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**6. AUTHOR(S)**  
Major (French Army) Tugdual BARBARIN

**7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**  
USMC Command and Staff College  
Marine Corps University  
2076 South Street  
Quantico, VA 22134-5068

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After the independence of its African colonies in the beginning of the 1960s, France maintained strong links and a significant military presence in the young African states. In the 1990s, French-African defense and security cooperation underwent a radical reorientation.  
In 1996, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in close coordination with the French Ministry of Defense, developed an innovative system of military training which places the emphasis on three main objectives: (1) building African armed forces adapted to the African specificities, (2) enabling African countries to take the ownership of the training process, and (3) associating regional stability and national security. The ENVR program resulted from this concept. In 2012, this program includes 15 schools dealing with many different aspects of defense and security.  
Having reached a certain degree of maturity, the ENVR program is now confronted to the challenge of its expansion, which may jeopardize the very nature of the program if not handled carefully.

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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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THE REGIONALLY-ORIENTED NATIONAL SCHOOLS, AN INNOVATIVE TOOL FOR NATIONAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY BUILDING

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR:

Chef de bataillon Tugdual Barbarin
Armée de Terre, Trupes de Marine - France

AY 11-12

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr Paulette Otis, Professor of Strategic Studies
Approved: Paulette Otis
Date: 4 April 2012

Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr Edward J. Erickson, Associate Professor of Military History
Approved: Erickson
Date: 4 April 2012

DONALD F. BITTER, PH. D.
Professor of Military History
Donald F. Bitter
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: The Regionally-Oriented National Schools, an innovative tool for national and regional security building

Author: Chef de bataillon Tugdual Barbarin, Armée de Terre, Troupes de Marines (France)

Thesis: Resulting from a long, common history between France and its former African colonies, the Ecoles Nationales à Vocation Régionales (ENVRs), which could be literally translated into Regionally-Oriented National Schools, can be regarded as an innovative program characteristic of an innovative approach to defense and security cooperation. While focusing on building forces that partner countries may be able to sustain in the long run, the program is based on the close integration of national and regional security. In that respect, it may be a precursor concept participating to a comprehensive form of conflict prevention policy.

Discussion: After the independence of its African colonies in the beginning of the 1960s, France maintained strong links and a significant military presence in the young African states. This situation resulted from a French desire to retain a significant influence on African affairs, and from a need for African countries to be supported. The radical changes in the global political situation that occurred in the 1990s called for a profound renewal of French-African cooperation policy, especially in the field of military training and education.

In 1996, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in close coordination with the French Ministry of Defense, developed an innovative system of military training which places the emphasis on three main objectives: (1) building African armed forces adapted to the specific needs and constraints existing in African countries, (2) enabling African countries to take the ownership of the training process, and (3) associating regional stability and national security. The formalization of this concept gave birth to the ENVR program. The ENVR network expanded quickly. In 2012, it includes 15 schools dealing with many different aspects of defense and security. Several ENVR institutes have already left the program to transform into national or international establishments. Moreover, the program progressively develops into non-francophone countries.

Despite the fact that it is still a young project, the ENVR program already proved successful in many respects. The ENVRs have gained a reputation of high-quality training centers and other African countries are willing join the program. This success is largely based on a long-term commitment at the institutional and individual level which fosters mutual understanding and confidence among the partners. Having reached a certain degree of maturity, the ENVR program is now confronted to the challenge of its expansion. The inception of new partners along with France seems to be both ineluctable and desirable. However, it may jeopardize the very nature of the program if not handled carefully.

Conclusion: Proposing an innovative tool for defense and security cooperation, the ENVR program deserve a closer attention from the defense and security community. Indeed, it stresses the importance of training and education in conflict prevention, while actively promoting regional stability. With this respect it can be considered as a precursor for a modern form of defense and security cooperation.
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PREFACE

While working in an international environment, I realized that persistent French influence over Sub-Saharan African countries is often held to be self evident by most of our international counterpart. However, when prompted to support such an assertion, people are rarely able to provide precise examples demonstrating this influence. At best, they evoke outdated clichés which do not reflect the reality of current relationships between France and its African partners and demonstrate nothing but ignorance about Africa and its place in today’s world. This situation probably results from the fact that few western countries have direct strategic interest in Africa. The fact that the bulk of the literature dealing with Sub-Saharan Africa is in French language is also a possible explanation.

Concurrently, my few deployments overseas made me aware of the great interest that many western countries express about the current issues in the field of defense and security cooperation. The ongoing reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan shed a renewed light on the challenges presented by state (re)building and the restoration or creation of efficient security forces in foreign countries. Moreover, given the threat that the existence of weak states represents for global security, such concerns cannot be ignored. One of the latest Marine Corps strategy documents exemplifies the growing emphasis placed on conflict prevention and security cooperation:

“We will look for opportunities to increase the number of Marines assigned to government and military assistance organizations, including country teams. At the conclusion of these tours, we will assign them to follow-on duties that apply their experience to regionally-focused operating, advisory, and security forces. We will institutionalize training and advisory duties as legitimate, normal career activities for all Marines, and ensure promotion policies reflect appropriate consideration of these duties.”1

These two observations, as well as a two year long posting in the École Militaire de l’Outre-Mer et de l’Etranger (EMSOME, i.e. French Military School for Overseas Studies),

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incited me to pay attention to a recent concept implemented by France in the framework of its defense and security cooperation with African countries. Indeed, the *Ecoles Nationales à Vocation Régionale* (ENVR, i.e. Regionally-Oriented National Schools) program illustrates one of the most modern aspects of the relationships between France and the African countries and presents an original approach to conflict prevention. I am glad that the Master of Military Studies (MMS) offered me the opportunity to conduct research on this topic and to present it on this thesis.

I would like to thank Doctor Paulette Otis, my mentor, for her patience and precious pieces of advice. I also would like to thank Doctor Guillaume Lasconjarias and Doctor Amandine Gnanguên from the French Institute for Strategic Research at the Military School (IRSEM) for their valuable support. I cannot forget Miss Isabelle Pierre, from EMSOME, Lieutenant (French Navy) Stephanie Payraudeau, as well as officials from the Directorate for Security and Defense Cooperation (DCSD), and the *coopérants* in the ENVRs, who made this study possible.

Lastly, I want to thank my wife Karine who did her best to thwart our five children’s attempts to disrupt the completion of this paper. She successfully denied me the opportunity to use them as an excuse to withdraw from the MMS program. With this respect, our little French-American baby was probably the one who made life the most difficult for her.
INTRODUCTION

Helping another country to maintain internal stability is one of the most complicated tasks a state may have to address. This issue is even more difficult when considered in the long run. Indeed, if a more or less direct military intervention can help to solve security issues in the short term, setting the conditions for stability and giving a country the necessary tools to preserve it represent an even more daunting challenge. Not only actors internal to the country have to take part in the security architecture, but external actors are also players. Moreover, having a tool is one thing; being able to use it is another problem, especially when the tool is complicated. Because of the special relationships it has with its former African colonies for more than five decades, France was particularly exposed to this issue and has developed several programs aimed at helping African countries to provide their own security.

Resulting from a long, common history between France and its former African colonies, the *Ecoles Nationales à Vocation Régionales* (ENVRs), which could be literally translated into Regionally-Oriented National Schools, can be regarded as an innovative program characteristic of an innovative approach to defense and security cooperation. While focusing on building forces that partner countries may be able to sustain in the long run, the program is based on the close integration of national and regional security. In that respect, it may be a precursor concept participating to a comprehensive form of conflict prevention policy.

This thesis first depicts the main features of the relationships between France and its former African colonies from their independence up to now for it is essential to understand how the ENVR idea emerged. Then, it presents the ENVR concept and its implementation before drawing some perspectives from the experience gained through this program.
1 A LONG MATURATION PROCESS: REFORMING THE FRENCH COMMITMENT IN AFRICA

After the dissolution of French Equatorial Africa and French West Africa, and the independence of its African colonies at the very beginning of the 1960s, France maintained close links with the newly independent, francophone countries in institutionalizing a strong economic, cultural, and military cooperation. During the following decades, cooperation in the development of Sub-Saharan Africa represented a cornerstone in the French foreign policy. The framework elaborated during this period lasted more than thirty years, but the recent evolutions of the international context called for an adaptation of this structure. These changes, along with new domestic constraints, prompted radical changes in the nature of the French involvement in the western part of Africa, as well as in the structural organization of the administration in charge of the implementation of the newly designed policy.

