This paper looks at the need to rebalance the use of military force in support of U.S. foreign policy after the expected withdrawal of U.S. troops from combat operations in Afghanistan. It analyzes the need to update grand strategy, recommends adjustments to State Department structure, and identifies issues with current war powers.
Rebalancing the Use of Force: Military Action and U.S. Foreign Policy Beyond 2014

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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AY 11-12
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title:  Rebalancing the Use of Force:  Military Action and U.S. Foreign Policy Beyond 2014

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Thesis:  As the United States concludes its protracted campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan amid uncertain economic fears, the American people and many policymakers will likely advocate a “never again” attitude toward limited military conflicts which they perceive to be neither desirable nor necessary to secure vital national interests.  As America now ponders its future challenges and updates its strategic policies, the United States must rebalance its use of force to ensure it remains a viable means of statecraft.

Discussion:  At the end of World War II, the United States was thrust into an unfamiliar position as the leader and sole protectorate of freedom and democracy around the world. The fear of Soviet Communism compelled the United States to reorganize the Executive branch and create bureaucratic structure to meet the demands required of a rising superpower seeking to project power across the globe. The Executive branch of government grew more powerful at the expense of the Legislative, and the militarization of American foreign policy has increased steadily ever since. The end of the Cold War proved democracy superior to communism, but instead of returning to its roots of small government and a foreign policy of relative isolation, American foreign policy evolved to include humanitarian missions and prevention of genocide during the 1990s. Military action became the primary tool to create America’s vision of a new world order, regulating other elements of statecraft – diplomatic, information and economic to the shadows. After 9/11 the military remained the instrument of choice as the U.S. embarked on preemptive operations to defeat terror organizations and spread democracy abroad.

Conclusion:  The United States must reevaluate its continued reliance on military action. In an effort to rebalance the tools of national power and ensure a more complimentary relationship, the United States must update its Cold War-era grand strategy, strengthen political-military collaboration to meet the demands of the Information Age, and clarify just how the nation will go to war in the future.
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DISCLAIMER

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Preface

First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to my faculty mentor, Dr. John Gordon, whose expert advice, tireless assistance, and meticulous editing made this effort possible. Every time I left his office with a new book or insight that was crucial in my research. I would also like to recognize my mother-in-law, Ginny Frank, for her assistance in editing and in citing several sources. A special thank you to my beautiful daughter, Maggie, who allowed me a quiet place at home to write without much complaint. Finally, I would like to thank my loving wife, Susan. She is my most trusted friend, supporter, and honest editor, even when it hurts to hear.
As the United States concludes its protracted campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan amid fears of uncertain economic times, the American people and many policymakers will likely advocate a “never again” attitude toward limited military conflicts which they perceive to be neither desirable nor necessary to secure vital national interests. However, the globalized and interconnected world will demand continued American military intervention to maintain stability during crisis, to promote global prosperity, and to safeguard economic opportunities abroad. As current military strategy shifts to place a premium on the use of air and sea power, supported by special operations and conventional ground forces, prudence dictates the development of guidelines to ensure the future utility of force as a sensible means to further core national interests and limit eagerness to solve political crisis solely with military might. This effort is necessary to ensure the United States approaches potential military conflict with a balanced perspective, applies appropriate force levels of various types to achieve necessary objectives, and manages the desire to win with the emerging necessity to steer future conflicts to a successful conclusion once strategic aims have been attained. Since the United States emerged from World War II as a predominant power, and in response to perceived Soviet aggression, the United States “militarized” its foreign policy at the expense of other sources of national power. As America now ponders its future challenges and updates its strategic policies, the nation must rebalance its use of force to ensure it remains a viable means of statecraft.

A Nation With Exceptional Roots

Throughout much of the history of the United States, American foreign policy has been guided by the virtues of American exceptionalism, a great desire to shine the beacon of freedom and liberty abroad. The roots of American exceptionalism are defined in the Declaration of Independence of 1776, which asserts that, “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."¹ The *U.S. Constitution*, ratified in 1789, protects these unique principals of government. It has been argued that in the history of the world, no other government, regime or authority championed such ideas, let alone created itself on the foundation of such a noble concept.

With origins dating back to Jamestown in Virginia and later the Puritan colony settlements in Massachusetts, American exceptionalism denotes the extraordinary character of the United States as a uniquely free nation built on democratic ideals and personal liberty. In 1630 John Winthrop proclaimed, “We shall be as a city upon a hill. They eyes of all people are upon us, so that if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work we have undertaken and so cause him to withdraw his present help from us, we shall be made a story and a byword throughout the world.”² Many believe the United States is a model that should be emulated by the rest of the world. Ronald Reagan, U.S. President from 1981 to 1989, repeatedly invoked the “city upon a hill” metaphor. However, most fail to consider that many societies are not prepared for democracy. The Founding Fathers, that is the winners of the War of Independence with Britain and the framers of the U.S. Constitution, noted this truth on several occasions. Alexander Hamilton wrote, “What may be good at Philadelphia may be bad at Paris and ridiculous at Petersburg,” and John Adams remarked that establishing republican governments in Latin America was, “As absurd as similar plans would be to establish democracies among the birds, beasts and fishes.”³
Although the Founding Fathers warned against becoming entangled in affairs overseas, America’s readiness to export these ideas can be found in the War of 1812 with the attempted invasion of Canada and certainly in the 1823 Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine warned European nations not to colonize or meddle with affairs in the Western hemisphere and that such acts would be seen as aggression necessitating the United States’ intervention. While Manifest Destiny and the “white man’s burden” certainly fueled American expansionism in the 19th Century, it was victory in World War II that brought to America’s shores not only a rejuvenated sense of commitment to American exceptionalism, but for the first time the military power and reach to spread these ideas across the globe.

