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FROM STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION TO “SIMPLY COMMUNICATE”- REDEFINING "SC" IN MILITARY COMMUNICATION

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**Abstract**
Many senior military leaders have declared that communication is an integral part of modern warfare, yet express dismay at perceived failures in influencing the global public of recent operational merits. This paper explores Strategic Communication (SC) within the DOD by surveying current challenges facing military communication capabilities (MCC) including doctrinal inhibitors and their impact on the SC process, operational planning and desired outcomes. This paper will also survey professional and academic communication models, and propose a contemporary military communication process (model) that integrates and facilitates each MCC in the operational planning process.
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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REDEFINING "SC" IN MILITARY COMMUNICATION

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Preface

As a U.S. military public affairs officer, I am tired of hearing that military communication is broken, primarily that “Strategic Communication” (SC) or “Information Operations” (IO) has failed in achieving operational relevance in winning a “War of Ideas.” This paper, as well as many other recent studies, outlines doctrinal and policy roadblocks within the Department of Defense’s communication activities that hamper the military’s ability to effectively participate in the emerging global communication environment. Doctrine and policy fixes aside, the current value of SC-currency needs examination, as its operational applicability may be counterfeit in practice. The exponential growth of communications technologies and applications—especially in new and social media—offer more reward than risk, and provide an incredible means to break away from communication-control paradigms and directly converse with people (and publics) once again. Although emerging technology is an adaptive enabler for communication progress, approach is equally important. Commanders and leaders must learn to shed risk now and allow “digital natives”—a preponderance of today’s military force composition—to employ mobile and social communication technologies to create dialogue with various diverse publics.

These same challenges impact the Marine Corps, as Public Affairs (PA), IO, and Combat Camera (COMCAM) continue to bicker over form and function of their respective capabilities regardless of the effect global-communication has on how they currently operate. Nonetheless, there are many Marines, especially within the public affairs profession, who have earnestly attempted to “move the needle” toward progressive change in communication approach and design through their research, published works, field experiences, and professional collaboration—many of which are included in this study. Their collective and noteworthy
attempts to tackle current communication challenges in the Marine Corps have not yet provided the needed systemic change that leadership demands, even though these efforts may have already provided the correct diagnosis and remedies to overcome the Marine Corps’ SC difficulties. To that end, the Corps’ senior leaders must share the burden for its communication shortcomings, and make the necessary investments in professional communication (and communicators) in order to meet their own expectations.

Accordingly I would like to offer my sincere thanks to my fellow friends, colleagues, and Marines for their counsel, perspective, and support in this research to include: Maj. Cliff Gilmore, Maj. John Caldwell, LtCol. Matt Morgan, Maj. Carrie Batson, Maj. Jeff Pool, LtCol. Greg Reeder, and the patron-saint of Marine Corps Public Affairs, Maj. Stu Fugler. I equally share your personal passion for positive change and evolution, and hope that this research compliments your already notable contributions to military communication. I would also like to thank LtCol. Jose Garcia (USA) and Mr. Scott Woosley of the Defense Information School, as well as LtCol. Brian Baker, Dr. Edward Erickson and Dr. Pauletta Otis of the Marine Corps Command & Staff College for their guidance, advocacy, and encouragement during this research. Special thanks to my wife and kids for giving me the time to research and write.

Thanks, Dad, for giving me the opportunities and encouragement that has shaped the course of my life. I will truly miss you.
Executive Summary

Title: From Strategic Communication to “Simply Communicate”- Redefining “SC” in Military Communication

Author: Major Christian Devine, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: Many senior military leaders have declared that communication is an integral part of modern warfare; yet express dismay at perceived failures in influencing the global public of recent operational merits. This paper explores Strategic Communication (SC) within the DOD by surveying current challenges facing military communication capabilities (MCC) including doctrinal inhibitors and their impact on the SC process, operational planning and desired outcomes. This paper will also survey professional and academic communication models, and propose a contemporary military communication process (model) that integrates and facilitates each MCC in the operational planning process.

Discussion: Complicating DOD’s SC-conundrum is the services’ broad attempts to define, staff, integrate, and employ its MCCs efficiently. The intent to amalgamate capabilities of: Public Affairs (PA), Information Operations (IO), Military Information Support Operations (MISO) formerly referred to as Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Defense Support for Public Diplomacy (DSPD), and Combat Camera/Visual Information (COMCAM), into a coordinated and synergistic SC-effort has been challenging. MCC diversification and stove-piped approach to organizational communication has been detrimental to DOD. DOD’s challenge to find the balance between capability (MCCs) and communication process (planning) remains a significant issue. Leaders have signaled that the SC is a “process,” and that this process must simply and adequately integrate into operational planning to be relevant. Therefore, before any military communications (spanning the levels of war) can coalesce into something “strategic,” an examination of the inter-relationship among SC capabilities, DOD’s communication process, and operational planning are essential.

Conclusion: While advances in communications technology have impacted communication exponentially within the last decade, DOD’s communication doctrine (including practice and processes) has not been equally transitory. The necessity for a lexicon shift, and more importantly, for a doctrinal shift in communication practices is warranted based on the evolution of (mass) communication from broadcast and narrowcast eras to a networked communication era. Emerging communication technologies blur the lines between PA and IO ownership of persuasion and influence, noting that PA informs and influences with its communication efforts. Considering the highlighted complexities of today’s global-communication environment, and disharmony among joint and service-specific doctrine and policies of DOD MCC’s and their approach to SC, incorporating a communication model (or process) that facilitates communication planning in the operational planning process is imperative for a cohesive strategy, integration, engagement, and employment of MCC to support mission objectives. Based on these observations, this research provides DOD with a unified Military Communication Process to assist MCC’s in developing and connecting communication strategies with operational planning.
"The US military is not sufficiently organized, trained, or equipped to analyze, plan, coordinate, and integrate the full spectrum of capabilities available to promote America’s interests. Changes in the global information environment require the Department of Defense (DOD), in conjunction with other US Government (USG) agencies, to implement more deliberate and well-developed Strategic Communication processes."—U.S. Dept. of Defense

**Purpose:**

The Department of Defense (DOD), along with other U.S. Government (USG) agencies, is committed to developing a “Strategic Communication” (SC) process within the department as a utopia for voice and influence in the modern global-communication environment. However, this process is ill defined, disintegrated, monologic, and often operationally irrelevant. Military communication professionals find themselves operating in the most demanding and evolving communication environment in history while compelled to maneuver within it with outdated and impractical doctrine and policies that stifle DOD’s ability to effectively lend its full voice to the military narrative. This paper surveys DOD’s SC challenges facing its military communication capabilities (MCC's) and how doctrinal inhibitors impact functional approaches to communication and operational planning, while also exploring various communication models and how their elements can bolster DOD’s SC aspirations.

**Introduction:**

In the advent of the internet-age, human beings have never had such exposure or access to the world in which they live, nor the ability to connect with and learn about people, places, and events that shape the world. As we enter the second decade of the 20th-century, Marshall McLuhan’s “global village” concept is now mainstream as human discourse through the evolution (and revolution) of contemporary communications is connecting our world. Communication (minus the “s”), the transactional-social interaction of sending and receiving information, has been markedly affected by rapid advances in global communications. As the
24-hour news-cycle advances from cable/satellite telecommunications to the internet (and mobile web), people (and organizations) must maneuver within and among various, diverse, and overcrowded information mediums to discern what communication (content) is important and relevant to their livelihood—and how it impacts the “village.”

Accordingly, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has faced equal challenges in penetrating this evolving and teeming communication environment, especially in the post-9/11 era. Simply stated, the global communication environment evolves and moves too quickly to permit DOD’s effective participation based on current doctrine and policies. Many senior military leaders have declared that communication is an integral part of modern warfare, “yet persistently lament about failures in the communication arena” while not directly engaging in practical solutions. In both recent Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, the DOD has expressed frustration in its communication efforts due in large part to perceived military failures in achieving both substantial voice and influence in these respective areas of operation (AO). “In response to this image crisis, the Pentagon, State Department, and other agencies of the federal government are currently seeking new models for message strategy, coordination, and alignment.”

