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15. SUBJECT TERMS
Counterinsurgency, Company-level counterinsurgency, Counterinsurgency Tactical considerations

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
   a. REPORTUnclass
   b. ABSTRACTUnclass
   c. THIS PAGEUnclass

17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
   UU

18. NUMBER OF PAGES
   20

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
    Marine Corps University / Command and Staff College

19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)
    (703) 784-3330 (Admin Office)
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE

Seven Counterinsurgency Principles for Tactical Leaders: A Primer for Company-Level Counterinsurgency Operations

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Executive Summary

Title: Seven Counterinsurgency Principles for Tactical Leaders: A Primer for Company-Level Counterinsurgency Operations with Operational and Strategic Benefits.

Author: Major Mark Liston, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: There are seven enduring principles of successful counterinsurgency efforts at the tactical level: Determining Insurgent Endstate, Isolation of the Objective, Clearing the Objective Area of Insurgents and Equipment, Identifying the Legitimate Population, Control all Entry and Exit Points on the Objective, Integrate Host Nation Forces, and Establish Firm Bases to Expand Influence Throughout the Objective. A counterinsurgent utilizing this framework can prioritize resources and efforts in order to achieve a lasting success at the Operational Level of War.

Discussion: This paper was written to describe several concepts that played an important role in several counterinsurgency tactics. As many key issues to resolving an insurgency reside at the national level, the author has focused solely on considerations that are enduring across the tactical spectrum. Based upon research and experience, this author has identified seven enduring counterinsurgency principles at the tactical level. This paper briefly describes each principle, and compares them to this author’s experience for the purpose of demonstrating their utility.

Conclusion: The seven counterinsurgency principles of: Determining Insurgent Endstate, Isolation of the Objective, Clearing the Objective Area of Insurgents and Equipment, Identifying the Legitimate Population, Control all Entry and Exit Points on the Objective, Integrate Host Nation Forces, and Establish Firm Bases to Expand Influence Throughout the Objective, can be applied by leaders at the tactical level in order to decisively defeat an insurgent who has previously controlled the objective area.
Introduction

Counterinsurgency operations, those military and political actions taken to defeat an insurgency, are a complex, ever-changing form of warfare. During the Vietnam Conflict and French counterinsurgency experiences during the 1960's, a few experienced counterinsurgents captured their experiences in some useful works. As a result of the American and Coalition Forces experiences in OPERATIONS Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, a great deal of new works have been written on the topic. A quick search on the Internet or local bookstore can result in an overwhelming number of works on the subject, and useful products can be difficult to locate quickly.

This paper was written with the intent of providing a useful and enduring set of general counterinsurgency principles, which are effective at the tactical level, and have operational and strategic implications. Leaders engaged in this fight are quite busy with literally dozens of simultaneous tasks, from training, personnel issues, and the myriad of details required to actually deploy into theater. The author intends to provide a short, but pertinent guide on how to prioritize counterinsurgency efforts at the company-level, in order to achieve operational and ultimately strategic success.

Methodology

This paper was written to describe several concepts that played, and will continue to play, an important role in several counterinsurgency tactics. As many key issues to resolving an insurgency reside at the national level, this work focuses solely on considerations that are enduring across the tactical spectrum. Based upon research and experience, it is argued that there are seven enduring counterinsurgency principles that can be identified at the tactical level.
Each principle will be briefly described, and compared with the author’s experience for the purpose of demonstrating the utility of the issues for consideration. The list is far from complete, and several leaders with experiences similar to the author’s could argue other factors with validity. It is hoped that this document can at least generate further momentum to create easily digestible knowledge for commanders at the tactical level.

The physical setting of the counterinsurgency operation that this author conducted will be described, and the enemy and friendly situation at the time will be examined. The seven counterinsurgency principles that have been determined to be critical will be discussed, and a description of how they were/could have been employed will be proposed.