To comprehend the transformation of American foreign policy in the modern era, it is essential to examine the strategic dynamics after World War II. During the Cold War, that is the period from September 1945 to December 1991, when Western powers led by the United States, and the communist world, led by the Soviet Union, were locked in a continuous political and military struggle, the United States focused almost exclusively on an enemy whose philosophy was the antithesis of these American ideals. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, during the interwar years, the United States embarked on various humanitarian missions across the globe in an effort to minimize human rights violations and ease suffering. In stark contrast, U.S. foreign policy shifted dramatically on September 11, 2001. In the post-9/11 world, America’s foreign policy focused on prevention and preemption, primarily through the use of military force.

A Cold War: September 1945 to December 1991

As the fires of World War II still smoldered, a lack of trust and non-negotiable political differences between East and West ignited the Cold War and the militarization of U.S. foreign
policy first began to exert itself. Lasting more than forty years, this ideological battle between the United States and the Soviet Union did not involve direct military conflict, but rather, proxy wars around the globe, as well as a protracted arms race that forever changed the capabilities of both militaries. The balance of Western power had tipped from Europe, specifically Great Britain, to the United States. With Europe’s economy and infrastructure devastated, America, an economic and military superpower with technological superiority and atomic weapons, saw itself as the only viable roadblock to prevent the uncontrolled spread of evil Communist ideology by the Soviet Union. U.S. policies focused on preventing the spread of Communism at any cost as “The concept of national interest changed dramatically after World War II, and all aspects of U.S. policy during the Cold War were designed to promote the ‘new’ national interest.” In February 1946, a U.S. diplomat stationed in Moscow, George Kennan, outlined a strategy of containment in the now famous “Long Telegram” and in 1947 penned the Foreign Affairs article “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” to disclose his views to the public. This containment strategy stated that the Soviet Union would aggressively try to expand, and the United States must use counter-force anywhere in the world to contain them.

In a March 1947 speech, President Truman unveiled his grand strategy. “The Truman Doctrine …established the precedent of using foreign aid…as an instrument of foreign policy. It also made clear … that the United States would use military force not only within its own hemisphere (Monroe Doctrine) or when democratic ideals were threatened, but in support of any country fighting communism anywhere in the world.” Beginning in 1948, the Marshall Plan, as well as the Soviets’ Berlin Blockade and the West’s airlift to break it, became symbols of the United States’ resolve and commitment to the Truman Doctrine and ideals of American
exceptionalism. Both demonstrated to the Soviet Union as well as to Western Europeans that the United States was willing to back up its words with action in order to help contain the Soviets.

A dramatic shift in American foreign policy to fight the Cold War could not be executed without a historic restructuring of the Executive Branch. The National Security Act of 1947 reorganized and unified several aspects of the U.S. Government. It merged the War and Navy Departments into a Department of Defense headed by a civilian, established the Central Intelligence Agency, and created the National Security Council. This massive restructuring effort was seen as vital for America to triumph in the Cold War as, “[T]he military became an important and overt instrument of U.S. foreign policy; the success of U.S. foreign policy was tied directly to military might. For the United States to play a major world role, not only did it have to have a credible military force, but also it had to be perceived as willing to use that force to support its foreign policy goals. Therefore, the country needed a structure that more firmly linked the military to the civilian sides of policy-making.”

In an effort to strengthen U.S. and Western European ties both politically and militarily, the North Atlantic Alliance of April 1949 formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The North Atlantic Alliance proclaimed the U.S. and Western European nations’ agreement that an armed attack against any one of them would be considered an attack against them all. However, just six months later, on August 29, 1949, the Soviets successfully test detonated an atomic device, ending America’s nuclear monopoly. America had long assumed its technical superiority to the Soviets, and this new atomic threat forced policymakers to reevaluate their early Cold War policies.

Perhaps the most influential document to guide American decisions during the Cold War was the “National Security Council Report 68: United States’ Objectives and Programs for
National Security” (NSC 68). Published April 14, 1950, and top-secret until 1975, this fifty-eight page report endured over the next twenty years as the underlying principal for strategic thinking. It put forth the premise of a bipolar world and determined that the United States must rapidly expand its nuclear arsenal and conventional military forces in order “to have the military power to deter, if possible, Soviet expansion, and to defeat, if necessary, aggressive Soviet or Soviet-directed actions of a limited or total character.” In essence, the United States had committed itself to spending one fifth of its Gross National Product (GNP) on the military in an arms race against the Soviet Union. America’s armed forces increased from 1.5 million to 3.5 million personnel. Military budgets quadrupled over the next twenty years as “NSC-68 became the ‘field manual’ for waging the Cold War.”

On June 25, 1950, the communist North Korean People’s Army attacked south across the 38th Parallel in an effort to topple the democratic government of South Korea. The U.S. decision to assist South Korea in what was seen as a police action at the onset of hostilities had several impacts to U.S. foreign policy. First and foremost, the United States committed to an open-ended defense of South Korea. Second, “the Korean War prompted a policy reversal regarding Indochina, in particular Vietnam.” The domino theory took root and had far reaching implications in leading to a protracted American escalation of the Vietnam conflict.

The arms race between the United States and Soviet Union continued to heat up throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s. Each side amassed huge nuclear arsenals, and a doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD) emerged. MAD stipulated that the only way to reduce the threat of nuclear warfare was to ensure that neither side could hope to survive an attack. In a bizarre manner, more nuclear weapons coupled with diverse second-strike systems fueled tensions on both sides while also fostering nuclear restraint and deterrence. Recognizing
the economic unsustainability of the arms race, political figures on both sides began arms control
talks that eventually led to caps on the number of nuclear weapons each side could hold.
However, this period of détente was short-lived as a new President, committed to decisively
ending the Cold War, took office.\textsuperscript{14}

Ronald Reagan’s first-term as president was characterized by hostile rhetoric, including
references to the Soviet Union as an “evil empire,” an arms buildup, and a 34% increase in
defense spending between 1981 and 1985.\textsuperscript{15} This strategy sought to capitalize on the economic
aspect of the arms race by forcing the Soviet Union to spend increasingly scare funding on
military build-up and weapons systems in order to compete with the United States. Another
strategy employed by Reagan and later dubbed the “Reagan Doctrine” was to provide aid to
insurgencies in key areas such as Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Cambodia and Angola – irrespective
of whether the ideals of the insurgents were compatible with the United States’ policy of
supporting democracy. In places like Afghanistan, this had the effect of bogging the Soviet
Union down in wars it could not win -- consuming valuable economic and military resources.
Weighing the opinions of Secretary of State George Schulz, who contended that diplomacy
would only work if the USSR believed the United States stood ready to use force, against the
philosophy outlined in Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger’s “Use of Military Force”
speech, including prerequisites such as the existence of vital national security interests and the
 guarantee of public support before committing troops, dubbed the Weinberger Doctrine, Reagan
sent troops to Guatemala and bombed Libya – sending a clear message to Moscow\textsuperscript{16}.

