such defectors being rewarded for such shifting actions. This situation only fuels the flames of instability.

An estimated 78% of the population of South Sudan earns a living through agricultural efforts. An influx of an estimated 700,000 IDPs as reported by UNHCR is expected.60 An additional 90,000 will be added to the workforce as a consequence of the demobilization of half the SPLA force.61 Hence, a considerable problem exists since it is unlikely that the land will be able to keep everyone gainfully employed. This will posed a threat to stability with potentially more armed opposition. This potential threat to internal order and stability will have to be neutralized by a smaller SPLA force and poses yet another challenge for a security cooperation force.

US INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH SUDAN

The US initially sided with Sudan during the Cold War, mainly to reduce the influence of the Soviet Union in Africa. However, after the US displayed allegiance to the Israelis in the 1967 Six Day War, US-Sudanese relations declined.62 Then in the 1980s, Sudan became important as a regional counterweight to Soviet-backed Ethiopia. By 1983, President Nimairi had amassed enough weapons from the US to deal with any potential domestic issues and not just foreign threats. He utilized these very arms to wage war against the SPLA and supply the government backed militias.63

In an article in the Small War Journal written prior to independence, Thomas Talley made the following statement in 2010:

The Southern Sudanese appear to be misreading the nature of U.S. commitment. The Southern Sudanese are expected to vote for independence in their upcoming referendum – based upon a belief that the U.S. is committed to their cause. This is not
entirely correct: the U.S. commitment is to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, an agreement which we helped broker. U.S. commitment is better understood as a commitment to a process, less so to a specific, pre-determined outcome, and much less than to a cause.  

Given this statement and the U.S. prior support of the Government of Sudan in the 1980s and 1990s, does the SPLA have an institutional memory of these events to make them distrust U.S. intentions?

It is a reasonable assumption that the U.S. actions since independence 9 July 2011 have dispelled any concerns by the South Sudan regarding the U.S. intentions. These actions include diplomatic support on the international stage, financial aid, and military assistance in the form of weapons and personnel.

CONSIDERATION ANALYSIS

The next step of this study is to synthesize the issues identified during the cultural analysis into actionable considerations for the potential security cooperation force commander. It is worth noting that although a multitude of issues were identified through the cultural analysis, not all of these issues could or should be addressed by security cooperation operations.

The considerations can be divided into two categories: (1) considerations for preparing the security cooperation force, and (2) considerations for executing the mission (mainly focused on the SPLA). An overarching factor, regardless of the consideration category, is maintaining respect for South Sudanese sovereignty and culture. If any potential solution to an alleged issue encroaches on the sovereignty of South Sudan or is perceived to change its culture, then that solution is not feasible.

With respect to considerations for preparing the security cooperation force, the most critical consideration is the clarification of the strategic objective the mission supports; this must include the desired end-state. Verifying these items upfront ensures the security cooperation force is preparing for the ‘right’ mission and its associated tasks. For example, training and
advising are two different activities with different levels of responsibility for the force commander and his unit. Additionally, this consideration assists the commander in focusing his preparation effort given the finite resource of time.

Another consideration concerning the security cooperation force is the establishment of the ‘right’ mindset. The cultural analysis reveals three key operational environmental conditions: an ongoing armed border dispute, increasing levels of internal ethnic group conflict including armed militias, and substantial numbers of IDPs returning to the country. Regardless of whether the mission is training or advising, the security cooperation force must recognize the supported unit’s life is at risk and execute their mission with a commensurate effort which starts with the ‘right’ mindset.

A critical consideration for the force is preparing to train and advise the SPLA from a context consistent with its culture and historical past. For example, the force must recognize the SPLA was borne from an insurgency so concepts that seem like common knowledge (i.e. the laws of war, the subordination of the military to the political body, the rule of law, etc.) to western militaries may be extremely difficult to explain and encourage the SPLA to adopt. Considerable time must be committed to increasing the cultural knowledge and understanding of the security cooperation force.