Within the last ten years, “Strategic Communication” (SC) has been the organizational panacea that the DOD and Department of State (DOS) have employed for success in “winning the cognitive domain” of current and future operations. Cognitive domain is defined as “the domain of the mind, will and emotion...a domain in which perceptions affect attitudes,” and a critical strategic focal point for DOD’s operational success as stated by Defense Secretary (SECDEF) Robert Gates in a 2009 report on SC:

“After struggling to define strategic communication and develop effective coordination processes for much of the past decade, there is now substantial consensus within the Department about the value of viewing strategic communication fundamentally as a process, rather than a collection of capabilities
and activities. In this ever more complex and interdependent world, the strategic communication process is increasingly vital for DOD. Without a nuanced understanding of stakeholders and audiences, DOD policy-makers, planners, and field personnel cannot effectively evaluate the likely effects of DOD actions, words, and images. And unless those "perception effects" are taken into account, DOD components cannot effectively develop or implement policy or come up with effective engagement plans, communication plans, or risk mitigation strategies. 8

In turn, the DOD, the services, and combatant commands (COCOM’s) have made sweeping attempts to coalesce inherent SC capabilities into planning—through doctrine, policy, guidance and training—in order to effectively employ its various military communication capabilities (MCCs) in the modern-day global-communication environment. 9 Yet, it is still undetermined if the DOD has made significant headway in evolving SC as a process.

Complicating DOD’s SC-conundrum is the services’ broad attempts to define, staff, integrate, and employ its MCCs efficiently. The intent to amalgamate capabilities of: Public Affairs (PA), Information Operations (IO), Military Information Support Operations (MISO) formerly referred to as Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Defense Support for Public Diplomacy (DSPD), and Combat Camera/Visual Information (COMCAM), 10 into a coordinated and synergistic SC-effort supporting the Joint Force Commander’s (JFC) intent and endstate has been challenging. Integration has been difficult as each of the aforementioned MCCs (both Joint and Service-specific) continually operate according to doctrine, policy, and instruction that is sometimes complex, ill-defined, contradictory, and (in some cases) impractical to effectively function in today’s communication environment.

Additionally, Major Cliff Gilmore, in his JFO article (2010), depicts more significant challenges as “the SC-concept has created stovepipes” among the respective MCCs “that further confuse specific roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority, increases competition for resources (particularly manpower), and complicates coordination of effort.” 11 Gilmore’s research
highlights the need for doctrinal shifts in DOD's communication tactics, by proposing alternatives to the collective approach, terminology, guiding principles, process, and structure of the Department's MCCs in order to eliminate contemporary parochialism and competition, and promote coordination and cooperation among these capabilities. Furthermore, Gilmore's work proposes that there are significant flaws in DOD's SC-framework that currently prohibit Gates' realization of "SC as a process," suggesting "the most conspicuous thing about the military's current doctrinal communication planning and execution process is its absence."

**Structure:**

First, this research will illustrate origins of DOD SC and attempts by DOD to define and operationalize its relevance to meet strategic objectives, while highlight associated doctrine and policy inhibitors that preclude MCC's from effectively conversing in the global communication environment. Next, the paper will examine communication eras and how each impacted DOD communication approaches, doctrine and policy lexicon (terms), and the necessity for immediate adjustments in order to adapt to the current communication environment. This study will also explore marketing and advertising resources as a fifth SC-enabler not currently included in DOD's communication arsenal, and also scrutinize the ownership of DOD's "influence" capability between PA and IO. Lastly, in order to make gains toward an SC process, this paper will analyze our current military communication processes by surveying professional and academic communication models, and propose a contemporary military communication process that integrates MCC's and facilitates a simple approach to developing communication strategies in the operational planning process. Moreover, this research will examine SC-enablers generally associated with non-lethal effects (traditional communication), and not include IO-capabilities associated with lethal (kinetic) action: such as Electronic Attack (EA), Electronic Warfare (EW),
or Computer Network Attack (CNA), but note here the significant impact these capabilities bring to the JFC and their necessity for integration in operational planning. The paper will default to Marine Corps-specific examples for illustration purposes.

**Exploring “Strategic” Communication:**

SC is defined (and implemented) in different ways across U.S. Government agencies. In 2004, DOD and DOS eagerly adopted the “buzz” surrounding SC, looking for ways to streamline and coordinate their respective communication strategies, objectives, actions, and messages across interagency departments and key publics. Contemporary government SC-practices were converted from private sector Integrated Marketing Communication (IMC) models constructed during the late 1990’s. These models sought to coordinate and integrate all communication tools and resources within a company into a seamless program, while maximizing the impact on consumers and their target markets through traditional marketing, advertising, public relations, company ambassadorship, and brand management—all designed to strengthen a firm’s image and “keep the company’s total communication program in synch.” The IMC design creates a company-wide activity aimed at integrating every aspect of the organization’s operation to ensure consistency and synergy among all communication activities, with great emphasis placed on employees understanding and exhibiting organizational communication goals, and also involving customers (and sometimes competitors) in the IMC-planning process.

While private sector IMC practices have been integral in the holistic development of corporate images, brands, and awareness, public sector adoptions in SC have witnessed mixed results due in large part to the varying size of multiple government organizations, political turnover, and their necessity to coordinate across interagency departments. For example, it has been much easier for Coca Cola to coordinate and execute communication strategy for their
98,000 employees\textsuperscript{18} than it has for DOD leadership to synchronize SC efforts to over 2.1 million.\textsuperscript{19}

Both DOD and DOS were early adopters of SC in government, and accordingly emphasize communication impacts within both their respective national strategies,\textsuperscript{20} yet both agencies continually express the need for greater efficiency as expressed by Secretary Gates in 2008:

"Although the United States invented modern public relations, we are unable to communicate to the world effectively who we are and what we stand for as a society and culture, about freedom and democracy, and about our goals and aspirations... Strategic communications will play an increasingly important role in a unified approach to national security. DoD, in partnership with the Department of State, has begun to make strides in this area, and will continue to do so. However, we should recognize that this is a weakness across the U.S. Government, and that a coordinated effort must be made to improve the joint planning and implementation of strategic communications."\textsuperscript{21}

While the U.S. Government (USG) and DOD have readily established internal SC-capabilities, frustration continues across the department (and the services) for positive return on the SC-investment. Major John Caldwell's (2010) recent SC-research captures the dissatisfaction of DOD's SC progress despite "the fact that the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), subsequent 2006 QDR Execution Roadmap for SC, and Secretary of Defense's 2008 Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF) directed specific and timely actions in order to address DOD/component SC deficiencies."\textsuperscript{22} Caldwell further notes that squabbling across DOD over the definition, process and validity of SC remains active at executive levels\textsuperscript{23} (and internally among the MCCs). In Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Admiral Michel Mullen's article, "Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics" \textit{(JFQ, 2009)}, he critically debates the "strategic" lexicon of SC, arguing that the term polarizes communication expectations in warfare, questions DOD's monologic approach to communication, and offers that SC should be
viewed as an integrated process vice a set of capabilities.  

Ironically, unlike other recent USG strategies, SC is excluded from the CJCS’s 2011 *National Military Strategy*. DOD Joint publications such as JP-3 (Joint Operations) define SC as: “Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.” While the initial DOD definition reads more like a mission statement of departmental SC expectations than a process, SC definitions have evolved among the services (and agencies) in order to craft SC enterprises that compliment their respective organizations. Yet DOD’s challenge to find the balance between capability (MCCs) and communication process (planning) remains a significant issue. Caldwell identifies this apparent dichotomy in the 2010 QDR, as the report references the need to “improve key capabilities” associated with SC, yet it also clearly communicates the need and relevance of an SC process to achieve USG information objectives. He emphasizes that both capability and process are inherently hampered due to the disharmony and infidelity spanning policy and practice of SC within DOD by stating:

“In the near term, forces abroad must endeavor to be relevant and effective in the (physical/informational/cognitive) domains of the information environment. Joint forces do so with a non-doctrinal SC handbook, scattered doctrinal SC references, and field-developed organizational structures required to perform necessary research and assessments in support of the implementation of integrated and synchronized SC plans.”