1.1 Reasons for a French presence in Africa

From the beginning of the 1960s to the mid-1990s, the cooperation between France and African countries was strongly focused on former French colonies and mainly based on bilateral relations. This cooperation resulted from a conjunction of three different rationales. Because of the economic, cultural, linguistic and political links built during the colonization era, a kind of African preference characterized, and still does, French foreign policy as a reminiscence of history. In addition, these privileged links were also tainted with a touch of compassion. Viewed by many intellectual elites from both sides like a way to assume responsibilities for reparations of colonization, the cooperation with former French colonies was sometimes perceived as a humanist challenge consisting in finding a way to combine the universal values of democracy with the respect of cultural authenticity.

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Mutual interest was another rationale for French-African cooperation. Indeed, like in every system of aid, an altruistic logic fitting with the needs of receiving countries coexists with a model of foreign policy serving the aims of the donor.³ In this case, since 1960, the French administrations used African policy as a tool of influence designed to maintain France’s status on the international stage in holding a heavy sway over a significant part of the African continent. Among the most significant components of this comprehensive policy were the CFA Franc (Franc des Colonies Françaises d’Afrique, literally Franc of the African French Colonies), Francophonie - the formal organization of francophone countries and the regular France-Africa summits which were a vector of French diplomatic influence.

To be fair, one must acknowledge that this situation did not only result from a French will to reinforce its weight in the concert of nations, but also to the will of most of the African heads of State. Many of them requested the presence of French forces after their country gained independence in order to help them to build the institutions their newly created state needed. Similarly, the creation of Francophonie and the establishment of cultural cooperation was initially the idea of African personalities such as Senegalese President Senghor and Tunisian President Bourguiba – despite the reluctance of General De Gaulle who saw this kind of organization as inefficient and useless.⁴ Moreover, former French colonies often relied on the French influence in international institutions to make their voice heard. These considerations make the French-African relationships look more like a clientelist policy rather than a form of neo-colonialism.

This assessment is supported by the fact that several African states decided to leave the Franc zone or unilaterally put an end to their defense agreement with France. Such events demonstrated that France was unable to apply enough pressure against African countries to maintain them in the institutions conducive to its influence. Moreover, some African partners

³ Jacquemot, 48.
providing France with strategic resources, such as Niger with uranium and Gabon with oil, had actually efficient means of pressure over the former colonial power. Therefore, considering the French-African relationships as a one-way exchange is an incorrect view of the situation.5

The French military presence in the African continent was a telling example of such a mutual exchange. Mainly formalized by bilateral defense or military assistance agreements, it was focused on three major aims: (1) maintaining order in the former colonies, (2) preventing the nascent countries to side with the Soviets, and (3) maintaining the prestige of France in the world. Helping stabilize the new countries implied establishing local security forces able to replace the French colonial troops, integrating the African soldiers serving in French armed forces in these new armies, and training African military cadres. It also included advising when an insurrection movement threatened the newly established government as in Cameroon with the Union des Populations du Cameroun (Cameroon Populations Union).

More focused on developing the political and economic bases for the development of their countries, most African heads of state welcomed the persistence of the French involvement in their internal security affairs.6 In addition to the French troops dedicated to the building of local armed forces, the context of the Cold War provided a reason for preserving a significant French contingent in Africa. Indeed, equipping and training new armies was not enough; avoiding the rising of new communist states was also necessary. Of course, the French forces prepositioned in Africa, reinforced by units from metropolitan France or overseas territories when needed, were a convenient tool to intervene directly in African crises.7

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5 Petiteville, 577.
1.2 An outdated framework

The framework of relationships between France and Africa in the mid-1990s was directly inherited from the policy designed and implemented by General De Gaulle’s administration immediately after the French colonies attained independence. As mentioned above, the French-African cooperation policy resulted from the conjunction of the deliberate political will of the French administrations and of the desire of African heads of states. Therefore, it was more something of a superposition of plans in different fields than a comprehensive, coordinated policy. The decision making process in force at the beginning of the 1990s reflected this situation.

Effective up to 1998, the Ministry of Cooperation was created in 1959. Its existence suggests that the cooperation policy was a fully integrated and coordinated one. Unfortunately, its scope was narrowed to the African Francophone countries. Moreover, the fact that the main decisions were often made in the Elysée Palace because of the direct – and even personal – links many African heads of state maintained with the French president, gave this ministry a role of execution rather than one of conception. Moreover, the coordination of cooperative actions in the field suffered from the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remained in charge of cooperation with non-Francophone countries and of all the diplomatic relations. In addition, each minister did his best to retain control over the actions falling under their field of competence. As a consequence, the Ministries of Defense, Culture, Education, Industry, and Finance, each one of which had more material and human resources than the Ministry of Cooperation, were used to intervene in the implementation of cooperation policy. This denied any institution the ability to make significant decisions and resulted in waste of resources and overall inefficiency. During thirty years, minor changes introduced variations to the subordination of the Ministry of Cooperation and to the scope of its responsibilities.

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8 The Ministry of Cooperation has been officially merged into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 1st January 1999. See paragraph 1.3.
However, it never became the coordinating institution needed to give consistency to the cooperation policy.

Criticisms about this system were neither uncommon nor recent. In his article, Franck Petiteville lists eleven reports and audits released by French officials between 1961 and 1996 recommending a reform of the cooperation organization.\(^9\) Then, he exposes the grievances forming the main features of these reports:

“The main criticism traditionally expressed focuses on the fragmentation between the administrations in charge of this cooperation, factor creating intertwining of powers, competition between ministers, and opacity of the system. In particular, the division of responsibilities between cooperation with black Africa, devolved to the Ministry of Cooperation, and cooperation with the other developing countries, assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is systematically denounced as an irrational management process of French cooperation. Linked to this question, the second fundamental criticism is about the budgetary imbalance of French cooperation in favor of Africa, often described as a survival from the colonial era and as a brake on redeployment of state aid to development in other regions of the world. The third recurrent criticism points out the confusion in the fields of geopolitical positioning, diplomatic and cultural influence, economic profitability for some French companies, and development assistance towards partnering countries.”\(^10\)

The fragmentation mentioned above and the fact that some lobbies took substantial advantage in preserving the status quo caused the subsistence of the established edifice. Despite the attempt of some high level French officials,\(^11\) reforming the system proved arduous.

1.3 Reforming the organization of French cooperation

Three major evolutions in the international context occurred in the early 1990s and eventually confirmed the obsolescence of this framework. The first one was the end of the bipolarization. In making the threat of communist infiltration in Sub-Saharan Africa


\(^10\) Petiteville, 593

\(^11\) Jean-Pierre Cot, appointed Minister of Cooperation on 22 May 1981, resigned on 8 December 1982 partly because he realized he was unable to implement the changes he deemed necessary to improve the system. Petiteville, 584-586.
disappear, the end of the Cold War removed the argument of the French shield against an extension of the Soviet influence to justify French military presence in its former colonies. The increased French involvement in an accelerating mechanism of European integration is the second major factor. Willing to strengthen the nascent European Community and facing the need of eastern European countries for help in order to build viable economies, France shifted its focus from Africa to Europe. As President François Mitterrand mentioned before numerous African heads of State in his speech at the 1990 La Baule Conference, such a change in priorities had huge implications for Africa because “the financial resources of countries friendly to African states are not unlimited”.12

The last major factor calling for a change of paradigm in French-African relations was the increasing participation of Bretton Woods institutions in the African economies. In the wake of the trade liberalization following the end of the Cold War, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) took a significant part into the structural reforms many African countries were conducting. The inception of the IMF in the economies of the traditional French purview weakened the strong economic influence France had on its former colonies.13

Following these changes in the international context, the organization of French cooperation underwent a profound structural and political reform in 1998. The main change was the merging of the services of the Secretary of State for Cooperation, the successor of the Ministry of Cooperation, and of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, the Comité Interministériel de la Coopération Internationale et du Développement (CICID, i.e. Inter-Agencies Committee for International Cooperation and Development), headed by the Prime Minister, was established to design and coordinate international cooperation actions from all ministries involved. In addition, the Agence Française de Développement (AFD, i.e. French Agency for Development) was established as the “pivotal actor” for development projects.

13 Petiteville, 599.
Lastly, the CICID defined a priority zone of solidarity. This zone consisted of the countries in which the French administration assessed AFD support is expected to have a maximum leverage on stability and economic development. Accordingly, AFD resources would be focused on this zone.\textsuperscript{14} These evolutions reflected a political will to insure a better coordination of the different institutions involved in French international cooperation and to define priorities in order to avoid dispersion and increase efficiency in the field.

