**Title:** Employment of the United States Marine Corps Operating Forces in a Post OIF/OEF Security Environment: To Engage, Respond, and Protect

**Author:** Sadowsky, Mark D.

**Performer Organization:** USMC Command and Staff College

**Performer Organization Address:** 2076 South Street, Quantico, VA 22134-5068

**Distribution Statement:** Unlimited

**Abstract:**

This report recommends a change to the force structure, employment, and operational tasking of the United States Marine Corps in a post OIF/OEF security environment. The operational concept revolves around the formation and deployment of a Maritime Expeditionary Team, a forward deployed joint and interagency unit that is task organized, regionally based, and specifically trained to engage with foreign partners and allies, respond to crises, and protect the interests of the United States as directed by the geographic combatant commanders.
EMPLOYMENT OF THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS OPERATING FORCES IN A POST OIF/OEF SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: TO ENGAGE, RESPOND, AND PROTECT

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTERS OF MILITARY STUDIES

MAJOR M.D. SADOWSKY

AY 10-11

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Donald F. Bittner, Ph. D., Professor of History
Approved: ____________ Date: 25 March 2011

Oral Defense Committee Member: J. William Gordon, Ph. D., Professor of History
Approved: ____________ Date: 25 March 2011
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Executive Summary

Title: Employment of the United States Marine Corps Operating Forces in a Post OIF/OEF Security Environment: To Engage, Respond, and Protect

Author: Major M.D. Sadowsky, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: By leveraging the unique capabilities of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force, in cooperation with our joint, combined, and interagency partners, the Marine Corps is positioned to meet the requirements outlined in the National Security Strategy by fundamentally altering the mission and structure of the current operating force.

Discussion: The Marine Corps is soon to enter its 10th year of combat operations serving as a de facto second land army of the United States. The Marine Corps has once again demonstrated the operational flexibility, leadership, and dedication required to divert from its role as the nation's primary maritime based force in readiness in order to accept the conventional land roles required by the continuing war on terror. However, as the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to move towards resolution, the Marine Corps must actively evaluate the future requirements for personnel, equipment, and capabilities in a post OIF/OEF environment. As the United States continues to plan for a conditions-based turnover in Afghanistan starting in 2011, the Marine Corps must determine the appropriate operational capabilities, equipment sets, and force structure in a post OIF/OEF security environment that will include a significant reduction in the Department of Defense's annual budget. With such vital questions about the future mission and roles of the Marine Corps within the DoD, the Commandant of the Marine Corps recently convened a Force Structure Review Group tasked specifically with answering these questions. The United States Marine Corps adds a unique set of capabilities to the military forces of the United States of America. These capabilities, combined with the expeditionary mindset that serves at the core of the Marine Corps philosophy, place the Corps in an enviable position as it moves forward in the post OIF/OEF environment. As an organization, the USMC is flexible enough to work with its joint, combined, and interagency partners to engage foreign governments and nations to help shape, deter, or win the battles of the tomorrow. In an era where many of the branches of the armed forces are struggling to determine what their future role will be, the Marine Corps for once is in an enviable position as the lead service within the Department of Defense of the future.

Conclusion: The future operational requirements of the Marine Corps can best be accomplished through the formation of Maritime Expeditionary Teams (MET) that are forward deployed, tied to the geographical combatant commands outline in the Unified Command Plan, task organized, trained and educated to meet the specific area of responsibility requirements, and capable of meeting the engagement requirements outlined in the 2010 National Security Strategy.
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Preface

The following paper is a product of the author’s questions about the future of the Marine Corps at the conclusion of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The “Crossroads of the Marine Corps” at Quantico, Virginia provides the ultimate intellectual cauldron to challenge the established norms, to analyze current doctrine, and to pursue alternative courses of action. The genesis of the Maritime Expeditionary Team (MET) concept was developed in response to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ remarks at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in the spring of 2010. Only later did the author become aware of the Marine Corps’ previously published concepts of a similar nature. Although the sequencing is incorrect, the author is attempting to improve, modify, and further develop the concepts already in the Marine Corps’ realm of consideration.

The purpose of this essay is to propose the MET concept and its related manning, training, and equipping issues. This document was not designed or intended to serve as a comprehensive or detailed plan for the implementation of the MET concept. As such, there are no specific details relating to end strength numbers, budget requirements, or procurement priorities. However, the study does outline a recommendation for the structure of the ground combat element; the other elements were omitted due to the author’s lack of subject matter knowledge as well as the limitations on the depth of the subject. There is much more work still to be done.

The end of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, several challenges to the future role of the Marine Corps by the Secretary of Defense, the fiscal realities facing the nation, the emergence of new global threats, and the evolution of new partnership
opportunities makes this a unique time in the history of the Marine Corps. As has happened in the past, the Corps will find the way to contribute to help advance the national and international interests of the United States — this study simply seeks to propose one possible option.