The preponderance of the SPLA’s challenges is related to its members’ image or identity. The security cooperation force must place overwhelming emphasis on developing the soft skills of the SPLA, particularly ethical behavior & leadership and information operations. These skills will be crucial in building the SPLA’s legitimacy among the population and changing the international perception of South Sudan as a country that condones human rights violations.
The most important consideration to improving stability in South Sudan is identifying and understanding the unmediated interests of the various opposition groups which drive the internal conflict. In order to assist the SPLA in developing solutions to mitigate these grievances, the security cooperation force must understand the root of the problem vice the symptoms to which the SPLA has already dedicated significant resources. Again, this effort requires cultural understanding and historical reference points. While the security cooperation force may not be able to address these issues directly, it may be able to advise the SPLA on potential uses of other national instruments of power that they could pursue through their government.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations offered in this section generally apply to cultural preparation of a force regardless of assigned mission. It cannot be overemphasized that identification and understanding the issues does not mean the issues can be resolved. Understanding culture will always play a role in understanding an enemy and ally as well as oneself; however, it is a time consuming endeavor that must be started at the beginning of planning and just like intelligence preparation of the battlefield, it must be updated frequently.

Not all of the doctrinal publications and directives emphasize the significance of culture. In the case of MCO 5710.6A, “USMC Security Cooperation”, the word “culture” is not mentioned once. But there can be no doubt of the significance of culture given the expenditure of resources to build institutional cultural knowledge. Some examples of the Marine Corps’ commitment to culture can be found in the establishment of the Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning, expansion of the Foreign Area Officer and Regional Area Officer programs to include enlisted staff non-commissioned officers, and the Marine Corps Civil-Military
Operations School, located aboard MCB Quantico, Virginia, (formerly the Security Cooperation Education and Training Center). The commitment to culture must be driven by an organization’s leadership.

For a complete picture of a host nation’s culture, an organization must utilize a wide variety of references. The reports of International Governmental Organizations (IGOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and other humanitarian agencies are particularly helpful given the amount of time that they have spent on the ground in a given area of operations without the influence of organized armed forces. Utilizing this method may help to overcome the proverbial “Foreign Culture as an Iceberg” and increase cultural understanding. (Refer back to page 6 for comments on cultural awareness and cultural understanding.)

CONCLUSION

This study has demonstrated that a cursory review of cultural factors is inadequate to prepare for effective execution of security cooperation operations. In order to develop a genuine understanding of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, an in-depth cultural analysis of the organization must be conducted that takes into account not only the demographics of the organization but also the historical events that have influenced it as well as how it is influenced by the environment in which it exists. While it did not play a major role in this analysis, there is value in assessing the impact of a foreign entity’s involvement, in this case the United States, in host nation’s affairs prior to engaging in operations on their soil. This will assist in determining the host nation’s perception of the supporting force which can dictate the supporting forces words and deeds.

In the case of South Sudan, improving the perceived negative identity of the SPLA should be the ultimate goal in enabling stability. To accomplish this objective, the security cooperation force must be able to train and/or advise the SPLA in a context that is consistent
with South Sudanese culture which starts with a commitment throughout the entire process to truly understanding its culture.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAOCL</td>
<td>Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Security Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan</td>
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<td>GOSS</td>
<td>Government of South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCP</td>
<td>National Congress Party</td>
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<td>NIF</td>
<td>National Islamic Front</td>
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<td>SAF</td>
<td>Sudanese Allied Forces</td>
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<td>SPLM</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement</td>
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<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<td>SRRA</td>
<td>Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association</td>
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<td>South Sudan Defense Forces</td>
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<td>SSLM</td>
<td>Southern Sudan Liberation Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDSF</td>
<td>United Democratic Salvation Front</td>
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APPENDIX B:
Glossary of Terms

Animism: The belief that natural objects, natural phenomena, and the universe itself possess souls.65

Culture: The shared world view and social structures of a group of people that influence a person’s and a group’s actions and choices.66

Foreign Internal Defense: Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called FID.67

Insurgency: A protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order; … usually slow to develop and is not an accident, for in an insurgency leaders appear and then the masses are made to move.68

Military Engagement: Routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation’s armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence.69