Physical/Civilian Setting

The area of operations for the counterinsurgency mission in 2005 was centered on the city of Al Karmah, with a population of roughly 65,000 inhabitants, located six miles east of Al Fallujah. The town was bordered on the south by a river running generally east-west, and all other directions were rural farmland. There was one major north-south road, a smaller east-west road leading to the farmlands, and other smaller villages in the vicinity.™

The infrastructure of the town was relatively intact, and was typical of an Iraqi city of that size in the Al Anbar Province. There was not much physical damage from combat, electrical and fresh water service was generally reliable. There was no means of trash removal, but the local population dealt sufficiently with the issue, and this was not a source of discontent. Medical services were provided by a local clinic, but most medical needs were met by an Iraqi hospital, which was about a 30-minute drive from the center of the town. The basic needs of the
populace for daily existence were being met, somewhat simplifying the problems we encountered.\textsuperscript{III}

The population of Al Karmah was estimated to be approximately 65,000 thousand people, many of whom appeared to be self-sufficient, or traveled short distances to their workplace. The standard of living seemed to be adequate for their needs, but the poor security situation naturally weighed heavily on all of the inhabitants. As the infrastructure was generally intact, basic needs such as power, water, sanitation, and fresh food were available. These factors indicated that the overall unrest and violence issues were over security, not basic existence requirements.\textsuperscript{IV}

The population had undergone many challenges since the fall of the Saddam Regime nearly two years prior to the author’s arrival. The area was inhabited by many Former Regime Elements (FRE) who had retired to that area over the years. During Saddam’s reign, he provided retirement homes to former military and intelligence officials, in the hope that they would take a stake in the stability of the area, maintaining order close to Fallujah, a restless city even during that period. In addition to the FRE, the city of Fallujah had been cleared in a massive, violent clearing operation two months prior, and many insurgents who had fled that area were currently operating out of Karmah. The proximity to the volatile city of Fallujah allowed insurgents to escape the isolated city, but still perform operations in the area.\textsuperscript{V}

Al Karmah had been the scene of previous fighting at various times since 2003, and had been cleared, but not held several times in the past. Most coalition force efforts in the region were focused on Fallujah, and little attention was paid to Karmah. The local government was almost non-existent, with the only real official being a Mayor who must have at least appeased
the insurgents (if he were not one himself) in order to stay alive. There were no police or security forces, and the public services seemed to be run by the people who had performed those duties under the Ba'ath Regime. VI

The Enemy

The insurgents in Karmah were from at least three sectors: FRE, insurgents who were in the area due to its proximity to Fallujah, and local fighters who operated along tribal lines. The recent massive clearing operation and subsequent isolation of Fallujah had displaced people (good and bad) throughout the area. The city was surrounded by an effective system of checkpoints, access was controlled through a system of documentation and biometric verification measures, and people had to prove they had previously lived in the city to gain access. This barrier effectively kept most insurgents out, and it created a situation where citizens awaiting documentation were displaced, and staying with relatives in Karmah. VII

The FRE were from military and governmental positions. This created a relatively strong insurgent base, as the leadership abilities of both groups was generally effective, and the military skills of the officers was evident in the way attacks were planned and carried out. Additionally, the fact that they lived in Karmah or the surrounding area added to their desire to see coalition forces defeated or driven out, in order for them to return to a lifestyle they had enjoyed in previous times. VIII

The insurgents who were displaced from Fallujah, due to their drive and ability, were probably the most dangerous, but they were rarely encountered. They usually avoided contact, as their mission was to operate in and around Fallujah, and they merely sought refuge in Karmah.
These elements added to the unstable security situation, as the locals feared and/or respected them, and generally would not provide information about them.\textsuperscript{IX}

The third group of insurgents were ones who operated along the tribal lines. The tribes were generally tied to specific geographical areas, like towns or sectors of the rural areas. They operated to protect their tribes, focused on security, and financed their activities through black market sales or highjackings. This group was very hard to gain information on, as they were loyal to each other, and any information gained on them was usually provided to weaken another tribe.\textsuperscript{X}

Counterinsurgent Force

The USMC company had a rather large force to conduct company-sized counterinsurgency operations. The author was the Commanding Officer, and will adhere to validating further points in third-person style. This force, India Company, 3d Battalion, 8\textsuperscript{th} Marines, comprised of one Rifle Company (roughly 165 Marines and Corpsman, full weapons sets, plus many additional machineguns, several HMMWV's), an armored section (2 M1A1 Main Battle Tanks), a truck detachment (8 large armored MTVR trucks), an additional communications detachment, a tactical air control party, and usually a Scout/Sniper element (one to three teams). In addition, India Company had an Iraqi Army Rifle Company (roughly 85 Iraqi Soldiers) attached and living in my base. Although this sounds like a very large force, the battlespace area that was assigned (both in size and population) would be more appropriately controlled by an entire infantry battalion. The force was employed in three elements- one platoon was a patrolling element, one manned forward operating bases in the city itself, and one was resting/refitting aboard Camp Fallujah, a large Marine base 10 miles to the south. We
rotated duties roughly every 72 hours to prevent the Marines from falling into a routine that would dull their aggressiveness and alertness. Air support from fixed and rotary elements was scheduled several times a week, and they, along with artillery fires, could be relied upon for a fast response at any time if necessary. The available combat power from all arms provided the commander with many options under all weather conditions.

