When DHS began operations in 2003, its employees had a common and solid mission to fight terrorism and they rallied around it with patriotic zeal. Today the mission is uncertain and the patriotic zeal diminished. Criticisms of DHS continue to increase while morale amongst DHS employees worsens. A transformational change within DHS needs to occur in order to improve the United States homeland security posture. One option for change is to adopt a coercive approach similar to the reform of the U.S. Department of Defense with the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols bill. Another option is to adopt a normative approach of organizational behavior focusing on changing values and beliefs. This approach has worked well for other societal problems like raising awareness for the environment, reduction of forest fires, and the increase in the usage of seat belts.
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TITLE:

"OneDHS": The Department of Homeland Security’s Organizational Culture

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AUTHOR:

Wade R. Townsend

AY 11-12

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Rebecca J. Johnson

Approved: ____________________________

Date: 27 April 2012

Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Francis Marlo

Approved: ____________________________

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Executive Summary

Title: “OneDHS”: The Department of Homeland Security’s Organizational Culture


Thesis: After ten years of intense programmatic and mission oriented objectives, there needs to be a transformational culture and behavioral change within the Department of Homeland Security. The change, known as OneDHS, would create a sustainable implementation of a unified Department of Homeland Security. The Department and its personnel will identify as one department with all components contributing to its paramount goal of securing the nation.

Discussion: When DHS began operations in 2003, its employees had a common and solid mission to fight terrorism and they rallied around it with patriotic zeal. Today the mission is uncertain and the patriotic zeal diminished. Criticisms of DHS continue to increase while morale amongst DHS employees worsens. A transformational change within DHS needs to occur in order to improve the United States homeland security posture. One option for change is to adopt a coercive approach similar to the reform of the U.S. Department of Defense with the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols bill. Another option is to adopt a normative approach of organizational behavior focusing on changing values and beliefs. This approach has worked well for other societal problems like raising awareness for the environment, reduction of forest fires, and the increase in the usage of seat belts.

Conclusion: The formation of the Department of Homeland Security was the largest reorganization of the Federal Government since Congress implemented the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols reformation of the Department of Defense. While Goldwater-Nichols was successful for the Department of Defense, this thesis argues that a coercive approach will not work for the Department of Homeland Security. To best implement and entrench the “OneDHS” culture, DHS must use a normative approach to organizational behavior.
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Very Respectfully,

Wade R. Townsend
“It’s easy to forget that, when this war began, we were united, bound together by the fresh memory of a horrific attack and by the determination to defend our homeland and the values we hold dear. I refuse to accept the notion that we cannot summon that unity again. I believe with every fiber of my being that we, as Americans, can still come together behind a common purpose, for our values are not simply words written into parchment. They are a creed that calls us together and that has carried us through the darkest of storms as one nation, as one people.”

—President Barack Obama, West Point, New York, December 2, 2009

Introduction

“Before the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), homeland security activities spread across more than 22 federal agencies, an estimated 2,000 separate Congressional appropriations account, and at least 85 oversight committees.”2 With the creation of the DHS, came the assumption of a consolidated approach to federal homeland security. No longer would 22 separate agencies, offices and functions view homeland security from their own individual perspective. Instead, these entities would work together with a unity of effort, resolving the nation’s security needs in the best interests of the nation rather than that of a single entity or agency. Ten years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, however, the DHS still has not created the culture and internal integration necessary to function successfully as a Federal agency. Clearly, the process of changing governmental culture is no simple task. Homeland security requires an ongoing process of dialogue and transformation that embraces both complexity and ambiguity. What changes should occur within the DHS to improve its ability to secure America’s homeland?

To answer the question on appropriate and applicable changes, we must first understand and define the concept of homeland security. Providing public or homeland security is a fundamental function of government. As such, within the United States, the National Strategy for Homeland Security officially defines homeland security as "a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur."3 The search for the
appropriate homeland security enterprise (defined as those that share a common national interest in the safety and security of the United States and its population) is a dynamic process that must balance control with processes, operations with management, and feedback among public, private, and nonprofit organizations. After ten years of intense programmatic and mission oriented objectives, this has yet to occur within DHS. As such, there needs to be a transformational culture and behavioral change within the DHS. The department must unify its strategy with operations and ensure the integration throughout the vast and varied components, which make up the department, through its own internal mechanisms. The change, known as OneDHS, would create a sustainable implementation of a unified Department of Homeland Security. OneDHS must establish a common identity and language throughout the DHS. The end state of OneDHS is having the DHS and its personnel identify as one department with all components contributing to its paramount goal of securing the nation.

This paper will provide an opportunity to comprehend this need for change. The next section will provide a brief description of the origin of the concept of homeland security and how it has changed since 2001. The section following will include a brief description of the ten-year history of the DHS, highlighting the important policy and operational objectives for the department. The section following will speak to the concepts of how DHS approaches homeland security to include organizational change. The section following will address the possible changes and actions the DHS can undertake based upon its own studies and analysis, as well as those of GAO and other think tanks. In conclusion, I will show that the ideas and evidence presented in this paper suggest that the true challenge will be to define, produce, and sustain the organizational behavior and desired “OneDHS” culture.

**Homeland Security the Concept**
As provided earlier, the definition of homeland security from the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security covers three main areas of focus: preventing terrorist attacks, reducing vulnerabilities, and ensuring resiliency if attacks occur. Note, homeland security “was a familiar term on Capital Hill before September 2001. Congressional documents show that the United States was referred to as “the homeland” as early as 1995, and the term ‘homeland security’ was used extensively by 1998.”

A July 1995 report of the Senate Committee on Armed Forces stated, “the United States must be able to defend both its deployed forces and the homeland.” In January 1997, William Cohen, Secretary of Defense designee, addressed Congress in a speech, warning “[t]he proliferation of weapons of mass destruction threaten our interests, our forces and even our homeland.”

In 1998, the concept of homeland security included crisis and consequence management. By 1999, the now familiar term “homeland security” “was used widely in reports and papers of think tanks, such as The Cato Institute, RAND, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), as well as TRADOC and other government groups.”

Prior to September 2001, the American public overall did not understand or have a need to understand the homeland security concept. For the American public, reality meant having the strongest military power in the world, the most dominant economic power in the world, and terrorism did not occur within the United States. This notion changed dramatically after September 2001. The concept of homeland security became a part of American thinking and behavior and government. Homeland security, the concept, now represented an active and powerful government and military and public coordination ensuring that government at all levels was actively engaged to provide security for its citizens. From October 2001 to today, the concept of what homeland security means and what can be considered a homeland security issue
“[is] being formulated and retooled, almost on a continual basis - focused first on foreign terrorism, then evolving to include domestic terrorism (the 2001 Anthrax attacks, one week after September 11, 2001), then natural disaster emergency management prevention and response (Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma in 2005), a pandemic in 2009 (H1N1), and a not so natural disaster emergency management prevention and response (Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in 2010).”