Perhaps the most fortuitous development for Regan was the rise to power of Mikhail
Gorbachev in 1985. Gorbachev represented a new breed of Soviet leader – one who understood
the dire circumstances his country was facing and who was willing to work with the West. This
readiness to cooperate, coupled with Regan’s softening stance on the Soviet Union, set the stage for talks that resulted in commitments to significant reductions in strategic arsenals. Reagan’s willingness to negotiate with the Soviets during his second term as well as Gorbachev’s foreign policy overhaul led to democratic revolutions in eastern Europe and the eventual fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. After more than forty years, the Soviet threat was neutralized. By expanding the military and creating new and fearsome weapons systems, the United States prevailed. Far from being a time of celebration and pacification, the end of the Cold War brought with it immense uncertainty for the world’s only remaining superpower.

**A Tepid Peace: January 1992 to September 2001**

The abrupt fall of the Berlin Wall and the effective end to the Cold War was a happenstance that the United States government was unprepared for and an event that left it scrambling to form a coherent foreign policy in a world that had shifted overnight. Where two superpowers had once served as stabilizing forces in regions under their respective influence, now nationalist, ethnic and religious conflict erupted. Using military force to support idealistic goals, the administrations of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton were marked with indecision, inaction, and contradiction as America struggled to define and balance its national interests with its humanitarian-driven worldview in an effort to live up to the ideals of American exceptionalism.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, President George H.W. Bush’s administration appeared to adopt a wait-and-see approach to foreign policy. When national interests were clearly at stake, such as the threat to America’s oil supply, Bush took decisive action. After Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Bush worked through the United Nations to establish a coalition of international troops to respond to the aggression. In what he called the “new world order,” Bush
envisioned a scenario such as this that even brought the Soviet Union and United States together on the same side. With American and international citizens watching a war unfold live for the first time on their televisions, U.S.-led forces decisively drove the Iraqis out of Kuwait and ended the war in forty-three days. This stunning victory was the result of using “overwhelming force” and strictly adhering to General Colin Powell’s version of the Weinberger Doctrine labeled the Powell Doctrine, which stipulated exhausting all “political, economic and diplomatic means,” before taking military action.18

Decisions about whether to intervene militarily in other conflicts were not so readily resolved. When war resulted from Croatia and Slovenia declaring their independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, Bush was unsure whether this conflict, in contrast to Kuwait, was in the national interest. Ultimately, Secretary of State James Baker described the administration’s decision not to intervene when he said the United States “had no dog in this fight.”19 Conversely, months before the end of his term, Bush would send troops to Somalia in 1992 as part of a UN mission. Both these decisions would have repercussions for the next administration.

The decision to go to Somalia broke with the Powell Doctrine as the United States had no strategic or political interest in the small African country. Critics argued that starvation was worse in other African countries but that Somalia was chosen because it was easily accessible. Blurring the line between doing what is in the best interest of the country and what the masses demand, “critics believed Somalia gained attention simply because television highlighted the starvation there. U.S. policy and lives, in other words, were becoming dependent on decisions made in the offices of CNN, ABC, NBC, and CBS.”20 After eighteen American soldiers were killed in Mogadishu in 1993, Clinton withdrew U.S. troops. The Somalia experience had a profound effect on the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 which laid out criteria under
which U.S. troops would participate in UN operations and whether the U.S. would support such UN missions at all.

After an embarrassing incident in Haiti where U.S. troops sent on a training mission were unable to disembark due to safety concerns, the Clinton administration shifted its focus back to the former Yugoslavian republic. During discussions on how to respond to the crisis in Yugoslavia, UN Ambassador Madeline Albright pushed for military intervention in direct opposition to JCS chairman Colin Powell. During one heated discussion, she confronted Powell by asking him, “What’s the point of having this superb military that you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?” Clinton would later make her his Secretary of State.

In a throwback to Wilsonianism, Clinton espoused the ideals set forth in the 1997 report “National Security Strategy for a New Century” which “suggests that U.S. military intervention may be appropriate “to respond to, relieve, and/or restrict the consequences of human catastrophe.” Using military force in this way was termed “new interventionism” and was one of the cornerstones of the Clinton Doctrine which advocates combating instability in areas the United States does not have a national interest in before it spreads to areas where American interests lie. It became one of the rationales Clinton used to justify bombing Kosovo in 1997.

In what is seen as a time of inconsistent and contradictory foreign policy, the United States “cherry picked” reasons and methods for intervention while ignoring glaring human rights violations in countries such as Rwanda. In a significant change, the military began to be used for humanitarian missions rather than for national security. America’s approach to world affairs seemed to lack vision as to its mission and purpose overseas. All this was to come into razor-sharp focus on September 11, 2001.
A Decade on Fire: October 2001 to December 2011

From the screening process at the airport and concerns over privacy to worries about security and how we judge those who are a different culture or religion from us, September 11, 2001, was truly a watershed moment for America. However, the area where 9/11 may have had the most effect, is one many Americans do not consider. September 11 and the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan forever altered how America conducts its foreign policy and how it is perceived by the world.

The attacks on 9/11 were the acts of a nonstate group on the continental United States that had not seen an enemy attack since 1812. Up until this day, George W. Bush’s foreign policy objectives seemed to be one of shrinking world involvement. By pulling out of the Kyoto protocol, suspending talks with North Korea and withdrawing from the SALT I treaty, Bush sent clear signals that he was willing to act unilaterally and would only do what was in the clear national interest.

