Since 1994, the two Russian-Chechen wars revealed the importance of combining enemy and population-centric tactics to resolve conflicts. The first war, based on enemy-centric tactics, ended in Russian failure and Chechen autonomy. Economically devastated by war, the Chechnya population splintered as the separatists continued the war to liberate neighboring countries. Although the Russian second invasion secured Chechnya, the Russian forces were unable to destroy the population’s support for the separatists. In 2002, identifying the split between radical and moderate separatist elements, the Russian government added population-centric tactics focused on local moderate Chechens. The moderate local Chechens subsequently began administering Chechnya. War weary and disillusioned by separatist terrorism, the Chechen populace chose the stability and economic opportunities the Russian orchestrated and funded Chechen government provided. Relentlessly targeted and having lost Chechen support, the remaining separatists lived in exile or joined terrorist organizations. In the end, the combination of tactics ended Chechnya’s bid for autonomy.
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RUSSIAN-CHECHEN CONFLICT 1994-2010

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OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This topic was part of my professional search into non-American efforts to resolve small wars. My future as a Marine appears to be full of small wars resulting from radical beliefs, failed states, criminal enterprises, and dealing with the criminals who revel in the violence and chaos of lawlessness for power and greed. Although the Russian solution, in particular the violent end of it, might seem foreign to Americans, I see many similarities between the Russian practices in Chechnya and the American practices so far in Iraq and Afghanistan. Colonel C.E. Callwell’s three types of small wars rings true in conflicts today with wars of vengeance, perceived lawlessness (adhering to Western norms,) or military conquest followed by the inevitable insurgency. I believe a better understanding of the Russian successes and failures during their attempts at conflict resolution will result in finding and designing the most advantageous position for peace in America’s future endeavors.

I would like to acknowledge the staff and many guest instructors at the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College that have given me a solid professional foundation. In particular, I would like to acknowledge Lieutenant Colonel R. Page (USMC), Mr. D. E. Streusand PH.D., Mr. P.D. Gelpi PH.D., Mr. C.A. Swanson PH.D., and Mr. B.A. Wineman PH.D. for their advice and professional knowledge that I have leaned on throughout my research. I am in debt to the editorial advice of the Ms. Stase Rodebaugh at the Grey Research Center. Lastly, I will acknowledge my family, Barbra, Adam, Sarah, and Conor for their love and support.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: A Small War: The Development of the Russian-Chechen Conflict 1994-2010

Thesis: The Russian government’s ability to identify and support moderate Chechen separatists who opposed ideological terrorism was the key to Russia ending the insurgency and re-claiming Chechnya.

Discussion: After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Chechnya declared its independence and elected a Western style government and President. In 1994, Russia, emerging from the disintegration of the Soviet Union, invaded Chechnya to re-establish control over the area. The Russian invasion and subsequent enemy-centric campaign met united Chechen resistance, suffered heavy losses, and failed to undermine support for the insurgency. With no end in sight, Russia signed a peace treaty that led to the withdrawal of all Russian soldiers and officially ended the war with the final status to be resolved in 2001. The war left Chechnya independent but in ruins, while Russian economic isolation efforts diminished the Chechens’ prospects for a stable life. Isolated from legitimate economic opportunities and still armed for war, many Chechens conducted lucrative criminal activities or continued the war to liberate neighboring Caucasus states. In 1999, suffering from Chechen based terror attacks and criminal activities, Russia invaded Chechnya to secure the resource vital region from criminals and terrorists through the reintegration of the nation into the Russian Federation. The Russian invasion and subsequent enemy-centric operations, conducted by highly trained elite units that executed methodical and detailed plans, were unable to destroy the Chechen resistance. In 2002, with a better understanding of the Chechen people, the Russian government introduced population-centric tactics. Through bribery and amnesty, the Russians lured moderate Chechen officials, who subsequently won local elections, then begin administering Chechnya. War weary and disillusioned by radical Islam, the Chechen populace chose the stability and economic opportunities the Russian orchestrated and funded Chechen government provided. Relentlessly targeted by Russian enemy-centric tactics and losing Chechen support do to Russia’s population-centric tactics, the remaining separatists turned to terrorism. By the end of 2010, from Russia’s point of view, the hybrid tactics, that combined population and enemy-centric tactics, ended organized opposition to the government and brought signs of increased stability to Chechnya.

Conclusion: Russia devised the victory in Chechnya by combining enemy-centric tactics that killed many separatists with population-centric tactics that persuaded Chechen moderates to lead their country and end Chechnya’s bid for independence. After the first war, popular separatist leaders turned to radical Islam and terrorism. The separatist change to radical Islam included expanding Chechnya’s goal of self-determination to freeing the greater Caucasus region from Russian authority. The separatists, once tightly linked, splintered into groups for or against radical Islam enabling the Russians to find moderate Muslims within the separatists to administer Chechnya. While continuing enemy-centric attacks to reduce opposition leadership, Russia added population-centric tactics to find moderate Muslims. The majority of the population, eager for an end to war and opposed to radical Islam, supported the Russian selected but Chechen elected government and effectively ended the insurgency. Although Russia met short-term war objectives, terrorist attacks continue and long-term regional stability remains uncertain.
INTRODUCTION

Since 1994, the two Russian-Chechen wars have revealed the importance of identifying moderate leaders to unify a nation and resolve conflicts. The first war, born out of a leader’s hubris without Russian popular support, ended in Russian failure and Chechen autonomy. The Chechens, although victorious, found their country ruined by war with the population splintered into criminal fiefdoms and drifting to radical Islam. Armed for war and radicalized by their war experiences, elements of the Chechen separatists turned to a form of radical Islam and continued the war to liberate neighboring countries and forcibly institute strict Islamic laws. The radical views and spread of terrorist attacks horrified most Chechens and Russians. Battles broke out between moderate and radical Muslim groups over the spread of radical Islam. Russia, the main terror target, gained popular support to take revenge and invade the lawless Chechnya.

Although the Russian second invasion and subsequent operations secured Chechnya, the Russian forces were unable to destroy the population’s support for Chechen separatists. In 2002, with a better understanding of the Chechen people and the split between radical and moderate separatist elements, the Russian government instituted ‘Chechenisation.’ Through bribery and amnesty, Russia found and supported local Chechen officials who opposed the radical separatist elements. The pro-Russia local Chechens subsequently won local elections and then began administering Chechnya. War weary and disillusioned by separatist terrorism, the Chechen populace chose the stability and economic opportunities the Russian orchestrated and funded Chechen government provided. Relentlessly targeted by Russian forces and having lost Chechen support, the remaining separatists lived in exile or joined terrorist organizations. The split in the Chechen separatist organization between radicals and moderates enabled the Russian government to solidify control over Chechnya. The Russian government’s ability to identify and
support the moderate Chechen separatists who opposed ideological terrorism was the key to Russia ending the insurgency and re-claiming Chechnya through the Chechen populace. In the end, the Chechen people chose the stability under a Russian supported government led by a semi-autonomous moderate Chechen leader over the continued instability of a radical terror organization. The story of how the Russian war against Chechen independence ended starts with the knowledge of the people, the leaders, and the history of the conflict.

**CHECHNYA**

Chechnya is part of Southeastern Europe in the Northern Caucasus Mountains (Appendix A.) The Caucasus Mountains define the region and provides a natural strategic north-south barrier along the land corridor between the Black and Caspian Seas. The imposing mountain range, with only a few north-south roads, forces trade routes to go east-west. The Chechnya-Georgia Pankisi Gorge provides one of the few natural north-south routes across the Caucasus Mountains. The Chechen capital of Grozny sits astride the major east-west trade route North of the Caucasus Mountains and its oil pipelines link modern oil refineries in Grozny to the European market and beyond via the Black Sea. The mountainous region has economically important oil and gas deposits while the river valleys have the agriculture. Chechnya has borders with modern Dagestan to the East, Georgia to the South, Ingushetia to the West, and Russia to the North. All but Georgia are part of the Russian Federation.