1.4 **Impact on military cooperation: from a cooperation of substitution to a rationale of partnership**

With respect to the outdated character of French cooperation, military cooperation was not an exception. Before 1998, two different institutions were in charge of this aspect of cooperation policy. On the one hand, the *Mission Militaire de Coopération* (MMC, i.e. Military Mission for Cooperation), under the authority of the Ministry of Cooperation, was in charge of security cooperative actions with Francophone African countries. On the other hand, the *Sous-direction de l’Assistance Militaire* (SAM, i.e. Under-Secretary of Military Assistance), integrated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had to deal with the other countries. In addition to the imbalance in financial resources, the positioning of the MMC, directly subordinated to the Minister of Cooperation, was by far more advantageous than the one of the SAM within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

On 10 December 1998, Decree N°98-1124 established the new organization of the central administration of the Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs, the MAEE.\textsuperscript{15} It enacted the creation of the *Direction de Coopération Militaire et de Défense* (DCMD, i.e. Directorate for Military and Defense Cooperation\textsuperscript{16}) within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

\textsuperscript{16} On 16 March 2009, the DCMD is transformed into the DCSD, i.e. Directorate for Security and Defense Cooperation. In addition to its precedent tasks, it encompasses police and civilian security structural cooperation.
under the General Directorate for Political and Security Affairs. Resulting from the merging of the MMC and the SAM, this new entity ensured a better consistency of French military structural cooperation throughout the world and a better coherence with French foreign policy. A rebalancing of the military cooperation budget between Sub-Saharan Africa and other parts of the world reflected the general reorientation of French diplomacy. Moreover, the suspension of the national conscription and the professionalization of the French armed forces (1995) led to the redeployment of the French armed forces on the African continent and the restructuring of the cooperation.

Such a reduction of French forces on the continent was often perceived by African countries as an expression of disengagement. Nevertheless, this change was more the logical consequence of a larger and more profound change in the conception of security cooperation. During a colloquium held in November 2002 in Bamako, Mali, Lieutenant-General (French Air Force) François de Vaissière, the then head of the Military and Defense Cooperation Directorate, described the new two lines of approach the French cooperation policy adopted in 1998, and expressed the four objectives pursued by this renewed policy. Those features are still valid in today’s French cooperation policy.


77 The French military cooperation is divided into structural and operational cooperation. Structural cooperation deals with long term and highly politically charged issues; it is developed and implemented by the DCSD. Operational cooperation is conducted by the general officers commanding the French forces prepositioned overseas; in Africa, it consists in punctual actions aimed at taking part into preparation of African units deployed in peacekeeping operations, and at helping the empowerment of the African Union African Standby Force. Source: Senator Josselin de Rohan, Rapport d’information fait au nom de la commission des Affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées, sur la politique africaine de la France (Paris, France: Senate Report N°324, February 28, 2011).

18 A report of the Rand Corporation acknowledges this fact: “French security cooperation activities benefit from a well-coordinated interagency process. EMA’s different bureaus [EMA stands for Joint Headquarters] are in constant communication with their counterparts at MAEE. The MOD’s DAS, which makes strategic and political assessments of the countries where France intervenes, is part of the process as well. Such a structure is arguably easier to put into place when the agencies themselves are small—fewer than ten persons work at the DCSD’s Africa Bureau, and a similar number at the Africa Bureau of the DAS.” Source: Jennifer D. P. Moroney and others, Lessons from U.S. Allies in Security Cooperation with Third Countries The Cases of Australia, France, and the United Kingdom (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, October 2011), 54.

The first principle was the end of the notion of the French backyard in Africa. This meant that France’s policy in Africa would no longer deal exclusively with its former colonies. While fulfilling the commitments it had already entered into with its main partners, France intended to develop relationships with African countries that were not among its traditional counterparts. The second principle was the transition from a cooperation of substitution to a rationale of partnership. This change was aimed at giving African countries more responsibility and at leading them to the path of increased autonomy. Concretely, it required them to define their objectives by themselves, to build cooperation programs in partnership with France, and above all to take an active part in those programs.20

Following those two principles, the 1998 cooperation policy pursued four main objectives. First, a particular emphasis would be placed on military cadres’ education and training, especially for officers. Then, cooperation activities were to contribute to the internal stability of African states in helping African countries to improve control over their territory. In addition, the program developed in this framework must increase regional stability.21

Finally, military cooperation between France and African countries must progressively include association with other European countries, especially the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Unless accepting a dramatic decrease of French influence on the African continent, which could be perceived by former French colonies as a cowardly abandonment, such an evolution in the structures, policy, and resources required new concepts of actions. Therefore,
it is not surprising that French defense cooperation in Africa was reoriented along two innovative concepts. Both were designed to be implemented not only in Francophone countries but also in other African countries. The first one was the Renforcement des Capacités Africaines au Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP, i.e. Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities). This program has been initiated, developed and managed by the French Ministry of Defense with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1994. It is aimed at building, training, and equipping African national forces in order to allow them to progressively take on the responsibility of the security of the continent. It is implemented under the overview of the United Nations and in coordination with the African Union (AU). The RECAMP program is considered by the AU and its partners as the security complementary part of the NEPAD, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. The second concept was the Ecoles Nationales à Vocation Régionales (ENVRs). This thesis focuses on the latter.

2 THE ENVR: AN INNOVATIVE INITIATIVE TO HELP AFRICAN COUNTRIES

2.1 From “Plan Raisonnable” to the ENVRs, the evolution in military education and training cooperation

The concern of French command for educating and training African military cadres is not new. It appeared after World War I. Spurred by the remarkable behavior many African soldiers displayed on the battlefield and by a commitment to reward these veterans, France established several military schools designed to offer native Africans the opportunity to have an education following the French standards and to access the Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) courses. Between 1921 and 1925, this idea led to the creation of six schools located in Francophone African colonies (Senegal, Ivory Coast, Mali, Congo, Upper Volta, and Madagascar) in order to select and recruit NCOs and specialists for colonial troops. A few of
those NCOs even became officers in the French armed forces.\textsuperscript{22} In 1956, in addition to the training offered to some native Africans in the French military schools in France, the École de Formation des Officiers Ressortissants des Territories d’Outre-Mer (EFORTOM, Officers School for People from Overseas Territories) was established in Fréjus, a city located on the Mediterranean coast of France. Its original mission was to train and educate officers for the French colonial troops in a two year long curriculum. After 1960, the EFORTOM was maintained to support the newly independent countries. Its mission was to provide the young African republics with the “backbone of their nascent armed forces”. From 1956 to 1965, 275 cadets graduated from the EFORTOM in eight classes; five of them became the head of state of their countries.\textsuperscript{23}

Unfortunately, the EFORTOM alone was not capable of providing enough military cadres for all the new African countries. Therefore, a program called “Plan de mise sur pied des armées nationales des Etats africains” (Plan to set up national armies of African countries) or more usually “Plan Raisonnable”\textsuperscript{24} allowed the former French colonies to send people in French military schools and academies to be trained and educated. Between 1960 and 1990, the number of African officers and NCOs trained in France went from 1000 to more than 2000 per year.\textsuperscript{25} They were educated and trained according to the French standards following the same courses as their French counterparts. Moreover, many former French colonies had French military detachments operating as advisors and instructors on site in the framework of technical military assistance. In some countries, military schools were established to train local troops using the French method slightly adapted to fit local specific


needs. The signal officers’ course created in Bouake, Ivory Coast, in 1983 and the infantry officers’ course established in Thies, Senegal, in 1987 were among those schools. Despite the excellent quality of the training provided by this program, there were two major drawbacks: (1) the training had a significant cost, and (2) it did not sufficiently address the local particularities the trainees faced when back in their country.

Like the other parts of the French cooperation policy in Sub-Saharan Africa (see above), “Plan Raisonnable” underwent huge changes. In his speech in La Baule before the African heads of state in 1990, President François Mitterrand articulated that, from then onward, the French troops will not be committed in the African continent short of external aggression or humanitarian intervention. This decision implied thinning military staff working in military schools in Africa. Simultaneously, in accordance with the reorientation of its international cooperation toward Eastern Europe, France started to divert resources from its former African colonies. Moreover, because of the downsizing of the French forces resulting from professionalization, there were fewer places available in military institutions in France. This made the situation unsustainable for the established training system and called for innovative solutions.

2.2 **The ENVR concept**

Elaborated in 1998 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ENVR concept is implemented by the DCSD. It pursues four aims: the first objective is to reduce the overload on the French military schools; the second one is to provide African armed forces with courses that are more adapted to the geopolitical context in which they operate and to their usual equipment; the third aim consists in progressively enabling the African armed forces to

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26 Most of the information mentioned in this paragraph are from “Le concept des ENVR,” *Partenaires Sécurité Défense, Revue de la cooperation de sécurité et de défense*, n° 268 (Winter 2012): 11-14.

handle the training by themselves; lastly, the concept integrates the promotion of regional stability.