Following 9/11 Bush quickly realized that an isolationist approach to world affairs would not work. There was overwhelming international and Congressional support for the president including the invocation by NATO of Article 5 of its charter which allowed for a collective military response. Most agreed that al Qaeda was directly responsible for the attacks and that the Taliban was indirectly responsible as the host of this terrorist group. In October 2001, the United States launched attacks in Afghanistan.

As operations in Afghanistan lingered on, the Bush administration began to shift their focus to Iraq. Issued in September 2002, the National Security Strategy of the United States, which largely became known as the Bush Doctrine, stated that the U.S. was willing to act by itself and preemptively if necessary in order to prevent terrorist attacks. This signified a break in
U.S. tradition since the end of World War II when most foreign policy was conducted through alliances and in the spirit of cooperation. This doctrine was a product of the neoconservatives in the administration who believed in American exceptionalism with countries holding free market American ideals, in a dominant, unchallengeable military and in military resources for nation building – a concept Bush initially opposed. This doctrine became the basis for justification of military action in Iraq, which subsequently evaporated the international goodwill the United States had acquired following 9/11.

While Obama made good on his campaign pledge to end the war in Iraq, he escalated operations in Afghanistan. The violence of the Arab Spring, a wave of demonstrations and protests across North Africa and the Arab Middle East, brought down the U.S. allied government in Egypt and resulted in U.S. involvement in NATO-led military operations in Libya. Tensions with Iran over their attempts to weaponize nuclear material and the succession of Kim Jong II’s son in North Korea also became ongoing areas of concern for the Obama administration.

The 9/11 attacks left the U.S. in unprecedented waters. In an effort to ensure national security, decisions were made in reaction to events rather than in following a grand strategy that would steer the country through this difficult time. The military was utilized as never before to carry out policy decisions made in Washington. Though it is impossible to tell so soon what the long-term implications are of such short-sighted planning, it is clear to many that the United States has weakened its position internationally as “U.S. primacy and unilateral actions were widely viewed in other capitals as menacing rather than reassuring to global security.”

The Way Forward

The militarization of American foreign policy began during the Cold War and has increased steadily ever since. During the 1990s, as foreign policy evolved to include
humanitarian missions and prevention of genocide, military action was the primary tool utilized in the diplomatic arsenal consequently regulating other elements of statecraft – diplomatic, information and economic to the shadows. After 9/11, the military remained the instrument of choice as the U.S. embarked on preemptive operations to defeat terror organizations and spread democracy abroad. The time has come, however, when the United States must reevaluate its continued reliance on military action. In an effort to rebalance the tools of national power and ensure a more complimentary relationship, the United States must update its Cold War era grand strategy, strengthen political-military collaboration, and clarify Executive authorities to take the nation to war.

A Restatement of Grand Strategy

"Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?"
"That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," said the Cat.
"I don’t much care where--" said Alice.
"Then it doesn’t matter which way you go," said the Cat.
"--so long as I get SOMEWHERE," Alice added as an explanation.
"Oh, you’re sure to do that," said the Cat, "if you only walk long enough."

-Lewis Carroll, Alice In Wonderland\textsuperscript{26}

Though the United States routinely releases foreign policy updates and strategic assessments such as the National Security Strategy, it has been some time since a comprehensive retooling of grand strategy, “the purposeful employment of all of the assets of a state, not only to the use of the military instrument.”\textsuperscript{27} It articulates a vision, helps set priorities, identifies near and long term costs, and explains possibilities to its own people and other states. Its utility cannot be underestimated because, “even as the specifics of how to best implement a grand strategy may be hotly debated, the broad contours of the vision, if shared, can help set a direction for the country that can be sustained over time and across administrations.”\textsuperscript{28} Unfortunately, current U.S. grand
strategy remains entrenched in the early days of the Cold War – containment, deterrence and unilateral action – with significant emphasis on the use of force. Because of the necessity for military power during the Cold War and its continued prominence today, American diplomatic policy also continues stagnate.

The challenge of updating grand strategy is immense, and to do so effectively requires enormous energy, commitment and a whole-of-government approach. The National Security Council (NSC) must form the nucleus of any effort to publish an updated grand strategy adapted to the complexities and new dynamics of the Twenty First Century. The interagency must commit to a thorough revision of grand strategy with the goal of producing a document similar to the 1950 NSC 68 report, the top-secret architecture that guided policymakers for more than twenty years during the Cold War. It is essential for the United States to overhaul its grand strategy if it is to remain a relevant and influential power on the global stage. To ensure these efforts yield a beneficial and lasting policy able to span multiple administrations, the Senate must ratify the new grand strategy and each new President will endorse the strategy within the first 100 days in office or direct the NSC to reconvene a grand strategy review. However, before the update can begin, certain considerations concerning the paradigm shift that took place at the close of the Twentieth Century must be understood.

First, policymakers cannot discount the dynamic effects of globalization and the interconnected nature of today’s globe. The undercurrents of the new multi-polar world are at odds with the U.S. worldview since America emerged as a superpower after World War II and became a hegemonic power after the Cold War. Policymakers must understand the new status quo and chart a fresh course for the United States by prioritizing and directing its ways (strategies) and means (resources) if America hopes to advance its desired ends (policy
objectives). “The collapse of the Soviet Union prompted the emergence of a more complex and unpredictable world in which the Cold War concepts of security and deterrence have less relevance.”

Globalization, fueled by information technology and economic interdependence, demands America’s vision of itself as the hegemonic superpower evolve. The continuing revolution in computer technology and the power of the Internet has “flattened” the global landscape while dramatically and rapidly redistributing global economic and informational power. One need only look as far as China, India or Brazil to see the effects of globalization on economic and information systems; the financial crisis of 2008 demonstrates that the United States can no longer afford to ignore these developments. U.S. hegemony will be challenged by rising economic powers in the coming decade. The world is rapidly developing a multi-polar power structure of traditional states, while simultaneously, complexities from stateless actors are surfacing.