Chechnya’s population, concentrated on the Caucasus foothills and plains to the North, is predominantly Chechen. In Chechnya, there are close to 1.2 million Chechens, who are Sunni Muslim and speak the same North Caucasian language. The Caucasus Mountains largely protected the Chechen society from outside influence until the Russian expeditions in the 1700’s. The basis of Chechen social structure and ethnic identity rests on defending family and clan
horior, respect for elders, and establishing relationships between families and tribes. About 150 tribes formed the historic Chechen society. The tribes, normally independent, formed into nine distinct tribal confederations during crisis or for economic prosperity. The confederations elected a political leader and a separate military leader to further their causes.5 Due to limited natural resources, a 200-year-old opposition between the generally poorer mountain and richer plains tribes exists.6 The opposition also follows along religious lines with the plains following the Naqshbandis order of Sufi Islam and the mountain tribes following the Qadiris order.7 By 1990, whether by Stalin's forced displacement or by war, the tribes' historic locations changed and many had intermingled. Although the tribes changed considerably, the cultural ties, both religious and societal, continued to unite Chechens for shared causes or when threatened.

Due to Chechnya's strategic location, Russia fought historic battles to gain access to the region and quell lawlessness on her borders. The current Russian-Chechen relationship started in the 17th century when the Chechens actively opposed the Russian expansion into the Caucasus. From 1722 to 1859, Chechen forces united, under tribal leaders like Sheikh Mansur and later Imam Shamail, and contested Russian expeditions into the area.8 The pattern of unified Chechen resistance to Russian aggression began with a victory at Enderi in 1722, followed by other Chechen victories in 1785 and 1842.9 Unwilling to live in peace beside the "uncivilized" Chechen tribal culture, the "civilized" Russian forces since Peter the Great (1722)10 sent military expeditions to pacify the region or deport its citizens. The centuries of punitive military expeditions created an "us" verse "them" demonizing barrier and led to the impetus for military solutions vice political. The Russians designed the expeditions to forcibly suppress the lawlessness along Russia's border vice occupy the lands. After suffering defeat or taking casualties, the Russian expeditions focused on crushing the populaces' will. The massacre of
Nogays in 1783 followed by an expedition against Dadi Yurt in 1819 defined, in generations of Chechen minds, the Russian excess violence towards the entire populace.\(^{11}\) In response to the Nogay massacre and other attacks against the Chechen populaces, Sheikh Mansur declared the first Chechen \textit{gazavat}, Islam holy war, further defining the lore of united Chechen tribe resistance against Russian brutal oppression.\(^{12}\) Over a hundred years of Russian oppression created a historic memory in the Chechen communities of Russian abuses and united religious based response. By the end of 1859, Russia formally annexed Chechnya, deported many Chechens, and then granted it semi-autonomous rule.\(^{13}\) Despite the history of animosity, Chechnya, as a part of Russia, remained relatively stable under Chechen semi-autonomous leadership for fifty years.

World War I and the communist revolution in 1917 ended the relative calm with Chechens, aiming for their own independence, fighting against both sides. In 1922, the Soviet Union took control of the area and created the Chechen Autonomous Region, which in 1934 became part of the Chechen-Ingush Region, and then a Soviet republic in 1936.\(^{14}\) In 1944, the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin charged the entire populace with collaborating with the Germans and deported many Chechen residents to Central Asia. Alongside the earlier massacres of Chechens, Stalin's deportation of nearly every Chechen (over 500,000) remains the basis of Chechen historic memory and forms the basis of resistance to Russian control.\(^{15}\) After centuries of oppression, the Chechen population had a collective memory of Russian abuses.\(^{16}\) Since 1722, Russian forces had attacked, deported, and collectively attempted to destroy the Chechen population and culture.\(^{17}\) Although not permitted under Soviet rule, Islamic practices survived underground and continued out of sight of authorities. Traditional folklore passed to each generation the history of the centuries of Russian expeditions that united the Chechens under
charismatic Islamic leaders and formed the basis of Chechen national consciousness. Although many Chechens rose to prominence within the Soviet regime, when the Soviet Union began to unravel in 1991, the shared historical memory of Russian oppression united the Chechens under the banner of independence and nationalism.

THE FIRST WAR

From 1991 to 1994, a Chechen and former Soviet General, Dzhokhar Dudayev, united a majority of the Chechen tribes through an economic union that shared the oil profits of the country. In October 1991, during a flawed and single candidate election, the Chechens elected Dudayev as the President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and unilaterally declared the republic's sovereignty and its independence after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Although Dudayev's union of mainly Qadiris for oil profit enabled his election, the actions ignited a backlash of violence from less fortunate Naqshbandis who sought and received Russian influence to repair the power sharing between confederations. With Dudayev's separatist comprising members who had attempted a coup against Yeltsin, Russia supported the opposition that contained members of the former republic's communist government. The month following Dudayev's election, Russian President Boris Yeltsin dispatched troops by plane to Grozny to reclaim the city and, in effect, Chechnya. With Dudayev's forces preventing them from leaving the Grozny airport, the troops withdrew. Although refusing to recognize the republic's independence, Russia hesitated to use further force against the separatists. Within a year, Chechnya further split (Appendix A) with Ingushetia re-joining the Russian Federation while Chechnya remained independent. For many Chechens, the breakup of the Soviet Union presented a historic opportunity for freedom away from the decades of oppression under Russian rule. For the ethnic Russians, who made up almost 25% of the population and who had
migrated to Chechnya after World War II when Stalin deported a large portion of the Chechen population, the cultural and economic ties to Russia remained. Within Chechnya, the disenfranchised Naqshbandi groups, who sought to rejoin the Russian Federation to re-balance the power and oil profits, continued to oppose Dudayev's Qadiris union for oil profits and separatist movement. The opposition resulted in unrest and violence forcing Chechen residents to flee Chechnya. With law and order breaking down within Chechnya and ethnic Russians fleeing the violence, Russian authorities felt pressure to address the problem.

From 1991 to 1994, the Russian Federation's internal power struggle between communist and Yeltsin's forces left Chechnya essentially unhindered as an independent state. In October 1993, following Yeltsin's disbandment of the Russian Supreme Soviet, the Russian Federation emerged from internal conflict with the aim to restore constitutional order.24 The early 1990s also presented Yeltsin with another unique post-cold war change: regionalization of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces.25 After UN action in Bosnia, Yeltsin knew that unless Russia acted to resolve Chechnya's instability, the UN might deploy American or European forces as peacekeepers to Chechnya and threaten Russia's sphere of influence north of the strategic Caucasus Mountains and into the vital oil fields. In 1991, the Confederation of Independent States (CIS) formed between the Russian Federation and other former Soviet states. By April 1994, the UN granted observer status to the CIS26 and recognized Russian Peacekeeping within the CIS bounds that included Chechnya.27 With tacit international approval for restoring law and order in the region and the military freed up from crushing internal political dissention, Yeltsin had the opportunity in Chechnya to unify the nation, gain political support and deter foreign intervention. Chechnya's independence and instability offered Yeltsin the opportunity to fulfill his political goal to restore Russian greatness.
Chechnya was vital to Russia's strategy to return to world prominence. Securing and maintaining the Caucasus oil pipeline that ran through Chechnya to the Black sea was integral to Russia's economic recovery. The chaos and vacuum left by Soviet dissolution presented criminal organizations the opportunity to flourish and grow throughout Russia weakening the central authorities.\(^28\) Yeltsin saw Chechnya as an enemy country that harbored criminal elements that weakened Russia and threatened her economy. When he launched Russian troops into Chechnya, Yeltsin had three main objectives: curb and contain Chechen based organized crime; re-establish government control over the oil pipelines running through Chechnya; and counter the forces that were causing the dismantling of first the Soviet Union and now Russia.\(^29\) All three objectives had the potential to be solved diplomatically: establish a united effort against the crime that hurt Dudayev as much as it hurt the Russians; a Russian-Chechen political power sharing deal for control of oil fields to stave off war; and granting Chechnya a semi-autonomous rule to counter potential Western influence but grant Dudayev legitimacy. Although Chechnya was strategically important to Russia, Yeltsin failed to explore a peaceful resolution to the coming conflict.