Accordingly, each of the services (and other DoD agencies) are hedging their own paths in the SC-realm. For example, the Marine Corps defines SC as, “a process by which we integrate activities across all informational functions and engage key audiences to achieve effects
consistent with Marine Corps interests, policies and objectives.” Although the Marine Corps advocates the “process” in its SC definition, the Corps has recently expanded great effort in analyzing and measuring the Corps’ MCCs to: 1.) determine how they can best support the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), 2.) provide service-specific input to a Joint SC Capabilities-Based Assessment as required by SECDEF, and 3.) determine how best to incorporate these MCCs into its various MAGTF operational planning teams (OPT) throughout the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP).

Moreover, to enhance the discourse on Marine Corps SC considerations, the 3rd edition of the Marine Corps Operating Concepts (MOC) included a robust examination of SC-related challenges the MAGTF will face in the future, noting that recent DOD publications on SC “have added clarification but have stopped short of spelling out exactly how, when, and by whom SC is performed.”

In order for the Marine Corps to effectively execute SC as a process, the MOC’s “Functional Concept for SC” desires to connect and nest national-level SC plans with its own, yet views a major inhibitor to this endstate being the MAGTF’s kinetically focused planning process. The MOC stipulates that the Corps, “largely through training and education, must expand the planning culture of the MAGTF so that non-kinetic tools and the cognitive domain are consistently and completely addressed in every planning problem and throughout each phase of execution.”

In November 2010, the Marine Corps investigated this constraint by conducting its first SC “wargame,” spanning doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF), and examined how to integrate SC (and its MCCs) in operational planning across the levels of war, identify capability gaps, and determine how well this integration and inclusion supports the MAGTF (and Joint Force) Commander. The wargame produced significant highlights:
Most participants concluded SC must fully integrate into all steps of the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) in order to realize value of non-kinetic actions. Majority of participants concluded the concept title of "Strategic" Communication, as currently authored is confusing and disjointed—diminishing its operational value. Participants concluded that assessment during execution must focus on SC objectives articulated in the Commander's initial planning guidance. SC concept and doctrine developers must consider focusing communication with the adversary while emphasizing the importance of communicating to multiple key publics. All agreed if you do SC it may help to complete the mission, but without SC, the mission overall will most likely become a strategic failure. Unanimous agreement that our current SC process is much too slow; that it takes too long to release any message due to extensive and time consuming approval process. Possible redundancies among MCCs organic to the MAGTF. 

The wargame demonstrated that even at the service-level, there is significant discord defining what is "Strategic" Communication, what (or which) capability (or staff principal) is responsible for it, and how is it integrated into the planning process.

The inferred lexicon of "Strategic" Communication polarizes its perceived purpose, especially at the operational level, where expectations of its function vary differently across government. Yet SC-currency among interagency leaders has remained surprisingly valuable as agencies gainfully employ or contract SC-professionals to augment communication staffs. Even the 2010 National Security Strategy reinforces the importance of SC, stating:

"Across all our efforts, effective strategic communications are essential to sustaining global legitimacy and supporting our policy aims. Aligning our actions with our words is a shared responsibility that must be fostered by a culture of communication throughout government. We must also be more effective in our deliberate communication and engagement and do a better job understanding the attitudes, opinions, grievances, and concerns of peoples—not just elites—around the world."

The lexiconic hang-up on the adjective "strategic" and the terms' connotation to "executive or high-level guidance" generated debate about its use (and misuse) in current communication practices similar to those previously mentioned by Admiral Mullen. The current Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication & Communication Strategy (2010) reinforces this
discord stating that the term “strategic” has created significant “intellectual baggage,” and contends that the term be used to describe efforts at higher echelons of command. The mounting ambiguity over the DOD’s SC-construct may signal the beginning of a separation from SC unless doctrine, education, capability, and resources are smartly aligned to give weight to this widely heralded non-kinetic capability. Leaders have signaled that the “process” is key, and that this process must simply and adequately integrate into operational planning to be relevant. Therefore, before any military communications (spanning the levels of war) can coalesce into something “strategic,” an examination of the inter-relationship among SC capabilities, DOD’s communication process, and operational planning are essential.

**SC “Inhibitors”:**

The 2006 QDR Execution Roadmap for SC was the first significant DOD document to highlighted SC as a cornerstone to future strategic success, and published a series of tasks and milestones (as previously mentioned) for the department to effectively “develop programs, plans, policies; information, and themes” to support the USG’s strategic objectives. The document identifies DOD’s main SC-enablers as PA, IO (MISO inclusive), COMCAM, and DSPD (MCCs examined for this research). Notably, in relation to the latter, since SC involves activities outside the control and purview of military commanders, DOD recognizes the lead role DOS plays in national-level SC and the desire for interagency synchronicity. SC-related capabilities, like Civil-Military Operations and Key-Leader Engagement (KLE), will not be directly analyzed here as inclusive SC-enablers, yet recognize their value as key interpersonal communication and engagement functions for military commanders. Doctrinal explanations of MCC are important for uncovering how each fits into the SC-process, therefore a general description of these capabilities are provided below for the purposes of this paper. However, this paper will not
provide a detailed comparative analysis of MCC functions (spanning joint and service
document/policies) to determine "who should be doing what and why" in operational planning, as
first, agreement on a communication process will provide the means to better define those
communication roles.

1. **Public Affairs- PA** conducts three basic functions: public information, command
information, and community engagement activities that support the commander's intent
and concept of operations (CONOPS). As the primary coordinator of public information
within the military, accurate and timely information is essential to the public’s
understanding and resolve in times of crisis. The PA mission is to support the JFC by
communicating factual and accurate unclassified information about DOD activities to
various publics. Public Affairs Officers serve as "special staff" officers for the JFC and
provide direct counsel on the effects of military operations on public perception and the
media. (Note: Marine Corps PA is a traditional headquarters combat-support function.)

2. **Information Operations- IO** are the integrated employment of the core capabilities of
electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), military information
support operations (MISO), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security
(OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence,
disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making while
protecting our own. IO places great emphasis of integrating its "core" capabilities with
"supporting" (physical attack, information assurance, physical security) and "related"
capabilities such as PA, CMO, and COMCAM. Some capabilities under IO have a
"physical dimension" (kinetic) such as EW and CNO which will not be directly included
in this research. (Note: Annex A provides further description of these IO functions as
well as a newly proposed IO definition by DOD).
(Note: Marine Corps proponent for IO is the Marine Corps Information Operations
Center (MCOIC).)

3. **Defense Support for Public Diplomacy- DSPD** includes those activities and measures
taken by DOD components to support and facilitate USG public diplomacy efforts, foster
trust and partnership among host nations, and collaboratively shape the operational
environment through communal engagement and interagency communication. (Note: Marine Corps contributor/proponent for DSPD is the Marine Corps Security
Cooperation Education and Training Center (SCETC).)