Another consideration leaders must grasp before updating grand strategy is that while U.S. unilateralism was required to win the Cold War, continued reliance on this tactic is unsustainable and will only diminish America’s influence and power. The situation that resulted at the end of World War II was unique. Territorially, the United States remained virtually untouched by the war, whereas Europe and Japan lay in ruins. As the U.S. found itself at odds with its former ally, a communist Soviet Union, it could expect to receive little if any help from western democracies left shattered by the war. America’s industrial capacity, seemingly limitless resources and the U.S. military’s technological superiority harnessed to win World War II, merged with its ideas of American exceptionalism and forced the U.S. to take unilateral action to contain communist expansion, all the while propping up European and Japanese economies to
block the appeal of Marxist ideology. Neither of these conditions is prevalent today. Soviet communism failed in its attempt to flourish, and the economies of Europe and Japan have recovered and remain relatively secure. While suited to a bi-polar world where leaders can reasonably measure the response of a lone threat, exporting American culture and values is far more dangerous in today’s blurred, multi-polar environment where geopolitical and social politics are more difficult to gauge.

A final consideration that must be understood before tackling the problem of U.S. grand strategy revision is that overreliance on force by political leaders since the end of the Cold War has allowed “the American way of battle” to creep into political and strategic definitions of success. Drawing from Russell Weigley’s classic work, *The American Way of War*, Antulio Echevarria argues that the U.S. military’s style of waging war centers on achieving a decisive and rapid military victory over an enemy. “Americans—not unlike many of their European counterparts—considered war an *alternative* to bargaining, rather than part of an ongoing bargaining process, as in the Clausewitzian view. Their concept of war rarely extended beyond the winning of battles and campaigns to the gritty work of turning military victory into strategic success, and hence was more a way of *battle* than an actual way of war.”\(^{30}\) This approach has allowed policymakers to fixate on black and white political objectives – drawn from ideas of American exceptionalism – instead of the gray realities of a shifting global order. Adding to this problem, the lack of a relevant grand strategy obstructs these leaders from maintaining the proper context of long-term policy objectives in decision-making. Therefore, U.S. strategies tend to be reactionary and focus on near-term successes with little consideration of their effects on long-term U.S. interests. This is a natural tendency considering the political cycle of Congressional elections every two years and a Presidential election every four years. The effect of domestic
politics can sometimes lead to grave consequences for U.S. foreign policy. A refined grand strategy will do much to professionalize foreign policy decision-making by politicians with competing domestic interests.

Today a different approach is required as multiple powers emerge in the information age. “If we remain strategically adrift, it will be difficult, if not impossible to protect and advance our interests in the face of such varied and daunting national security challenges.” Grand strategy must take the emphasis off of decisive, overwhelming victory when military action is sanctioned. Instead, it must retool the premise for use of force as one method of statecraft to use in concert with others to resolve conflict and further U.S. interests. To do so successfully, the United States cannot afford to act alone. Beyond 2014, the United States must foster collaborative efforts to maintain regional stability to address “a crucible of challenges testing American leadership. Global problems, from violent extremism to worldwide recession to climate change to poverty, demand collective solutions, even as power in the world becomes more diffuse. They require effective international cooperation, even as that becomes harder to achieve.” U.S. leaders must make collaboration the cornerstone of U.S. grand strategy in the same manner that Cold War policymakers advocated containment and deterrence. Collaborative efforts between government agencies and international partners must replace unilateral action to defeat radical ideologies, today’s greatest threat to American interests and values. For this concept to meet success, military force can no longer be predominant as “the United States faces profound challenges that require strong, agile, and capable military forces whose actions are harmonized with other elements of U.S. national power.”
Political-Military Divides

*Broadly speaking, when it comes to America’s engagement with the rest of the world, you probably don’t hear this often from a Secretary of Defense, it is important that the military is – and is clearly seen to be – in a supporting role to civilian agencies.*


While a long-term context outlined in a modernized grand strategy is vital, alone it will not assure the effective use of force. Clausewitz’s commonly referenced definition of war maintains, “War is a continuation of policy by other means.” However, Clausewitz later clarifies his meaning when he states, “[W]ar is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.” The distinction is subtle but important. The use of the words “by other means” implies a divide where one action (diplomatic) stops and another (military) begins and vice versa. “With other means” provides a dramatically different connotation. Today’s complex environment demands leaders, both civilian and military, embrace “with other means.”

The most important fundamental governing the use of force is civilian control of the military. Since military force is an instrument of policy, civilian control legitimizes military operations. While this concept remains a central tenant, the information age is exposing gaps between the Department of State and the Department of Defense. Policy is directed by civilians but cannot ignore recommendations from military commanders. Likewise, when waging war, the opinions of civilian leaders must never be discounted. Since collaborative efforts are vital to ensuring a whole-of-government approach to foreign policy, organizational reforms must be made to make certain that political and military objectives are understood up and down the chain of command and across civilian and military leadership.
The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 made the most sweeping changes to the Department of Defense since it was established in the National Security Act of 1947. It elevated Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (JCS) power and established combatant commanders with incredible influence resulting in “a muscular JCS chairman in Washington and a network of heavily resourced combatant commanders overseas. Goldwater-Nichols all but guaranteed that the Pentagon would become the preeminent player in the execution, and eventually the planning, of national security policy.”

The increasing role of the Defense Department at the expense of the State Department has several critical aspects that need repair as the U.S. moves forward beyond the protracted conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. To safeguard its interests at home and abroad, the vital relationship between political and military nodes must be strengthened. Only then can government leaders employ an effective whole-of-government approach to implementing foreign policy as presented in the *National Security Strategy 2010*.

First, State’s regional bureaus must be realigned with Defense’s areas of responsibility to allow for effective coordination between the two departments, as “there are a few, but significant, differences. For example, the State Department includes North Africa in its Near East Bureau, while Central Command, which covers the Middle East, includes only Egypt among North African countries (Libya, Algeria, and Morocco, among others, fall under the African Command). Another difference: the Near East Bureau’s eastern border is Iran, and thus does not include Afghanistan, Pakistan, or the other -stans, which fall under the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs; all those countries fall under Centcom in the Defense Department.”