Seven Counterinsurgency Principles

Every military operation should be an execution of a well-thought out plan. The author’s initial counterinsurgency experience was an evolving series of actions that were not a result of a series of measures applied to a carefully developed problem. This section will describe what the author (with the benefit of reflective hindsight, education, and experience) believe are seven mission-essential elements for the general conduct of a tactical-level counterinsurgency. These principles are listed in what should be accomplished in a rough chronological order, but many functions will overlap each other.

Determining the Insurgent Endstate

Noted counterinsurgent theorist and practitioner David Kilcullen puts forth the thought that the first step a counterinsurgent should take is to attempt to identify the goals his opponent is trying to achieve.\textsuperscript{XI} In describing operations against Communist Insurgents, Sir Robert Thompson, a successful counterinsurgent with experience in Malaya, stated that one must “Know your enemy and what he is trying to do at all stages” in order to achieve decisive results.\textsuperscript{XII} By determining your opponents desired outcome, you can visualize what motivates them, how they recruit, sustain their ideology, and target those methods.\textsuperscript{XIII}
The insurgency in Karmah was not clearly understood by the author’s predecessor, or the Battalion Intelligence Analysts. Initially, the company did not have a clear understanding of the insurgent network or leadership structure. It appeared that the FRE desired some form of stability, and a return of prestige, which was lost once they were taken out of ruling positions since the fall of the Saddam Regime. Identifying their key leadership, organization and resource supply should have been prioritized to identify these elements for targeting/engagement.

The insurgent elements who were operating the area due to the isolation of Fallujah most likely desired an environment where they could conduct operations without interference from local coalition forces. The concepts of physically isolating the city, tracking all movement and establishing a census, which will be discussed in detail, would focus effort against this enemy, and build situational awareness of local needs.\textsuperscript{XIV}

Insurgent forces aligned along tribal lines were difficult to identify due to the fact that most Iraqis in Al Anbar Province were loyal to, and trusted family the most\textsuperscript{XV}. This fact would prevent the flow of effective intelligence, as most of the information came from other tribes, who were providing information to enable us to operate against their competition. Although much of the intelligence was incorrect, the detention and questioning of these individuals helped to build our situational awareness, although it needed to be cross-referenced with several other sources in order to increase the chances of its validity.

\textit{Isolation of the Objective}

According to a widely accepted counterinsurgent, French Army LtCol David Galula, one of the first steps a counterinsurgent should take is to physically isolate the objective area if possible.\textsuperscript{XVI} By physically isolating the objective area, several key factors can begin to be
implemented. As an insurgency/counterinsurgency is a battle to win the support of the population, isolating them can serve to identify all of the inhabitants, protect the city, limit movement, and restrict insurgent lines of communication and resupply. These measures have been a time-proven method to effectively draw the wedge between the insurgency and the population, from the UK efforts in Northern Ireland, to Iraq in 2006-2009.\textsuperscript{XVII} In the Iraqi city of Ar Ramadi, a Marine Battalion isolated a section of the town controlled by Al Qaeda of Iraq with concrete barriers, creating a “gated community” where they could begin clearing operations.\textsuperscript{XVIII} This technique created decisive results, and the insurgents were permanently driven from their support base in a matter of weeks.

Lt Col Galula emphasized the need for the objective area to be able to by physically isolated, and stated the geography of the objective should be chosen to help aid those efforts.\textsuperscript{XIX} The city of Karmah was geographically set up to be physically isolated through the use of barriers. The city was bounded on the south by a river flowing east to west, and had three main road exits- east, north, and west. Given appropriate resources of Marines, Iraqi soldiers and engineering efforts, this principle could have been effectively utilized.

\textit{Clearing the Objective Area of Insurgents and Equipment}

After physically isolating the objective area, the area must then be systematically cleared of insurgents and equipment that may facilitate their operations.\textsuperscript{XX} The city had been subjected to coalition clearing operations in the past, but the forces left the area after the action. Sir Thompson stated the need for the governmental forces to remain in place long after the operation to ensure the insurgents did not return.\textsuperscript{XXI} By physically isolating the objective, then clearing out
the insurgent forces which fought the company, or ones that could be identified, theoretically the
city would be secure, and the security would just be maintained from that point on.