The following paper is a direct result of the freedom of thought inspired by the lively discourse provided on a daily basis in the “syndicate room” of Conference Group 11 under the watchful tutelage and mentorship of Lt Col T.D. Martin USAF, Dr. J.W. Gordon, and Dr. Andy Cobb. The author would also like to thank Dr. D.F. Bittner for graciously accepting to serve as my mentor and for taking the leap of faith that the topic would one day be refined enough to qualify for submission. Finally, this project would not have been possible without the close and continuous support of my wife, Cassandra, and my children, Hudson and Eleanor.
Introduction

The United States Marine Corps is about to enter a significant transitional period due to the end of its responsibilities for combat operations in Iraq, the eventual draw down of the mission in Afghanistan, and the budgetary reductions resulting from the global economic recession. The challenge to the current military and civilian leadership is to accurately forecast the service’s future missions and requirements in order to train, man, and equip the force for the forthcoming years. This paper will seek to forward a recommendation for the future employment of the operating forces within the USMC based on the projected role and mission of the Corps within the Department of Defense (DoD) in the post Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom period. This recommendation will continue to meet the requirements outlined in Title 10, Subtitle C, Part I, Chapter 507, section 5063 of the U.S. Code, in which the Marine Corps is directed to be “organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet…”

Punctuated Equilibrium

In 1972, Dr Stephen Jay Gould, an evolutionary theorist from Harvard University, published a theory that he called “punctuated equilibrium.” He suggested that species of the planet did not develop slowly over long periods of time, as had been previously believed, but that evolution occurred rapidly in response to a significant change in the environment. Other than these brief periods of rapid change, the world’s species remained in a relatively steady state, hence the concept of equilibrium punctuated by bursts of rapid change.
The U.S. military changes in much the same manner. Long periods of stability with regards to tactics and equipment are punctuated by startling developments in equipment and technology in response to changes in the battlefield environment. The advent of the tank during World War I, the amphibious tractor during World War II, or the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are all examples of significant developments that were rapidly conceived and implemented in order to meet the tactical needs on the battlefield. As the Marine Corps prepares to deescalate its commitments to the war in Afghanistan, the senior leadership is already focused on the operational capabilities, equipment sets, and force structure for the Marine Corps of tomorrow. Regardless of the final shape and character of the force resulting from this punctuated period, it must be capable of meeting the needs of the Corps in the future.

Force Structure Review

On September 21, 2010, the then Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James T. Conway, convened a Force Structure Review Group (FSRG) in Quantico, VA. The FSRG was tasked with developing options and recommendations for the size and missions of the Marine Corps starting in 2013. The initial guidance provided by Lieutenant General George Flynn, the Deputy Commandant for Combat Integration and Development, included making “a force capable of performing multiple missions, including rapid engagement, crisis response and power projection.” This FSRG is the fourth such group to meet over the course of the last six years. What specifically characterizes and differentiates this group from the previous ones it is that it was
convened in wake of several challenging statements made by the Robert M. Gates, the current Secretary of Defense (SecDef).

**Challenge to the Corps**

On May 7, 2010, during an address at the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Secretary Gates posed the rhetorical question that “since the Marines have essentially, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, played the role of second land army, what differentiates them from the Army? And what is their mission going forward that makes them unique?” The Secretary went on to say that the next Commandant (General Amos was not identified as the 35th Commandant of the Marine Corps at that point) would be challenged with determining the mission of the Corps post Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, Secretary Gates planned to use the views and opinions of the generals that he was interviewing for the position to help determine who would be appointed as the next Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Secretary Gates continued to challenge the future mission of the Marines during his remarks on August 12, 2010 at the Marines’ Memorial Hotel in San Francisco. During his address, the Secretary again questioned the overall mission of the Marine Corps and stated that “All of the military services have been challenged to find the right balance between preserving what is unique and valuable in their traditions, while at the same time making the changes necessary to win the wars we are in and prepare for the likely future threats in the years and decades to come.”

**Marine Corps Current Vision and Strategy**

Ironically, during this same time frame the USMC released two separate publications that specifically addressed the issues identified during the Secretary’s
remarks. The first of these documents was the *Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025* (2010). The stated purpose of this document was to “inform all Marines where we intend to take our Corps, to give Combatant Commanders a concept of how we might best be employed, and to provide our civilian leadership a reference point as to how we see Marine Corps contributions to national defense in the coming years and decades.” The essence of this document was to maintain and reinforce the competencies that highlight the Marine Corps as the expeditionary “force of choice” of the future by being “organized, optimized, modernized, and postured” to be “able to respond rapidly and decisively to crises anywhere in the world.”

The second significant document was the 3rd edition of the *Marine Corps Operating Concepts* (MCOC), published in June 2010. This comprehensive document identified two primary contributions by the USMC towards meeting the goals of the national security policy. These two missions can be loosely identified as “assuring littoral access, and responding to crises.” The MCOC also specified that fighting and winning “small wars” was included as a part of crisis response mission.

The Marine Corps undoubtedly expended countless man-hours on developing and publishing these products. As a vision for roughly the next 15 years, the concepts and ideas presented in the documents represented the USMC’s best estimate as to how it will contribute to the national security mission in the future. Secretary of Defense Gates’ comments with regards to the Marine Corps’ future mission so soon after the release of these documents indicated that he was looking for additional clarity or specificity.

**History of USMC Mission and Role Development**
As challenging as the Secretary’s comments were to the Corps in general, the leadership could at least take solace in the fact that this was not the first time that an administration had challenged the USMC to define itself and its role in protecting and preserving the nation’s interests at home and abroad. While Secretary Gates openly stated, “We will always have a Marine Corps,” his lack of specificity with regards to the size, missions, and role within the Department of Defense is a cause for concern, at least for those who view the Corps as a fourth, separate, and co-equal service.12

The USMC’s mission has changed several times throughout its storied history. From an expeditionary police force to a second land army, the USMC demonstrated operational flexibility, visionary leadership, and an almost prescient knowledge of the future requirements of the Corps. Famously, the Marine Corps during the interwar period between 1918 and 1941 was forced to decide whether they would be a “colonial constabulary or an amphibious warfare force.”13 Fortunately, starting with Lieutenant Colonel Earl H “Pete” Ellis, the USMC began to effectively identify how it would contribute to a future war in the Pacific against Japan. His vision of the Marine Corps contributions and capabilities in the Pacific as outlined in “Operation Plan 712H - Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia (1921),” helped frame the missions, techniques, and acquisition priorities before and during WWII.14