While many will argue that State does not need to involve itself with Defense’s Northern Command, the violence, drug cartels and corruption rampant across Mexico is a significant
threat to U.S. citizens. Border security and immigration, while a core function of the Department of Homeland Security also requires the State Department’s attention. A multi-polar world requires a regional outlook instead of a country-specific approach to foreign affairs. Matching the regional bureaus to the combatant command’s areas of responsibility streamlines communication channels between the two departments, allows for more rapid decision-making and less confusion. Iran’s influence in the Iraq and Afghanistan provides an example. The three countries fall under Central Command, but if the combatant commander wishes to coordinate with the State Department, he must coordinate with two separate regional bureau chiefs. Iraq and Iran fall under the Near East Bureau, while Afghanistan resides within the South and Central Asian Affairs Bureau.

Another issue that must be resolved is cultural. The Department of State, while often deliberate in its decision-making, does so because its leaders develop and implement long-term strategies. This is only natural since diplomacy is built on trust and relationships, requiring time and continuous effort. The culture within the Department of Defense is entirely different. Often seeking rapid and decisive victory with its technological edge, the military views problems in very finite terms. Since 2004, military commanders down to the battalion level have been allocated more than six billion dollars in Commander’s Emergency Relief (CERP) Funds in Iraq and Afghanistan. These funds, “can be dispensed quickly and applied directly to local needs, they have had a tremendous impact – far beyond the dollar value – on the ability of our troops to succeed in Iraq and Afghanistan. By building trust and confidence in Coalition forces, these CERP projects increase the flow of intelligence to commanders in the field and help turn local Iraqis and Afghans against insurgents and terrorists.” While effective at reducing violence, the projects funded by CERP have proven unsustainable once turned over to the control of
Afghans. This short-term view of using money as a weapon by the military often clashes with opinions in State – the department charged with heading reconstruction. While only one example of long-term versus short-term conflicts, CERP demonstrates the need for both departments to bridge their cultural divides.

The most important reform is structural. The Department of State has regional bureaus, but they lack any real authority and are, “merely support staff for the embassies (the ‘country teams’). If Defense were to mimic State’s structure, it would be akin to making European Command subservient to individual U.S. military bases in Europe.” While this structure proves effective in meeting day-to-day, normal peacetime diplomacy requirements, it is ill suited during a time of war in the information age.

To close the gap that exists in State Department leadership at the regional level when the U.S. is conducting major combat operations, Special Representatives must be empowered to serve as regional ambassadors. Career Foreign Service officers, not political appointees, will fill these positions. They will be nominated during wartime by the Secretary of State and the President and confirmed by the Senate for fixed, renewable terms similar to the process for appointing combatant commanders. The Special Representative will lead the regional bureau responsible for the affected region and have authority over the ambassadors of specific countries designated by the President. This position fills a current void and allows for effective political-military partnership at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war. Once no longer required, the President recommends the Special Representative be dissolved but the Senate shall consent.

Future conflict demands a whole-of-government approach. A realistic starting point to institute necessary reforms is to focus on closing serious gaps between the State and Defense
Departments. Realigning geographic breakdowns, overcoming cultural barriers and overhauling State’s wartime structure are necessary changes that must be instituted to further unity of effort and legitimacy of the operation.

War Powers

_It is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority._

-Alexander Hamilton, _Federalist Paper #8_43

A grand strategy provides the basis for when to take military action, while reforms to strengthen the relationship between State and Defense enhance opportunities to achieve unity of effort during a conflict. The final factor that must be addressed is how the United States commits its armed forces to battle and under whose authority. While these questions have been argued since the birth of the nation, the debate has become much more complex in the post-Vietnam War era.

Under the U.S. Constitution, war powers are divided because the drafters understood the solemn responsibilities inherent in waging war. They recognized that war and the government’s fear of foreign enemies posed grave threats to individual liberty. They also believed that in a democratic nation, the decision to go to war should be preceded by vigorous public debate and should only be made through consensus. At the same time, they acknowledged that the President needed authority to act decisively in genuine crises.44 Therefore, the framers of the Constitution vested in Congress the power to declare war and to raise and support the armed forces as stated in Article I, Section 8. The President, on the other hand, was granted full command authority with his designation as Commander-in-Chief pursuant to Article II, Section 2.45
In the wake of the undeclared and unpopular Vietnam War, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution of 1973, over the veto of President Richard Nixon, to check the power of the President in committing the United States to an armed conflict without the consent of Congress. The War Powers Resolution requires the President to notify Congress within forty-eight hours of ordering military action. This statute also prohibits military forces from remaining in action longer than sixty days, with an additional thirty-day withdrawal period, without Congressional authorization for the use of force or a declaration of war. Since its enactment almost forty years ago, the statute has been largely ignored, and nearly every U.S. President has declared the War Powers Resolution an unconstitutional check on Presidential power.

Led by General Creighton Abrams, U.S. Army Chief of Staff from 1972 to 1974, the military also responded in the aftermath of its Vietnam experience. Fueled largely by personal experience, General Abrams was appalled at America’s repeated unpreparedness for war, arguing, “You’ve got to know what influences me. We have paid, and paid, and paid again in blood and sacrifice for our unpreparedness.” As commander of military operations in Vietnam from 1968 to 1972, he learned firsthand the necessity of popular support during war. Abrams set out to fix the “hollow army,” broken in Vietnam. The end of the draft and transformation to an all-volunteer force, gave Abrams his opportunity to drive reform. In what became the Total Force Policy, more commonly called the “Abrams Doctrine,” the Army shifted combat support and combat service support necessary to sustain the Active Army in a large-scale conflict into the National Guard and Army Reserve. Abrams restructured the U.S. Army, “in a way that made it harder for a commander in chief to go to war, or at least harder to fight a war without having first sought the support of the American people for that war.” By the late 1980s, the Total Force Policy had so radically altered the structure that fifty-two percent of combat forces
and sixty-seven percent of remaining Army forces were Guard or Reserve. This ensured the all-volunteer Active component was not isolated from mainstream America because they were dependent on the citizen-soldier to get the job done. Where President Lyndon B. Johnson optioned out of calling up Guard and Reserve forces during Vietnam, the Total Force Policy demanded future Presidents mobilize the Guard and Reserves before committing military forces to large-scale, sustained conflicts.