**Identify the Legitimate Population**

The identification of the inhabitants of the isolated area is the next key step in the
operation to expel an insurgency. LtCol Galula described a procedure where the
counterinsurgent should identify all individuals residing in a house, record their names, familial
links and occupations, and issue them an identification card.\(\text{XXII}\) This process seems vitally
important for the long-term defeat of the insurgents, and to establish true control of the
objective. No previous commander had done this in India Company’s area, but it appears that
this should have been accomplished. There were numerous challenges with this task- the size of
the population, time and resources to document every individual, and the creation of an efficient
carding system all were tasks requiring resources far above the company’s capabilities. All of
this activity was occurring in neighboring Fallujah, and the USMC resources available to achieve
that task were dedicated to maintaining order in that important city.

**Control all Entry and Exit Points to the Objective**

After isolating the objective and identifying the inhabitants, Lt Col Galula states that
creating entry and exit points, controlled by the counterinsurgent force, is the next logical
step.\(\text{XXIII}\) This control measure can provide a great deal of information, and further deter any
insurgent movement of personnel and equipment throughout the objective. The creation of entry
and exit control points (ECP’s), manned by a mix of USMC and Iraqi Army (IA) forces would
achieve several functions.
The primary effect the ECP's would create is what Colonel Richard Iron (UK Army with extensive experience in Northern Ireland) labeled "uncertainty". The insurgents and their supporters would have to either abandon resupply and movement operations, or they would be forced to take measures to circumvent the ECP's, which would place more demands on their system for the planning and conduct of sustainment operations. All inhabitants, to include insurgents and their supporters, who were not identified, would have to assume their movements would be tracked, and their vehicles would be searched.

The intelligence gained through the ECP's would help intelligence gathering to build situational awareness, and to increase our interaction with the inhabitants. The interaction and monitoring of movement can build situational awareness as to where employment was, fuel and other necessities of life were located, and identify the amount of social interaction with the neighboring areas. In addition to the situational awareness, the increased interaction would certainly bring further intelligence gathering, and the locals would interact daily at the ECP's, and continually provide intelligence through a relationship-building process. By placing IA forces at the ECP's, it would help promote their legitimacy in the eyes of the locals, increase overall understanding of daily operations, and place them in the lead role for the eventual transfer of authority to host nation (HN) forces. The IA forces would have to be closely watched by the USMC forces as well, in order to prevent extortion, taxing, bribes and intimidation. All of these actions, if done correctly, would build the capability and legitimacy of the IA for a successful long-term transition of authority for the area.

Integrate Host Nation Forces
The next step in the long-term operation is to integrate the HN forces. As previously stated, they can perform vital functions in the clearing and ECP phases, as they have the language and cultural understanding to effectively “read” the population. Kilcullen describes an effective counterinsurgency as one where partnering with the HN forces, providing a professional role model, firepower and logistical support to overmatch the insurgent forces are keys to a successful conclusion of a counterinsurgency.\textsuperscript{xxv} I had an IA company at my disposal, and could use them for these tasks. Another key element would be host nation police forces, but all of these assets were dedicated to operations in the main effort, Fallujah, in an attempt to make lasting gains throughout the Province.

\textit{Establish Firm Bases to Expand Influence throughout the Objective.}

As a counterinsurgency is a battle for the will of the population and the center of gravity, they must be protected by a force that clearly controls the region and can provide reliable support. Lt Col Galula states that

\begin{quote}
Counterinsurgent personnel must become acquainted with the population, and know each inhabitant, so unusual behavior can be spotted easily. The process of getting acquainted with the population gets speeded up if the occupied village is divided into sections, and each is assigned a group of soldiers who will always work there.\textsuperscript{xxvi}
\end{quote}

This requirement for the counterinsurgent force to live and operate within the physically isolated objective area dictates the construction and operation of appropriate-level operating bases (“firm bases”) within the city. As the company began operations, it had one platoon-sized base on the edge of the city, and the rest of the company was located about one mile south of it. Initially, India Company did not occupy any positions among the people.
The Conduct of the Counterinsurgency Operation

The author’s experience was that of relieving a fired Company Commander, and did receive any useful guidance on the nature of the local insurgency. Nor was he able to begin the counterinsurgency operation as an application of meaningful guidance in accordance with a carefully assembled plan that analyzed all factors that influenced the current situation. Rather, the author was informed that in two hours he would be assuming command of a rifle company who had been operating in a demanding environment for about 45 days, with no positive results. The Company Commander was to be relieved upon arrival, so there would be no turnover. The author was given the rather broad guidance of “kill the bad, help the good, and check back with me about once a week” from the Battalion Commander, no guidance or taskings whatsoever from the Executive Officer or the Operations Officer, and was convoyed out to the unit, and assumed command.