It therefore asks the question of what is homeland security? Is it a program, an objective, a discipline, an agency, an administrative activity, another word for emergency management? Is it about terrorism? All hazards? For this paper, we use a modified definition of the concept of homeland security for the United States as an ever-evolving discipline, and at its core, the prevention of terrorism and appropriate response when attacked. This modified definition provides an opportunity for the nation’s government to improve its resiliency and sustainability, at the national, federal, state, local and tribal community levels, from all threats and disasters—not just terrorism.

**Department of Homeland Security Overview**

“[H]omeland security is not the same thing as the Department of Homeland Security,” as noted by Christopher Bellavita in his article in the Homeland Security Affairs Journal. The Department of Homeland Security is a federal cabinet agency created in response to the events of September 11, 2001. The missions of the Department of Homeland Security are “to prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks; protect the American people, its critical infrastructure, and key resources; and respond to and recover from incidents that do occur.”

The Department of Homeland Security employs more than 220,000 employees in jobs that range from aviation and border security to emergency response, from cyber security analyst to chemical facility inspector.
The duties are wide-ranging, but the Department’s goal is clear - keeping America safe and secure. Nevertheless, how did DHS become this federal agency?

“Eleven days after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge was appointed as the first Director of the Office of Homeland Security in the White House. The office oversaw and coordinated a comprehensive national strategy to safeguard the country against terrorism and respond to any future attacks.”¹¹ The Office of Homeland Security, which later became the Homeland Security Council, was responsible to coordinate "homeland security" efforts. “With the passage of the Homeland Security Act in November 2002, DHS formally became an executive cabinet agency responsible for coordinating and unifying national homeland security efforts.”¹² It started formal operations on March 1, 2003. Figure A illustrates the proposed organizational chart for the DHS. Per Raphael Perl, a noted homeland security expert, “the creation of DHS constituted the most significant government reorganization and most diverse merger of federal functions and responsibilities, into a single organization.”¹³

Under Secretary Ridge, the Department’s focus was on the security of civil aviation and protection of the United States borders – the major vulnerabilities revealed by the terrorist’s attacks on September 11. The Department’s mission under Secretary Ridge was:

[DHS] will lead the unified national effort to secure America. [DHS] will prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation. [DHS] will ensure safe and secure borders, welcome lawful immigrants and visitors, and promote the free-flow of commerce.¹⁴

After establishing a basic structure for the Department and getting the department functioning, Secretary Ridge announced his resignation on November 30, 2004, following the re-election of President Bush.

President Bush nominated federal judge Michael Chertoff to succeed Secretary Ridge and he became the second Secretary of DHS in February of 2005. Where Secretary Ridge’s
administration concentrated on immediate security measures for the aviation industry and border protection, Secretary Chertoff’s administration focused on augmenting federal power through legislation, law, or regulation. Secretary Chertoff’s belief for the Department of Homeland Security is the power of the federal government to solve all homeland security problems. Secretary Chertoff realigned the Department’s approach to security that incorporated prevention and protection fosters our prosperity. He believed that a risk-based approach (prioritizing criticality because the United States cannot protect all assets) was applicable to both the Department’s security operations as well as its internal philosophy. He states “[r]isk management must guide our decision-making as we examine how we can best organize to prevent, respond and recover from an attack.”15 The Department of Homeland Security’s philosophy changed to the risk based approach for strategic decision-making.

Both Secretary Ridge and Secretary Chertoff understood that a transformation of the magnitude of a DHS takes time and that the DHS immediate focus is its homeland security mission. Both secretaries indicated a need for DHS to increase its focus on management issues. The issues range from coordinating the varied management processes, systems, and people through the development of an overarching management integration to improving its strategic planning and effectively managing strategic human capital. This is important not only to DHS itself, but also to the nation’s homeland security efforts, because, in addition to managing its own organization, the Department plays a larger role in managing homeland security and in coordinating with the activities of other federal, state, local, tribal and private stakeholders. To meet the challenges, DHS continues to evolve and integrate its functions and implement its programs. This larger role became more apparent under the current Secretary Janet Napolitano. On January, 20, 2009, Janet Napolitano became the third Secretary at DHS and outlined
five major priorities for the DHS. The priorities were as follows: guard against terrorism, secure our borders, enforce immigration laws, prepare for, respond to and recover from natural disasters, and unify and mature DHS. As an element to begin the Department’s maturation process, in 2010, Secretary Napolitano led the completion of the first-ever Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR). The QHSR established a unified, strategic framework for homeland security missions and goals. The QHSR was to further a culture known as OneDHS. OneDHS as described by Secretary Napolitano is “dedicated employees believing first and foremost in the DHS mission… [and] being united as a whole…, working together, sharing the DHS vision and moving it forward every day.”

Additionally, DHS conducted a Bottom-Up Review (BUR) to align its activities and organizational structure to better serve its missions and goals. The QHSR and the BUR are processes that highlight the continued challenge of building OneDHS from previously separate organizations and entities. An underlying theme within both documents is that creating the OneDHS (a single integrated and optimized Department) has been a major challenge at the DHS since its founding. To address OneDHS, the BUR highlighted the need to improve departmental management; “[t]he integration of 22 different Federal departments and agencies into a unified, integrated Department of Homeland Security continues to represent a significant public policy and management challenge.” Although each of these three secretaries had a strategic plan, priorities shifted that complicated unification efforts within DHS. Over the course of its brief history, DHS has evolved, realigned, and reorganized into its current structure with each change highlighting attention to programmatic missions and less focus on the organizational issues of merging different cultures together into OneDHS. The current organizational structure of DHS includes 7 operating components, 4 headquarters directorates, and over 15 additional supporting
offices. Many of these functions have combined and overlapping responsibilities for policy, management, operations, acquisition, external affairs, and research and development. These elements indicate a need for “change” to include a continued improvement of internal coordination and integration of functions within the DHS.

The DHS Approach to Homeland Security: Challenges

In the days following the creation of the Department, the nation remained in a state of the unknown. The impacts of the September 11 terrorist threat were unclear. Vulnerable targets (both sites and personnel) within the United States could be anywhere. The potential for additional attacks remained a daily threat. “The strategy in the early days of the Department was "ready, fire, aim.” [The aiming] happening after the organization trie[d] a lot of things: Buil[t] on what work[ed]. Get rid of what does not.”18 There were many challenges to the formation and execution of the Department of Homeland Security. The challenges, some from the initial beginning of the Department continue through to today. The challenges can be broken down into three specific areas:

- Intra-organizational challenges;
- Political challenges; and,
- Agency administrative challenges.