The planners of the 1994 Russian campaign failed to consider the historical Chechen resistance movements and implications of using Russian forces to unify the faltering state. The Russian government underestimated the Chechen will to resist because the Dudayev regime appeared disorganized with the populace split. Yeltsin and his advisors neglected to see the historic tradition of united resistance within Chechen society to outside interference. Although the Chechens had a history of internal division that impeded the creation of a unified Chechnya, the shared historical memory afforded the Chechens the capacity to unite and resist a Russian invasion. Chechen support for Dudayev's corrupt and inefficient government with various
groups and fraternities vying for control of the oil pipelines were faltering before the conflict began. The Russian invasion, accomplished through inappropriate and excessive methods, consolidated the Chechen separatists behind Dudayev and served to increase and reinforce the will of the Chechens to continue the struggle.\textsuperscript{30}

Once Yeltsin decided on a military solution, the Russian campaign made no effort to rally opposition to Dudayev among the Chechen population. After a proxy force of Chechens initiated a failed coup, Russia discarded supporting or exploiting the local Russian and Naqshbandis opposition that resented Dudayev's control of the oil revenues. No civil affairs or psychological operation units deployed to Chechnya to assist with gaining the civilian populations support or taking care of their needs.\textsuperscript{31} Russia did not attempt to win local support in the key ethnic Russian strongholds like Grozny or Naqshbandis cities like Gudermes before attacking and leveling both cities. The Russian much publicized use of excess violence served to garner local and foreign support for the Chechen cause vice support Russian goals.\textsuperscript{32} After indiscriminate Russian attacks, the Chechens that supported Russian interference switched sides and firmly supported Dudayev. On the Russian side, the lack of Russian political unity, that Yeltsin sought to get through a quick victory, created a vulnerability that the Chechens exploited through the media.

Yeltsin's desire for a quick end to the situation, led to him and his staff's failure to explore the problem and understand his limited political support for the war. Lacking the will to attack fellow citizens of the Russian Federation, many of Yeltsin's defense ministers and Generals retired in protest.\textsuperscript{33} With the military retiring in protest, Yeltsin hired a proxy force of Chechens to launch a coup. On 26 November 1994, a force of 5,000 Chechen men and tanks attempted to overthrow Dudayev's Chechen government. Dudayev rallied the Chechens against
the Russian proxies. The coup failed and the force lost 67 tanks in city fighting.\textsuperscript{34} The Russian proxies had little Chechen support and to the Chechens the force represented a foreign Russian mercenary force more than a legitimate opposition force to Dudayev. The victory of the Chechen light infantry forces over Russian tanks was heartening and gave confidence to the defenders that they could defend and defeat Russian tanks with their weapons.\textsuperscript{35} Arrogant and misreading Chechen resolve, Yeltsin decided to order the Russian Army into Chechnya and end the issue through force.\textsuperscript{36}

In 1994, the Russian Army was under-trained, under-manned and had little logistical support to conduct major combat. The army had not conducted a regiment or division-size field training exercise in over two years. With most battalions manned at 55\% or less and filled with conscript soldiers, the units had minimal training and experience and lacked the desire to be in Chechnya.\textsuperscript{37} Since Russia had no fully ready divisions, partly manned regiments and battalions assembled into composite units and deployed to Chechnya with no prior training.\textsuperscript{38} The Russian command expected weak Chechen resistance that would fold in the face of Russian forces.\textsuperscript{39} During the invasion, the Russians continued to use Soviet era tactics of taking lightly defended cities from the march, using armor formations as a show of force with tanks in the lead.\textsuperscript{40} The technique of using speed to surprise the population worked when the resistance was unprepared and frightened of the tanks: after the 26 November battle, the Chechens were ready and confident. Driving into Grozny to capture the city center as part of a police action, the conscript soldiers did not expect any resistance, some did not have weapons or any machinegun ammunition, and others slept in the carriers as the columns rolled into Grozny.\textsuperscript{41} The Russian lack of caution, preparedness, and reconnaissance would cost both Russian troops and Chechen civilians thousands of casualties and further destabilize the country.
After the pro-Russian Chechen force failed to overthrow Dudayev, Yeltsin issued an ultimatum for the Chechens to surrender. On 11 December 1994, with Dudayev still refusing to surrender, Yeltsin launched a force of approximately 40,000 Russians into Chechnya against a force of 5,000-7,000 Chechens. The Russian force advanced into Chechnya along three axes. (Appendix B) The Russian campaign plan had four phases:

1. Border troops should surround Chechnya although the air force surveyed and controlled the air space over the republic. On the ground, three groups of army and Interior Ministry troops should move in from North West, West, and East towards Grozny and surround the city leaving an opening towards the South through which the Chechen forces can leave the city. Grozny was not to be stormed. This phase was expected to take three days. 2. Securing of Grozny through occupation of presidential palace, other government buildings, television and radio stations and “other important objects”. This phase was expected to take four days. 3. Clearing the lowlands through pushing the Dudayev forces into the southern mountains although establishing a pro-Russian government in the “liberated” areas. This phase was expected to take between five and ten days. 4. Elimination of pockets of resistance in the southern mountains. It was expected that this phase could be quite long.

From the start, the Russian forces met fierce opposition that delayed their advance. After ten days, seven more than planned, the Russian force surrounded Grozny. On 31 December 1994, following a ten-day aerial and artillery bombardment of the city against a Chechen force of less than 1,000, a Russian force of 6,000 soldiers conducted a three-pronged mechanized attack into Grozny. Instead of the anticipated light resistance, the Chechens repulsed the Russian initial attack and it took another two months of heavy fighting for the Russians to capture the city. The military invasion and the indiscriminate air campaign quickly changed the nature of the war from the declared disarming of illegal formations into a total war on the population of Chechnya. The indiscriminate killing of civilians served to strengthen the Chechen will to resist. The Chechen’s heralded defense, publicized through the international
media, was a magnet for Chechen and foreign volunteers who aided in the defense of Grozny, and later supported the separatists against Russian occupation.\(^{47}\)

The Russian Army failed to anticipate the breakdown of basic life services caused by the heavy, prolonged battle urban fighting. The capital city of Grozny was a modern city of 490,000 people mostly living in concrete and brick high-rise apartment buildings in an area over 100 square miles.\(^{48}\) The attack left civilians had no place to go. The civilians did not anticipate the need to avoid the fighting, so they stayed in their homes although the fighting engulfed the city. The three months of heavy fighting left the city in ruins and the populace in desperate need of basic life services. The inhabitants of Grozny, citizens of Russia, expected the Russian Army, as the sole government representative to provide food, shelter, clean water, sewage, electricity, and medical treatment to the civilians. Because the operation took months longer than planned, the Russian combat service support units were barely able to sustain the Russian Army, let alone the large civilian population. The Russians entered Chechnya with inadequate forces to supply basic services to the distraught populace and without a strategy to communicate to the population.\(^{49}\) Eventually, the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations restored these facilities and provided support for over 200,000 civilians during the conflict.\(^{50}\) The lack of an interagency plan to deal with breakdown of civilian services caused Russia to lose both support and legitimacy. Citizens expect their government to provide basic services or lose legitimacy. Although the Russian plan called for an establishment of government in liberated areas, Russia’s inability to provide basic services stimulated anti-Russian sentiment and increased support for Dudayev.

With the fall of Grozny in the spring of 1995, the Chechens switched to a strategy of insurgency. The Chechen military leaders (Dudayev, Aslan Maskhadov, Shamil Basayev, and Ruslan Gelaev) all had Soviet military or intelligence training and war experiences in
Afghanistan, Abkhazia, and Georgia. Mufti Akhmad Kadyrov, Chechnya’s religious leader, imitated Sheikh Mansur and declared a *gazavat* against the Russian forces. The declaration helped to unite the Chechens in support of the separatist resistance. Fully committed to separating from Russia, the Chechen leadership chose a strategy to erode the Russians will to continue the war. Dudayev’s strategic purpose was to break the resolve of the Russian government and population by using the media to highlight Russian losses and excess force. Dudayev could “win” by preserving his forces and striking the Russians weak points to wear down the Russian political will. Unable to expel Russian forces through military means, Dudayev relied on the possibility that the political opposition in Moscow would force the Yeltsin government to abandon the conflict. Yeltsin’s lack of solid political support for the invasion from the outset made the strategy credible.