In order to attain these objectives, France and the host country reached an agreement where the latter provides the location, the infrastructure and the staff needed for the general running of the school while Paris brings technical expertise and financial support. This support includes the participation of skilled French cadres to the training of the students. In return, the host country accepts students from other countries whose transport and scholarships fees are partially funded by the French government. By giving the opportunity to African military cadres to learn and work together according to the same procedures and techniques, the ENVR concept lays down the foundations of further regional security cooperation.

In order to be labeled as an ENVR, a school must meet four basic requirements. First, it must comply with a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreed to by France and the host country that defines how the school is run. The validity duration and the content of the MoU vary. Amongst other things, this agreement specifies the composition of the staff, and the financial contribution of each signatory country. Usually, the host nation pays for current expenditures while France funds a variable part of training equipment and the operating cost in addition to the support for foreign students. As much as possible, the budget is designed to avoid the creation of any financial dependence of the host nation to French support. Second, the allocation of slots available for local students and the ones coming from other countries of the region must be fair. Usually, one third of the students stems from the host nation while two thirds of them are foreigners. This ratio is specified in the MoU. Third, each trainee must go through a systematic selection process prior to his or her admission into the school. Lastly, the training must be similar to the one provided by the equivalent French institution.

28 A French coopérant. Survey conducted by the author, January 2012.
This last requirement implies that the certificates and diplomas delivered by the ENVRs have the same value as the one delivered in France. A formal pairing system may even be established to formalize the links between an African school and its French equivalent institution. This is the case between the *Cours Supérieur Interarmées de Défense* of Yaoundé, Cameroon, and the French *Ecole de Guerre*. Moreover, to ensure this standard is met, local and French staff members of each ENVR are responsible for permanent and close monitoring of the training (see section 2.5).

The ENVR program is not a standalone plan. It is nested in a larger framework, namely the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), a continental organization established by the African Union in 2002, and designed to allow the African countries to manage conflicts on their own continent. In providing trained officers and NCOs to the African armed forces, the ENVR program contributes to building local defense and security forces capable of participating in the African Standby Force (ASF), the operational organ of the APSA.

One of the very few American studies taking into account the ENVR program, a Rand Corporation report issued in 2011, underlines the main specificities of this innovative concept:

“[…] the ENVR concept gives a large degree of ownership to the host country, giving it a direct role in the management (as well as the financing) of the school. The concept also promotes a regional approach by bringing together students and trainees from countries that often face similar security issues and can only benefit from pursuing their collaboration in the future. ENVR are particularly illustrative of France’s efforts toward addressing regions rather than individual countries, and launching multilateral projects that can be supported by a wide range of donors and contributors.”

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29 Concretely, both school have common lecture blocks taught by the same professor and a Joint Committee for Education hold a yearly study session to discuss the curriculum. Source: A DCSD official, email message to author, March 12, 2012.

30 The ASF structure is supposed to be composed of five standby brigades, one for each regional organization. It is designed to be rapidly deployed anywhere in Africa to fulfill a mandate given by the African Union. The deployed element must be able to operate within or in coordination with a United Nation mission. Source: Amandine Gnanguénou, “Architecture africaine de paix et de sécurité,” Université de Montréal, Réseau francophone de recherche sur les opérations de paix (December 7, 2008), [http://www.operationspaix.net/10-details-lexique-architecture-africaine-de-paix-et-de-securite.html](http://www.operationspaix.net/10-details-lexique-architecture-africaine-de-paix-et-de-securite.html) (accessed March 1, 2012).

31 Jennifer D. P. Moroney and others, 54.
2.3 The ENVR network

On 1 July 1996, the inauguration of the Inter-African Military Administration School in Koulikoro, Mali, marked the beginning of the ENVR venture. Indeed, while not officially labeled as ENVR, this school is the concrete experimentation of a new type of school placing a great deal of emphasis on taking into account local specificities and on integration of regional security issues to the curriculum. After the formalization of the ENVR concept in 1998, the Ecole du Service de Santé des Armées de Lomé (ESSAL, i.e. Army Medical Corps School of Lome) was the first ENVR to be established (June 1998).

Taking advantage of the existent national military schools in some African countries with which France already had bilateral agreements, the ENVR network quickly grew (see Annex 1). For instance, the Signal Officers’ Training School of Bouaké, Ivory Coast, established as a national school in 1983, and the Gendarmerie Officers’ Training School of Abidjan, created in 1972, were among the very first centers entering the ENVR program in 1997.32 Likewise, the Staff College of Koulikoro, Mali, was labeled “ENVR” in 1998, nine years after its creation under national status. This status change implied, in particular, the adaptation of administrative procedures, a wider opening to international participation (most of these schools already trained foreign officers in accordance with bilateral agreements), and an increase in the African staffing for instructor positions.

In 2012, the ENVR program represents a significant and active network with fifteen training schools and centers in Africa (see Annex 2). The overall capacity of the establishments steadily increased over the years (see Annex 3). In 2011, more than 2,300 trainees (EMP included) from 30 countries to attend 60 different courses related to security and defense. Since the creation of the first ENVRs, more almost 15,000 people have been trained in these schools (see Annex 4). France takes part in this program providing annually ten million Euros and assigning 45 French seconding officers and senior NCOs in the schools.

32 Because of the current political situation in Ivory Coast, these two schools are currently inactive.
During the time of their assignment in an ENVR, French personnel do not fall under the control of the French Ministry of Defense but are detached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and monitored by the DCSD.

2.4 Organization of the ENVRs

Preferably, the position of the French military personnel, usually called coopérant, embedded in the ENVRs is not in direct contact with the trainees. Indeed, in order to allow a better appropriation of the training process by the African military cadres and to make the courses’ content fit with local specificities, each detachment is limited to the strict necessary number of coopérants and do not exceed 5 officers and NCOs (see Annex 5). They rarely act as instructors. Usually, a field grade officer is appointed as a deputy of the school commander and holds the position of superintendant. If there are NCOs coopérants, they often are the technical advisors for the teachers or for the administrator. Only when there are not any or too few local cadres qualified to teach very specific skills, French coopérants teach the course. It is interesting to note that all coopérants wear the uniform of the local armed forces instead of the French one. This is aimed at giving a perceivable signal that their primary mission is to help the local armed forces.

Each ENVR focuses on a specific set of competencies, all of which are necessary to improve the stability and security of the host country and the regional organization. These are defined during the initial negotiations between the French and the local officials and specified in the MoU. Since the aim is to provide knowledge and skills consistent with local specificities, a great deal of attention is paid to the fact that the training has to deal with equipment the African countries can afford. For instance, the PANVR (Regionally Oriented National Aeronautic Centre) of Garoua, Cameroon, proposes several courses designed to teach piloting and maintaining of ultra light aircraft such as the Tétras ULM. The observer-pilot course and the ULM mechanics course are two examples. In addition, the PANVR
organizes each year a six months long course to prepare African candidates for entering the French Air Force Academy.\textsuperscript{33}

Initially designed to address military fields of competencies, the ENVRs quickly developed to encompass a wide range of areas dealing with defense and security issues. Over the years, the ENVR network has become a comprehensive network taking into account the peacekeeping and the law enforcement facets, as well as the air and naval aspects of these concerns. It even includes courses addressing the operative and strategic approach to peace and security challenges.

The ENVRs may be grouped into five categories according to the kind of skills they are providing: general military education, military medicine, technical or specialized military training, homeland security, and peacekeeping operations training. Within each category, each school is responsible for a specific level (for instance tactical, operational, and strategic level of operations) or domain (for example administrative, technical, and logistic support).