Intra-Organizational Challenges

The intra-organizational challenges pertain mainly to the various cultural conflicts that arose due to the formation of the Department. Some of the agencies brought into the Department such as the United States Coast Guard and the United States Secret Service had over one hundred years of culture of their own. Charles Perrow, an Emeritus Professor at Yale and leading expert in critical infrastructure protection notes, “The launching [of DHS] was rough and premature. President Bush had resisted congressional efforts to establish it, but once Congress passed the
law, he set an unreasonably ambitious four-month deadline for DHS to open its doors to twenty-two agencies.”

Adding to the difficulties, Perrow further states that the concept was “not only large (180,000 employees) and diverse (twenty-two agencies with 650 separate computer systems to integrate), but many of the agencies it took in were already “high-risk” agencies by GAO standards… The potpourri of unrelated activities was to exceed that of any previous large government mergers.”

Further, in addition to its security missions, President Bush on July 22, 2002 stated, “This Department of Homeland Security will foster a new culture throughout our government.”

Creating a common culture for any entity is a challenge, but it has been particularly difficult for the Department of Homeland Security. In business terms, it was a merger of twenty-two organizations, many of which had a culture of their own. These Headquarter offices each have newly appointed senior level executives with management and oversight responsibilities. Now add into this, a forced change with every new administration, which brings about new executives, new priorities, and new responsibilities. It is understandable to see why the fruition of a common culture has been difficult. By combining security responsibilities under one overarching concept, the intent of the creation of the Department of Homeland Security was to break down longstanding stovepipes of activity. The stovepipes do not encourage collaboration and coordination and allow the potential for exploitation by those seeking to harm America. Homeland security also creates a greater emphasis for joint unity of effort across previously separate and distinct elements of government and society. Figure B shows the evolution of homeland security. Homeland security straddles the boundary between civil society and internal affairs on one hand, and the military and defense sectors on the other. A central challenge is the need to balance increased security and prevention against the need for a stronger response. Thus,
when it comes to reorganizing the Department of Homeland Security, “the main issue is to frame boundaries around problematic issues.” There have been many congressional hearings, plans, and strategies produced since the inception of DHS regarding its mission and ever-evolving role in homeland security. Differences of opinion change over time based on factors like the administration in office and challenges of the day. For example, “Tom Ridge viewed the DHS like a “holding company.” As the first secretary of the department, Ridge saw infrastructure and integration as key components to building DHS,” and yet after Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, the DHS focus shifted quickly from terrorism as the top topic to mitigating natural disasters.

The formation of the DHS as a unified approach for homeland security is considered by some as less than successful. Christine Wormuth, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies states, “[f]rom the dysfunction of the DHS…[including]…the continuing…battles about roles, responsibilities and budget share, it is clear that the United States does not yet have a comprehensive, cohesive and competent system to ensure the security of the homeland.” The creation of DHS led to a rapid growth in a workforce, and a thirst for protection and projection of security as well as concentrated efforts of unity, which required the United States Government to move quickly. In fact, by some accounts, quicker than the foundations for a homeland security “bureaucracy” could be established and captured in doctrine and even before the organization understood where it needed to go or what it needed to begin. The continuation of the evolving role of the Department will remain a challenge. Similar to this challenge is what Secretary Ridge described as “the politics of ...Washington.”

**Political Challenges**

Laura Kahn, a noted biodefense expert and member of the Princeton University Program on Science and Global Security, asserts that “[m]any of the challenges that Homeland Security
faces derive from its broad (read: ill-defined) mandate. Such a veritable smorgasbord of bureaucracy has led to continual inter- and intra-agency conflict.”

She further maintains, “DHS is buried in excessive congressional oversight.” DHS reports to 108 committees, subcommittees, and commissions, in contrast, for example, to 36 committees and subcommittees that oversee the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Pentagon, which has a budget 10 times greater and far more employees. Jena Baker McNeill, a Senior Policy Analyst for Homeland Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, supports that “[m]embers (of Congress) like having a slice of the homeland security oversight pie, because being tough on homeland security translates into tremendous political rewards. Yet the current system is confusing and highly burdensome and impedes policy progress by often placing conflicting demands on the DHS.”

Ms. Kahn follows that “[t]his fragmented system guarantees that Homeland Security officials spend more time preparing for committee meetings than performing their day-to-day duties… [and] Homeland Security will not reach its full potential.”

While the intent is for DHS to be the leader of the broad homeland security effort, integrating its myriad activities into one cohesive homeland security enterprise has been difficult. To meet these larger homeland security challenges, the DHS needs to become a well-managed, organizational sound and culturally stable DHS. By accomplishing these objectives, DHS will be able to direct much greater emphasis on instilling a comprehensive approach to strategy development and planning particularly concerning Congressional oversight and legislative affairs activities.

Adding to the challenge is the continuing conflict over the perceived DHS’ lack of responsiveness to Congressional committees, and other watchdog organizations. Secretary Napolitano stated, “Separation of powers has created a problem with the creation of the
department. [Further]…the government lacks strategic oversight for the DHS.”

The DHS acknowledged in the BUR that coordinating and “[i]ntegrating these many disparate entities—some with long histories of independent or autonomous operations, and all with distinct operational cultures—while maintaining their unique strengths and capabilities has presented significant public policy and management challenges.” As noted by Perrow, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that DHS’s “implementation and transformation remained high risk because DHS had not yet developed a comprehensive management integration strategy and its management systems and functions…were not yet fully integrated and wholly operational.” Further, GAO recommended that the Department, similar to other high-risk agencies, create a plan that “defines the root causes of identified problems, identifies effective solutions to those problems, and provides for substantially completing corrective measures in the near term. Such a plan should include performance metrics and milestones, as well as mechanisms to monitor progress.” Combating terrorism was the center of programmatic emphasis. The milestones and progress were not related to any internal integration or merging of joint capabilities for a common purpose.

The mechanisms must include short (1-3 year), mid (5-7 year), and long-term (10-25 year) milestones. The DHS must realize that the long lead times for “investing” in performance underscores the need for informed, focused and timely action. For DHS, the ability to get at the theoretical OneDHS depends on a myriad of factors; economical, political, personal, and a historical lack of integration, that are hard to control, much less to predict. GAO added that “in the case of agencies thrown together in the government, with only parts of each agency tasked with, or assigned, roles in a common enterprise such as protecting the nation from terrorists, with diverse histories, and subject to the oversight of several committees, cooperation will be
extremely difficult, perhaps more difficult than before the reorganization.”

James Jay Carafano, one of the nation’s leading experts in homeland security, is in agreement with Perrow, and states, “Key issues remain unresolved because of inertia and frustration that continued tinkering has produced little real progress.”