After Grozny fell to Russian forces, Yeltsin tried to bolster public support for the war through a global disinformation campaign and putting pro-Russian Chechens as “governors” of Chechnya to complete the subjugation of the country. To counter the apparent media favoritism of Chechen actions, the Russian government provided distorted accounts to global media of friendly casualties, civilian casualties, and types of weapons used. The Chechens welcomed and utilized Western journalist to report Russian actions and effectively counter Yeltsin’s messages. Because a majority of the Chechen populace and leaders opposed to Russia’s brutal operations, the Russian government was only able to use a few weak and less credible Chechen leaders to assist with local governance. The pro-Russian Chechen governors, first Salambek Khadiev then Doku Zavgaev, lacked legitimacy and found themselves confined to a government under siege in Grozny. With less than 40,000 Russian troops for the campaign, the Russians had to remain stagnant and occupy urban centers to protect the civilian and military
infrastructure. By the beginning of 1996, with the Russian national elections underway, the Chechens commenced a media blitz of activities to bolster Chechen resolve while diminishing the Russians.

The Chechens 1996 timely counter-offensives changed the war. In January 1996, the Chechens launched raids into the neighboring Russian state of Dagestan, capturing territory, holding it for three days under Russian attack before withdrawing back into Chechnya. The media covered the entire episode, reporting Russia's excessive use of force against the residents and Russia's failure to capture the Chechen force. Next, on 6 March 1996, the Chechens launched a Vietnam “Tet” style attack to recapture Grozny, infiltrating thousands of fighters who drove the Russians out of the city. Two days later, when the Russians had assembled a force to re-capture the city, the Chechen force had melted back into the population. The Grozny operation and similar attacks inside and outside of Chechnya demonstrated the high cost of continuing the war. Yielding to political reality, the Yeltsin government announced a peace initiative and negotiated a precarious cease-fire during the run up to the Russian Presidential election. On 6 August 1996, with Yeltsin re-elected and Russian forces still in Chechnya, Chechen forces launched another attack and seized Grozny again. Russian counterattacks over the next few days failed. Under intense political pressure, Yeltsin sent Aleksandr Lebed, secretary of the Russian Security Council, to Chechnya to meet the Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov and sign first another cease-fire then the Khasavjurt Accords, which ended the war and led to a total withdrawal of the Russian troops from Chechnya. While the war ended, the agreements froze the issue of Chechen independence until new agreements could be in December 2001. In January 1997, Chechnya elected Maskhadov as president and the Chechens had their de-facto independence.
The first war demonstrated a number of Russian miscalculations to resolve the conflict. Although the “enemy” that Russia acted against was the region’s destabilization, acting before NATO intervened, and securing economic resources, the Russian enemy-centric campaign actions undermined their goals and furthered the Chechen separatist cause. In a series of missteps, from failing to resolve diplomatically the situation with Dudayev, providing false information to the media that the separatists debunked, failing to provide basic services to the populace, to conducting oppressive military operations that drove the Chechens to support the separatist, Yeltsin’s actions lost legitimacy in the eyes of the Chechens, the Russians, and the world. Without the corroboration that comes with legitimacy, Yeltsin did not have the political support to continue the war and win against the “enemy.” Yeltsin’s peace agreement left the region unstable, the economic resources in Chechen hands, and the potential for NATO intervention lingering. At the end of the war, the Russians killed Dudayev, the leader who had united the Chechens and had the potential to act as a partner with Russia to keep Chechnya from getting worse. Dudayev’s successor, Maskhadov, never had the influence to control the more radical elements within Chechnya. By the end of the war, Russia’s action failed to achieve their goals and established a politically unstable situation that enabled the spread of radical Islam.

**THE RISE OF RADICALS**

The election of Maskhadov and withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya did not resolve the Russian-Chechen conflict. The war had left Chechnya in ruins and economically failing. The peace agreement included major Russian economic aid to re-build Chechnya that never arrived. After the war, the Russian government economically isolated Chechnya, which further eroded the Chechens ability to stabilize the country. The only bond that many of the Chechen insurgents had with each other was a hatred for Russia. With Russia gone, the loose
alliances began to fray and most of Chechnya fell into the hands of local warlords. Maskhadov’s ability to influence waned after the Russians withdrew. A radical form of Islam filled the lawlessness and ideological vacuum that communist Russia left behind.

Towards the end of the war and throughout 1996, the Chechen insurgency began to split with one group under the very successful Chechen leader Basayev. Basayev had led and fought in the historic defense of Grozny, led attacks into Dagestan, and led both counterattacks to re-take Grozny. Due to his immense credibility as a “bandit” who fought Russian aggression, Basayev had the ability to influence Chechens and Maskhadov. Basayev aligned with other Chechen war heroes, Ibn Al-Khattab, an Arab and the leader of foreign jihadist, and Salman Raduyev, who had larger aspirations than just securing the self-determination of Chechnya.

The lawlessness within Chechnya gave extreme Islamism a foothold to operate in the Caucasus. During the war, the Chechens had received considerable support through foreign fighters that came to fight in the name of Islam. Under the banner of Islam, Basayev’s sect fomented attacks against any who resisted practicing their corrupt form of Islam – even other Muslims. The foreign fighters, like Al-Khattab, settled into Chechnya, married locals, and begin establishing local terrorist training centers teaching their corrupt form of Islam. The Chechen success against Russia bred a growth of nationalism and sense of superiority that led Basayev to believe in creating a united Islamic state across the Caucasus. To form a coalition and stabilize Chechnya, Maskhadov gave Basayev key ministerial posts within the Chechen government. Instead of further stabilizing Chechnya, Basayev used his influence and government position to assist with the introduction of radical Islam into Chechnya, then into neighboring states like Dagestan.
The decision to forcibly spread their corrupt form of Islam and free the Caucasus from Russian control caused the split between the moderate Maskhadov and Basayev, now radical, to widen. Starting in 1996, Chechen separatists, particularly Basayev's elements, received blame for attacks on civilian targets in Russia, including apartment buildings, railway stations, and civilian kidnappings and killings. Chechnya, already seen as a criminal state, became in the Russian, and later, the media's eyes as a state that harbored terrorist. By 1998, Basayev and his Chechen movement aligned with the terrorist organization Al Qaeda. Within Chechnya, supporters of Maskhadov (moderate Muslims) and Basayev militias fought over the forcible conversion of Chechens to Basayev's version of Islam and the spread of violence only heightened the international view of Chechen lawlessness. Kadyrov, the Chechen Mufti that declared the 1995 Holy War against Russian forces, formed a Sufi regiment to combat Basayev's militias and stop the spread of radical Islam. Many of the older Imams that grew up under communism did not have any religious training to challenge the corrupt version; although the younger Imams did, they lacked the respect needed to dispute the militias. Kadyrov had both the respect and knowledge to contradict Basayev's view of Islam. Sensing his support within Chechnya diminishing, with a large group of foreign fighters and young militarized Chechens, Basayev commenced efforts to free other Russian held states while he still held the initiative. The expansion into Dagestan represented Basayev's unbridled control of the Chechen separatist organization through spectacular attacks that hijacked the organizations goals and diminished Maskhadov's ability to unify the populace.

With the terrorist attacks within Russia not getting the attention or weakening Russia's grip over the Caucasus, Basayev established a base within Dagestan to incite Islamic revolution. After 1996, Al Khattab settled in Dagestan and began an Islamic military movement to free
Dagestan from Russian authority. The extreme Islamic views found resistance within Dagestan and ended with the local militias chasing Chechen and Dagestani radicals out of Dagestan and back into Chechnya. Unwilling to concede his goals, on 2 August 1999, in conjunction with Al Khattab’s foreign fighters and Dagestani elements, Basayev led approximately 2000 fighters to free Dagestan and establish an Islamic state. By mid-September 1999, a combined Russian and Dagestani force beat back the Chechen attack. On the border of Chechnya, Russian forces had to decide to hold or continue into the lawless, terrorist, Chechen stronghold.