What General Abrams failed to foresee, however, was the rise of civilian contractors. In 1985, the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) was established to, “preplan for the use of civilian contractors to perform selected services in wartime to augment Army forces…to release military units for other missions or fill shortfalls.” Used initially in limited capacities to cut costs, the employment of the LOGCAP expanded rapidly during the Clinton administration. In 1995, civilian contractors deployed alongside U.S. led NATO forces to Bosnia and the “private military industry came of age.” As the Twenty-First Century dawned, corporations like Kellogg, Brown and Root and DynCorp became common fixtures on battlefields, as the government became more dependent on outsourcing. “Deploying LOGCAP or other contractors instead of military personnel can alleviate the political and social pressures that have come to be a fact of life in the U.S. whenever military forces are deployed.” In other words, LOGCAP has superseded the Total Force Policy.

With the underlying purpose of “Abrams Doctrine” circumvented by LOGCAP, the War Powers Resolution of 1973 remains the only obstacle between the President and unchecked unilateral action. While Congress maintains the “power of the purse,” and could theoretically cut funding for military force, it is an act of political suicide. No politician will stand to be perceived as not supporting American troops deployed into harm’s way. The War Powers
Resolution, “is ineffective at best and unconstitutional at worst…it too narrowly defines the
president’s war powers to exclude the power to respond to sudden attacks on Americans abroad;
it empowers Congress to terminate an armed conflict by simply doing nothing; and it fails to
identify which of the 535 members of Congress the president should consult before going to
war.”

Therefore, Congress must consider the recommendation of the 2008 bipartisan group, co-
chaired by former Secretaries of State James Baker and Warren Christopher. The National War
Powers Commission, as it was called, determined after a year of study that the 1973 War Powers
Resolution should be replaced by a new law, “that would, except for emergencies, require the
president and Congressional leaders to discuss the matter before going to war.” They call their
new statute, the War Powers Consultation Act of 2009, and its principle purpose is, “to ensure
that the collective judgment of Congress and the President will be brought to bear in deciding
whether the United States should engage in significant armed conflict, ”a period longer than or
expected to be longer than a week.”

Regardless of whether or not Congress adopts the War Powers Consultation Act of 2009
as it is written or some other statute, the bottom line is the current law – the War Powers
Resolution of 1973 – is weak in substance and history has shown time and again over the
previous forty years that it fails to live up to its original purpose. The decision to wage war is
too important to be handicapped by such an ineffectual and futile law.

Conclusion

The review of the national defense strategy by the Obama administration presents a
unique opportunity to reexamine a fundamental pillar of American foreign policy – the
application of military force. Since the end of World War II, the United States has increasingly
relied on military power in its foreign policy doctrine. As the United States ends its military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, new debates will surface on whether military force should be the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. In today’s interconnected and globalized world, a new approach to foreign policy demands a restatement of U.S. grand strategy, a strengthening of political-military relationships and a reanalysis of the Total Force structure. Only then can America hope to rebalance its use of military force with the other means of statecraft and adapt to the challenges of a multi-polar world in the Twenty-First Century.
Endnotes


7 Kaufman, 79-80.

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9 Kaufman, 85.


12 Nojeim, 74.

13 Nojeim, 73-74.


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19 Nojeim, 228.

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24 Kaufman, 136.


26 Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland (Cambridge: Candlewick Press, 1999), 103-104.


31 Brimley, 4.


36 Clausewitz, 87.

37 Glain, 342.


42 Armstrong, 2.


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51 Scales, 18.


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Appendix A

The Weinberger Doctrine

1. The United States should not commit forces to combat unless the vital national interests of the United States or its allies are involved.

2. U.S. troops should only be committed wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. Otherwise, troops should not be committed.

3. U.S. combat troops should be committed only with clearly defined political and military objectives and with the capacity to accomplish those objectives.

4. The relationship between the objectives and the size and composition of the forces committed should be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.

5. U.S. troops should not be committed to battle without a "reasonable assurance" of the support of U.S. public opinion and Congress.

6. The commitment of U.S. troops should be considered only as a last resort.
Appendix B

The Powell Doctrine

1. Is a vital national security interest threatened?

2. Do we have a clear attainable objective?

3. Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?

4. Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted?

5. Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?

6. Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?

7. Is the action supported by the American people?

8. Do we have genuine broad international support?
Appendix C

Department of Defense Organizational Chart

Appendix E

U.S. Department of Defense Commanders’ Areas of Responsibility Versus U.S. Department of State Regional Bureaus

Appendix F

War Powers Consultation Act of 2009 (Proposed by the National War Powers Commission)

WAR POWERS CONSULTATION ACT OF 2009

WHEREAS, the War Powers Resolution of 1973 has not worked as intended, and has added to the divisiveness and uncertainty that exists regarding the war powers of the President and Congress; and,

WHEREAS, the American people want both the President and Congress involved in the decision-making process when United States armed forces are committed to significant armed conflict, and such involvement of both branches is important in building domestic understanding and political support for doing so and ensuring the soundness of the resulting decision; and,

WHEREAS, past efforts to call upon the Judicial Branch to define the constitutional limits of the war powers of the Executive and Legislative Branches of government have generally failed because courts, for the most part, have declined jurisdiction on the grounds that the issues involved are “political questions” or that the plaintiffs lack standing; and,

WHEREAS, it harms the country to have the War Powers Resolution of 1973, the centerpiece statute in this vital area of American law, regularly and openly questioned or ignored; and,

WHEREAS, the country needs to replace the War Powers Resolution of 1973 with a constructive and practical way in which the judgment of both the President and Congress can be brought to bear when deciding whether the United States should engage in significant armed conflict, without prejudice to the rights of either branch to assert its constitutional war powers or to challenge the constitutional war powers of the other branch.

NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED:

Section 1. Short Title.


Section 2. Purpose.

The purpose of this Act is to describe a constructive and practical way in which the judgment of both the President and Congress can be brought to bear when deciding whether the United States should engage in significant armed
conflict. This Act is not meant to define, circumscribe, or enhance the constitutional war powers of either the Executive or Legislative Branches of government, and neither branch by supporting or complying with this Act shall in any way limit or prejudice its right or ability to assert its constitutional war powers or its right or ability to question or challenge the constitutional war powers of the other branch.

Section 3. Definitions.

3(A). For purposes of this Act, “significant armed conflict” means (i) any conflict expressly authorized by Congress, or (ii) any combat operation by U.S. armed forces lasting more than a week or expected by the President to last more than a week.

3(B). The term “significant armed conflict” shall not include any commitment of United States armed forces by the President for the following purposes: (i) actions taken by the President to repel attacks, or to prevent imminent attacks, on the United States, its territorial possessions, its embassies, its consulates, or its armed forces abroad; (ii) limited acts of reprisal against terrorists or states that sponsor terrorism; (iii) humanitarian missions in response to natural disasters; (iv) investigations or acts to prevent criminal activity abroad; (v) covert operations; (vi) training exercises; or (vii) missions to protect or rescue American citizens or military or diplomatic personnel abroad.

3(C). The “Joint Congressional Consultation Committee” consists of:

(i) The Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives and the Majority Leader of the Senate;
(ii) The Minority Leaders of the House of Representatives and the Senate;
(iii) The Chairman and Ranking Minority Members of each of the following Committees of the House of Representatives:
   (a) The Committee on Foreign Affairs,
   (b) The Committee on Armed Services,
   (c) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and
   (d) The Committee on Appropriations.
(iv) The Chairman and Ranking Minority Members of each of the following Committees of the Senate:
   (a) The Committee on Foreign Relations,
   (b) The Committee on Armed Services,
(c) The Select Committee on Intelligence, and
(d) The Committee on Appropriations.

3(D). The Chairmanship and Vice Chairmanship of the Joint Congressional Consultation Committee shall alternate between the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Majority Leader of the Senate, with the former serving as the Chairman in each odd-numbered Congress and the latter serving as the Chairman in each even-numbered Congress.

Section 4. Consultation and Reporting.

4(A). The President is encouraged to consult regularly with the Joint Congressional Consultation Committee regarding significant matters of foreign policy and national security.

4(B). Before ordering the deployment of United States armed forces into significant armed conflict, the President shall consult with the Joint Congressional Consultation Committee. To “consult,” for purposes of this Act, the President shall provide an opportunity for the timely exchange of views regarding whether to engage in the significant armed conflict, and not merely notify the Joint Congressional Consultation Committee that the significant armed conflict is about to be initiated. If one of the military actions described in Section 3(B) of this Act becomes a significant armed conflict as defined in Section 3(A), the President shall similarly initiate consultation with the Joint Congressional Consultation Committee.

4(C). If the need for secrecy or other emergent circumstances precludes consultation with the Joint Congressional Consultation Committee before significant armed conflict is ordered or begins, the President shall consult with the Joint Congressional Consultation Committee within three calendar days after the beginning of the significant armed conflict.

4(D). Before ordering or approving any significant armed conflict, the President shall submit a classified report, in writing, to the Joint Congressional Consultation Committee setting forth the circumstances necessitating the significant armed conflict, the objectives, and the estimated scope and duration of the conflict.

4(E). If the need for secrecy or other emergent circumstances precludes providing such a report before significant armed conflict is ordered or begins, such a report shall be provided to the Joint Congressional Consultation
Committee within three calendar days after the beginning of the significant armed conflict.

4(F). For the duration of any significant armed conflict, the President shall consult with the Joint Congressional Consultation Committee at least every two months.

4(G). On the first Monday of April of each year, the President shall submit a classified written report to the Joint Congressional Consultation Committee describing (i) all significant armed conflicts in which the United States has been engaged during the previous year; (ii) all other operations, as described in Section 3(B) of this Act, other than covert operations, in which the United States was engaged in the same time period.

4(H). Congress shall employ a permanent, bi-partisan joint professional staff to facilitate the work of the Joint Congressional Consultation Committee under the direction of its Chairman and Vice Chairman. The members of the Joint Congressional Consultation Committee and the professional staff shall be provided all relevant national security and intelligence information.

Section 5. Congressional Approval or Disapproval.

5(A). If Congress has not enacted a formal declaration of war or otherwise expressly authorized the commitment of United States armed forces in a significant armed conflict, then within 30 calendar days after the commitment of United States armed forces to the significant armed conflict, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Congressional Consultation Committee shall introduce an identical concurrent resolution in the Senate and House of Representatives calling for approval of the significant armed conflict.

5(B). Such a concurrent resolution shall be referred to the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committees shall report on the concurrent resolution within seven calendar days. When the Committees so report, the concurrent resolution may be called up by any Senator or Representative, shall be highly privileged, shall become the pending business of both Houses, shall be voted on within 5 calendar days thereafter, and shall not be susceptible to intervening motions, except that each house may adjourn from day to day.

5(C). If the concurrent resolution of approval is defeated, any Senator or Representative may file a joint resolution of disapproval of the significant
armed conflict, and the joint resolution shall be highly privileged, shall become the pending business of both Houses, shall be voted on within five calendar days thereafter, and shall not be susceptible to intervening motions, except that each house may adjourn from day to day. The effect of the passage of this joint resolution shall not have the force of law unless presented to the President and either signed by the President or subsequently approved by Congress over the President’s veto, but Congress may specify the effect of the joint resolution of disapproval in the internal rules of each House of Congress.

5(D). Nothing in this Section 5 alters the right of any member of Congress to introduce a measure calling for the approval, disapproval, expansion, narrowing, or ending of a significant armed conflict.

Section 6. Treaties.
The provisions of this Act shall not be affected by any treaty obligations of the United States.

Section 7. Severability.
If any provision of this Act is held invalid, the remainder of the Act shall not be affected thereby.