The author had a steep learning curve in the first few weeks. The Commander had his first firefight and sustained friendly casualties within the first 30 hours of command. The new Company Commander met with the local Mayor and Sheiks during the first week in order to try to gain their support. The Company initiated a demanding patrolling schedule, which kept the Marines constantly on the move throughout the area of responsibility. Work began to improve the defensive positions around the bases, and the morale of the Marines seemed to rapidly improve as a result of the renewed tactical emphasis and attempts to seize the initiative from the insurgent elements.

As a unit, India Company had a great deal of interaction with the local populace, but apart from a weekly Sheik and Mayor meeting, the CO had little interaction with the civilian
leadership. The Commander's initial assessment found them to be ineffective, self-centered, and generally unconcerned about setting to create a secure future. It was apparent the locals had to appease the US forces as well as the insurgents in order to survive. The author attempted to win the local leader's support to assist efforts in defeating the insurgency, which would allow them to begin a new phase of their existence. Realizing the ineffective span of control and selfish nature of the self-proclaimed local leadership, the author soon disregarded them and dealt with individuals instead of appointed leaders, with various degrees of success.

India Company dealt with the insurgency through a high tempo of operations, utilizing all assets of combined arms available to it—fixed and rotary winged aircraft and tanks in support of numerous dismounted patrols. The company eventually managed to engage several groups of insurgents, killed their indirect fires cell, and reduced violence to a very low level. When India Company transferred responsibility to another unit six months later, the area was quiet for several additional months. Although one could argue the lack of engagements was a measure of success, the author believes that a comprehensive planning effort, utilizing commander's guidance and the Seven Counterinsurgency Principles described previously, would have made a more lasting transition for the area.\textsuperscript{XXVII}

An Ideal Approach to a Complex Problem

The correct tactical solution that would provide a long-term, effective solution to the complex counterinsurgency encountered in and around Al Karmah in 2005 constituted a challenging problem. The nature and elements of the insurgency were not understood, as it was a fluid tactical situation, and the unit had not been in the area for long. There was no time to gather information and develop a careful, all-encompassing plan. An ideal tactical plan would
have taken the Seven Counterinsurgency Steps into the planning process, and created measures to address these factors.\textsuperscript{XXVIII}

The Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency Field Manual states that the first step of the planning process, \textit{Design}, is the most important planning step.\textsuperscript{XXIX} This step is where a commander and his staff carefully analyze all aspects of the problem, and identify aspects of the issue that will need appropriate measures applied to resolve it. The detailed, overall view of the issues is a vital function of attempting to provide long-term solutions to a complex counterinsurgency. An in-depth analysis of the issues surrounding the insurgency in and around Al Karmah would have outlined initial steps to be taken, but this process was not accomplished by the previous commander. Without this framework, and a developed understanding of the true issues and problems posed by the threats and issues, the unit would only be able to operate in a reactionary manner. Utilizing the seven counterinsurgency principles identified earlier in the paper, the author will assess how those principles would be explored thorough the design process, and what initial efforts could be applied to address them.

Issues and solutions for the seven counterinsurgency steps

1.) Determine the Insurgent Endstate

The first counterinsurgency step, as identified by Kilcullen, is to clarify what the ultimate goal of the insurgency is. By understanding the opponent's desired endstate, a leader can focus resources to either defeat those efforts, or interject and provide that solution, or to discredit the insurgent message to the population. An effective utilization of this information would result in the unit fighting the enemy strategy, instead of reacting to their tactics.\textsuperscript{XXX}
During a successful counterinsurgency in the Philippines, a cunning leader and President of the country, Magsaysay, utilized this tactic to decisively defeat an insurgency threatening his government. A former insurgent himself, Magsaysay correctly understood the insurgent endstate, and provided it to them.\textsuperscript{xxxi}

As a counterinsurgent, Magsaysay utilized what the design phase is in essence—determining why an opponent is fighting, and apply measures to address the issue. Magsaysay correctly determined that land distribution was a key aspect of the unrest created by the Huk insurgency. One of the effective measures that Magsaysay applied to combat this was to create an environment for captured insurgents to begin a new life. He provided an island, with housing, electricity and running water, where the former insurgents could create a new life, and achieve the lifestyle they were originally fighting for.\textsuperscript{xxxii} This brilliant tactic robbed the insurgent movement of their desired endstate, and ultimately provided a non-violent solution to the insurgency issue.