Following WWII, the USMC faced serious challenges to its future as an independent military service. Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Ret.), famously recounted the most serious challenge to the Marine Corps’ fight for existence in his book First to Fight – An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps. Lieutenant General Krulak, in writing a response to the Commandant’s direct question pertaining to why the
nation needed a Marine Corps, took an unusual approach by stating that America did not actually need one. This opinion was not seen as a work of heresy by generations of Marines only due to Krulak's amazing ability to accurately and openly admit that the nation did not really need a Marine Corps, but that the American people wanted one. This position was bold, brash, and a subtle work of genius.

Despite the Marine Corps significant contributions to the war in the Pacific its organizational future as a separate branch of the armed forces was in jeopardy in the roles and missions debate in the years after 1945. Lieutenant General Krulak was among a small and remarkable group of leaders within the Corps that banded together to create the Chowder Society, an organization dedicated to maintaining the Marine Corps as a separate branch of the military. The Chowder Society helped defend the Corps and "helped draft the National Security Act of 1947, the legislation that spells out Marine Corps roles and missions even today."15

Overview

Where Four Map Sheets Come Together

As Lieutenant General Krulak accurately identified in First to Fight, the USMC did not maintain a monopoly on operations in the domains of the land, air, and sea.16 To the contrary, the other branches of the military were able to focus effectively and specifically on each of these domains. What was unique about the Marine Corps was that it has "not relied on a single geographic domain to ensure our place in national defense and service to the Nation."17 The Marine Corps saw this lack of mastery and focus in one
specific domain as an advantage by providing a perspective and a capability that encompassed more than just one domain. By operating “where four map sheets intersect” the Marine Corps could influence combat operations by “effectively bridging the nation’s most critical seams between domains.” 18

USMC’s Role in the Range of Military Operations

This flexibility enabled the Marine Corps to conduct combat operations among, between, and across the air, land, and sea domains, particularly in those areas where the other services specialization precluded their participation in other forms of combat. The Marine Corps proved that it could seamlessly transition a capable and sustainable force from the sea onto land, all while integrating aviation elements into combat operations. Significantly, The Corps not only demonstrated the ability to operate in any physical combat environment but also that it could operate throughout the Range of Military Operations (ROMO), from large-scale conventional combat operations and irregular warfare to peacebuilding and domestic support. 19

Service as the Expeditionary Force in Readiness

One inherent danger arose from professing competence in a variety of military operations across such a wide range of potential environments: The service can be seen as the jack of all trades but the master of none. The Marine Corps effectively avoided this pitfall by developing and promoting an appropriate strategic communication message. The one consistent concept that permeated every Marine Corps publication was the idea that the Corps was the premier “Force in Readiness” for the U.S. military. This concept included the organization’s vision of itself as being expeditionary, capable of operating in austere environments, and forward deployed from the sea to meet the nation’s challenges.
to literally be ready as the “First to Fight.” Its *Vision and Strategy 2025* reinforced this concept by proclaiming the USMC’s “unique role as the Nation’s force in readiness.”

**Proposed Force Structure**

**Repositioning the Range of Military Operations**

Although the USMC maintains a combat force capable of operations across the ROMO, the current posture of the Corps is focused primarily on large-scale conventional operations. The focus on that mission drives the training, manning, equipping, and procurement cycles to support that capability. In recent years, the USMC has served as a second land army, a role that shaped procurement, training, and manning levels. This paper is based on the vision that the USMC needs to move in the opposite direction: to focus on the area of the ROMO focusing more on stability operations and less on conventional war (see Appendix A).

**MET Structure and Assignment**

Having stated the overall mission set for the Corps based on the position in the range of military operations, this study will now propose a force structure that will meet the needs of the DoD while maintaining the naval character and uniqueness of the Marine Corps. Based on the theme that form follows functions, the structure itself revolves around the concept of a Maritime Engagement Team (MET). A MET would be task-organized, regionally based, forward deployed, multi-mission capable force supported by the joint, combined, and interagency communities. The ground component of a MET would be a Regimental Combat Team (RCT) (reinforced) sized element capable of
detaching battalion sized Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) for service aboard amphibious shipping, for duty as an independent ground based capability, or as otherwise directed.

Each MET would maintain a habitual and direct support relationship with an established Geographic Combatant Command (GCC). The Combatant Commander (COCOM) would retain operational control over the RCT, to include the battalion-sized elements forward deployed to his area of operations. With a dedicated force and a persistent presence in the region, the COCOM would have the operational flexibility to commit these forces in support of existing contingencies, emergent humanitarian and disaster relief operations (HADR), or in support of the theatre security cooperation plan. There would be a standing MET for each of the following geographic commands totaling six: Africa, Central, European, Northern, Pacific, and Southern. These dedicated forces recognize that “forward-deployed amphibious forces are increasingly in demand by U.S. Regional Combatant Commanders as operational elements of their respective regional engagement strategies.”