4. **Combat Camera (Visual Information)- COMCAM** provides the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the Military
Departments (MILDEPs), the combatant commands, and the joint task forces (JTFs) with
a directed imagery capability in support of operational and planning requirements during
wartime operations, worldwide crises, contingencies, and joint exercises. COMCAM is
an essential battlefield information resource that supports strategic, tactical, and
operational mission objectives, that provides commanders with combat-trained documentation teams that are primary suppliers of operational imagery to support battlefield information superiority. COMCAM is not defined by any DOD doctrine like other MCCs, and is usually employed as an operational capability. Serves as lead agent to catalogue and archive all DOD imagery.\textsuperscript{50}

According to JP 3-0, \textit{Joint Operations}, the MCC’s are integral to shaping outcomes in the “informational dimension” of operations by linking the “physical” (technical systems) and “cognitive” (mental processing) dimensions of the information environment.\textsuperscript{51} The publication states, “different information-related ways and means can combine in this dimension for a common purpose...the commander integrates IO, PA, and DSPD—which typically have their own distinct, individual focus—to accomplish SC objectives.”\textsuperscript{52} The aforementioned Commander’s SC-Handbook depicts a comparison of MCC’s, and oddly enough excludes COMCAM and includes SC as an overall “capability” vice the process which these communication functions are supposed to formulate (See Figure 1 below).\textsuperscript{53} DOD delineates specific roles for each MCC (as depicted). So how have these capabilities fallen short of meeting commander’s desired SC endstates? Does the current composition and compartmentalization of these MCC’s preclude DOD SC-efforts from being functionally effective in today’s communication environment? Content previously described here and similar discourse in open sources provide the answer, portraying DOD’s SC-enablers as fragmented, passive, regimented, slow, and unremarkable—the latter having the most significant operational impact on the expectations of military commanders.
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<td>Cognitive</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>public, and deter</td>
<td>factual, unclassified</td>
<td>publics</td>
<td></td>
<td>Public information, command</td>
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<td></td>
<td>adversaries</td>
<td>information about DOD</td>
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<td>Information, and community relations activities</td>
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<td>DSPD</td>
<td>Support and facilitate</td>
<td>Support foreign policy</td>
<td>Foreign audiences and opinion</td>
<td>Understand, inform</td>
<td>Cognitive</td>
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<td></td>
<td>USG public diplomacy</td>
<td>objectives</td>
<td>makers</td>
<td>and influence</td>
<td>DOD activities and measures</td>
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**Figure 1:** Military Communication Capability Comparison, *Commander’s Handbook for SC* (USJFC, 2010)

But what has been the grading rubric that DOD and other USG leaders have been measuring “whole of government” SC success against? Is it that our *message* simply does not resonate or penetrate *target audiences* via mainstream media across traditional *domestic* and *international audiences* as it had in past decades? Or is it based on the observation that our enemies like Al’Qaeda have had marked success penetrating the media with their message by efficiently leveraging the *war of narratives* to *influence perceptions*? More importantly, does the transitional focus from capability to process improve DOD’s SC efficiency and provide the mechanics to overcome SC shortcomings? If so, then an examination of how military professionals communicate within the *information environment* needs review.

Words, and how individuals use them, are important, especially for military practitioners in communication-related professions across DOD who develop and select terms that describe and define mission parameters and their associated relevance to capability. The highlighted
terms in the previous paragraph depict just some of the current lexicon that is often misused or ill defined. While advances in communications technology have impacted communication exponentially within the last decade, DOD's communication doctrine (to include practice and processes) has not been equally transitory. The necessity for a lexicon shift, and more importantly, for a doctrinal shift in our communication practices is warranted based on the evolution of (mass) communication from broadcast and narrowcast eras to a networked communication era (See Figure 2). Doctrine spanning SC functions is predominantly broadcast and narrowcast centric, as policy and practice align MCC's to approach and operate within this new and continuously changing communication environment in old ways.

Figure 2: Evolution of Communication
-Current DoD Doctrine is "Broadcast" and "Narrowcast" intensive; adoption of "Networked" communication practices is essential for DOD SC efforts to become apart of the global conversation.

Gilmore's (2010) proposed SC-lexicon shifts reflect adaption and adoption to "networked" communication, urging DOD leaders and communicators alike to utilize terms based on relative meaning. For example, "communications" is a technical descriptor depicting one-way (or monologic) platforms used to transmit information (or content) such as radio, television, and the Internet—quite different than the singular term (communication) that has been

20
previously defined. Therefore, when individuals and doctrine convey or promote the term “Strategic Communications” (plural), they should be referring to the complex technical infrastructure enabling diverse transmissions. More importantly, Gilmore’s example reflects a current endeavor among many military public affairs practitioners to reset (or refocus) DOD SC-efforts on the social and transactional nature of basic “communication”—human dialogue. In essence, the digital “networked” evolution (as depicted in Figure 2) illustrates communication “coming full circle,” as technology now empowers people once again to socially participate in public and private discourse (spanning time and location) that pre-dates the “broadcast” model and even Guttenberg’s removable-type revolution. Nonetheless, “future success of military communication efforts requires a deliberate shift in mindset toward a school of thought and practice grounded in social rather than technical communication theory and practice.”

Likewise, this technical to social transition should equally describe the communication arena—shifting the identifier from “information environment” to “communication environment” as communication incorporates much more than simple data transferring between (or among) parties. If DOD elects to continue fighting and winning the “battle of the narrative” in the “cognitive dimension of the information environment” as stated in the Commander’s Handbook for SC, then MCCs will continue to impede the SC-process by precluding themselves from creating dialogue, building relationships, and gaining meaningful feedback from groups, publics, stakeholders, and adversaries.

Similarly, DOD (via its MCCs) must engage in communication with people not “targets.” The term “target audience” is the principal misused expression among all military leaders and DOD SC professionals, as this term holistically captures the preponderance of the DOD’s monologic-communication outlook based on traditional communication mediums.
Spanning traditional communications like television, radio, and print media (broadcast), and also cable and online news gathering sources (narrowcast), SC professional’s obsession with communicating to “target” (i.e.-noun, something you aim at or hit)64 “audiences” (i.e.-noun, people watching or listening to a broadcast)65 has been the quintessential core of DOD communication. Whether via press releases, media advisories, advertising slogans, Armed Forces Radio and Television Station (AFRTS) broadcasts, leaflets, websites, or press conferences, DOD’s communication culture is ingrained with a proclivity toward monologue when the public(s) expects dialogue and interaction (networked). Subsequently, the term “target audience” screams monologic arrogance—i.e., a group of people who consciously remain in “receive-mode” that MCC’s perceivably identify and hit with their message. In other words, MCC’s using one-way communication mediums to transmit a message to specific publics that the sender perceives people want, receive, and understand. This further demonstrates that “military practice remains firmly grounded in the mindset of communication as a technical process of information control and delivery—i.e., what’s the message and how do I get it out?”65

In order to reverse this paradigm, SC-efforts should transition from “target audiences” to focus communication efforts to “key publics” (or key actors) consisting of people who share common interest or connection to a given issue.

Marketing & Advertising: a 5th SC-Enabler?

The target audience-focus was another dangling-modifier that migrated from private sector IMC, as this term’s utility is inherently apropos to (commercial) market segmentation and composition, brand promotion, and obtaining (and maintaining) desired market-share for profits.67 Ironically, as the military developed SC practices from the private sector, the DOD has been reluctant to formally incorporate these unique skill-sets that marketing and advertising
principles bring to the SC arsenal (aside from specific contracts with private firms for domestic advertising). Notably, marketing’s unique expertise is habitually people-centric (i.e.-the customer) through exploratory market analysis, anthropologic research (via demographics, sociographics, psychographics, etc.), market segmentation, brand positioning and penetration strategies, selling skills, motivation and needs analysis, measurement, and, most importantly, communication strategies that affect people’s attitudes and behaviors. The marketer’s expertise lies in adapting an organization to satisfy a key public’s (or media’s) wants and needs more effectively and efficiently than their competitors (adversaries). The Commander’s Handbook for SC also recommends “private enterprise or nongovernmental expertise in the areas of advertising, marketing, and progress measurement may be beneficial to help shift paradigms and develop new ways to conduct SC as well as new ways to use military resources in the execution and assessment of SC.” Therefore, one of DOD’s communication shortcomings is the non-integration of marketing and advertising capabilities into the SC framework—especially at the department/service “strategic” or executive levels. Augmenting executive (joint and service-level) headquarters’ staffs with contractors from private sector communication firms (marketing, advertising, and public relations (PR)) provide DOD with diverse communication industry expertise and reach-back capabilities needed to remain operationally relevant and effective in the networked era.