In the author's experience in Al Karmah, initially the unit that had not accomplished any functions in attempting to determine what the enemy actually was fighting for. The battalion intelligence section provided products/target packages that were designed to kill or capture individual insurgents, but they did not attempt to figure out why these individual were putting their lives on the line to operate against India Company. A careful assessment based in the Marine Corps Planning Process problem-framing step context is the solution to this complex challenge.

In order to counter the insurgency, and to operate proactively vice reacting to enemy activity, the author should have sat down with the platoon commanders and the battalion intelligence
section, and spent time trying to assess why the insurgents were fighting. A successful plan would have done this for each of the three different insurgent elements, as they may have had different endstates and goals. Additionally, resources should have been dedicated to attempt to assess how each group was formed, the leaders identified by name, and their general operating methods. A good deal of work was devoted to this by the battalion intelligence section, but it was not widely disseminated, and as a commander, the author did not place enough emphasis of this task.

2.) Isolate the Objective

The second step of the proposed counterinsurgency plan is to isolate the objective. As Galula suggested, isolating an area contains the population and insurgents in one area. This feature sets the stage for further operations that identify the residents, and reduces the insurgent’s freedom of maneuver throughout the battlespace.

The city of Al Karmah was well suited to by physically isolated. The bridge on the southern edge of the city connected it with Fallujah, Baghdad and other key areas. It was initially closed by the previous unit, which created much animosity among the locals, as it greatly increased the distances they had to travel (this fact should have been identified in the previous step, which would have brought this factor into question for further thought). The key roads to the west, north and east all could have been locations of physical entry-control points, manned by IA elements. They would have better situational awareness than India Company’s Marines would, and this task would help promote the IA’s legitimacy. In order to ensure the integrity of the system, the Marines would have to carefully watch the IA to prevent any attempts to collect bribes, steal from and threaten the locals, which would be counterproductive to the overall
efforts. This function of monitoring and developing the moral activities of HN forces is
generally as important as progressing their tactical skills.

3.) Clear the Objective of Insurgent Elements

Thompson emphasized that when combating an insurgency, an area should be isolated,
then systematically cleared in order to remove insurgent elements, equipment and weapons. This clearing would remove most enemy combatants (the ones that fought, or that could be identified), and removed their ability to maintain weapons within the objective area. This would limit their ability to fight in the future, forcing them to move weapons, thereby making themselves vulnerable to the ECP's. In addition to simply clearing the city, the interaction with the local populace with the Marines and IA elements would help to establish ties. As in the previous case, the Marines would need to ensure the IA did not steal from the homes, or alienate the populace.

4.) Identify the Legitimate Population

In Counterinsurgency Theory and Practice, Galula described the utility of conducting a census to determine who actually resides in the area. This information can serve many purposes-identify household members, provide a ready list of names/references to cross check information, and establish familial/tribal links. Current technology can result in a product that links households with individuals, photos, street locations, and other useful information.

Conducting a census in Al Karmah would have been extremely beneficial for India Company, and the unit that would relieve it. If there was an accurate roster with addresses, all counterinsurgent activities could have been much more specific, and the company could have
acted on intelligence much faster. Constructing the database would have been time consuming, but it would have been a very valuable tool. The company did have a Lieutenant who started a project like this on his own, but at the time the commander did not place much validity on the project, and did not provide the emphasis needed to complete the project.

In order to conduct a census, India Company would have had to request additional intelligence Marines, and support from the Combat Camera photographers. An intelligence section would have access to imagery, and the capability to create a useful product. Upon completion of the initial project, the commander would have to dedicate a small team devoted strictly to the task of updating and analyzing the data.

Another key task of identifying the population is the construction and issuance of identification cards. These cards would provide all regions with the information of who was traveling where, and even if the “why” was incorrect, the facts were present. Again, this task would take resources that were dedicated to Fallujah, and the products would need to be constantly updated, but it would be another aid to a long-term solution.