Training and Equipping the Force

By maintaining a habitual relationship between a geographic region and its direct support MET, the Combatant Commander has the ability to tailor and direct the manning, training, and equipping of his force in support of the planned or suspected needs of his specific area of responsibility. For example, the SOUTHCOM Commander could direct that his supporting MET would only be issued green MARPAT utility uniforms; that they train specifically to jungle, urban, and mountain warfighting capabilities; that all personnel study the Spanish and Portuguese languages; and that the force is primarily
non-mechanized. This flexibility provides the commander on the ground the ability to shape and affect the force that supports his mission. Conversely, a present day Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) sails into a theatre of operations with a standard equipment set that may or may not meet the operational needs of the commander.

Maintaining this habitual relationship would also mean that the Marines deploying into the AOR would be familiar with the culture, language, military, and civil agencies with whom they will partner during their deployments. Ideally, the Marines would spend the majority of their careers in the operating forces back in the MET in which they initially served. For example, the Marine 2nd Lieutenant that deploys and trains with his counterpart in Argentina might one day deploy as a Lieutenant Colonel and partner with his Argentinean counterpart whom he has known for twenty years. This consistency in the assignment process would also benefit Marine families by allowing them to homestead in one geographic area in the continental United States; thus, enabling a sense of community and stability that is not currently in place.

**Joint and Interagency Implications**

Although the MET would be embarked and deployed aboard amphibious shipping, the intent would not be to serve as simply as a forward deployed Marine Expeditionary Unit waiting for something to happen. Of note, this significant forward based presence would require a change to the U.S. Navy's current amphibious shipping acquisition and replacement program in order to effectively support such an extensive sea based structure. The MET would retain the traditional MAGTF capabilities and be able to execute the full spectrum of MEU operations. However, the task organization and the
assignment of joint and interagency personnel would be crucial to exponentially expand the scope, range, and capabilities of the program.

The most significant interagency partner in the MET would be the U.S. Department of State (DoS). Each MET should have a regional Ambassador-at-Large that partners, trains, and deploys as a part of the organization. A simple State Department representative or political advisor does not provide sufficient emphasis to the organization. The concept requires the actual weight of a senior participant capable of integrating, leveraging, and representing the interests of the DoS, willing to deploy forward, and capable of effectively integrating all of the instruments of national power in support of the strategic communication message of the U.S. government. In addition to the dedicated support personnel from the DoS, the COCOM would be able to augment his operation with additional DoD personnel based on the nature of the mission and the specific operational environment. For example, SOUTHCOM might want to add a medical capability (MEDCAP) in support of a theatre engagement activity but AFRICOM might prefer a veterinary capability or and engineering detachment in support of a long range project.

Another military augment to the MET would be a Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element (SJFHQ-CE). This core element currently exists within each geographic combatant command and is prepared for a short notice deployment. This deployable unit is a “full-time, joint, cross-functional element within a GCC staff.”22 In addition to reinforcing the planning capabilities of the MET, the purpose of the core element would be to ensure that the MET is prepared to serve as a Joint Force Command if and as required. It provides the joint service personnel to effectively integrate and
maximize the full range of military capabilities in an emergent situation or for general coordination during standard operations.

The recurring MET deployment rotation (see Appendix B) would also allow the COCOM to engage, leverage, and support a wide range of Non-Governmental Agencies (NGOs) and other organizations that could be incorporated into the MET in advance of the deployment into the AO. This cooperative effort in a specified area of responsibility would allow the MET to establish working relationships with the NGOs, and to meet the specific needs of the geographic area. For example, deploying a leadership element from Doctors without Borders would enhance the overall capabilities of the MET while simultaneously providing the NGO with access to remote areas, a standing command or cooperative relationship with the MET civilian and military leadership, and the logistical and security support that only a military force can supply. While there will be some NGOs that will specifically seek to distance themselves from the perception that they are associated with the Department of Defense, and therefore will seek limited overseas interaction with the regionally based MET, there will still be a significant benefit from establishing early and formal (or informal) relationships with the NGO leadership.

**Professional Military Education and Cultural Awareness**

Assignment to a specific MET would also affect and guide the professional military education (PME) of the individual Marines. General James F. Amos, the newly appointed 35th Commandant of the Marine Corps, in his 2010 planning guidance, stated that he wanted to “triple resident Expeditionary Warfare School, and double resident Command and Staff College.” Taking this initiative one step further, the MET concept would require all officers to attend resident Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS) at a
Marine Corps University satellite campus. By pushing out a satellite campus, such a plan would allow for personnel to remain on station rather than changing stations to Quantico for a year of training, enable the entire officer population to attend resident PME as Lieutenants and Captains, allow for a regional focus on the PME curriculum, and enable foreign officers from the region to attend the PME classes with their counterparts from the U.S.

During a four year tour in the operating forces, everyone in the unit would receive two, six month long blocks of formal instruction. During these periods, the focus would be entirely on PME. The units would not have equipment sets to maintain and the classes would not be conducted in a Marine’s “spare time.” Every Marine would have a chance to attend the Corporal’s Course, or the Staff Academy, or EWS, and all at the satellite campus on their home station. The course materials would range from the very nature and theory of war, to the specifics of training for and conducting war – all of which are effectively outlined in MCDP-1 Warfighting. The mental rigors of service as a “Strategic Corporal,” or as a general purpose MAGTF officer, require dedicated periods of reflection, study, and academic exploration. Prescribing that 25% of a Marine’s fleet tour will be dedicated to study is an entirely appropriate allocation given the expectations and standards currently in place. Marines cannot be expected to think, write, and speak at a superior level if we never afford them the opportunity to develop these skills.

This dedicated PME block also has the added benefit of allowing the development of habitual working relationships and unit cohesion throughout the MET and with international partners, even before the area specific pre-deployment training blocks have started. Ultimately, the infantry small unit leader has trained and been educated
alongside his other MOS counterparts. Once deployed, he can rely on his interpersonal relationships, professional education and training, and his own initiative and creativity to accomplish his mission.