\textsuperscript{33} Survey.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>French name</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
<th>Opening Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Military Training</td>
<td>CSID</td>
<td>Cours Supérieur Interarmées de Défense</td>
<td>Advanced Joint Services Defense Course</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EEML</td>
<td>Ecole d’Etat-Major de Libreville</td>
<td>Staff College of Libreville</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical or Specialized</td>
<td>EGT</td>
<td>Ecole de Génie-Travaux</td>
<td>Construction Engineer School</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Training</td>
<td>PANVR</td>
<td>Pôle Aéronautique National à Vocation Régionale</td>
<td>Regionally-Oriented National Aeronautic Centre</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EN-Bata</td>
<td>Ecole Navale - Bata</td>
<td>Navy Training Centre – Bata</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EMTO</td>
<td>Ecole Militaire Technique - Ouagadougou</td>
<td>Military Engineering College - Ouagadougou</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EMA</td>
<td>Ecole Militaire d’Administration</td>
<td>Military Administration School</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Medical Training</td>
<td>EPPAN</td>
<td>Ecole des Personnels Paramédicaux des Armées</td>
<td>Military Paramedic Personnel School</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ESSAL</td>
<td>Ecole du Service de Santé des Armées de Lomé</td>
<td>Army Medical Corps School of Lome</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EASSML</td>
<td>Ecole d’Application du Service de Santé Militaire - Ouagadougou</td>
<td>Military Medical Practice School – Libreville</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Security Training</td>
<td>CPPJ</td>
<td>Centre de Perfectionnement de la Police Judiciaire</td>
<td>Judicial Police Training Centre</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CPTMO</td>
<td>Centre de Perfectionnement aux Techniques de Maintien de l’Ordre</td>
<td>Law Enforcement Training Centre</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAOG</td>
<td>Cours d’Application des Officiers de Gendarmerie</td>
<td>Gendarmerie Officers Training Course</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping Operation Training</td>
<td>CPADD</td>
<td>Centre de Perfectionnement aux Actions post-conflictuelles de Déminage et de Dépollution</td>
<td>Western Africa Centre for Humanitarian Mine Action Training</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because of the long, common history between France and its former African colonies, the ENVRs are concentrated in Western and Central African countries (see Annex 2). However, the ENVR network is going to be expanded since negotiations are going on between France and Burkina Faso to create a Civil Protection School\(^{36}\) and the establishment of new schools or training centers outside the perimeter of the ECOWAS\(^{37}\) and the ECCAS\(^{38}\) is not to be excluded.


\(^{35}\) Before the Staff College of Libreville, the Staff School of Libreville has been established in 2001. This school was delivering a basic staff training sanctioned by a certificate. Source: [http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/enjeux-internationaux/defense-et-securite/cooperation-de-securite-et-de/les-ecoles-nationales-a-vocation/article/l-ecole-d-etat-major-de-libreville](http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/enjeux-internationaux/defense-et-securite/cooperation-de-securite-et-de/les-ecoles-nationales-a-vocation/article/l-ecole-d-etat-major-de-libreville).

\(^{36}\) Partenaires Sécurité Défense, n°268: 35.

\(^{37}\) ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States

\(^{38}\) ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States.
2.5 Meeting the standards: selection and control process

Several screening procedures exist in order to ensure the high quality of the training delivered in the ENVRs. First, the instructors are rigorously selected on the basis of their qualifications. While the French cadres detached by the DCSD must have the qualifications and demonstrate a solid experience with respect to the skills taught in the schools they are assigned to, their African counterparts have to meet the same standards. If required, some of them are recommended to attend a refresher training program in France or in a local institution.

The students must also meet some requirements to be admitted to the courses. These standards are defined in the MoU upon which France and the host nation agreed. There may be administrative, medical, physical, or academic criteria evaluated either on the records, or by the means of competitive exams, or both. This selection is aimed at preserving the quality of the training, and at minimizing failures during the course. For example, to enter the EEML, an applicant must pass an exam about general and military knowledge, a topography test, and a document analysis test; he must also run fifteen kilometers in combat gear in less than three hours.39 During most of the courses, the trainees have to take intermediate and final exams aimed at verifying they have digested the delivered information and techniques.

In addition to the selection processes described above, each ENVR is monitored by the local chain of command and by the DCSD as well. In every ENVR, the position of superintendent is staffed by a French field grade officer. This officer is the primary point of contact for the DCSD to which he periodically report. Usually considered as one of the deputies of the ENVR commander, a local colonel or general officer, he is assisted by a local officer, the deputy superintendent. He is particularly in charge of verifying that the quality criteria defined in the MoU, also known as the “Label-France”, are met. This quality label takes into account requirements such as the content and the organization of the courses, the

compliance with the working hours, the correct execution of the classes, and the supervision of the applicants’ selection.\textsuperscript{40} This internal chain of control is completed by onsite inspections conducted by the host country, as well as by the DCSD, which encompasses the financial and administrative management of the establishment. In addition, the opportunity exists for a formal system of twining of one ENVR with its equivalent establishment in France, favoring emulation between the two institutions.

2.6 \textbf{Going ahead: evolutions of the ENVR program}

After 15 years of existence, the ENVR program is progressively improving to keep the pace with the current defense and security issues in a pragmatic way and leverage the advantages inherent to the concept. Indeed, three schools deserve a closer look because they exemplify adaptations or evolutions of the ENVR concept which may draw some interesting perspectives for the future.

2.6.1 \textbf{Out of Africa: the Gendarmerie Officers’ Training School in Rosù, Romania}

The Gendarmerie Officers’ Training School was the only ENVR institute outside the African continent. Established on 3 April 2000 in Rosù, in the vicinity of Bucharest, this school was designed to train officers of European security forces. The International Senior Officer Course was designed according to European standards and was aimed at enhancing the integration of national security forces into the framework of the European Policy Cooperation in the European Space.\textsuperscript{41} Each class was composed of a dozen of students coming from about ten countries.\textsuperscript{42}

In 2009, the Gendarmerie Officers’ Training Course became a national establishment. It still works under Romanian status and still conducts once a year a four months long course.

\textsuperscript{40} Tibault Stéphène Possio in \textit{Les évolutions récentes de la coopération militaire française en Afrique} (Paris, France: Editions Publibook Université, 2007), 303.
\textsuperscript{42} The 2010 class was composed of officers from Romania, France, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Armenia, Moldova, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine. Previous years, officers from Poland, Albania and Croatia also attended this course. Source: French embassy in Romania, \texttt{http://www.ambafrance-ro.org/}. (accessed on February 25, 2012).
focused on training police officers having an international-oriented staff position. It even welcomes non-European officers whose position involves working with European security forces (see Annex 4). For instance, the class of 2010 included one Armenian and one Jordanian officer.\footnote{French embassy in Romania, \url{http://www.ambafrance-ro.org/index.php/fr_FR/actualites/actualites-franco-roumaines/reception-du-8eme-cours-superieur-international-le-2-decembre-2010-par-m-henri-paul-ambassadeur-de-france} (accessed on February 25, 2012).}

2.6.2 Opening to non-Francophone African countries: the Naval Academy of Bata, Equatorial Guinea

Inaugurated on 11 October 2011, the Naval Academy of Bata (ENBata), Equatorial Guinea, is not only interesting because it complete the ground and air approach to national and regional security with a naval program.\footnote{The Regionally-Oriented Naval Training Centre of Attécoubé, Ivory Coast, created in 1998 already covered the naval aspect of security and defense issues. Due to the political situation in the host country, this centre has been closed in 2002. Source: \textit{Frères d’Armes, Revue de liaison de la Coopération militaire et de défense} n°230 (May/June 2001): 17.} It is also the first ENVR established in a non-francophone African country, since the Equatorial Guinea is a former Spanish colony.\footnote{Even if French, as well as Portuguese, are the two other official languages of the Equatorial Guinea, 96% of the population speak Spanish in addition to another traditional language.} Four different courses are proposed – naval officer, ship handler, semaphore watchman, and helmsman) through which about 60 students from 13 different countries will go during its first opening year.\footnote{Survey.} It is worth to notice that Equatorial Guinea asked for hosting an ENVR because its officials are concerned about regional integration: being a non-Francophone state bordered by two Francophone countries, Equatorial Guinea displays a significant will to take an active part to the region collective security architecture.

Other ENVR schools are now progressively opening their courses to non-Francophone trainees. For instance, the CPADD, a center specialized in humanitarian mine action training, already welcomes Brazilian instructors as temporary staff members and proposes classes in Portuguese. Starting in September 2012, the CPADD will be able to accept English speaking trainees. Reinforcing this trend seems to be a prerequisite to rebalance the origin of the
trainees, whose a large majority currently comes from Western and Central Africa (see Annex 6), and attract new African partners in the program.

2.6.3 Internationalization: the Peacekeeping School (EMP) of Bamako, Mali

In 1999, the Ecole de Maintien de la Paix (EMP, i.e. Peacekeeping School) of Zambakro opened in the Ivory Coast. But the turmoil resulting from the internal political crisis caused the closing of the school in December 2002 and obliged French officials to seek another location to resume peacekeeping training within the ENVR program. In June 2003, the EMP was resettled in Koulikoro, Mali, allowing officers from different African countries to attend courses addressing the conception and the conduct of peacekeeping operation at the battalion or brigade level, the supervision of DDR process, or the preparation of RECAMP major exercises. Those courses were taught in English and in French and elaborated in coordination with the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana and the African Centre for Strategic Research and Studies (ACSRS) in Nigeria.