Militia: A body of citizens organized in a paramilitary group and typically regarding themselves as defenders of individual rights against the presumed interference of the federal government.70

Operational Culture: Operationally relevant behavior, relationships and perceptions of indigenous security forces against or with whom Marines operate; civilian populations among whom Marines operate; indigenous communities or groups whom Marines wish to influence; international partners in coalition operations.71

Security Assistance: Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Also called SA.72

Security Cooperation: All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. Also called SC.73
APPENDIX C: Distribution of Ethnic Groups in South Sudan

The administrative units and their names shown on this map do not imply acceptance or recognition by the Government of Southern Sudan. This map aims only to support the work of the Humanitarian Community.
APPENDIX D:
Key Events in Sudan / South Sudan

1899-1955 - Sudan is under joint British-Egyptian rule.

1956 - Sudan becomes independent.

1958 - General Abboud leads military coup against the civilian government elected earlier in the year.

1962 - Civil war begins in the south, led by the Anya Nya movement.

1964 - The "October Revolution" overthrows Abboud and an Islamist-led government is established.

1969 - Jaafar Numeiri leads the "May Revolution" military coup.

1971 - Sudanese Communist Party leaders executed after short-lived coup against Numeiri.

1972 - Under the Addis Ababa peace agreement between the government and the Anya Nya, the south becomes a self-governing region.

1978 - Oil discovered in Bentiu in southern Sudan.

1983 - Civil war breaks out again in the south involving government forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by John Garang.
1983 - President Numeiri declares the introduction of Sharia Islamic law.

1985 - After widespread popular unrest Numayri is deposed by a group of officers and a Transitional Military Council is set up to rule the country.

1986 - Coalition government formed after general elections, with Sadiq al-Mahdi as prime minister.

1988 - Coalition partner the Democratic Unionist Party drafts cease-fire agreement with the SPLM, but it is not implemented.

1989 - National Salvation Revolution takes over in military coup.

1993 - Revolution Command Council dissolved after Omar Bashir is appointed president.

1995 - Egyptian President Mubarak accuses Sudan of being involved in attempt to assassinate him in Addis Ababa.

1998 - US launches missile attack on a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, alleging that it was making materials for chemical weapons.
1999 - Sudan begins to export oil.
Main opposition parties boycott presidential elections. Incumbent Bashir is re-elected for further five years.

2001 - Islamist leader Al-Turabi's party, the Popular National Congress, signs memorandum of understanding with the southern rebel SPLM's armed wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Al-Turabi is arrested the next day, with more arrests of PNC members in the following months.
Government accepts Libyan/Egyptian initiative to end the civil war after failure of peace talks between President Bashir and SPLM leader John Garang in Nairobi.
US extends unilateral sanctions against Sudan for another year, citing its record on terrorism and rights violations.

2002 - Government and SPLA sign landmark ceasefire agreement providing for six-month renewable ceasefire in central Nuba Mountains - a key rebel stronghold.
Talks in Kenya lead to a breakthrough agreement between the government and southern rebels on ending the 19-year civil war. The Machakos Protocol provides for the south to seek self-determination after six years.

2003 - Rebels in western region of Darfur rise up against government, claiming the region is being neglected by Khartoum.

2004 - January - Army moves to quell rebel uprising in western region of Darfur; hundreds of thousands of refugees flee to neighbouring Chad.
2004 - March - UN official says pro-government Arab Janjaweed militias are carrying out systematic killings of non-Arab villagers in Darfur.
2004 - May - Government and southern rebels agree on power-sharing protocols as part of a peace deal to end their long-running conflict. The deal follows earlier breakthroughs on the division of oil and non-oil wealth.
2004 - September - UN says Sudan has not met targets for disarming pro-government Darfur militias and must accept outside help to protect civilians. US Secretary of State Colin Powell describes Darfur killings as genocide.