For example, each of the services and some DOD agencies contract with commercial marketing and advertising (and PR) firms for expertise in brand development, image management, general awareness, SC, and support for recruiting efforts. The Marine Corps, through the “Advertising Branch of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC), is authorized by Congress to conduct domestic advertising, but only as a personnel procurement
function.\textsuperscript{71} For over 60 years the Marine Corps has collaborated with \textit{J. Walter Thompson} (JWT), the 4\textsuperscript{th} largest advertising firm worldwide, to develop and promote much of the Marine Corps' brand, mystique, and niche (domestic) communication. This long-lasting fraternal affiliation between JWT and the Corps has afforded the latter with considerable success (in comparison to the other services) in cultivating its "elite-warrior" image to various domestic key publics (future prospects, parents, influencers, legislators, and fellow Marines), and now to the networked global public as well. JWT has established significant professional currency with Marine leaders making it the most influential communication arm within the Marine Corps. JWT’s IMC-approach, personal (and historic) understanding of the Corps’ organizational culture, and full-service marketing, creative, and advertising reach-back capabilities, provides the Marine Corps with a skilled SC-enabler that could augment the Corps’ existing MCC’s. However, like other DOD agencies, the Marine Corps has failed to effectively develop an IMC-approach to efficiently integrate JWT (via contract) into its communication arsenal, especially at the headquarters-level. Parochialism is the result of decades of success, and the Marine Corps continues to stovepipe JWT’s services among approximately eight Marine Corps agencies and commands under separate service contracts which inhibit SC unity, create service/product redundancies, and stagnate integration.

Likewise, JWT’s primary Marine Corps client, MCRC, executes the Corps’ premier, public-centric communication enterprise, yet falls short in realizing its full SC potential even though JWT provides MCRC with significant external reach. Similar to MCOIC, MCRC orchestrates influential and persuasive communications (with robust JWT support) toward select and diverse publics (much like IO), yet parallel disintegration occurs internally within each command as both fail to fully integrate their respective MCC’s (primarily PA) into a coordinated
SC effort and instead elect to diversify (stovepipe) their communication enablers. Irrespective of marketing and advertising, this example underlines DOD’s (and the Marine Corps’) overall approach toward SC—employing independent, regimented, and narrowly-focused communication capabilities predicated on old doctrinal practices utilized from a different communication era.

“Influence” Equities:

There are several other key issues inhibiting the ability of MCC’s effective integration into a SC-framework. The parochial mission and function of MCC’s, based on outdated doctrine and professional complacency, prevent discourse on innovative ways to embrace communication synergy. One of the most prevalent issues debated among military communication professional and leadership is the concepts of influence and persuasion, and whether (or if) this communication type falls strictly within the purview of IO (and MISO). Previously noted, IO via MISO are doctrinally identified to conduct communication-related influence-operations that affect behaviors of a “target audience” (primarily adversaries). Many PA-practitioners argue for a shared association in the influence and persuasion communication-art, based on the simple premise that by informing various publics about the military, PA can influence their perceptions (and arguably their behaviors) about the military as well. Gilmore (2011) offers that DOD:

“Having fooled itself into thinking IO, PSYOP/MISO, PA and SC are different tools merely because the military uses them to "target" different people does not make them different tools. Second, insisting that a tool can be labeled one way when used to hit one kind of "target" then labeled another way to hit a different kind of "target" represents a near-clinical denial of the fundamental changes in speed, ubiquity and mobility that characterize the rapidly evolving communication environment.”

Although PA provides factual (unclassified) information to inform and educate various publics about the military, it also places that information in the most favorable context to support
the communication objective by constructing or “packaging” messages in distinct ways. Major Jeffery Pool (USMC) examined the applicability of “ownership” in the influence and persuasion realm in his 2009 study of PA and IO. Pool’s analysis of DOD’s doctrine, policy, and practices, as well as relative USG laws pertaining to PA and IO (to include the “propaganda” debate), provide several examples offering evidence that both current law and doctrine do not restrain PA from persuasive communications, but in most cases expect such practices in PA’s communication efforts. Pool states, “a review of Joint and Service doctrine regarding public affairs and information operations finds that there are no regulations forbidding military PAOs from attempting to influence either domestic or international perceptions of operations. The one caveat is that the influencing activity is conducted in a truthful, factual manner with no intent to deceive their intended audiences.” His research further infers DOD playing doctrinal semantics with regard to PA’s ability to influence and persuade, offering that current doctrine uses the term “shape” in lieu of influence to describe expectations of PA roles to include “media shaping public perception and how carefully planned themes and messages by PAOs can help shape the information environment.” Pool’s research provides sound arguments characterizing PA’s part in persuasive communications, and how difficult it is for PA communication not to influence based on the political, economic, cultural, and operational variables that it often finds itself engaged as described in JP 3-61 (PA influence responsibilities):

“Contribute to global influence and deterrence by making public audiences aware of US resolve, capabilities and intent; Contribute to deterring attacks against US interests by disseminating timely, fact-based, accurate and truthful information to the public; Counter adversary propaganda with the truth. Actively use truthful, fact-based, accurate, and timely public information products to respond to adversary inaccurate information and deception.”

Subsequently, the IO and PA relationship functioning in the current networked-communication era has become more complex, as DOD aims to determine which MCC
communicates to various audiences (publics). CJCS memo (2004), *Policy on Public Affairs Relationship to Information Operations*, attempted to define communication lanes for both PA and IO, noting the *inform* nature of PA and the *influence* nature of IO—differentiating between audience and intent. This policy states: “Although PA and IO both conduct planning, message development, and media analysis, the efforts differ with respect to audience, scope, and intent, and must remain separate.” However, as modern communications blur the lines among adversarial and friendly publics, as well as *domestic* and *international audiences*, so too do the operational communication boundaries between PA and IO. Moreover, as people adopt tech advances in social communication, the coordination needs for PA and IO become increasingly important, as the media and the public, and now the public as the (extended) media, via “crowdsourcing,” directly influence operations and the will of the (American) people to pursue military means in global events. According to Gilmore, doctrinal functions of MCC’s are based on “two key assumptions that are no longer valid: first, communication is a function distinct from operational activities, and second, that friendly and hostile publics can be engaged independently from one another.”

Since 2004, emphasis on the information domain has increased, and while the same challenges persist, Secretary Gates in January 2011 issued additional guidance to reinforce DOD alignment and advocacy for SC and IO stemming from “increased Congressional scrutiny and reporting requirements.” Ironically, the memo depicts SC and IO as collegial capabilities, vice IO as being partner in a SC process as outlined by doctrine. The memo’s significance is the emphasis placed on IO, by assigning a new DOD-advocate (Undersecretary of Defense for Policy-USD (P)) and redefining IO as the “integrating staff function” (vice staff-owner) for MISO, EW, and CNO. Also, the same USD (P) is designated as a co-lead with DoD Public
Affairs for all SC matters, integrating policy-making and communications planning, yet inferring that SC is a PA niche and separate from IO activities. IO capability (and capacity) is equally highlighted as SECDEF stresses the "lack of adequately-trained IO personnel" and the importance of future IO development and training. Reluctance by senior military leaders (to include MCC's) to incorporate PA—those military communication professionals most closely associated with information effects—into IO-related capabilities, prior to the advent of the networked era, detrimentally impacted SC efforts across the department contributing to SC ineptitude. This IO-momentum continues across the DOD and services, as its operational and "effects-based" approach has cascaded IO capabilities (like MCOIC) to the top of a JFC (or MAGTF) commander's communication "wants"—often at the expense of PA (the military's trained and experienced communicators) and the SC process. Smartly, IO, in essence, has conducted its very own IO-campaign within DOD to influence leaders that IO's capability fulfills operational communication needs, and in most cases has replaced SC as the de facto moniker used by operators and commanders for all things related to communication and media-centric activities within the military—i.e., "Let's get some IO on this media situation."