**Agency Administrative Challenges**

Along with confusion on homeland security oversight priorities, there has been criticism from Congress and “homeland security pundits” on the administrative and organizational performance of DHS. Thus, it has been difficult for DHS to direct and build a strong culture for its employees. Not having a long-term defined mission and bringing historically stovepipe function together are major deterrents from building and sustaining a strong culture. The result is greater turnover in employees and low employee morale results in satisfaction surveys. When DHS began operations in 2003, its employees took pride in their positions and had a common goal to fight terrorism. These two factors, while inherently meaningful and full of patriotism remained idle and ignored. As a point, “in July 2006, the Office of Personnel Management conducted a survey of federal employees of all 36 federal agencies. DHS was last in job satisfaction and results-oriented performance culture.”

The low scores endorsed major concerns about leadership and the culture, or lack thereof, within the agency. Six years later, the administrative and organizational status within the DHS is still a poorly defined goal, the threat still uncertain, and morale amongst employees is still low. As noted by Christine Wormuth, “[p]erhaps most importantly, there is not yet a common corporate culture at DHS…” This is not the expectation of what and how the DHS was to come together.

America’s expectations of how the government, and more specifically DHS, secures the United States have changed dramatically during the post-9/11 decade. The expectations for
homeland security and the ever-increasing evolution of threats from traditional nation state actors, drug cartels and natural disasters suggest that the DHS mission should be threat agnostic. Threat agnostic means an all hazards; all threat approach to risk management and decision-making. The DHS enterprise has become more complex as it has become the leading entity responsible for America’s homeland security, and its core “terrorism based” mission has become correspondingly distributed and vast. Secretary Ridge notes,

The reorganization of the department itself [DHS] continues to impose challenges; it remains a work in progress. However, nothing that has occurred in the past 10 years suggests to me that we did not bring in the right agencies. The aggregation in one department of those units of government [now in DHS] is appropriate, but there is a level of maturity that has yet to be realized in terms of integrating...infrastructure. Progress has been made..., but it [DHS] is not yet the kind of efficient and effective enterprise we would like it to be.38

Some challenges that the Department faces today, including the joint culture, lack of a structure laying out who is exactly in charge and the overall expectations and continued economic uncertainty are noted and solvable. Secretary Napolitano believes that OneDHS is the pathway to that “reform."

**Reform Efforts**

Many experts compare the Department to that of America’s aging infrastructure. Both the Department and the infrastructure need to restructure in order to fulfill its missions. While the infrastructure owners need to focus their attention on material and services, some experts feel that DHS and it bureaucratic reorganization needs a complete rethink. Dr. Paula Gordon, a recognized homeland security, management and organizational behavior expert, has written that she believes the improvements needed in homeland security involve the problem solving process. Problem solving, she defined as "addressing a set of complex problems, challenges, and threats."39 The major elements involved in problem solving include problem definition,
identification of alternative courses of action, resource availability, managerial capability, and leadership. Figure C illustrates a fully elaborated table by Dr. Gordon.

Dr. Gordon continues that “the Homeland Security Act of 2002 …reflect[s] a certain approach to the defining the scope and nature of the problem of homeland security. To maximize efforts, there needs to be present both a common understanding of the challenges as well as a common sense of purpose. Reorganization is no guarantee…that markedly different missions will be able to collaborate effectively.”

Reorganization does not necessarily provide the concepts and beliefs of where DHS as an organization needs to focus its efforts at any given point in time. Rather, Dr. Gordon concludes, that “a common sense of purpose, direction, and mission helps ensure that we all working together to do what needs to be done.” Therefore, DHS should instill a common sense of purpose, as well as a common understanding of the challenges it faces, with a common definition of the problem. Those can be the central solutions to the progress it makes and the culture it creates. For OneDHS, this means sharing the vision and moving it forward every day. How might the Department of Homeland Security do a better job in this mission? The next section discusses some approaches to successful organizations.

DHS has made important progress in implementing and strengthening its mission functions over the past eight years, including implementing key homeland security operations and achieving important goals and milestones in many areas. The department's accomplishments include developing strategic and operational plans across its myriad missions, hiring and deploying its workforces, and developing and issuing policies, procedures, programs, and regulations to govern its homeland security operations. Establishing these are important accomplishments and has been critical for the department to position and equip itself for fulfilling its homeland security operational and tactical missions and functions.
DHS and organizational development must position themselves as equal partners centered on breaking the current barriers creating better strategic support within the DHS and enhancing execution of the homeland security missions and roles. In 2002, during the planning stage for the DHS, the then United States Comptroller General, David Walker outlined several important success factors including a proposed timeline of five to ten years for anticipating sustainable and meaningful results in his testimony before the Select Committee on Homeland Security. Mr. Walker’s success factors called for the following:

The experiences of organizations that have undertaken transformational change efforts along the lines [of DHS]… suggest that this process can take up to 5 to 10 years to provide meaningful and sustainable results. Given the scope and nature of challenges facing the new department, the critical question is how we can ensure that the essential transformation and management issues receive the sustained, top-level attention that they require… While national needs suggest a rapid reorganization of homeland security functions, the transition of agencies and programs into the…department is likely to take time to achieve… The transition plan should establish a timetable for the orderly migration of each component agency or program to the new department, identify key objectives to be achieved during the first year following the transfer, and describe the strategy for achieving an orderly transition and sustaining mission performance.\(^+\)

**Transformational Change**

The implementation of large-scale planned organizational change has become increasingly important in recent years as organizations continually attempt to reconfigure themselves to meet the challenges of an ever-shifting landscape, as noted above by former Comptroller General David Walker. In fact, large-scale planned organizational change is described as “a fundamental or radical change that is deliberate, purposive, systemic, and complex, and typically encompasses the whole organization within a finite time window”\(^+\)

This section addresses key models of change, including first-order and second-order change, evolutionary change, episodic change, revolutionary change, robust transformation, strategic
change, large-scale change, transformational change, and punctuated equilibrium (see Figure D). Figure D lists various types of change that could possibly be applied to homeland security in order to foster the behavioral changes necessary to cultivate a culture of OneDHS.

Not only is each change effort different, the organizational reaction to the change also differs, especially with respect to the degree of resistance to change that may occur. The notion of resistance to change is another challenge. Often, change fosters anxiety in individuals owing to the uncertainty and instability that may surround it. Resistance to change is a natural occurrence, should be expected in any change effort, and can occur on various organizational levels.

One of the research questions of this thesis is how to implement change in DHS. Walter Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, leading researchers of institutional theory, “distinguish between three types of institutional pressure to spark change: coercive, mimetic, and normative.”44 Applying interpersonal pressure to promote conformity and the manipulation of the totality of the person's social environment to stabilize behavior once modified is the definition of coercive pressure. Mimetic theory states that humans are naturally social creatures who influence each other in a variety of profound ways. That openness allows the formation of individual or culturally specific identities and defines the mimetic nature. The normative model involves change through norms, values, and cultural influences, whereby an education through shared visions shapes an individual's perception about a particular behavior, which is influenced by the judgment of significant others such as the Department of Homeland Security’s senior leadership.