For many Russian political and military leaders Chechnya represented “unfinished business” following the first war. Since 1996, Chechnya came to represent a state of lawlessness that harbored terrorist, invaded Russia’s Dagestan, and broke numerous violations of the peace agreement. The instability continued to interfere and threaten the economically vital Caucasus oil pipeline. Chechen criminal and insurgent groups kidnapped and killed Russians and Europeans travelers in the region. Unlike before the first war, Russian delegations met with the Chechen President Maskhadov to resolve the lawlessness before the outbreak of war. Although he also wanted to find a peaceful solution, Maskhadov had lost control over many elements within Chechnya, including Basayev’s group, and was in no position to be a real partner in combating the instability. The last Russian envoy, Interior Minister General Gennady Shpigun, arrived in March 1999 and was kidnapped at the Grozny airport and later killed. Ideologues within Maskhadov’s government prevented political solutions. By international law, Russia had a responsibility to act and protect its citizens. The media that once lambasted Russia for its arrogant assault against Chechnya now supported action against the Chechens. In addition, the vacuum of instability presented Russia with the dilemma that inaction could invite international (United States) action. Recent American and NATO actions in Kosovo and their expansion
into the former Russian states caused the Russian leadership great alarm. The fear of international intervention, Chechen terrorist activities, the invasion of Dagestan, and continued lawlessness forced the Russians to initiate the second Russian-Chechen War.

**THE SECOND WAR**

Unlike the first war, the Russian political and military leaders viewed the Second Chechen conflict as a “just war” against terrorist and terrorist sympathizers. After years of suffering terrorist attacks and seeing the violent Chechen criminal organizations spread to major Russian cities, the Russian populace and media supported the war. The Russian government made numerous diplomatic attempts to resolve the situation with Maskhadov, but his authority had greatly diminished. In 1999, a new Russian leader, Vladimir Putin, rose to prominence as the Russian Prime Minister. Putin commenced a strong anti-Chechen vocal campaign where he made numerous anti-Chechen (intertwined with anti-terrorist) statements. With strong political support garnered from his anti-Chechen rhetoric, Putin gave the order to conduct a ground attack into Chechnya to eliminate terrorist havens on 1 October 1999.

The Russian strategic goals of the Second Chechen war hinted at a continuation of the first war but with additional anti-terrorism goals. The three goals remained military in nature: reinstitute Russian control over Chechnya before NATO intervention; destroy Chechen separatist groups; and curtail terrorist operations. The Russians recognized that they were fighting two wars: the first against the separatists who only wanted independence and a second war against the terrorist and their forcible spread of radical Islam. Although the goals were similar to the 1994 war, the Russian military that executed the mission had changed.

Unlike the first war, the Russian Army prepared, trained, and organized for the second war. Over 100,000 Russian troops backed by aircraft, artillery and long-range missiles
conducted the invasion and follow-on operations. There would be no “march” order attacks and no key Generals refusing to command or support the attack. Unlike the haphazard organized Russian forces that initially stormed Grozny in 1994, this time the forces had conducted training together and were better prepared for the coming battles. The Russian forces were the elite of the Russian army: spetsnaz, marine, and paratroopers, backed by well-paid, trained, and supplied regular army troops as opposed to poorly trained conscripts. As recent as 1998, the Russian forces conducted large-scale exercises (over 15,000 troops) to prepare for Chechnya. The Chechen attack into Dagestan accelerated the Russian initial stage and enabled the encirclement and isolation of Chechnya plus airstrikes against critical military facilities. Learning from the lack of preparedness to provide basic services to civilians, the Russian government established emergency services and camps for displaced civilians and coordinated with humanitarian agencies for further support. The Russian campaign sought to remedy the first war failures.

The Russian campaign featured five phases: isolation of Chechnya; slow ground advance to surround Grozny; capture of Grozny; emplace a new pro-Russian Chechen government; and commence operations against remnants of Chechen terrorist organizations. The ground advance would be a methodical attack using firepower to level “terrorist” havens before infantry combat groups moved to clear areas with tanks in support. As Russian forces approached urban areas like cities and villages, the Russian officers issued an ultimatum for the occupants to surrender the “terrorist” or depart the area. If reconnaissance forces received fire from the urban area, the Russians leveled the area by fire before follow on infantry went in to clear remnants and secure the area with pro-Russian militias. In this manner, by destruction, each urban area was “saved” from terrorist. When the occupants returned to their homes, the civilians met Russian emergency services who provided food, water, power, and other essentials – while the Russian
controlled media reported and recorded the assistance. Russia sought legitimacy through the controlled media, civic actions, and pro-Russian Chechen militias.

The Russians used pro-Russian Chechen militias to occupy urban areas cleared by Russian troops. The violence between Chechen warlords, Basayev’s radicals, and moderate Chechen forces, enabled the Russians to recruit moderate Chechens to stabilize areas. Recognizing the feud between Chechens, the Russian government used money and an amnesty program to recruit thousands of Chechens to continue to fight the radicals but with the Russians. In the 1999 battle for Grozny, the Russians organized thousands of Chechens under Bislan Gantamirov, the former disgraced mayor of Grozny who had led anti-Dudayev Chechen forces in the failed September 1994 coup. Although stretched thin to occupy and conduct offensive operations during the first war, the second war’s combination of pro-Russian Chechens with over 100,000 Russian troops gave the Russian commanders an opportunity to conduct a myriad of operations, occupy urban areas, and rest troops after tense urban combat.

By February 2000, the Russian advance had secured Grozny and turned to a war against Chechen separatist elements. Although Russian heavy-handed operations caused some Chechen civilians to aid and fight against the Russian occupation, separatist leaders no longer had the general support of the populace. The interwar fighting between radical and moderate Chechens broke a key component of Chechen resistance against Russia: the united populace. With the Chechen resistance to Russian occupation disorganized without the general population’s support and forced to take refuge in the mountains and forest outside urban areas, the Russian campaign grew into a stalemate, unable to destroy the remaining separatist fighters, now labeled terrorist, who continued to strike and kill Russians. The Russian command began to question what the exit strategy was when the operations to clean out the terrorist destroyed
villages and perpetuated the resistance.\textsuperscript{114} Although the general populace no longer supported the resistance, Russia understood the resistance would continue until the Chechen populace supported a local government that they viewed as legitimate.

In March 2000, the Russian populace elected Putin as President. With the Russian populace and international media questioning the Russian campaign and brutal tactics in Chechnya,\textsuperscript{115} the election gave Putin the political capital to change the course of the war. Putin commenced a policy of ‘Chechenisation’: turning the government and military campaign over to the Chechens.\textsuperscript{116} The amnesty program had brought in many Chechen moderates, sidelined by Basayev’s sect, including the former separatist fighter and moderate religious leader, Mufti Akhmad Kadyrov. Kadyrov, the man who declared the Holy War in 1995, was a tribal leader and a leading religious figure that had thousands of fighters to support him. Most importantly, Kadyrov had violently opposed the radical elements under Basayev and demonstrated effectiveness in disputing the spread of the corrupted form of Islam. In June 2000, Putin took the first step of turning over the war to the Chechens by naming Kadyrov the head of the Russian administration in Chechnya.\textsuperscript{117} Kadyrov’s force, with tens of thousands of Russian troops, continued the counter-terror campaign, but came no closer to destroying the separatists who had taken refuge not only in the Chechen mountains’ but also in neighboring states.\textsuperscript{118} The Russian strategy had rested upon separating the terrorist/ separatist fighters from the populace and forcing the populace to join the occupiers for security. The populace remained neutral at best with a continued hate for Russian activities. The local government did not have any legitimacy because the Chechen people did not choose Kadyrov, Russia did. By the end of 2001, Russian leadership came to the realization that their enemy-centric plan was not succeeding and started peace negotiations in Moscow with representatives of Maskhadov’s government.\textsuperscript{119}
Although Chechen and Russian forces continued to conduct operations to stabilize Chechnya, a conference for peace convened in Europe during the summer of 2002 to further the negotiations started in Moscow. Moderates from Chechnya, Russia, and America met and created a compromise peace plan.\textsuperscript{120} The plan called for national elections and essentially a Chechnya not in Russia but with Russia.\textsuperscript{121} Unfortunately, Basayev’s sect saw peace as a threat to their stated goal of a free Islamic Caucasus state and struck the Moscow Dubrovka Theater killing 131 civilians in October 2002. When the Chechen leadership under Maskhadov, considered moderates, refused to split from Basayev, a key Russian demand, negotiations abruptly ended.\textsuperscript{122} The Chechen separatists had failed to understand that in a post September 11 world, any government (even a government in exile) aligned with terrorist were accountable for the terrorist actions.\textsuperscript{123} Russia was willing to negotiate with moderate separatists but not anyone aligned with terrorist. Although Maskhadov was a moderate and wanted a peaceful solution, the Russians targeted and killed Maskhadov (2005) along with Basayev (2006) and many other leaders who supported the terrorist attacks.\textsuperscript{124} No longer working with Maskhadov, Putin used his picked Chechen leader Kadyrov to implement the peace plan.