2005 - January - Government and southern rebels sign a peace deal. The agreement includes a permanent ceasefire and accords on wealth and power sharing.
UN report accuses the government and militias of systematic abuses in Darfur, but stops short of calling the violence genocide.
2005 - March - UN Security Council authorises sanctions against those who violate ceasefire in Darfur. Council also votes to refer those accused of war crimes in Darfur to International Criminal Court.
2005 - 9 July - Former southern rebel leader John Garang is sworn in as first vice president. A constitution which gives a large degree of autonomy to the south is signed.
2005 - 1 August - Vice president and former rebel leader John Garang is killed in a plane crash. He is succeeded by Salva Kiir. Garang's death sparks deadly clashes in the capital between southern Sudanese and northern Arabs.
2005 - September - Power-sharing government is formed in Khartoum.
2005 October - Autonomous government is formed in the south, in line with January 2005 peace deal. The administration is dominated by former rebels.

2006 May - Khartoum government and the main rebel faction in Darfur, the Sudan Liberation Movement, sign a peace accord. Two smaller rebel groups reject the deal. Fighting continues.

2006 August - Sudan rejects a UN resolution calling for a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur, saying it would compromise sovereignty.

2006 November - African Union extends mandate of its peacekeeping force in Darfur for six months.

2007 April - Sudan says it will accept a partial UN troop deployment to reinforce African Union peacekeepers in Darfur, but not a full 20,000-strong force.

2007 May - International Criminal Court issues arrest warrants for a minister and a Janjaweed militia leader suspected of Darfur war crimes.

US President George W Bush announces fresh sanctions against Sudan.

2007 July - UN Security Council approves a resolution authorising a 26,000-strong force for Darfur. Sudan says it will co-operate with the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (Unamid).

2007 October - SPLM temporarily suspends participation in national unity government, accusing Khartoum of failing to honour the 2005 peace deal.

2007 December - SPLM resumes participation in national unity government.

2008 January - UN takes over Darfur peace force.

Within days Sudan apologises after its troops fire on a convoy of Unamid, the UN-African Union hybrid mission.

Government planes bomb rebel positions in West Darfur, turning some areas into no-go zones for aid workers.

2008 February - Commander of the UN-African Union peacekeepers in Darfur, Balla Keita, says more troops needed urgently in west Darfur.

2008 March - Russia says it's prepared to provide some of the helicopters urgently needed by UN-African Union peacekeepers.

Tensions rise over clashes between an Arab militia and SPLM in Abyei area on north-south divide - a key sticking point in 2005 peace accord.

Presidents of Sudan and Chad sign accord aimed at halting five years of hostilities between their countries.

2008 April - Counting begins in national census which is seen as a vital step towards holding democratic elections after the landmark 2005 north-south peace deal.

UN humanitarian chief John Holmes says 300,000 people may have died in the five-year Darfur conflict.

2008 May - Southern defence minister Dominic Dim Deng is killed in a plane crash in the south.

Tension increases between Sudan and Chad after Darfur rebel group mounts raid on Omdurman, Khartoum's twin city across the Nile. Sudan accuses Chad of involvement and breaks off diplomatic relations.

Intense fighting breaks out between northern and southern forces in disputed oil-rich town of Abyei.
2008 June - President Bashir and southern leader Salva Kiir agree to seek international arbitration to resolve dispute over Abyei.

2008 July - The International Criminal Court's top prosecutor calls for the arrest of President Bashir for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur; the appeal is the first ever request to the ICC for the arrest of a sitting head of state. Sudan rejects the indictment.

2008 September - Darfur rebels accuse government forces backed by militias of launching air and ground attacks on two towns in the region.

2008 October - Allegations that Ukrainian tanks hijacked off the coast of Somalia were bound for southern Sudan spark fears of an arms race between the North and former rebels in the South.

2008 November - President Bashir announces an immediate ceasefire in Darfur, but the region's two main rebel groups reject the move, saying they will fight on until the government agrees to share power and wealth in the region.

2008 December - The Sudanese army says it has sent more troops to the sensitive oil-rich South Kordofan state, claiming that a Darfur rebel group plans to attack the area.

2009 January - Sudanese Islamist leader Hassan al-Turabi is arrested after saying President Bashir should hand himself in to The Hague to face war crimes charges for the Darfur war.