**Communication Approaches:**

Many military leaders and communication-professionals have studied and utilized various professional and academic models of communication to convey pieces of the military narrative through words, actions, and images spanning its existence. Simple social connections are important in humanity and communication is the means. While the SC debate loiters throughout DOD, it is important to examine "basic" communication subsets and practices for achieving desired "strategic" outcomes—especially in planning. DOD communication-professionals have various experiences (and education) in communication practices and share
common-ground application of some noteworthy models and theories. While many organizations, to include DOD, have evolved their understanding of communication since Shannon and Weaver first introduced a formal communication model and process in 1948 with the *Mathematical Theory of Communication*, its concepts are still relevant as baseline for interpersonal and group communication. This model illustrates the “flow of a message from source to destination, an excellent breakdown of the elements of the communication process”—a linear progression of essential variables to include sender, message, transmission, noise, channel, reception, and receiver.

Davis Fougler’s research (2004) in examining the evolution and practical application of communication models and processes equally considers Shannon’s model as a base, “a general model of the communication process that could be treated as the common ground of such diverse disciplines as journalism, rhetoric, linguistics, and speech and hearing sciences. Part of its success is due to its structuralist reduction of communication to a set of basic constituents that not only explain how communication happens, but why communication sometimes fails. Indeed, it is one of only a handful of theoretical statements about the communication process that can be found in introductory textbooks in both mass communication and interpersonal communication.”

However, given the contemporary communication environment, challenges to this framework surface as communication is no longer viewed in this linear fashion, whereas communication processes are cyclic and networks are exponential, thus posing questions to determine the difference between senders and receivers in an “on-demand” world. While Shannon presents a theoretical base, most communication systems today are more complex and multidirectional, when information sources and destinations can act interchangeably of each other. With the introduction of “feedback”, Shannon’s basic model evolved to a bi-directional (interactive) process widely used in interpersonal communication, illustrating “that destinations provide feedback on the messages they receive such that the information sources can adapt their
messages, in real time.\textsuperscript{86} As dialogic lines blurred between sender and receiver roles, evolution produced a "transactional" model of communication, which eliminated the sender-receiver construct, and preferred to label the people associated with the model as equal communicators who both create and consume messages and information \textsuperscript{87}(equality being a relatively social unlikelihood).

With the introduction of mass communication theory spawned primarily by tech innovations in radio, motion pictures, and television, Elihu Katz's (1957) "Two-Step Flow or Gateway"\textsuperscript{88} communication process evolved from discourse among the few to discourse to the many by showcasing the important function intermediaries played communicating during traditional broadcast and narrowcast eras (See Figure 3).\textsuperscript{89} This model depicts gatekeepers as controllers of the narrative—how, when, where, and why a message will be communicated and to whom.

\textbf{Figure 3: Katz's Two Step Flow or Gatekeeper Model. (Graphic by Fouger, 2004)}

Censorship aside (as an extreme example), this process is usually enacted by news editors who "choose some content in preference to other potential content based on an editorial policy (most mass media), moderators (Internet discussion groups), reviewers (peer-reviewed publications), or aggregators (clipping services), among other titles."\textsuperscript{90}

The Gatekeeper model significantly influences DOD's communication with internal and external publics, whereas DOD leaders and external media have equally shared gatekeeper roles in communicating (controlling) messages to different publics. Moreover, this model has been
the doctrinal archetype that military PA professionals use in communicating to the public—
especially in broadcast and narrowcast eras where the military narrative is communicated
through the lens of media intermediaries. Pool’s (2009) examination of Katz notes the
associated challenges for PA:

"An essential weakness of this model is the lack of direct feedback from the
audience. In this model, the speaker should be satisfied for his main points to
have been conveyed in the proper context; however, if mistakes or
misinterpretations occur the speaker’s only recourse is to re-engage with a
gatekeeper to clarify their original message."91

However, in the networked communication era, Web 2.0 platforms have begun marginalizing
traditional media and organizational gatekeepers, and in some cases, replacing them altogether as
the “global public” consumes information, messages, and content more closely associated with
their individual preferences than what has been traditionally packaged to them by these elites.
Social and new media directly affect the influence of this model by leveling the playing field
between these elites and individual voices—creating new gatekeeper competition in telling
military narratives.

It is in this networked era, an abundance of narratives empowered and shaped primarily
by individuals via Web 2.0 mediums have profoundly challenged traditional models of mass,
group, and interpersonal communication toward the assimilation of a hybrid communication
model (incorporating characteristics of these previous models), emphasizing the reemergence of
the social character of human connectivity and dialogue. In the networked-communications era
humanity has once again re-established a Socratic platform whereby many can participate in the
“democratization of information”92 by crafting, capturing, and streamlining diverse combinations
of words, data, actions, images, and sounds into communication that sets the agenda for human
discourse. These platforms have “re-simplified” communication, realizing Sir Tim Berners-
Lee's personal vision of the Internet as a social vice technical innovation. In the immediate nature of the networked communication era, consumers no longer place the same premium (or trust) on pre-packaged media productions (the entertainment industry as an exception) as viable information sources, and have returned once again to placing their trust in the opinions and perceptions of people with common-ground (or interest). "Word-of-mouth," the most primitive communication enabler/extender has evolved into "world-of-mouth" through the acceleration of a narrowing digital divide. LtCol. Matthew Morgan et al., emphasize the Web 2.0 impact:

"Emerging technologies empower the individual, allowing anyone to create content, share information, and push micro agendas to sympathetic audiences at little cost; readily filter out information that conflicts with their ideologies and biases; and join virtual global networks based on common-needs and interests regardless of geography and circumstances." 95

Consequently, forecast for the networked-communication era will eventually peak as this digital-chasm closes and evolves to a full "participatory" communication era, where communication is no longer a consideration but an expectation. The basis for this evolution is occurring now (some scholars offer it is already here), as narratives are predicated on what is both said and done—myriad of words, actions (or inactions), and interpreted meanings —by individuals, nations, organizations, and states. "Meaning," or interpreted communication, has been a key element throughout communication eras and will become increasingly important as mediums shift to incorporate more images (streaming video via Skype, mobile devices, Flip, etc.) than words (email, websites, print, blogs, etc.) to convey and explain actions and inactions. Albert Mehabian's (1971) study of verbal and non-verbal communication relationships, primarily explaining the distinction of "meaning" from "words" in spoken communication, is increasingly more important in a digitally networked, global-communication environment. His model offers that 7% of meaning is word use, 38% meaning is how words are said.
"paralinguistics"), and 55% of meaning is in body language (primarily facial expressions) illustrating the importance of non-verbal's and context in conveying meaning. "The understanding of how to convey (when speaking) and interpret (when listening) meaning is essential for effective communication, management, and relationships." Effective meaning in a networked-era also transcends the verbal-non-verbal association, to include the emphasis on cultural impacts as people (and organizations) look to connect with diverse global publics in ways that make distinct associative connections through culturally correct vernacular use, as depicted by Caldwell's (2011) article, "Words are Weapons" in Marine Corps Gazette. These aggregate effects on shifts in communication, spurred by the networked-communication era, toward social dialogue (and its associated technical and cultural nuances) must be the catalyst for change in military doctrine, planning, and practices for MCC's to effectively achieve some semblance of desired SC.