Developing a regional focus enables a MET to operate more effectively in their assigned geographic area. The concept will be that the culture, language, and habits of the region will be second nature to the Marines in that AOR. By partnering with their foreign officers from within the AO, Officers would then have the ability to learn and appreciate the culture directly from the foreign officers that they would be working with in the future. The Marine Corps University is leaning forward aggressively with regards to a focus on the value and importance of culture. The USMC Command and Staff College currently dedicates approximately 25% of their academic focus to the study of Culture and Interagency Operations (CIAO).

**Deployment Ratios and the Four Block Training Plan**

A MET deployment would be six months long. The RCT that serves as the base of the MET will have four organic maneuver battalions. A proposed basic training plan (see Appendix B) would revolve around four operational blocks of six months each. Block 1 is a combined arms training block consisting of traditional Marine Corps skills and competencies. The USMC needs to uphold its Title 10 responsibility to maintain conventional combined arms operations in support of the nation's military objectives. The focus of Block I would be on the traditional combined arms skills formerly emphasized in the Combined Arms Exercise (CAX) program. This combined arms program would be standardized throughout the Marine Corps, as these skills are not AOR dependent. There will also be no need for the additional regional training currently
incorporated into the Mojave Viper program, as the regional training would be addressed at the MET level during an AO specific training block to be addressed later.

Block II consists of a period of professional military education. Regionally focused and in cooperation with the foreign officers from the individual AO, the focus would be on the traditional development blocks for the MAGTF officer as seen in the EWS curriculum, combined with language training and cultural education. This period will also be used to accomplish mandatory training not covered in later blocks of instruction. For example, rifle qualifications, certification of Marine Corps Martial Arts Instructors, swim qualifications, etc would all be accomplished during this time. Block II instruction would apply to every Marine in the MET, both officer and enlisted. This means that resident versions of the Staff Academy, Advanced Course, NCO Academy, etc, would also be provided on the satellite campus of the Marine Corps University.

Block III will consist of AO specific training. This is the COCOM's opportunity to direct specific training in support of known or suspected missions or to support a wide range of desired capabilities. Block III training must include the joint, interagency, and participating NGO command elements. The training schedule would be heavily influenced by the diplomatic objectives of the DoS and the theatre engagement plan sponsored by each individual COCOM. Block III training would not be a standard set of Predeployment Training Plan (PTP) elements. The schedule will be a living document, changing each cycle based on conditions in the AO and on the lessons learned from the currently deployed units.

Block IV will consist of the actual deployment into theatre. While the MET is maritime in nature and capable of deploying aboard amphibious shipping, not all
elements of the MET must deploy in that manner. For example, a specific element of a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion might be deploying in support of a road construction program in a single location throughout the deployment. That element could deploy independently but still under the OPCON of the COCOM. The deployment of forces into the area of operations, the rotation of units within the RCT, and the overall training plan has an additional benefit in that the individual Marine would be deployed for six months followed by 18 months at home station, meeting the Commandant’s 3:1 deployment to dwell ratio.²⁴

**Engagement and Foreign Security Assistance**

The benefit to the COCOM with having a dedicated maneuver force is that it allows the commander to develop and implement long-range plans that includes a variety of engagement, relationship building, and security force cooperation missions. One indirect method of ensuring littoral access is to develop and maintain relationships with allies in the region. If a specific enemy capability, sea-based mine laying for example, prevents the Marine Corps from conducting forcible entry operations, then relationships with neighboring countries might provide the needed access to prosecute the military mission. The familiarity and cooperation required to build the strong relationships necessary for that type of unified action are supported by the long, sustained, and comprehensive efforts of the interagency team espoused in the MET concept.

The key concept of engagement is also exhibited throughout the recently issued *National Security Strategy (2010)* (NSS). Specifically, it states that the nation must “focus American engagement on strengthening international institutions and galvanizing the collective action that can serve common interests…” The NSS emphasizes the
requirement to develop the relationship with our close friends and allies in “Europe, Asia, the Americas, and the Middle East.” This reinforces the concept that a MET is appropriate for each and every geographic command.

The 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS) also contains a vision that parallels the concepts and advantages of the MET concept. There is a focus on strengthening and expanding alliances and partnerships with a specific focus on not “limiting ourselves to the relationships of the past.” The NDS goes on to say that the goal is to “leverage a more agile continental U.S. based expeditionary total force and further developing a more relevant and flexible forward network of capabilities and arrangements with allies and partners to ensure strategic success.”

At a joint level, the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) states that “assuring access to ports, airfields, foreign airspace, coastal waters and host nation support in potential commitment areas will be a challenge and will require active peacetime engagement with states in volatile areas.” While the NSS and NDS are subject to change, the MET concept of employment and implementation is not dependent upon any one document of a particular administration.

Disadvantages

Lack of Mass and Change to Traditional Force Structure

The MET concept does have specific disadvantages compared to the current organization and operation of the Marine Corps. The regionalization and specificity of each MET makes combined operations at the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) level more difficult to execute. The deployment, rotation, and manning of the MET would be
impossible in a large-scale and protracted military engagement such as the war in Iraq due to the lack of general-purpose forces immediately available for tasking. However, the Corps would still be able to deploy large formations of combat forces. The difference would be in the speed that the units could be formed and the lack of familiarity and habitual relationships based on the ad hoc nature of the task organization. In contrast to today's deployment methodology, the elements of the MEF would have to come marching to the sound of the guns like Napoleon's corps army system as opposed to deploying as one organic unit. In addition, the remaining non-deployed elements of the MET would still consist of a significant amount of combat power that could be tasked organized in support of combat operations.