Mimetic Model

To date, DHS has utilized the mimetic model, which has been ineffective in making significant change. The mimetic model involves the mimicking or copying from other
organizations. As DHS consolidated twenty-two government agencies, it tried to continue to mimic the cultures of each entity instead of defining a new culture. The mimetic model provides value but does not result in major change or a unified organization in this situation. This is because the mimetic theory does not promote collaboration or unification. Decision-making does not optimize but rather satisfies organizational effectiveness. Outcomes are not optimal, only good enough. As confirmed by Sharie Bourbeau, a senior executive within the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, within the Department, “there is no search for commonality of mission. Components feel that if I collaborate, maybe I do not get to keep my program. What’s the motivation?”

The current DHS culture emphasizes the importance of external and internal dependencies and these dependencies impact on goal setting, thereby shedding some light on the obstacles a manager or an organization may face when trying to implement the recipes provided by the mimetic theory. Mimetic theory is prescriptive; matching contingencies with appropriate responses, it describes the best way for an organization to reach a given goal. It consists of several competing factions; some of them seem not interested in consolidation, while those seeking consolidation expect it to take place on their own terms. An example within the Department of Homeland Security is identification badges. Currently there is a standard format and outline for the badge. Each organizational component copies the original format of the identification badge; however, instead of each employee having a badge stating “the Department of Homeland Security” on it, the various components badges identify personnel as Coast Guard, FEMA, and Secret Service, as an example. Therefore, while each member of the Department has an identification badge to mimic one another, there is no unification or commonality on the badges to indicate the one department. Badges indicate the individual components instead of one
overarching organization. The mimetic theory within the federal government as shown above is not simply an exact imitation of others. There can be a reverse imitation, or a negative imitation, that is a bit more difficult to see. At its root, though, is the lack of unification and motivation to become one.

The mimetic model involves copying from other organizations. Another example of the mimetic model is the lessons-learned web site maintained by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which allows organizations to see what security “best practices” are being implemented. The mimetic model provides value but does not result in major change. A deficiency of this model is that it brings lower-compliance organizations up to the average level rather than raising the bar to a higher security posture. This is particularly true when environment uncertainty is high.

Another disadvantage of the mimetic model is it does not facilitate change. In the case of DHS, the culture of 22 federal agencies merged together. Certainly there were best practices from each of these agencies to leverage at DHS. Establishing a culture though and causing change, however, goes way beyond mimetic copying. Creating a unified DHS cannot occur through the mimetic model.

Coercive Model

The coercive model involves regulatory oversight and compliance to force change. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 is an example of the coercive model. As noted by Christine Wormuth, “[t]he Goldwater-Nichols legislation…is widely viewed as largely responsible for the most significant reform of the Department of Defense (DoD) since the National Security Act of 1946.” Congress created the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 to force the Department of Defense (DoD) to be more responsive and more efficient in the conduct of interservice matters.
Lines of communication were fragmented and fundamentally separated. These divisions caused unhealthy competition between DoD organizations ranging from procurement to operations. Joel Bagnal, former Deputy Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, explains “[i]nterservice rivalries led to friction among leaders, and incompatible communication systems and operational doctrine hampered cohesion among the many units involved.” As a result, the uniformed services created their own distinctive culture. The “teamwork or Oneness” needed for collaboration, coordination and synergy was absent. “The objectives of Goldwater-Nichols for the uniformed services included: establishing clear responsibility, assigning matching or corresponding authorities, and requiring and enhancing joint strategy formulation.”

The DHS shares similar objectives. “Many in the national security community and Congress are asking whether a Goldwater-Nichols type reform would enhance the nation’s homeland security system.” As the 25th anniversary of Goldwater-Nichols recently passed, note an assessment of its accomplishments: “Goldwater-Nichols was not written to reorganize DOD merely for the sake of change; it was an effort to reform the behavior, organization, and outcomes of military action by forcing leaders to think and operate jointly.” Goldwater-Nichols took twenty-five years of change to encourage joint thought and operation. Colonel Michael Edwards, Director of Operations, United States Air Force Combat Support Office, remarks that “[a]ll cabinet-level departments need to join in a Goldwater-Nichols type reform to provide unity of effort to leverage departmental competencies. The identification of gaps and seams in our capabilities will also be critical to meeting the new challenges our nation faces.” Joel Bagnal agrees with Colonel Edwards and feels that this path could create the unity of effort and culture of OneDHS. He states, “There is a great need for…homeland security…to undergo the same kind of transformation that the Goldwater-Nichols Act brought to the Department of
When thinking whether a Goldwater-Nichols approach or reform would truly be appropriate for instilling a OneDHS culture, it would be helpful to further understand the Act itself and the achievements that the Act had within DoD and if those achievements would transfer into the homeland security arena.

Christine Wormuth, in her review on whether a Goldwater-Nichols approach would work for DHS comments,

There is not yet a common corporate culture at DHS and … (DHS) needs significant reforms in order to achieve an adequately functional homeland security system. While the Goldwater-Nichols experience does not fit the homeland security sphere perfectly, there is a need for a new framework around which to organize the nation’s homeland security activities to better ensure their effectiveness.”

The major reforms achieved because of the Goldwater-Nichols Act include: planning, training and internal actions became unified rather than competitive. Even more critical, the Goldwater-Nichols Act served to foster a “Team Purple” or jointness, which can serve as a framework for DHS to work toward greater unity of effort and ultimately greater internal integration. However, the homeland security environment and culture is even more complex, both organizationally and politically, than the culture and environments of the uniformed services. DHS has a shared responsibility for homeland security with other government agencies, state and local governments, private sector, and citizens. To transition to the jointness of Goldwater-Nichols would not be as easy as cutting and pasting the Goldwater-Nichols Act into the homeland security environment and beginning anew. A homeland security/Goldwater-Nichols equivalent would need to promote jointness at various levels of government partnership. This jointness includes within DHS itself, within the intelligence community, between other Federal agencies, among state, local, territorial and tribal governments, with the private sector, and among nongovernmental organizations. Further, a Goldwater-Nichols approach suggests that the
opportunity to clarify roles and create unified/centralized command authority within the homeland security partnership listed prior. Creating a chain of command that would resemble a DoD chain of command is not possible due to the relationships and complexities among the stakeholders. A homeland security chain of command is simply not military and there is no authorized command and control authority. For command and control, DHS simply does not have the legal authorities required over state, local, territorial and tribal or private sector partners. DHS would have to instill compliance to force change through draconian measures. The measures, acting as the forcing function, could include funding. The funding could be withheld or eliminated unless the integration within and among the varied components existed.