**Finding a Communication Process:**

At the Defense Information School (Fort George Meade, MD), DOD PA practitioners are exposed to many of the aforementioned communication models, joint (and service) PA doctrine and publications, and the SC-process through entry-level training and education. However, minimal instruction is provided (to officers and senior NCO's) on how to integrate MCC efforts into operational planning. Considering the highlighted complexities of today's global-communication environment, and disharmony among DOD's joint and service-specific doctrine, policies, and approach to SC, incorporating a communication model (or process) that facilitates communication planning in the operational planning process is imperative for a cohesive and integrated communication strategy (CS). While the Commander's Handbook for SC highlights some of the similar challenges presented here, it falls short in providing military leaders and
communication professionals with a common practical approach that integrates MCC efforts across operations. The Handbook offers a SC-checklist for functional considerations that can be executed throughout Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP), a generic Communication Strategy Support Matrix, an unharmonious “SC-Orchestra” construct, and an Annex O that painstakingly attempts to depict various USG SC components, their relationships, responsibilities, and expectations to the point of cognitive dissonance. While these models span degrees of complexity, they insufficiently provide MCC’s with a simple map that guides actions during operational planning and toward a destination that compliments integrated SC efforts within government. Nonetheless, in order to effectively compete in the networked era and shift toward dialogic approaches, incorporating a unified military communication process assists MCC’s in operational planning. Gilmore’s (2010) proposed four criteria for a universal communication process is notable and should be considered:

1) The process should be issue-driven—what does the military intend to communicate and why?
2) The process should be receiver oriented—who do we intend to communicate with?
3) The process should be outcome focused—what does military hope to gain? How does communicate meet commander’s desired endstate?
4) The process should be “principle-based”—a set of (?) valued criteria that provide an azimuth in our operational approach; guides action throughout the process that fosters trust and credibility among stakeholders and publics.10

Discerning among the attributes of various communication models, theories, and process to facilitate communication planning is important, especially to capture the impact of emerging technologies that directly alter operational approach, performance, and expectations. In turn, to determine the appropriate communication process, military professionals must recognize elements of various models that incorporate planning strategies for transactional engagements. Some models have been more successful than others—spanning from organizational to interpersonal communication. For example, PR-professionals like Rhonda Abrams (2008)
attempted to capture a universal communication planning process for private sector organizations and businesses (See Figure 4). However, this model prematurely places the business objective before understanding (analysis) of the problem, and the development of messages before determining strategic goals, which together can produce organizational miscommunication. However, Fougler's (2004) "Ecological Model of Communication" is a good example of a contemporary, unified, interpersonal model that incorporates attributes needed for effective dialogic communication (See Figure 5). "This ecological model of communication is...a compact theory of messages and the systems that enable them. Messages are the central feature of the model" and the most fundamental product of the interactional and shared experiences among people, language, culture, and media.
Holistically, there are many key attributes from previous models that can be used to create a communication model for military SC progress. In addition, in order to develop a relevant model, it must be agile enough to for military planners to tackle not only the current but future-operating environment as well. DOD MCC’s must apply similar planning approaches to gain operational equities that will maximize their “full-spectrum influence” on the military narrative through integrative efforts as captured in the recent SC Joint Integration Concept, which states that a key dimension of the SC challenge “is integrating all the various influencing actions of the joint force to maximize their combined effect to accomplish SC goals. This also means that SC is a continuous activity and that even inaction can convey a message, whether intentional or not. Planning and execution must include these considerations.”

**A Military Communication Process/Model:**

In the absence of a defined communication model that facilitates operational planning, and accessing the relative value of past communication models and processes, this study
proposes a new Military Communication Process (Model) to assist MCC's integrating communication activities in operational planning (See Figure 6 below).

**Figure 6: Military Communication Process (Model)**

While communication models graphically depict processes in a variety of ways—linear, cyclic, hierarchical, etc.—the unidirectional arrow was purposely selected to represent the forward (escalading) nature of operational planning in an attempt to capture associated MCC symmetrical actions. Also, the defined (solid) "engagement arrow" signifies the forward need to maintain active dialogue (proactivity) with vast key and global publics (depicted by the undefined yellow environment), who in turn create effects that shape military communication (and operations). Furthermore, the convergence of military communication with the global
public does not meet at the tip of both points (requiring a gatekeeper), but rather, the penetrating engagement arrow illustrates the necessity to maintain presence in the public domain through continuous communication and outreach. The graphic’s undefined field representing the global public also depicts the amorphous nature that surrounds the communication environment and its constant influence and impact on planning, communication efforts, and desired outcomes. The continual public-effect has no defined space and equally influences both DOD and USG (interagency) communication and planning as depicted by the smaller arrows emanating from the global public.

Furthermore, to realize SC potential, the process needs to incorporate communication guidance from the “strategic” levels of USG (and coalition partners as applicable). In the classic sense, this is guidance from executive USG stakeholders. The model presupposes that communication themes, messages, or endstates spanning the interagency may (or may not) be available during operational planning and, when available, that MCC’s include guidance from executive departments in their respective planning (and vice versa).

Incorporation of Boyd’s “OODA-Loop” process serves as a reminder of the importance of tempo and the immediacy of communication in the networked era during planning. While this process is primarily designed for the JOPP (and MCPP), process elements should be equally transferable to timely events that require immediate engagement (i.e. -crisis communication) to maintain presence, voice, and, most importantly, influence; here, Boyd’s model serves as a guide. However, a fifth action was added to the model, “Assess,” representing the need to analyze the effect of communication on key publics, which in turn, will generate further engagement and may require re-orientation. Nonetheless, assessment is not easy, as MCC’s are given little resource to appropriately measure the effectiveness of their respective
communication efforts, and too often these results take long periods of time materializing. However, in context of current operational planning, Boyd’s decision-making steps simply guide communication-planner’s actions and integration throughout the process.

The six main blocks depicted within the engagement arrow represent phases of the communication process in relation to operation planning. These phases are conceptually straightforward and functionally agreeable for MCC integration, yet designed to meet Gilmore’s (2010) challenge to be issue-driven, receiver oriented, and outcome focused. In short, the phases illustrate collective action for each MCC during operational planning, particularly for PA and IO (MISO)—discovering integrative balances among activities that inform, educate, influence, and coerce.

1. **Phase I- Define Issues and Perceptions:** This phase is directly conducted during the “Mission Analysis” (Problem Framing) stage of the JOPP. In the networked era, various publics and media are concurrently defining and communicating events (conflict) and shaping perceptions about the operating environment. Analysis of diverse perspectives of conflict issues and causes (both friendly and adversarial) require discovery through multi-cultural lenses. This is not an MCC-inclusive function as combined staff participants should provide intelligence, history, and related assessments that provide depth to understanding issues spanning diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) arenas.

2. **Phase II- Identify & Analyze Key Publics and Actors:** Transition to this phase is conducted during the later “Mission Analysis” (Problem Framing) stage and the beginning of the “COA Development & Wargame” phase of the JOPP. Over-lapping occurs here as links are made between the problem or issue and discovery of who or what publics (or individuals) should be engaged to approach the problem or issue. Here integration among MCC’s begins to take
shape as each communication function begins to incorporate the commander’s intent and mission objectives into developing respective COA’s to identify key individuals, groups, organizations, and institutions (to include various media) who can either bolster or impede military influence in a particular AO. As COA’s are developed during the OPT, MCC’s must be prepared to help planners identify who or what key influencers should be engaged to support that respective COA as well as provide initial predictions on those outcomes.

3. **Phase III- Develop Communication Goals & Desired Actions:** Transition to this phase is conducted during the later “COA Development & Wargame” stage and the beginning of the “COA Comparison & Approval (Decision)” stage of the JOPP. With key publics and actors identified, MCC’s begin to consider what capabilities can be employed to influence them and support the commander’s desired endstate. Commander’s intent remains influential, “as communicators need to understand the strategy or vision of their organization in order to be able to craft adequate messages and advise effective activity to get these messages across in support of mission objectives.” Communication and actions should be receiver-oriented, taking into consideration culture, technology, and language barriers that impede the desired influence (or shaping effects) our communication efforts are intending to generate on identified publics. These communication COA’s are then thoroughly wargamed within the OPT, and thereafter refined into goals and plans that are outcome focused.