Shifting from one geographic region to another would only be executed under specific circumstances in order to meet an emergent or unexpected requirement. While the augmenting force would not have the regional awareness or specific theatre training that an organic element of the regional MET would possess, the basic combat skills will still be universal across the Marine Corps. The MAGTF concept itself is based on a scalable force ranging from a small Special Purpose MAGTF through the employment of a MEF. The MET program simply expands on this existing concept.

**Institutional Aversion to Change**

Another significant challenge to the MET system supporting specific Geographic Combatant Commands with apportioned dedicated forces is that division level and higher organizations would become force providers. This paradigm shift would be particularly challenging for the senior leadership of the Corps which might strongly desire the ability to rapidly form and deploy a MEF sized unit in support of combat operations. While the
Corps prides itself on operational flexibility and the ability to adapt and overcome the challenges of the tactical scenario, the employment of this concept would represent a major change to the structure and thinking of the Corps itself.

**Requires Significant Asset Allocation by Joint and Interagency Communities**

The largest challenge to the MET concept would be its reliance on support from the joint and interagency communities. In particular, the challenges to the Navy and the Department of State stand as significant obstacles to successful implementation. The Navy currently owns and operates only enough amphibious shipping to support the currently existing MEUs. The MET concept would call for five permanently deployed MEU (reinforced) sized elements (assuming that the NORTHCOM MET would be primarily land based). While portions of the force could be deployed on non-amphibious shipping, or even in commercially leased and maintained vessels, this concept would still require significant acceptance and buy in by the U.S. Navy. Given that service's overall lack of desire or inability to support the current or enhanced amphibious capability of the Marine Corps, the real challenge would be to get The Navy’s support of the concept. Of course, the final authority could be a directive from the DoD to do so.

The Department of State might be equally reluctant to commit the resources required to effectively participate in the MET program. High-level DoS participation is crucial if the resources and efforts of the MET deployments are to be organized and tasked to support theatre level objectives. Close coordination with the Embassy Teams throughout the region, combined with the integration and direction of the USAID program, are not possible without a senior representative deploying as a part of the
standing organization. Only the interagency team at the heart of the MET program can effectively synthesize all of the elements of national power.

As the lead U.S. government agency in charge of strategic communication (SC), participation in the MET program would enable the DoS to manage their SC responsibilities while simultaneously conducting diplomatic engagement at the theatre level. Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, defines SC as the “focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives...and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.” The MET program would provide the coordinated, capable, and efficient platform necessary to carry the strategic message forward in the future.

While the MET concept will require significant participation from the Department of State and some of its internal organizations, the opportunity also exists for participation and involvement from other agencies and departments within the U.S. government. Depending on the geographic area of responsibility, attachments to the MET could include the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, Customs, Commerce, etc.

**Summary**

**Current Marine Corps Planning Initiatives**

Even before the challenges to the future mission of the Marine Corp offered by Secretary Gates in 2010, the Corps was already examining ways to increase levels of
engagement, security cooperation and assistance, and forward presence throughout the world. In particular, these themes are addressed in detail in chapter 4 of the *Marine Corps Operating Concept*, as well as in the stand-alone publication *Send in the Marines – A Marine Corps Operational Employment Concept to Meet An Uncertain Security Environment*. While both of these documents support the general concepts of regionalization, specialized training for the operational area, and specially designated Special Purpose MAGTF (Security Cooperation) units, the concept is seen as a force multiplier or enhancement to the traditional MEU deployments or as an augment to the forward deployed elements of the Unit Deployment Program. Neither of these documents suggests or supports the idea that the deploying element is the persistent main effort in theatre.

The MET concept, by comparison, incorporates the benefits and capabilities of a MEU, UPD, and SPMAGTF (Security Cooperation) in one deployable entity. As such, there would no longer be an operational requirement for the UDP program or for any of the current Marine Expeditionary Units. While maintaining a robust military capability, employment of the MET program will allow the USMC to reduce its overall manning levels and to eliminate or civilianize some of the support functions in the rear. The MET concept, although a significant departure from the Marine Corps’ current mission and composition, is still in line with the values, philosophy, principles, and competencies that make the service unique within the DoD.

The impending budget cuts and the cancellation of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) have already signaled to the Marine Corps that they need to reassess the future mission of the Corps. The Corps’ support of the concept of Operational Maneuver
from the Sea is based significantly on the capability to operate from over the horizon. This capability is made possible by the MV-22 Osprey, the Landing Craft Air Cushioned, the High Speed Vessel, and the yet to be developed follow-on to the cancelled EFV. Without access to all of those platforms and capabilities, the Marine Corps will not be able to operate as planned.

To allow a budget constraint to effect procurement, which then determines capabilities that finally results in force structure and mission, is a serious mistake. In an ideal world the capabilities requirements would drive procurement and budgeting. Unfortunately, this is not the reality within which the military is operating in the second decade of the 21st century. Without letting a lack of funding drive the decision making process, the Corps needs to determine what capabilities it possesses given the structure that currently exists, and must then implement an effective plan to activate and energize those capabilities to meet the emerging needs of the nation.