On 22 November 2002, shortly after the Moscow theater terrorist attack, Putin instituted his own population-centric plan. The two phases of the peace plan, a constitutional referendum and presidential election, attempted to solidify Chechen support behind a Russian anointed Chechen leader. Russian authorities strictly held and controlled each of the two phases although many international agencies protested the irregularities and results.\textsuperscript{125} Russian election administrators denied Chechens, who continued to support the separatist, participation in the activities. No matter the irregularities, the Chechens Presidential election of Kadyrov signaled a growing sense of legitimacy for the Chechen government. In May 2004, unable to participate by
voting or running for election, Basayev's sect attacked the process and assassinated Kadyrov.\textsuperscript{126} Although some resistance continued, the elections and constitution represented to the war weary Chechens a legitimate government, a return normalcy, and the end of the violence. Kadyrov’s election ended the separatist populace based insurgency with Putin’s plan giving the Chechen government the needed legitimacy over the exiled separatists who aligned with terrorist. With the loss of the popular support, remaining separatists turned to terrorism to re-gain the initiative.

After losing the populace’s support within Chechnya, Basayev’s sect conducted a terror campaign in Russia to achieve their political goal. In September 2004, a terror attack took place at a public school in Beslan, North Ossetia part of the Russian Federation (Appendix A.) The attack ended with hundreds of children killed and the blame fell on the Chechen separatists.\textsuperscript{127} The terrorist attack highlighted how much the remaining separatist fighters had become desperate terrorists. Led by Basayev, and indirectly supported by Maskhadov, the attack’s goal was to seize children as hostages and with the local population serving as an outer ring to protect against any Russian attack, deliver demands, and negotiate with Russian authorities the status of a free Chechnya. The Ossetians, horrified by the brazen seizure and use of the children as human shields, participated and assisted with the failed Russian attempt to rescue the children. The attack became a media nightmare for the once hero worshipped separatists and solidified the Chechen support of the Russian peace plan vice Basayev’s alternative.\textsuperscript{128} With little remaining Chechen support, Basayev’s sect broke away from the Chechen separatists and officially started the Caucasus Emirate on 31 October 2007 seeking an Islamic Emirate across the Caucasus and outside support for terrorism.\textsuperscript{129} Once recognized as a terrorist organization, Russia’s efforts to isolate Basayev’s sect received foreign assistance following America’s September 11 attacks.
In America, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks served to assist Russia in isolating the Chechen terrorist organization from outside support. Chechnya’s landlocked geography has only one non-Russian infiltration route: a mountain pass to Georgia. The Chechen terror groups’ founders and main support came from Caucasus Mountain Qadiri tribes that historically conducted illicit activities across the Caucasus.\textsuperscript{130} Able to identify historic illicit routes through the Pankisi Gorge to Georgia, Russian security forces focused on isolating this region. Receiving international support after Beslan, Georgian security forces with American support also assisted in disrupting this route\textsuperscript{131} and forced terrorist activities through Ingushetia and Dagestan. Russian security forces targeted and killed Chechen leaders, including Basayev, along identified terrorist lines of communication. After terrorist attacks, legal and illegal business activities seeking material profit suffered during heightened security and improved security procedures. From 2000 to 2005, Russian investment in Caucasus border security increased fourfold disrupting and negatively influencing illicit profits.\textsuperscript{132} Although lawless behavior united insurgent and criminal organizations, disrupting illicit activity lines of communication presented Russian forces with the opportunity to divide the groups between idealist and profiteers.\textsuperscript{133}

Operating in austere environments and hunted by security forces, terrorist organizations receive financial support through two means: ideological charity or criminal activity.\textsuperscript{134} From the early 1990’s, Chechen organizations received financial backing from Saudi Arabian and Pakistani ideological charity groups.\textsuperscript{135} To supplement outside sources, the organizations also engaged in robbery, kidnapping, oil siphoning, drugs, and narcotics activities. After America’s September 11 attacks, Russia joined America and other nations as a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).\textsuperscript{136} By 2004, a Central Asian FATF regional body formed to focus on Eurasia whose membership included China and Russia.\textsuperscript{137} Both financial task forces focused on
disrupting terror financing. Also in 2004, due to a split in terror leadership and religious ideals, Kadyrov’s rise to lead Chechnya against the radical terrorist organization effectively disrupted much of the terrorist local criminal support. By 2010, the U.S. Congressional Research Office and the Financial Standards Foundation reported Russia had taken effective action in disrupting terrorist finances.\textsuperscript{138} Although the reports do not quantify the loss of financial support, as Chechen insurgents turned to conducting terrorist operations, the worldwide attention disrupted terror financing by discouraging criminal organizations from assisting or working with FATF labeled terrorist groups. Although Chechnya remains a high crime area,\textsuperscript{139} the combination of high profile worldwide financial actions and local anti-terror organizations disrupted the financial support of Caucasus Emirate terrorist organization and assisted with the government’s stability and legitimacy through improving the rule of law.\textsuperscript{140}

In April 2009, the Russian government unilaterally declared the counter-terrorism campaign in Chechnya over.\textsuperscript{141} Strategically, the Russian invasion and takeover has kept foreign, particularly United States, influence out of Chechnya. Although Russia announced the campaign over, a look back at the three stated goals of the 1999 Russian campaign reveals more unfinished business. The Russians achieved their first two goals of bringing Chechnya back under its fold and effectively destroyed the separatist independence goal by appointing Chechen elected Presidents who semi-autonomously ruled Chechnya. The political process established the Chechen government’s legitimacy and endured through the next two presidents. The remaining moderate elements of Chechen separatists, once led by Maskhadov, and still considered criminals in Chechnya, met in Norway and decided to “lay down their arms” in July 2009.\textsuperscript{142} The third goal of mitigating the use of Chechnya as a base for regional terrorist activities worked through counter-financing and military and police operations but at a cost:
forced out of Chechnya, Basayev’s terrorist organization spread throughout the Caucasus region with Al Qaeda’s support, and morphed into a regional catalyst for grievances against Russian control. Inside Chechnya, the violence and lawlessness continues with foreign government and business travel sites “emphatically” warning foreigners against all travel to Chechnya due to criminal activity. Economic stabilization efforts are showing signs of progress but high levels of corruption and fear permeate through the populace. With the terrorist activities mitigated, the stabilization of Chechnya and re-establishment of law and order continues today.

CONCLUSION

The two decades of war spread the conflict among generations of Russians, Chechens, and many regional neighbors. The missteps and miscalculations cost tens of thousands of lives and continue to delay the stabilization of the region. The Russian-Chechen conflict reveals the importance of understanding the history and ever-changing environment between two nations. Although the Chechens in the first war deemed the first pro-Russian governors illegitimate, during the second war the election of Kadyrov and his successors gained legitimacy by providing basic services, security, and, most importantly, appointment through elections. Russia’s success was borne out of their ability to isolate the terrorist while elevating Kadyrov, whose fighting and Islamic religious credentials carried influence in the Chechens eyes to counter the corrupt Islam.