5.) Establish Entry and Exit Control Points

A permanent system of fixed entry control points would restrict movement of the populace, but it could severely limit insurgent freedom of movement. This system would aid in our tracking of civilian movement, which would build the counterinsurgent force situational awareness on the daily requirements and the operating atmosphere. Additionally, the ECP’s would force unidentified insurgents to pass through coalition checkpoints, make them uncomfortable, and force them to at least hide weapons, which would reduce their flexibility.
Another key feature of this system is that it would limit their ability to rapidly withdraw after contact, which was a fundamental part of the way the insurgent forces operated.

There would be many requirements for personnel and equipment in order to construct and operate an effective system of ECP’s. Initially, much engineering equipment and effort would be required to physically restrict mobility to force it to pass through the ECP’s, and they would have to be protected. A fixed site that hindered the insurgent mobility, and demonstrated coalition power to the populace would undoubtedly attract attention. They would most likely be targets of suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and sniper attacks. An extensive system that would limit vehicle mobility and protect the individuals manning the ECP’s would have to be constructed by outside agencies. The sizeable manning requirement would also be a large planning factor, although I would make the majority of the force IA’s.

6.) Integrate Host-Nation Forces

The forces of the country containing the insurgency would be the key to determining long-term success. Kilcullen stated the necessity of HN forces to establish long-term effects as a critical capability. The HN forces are the ones who will run the long-term solution to the insurgency, and were also the ones with the most to lose if the insurgents ultimately won. India Company had an entire IA company under its command, and could possibly have received more.

IA forces would have been ideal to run the ECP operations previously described. They could interact with the locals, which would build their situational awareness, sense of responsibility and legitimacy. As with the other IA operations, they would have to be closely watched to deter them from collecting fees or stealing from the locals.
In addition to the IA Company, India Company could have requested a larger force, and police units. The reality was that even though the commander had a plan to fully integrate the IA forces, the resources just were not available at that time. The few IA units were engaged in the larger urban areas, which were experiencing a large increase in violence.

7. Establish Firm Bases

As an insurgency is a struggle over the will of the people; the one who provides measureable security to them will generally win their support. In order to provide a secure environment 24 hours a day, seven days a week, one must live among them, at least initially. According to the “Ink Blot” theory, smaller firm bases would spread their influence and security until those positive forces eventually linked up with each other. An isolated area like Al Karmah would be ideal for this type of operation.

The city had a company-sized base to the south and a platoon-sized base on the bridge at the southern exit of the city. Once the city was physically isolated, the establishment of these bases could eventually spread security, and further hinder the insurgent’s ability to operate. The combination of the physical isolation with the ECP’s and the establishment of firm bases would force the insurgents out, or aid in their destruction if they chose battle. Like organized crime, insurgents operate along the seams of authority, and they would most likely move out to a safer area. If they chose battle, the physical isolation would prevent their withdrawal, and facilitate their destruction under the guns of India’s Marines.

As events unfolded in Al Karmah, the unit did construct another firm base inside the city. At the time, it was directed that India accomplish this, and the commander thought it was a vulnerable waste of resources. The base was not attacked, and in hindsight the author believes it
served its purpose of driving the local insurgents out. The additional drain on manpower and resources proved to be worth the effort. In hindsight, the unit most likely could have placed another firm base on the northern sector of the city, and continued to achieve positive results.

Conclusion

This paper has identified and described seven counterinsurgency principles that this author believes are enduring and useful in general tactical counterinsurgency operations. Although each counterinsurgency is unique, and timing/location further refine their unique nature; these principles will continue to be valid.

A small-unit leader deploying to a counterinsurgency environment has many resources to develop his understanding of how to tactically develop the battlespace. The overwhelming burden of other tasks associated with preparing his force to deploy limits what information can be distilled to form his initial operating focus. Unless an idea of how to progress forward tactically is understood, the fight will rapidly digress into a reactionary, ineffective fight.  

This paper was developed through reflections based upon experience of two OPERATION Iraqi Freedom deployments, and from several works published on counterinsurgency since the early 1960’s. All of the concepts listed in this paper were identified in some form in virtually every work referenced. What seems commonsense to the author now as a counterinsurgent were not apparent while he was furiously busy conducting operations. The author hopes this work can assist a leader in the same situation simplify arriving at a tactical solution sooner than this author did.
Bibliography


End Notes

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