Assumptions for Planning

The MET program enables the Marine Corps to do what it does best – to operate at the small unit level, to deploy forward, and to maximize the unique set of qualities, capabilities, and characteristics that were the essence of the Corps since its inception at Tun Tavern in November 1775. These small but capable forward deployed units place more of a focus on the low end of the ROMO scale that pertains to HADR and TSC. The emphasis on this end of the scale is based on an assessment of the likely future threats, the capabilities of the other branches of the U.S. military, and the likelihood that a combined, joint, or multinational force would execute any large contingency plan. As with any assumption in military planning, if the assumption cannot be verified it turns
into a risk. The risk of the MET program to the Marine Corps is that this focus on the stability side of the contingency scale (Appendix A) will have a detrimental effect on the ability to rapidly mass a MEF size force for deployment.

Another assumption of the MET concept is that it is easier for forces to move up the scale of contingencies rather than down. This is based on the idea that learning to operate independently and in small geographically isolated elements is harder to teach and execute than fighting as a large conventional force under more centralized command and control. For example, an artillery battery commander conducting combat operations in support of a forward deployed unit, and without his organic battalion headquarters, must quickly master fire planning, ammunition resupply, communications troubleshooting, and a host of non-artillery specific tasks that might be assigned in support of the mission. This commander will have no trouble operating under the more centralized command of a battalion or regimental headquarters in a large scale operation. In fact, many of the difficult issues that he was facing on his own will now be coordinated for him by the more robust dedicated battalion staff sections.

By contrast, the battery commander who has always operated at the battalion or higher level will be challenged by the wide range of issues that he must handle without the support network that he was previously accustomed to. The commander who has no trouble massing fires and staying on a movement timeline might not find the tasks of working with tribal leaders or patrolling the local marketplace as easy to perform.

The central question facing the Marine Corps leadership at this point in the Corps’ history can be distilled down to “what are the future missions of the Marine Corps and what does the force (personnel and equipment) to support those operations look like?”
The temptation is to toss around buzzwords, general terms, or capabilities supporting the widest possible range of missions. For example, the USMC of the future will be agile, operationally flexible, expeditionary in nature, capable of operating in austere conditions, etc. These are the standing qualities and capabilities that constitute the characteristics of the Marine Corps that the U.S. public has come to appreciate.

In effect, the current USMC policy is placing the Corps in the upper middle of the ROMO scale and stating that they will be ready to effectively execute missions in either direction, equally easily, and in a timely manner. This stated priority is akin to trying to be "strong everywhere at once", but should be seen more accurately as "if everything is a priority than nothing is a priority." The MET concept is based on a focus for the Marine Corps on the small end of the ROMO spectrum. This focus identifies that "seam" on the map where the Marine Corps can claim dominance. The concept does not rely on the introduction and successfully implementation of the EFV, nor does it rely on the continuation of the MV-22 program. The USMC needs to state and claim a position for the future with the aim to prevent and deter conflict before the need arises to commit large scale combat forces into theatre and the MET program meets that need.

**Why Americans Want A Marine Corps**

The proposed focus of the Marine Corps does not create a gap in the U.S. military's capabilities. The U.S. Army still has ten combat divisions that they in theory can line up in the sand to cross the line of departure. Allies and foreign partners throughout the world also maintain a variety of scalable military forces capable of operations at the division level and above. The focus of the Marine Corps should remain where it has always been – to be the first ones on the scene, to arrive with a capable,
sustainable, and credible combat force, and to never fail to accomplish the mission. Lieutenant General Victor Krulak famously stated that there is a Marine Corps today because the American people want there to be one, not because they need one. This statement was based on three beliefs the people held about the Corps.

First, the people believe that “when trouble comes to our country there will be Marines – somewhere – who, through hard work, have made and kept themselves ready to do something useful about it, and do it at once.” Second, they believe that “when the Marines go to war they invariably turn in a performance that is dramatically and decisively successful – not most of the time, but always.” Finally, the people of this country believe that “our Corps is downright good for the manhood of our country; that the Marines are the masters of a form of unfailing alchemy which converts unoriented [sic] youths into proud, self-reliant stable citizens – citizens into whose hands the nation’s affairs may safely be entrusted.”31 These beliefs are as valid for today’s Corps as they were back when General Krulak first wrote them.

Conclusions

In conclusion, maybe the time has come for the USMC to transition back from an amphibious ready force to an expeditionary one. In a world where the future of traditional amphibious operations, specifically ship to shore amphibious assault, are in question due to advances in area denial capabilities and anti shipping missile technology, the USMC still has a crucial mission to perform. If there is one thing that the nation can be sure of, it is that the current situation will not persist. Financial realities, discontinued
programs, and uncertain enemies will all affect the future of the U.S. military. At this crucial juncture in the illustrious history of the Corps, the leadership must make difficult decisions for the future just as their predecessors did in the 1930s.

The global security environment of the future will be dominated by unpredictable hybrid threats. There will be no conventional forward edge of the battle area and the challenges to the nation, while likely to be focused around the "arc of instability," can and will be found both at home and abroad. Economic and financial conditions will affect procurement and manning levels. Despite these challenges, the concept proposed in this essay fully leverages the unique characteristics of the Marine Corps and proposes a forward deployed, agile, and capable force to support the geographic combatant commander’s requirements for engagement, crisis response, and power projection.
Appendix A

CAPSTONE CONCEPT for JOINT OPERATIONS Version 2.0

Range of Military Operations

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Appendix B

Notional Operational Block Assignment Schedule for the 1st Marine Regiment

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<td>PME</td>
<td>AO Specific Training</td>
<td>Deployment</td>
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</table>