On 26 March 2007, the President of the Republic of Mali inaugurated the new building of the Peacekeeping School in Bamako. It has been identified by the ECOWAS as one of the three centers for peacekeeping training. In 2007, eleven countries were contributing to support the school by funding the activities or detaching permanent staff. The Peacekeeping School is now under Malian status and is run by a board chaired by the Malian Minister of Defense assisted by representatives from all the stakeholders including the ECOWAS. However, the large majority of the courses are taught by African professors and officers; thus, the education and training provided are consistent with the local conditions.

48 Germany, Argentina, Canada, Denmark, the United States, France, Japan, Mali, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland. Source: Ecole de Maintien de la Paix de Bamako Alioune Blondin Beye, http://www.empbamako.org/ (accessed March 1, 2012).
Since 2007, the EMP of Bamako has trained more than 4600 military and civilian trainees, 44% of which come from the ECOWAS. About ten percent of the trainees are women.49

3 PERSPECTIVES

Assessing the ENVR program is hard. First, because the success of any educational program is intrinsically difficult to define and to evaluate. Second, because this program is still recent. However, it is already possible to draw some lessons from this original experiment. After stressing some strength developed in this type of cooperative process, it is worth considering how the ENVR concept may be improved or adapted to better respond to future challenges.

3.1 A first assessment criterion: exiting the ENVR program

Since the primary aim of the ENVR program is the appropriation of the training process by the local armed forces, the most obvious criterion of success is the number of schools that have been part of the ENVR program and are still operating under a different status. Three former ENVRs are now under national status: the Ecole Nationale des Officiers d’Active (Active Officers National Academy) of Thies, Senegal (1999-2006); the Ecole d’Etat-Major (Staff College) of Koulikoro, Mali (1998-2010); and the Gendarmerie Officers’ Training School of Rosu, Romania (2000-2009). The Peacekeeping School established in Bamako, Mali (1999-2007), is also another example. Even if did not become a national school, it is no longer an ENVR and proved to be relevant enough to attract international partners. Therefore, despite the fact that it is still a young program, the ENVR proved to be capable to reach its aim.

49 A French officer detached to the EMP of Bamako, email message to author, January 26, 2012.
3.2 **A key factor for structural cooperation: an enduring presence**

Undoubtedly, one of the main factors explaining the success of the ENVR program is the lasting commitment of France in Africa, especially in the field of defense and security. Such a long time presence is critical to create confidence and to convince the African partners that they can take advantage of the programs implemented by the French government. Moreover, it is the basis for mutual understanding between France and its African partners. The long lasting ties linking the parties involved in this venture provide an excellent platform for negotiations. The fact that African state agencies have often been designed after the French administrative organization facilitates the relationships between the stakeholders.

Moreover, this statement is not only true on the institutional side. It is even likely that the most interesting feature of the French cooperation in the ENVR program is the way the coopérants live in contact with the local population. Assigned in their position for two or three years, the coopérants usually bring their family with them for the duration of their stay overseas. In most cases, they live outside military camps, among the populace, and thus have direct contact with the local population on a daily basis outside the professional framework. Generally speaking, they are warmly welcomed by the local population, and they experience many aspects of the local way of living. Therefore, they get a pretty good understanding of the habits, customs, culture, and way of reasoning of the locals. After he has had a first experience in a cooperation duty, it is not unusual for a coopérant to be assigned in a position dealing with security and defense cooperation issues in a headquarters in France – the Joint Force Headquarters or the DCSD for instance. Consequently, many advisors taking part to the decision process have a concrete experience of the challenges and constraints that people face in the field. A Rand Corporation report released in October 2011 mentions this feature as one of the lessons to be learned from the French cooperation experience in Africa:

“[…] the work done by coopérants and the length of their stay allow them to develop personal relationships with the militaries of partner countries and to develop networks that facilitate future operations between France and the host
nations. Staying three years in a country also gives individuals a chance to better know their operational environments and be more culturally sensitive— an asset they will carry to their next assignments. Similarly, a general principle for French forces based abroad is to interact as much as possible with the local population.50

It is worthwhile noticing that, given the pivotal importance of personal relationships in many African cultures, this kind of management greatly facilitate the interactions between French and host countries officials.

A further emphasis can be placed on this specificity when considering that the cadres serving as coopérants do not represent a large part of the French armed forces: few positions are available and it is not rare to see the same officer or NCO serving successively in different positions. Indeed, assigning somebody in cooperation duty who has already demonstrated a certain ease in this kind of job is a way of minimizing the likelihood of problems resulting from inaptitude to adjust to local culture. As underlined in the Rand Corporation report, this situation offers advantages but also potential drawbacks:

“On Africa, for instance, almost 75 percent of the senior military advisors are from the Troupes de marine (an arm of the army dedicated to serving overseas). This results in easier communication and coordination, with the associated risk that this common cultural background may reduce the occurrence of original analysis or dissenting opinions.”51

3.3 Two main assets for success: a high quality education and permanent adaptation to the local context

However important an enduring presence may be for any structural cooperation program, it is not enough to make it successful. The excellent reputation of the ENVRs is established on the high quality of the education and training delivered in the different schools and centers constituting the ENVR network. Indeed, the requirement of delivering curricula equivalent to those delivered in French military school expressed in the ENVR concept is not only an advertisement. The control measures enforced to guarantee demanding training

50 Jennifer D. P. Moroney and others, 54.
51 Jennifer D. P. Moroney and others, 54. This opinion deserves to be moderated in considering the fact that the Troupes de Marine consists of 5 different branches – Infantry, Artillery, Armored, Signal, and Special Forces. This composition helps to maintain a certain degree of diversity within the arm.
programs are well-known and the results are the best support for this outstanding reputation: all the EPPAN\textsuperscript{52} students succeeded at the civilian nursing state examination sanctioning their training, and the ESSAL\textsuperscript{53} trainees are known for monopolizing the first places at the annual competitive exams of the Medicine Faculty of Libreville.\textsuperscript{54} Far from discouraging applicants, this hallmark makes ENVRs more and more attractive. With this respect, the fact that the accommodation capacity rather than the lack of valuable applicants limits the number of slots available for most of the courses is telling.

Another main asset characterizing the ENVR program is its capability to adapt to the local situation. The essential role of the coopérants in this adaptive process, as well as the fact that the staff of the ENVRs is mainly composed of local instructors, has already been underlined. However, it is worth stressing that such fitting with local specificities is not always easy and requires a strong will and, sometimes, imagination. The case of the CAOG, the Gendarmerie Officers Training Course, illustrates this feature: teaching law enforcement to students coming from 12 different countries implies knowing the judiciary rules applying in those states. Hence, designing a unique course for such a diverse student body requires ingenuity and flexibility. Arguably, the DCSD also proved to be adaptable enough to design and implement a policy according to local needs. The diversification of the domains addressed by the ENVRs supports this viewpoint. The establishment of MoU tailored to each specific situation is another example of the flexibility within the framework of the ENVR concept. The opening to non-Francophone trainees and the management of associated constraints in the organization of the courses may be considered as an additional proof of adaptability.

\textsuperscript{52} Military Paramedic Personnel School of Niamey, Niger.
\textsuperscript{53} Army Medical Corps School of Lomé, Togo.
\textsuperscript{54} Survey.
3.4 **An option for improvement: pre- and post-course management**

The assessment of the needs has been repeatedly identified by many stakeholders as one weak point in the program. The fact that the armed forces of many African countries involved in the ENVR program suffer from a dramatic paucity of human and financial resources forces their officials to react to situations rather than to act according to some sort of planning. Because it is difficult for them to have a clear vision of the future, they often are incapable of assessing their needs in terms of training and education. In 2007, the African Union committed itself to alleviate this issue in standardizing the composition of the African Standby Force (ASF) units. Meanwhile, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) established a system to evaluate the needs and to standardize training in order to fit UN operations requirements. Unfortunately, the ASF and the DPKO standards do not tally with each other.\(^{55}\)

In the same vein, many French coopérants express their disappointment at the absence of any efficient tracking system allowing them to trace the path of the trainees after they leave the ENVRs.\(^{56}\) Since employing the trainees after the completion of their course is an exclusive competence of the states, it is not unusual for trainees to be assigned or deployed in positions having no bearing with the skills they acquired, even in the case of specialized training. Hence, the time they spent attending an ENVR course – and the money spent accordingly – can be considered as waste. Moreover, such a lack of consistency between the training and the following assignments do not help to consolidate the proficiency of African armed forces, which is actually the final aim of the whole ENVR program. In order to alleviate this problem, several coopérants initiated follow-up surveys and established Internet-based tracking systems.