2009 March - The International Criminal Court in The Hague issues an arrest warrant for President Bashir on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur.

2009 May - An estimated 250 people in central Sudan are killed during a week of clashes between nomadic groups fighting over grazing land and cattle in the semi-arid region of Southern Kordofan.

2009 June - Khartoum government denies it is supplying arms to ethnic groups in the south to destabilise the region.

The leader of South Sudan and vice-president of the country, Salva Kiir, warns his forces are being re-organised to be ready for any return to war with the north.

Ex-foreign minister Lam Akol splits from South's ruling SPLM to form new party, SPLM-Democratic Change.

2009 July - North and south Sudan say they accept ruling by arbitration court in The Hague shrinking disputed Abyei region and placing the major Heglig oil field in the north.

Woman journalist tried and punished for breaching decency laws by wearing trousers. She campaigns to change the law.

2009 August - Darfur war is over, says UN military commander in the region, in comments condemned by activists.

2009 October - SPLM boycotts parliament over a Bill allowing intelligence services to retain widespread powers.

2009 December - Leaders of North and South reach deal on terms of referendum on independence due in South by 2011.

2010 January - President Omar Bashir says he would accept referendum result, even if South opted for independence.

2010 Feb-March - The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) main Darfur rebel movement signs a peace accord with the government, prompting President Bashir to declare the Darfur war over. But failure to agree specifics and continuing clashes with smaller rebel groups endanger the deal.

2010 April - President Bashir gains new term in first contested presidential polls since 1986.
2010 July - International Criminal Court issues second arrest warrant for President al-Bashir - this time on charges of genocide.

2010 August - Mr Bashir tests ICC arrest warrant by visiting Kenya, an ICC signatory. The Kenyan government refuses to enforce the warrant.

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2011 January - People of the South vote in favour of full independence from the north.

2011 February - Clashes between the security forces and rebels in southern Sudan's Jonglei state leave more than 100 dead.

2011 March - Government of South Sudan says it is suspending talks with the North, accusing it of plotting a coup.

2011 May - Northern troops overrun town of Abyei on disputed border between north and south. South describes it as "act of war". Thousands flee.

2011 July - South Sudan gains independence.

2011 September - State of emergency declared in Blue Nile state, elected SPLM-N Governor Malik Agar sacked. Some 100,000 said fleeing unrest.

2011 October - South Sudan and Sudan agree to set up several committees tasked with resolving their outstanding disputes.

2011 November - Sudan accused of bombing refugee camp in Yida, Unity State, South Sudan. A Kenyan judge issues an arrest warrant for President Bashir, saying he should be detained if ever he sets foot in the country again.

2011 December - International Criminal Court's chief prosecutor requests arrest warrant for Sudan's defence minister, Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein, for alleged war crimes in Darfur. Sudanese government forces kill key Darfur rebel leader Khalil Ibrahim.

2012 January - South Sudan halts oil production after talks on fees for the export of oil via Sudan break down.

2012 February - Sudan and South Sudan sign non-aggression pact at talks on outstanding secession issues.
Author’s Note: This importance of this map demonstrates the Dinka’s natural environment compared to its influence over the entire country.
APPENDIX F:  
General Demographics of South Sudan

Geography
Area: 644,329 sq. km. (Note: Negotiations continue between Sudan and South Sudan over borders.)
Cities: Capital--Juba. Other cities--Aweil, Malakal, Yambio, Torit, Wau, Bentiu, Bor.
Terrain: Mainly grasslands, wooded and grassy savannahs, floodplains, and wetlands. Generally flat with some high-altitude plateaus.
Climate: Tropical, hot, and humid with seasonal rainfall influenced by the annual shift of the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone. Rainfall is heaviest in the upland areas of the south and diminishes to the north.

Author’s Note: The highlight of this section is the continued border dispute.