**Equipment Set**

| A | Training allowance pool in support of traditional combined arms training | None | B | AO specific training equipment | C | AO specific training equipment |

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Annex C

COCOM
OPCON
COORD

Geographic Combatant Commander
Department of State

Marine Forces
Army Forces
Air Forces
Navy Forces

Maritime Expeditionary Team
Amb

GCE
ACE
LCE
FCE

Non Governmental Organizations
Other Governmental Organizations

Related/supporting units + capabilities
CAG
VET
MED
JSTF-CE
I/O
RAD BN
MARSOC
NMCB

Enhanced ARG
LHA
LPD
LSD
C2
CIV
Appendix D

List of Acronyms

AO – Area of Operations
AOR – Area of Responsibility
AFRICOM – Africa Command
CAX – Combined Arms Exercise
CIAO – Culture and Interagency Operations
CCJO – Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
COCOM – Combatant Command
DoD – Department of Defense
DoS – Department of State
EFV – Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle
EWS – Expeditionary Warfare School
FSRG – Force Structure Review Group
GCC – Geographic Combatant Command
HADR – Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief
MAGTF – Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MARPAT – Marine Pattern
MCOC – Marine Corps Operating Concepts
MEDCAP – Medical Capability
MEF – Marine Expeditionary Force
MET – Maritime Expeditionary Team
MEU – Marine Expeditionary Unit
MRAP – Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
NDS – National Defense Strategy
NGO – Nongovernmental Organization
NORTHCOM – Northern Command
NSS – National Security Strategy
OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF – Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPCON – Operational Control
PME – Professional Military Education
PTP – Pre-deployment Training Plan
RCT – Regimental Combat Team
ROMO – Range of Military Operations
SC – Strategic Communication
SecDef – Secretary of Defense
SJFHQ-CE – Standing Joint Force Headquarters – Command Element
SOUTHCOM – Southern Command
TSC – Theatre Security Cooperation
USAID – United States Agency for International Development
USMC – United States Marine Corps
Notes


4 Ibid, 16.

5 Ibid, 16.


7 Ibid.


10 Ibid, 14.


14 Jahn L. Kulper, Strategist, Drunk: The Prophet of Pacific Success., The Marine Corps Base Quantico, Quantico Sentry, OnLine, 07 August 2009,


17 *Marine Corps Operating Concepts*, 3.

18 *Marine Corps Operating Concepts*, 3.


29 Department of Defense, Joint Operation Planning, JP 5-0, 0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 26 December, 2006), xii.


31 Krulak, First to Fight, xv.
Bibliography

Provides insight as to how theater security cooperation and humanitarian assistance / disaster relief operations can be especially effective with regards to engagement and power projection from the US. Serves as an example of the power of joint and interagency operations and the effectiveness of forward deployed forces.

Background to the history of the working group based out of Quantico charged with conducting another force structure review for the SecDef. The article relates the number of times that the group has met and the current timeline. The group convened on 21 September and the formal report was due to the Commandant on 17 December 2010.

Cavallaro, Gina. “Corps to Update Foreign, Regional Area Officer Programs.” Marine Corps Times, 7 February 2011, pg 20.

Dennis, Peter and Jeffrey Grey, eds. Battles Near and Far: A Century of Overseas Deployment. Army Military History Conference, Canberra: (Australian) Army History Unit, 2005. This article relates to the change in the mission of the Marine Corps from an expeditionary force to an amphibiously based warfighting force.


This article outlines the SecDef’s vision as to the future of the military. It explains why Secretary Gates has rejected the USMC’s vision and strategy document and continues to ask tough questions about the future of the USMC.

The text is in part a historical background to the challenges to the future of the Marine Corps following World War II and is also a memoir detailing Lieutenant General Krulak’s career and his involvement with keeping the Corps as a separate service.
Addresses the challenges and history of joint force operations. This topic is relevant because it outlines the potential effectiveness of joint force operations while acknowledging the challenges associated with conducting joint operations in today’s military environment.

This article focuses on optimizing regionalization within the Marine Corps for building partner capacity. The author includes several of the same benefits as the MET program with regards to cultural awareness, standing international relationships, and operational experience.

This is the background material for the rise of the Chowder Society in the post WWII era. The article provides the historic backdrop and the inner workings within the Marine Corps to keep the service separate but an equal part of the defense establishment.

Provides the national strategy perspective with the specific focus on the importance of creating and developing international partnerships through the process of engagement using all of the instruments of national power.

An overview of the current cost in terms of personnel with regards to the continued combat operations in Afghanistan in support of OEF.

Describes how a standing joint force HQ could be integrated into a standing command structure in order to instantly create a JTF. This is relevant because of the nature and structure of the MET force that is advocated and the requirement to provide effective joint force operations with little to no notice.

Printed two years prior to the 2010 NSS, outlines how the military is currently task organized and how it will meet the requirements outlined in the 2008 NSS. This document is particularly useful as it highlights the disconnect between the current military and administration goals and objectives.
US Joint Forces Command. *USSOUTHCOM and JTF-Haiti...Some Challenges and Considerations in Forming a Joint Task Force, 2010.* Washington, D.C.: 2010. Highlight the benefits of standing relationships with foreign partners. The challenges encountered are those that the recommended structure would avoid.


Commanders to secure "forward deployed amphibious forces" in support of their engagement strategies.

This article outlines Dr Gould’s theories and contributions, especially with regards to his concept of punctuated equilibrium as it relates to developmental biology and evolution. The manner and method of evolution that he proposes is consistent with the way in which military tactics, techniques, and procedures are developed as well as the development and procurement of military related equipment.