At the heart of the conflict were cultural contradictions between Russians and Chechens: Russian centralized control verse Chechen self-determination; Russian intolerance and demonization of Chechens verse independent tribal culture; traditionalism (tribal societies, seen in foreign eyes as lawlessness) verse modern society. Neither Russian campaign initially attempted to address what cultural considerations caused the conflict to morph into a bitter contest. Through local referendums and elections, the Russians allowed the Chechens to
administer more and more control of the area, in effect, granting semi-autonomy that eased the cultural conflict.\textsuperscript{147} Unfortunately, by then, the violence and radical Islam ideas corrupted the traditional Chechen culture and removed aspects of law and order that had been in place before the wars. Specifically, the targeting of Chechen elders,\textsuperscript{148} who administered justice and had the influence to stop the spread of radical Islam, created an atmosphere of disrespect towards authority and elevated younger radicalized elements.\textsuperscript{149} The younger moderates, Saudi trained Islamic Imams, did not have the influence of the older elders, and were unable to counter the spread of radical Islamic ideas that justified criminal actions as long as they supported the spread of Islam.\textsuperscript{150} The results led to warlordism, graft, and continued instability from criminal elements that profited from the conflict.\textsuperscript{151} The loss of the elders and the related cultural demise enabled criminal activities to spread unabated even under a Chechen government. Without addressing the cultural issues, the Russian government turned to the military to resolve the conflict and related criminal activities.

Learning from the first war, the second Russian campaign was more effective in creating the conditions to end open conflict and dismantle Chechen support for the insurgency. The steady use of well-trained, equipped, and supplied Russian troops, supplemented by local pro-Russian militias, allowed the Russian army to clear the urban areas and keep the remaining insurgents running.\textsuperscript{152} With special operation forces, unmanned aerial vehicles, signals intelligence and air superiority, the Russian army identified and killed at least a hundred insurgent leaders.\textsuperscript{153} With the media effectively censored and the Russian populace clamoring for revenge, the Russian military tactics, although costly in terms of Russian and noncombatant casualties, allowed the introduction of the pro-Russian government into urban areas. The problem of leveling urban areas was the demonization of the Chechen people, whether as
terrorist, criminals or "backwards tribals," which led to abnormal behavior, like the killing of noncombatants and other outrageous war crimes.\textsuperscript{154} In effect, although they were able to secure urban areas from the insurgency, the Russian armies continued brutal, heavy-handed approach to clearing urban areas created and perpetuated resistance to Russian authority.

Russian success in turning the Chechen populace from the insurgency and violence arrived from finding moderate leaders to oppose the more radical elements in Chechen society. Using bribes and amnesties, the Russian government was able to turn key insurgent leaders, like Kadyrov, who then implemented the "results" of the constitutional referendum and presidential election. These elected officials, hand chosen by the Russians, received Russian money (power) to rebuild cities and invigorate the economy.\textsuperscript{155} The Russian use of elected Chechen officials, mostly tribal leaders, to rebuild cities, administer law, and improve security gave the appearance of a semi-autonomous Chechen government. By 2005, those separatist fighters who chose to continue became outcast, turned in for award money by war weary locals who wanted security and supported the local Chechen leadership.\textsuperscript{156} The 2010 United States Congressional Research Service report on Chechnya noted positive stability metrics, the marked decrease in crime and violence, and an increase in Russian and Chechen investment into Chechnya.\textsuperscript{157} Although Chechnya remains unstable, the Russians have instituted a centralized control of the nation through elevating and legitimizing the pro-Russian tribal leaders by giving them control of government funds and encouraging investment.

As the Russian army employed tactics that killed noncombatants, assassinated key separatist leaders, and censored local media, the separatist strategy radicalized and countered with major attacks on Russian civilian targets, like Dubrovka, Beslan, and in Dagestan that garnered worldwide media attention. The brutal violence and resulting destabilization of the
Chechen traditional society led to the introduction of foreign fighters, their corrupt form of Islam, and forced the political radicalization of once moderate leaders. Basayev’s conversion and support for foreign fighters was a key turning point that led to the radicalization and split between the nationalist insurgent and the ideological terrorist. In 1995, after Russian forces killed members of his family, Basayev, who once supported a pro-western democracy for Chechnya, now sided with the radicalized Islam solution. 158 The foreign fighters established schools and training camps that introduced tactics that went against traditional Chechen culture like suicide attacks, female fighters (some who committed suicide attacks,) attacks on other Muslims, and called for strict Islamic government. 159 In many Chechen and Dagestani areas, the introduction of radical Islam met violent opposition. Despite the arrests, the assassinations of key leaders, and local ideological resistance, the terror organization continued, fed by Russia’s brutal tactics. 160 As ‘Chechenisation’ took hold, the source of the insurgents’ power, the people’s anger at Russian occupation, relatively diminished as the Chechens swung their support to Kadyrov’s fight against radicals. When the remaining force lost popular support and influence due to their radicalization, the separatists turned to terror to remain relevant. Isolated from the peace process and a foe of the current Chechen government, the remnants of the insurgency, now a terror organization, continue to prolong the conflict 161 until their aim of Caucasus wide Islamic state forms.

Since 1993, the Russian-Chechen conflict has exhibited many characteristics of a “small war.” Colonel C.E. Callwell classifies small wars into three types: revenge or suppression of lawlessness; military annexation of territory; and, because of the first two, insurgency. 162 Both of the wars started with Russian attempts to quell lawlessness and annex territory followed by insurgency. From suppressing lawlessness to annexing territory, the Russian military and
Chechen insurgent response tended to reach the violent end of the spectrum of Clausewitz's total war, encompassing terrorism and violence against noncombatants. During the war, normal and rational behavior disappeared, overcome by the everyday violence of war and terrorism. The separatist leaders, exposed daily to bloody urban battles, assassinations, loss of family members, and cultural demise, became radicalized fomenting terrorism and embraced the regional spread of the war. The Russian leaders, unbridled by the war-energized populace, humiliated by Chechen battlefield success, and numerous terrorist attacks, were out for revenge. Whereas during the first war the Russian over-militarized effort lost the support of the Russian populace, during the second war the separatists radicalization and Beslan-type terrorist actions lost the support of the Chechen populace. Since 1994, the population's support for each side followed the development of the small war and determined the victor.

With passions driving the actions on both sides, the Russian leaders' opportunity to resolve the conflict had to wait until the impasse after the Grozny seizure in 2000 and later, the Chechen war weariness before 'Chechenisation.' Although once viewed as freedom fighters, the post September 11 world viewed the separatist actions at Beslan and other attacks as terrorism. Once labeled as a terrorist organization, Russia ended dialogue with Maskhadov and turned to Kadyrov for a Chechen peace solution. Identified as a terrorist organization, the support needed for an insurgency from the Chechen populace, criminal organizations, and foreign finances disappeared. Unlike the first war where the Russian populace grew war weary and disenchanted with the bloody struggle, separatist terrorist attacks during the second war only strengthened Russian resolve. Kadyrov's election marked the end of the separatist insurgency with the populace voting for stability vice terror. By 2009, the remaining Chechen separatists joined the pro-Russian Chechen state, fled into exile, or continued the fight under the regional Islamic
Caucasus Emirate terror organization as the Chechen populace sided with beginning signs of stability under the Chechen semi-autonomous government. Between the first and second war, the Chechen separatist organization's change to terrorism and corrupted Islam allowed the Russians a foothold to garner Chechen support and separate Basayev's sect of terrorist from a majority of the population. The separatists change from a unified population based insurgency to ideological terrorism was the key to Russia's population-centric tactics to re-claim Chechnya through the Chechen populace. In the end, the Chechen people chose the stability under a Russian supported government led by a semi-autonomous moderate Chechen leader over the continued instability of a Beslan-type terror organization.
NOTES


5 James Hughes, From Nationalism to Jihad, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, PA: 2007, 2-5. Although the historic numbers of tribes vary from 130-180, Hughes account of about 150 is the most consistent.