People*
Nationality: Noun and adjective (sing. and pl.)--South Sudanese.
Population (2008 census): 8,260,490. Of this, 4.29 million are male, and 3.97 million are female. More than half of the population (51%) is below the age of 18, and 72% of the population is below the age of 30.
Population density: 13 per sq. km.
Ethnic groups: Dinka, Kakwa, Bari, Azande, Shilluk, Kuku, Murle, Mandari, Didinga, Ndogo, Bviri, Lndi, Anuak, Bongo, Lango, Dungotona, and Acholi.
Religions: Christian, traditional, and Muslim.
Languages: English (official); Arabic (includes Juba and Sudanese variants); Dinka, Nuer, Zande, Bari, Shilluk, Otuho, Luwo, Moru, Mandari, Didinga, and Toposa.
Education: Net enrollment rate (2010)--44% (primary school); 63% of the population above the age of 6 years has never attended school.[1] Literacy--15 to 24 years old (40%); adult (total 27%; males 40%; females 16%).
Health: Infant mortality rate--102/1,000 live births. Maternal mortality rate--20.54/1,000 live births. Immunization rate--17% of children are fully immunized.
Work force: By occupation--subsistence agriculture and animal husbandry 78%.

Author’s Note: The highlight of this section is the literacy rate for adults which will adversely affect any training and education mission.

*Source: National Bureau of Statistics Key Indicators for South Sudan.

Government
Independence: July 9, 2011 (from Sudan).
Type: Republic.
Constitution: Transitional constitution.
Branches: Executive--president (head of state and head of government) and vice president.
Legislative--bicameral legislature consisting of 332-seat National Legislative Assembly and 50-seat Council of States; members serve 4-year terms. Judicial--Supreme Court, Courts of Appeal, High Courts, and County Courts.

34
Administrative subdivisions: Ten states; elected governors, state cabinets, and elected state legislative assemblies.

Political parties: The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) is dominant. Other political parties include the African National Congress, National Congress Party, South Sudan Democratic Forum, SPLM for Democratic Change, Sudan African National Union, United Democratic Front, United Democratic Salvation Front, United Democratic Salvation Front-Mainstream, and United Sudan African Party.

Central government budget (FY 2011 est.): $2.097 billion.


**Author’s Note:** The key takeaway for this section is the number of political parties; most control and direct militias which increases instability and must be addressed by the SPLA.

**Economy**

Economic growth rate (2012 proj., Government of South Sudan): 7.2%.

Natural resources: Oil reserves (immediately lucrative), hydropower, fertile agricultural land, gold, diamonds, hardwoods, limestone, iron ore, copper, chromium ore, zinc, tungsten, mica, and silver.

Agriculture: Products—sorghum, maize, rice, millet, wheat, gum arabic, sugarcane, mangoes, papayas, bananas, sweet potatoes, sunflowers, cotton, sesame, cassava, beans, peanuts, cattle, and sheep.

Trade: Major trading partner—Sudan.

**Author’s Note:** The highlight for this section is the continued dependence on Sudan as it’s only major trading partner.

**Geography And People**

South Sudan is estimated to be the seventh-largest country in Africa and is bordered by Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda. The country is divided by the White Nile River, which flows north out of the uplands of central Africa. During the annual floods of the Nile River system, South Sudan's Sudd area is inundated. This large, swampy region of more than 100,000 sq. km dominates the center of the country and supports agriculture and extensive wildlife populations.

South Sudan has a population of over 8 million and a predominantly rural, subsistence economy; approximately 83% of the population is rural. There are 10 states: Central Equatoria (population 1,103,592), Eastern Equatoria (906,126), Jonglei (1,358,602), Lakes (695,730), Northern Bahr el Ghazal (720,898), Unity (585,801), Upper Nile (964,353), Warrap (972,928), Western Bahr el Ghazal (333,431), and Western Equatoria (619,029).