4. **Phase IV- Craft Integrated Communication Strategy:** Transition to this phase is conducted during the later “COA Comparison & Approval (Decision)” stage and the beginning of the “Orders Development & Execution” stage of the JOPP. In this phase MCC’s craft strategies that are both integrated and complimentary. Participatory and diligent staff coordination to ensure all operational seams are covered and inclusive of support from MCC’s are paramount
Communication tasks are identified, coordinated, and delegated among MCC’s and included in mission orders (via Annexes F, D, and Y respectively). The development of themes, messages, internal guidance, engagement opportunities, CMO support, MISO shaping, deception, outreach methods, and DSPD and host-nation actions are identified and coordinated into a CS. *Note: the current requirement to develop 3 separate operational planning annexes—Annex F (PA), Annex D (IO), and Annex Y (SC)—doctrinally inhibits the MCC’s from ever becoming a truly integrated and efficient force provider. For purposes of this process, one comprehensive CS is staffed, coordinated, and published in one Annex to support the mission.

5. Phase 5- Dialogue; Coordinated Engagement: This phase is directly conducted during the later stages of the “Orders Development” stage (through initial influence & shaping communication/actions) and throughout the “Execution” stage of the JOPP. In this phase proactive engagement is the key and transactional communication (dialogue) is the expectation, as the elements of the CS—a myriad of words, images, sounds, conversations, and actions—penetrate key (and global) publics through various MCC’s aiming to create “synergistic” effects from the “full-spectrum influence” of organic SC-enablers to obtain the commander’s desired communication goals. Engagement and dialogue is continuous, primarily with key publics, in order to maintain proximate voice in ongoing narratives. This is the MCC’s “main effort.” In order to effectively engage key and global publics in the networked (and participatory) eras, integration, risk, tempo, and creativity are critical elements for success.
6. **Phase 6- Key Public Outcomes:** This phase is integrally linked to Phase 5 (as graphically depicted by the connector icon) as outcomes from our CS and participation are received, digested, and judged by key (and global) publics that we intended to inform and influence. Perceptions are reinforced or altered based on this continual dialogue and interaction.

Feedback and measure of effectiveness (MOE) is equally constant to determine if the CS effectively achieved desired results. As previously mentioned, "assessment" may be difficult depending on the operational environment and the resources available to provide accurate and unbiased feedback. While the CS may center on key (or adversarial) publics, feedback and perception shifts from outlying global publics must be equally evaluated to understand the full ramifications of our CS and associated operational actions to gain influence in the military narrative.

While the associated planning actions among MCC's within the aforementioned phases are diverse and numerous, and only generalized here, identifying what steps and actions within the process each MCC is responsible for is another study altogether. Also, with this coordination (integration) will come questions to determine the associated responsibility of identifying a "SC" or "CS" lead—a person designated by the commander or OPT leader as a possible "belly-button" (staff coordinator) to facilitate this integration. Future studies analyzing MCC functions relating to integration within this MCP-construct are incredibly worthwhile in order to discover operational-support efficiencies, functional redundancies, and capability and capacity deficiencies that will enhance DOD's SC efforts. The MCP merely outlines the planning road that MCC's can travel on, whereas Gilmore's "Communication Principles Model" (2010) provides the traffic signs along the way. Commanders dictate the destination; MCC's must supply the traffic (via the communication actions) throughout the planning process.
Conclusion:

This paper has surveyed a variety of current challenges inhibiting DOD from realizing its SC potential, especially in the networked era of global communication where public expectation of dialogue, immediacy, and engagement transcends the old communication adages of monologue, deadline, and reaction. Changes in approach begin with alterations in lexicon as illustrated by Gilmore (2010), while doctrine and policy must follow suit and reexamine PA and IO-relationships in order to foster greater efficiency, integrity, credibility, and sensibility in their collective efforts to influence current and future narratives shaping the U.S. military's post 9-11 legacy.

To gain equities in the cognitive domain, DOD must foster a renaissance among military leaders and communicators by adopting integration among MCC’s and adapting innovatively to employ them in a networked era. Emerging technologies (especially communications) will eventually foster cost-effective mediums to end the digital divide, and, in turn, propel greater global awareness, social engagement, and cultivate the most literate and politically active generation in human history—all directly impacting the spectrum of future military conflict. In turn, these various “plugged-in” publics will usher-in the “participatory” coomunication era which DOD must be poised to engage, which will require military leaders to seriously consider non-kinetic actions before kinetic ones. Correcting doctrine, policy, employment, and capacity issues surrounding MCC’s now will mitigate even more detrimental SC flaccidity in the not-so-distant future.

The operational planning process can be the catalyst that drives assimilation among communication activities, providing commanders with an influential force-multiplier that shapes both the conduct and account of conflict. As stated in the SC Handbook, SC is leadership
driven, so it is incumbent on leaders to discern if SC becomes a “strategic” part of their plan or if it remains a nebulous collection of dissociate, compartmentalized staff-functions. Many DOD leaders have stated (some depicted here) that SC is a broken process, but while this study heralds doctrinal challenges surrounding MCC’s, it also informally and equally holds DOD leaders—primarily commanders—responsible for SC failures, especially in the dawn of the networked era. The emerging global-communication environment requires a new “SC” concept for DOD to employ, “Simply Communicate.” Commanders who persist in applying risk-adverse, monologic, disintegrated, and controlling communication measures will effectively prolong DOD’s current communication shortcomings. Communication models presented here provide military professionals a refresh of ways and means to “Simply Communicate” once again. The unified Military Communication Process (Model) presented here is one of a series of initial steps (Gilmore’s “Principles” being another) that helps facilitate the SC process by providing military professionals with a gateway connecting communication strategies with operational planning. This additional tool, coupled with the means to creatively empower and permit our most digitally “plugged-in” warrior-generation to engage in today’s diverse digital discourse not only fosters “strategic” communication, but also makes it “simple” again.


7 Ibid.


12 Ibid.


16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Estimate of Coca-Cola Company employees (world-wide) for 2010; information provided from corporate website: http://www.thecoca-colacompany.com/ourcompany/meet_our_people.html

19 Combined estimate of Department of Defense personnel, both civilian (civil servant) and military (active duty) in 2010; information provided from DOD website: http://www.defense.gov/orgchart/

20 Multiple references to the importance of strategic communication as a required means to meet U.S. national interests outlined in DOD’s *National Defense Strategy (2008)* and DOS’s *U.S. Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication (2007).*


23 Ibid.


Caldwell, 2010.

Ibid.


In response to an increasing awareness of the importance of effective strategic communication (SC) capability at the United States Government, Department of Defense, Service and Combatant Commander levels, and based upon a review of current Marine Air-Ground Task Force Strategic Communication capabilities, the United States Marine Corps Strategic Communication Working Group (SC DWG) developed the MAGTF SC Concept.

Marine Corps Operating Concept, 2010.

Ibid.

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Strategic Communication Wargame 2011 was co-hosted by the United States Marine Corps Strategic Communication Working Group (SC DWG) and the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) at the Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA, from November 15-19, 2010.


Ibid.


Webster defines “strategic” as: relating to the identification of long-term or overall aims and interests and the means of achieving them; carefully designed or planned to serve a particular purpose or advantage.


45 Ibid.


47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3205.01C: Joint Combat Camera (COMCAM). Washington, DC: CJCS, January 27, 2010.


52 Ibid.


57 Ibid.


62 Ibid; Page III-10 states: “Communicating effectively requires confirmation that the message was not only received, but that it was understood. If we are to operate effectively in the cognitive dimension and influence intended audiences, we need to assess the effectiveness of our communication efforts in order to confirm receipt of transmission, audience understanding of the message, and their reaction. This requires dialogue.”


68 Ibid.

69 Clow et al., 2007


73 Gilmore, 2010.


76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.


82 Ibid.


84 Ibid.


87 Ibid.


89 Ibid.


92 Shirky, 2008.


96 Watzlawick, P., J.H. Beavin, & D.D. Jackson. Pragmatics of Human Communication: A Study of Interactional Patterns, Pathologies, and Paradoxes. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1967. Promote idea that “one cannot not communicate: Every behavior is a kind of communication. Communication does not involve the merely spoken words (digital communication), but non-verbal and analog-verbal communication as well.”


98 Ibid.


100 Gilmore, 2010.


103 Ibid.


105 Ibid.


109 DOD; SC JIC, 2009.


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