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56 Survey
Another issue related to post-course management pertains to skills upgrading. Because of the large number of states from which the trainees stem, it is almost impossible to establish a systematic upgrading system: each country has its own rules with respect to the period of validity of qualifications, and the total absence of any administrative control over the former trainees once they leave the ENVR does not simplify this task. Given these constraints, some ENVR set up procedures to ensure the follow-up of the trainees coming from the ENVR’s host nation. This is usually relatively easy to do. They also developed retraining courses available on a voluntary basis. Moreover, it is sometimes possible to trace a trainee when he successively attends several different courses in the same specialty: for instance, many students of the CSID, the Advanced Joint Service Defense Course of Yaoundé, graduated from the EEML, the Staff College of Libreville. This is also possible in the case of an ENVR offering basic and advanced courses: the PANVR, the Regionally-Oriented National Aeronautic Centre, is a telling example.

3.5 The way ahead: multilateral partnering

The opening of the ENVR program to multilateral partnering seems to be one of the most remarkable trends observable over the last five years. Indeed, it appears that it is probably an enduring and unavoidable evolution for at least three main reasons. To begin with, multilateral partnering increases the legitimacy of defense and security cooperation: the more stakeholders are involved, the less suspicious a cooperation program looks. Thibaut Stéphène Possio stresses that the “denationalization” process of the cooperation program contributes to increasing the confidence of African countries and to legitimize these program to the eyes of the international community.57

The second advantage of multilateral partnering is the recognition it brings to the ENVR program. If the fact that French standards are the quality benchmark for the instruction delivered in the ENVRs is largely recognized, the acknowledgement of this quality by other

57 Possio, 334-342.
countries, international organizations, or Non Governmental Organizations (NGO) can be nothing but beneficial for the reputation of the ENVR. For example, the label of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, as well as the ones of International Handicap and of Mine Advisory Group – two prominent NGO, gives credence and visibility to the courses delivered in the CPADD\textsuperscript{58} of Ouidah, Benin.

The last and certainly the most obvious grounds for an evolution towards multinational partnering is the financial aspect of cooperation actions. Securing funding for training centers and schools is probably the most daring challenge the ENVRs are confronted with. Indeed, once the initial investment on infrastructure, equipment, and staff is done - a significant investment is usually easily obtained given the will of stakeholders to realize their project, improving or at least maintaining the current training capabilities in the long term calls for a steadily increasing financial involvement of France and its African partners: increasing the workload capability of a training center and supporting the induced operating costs generate growing needs for funding.\textsuperscript{59} In most cases, especially given the current economic global context, France and the ENVR host country do not have enough financing capacities to support them. Consequently, France sought to involve other partners in the program such as other countries, international organization, or NGOs interested in a specific issue.\textsuperscript{60} This approach proved successful and some new partners joined the program and contribute to it significantly. However, this transformation must be conducted carefully because of the risks associated with it.

For instance, since it is the most important funder of the APSA\textsuperscript{61}, the European Union is going to extend its financial support to the training activities. Considering the fact that

\textsuperscript{58} Western African Centre for Humanitarian Mine Action Training
\textsuperscript{59} Survey
\textsuperscript{61} The African Peace and Security Architecture, see paragraph 2.2.
many countries decided to suspend their aid to address their own economic issues,\(^62\) this involvement is more than welcome but some reservations are already expressed. First, the EU funds will be provided to the ENVR through the African Union and then the Regional Economic Communities (REC) such as the ECOWAS and the ECCAS. Therefore, many stakeholders are worried about the complexity and the lack of transparency of the process. The low quality of the dialogue between the REC and the AU make this risk even more likely. In addition, the procedures to obtain additional financing from the EU in order to fund new projects will probably be long and complex; hence, a lack of reactivity is expected. Moreover, the lack of practical experience of decision makers emphasizes the risk of bad understanding of local realities resulting in decisions unsuited to the local realities.

3.6 **A pitfall to be avoided: trying to go too fast**

Even if the participation of new partners into training programs modeled after the ENVR concept is both desirable and necessary, it is important to keep in sight the eventual objective of this type of plan: the appropriation of the training process by the local armed forces. Hence, designing courses fitting the environmental constraints, the equipment, and the culture of local forces rather than western standards is crucial. Doing the contrary will inevitably result in creating security forces unsustainable for the state they belong to. Moreover, the desire to improve the situation may prompt new partners to invest a large amount of money in ENVR-like institutes. It is likely that such a course of action will increase the host nation’s dependence on external support, a situation contrary to the objective of the ENVR program.\(^63\) Lastly, remaining attentive to the feedback from our African partners is pivotal for the eventual success of the program. They know better than any others what can be assimilated by the people and the institutions of their countries and what the appropriate pace

\(^{62}\) For instance, the number of contributors to the Peacekeeping School of Bamako dropped from 11 in 2007 to 7 in 2011 (Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, USA, and Mali). Source: A French officer embedded in the EMP of Bamako, email message to author, January 26, 2012.

\(^{63}\) Cathelin, p.2 and 3.
is for that. Non-African stakeholders often do not realize that building forces capable of coping with current security challenges implies significant changes in institutions and mentalities. As a coopérant states:

“We often want to go too fast when carrying out our plans, to conduct our projects too fast, to pass on the torch as soon as possible. Time is necessary for our African partners to take ownership of this kind of schools. We must be very careful to avoid doing things in their stead because such an attitude belittles our African counterparts and won’t leave anything behind us after we leave. We must assist them when they take charge of teaching or administrative tasks. Lastly, we, as foreign staff members, must gain the confidence of the students. Again, this is a matter of patience.”  

Building efficient and sustainable national defense and security forces as well as a stable collective security system at the regional level takes time. It is not only a matter of equipment and skills. It deals much more with changing minds and habits, setting conditions for mutual understanding, and building trust. These issues require to be considered in the long run, and any attempt to take a shortcut is likely to prove detrimental to the eventual success of the program.

CONCLUSION

Resulting from a long common history, the ENVR program is the fruit of a significant evolution of the relationships between France and its former African colonies. In linking national and regional security issues, and in placing their actions in the long-term, the French Ministry of Defense and the French Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs designed an innovative framework which met with some success among their African partners. Moreover, they propose an example of a comprehensive way to address current security challenges.

As stressed in a publication of the Rand Corporation:

“France emphasizes long-term development of armed services with the goal of establishing African armies that can police, contain, and resolve state or regional conflicts effectively without outside assistance. Focused on Africa because of its previous colonial ties there, France attempts to provide its African partners with a corps of military experts capable of conceiving, preparing, and participating in peacekeeping operations under the aegis of an international organization and/or the United Nations.”

More generally, this realization may be regarded as a new matrix for a modern, long term vision of cooperation between industrialized countries and developing nations. Much is still to be done to enhance the efficiency of the ENVR system and to leverage all the benefits that may be drawn from it. However, the focus must remain on enhancing the capabilities of African countries in the long run, not on building security forces that are neither suited to their needs, nor affordable for them.

As a result of the increasing global economic competition, the search for natural resources will likely intensify in the next decades. Because of the immense and diverse reserves of natural resources it contains, the African continent will become a focal point for many developed countries. Therefore, if only for their own economic interests, these countries may become more interested in establishing stability in Africa. Because it provides an original approach to conflict prevention and peace building, the ENVR program deserves a closer attention from the defense and security community. While requiring a steady but modest financial and human commitment, it embraces the opposite of the COIN\textsuperscript{66} way to handle security problems: preventing the blaze rather than trying to extinguish the fire once lit.

\textsuperscript{66}COIN: Counter-insurgency.
ANNEX 1: CHRONOLOGY

**DCSD**

10 June 1961  Establishment of the Ministry of Cooperation and of the Military Mission for Cooperation (MMC)

10 December 1998  Ministry of Cooperation is disbanded. The DCMD is created within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the General Directorate for Political and Security Affairs.

16 March 2009  The DCMD becomes the DCSD (Directorate for Security and Defense Cooperation). Its scope covers police and civil security structural cooperation.

**ENVR**

1st July 1996  The Military Administration School is created in Koulikoro, Mali.

25 June 1997  The Staff College is inaugurated in Koulikoro, Mali.

6 January 1997  The Army Medical Corps School is inaugurated in Lomé, Togo. It is labeled as an ENVR in 1998.

19 May 1998  France and Ivory Coast sign an agreement with respect to the Gendarmerie Officers’ Training School of Abidjan.

June 1998  Army Medical Corps School of Lome, Togo, is labeled as ENVR.