**Normative Model**

Although both the coercive and mimetic models have been successful in various forums, the normative model offers the most promise for significant improvements. The normative model involves change through norms, values, and cultural influences. Since homeland security is a shared cultural challenge, having all stakeholders buy into values and expectations under the normative approach is optimal. The normative model has worked well in producing major societal change. A good example of changing culture is the “Smokey Bear" campaign, which raised public awareness of the dangers of wildfires and enjoyed success in terms of actions taken by citizens to help reduce the number of fires. The campaign has existed since 1944. According to the Ad Council (2001), it still has high recognition (95% of adults, 77% of children).

The Smokey Bear campaign and the OneDHS culture share similar traits. Both are individual behavior change campaigns that try to change in individuals the behaviors that promote behaviors that lead to improved individual or social well-being. Further, both have strength in using public awareness as a marketing process. Securing the homeland and or
preventing forest fires characterize the critical message of personal responsibility. Additionally, both are intelligent, easy to comprehend campaigns icons to inspire people; Smokey Bear with his “fire danger is low today” and the Department of Homeland Security itself, representing the prevention of terrorism and the safety of the nation. One advantage that the Smokey Bear campaign has is that for over seventy years, his message has not changed. The Department has only been in existence for nine years. It will take some time for OneDHS to become the norm. Turning homeland security from a government problem to a shared internal social-legitimacy issue and vision is a key to strengthening security and fostering the OneDHS approach.

Learning from past successes and failures provides a great opportunity to create a successful change effort. Below are two examples of normative organizational culture-change success stories. The first concerns New York City in the 1990s and the second highlights the Walt Disney Company and its chain of excellence. Both examples successfully applied normative organizational development theories and techniques to change the culture of the organization in a sustainable way. Strong leadership from an individual is demonstrated in the first example, whereas stakeholder involvement is demonstrated in the second.

**New York City Success Story**

Consider the New York City Police Department (NYPD), in which the social scientist team of W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne state “executed a “blue-ocean” strategy in the 1990s in the public sector.” Blue Ocean meaning focusing on the bigger picture, reaching beyond the current demand of the organization and building the strategy into the organization. When Bill Bratton became the appointed police commissioner of New York City in February 1994, he faced a unique predicament in which the odds were stacked against him. In the early 1990s, New York City was veering toward chaos. Crime was rampant and morale within the
NYPD was at an all time low. Concern with corruption within the NYPD, failing equipment, and budget restraints were serious factors guiding the police department, in fact, many social scientists had concluded that in light of these factors, the city was resistant to police intervention.

“Yet in less than two years and without an increase in his budget, Bratton turned New York City into the safest large city in the United States.”55 He broke out of the “red ocean” (beating the opponent (criminals) with a head on approach) with a blue-ocean policing strategy that revolutionized U.S. policing. Bratton began to implement and execute a shift in strategy. He ensured that his message of “owning” crime was understood by all NYPD employees. He ensured that the beat patrol officer felt that he/she was empowered to “own” the area of operations assigned to them. Through continued communications between the beat patrol officer and the communications cars, “reliable” back up was provided, time from incident inception to arrest was minimized and local citizens were able to see each area becoming safer in turn.

“Bratton achieved these breakthrough results in record time with scarce resources while lifting employee morale, creating a win-win for all involved.”56 In many turnarounds, the hardest battle is simply to make people aware of the need for a strategic shift. Tipping-point leadership builds on the rarely exploited corporate reality that in every organization, there are people, acts, and activities that exercise a disproportionate influence on performance. People remember and respond effectively to what they see and experience. This is a good example of how a shared vision made a difference that other actions were unable to produce.

Walt Disney Company

In contrast to a culture that has evolved over a number of years is a culture designed from day one and constantly reinforced day in and day out for the last ninety years. The Walt Disney Company is an example of a culture established by its creator and passed down through every
employee involved in the organization. Walt Disney rewrote “the rules of business. He instituted a culture based on his design of what is called the Chain of Excellence.”

Disney knew his company’s primary goal was to be financially profitable. Disney worked in reverse to design his company’s culture and ingrain it into every employee. Financial results are paramount in Disney’s culture; in order to achieve those results, guest satisfaction is critical. Guest satisfaction equates to repeat business, which in turn, equates to increased financial opportunities. To achieve guest satisfaction, cast or employee excellence is identified as the key cultural trait to obtain with leadership excellence enabling cast excellence. While Walt Disney and his leadership team made the ultimate decisions for the company, Disney, himself, ensured that he spoke to his employees in order to hear their thoughts, ideas, and opinions. The supportive environment, allowance for daily employee contribution and continuous training created a culture that is strong and constructive to this very day. This culture has outlasted its leader, implying a fundamental belief and understanding in the organizational culture and strategy of Disney.

Normative organizational applications like the New York Police Department and Walt Disney highlight how change for the better can occur. The examples, though very different situations, applied normative theories and methodologies to make and sustain the modification that occurred. Also in both cases, the change was cultural, which is difficult to create, but leads to a higher likelihood of sustainment of the organizational implementation of the change/culture. Change agents managed the examples of change. These change agents supported the change effort and maintained the support of others, allowing the change to successfully occur over time. Cummings and Worley identify five steps for effective change management, demonstrated in the New York City and Walt Disney examples. Figure E lists these steps.
Whereas the Smokey Bear mission or even the Walt Disney example is simple, the DHS mission is more complex. Building cohesion within such a varied organization is a difficult task. The key points must focus on an educated way of thinking devoted to DHS’s primary mission (homeland security) and internal relationships (administration), which must first be developed and then reinforced throughout the organization. The relationships must follow a standard format. The format includes: a) clarification of organizational and individual roles; b) improved communication and coordination; c) identified organization-wide priorities on which employees focus their attention; d) attend more to the human impact of transitions, managerial processes, and decisions; and, e) create more transparency and mutuality in organizational communications.

DHS must remember that culture change and cohesion are products of leadership acting in concert with all personnel regardless of rank, grade, or status throughout the organization. DHS must begin with the clear definition of a unifying mission such as OneDHS. OneDHS must address not just the overarching goal, but also the day-to-day activities that provide the motivation for continued collaborative activities. OneDHS must become the unifying vision across all the diverse subcultures and operation components before cultural change will take effect.

Similar to assisting other societal problems, organization development (OD) principles (a values-based approach to systems change in organizations) can make a significant contribution to the homeland security culture of OneDHS by helping unite a wide range of stakeholders (e.g., citizens, private sector, state and local government) to take a shared-vision joint approach. In a world of uncertainty, it is important not only to respond effectively to crisis, but also to better prepare our systems to anticipate and adapt to such events. DHS will need to reduce the
vulnerabilities of being a complex organization responsible for protecting the Nation and increase its resilience in order to increase the effectiveness and viability of OneDHS.