Except for an 11-year hiatus before the CPA was signed in 2005, South Sudan was embroiled in conflict with the central authorities in pre-south independence Sudan following Sudan's 1956 independence, resulting in major destruction and displacement since the end of colonial rule. South Sudan continues to cope with the effects of conflict, displacement, and insecurity. The country has many tribal groups and languages, and its people practice indigenous traditional beliefs, Christianity, and Islam. Over 90% of the population identifies themselves as Christian.
APPENDIX G:
Sudan Oil Resources (Prior to Separation)\(^7\)\(^8\)

Authors’ Note: The significance of this map lies in demonstrating how the preponderance of the oil resources are close to the historical boundary which Sudan is continuing to contest for the foreseeable future. This includes the pipeline from South Sudan through Sudan to Port Sudan on the Red Sea.
## APPENDIX H:
Current SPLA Leadership

### SPLA, Internal security and other security organs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1st Lt. Gen. James Hoth Mai</td>
<td>Chief of General Staff SPLA</td>
<td>Upper Nile</td>
<td>Nuer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lt. Gen. Ping Deng Majok</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration &amp; Finance</td>
<td>Abyei</td>
<td>Dinka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lt. General Deng Wek</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations</td>
<td>Jonglei</td>
<td>Dinka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lt. General Biar Atem</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics</td>
<td>Jonglei</td>
<td>Dinka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Lt. General Mabuto Mamur</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff for Moral &amp; Political Orientations</td>
<td>Eastern Equatoria</td>
<td>Lotuka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Lt. General Majak Agot</td>
<td>South Sudan National Security Service (Special Branch)</td>
<td>Jonglei</td>
<td>Dinka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1st Lt. Gen. Achuil Tito</td>
<td>Inspector General Police</td>
<td>Warrap</td>
<td>Dinka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Major General John Lat</td>
<td>Military Intelligence</td>
<td>Lakes</td>
<td>Dinka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Major General Marial Nuor</td>
<td>Public Security</td>
<td>Lakes</td>
<td>Dinka</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX I:
Relevant Agreement

Comprehensive Peace Agreement – 2005: “The peace agreement which was signed in Kenya on 9 January 2005, after long years of argument, stalemate, and eventual negotiation between the Khartoum government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. The agreement recognizes a division between the political authority of the newly formed Government of National Unity in Khartoum, and the Government of the Southern Sudan operating from Juba. Agreements between the north and the south over the sharing of power, wealth, and resources were reached, on the basis of a somewhat notional geographical boundary—that is, the line that separated the former three southern provinces from their northern counterparts at the time of independence in 1956. This line was partly the result of pure administrative convenience, and several adjustments had been made over the years of the Condominium period.”80
ENDNOTES

1 President of the United States of America, National Security Strategy 2010, 11.
2 President, National Security Strategy 2010, 3.
10 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, JP 3-0, August 11, 2011, I-14.
12 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Foreign Internal Defense, JP 3-22, July 12, 2010, I-12.
13 Commandant of the Marine Corps, USMC Security Cooperation (Formerly Policy For Marine Corps International Relations (MCIR) Program), MCO 5710.6A, March 24, 2006, 3.
18 Otis, “Who Are They?”, 17.
19 Major Grant A. Fish, USAF, "The Transition to an Independent Southern Sudan: How should the US Military Posture to Influence and Deter Factors that may Cause Regional Instability?", (Masters, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2011), 15.


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"SPLA to be Called South Sudan Armed Forces After Independence", *Sudan Tribune*, April 28, 2011.


Julius N. Uma, "SPLA to Demobilize all Child Soldiers by End of the Year." *Sudan Tribune*, 2010.


Warner, *Email regarding Militia Integration Policy and Potential Effects on the SPLA*.


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62 Fish, "The Transition to an Independent Southern Sudan: How should the US Military Posture to Influence and Deter Factors that may Cause Regional Instability?", 15.
64 Thomas Talley, "Southern Sudan - the Four Theses", Small Wars Journal, (October 2010).
69 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, JP 3-0, August 11, 2011, GL-13.
71 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Foreign Internal Defense, JP 3-22, July 12, 2010, GL-11.
72 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Distribution of Ethnic Groups in South Sudan", (December 2009).
74 Center of Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), South Sudan Overview. (Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, October 2011), 9.
75 U.S. Department of State. Background Note: South Sudan. (Washington, D.C., 2011).
76 CAOCL, South Sudan Overview, 18.
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———. *South Sudan Overview*. Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, October 2011. A Microsoft Powerpoint format, provides details on both South Sudan and specifics challenges to the SPLA.


Commandant of the Marine Corps. *MARINE CORPS SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND RELATED INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS, MCO 4900.3A*, April 3, 2001. [http://www.marines.mil/news/publications/Documents/MCO%204900.3A.pdf](http://www.marines.mil/news/publications/Documents/MCO%204900.3A.pdf). This order is a supporting document to the Marine Security Cooperation policy. It clarifies the purpose and scope of Marine Corps security assistance and related international programs and their role in the execution of the NSS, NMS and the Unified Commander's TEP. It is not directly informative for this study as the emphasis is on material assistance but does identify the major programs of security assistance from a Marine Corps perspective.

———. *USMC SECURITY COOPERATION (FORMERLY POLICY FOR MARINE CORPS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (MCIR) PROGRAM), MCO 5710.6A*, March 24, 2006. [http://www.marines.mil/news/publications/Documents/MCO%205710.6A.pdf](http://www.marines.mil/news/publications/Documents/MCO%205710.6A.pdf). This order establishes the policies and objectives associated with the planning,
programming, budgeting, and execution of SC activities in order to facilitate Marine Corps support for combatant command and service-level SC activities.


Marinkovic, Nenad. Field Dispatch: The Challenge of Tackling Terrorism in South Sudan, August 2011. http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/field-dispatch-challenge-tackling-terrorism-south-sudan. Highlights the challenges ahead for GOSS to address the militias (some backed by GOS) operating in South Sudan. This is noteworthy to the US war-fighter because some of these militiamen will be integrated into the SPLA. Many of these individuals have been involved in human rights violations.

Page, Susan D. Statement of Susan D. Page Ambassador-Designate to the Republic of South Sudan before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, edited by Senate Foreign Relations Committee October 5, 2011. http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Page%20final.pdf. This transcript helps to identify potential military operations in South Sudan as well as potential objectives from a Department of State perspective.


United States Africa Command. *Fact Sheet: United States Africa Command: U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs Office*, 2011. [http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1644](http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1644). In addition to providing the reader with a general overview of AFRICOM, this reference also states the strategic objectives of AFRICOM. The significance of AFRICOM's strategic objectives is that the majority of them can only be realized through security cooperation operations.

Warner, Lesley (warnerl@cna.org). *Email dated January 20, 2012 regarding Militia Integration Policy and Potential Effects on the SPLA*, edited by Major Barian A.
Woodward (Barian.woodward@usmc.mil). This conversation surfaced a number of second and third order effects of the current militia integration policy of the SPLA. This policy should undoubtedly be considered by US personnel operating in South Sudan. It speaks to the motivation of reintegrated soldiers as well as potential resentment of SPLA loyalists also serving.


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Akol, Lam. "South Sudan Referendum: First Things First." September 4, 2010. http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-Referendum-First,36175. Provides rationale for South Sudan secession by examining the historical events of Sudan. Through his analysis, the author has identified conditions that are relevant in 2012 in the internal disputes of South Sudan.


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are the subsequent divisions of the movement which leads to implications of possible future segmentation within the SPLA.

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Talley, Thomas. "Southern Sudan - the Four Theses " *Small Wars Journal* (October 2010). [http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/584-talley.pdf](http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/584-talley.pdf). While the author made predictions that would ultimately not occur, he provides detailed information regarding the U.S. involvement in brokering the CPA. This involvement may imply advocacy to the South Sudanese cause.

Uma, Julius N. "SPLA to Demobilize all Child Soldiers by End of the Year." *Sudan Tribune*, 2010. [http://www.sudantribune.com/SPLA-to-demobilize-all-child,36125](http://www.sudantribune.com/SPLA-to-demobilize-all-child,36125). The article assists in establishing the fact that the SPLA employed child soldiers as well as identifying the efforts to remove child soldiers from the SPLA.


Wondu, Steven and Ann Lesch. *Battle for Peace in Sudan*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2000. This reference provides original dialogue from both North and South Sudan leading up to the Abuja Conferences of 1992-93. This work assists in establishing the root causes of conflict, particularly the issues of self-determination, national identity, and religion & state.