7 Viatcheslav Avioutskii, “Chechnya: towards partition?”


9 Banville, “History of Chechnya,” Many leaders of the resistance fled to the Ottoman Empire.

10 Russell, Chechnya – Russia’s ‘War on Terror, 29-34

11 Banville, “History of Chechnya.”

12 Russell, Chechnya – Russia’s ‘War on Terror, 33

13 Banville, “History of Chechnya.”

14 Banville, “History of Chechnya.”

15 Banville, “History of Chechnya,” Russell, Chechnya – Russia’s ‘War on Terror, 29-33. Russell details: “The Dadi Yurt massacre was seared into minds of Chechens. Beginning with General Yermelov’s scorched-earth policy in 1816, continuing with several decades of Russian cut-and-burn counterinsurgency and deportations, and ending with Stalin’s 1944 deportation of the entire Chechen population to Central Asia, no other people evokes the enmity of the Chechens more than the Russians. Inexplicably, and exacerbating an already strong Russophobia among the Chechen population, in 1949 Soviet authorities erected a statue of General Yermelov in Grozny. The inscription on the statue declared, ‘There is no people under the sun more vile and deceitful than this one.’” The death of Stalin allowed the surviving deportees to return in 1956.


17 Russell, Chechnya – Russia’s ‘War on Terror, 30-32.


19 Viatcheslav Avioutskii, “Chechnya: towards partition?”


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24 Russell, Chechnya – Russia’s ‘War on Terror, 73.
25 Through Regionalization, the UN allowed world regions to agree to stand up peacekeeping forces to be used within their region and receive financial support and legitimacy. While Russia already had agreements to use forces within the federation, UN approval gave them legitimacy over US or outside forces. Kristina Jeffers, Misreading Moscow, Tufts University spring 2006, 13-14.
27 Jeffers, Misreading Moscow, 14.
29 Cassidy, “Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Strategic Culture and the Paradoxes of Asymmetric Conflict", 29.
34 David P. Dilegge, “View From the Wolves’ Den The Chechens and Urban Operations”.
35 Russell, Chechnya – Russia’s ‘War on Terror, 70
38 Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000, 5-6. Grau, “Changing Russian Urban Tactics: The Aftermath of the Battle of Grozny”. Dilegge, “View From the Wolves’ Den The Chechens and Urban Operations”. Russell, Chechnya – Russia’s ‘War on Terror. Multiple sources reported the lax preparation for this assault reflected the hubris from the top, Yeltsin down. Russell and Grau reported the Defense Minister, General Pavel Grachev, even boasted on the eve of the attack that he could seize Grozny in two hours with one parachute regiment.
41 Dilegge, “View From the Wolves’ Den The Chechens and Urban Operations”.
42 Faufby and Magnusson, “The Battle(s) of Grozny”.
Russia’s ‘War on Terror’, 69.
56 Faury and Magnusson, “The Battle(s) of Grozny”.
58 Fuller, “Chechnya: Khasavyurt Accords Failed to Preclude a Second War”.
60 Al-Khattab’s nationality is listed as Saudi Arabian, Jordanian or Syrian so I left it as Arab. Turbiville, Jr. “Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist Operations”, 57-60.
61 For purposes of this paper, I am using “radical Islam” and “corrupt form of Islam” to distinguish between the practices that Basayev’s sect conducted and the actual religion. Although Basayev said he was a Salafi Jihadist and practiced Islam in its “pure” form before any changes/ interpretation to meet modern society’s cultures, he approved the killing of other Muslims who were not practicing the “pure” form. Souleimanov, “Chechnya, Wahhabism, And

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76 Souleimanov, “Chechnya, Wahhabism And The Invasion Of Dagestan”.


78 Emil Souleimanov, “Chechnya, Wahhabism And The Invasion Of Dagestan”, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Volume 9, No. 4, Article 4 - December 2005 http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue4/v9no4a4.html accessed 20 December 2010’. Baseav’s key positions included Vice Chairman, Vice President and Prime Minister.

79 Souleimanov, “Chechnya, Wahhabism And The Invasion Of Dagestan”.

80 Russell, Chechnya – Russia’s ‘War on Terror, 74-75, 93,97,98.


84 Viatcheslav Avioutskii, “Chechnya: towards partition?”, http://www.strategicsinternational.com/3engchechenia.htm (accessed 8 February 2011) Kadyrov reportedly even went to Dagestan to ask forgiveness to families of civilians killed by terrorist attacks conducted by Basayev.

85 Viatcheslav Avioutskii, “Chechnya: towards partition?”. Walter Richmond, “Russian policies towards Islamic extremism in the Northern Caucasus and destabilization in Kabardino-Balkaria,” Ethно-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus, edited by Moshe Gammer, Routledge, New York NY: 2008. 92-94 Richmond details how many of the older regional Imams did not have any training, although the younger Imams did, they lacked the respect needed to publicly contest the Wahhabis: Kadyrov had both the respect and knowledge.

86 Souleimanov, “Chechnya, Wahhabism And The Invasion Of Dagestan”.

87 Souleimanov, “Chechnya, Wahhabism And The Invasion Of Dagestan”.


92 Russell, Chechnya – Russia’s ‘War on Terror, 93.


95 Szaszdi, Russian Civil-Military Relations and the Origins of the Second Chechen War, 165,292.


98 Russell, Chechnya – Russia’s ‘War on Terror, 69.

99 Russell, Chechnya – Russia’s ‘War on Terror, 77, 79.
Russia's 'War on Terror', 1994-2000.


Souleimanov, "Chechnya, Wahhabism And The Invasion Of Dagestan".


Oliker, Russia's Chechen Wars 1994-2000, 43.


Russell, Chechnya – Russia's 'War on Terror', 134.

Russell, Chechnya – Russia's 'War on Terror', 131.

Russell, Chechnya – Russia's 'War on Terror', 134.


Basayev was killed in 2006 and Maskhadov in 2005.

Russell, Chechnya – Russia's 'War on Terror', 83-84.


Shevtsova, Putin's Russia, 370-374. Russell, Chechnya – Russia's 'War on Terror', 114-126.

Pkhakadze, "What is Hidden Behind the Idea of the Caucasian Emirate?".

8 February 2011; Viacheslav Avioutskii, “Chechnya: towards partition?”,


132 Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “Terrorism prevention in Russia: one year after Beslan”, 9-11

133 Abdullaev, “Chechen Criminal and terrorist Groups: Points of Convergence”, 126-139

134 Abdullaev, "Chechen Criminal and terrorist Groups: Points of Convergence", 126-139


137 Department of State, “Russia country Report on Terrorism 2004”.


139 Abdullaev, "Chechen Criminal and terrorist Groups: Points of Convergence", 126-139


145 Russell, Chechnya – Russia’s ‘War on Terror’, 170.

146 The local elections and referendum occurred between 2002 to 2004.

147 Fuller, “Chechnya: Kadyrov uses ‘Folk Islam’ for Political Gain”. Besides the assassination of the elder Mufti Kadyrov, between 17-50 Imams were targeted and killed by radical elements led by Basayev.

148 Russell, Chechnya – Russia’s ‘War on Terror’, 56-60.


150 Abdullaev, "Chechen Criminal and terrorist Groups: Points of Convergence", 126-139.

Russell, Chechnya – Russia’s ‘War on Terror’, 129.
155 Russell, *Chechnya – Russia’s ‘War on Terror*, 170.
156 Russell, *Chechnya – Russia’s ‘War on Terror*, 146-147.
159 Russell, *Chechnya – Russia’s ‘War on Terror*, 101, 139-141, 144. Turbiville, Jr. “Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist Operations” 53-57
Chechnya and neighboring countries and towns including Beslan to the West.

The 1994 Russian axis of attack into Chechnya

Source: "Soft Log" and Concrete Canyons by Lester Grau
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