21 October 1998  The National Officers School of Thies, Senegal, is labeled as ENVR.

1998  Establishment of a Regionally-Oriented Naval Training Centre in Attécoubé, Ivory Coast.

7 June 1999  The Peacekeeping School of Zambakro, Ivory Coast, is inaugurated.

18 August 1999  The agreement establishing the Law Enforcement Training centre of Awaé, Cameroon, is signed.

12 November 1999  The Judicial Police Training Centre of Porto-Novo, Benin, is inaugurated.

January 2000  The Military Engineering College of Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, is inaugurated.

July 2000  The agreement establishing the Staff School of Libreville, Gabon, is signed.

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68 The ENVR program hosted by the Staff College of Koulikoro has merged into the Staff College of Libreville after a two years long transition (2010-2011). The Staff College of Koulikoro is now run under national status. Source: a DCSD official, email message to the author, March 12, 2012.
6 October 2000  The Infantry Officers’ Training School of Thies, Senegal, is labeled as ENVR.

20 January 2001  The Regionally-Oriented National Aeronautic Centre is inaugurated in Garoua, Cameroon.

February 2001  The Law Enforcement Training Centre opens in Awaé, Cameroon.

8 October 2001  Inauguration of the Gendarmerie Officers Training opens in Ouakam, Senegal.

4 February 2002  The decree establishing the Staff College of Libreville is signed.

November 2002  The Gendarmerie Officers’ Training School of Rosù, Romania, is inaugurated.

1st January 2003  The Military Nurse Technical School of Niamey, Niger, is labeled as ENVR.

24 January 2003  The Staff College of Libreville is inaugurated.

24 April 2003  The Western African Center for Humanitarian Mine Action Training of Ouidah, Benin, is inaugurated.

16 June 2003  Reopening of the Peacekeeping School in Koulikoro, Mali.

April 2004  Decision is made to transfer the Peacekeeping School in Bamako, Mali.

26 March 2007  The Peacekeeping School of Bamako opens.

22 October 2007  Contributors’ conference in New York, USA, to examine the transformation of the Law Enforcement Training Centre (CPTMO) of Awaé, Cameroon, into an International Security Forces School with a United Nations’ label.

September 2008  The Advanced Joint Service Defense Course opens in Yaoundé, Cameroon. From then onwards, African armed forces have a Command and Staff College level school on the continent.

October 2009  The Military Medical Practice School is inaugurated in Gabon. It allows the education and training of military doctors specialized in emergency medicine, disaster medicine, epidemiology, and hygiene.

20 September 2010  The Construction Engineer School of Brazzaville, Congo, is labeled as an ENVR, one year after its opening as a national school.\(^69\)

11 October 2011  The Naval Academy of Bata, Equatorial Guinea, is inaugurated.\(^70\)

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ANNEX 2: ENVRS LOCATION AS OF JANUARY 2012\(^{71}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYM</th>
<th>FRENCH NAME</th>
<th>ENGLISH TRANSLATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAOG</td>
<td>Cours d’Application des Officiers de Gendarmerie</td>
<td>Gendarmerie Officers Training Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPADD</td>
<td>Centre de Perfectionnement aux Actions post-conflictuelles de Démimage et de Dépollution</td>
<td>Western African Centre for Humanitarian Mine Action Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPPJ</td>
<td>Centre de Perfectionnement de la Police Judiciaire</td>
<td>Judicial Police Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPTMO</td>
<td>Centre de Perfectionnement aux Techniques de Maintien de l’Ordre</td>
<td>Law Enforcement Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSID</td>
<td>Cours Supérieur Interarmées de Défense</td>
<td>Advanced Joint Services Defense Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAI</td>
<td>École d’Application de l’Infanterie</td>
<td>Infantry Officers’ Training School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASSML</td>
<td>École d’Application du Service de Santé Militaire - Libreville</td>
<td>Military Medical Practice School – Libreville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEML</td>
<td>École d’État-Major de Libreville</td>
<td>Staff College of Libreville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGT</td>
<td>École de Génie-Travaux</td>
<td>Construction Engineer School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMA</td>
<td>École Militaire d’Administration</td>
<td>Military Administration School</td>
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<td>EMTO</td>
<td>École Militaire Technique - Ouagadougou</td>
<td>Military Engineering College - Ouagadougou</td>
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<td>EN-Bata</td>
<td>École Navale - Bata</td>
<td>Naval Academy – Bata</td>
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<td>EPPAN</td>
<td>École des Personnels Paramédicaux des Armées</td>
<td>Military Paramedic Personnel School</td>
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<td>ESSAL</td>
<td>École du Service de Santé des Armées de Lomé</td>
<td>Army Medical Corps School of Lome</td>
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<tr>
<td>PANVR</td>
<td>Pôle Aéronautique National à Vocation Régionale</td>
<td>Regionally-Oriented national Aeronautic Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMP*</td>
<td>École de Maintien de la Paix</td>
<td>Peacekeeping School</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The EMP is no longer under ENVR status.

\(^{71}\) Source: DCSD

NUMBER OF NON-FRENCH TRAINEES IN AFRICAN ENVRS 2000-2011

72 Source: DCSD
(The trainees of the Peacekeeping School of Bamako, Mali, are not included in 2011 figures)
## ANNEX 4: ENVR TRAINEES BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN SINCE 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Organization</th>
<th>COUNTRIES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td><strong>TOTAL FOR AFRICAN ENVR</strong></td>
<td><strong>14,572</strong></td>
<td><strong>76</strong></td>
<td><strong>572</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Countries highlighted in yellow are or were hosting an ENVR)

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73 Source: DCSD  
74 SADC: Southern Africa Development Community  
75 IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development  
76 Figures of year 2011 do not take into account the 1,370 trainees who took part into a course at the Peacekeeping School of Bamako, Mali. Source: DCSD.
ENVR Trainees in the Gendarmerie Officers’ Training School in Rosu, Romania

<table>
<thead>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL FOR NON AFRICAN ENVR</strong></td>
<td><strong>107</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Countries highlighted in yellow are or were hosting an ENVR)
### ANNEX 5: GENERAL DATA ABOUT ENVR 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRENCH ACCRONYM</th>
<th>ENGLISH NAME</th>
<th>HOST COUNTRY</th>
<th>FRENCH STAFF</th>
<th>AFRICAN STAFF</th>
<th>NBR OF DIFFERENT NATIONALITIES (STUDENTS)</th>
<th>ANNUAL BUDGET 2011 (IN EUROS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAOG</td>
<td>Gendarmerie Officers Training Course</td>
<td>SENEGAL</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6/16*</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPADD</td>
<td>Mine Action and Depollution Training Centre</td>
<td>BENIN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35**</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>168 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPPJ</td>
<td>Judicial Police Training Centre</td>
<td>BENIN</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>106 405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPTMO</td>
<td>Law Enforcement Training Centre</td>
<td>CAMEROON</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSID</td>
<td>Advanced Joint Services Defense Course</td>
<td>CAMEROON</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12***</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAI</td>
<td>Infantry Officers’ Training School</td>
<td>SENEGAL</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>290 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASSML</td>
<td>Military Medical Practice School – Libreville</td>
<td>GABON</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>572 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEML</td>
<td>Staff College of Libreville</td>
<td>GABON</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGT</td>
<td>Construction Engineer School</td>
<td>CONGO</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>600 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMA</td>
<td>Military Administration School</td>
<td>MALI</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMTO</td>
<td>Military Engineers College - Ouagadougou</td>
<td>BURKINA FASO</td>
<td>2/1*</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>366 379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EN-Bata</td>
<td>Navy Training Centre – Bata</td>
<td>EQUATORIAL GUINEA</td>
<td>3/3*</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>420 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPPAN</td>
<td>Military Paramedic Personnel School</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESSAL</td>
<td>Army Medical Corps School of Lome</td>
<td>TOGO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27****</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>650 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PANVR</td>
<td>Regionally-Oriented national Aeronautic Centre</td>
<td>CAMEROON</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>190 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMP****</td>
<td>Peacekeeping School</td>
<td>MALI</td>
<td>1******</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2 000 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* permanent staff / usual guests speakers  ** Occasional reinforcement by Bresilian Army for Portuguese-speaking countries  *** French and Cameroonian guest speakers often reinforce the staff to teach specific classes.  **** The students attend the medicine course in the Lome Faculty of Medicine.  ***** Now under national status.  ******* Other

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77 Survey
countries have officers as members of the staff (Canada -2, Switzerland -1, Germany -1, Senegal -1)
ANNEX 6: GEOGRAPHIC REPARTITION OF ENVIRONMENTAL TRAINEES 2000 – 2011

NUMBER OF TRAINEES IN AFRICAN ENVIRs BY YEAR AND BY REGIONAL ORGANIZATION

Source: DCSD
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