Ronald E. Fisher, Deputy Director, Infrastructure Assurance Center, Argonne National Laboratory highlights that change for an organization’s development and behavior is related to:

An organization’s end goal is...to fulfill its mission...achieving a mission is (accomplished) by achieving the utmost effectiveness. A strong culture is necessary to achieve the effectiveness all organizations seek. Some organizations with long histories whose cultures have evolved organically often find less desirable attributes have seeped into their culture causing misalignment. Organizations that intentionally design a culture and reinforce desired attributes of that culture are effective in achieving positive outcomes.58

Sometimes overlooked, change is a continual effort; investing in the continuity and unity of effort in turn leads to the sustainability of change. In most cases, change relies on the participation of the entire organization, making it difficult to achieve if the people are not invested in the effort personally. In her 2001 book, The Change Monster, Jeanie Duck presented the idea of the rule of thirds, in which she quotes: “One third will see the change as irrelevant to them, one third will embrace them with varying degrees of enthusiasm, and one third will disagree and resist either openly or in secret.”59

Per Ronald E. Fisher, “Organizational change can occur many different ways: through both planned and unplanned models of change.”60 Among the different types of planned organizational change that may occur, the model of change that is most applicable to the arena of homeland security and OneDHS is transformational change with a normative approach allowing change through norms, values, and cultural influences. The reason is that the change that needs to occur to transform into OneDHS is a radical type of change, shifting the culture of homeland security to focus on changing the basic culture of the organization or the existing framework within the organization.
Natural change, which can also be called mimetic, occurs within organizations at an incalculable rate. However, planned change is sometimes necessary in order to achieve desired results. Planned change is sometimes necessary as a catalyst for whole-systems change within an organization. For the DHS, the QHSR and BUR represent formal processes of planned change. Both documents are attempts to provide internal information for a long term approach to fostering the OneDHS culture.

As defined by Cummings and Worley, “Culture is the foundation for change, encompassing the ability to either promote or obstruct organizational transformation.”61 Culture can also be defined as the normative glue that holds an organization together. Ron Fisher explains, “Over the years, many authors have worked to further refine the concept of culture, resulting in the development of over 150 different definitions of culture.”62 We can define culture in different ways using different perspectives with different purposes in mind similar to the definition of homeland security. Thereby, culture and change management with the DHS become equal partners on the platform of homeland security and OneDHS. In order to be effective, there must be sound and clearly specified guidelines, rules or principles. These guidelines will act like a compass to navigate the Department to build the correct framework to instill OneDHS. OneDHS must become the key principles and metrics to focus, direct and reinforce the processes, outcomes and resources of the Department of Homeland Security.

“Effective change management needs to be a multi-stakeholder feedback loop with open information sharing and communication among and between stakeholders.”63 The United States has historically been a reactive environment and culture as it relates to homeland security. This reactive nature has led to an obstruction of the OneDHS culture. This is why the normative
approach is critical to creating and sustaining change. The normative approach addresses the values and norms and, ultimately, social behavior both internally and externally.

The Security Culture Model shown in Figure F promotes a normative approach to cultural change that has the potential to enhance homeland security and OneDHS. Because the problem is complex, involves a range of stakeholders, involves an uncertain environment, and changes over time, the Security Culture Model incorporates a culture roadmap, culture model, and change management model. Efforts in all three areas will be required to establish and instill a culture that will enhance homeland security and promote OneDHS. The Security Culture Model includes a culture roadmap and at the top of the roadmap, shown in Figure G, are sponsorship, leadership and communication. These are key elements within any culture. The events of 9/11 were a catalyst for a transformational change but were not sustained. Thus, security-posture change needs to be reintroduced. It is a challenge to realize such a change without an initiating event like 9/11, but it can be done. This is why the change component of the model is important. The change component includes motivating change, creating a vision, developing political support, managing the transition, and sustaining momentum. Each of the steps helps unite stakeholders, in this case, the personnel within DHS at all levels.

Because cultural change is paramount in ensuring the success of increasing the Nation’s security posture, Edgar Schein’s modified culture model is included (Figure H) as a critical component of the Security Culture Model. Constant artifacts and symbols provide reminders to stakeholders about commitments both past, present, and future. After 9/11, the World Trade Center towers were a reminder of what had happened. These artifacts were powerful in uniting the nation, but were not sustained and slowly disappeared. The culture roadmap and culture
model together help shape the beliefs, attitudes, and behavior of individuals. The transformation would be a self-driven, internal integration fostered by the DHS and unified by the personnel.

Therefore, in an age of fiscal constraint, increased Congressional oversight, and ever increasing public pressure, DHS should focus on central areas of responsibility and capabilities to allow greater attention to foster the OneDHS culture. The OneDHS culture and mindset will be the foundation that encourages the disparate entities to merge in a “joint” fashion that will enable the organizations’ capabilities to seam together for the common purpose. Given the vastness of “homeland security,” it is important that DHS, as a relatively new cabinet department, set clear goals, objectives, and priorities for securing the United States, as well as instituting and instilling the OneDHS culture. Among the most important elements of effectively implementing OneDHS, is the close adherence to key success factors. The success factors include: a) clarifying, defining, and communicating leadership roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority at all government levels; b) strengthening accountability systems; c) consolidating the mission of preparedness; and d) enhancing the capabilities to respond to major disasters and emergencies. The quality and continuity of the new department’s leadership is critical to building and sustaining the long-term effectiveness of DHS and homeland security goals and objectives. There has been significant operational progress within DHS, as noted by Carafano, “Since 9/11, America has done a better job of defending itself,…learn[ed] what worked and what did not work in the war against terrorism.”64 Progress, in the homeland security enterprise framework, with increased integration among the various internal stakeholders, has been inconsistent. Carafano notes, “[g]etting the national homeland security enterprise right remains one of the most difficult challenges in Washington because it runs up against the standard Washington practices of over centralization, complacency, and entrenched politics.”65 The need
for a clear focal point within DHS for comprehensive strategy development, not just for operational and tactical missions, but to tackle as Carafano indicates, “[t]he inherent bureaucratic processes of federal decision making” is a key requirement for building the common culture known as OneDHS.

Conclusion

The DHS organization is dynamic. The pace of its operational growth has been unprecedented. With the release of both the BUR and the QHSR, it is clear that the many different missions, functions and operations of protecting the Homeland are a difficult but not an impossible task. The issues that permeated the DHS short-term vision and mission (2003-2008) are different from that of the long-term vision and goal. The long-term DHS goals must focus on the ways in which the DHS not only continues operational and tactical programmatic missions, but also on transforming the internal integration of twenty-two agencies into “one team” or OneDHS. There will always be policy tradeoffs as DHS seeks to incorporate the OneDHS culture into an ever-changing environment impacted by budget and personnel. The need for a systematic process about the culture, which comes under continued political, economic and Congressional stresses, is apparent.

OneDHS is the strategy that DHS should give greater attention to relating to having a workable command structure to support the internal operational imperatives of the department. The current organizational culture of DHS does not match its goals or its stated responsibilities. In order to be successful, the organization needs modified internal beliefs and to create the culture roadmap to define the OneDHS culture. This will improve the operational and tactical arenas to align with its stated goals and functions as well as the strategic OneDHS culture. An effective organization will align its personnel structure better to meet the diverse required
mandates of the DHS mission. As noted by Carafano, the DHS has “[t]wo long-term projects … to undertake which must include… [e]stablishing the national homeland security enterprise; and [i]mproving federal interagency operations.”

Mr. Carafano further poses that “[t]he constant turmoil impose on the DHS has adversely affected operations, distracted the leadership, and slowed the process of establishing effective processes and procedures. The first priority…should be to end unwarranted tinkering.” The unwarranted tinkering has lessened the opportunity to create and implement the OneDHS culture. It needs noting that the homeland security culture of OneDHS requires a new understanding of policies, procedures and path forward. DHS personnel must reflect the new way of doing business that is fundamentally different from the business practices taught at their own stovepipe entity, which focused historically on their own culture and hierarchy. DHS can begin an initial instruction period of training that provides OneDHS programming that instills the information of the new DHS enterprise. This training should ensure that there is a single DHS doctrine for homeland security captured in one place and promulgated throughout the agency.

While many experts on “homeland security” have argued that DHS should adopt a Goldwater-Nichols Act like reformation similar to the Department of Defense, this thesis argues that a coercive approach will not work for homeland security. Strengthening the status quo via regulation is neither optimal nor plausible, whereas the normative approach has emerged as an opportunity for unparallel success. Incremental increases in the internal integration of the DHS roles and missions through the QHSR and BUR have ensured that DHS senior leadership remains engaged and confident in the OneDHS commitment. It is clear that DHS still has work to do, but homeland security is a shared responsibility best handled through a normative approach to organizational behavior. Adopting a normative approach to organization behavior is
needed to turnaround DHS and instill an OneDHS culture. For a OneDHS culture has important implications for the future of homeland security initiatives as well as DHS as an organization. E pluribus Unum. “Out of many, one.” One DHS. Our founding fathers continue to play an important and guiding role.
Endnotes:

5 Ibid. p. 4.
6 Ibid. p. 4.
7 Ibid. p. 5.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
20 Ibid, 12.
25 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
33 Ibid, 5.
34 Ibid, 13.


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Sharie Bourbeau, comment on Homeland Security Culture and Reorganization, 17 February 2012.


Colonel Michael Edwards, USAF, Goldwater Nichols for Homeland Security, pg 65


Ron Fisher, comment on culture and DHS reorganization 19 January 2012


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Figure A

DHS Organizational Chart (proposed) January 24, 2003
Figure B

**Traditional Responsibilities**
- Maritime Security
- Trade Facilitation
- Foreign Agriculture Threats
- Migration Security
- Aviation Security
- Emergency Management
- Land Border Security
- Immigrant Administration
- Transportation Security
- and Enforcement
- Leadership Protection
- Intelligence and Law
- Financial System Security
- Enforcement

**New Threats and Evolving Hazards**
- Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Illegal Trafficking and Related Transnational Crime
- Global Terrorism
- Smaller Scale Terrorism
- Cyber Attacks
- Pandemics and Natural Disasters

**Core Homeland Security Mission Areas**
- Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security
- Securing and Managing Our Borders
- Enforcing and Administering Our Immigration Laws
- Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace
- Ensuring Resilience to Disasters

Elements of Problem solving

~ **Problem Definition:** Recognizing, defining, and understanding the nature and scope of the problem

~ **Alternative Courses of Action:** Identifying and judging the merits, feasibility, and potential promise of different possible approaches to addressing the problem

~ **Resource Availability:** Possessing adequate human, fiscal, and material resources and the ability to muster the resources needed to address the problem

~ **Managerial Capability:** Possessing adequate managerial and administrative capability needed to orchestrate efforts to address the problem

~ **Leadership:** Having the skills, vision, knowledge, experience, interest, understanding, initiative, commonsense, courage, sense of responsibility, ingenuity, creativity, commitment, and tenacity to determine and carry out a course of action, and having the flexibility and perceptivity to change course as changing circumstances may require.

Source: Dr. Paula Gordon  GordonHomeland.com
### Figure D

#### Types of Organizational Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First-Order-Change</td>
<td>Alterations or modification in existing system characteristics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-Order Change</td>
<td>Radical, more fundamental change changing the organization’s deep structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evolutionary Change</td>
<td>95% of change that occurs continuous change, ongoing, evolving, and cumulative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episodic Change</td>
<td>Infrequent, discontinuous, and intentional organizational changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary Change</td>
<td>Major change in the system, a “jolt” that will never leave the organization the same again</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robust Transformation</td>
<td>The environment undergoes an abrupt, unexpected, significant, but temporary shock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Change</td>
<td>Involves improving the alignment among an organization’s environment, strategy, and organization design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large-Scale Change</td>
<td>Change in areas such as formal structures, work systems, beliefs, and social relationships internally and/or externally )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformational Change</td>
<td>Complex, involving activities that are aimed at changing the basic culture of the organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punctuated Equilibrium</td>
<td>Depicts organizations as evolving through relatively long periods of stability in their basic patterns of activity that are punctuated by relatively short bursts of fundamental change</td>
</tr>
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Source:
Figure E.

**Effective Change Management**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOTIVATING CHANGE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Creating readiness for change</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Overcoming resistance to change</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CREATING A VISION</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Describing the Core Ideology</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Constructing the Envisioned Future</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEVELOPING POLITICAL SUPPORT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Assessing Change Agent Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Identifying Key Stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Influencing Stakeholders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MANAGING THE TRANSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Activity Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Commitment Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Management Structures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUSTAINING MOMENTUM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Providing Resources for Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Building a Support System for Change Agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Developing New Competencies and Skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reinforcing New Behaviors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Staying the Course</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cummings and Worley, Organization Development and Change, p. 164
Figure F

Security Culture Model

CULTURE ROADMAP

CHANGE MODEL

SECURITY CULTURE

Beliefs and

Transformational Change

Sustainable Change

Source:
Source:
Figure H:

Schein’s Culture Model (Modified)

VALUES

Manifestation → Realization

ASSUMPTIONS

Interpretation

ARTIFACTS

Symbolization

SYMBOLS

Source: