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The widespread adoption of selected civilian law enforcement policing techniques into infantry combat operations will allow Marines in IW to dramatically improve their ability to identify the modern hybrid-threat enemy, who often hides within civilian populations. Identification will limit the ability of the enemy to maneuver and enabling the full kinetic and non-kinetic combat power of the unit to be brought to bear to accomplish the mission. Combat Policing is a system of refined observation and investigation skills used by U.S. combat forces, which is based on a historical body of knowledge drawn from civilian police techniques against gangs in large U.S. cities. It aims to disrupt enemy action by creating a superior understanding of how enemy networks are organized and how they function, to facilitate identification and destruction of the enemy.

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>b. ABSTRACT</th>
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COMBAT POLICING: THE APPLICATION OF SELECTED LAW ENFORCEMENT TECHNIQUES TO ENHANCE INFANTRY OPERATIONS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Table of Contents

Table of Contents

Page

DISCLAIMER ..........................................................................................................................

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................

PREFACE ..............................................................................................................................

AR RAMADI: DECEMBER 2005 ...............................................................................................

INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................................

Thesis .....................................................................................................................................

Roadmap of this Examination ..............................................................................................

THE MARINE CORPS IN REGULAR WAR, 1991-PRESENT

THE MARINE CORPS IN IRREGULAR WAR, 1991-PRESENT

DID THE MARINE CORPS APPLY MANEUVER WARFARE PRINCIPLES IN IRREGULAR WAR?

AN EXAMINATION OF SIMILARITIES BETWEEN COUNTER-GANG OPERATIONS AND IRREGULAR WAR

AN EXAMINATION OF THE APPLICABILITY OF USING THE SAME TECHNIQUES IN A MILITARY ENVIRONMENT

AN EXAMINATION OF COMBAT POLICING’S RESULTS WHERE IT WAS APPLIED

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE MARINE CORPS

CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................................
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THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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Executive Summary

Title: Combat Policing: The Application of Selected Law Enforcement Techniques to Enhance Infantry Operations

Author: Major Rory B. Quinn, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: The widespread adoption of selected civilian law enforcement policing techniques into infantry combat operations will allow Marines in IW to dramatically improve their ability to identify the modern hybrid-threat enemy, who often hides within civilian populations. Identification will limit the ability of the enemy to maneuver and enabling the full kinetic and non-kinetic combat power of the unit to be brought to bear to accomplish the mission.

Discussion: Combat Policing is a system of refined observation and investigation skills used by U.S. combat forces, which is based on a historical body of knowledge drawn from civilian police techniques against gangs in large U.S. cities. It aims to disrupt enemy action by creating a superior understanding of how enemy networks are organized and how they function, to facilitate identification and destruction of the enemy, who often hides in plain sight among the population.

A Combat Policing mindset sees enemy forces as a collection of networks which can be penetrated through frequent and detailed human contact. Most enemy activity occurs in urban centers, marketplaces and locations of societal commerce. That fact makes the intelligence technique of “link analysis” a particularly effective tool for discovering the multiple relationships – financial, social and societal – that exist between individuals. Once the observation/investigation mindset is applied to relationships uncovered by link analysis and other techniques, enemy concealment among populations tends to evaporate as the shape of military, social and criminal networks becomes clear.

Among enemy networks, “threat financing” is among the most critical to master on the modern battlefield. The military, in the future, must be careful not to be too quick to dismiss the reality of terrorist financing as the potential center of gravity of their enemy – a dismissal which often occurs because money is a subject matter outside the traditional realm of study for military officers. All avenues of finance, as well as the infrastructure used to establish governance, exposes the enemy to potential discovery of his methods by forces schooled in police investigative techniques.

Combat Policing relies on no specific equipment and not require periodic software patches or hardware “refreshes.” It relies on acute observation, a database of mental experiences and a willingness to engage in questioning and discovery among individuals encountered in the battlespace.

Conclusion: Combat Policing should be uniformly embraced throughout the Marine Corps. It should be viewed as an integrating concept of operations for all infantry operations. It should synchronize existing infantry tactics, techniques and procedures to build a superior picture of the enemy and his enabling networks, which Marine forces do not currently possess.
Preface

I would like to thank my wife, Megan, for the long hours she allowed me to dedicate to the research for this paper. She is a first rate editor and a tremendous support both to me and to the Marines whom this effort will hopefully benefit in the future.

Mr. Twayne Hickman, Mr. Ralph Morten, Ms. Jennie Haskamp, Majors Tim Powledge, USMC, Marcus Mainz, USMC and William Osborne, USMC, were also critical in the development of both thoughts and words as this paper developed.

I would also like to thank my military and civilian mentors at Command and Staff College for their support, advice and feedback throughout this process – notably Colonel Royal P. Mortenson, USMC and Colonel Mark A. Strong, USA, Dr. Mark H. Jacobsen and Dr. Rebecca J. Johnson.
In the middle of a violent and difficult combat deployment, a Marine captain sat in his quarters, frustrated by the lack of progress he was making in the war. He deployed three months earlier on this, his second tour to Iraq. Over the course of those months, his weapons company completed hundreds of patrols throughout the city providing security, reconnaissance, and emergency response as circumstances required. His battalion had been attacked with over 100 improvised explosive devices (IEDs), while avoiding and defusing more than 100 others. The attacks had already resulted in ten Marine deaths, with dozens more wounded. Despite creative tactics of driving at varying speeds, instituting unpredictable stops and starts, and avoiding setting observable route selection patterns, there was no relief from those powerful weapons. The captain’s vehicle-mounted weapons company could not devise effective methods of combating the IEDs. IEDs were the dominant weapon on the battlefield. They were the enemy’s weapon of choice as a result of their explosive power, lethality and relative ease of production.

The IEDs the captain faced had evolved a long way from the soda cans filled with plastic explosives he encountered in February 2004, during the early months of the insurgency. The IEDs of December 2005 were usually constructed by inserting a detonation mechanism in the nose of an artillery shell. The shells were designed to fragment, thereby causing significant damage to people and equipment. His Marines were being repeatedly hammered by what amounted to direct hits of conventional artillery as they traversed the city.

The IEDs were often buried beneath the pavement – either dug in on an angle from the side of the road or, with increasing frequency, buried where the asphalt was cut out and replaced. By now, the captain’s enemy had tremendous standoff capability, in that he could trigger the IEDs from a mile away. Previous versions of the IED had used short range technology like
garage door openers as trigger devices. The trigger of choice for the enemy, over time, had become long-range cordless telephones (LRCT) as a result of their range, signal strength and ease of mobility.

As the captain sat in his quarters, an email arrived. A retired Los Angeles (LA) police detective, a family friend, responded to an email from a week earlier when the captain wrote the majority of the IEDs hitting his Marines were initiated using a particular make and model of LRCT.

The detective matter-of-factly explained he knew the name and work address of the Iraqi citizen who was the receiving agent for all phones of that make and model delivered to Iraq. He stated the Iraqi picked up shipments of those phones on Wednesday afternoons at Baghdad International Airport, working with U.S. military customs agents to obtain the commercial equipment. He recommended the captain go arrest the man because, while posing as an interested buyer over the phone, the detective made it clear to the Iraqi that he wanted to purchase dozens of the phones after confirming that their signal was of high enough quality to penetrate a few inches of dirt or asphalt. The Iraqi snickered as he indicated this model – for certain – possessed those capabilities.¹

The captain read the email in a stupor. He had not received such detailed information from his intelligence section during a cumulative ten months of deployments. At the end of the email, the detective noted he obtained this information over roughly six hours of police work, using only internet research and emails, during which he utilized standard police investigative techniques for extracting information, cross-referencing data and allowing people to talk.

The captain, seeing an opportunity to disrupt the enemy’s IED production process, passed the information through his battalion’s intelligence section and up the chain of command.
Nothing happened. During follow-up phone calls to various agencies, it became clear that military officials did not feel this information was useful. They had reservations about interfering with commercial vendors based solely on the speculation of a non-military civilian from LA. The lack of action left the captain with little else to do other than supervising sniper positions designed to shoot IED emplacers at various street corners around Ramadi in the dead of night.2

Introduction:

Warfare, as it has for centuries, evolves. The military threat faced by U.S. forces today is a hybrid enemy comprised of a combination of regular military forces, non-state actors and common criminals out for personal gain. Marines do not solely face a ‘traditional’1 enemy of uniformed professionals who fight on behalf of an established government. Marine Corps warfighting doctrine and capabilities must adapt to enable continued superiority on a complex battlefield that now includes elements of civilian commercial equipment, advanced communications infrastructure and even illegal narcotics funding streams. The Marine Corps Combat Policing (CP) program is ideally suited to provide the framework for expanding service warfighting capabilities to excel on this modern battlefield and should be uniformly institutionalized across the service. Currently, the CP program is unevenly embraced by various commanders, resulting in a significant reduction in its potential to innovate to meet the threat – specifically in the realm of Irregular Warfare (IW). CP should be an integrating standard concept of operations for basic infantry operations. It should synchronize existing infantry tactics, techniques and procedures to build a superior picture of the enemy and his enabling networks, which Marine forces do not currently possess.

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1 There have been many times that Marines have fought irregular enemies, as is well documented in the Small Wars Manual. The author is not suggesting that non-state irregular enemies are new, but that the modern battlefield has a higher percentage of them than in the past. Current threats are “hybrid” elements of both military and criminal groups.
Thesis:

The widespread adoption of selected civilian law enforcement policing techniques into infantry combat operations will allow Marines in IW to dramatically improve their ability to identify the modern hybrid-threat enemy, who often hides within civilian populations. Identification will limit the ability of the enemy to maneuver and enabling the full kinetic and non-kinetic combat power of the unit to be brought to bear to accomplish the mission.

Road Map of this Examination:

During the course of this examination, the reasons for the Marine Corps’ notable recent successes in conventional war will be identified and contrasted with the service’s struggles in IW. This paper will examine whether the principles of maneuver warfare (MW) have been applied to irregular operations with same depth of understanding with which they have been adopted in regular operations. An analysis of the similarities between the challenges faced by Marines in IW and those faced by civilian law enforcement in counter-gang operations will lead to an evaluation of whether those counter-gang techniques can be effectively transferred for use in a high threat military environment. Examination of the current CP program will illustrate the results of this law enforcement model where it has been attempted. Finally, an analysis of these results will inform recommendations for future action in the Marine Corps as well as the ultimate conclusions of this research project.

The Marine Corps in Regular War, 1991-Present:

In 1989, the Marine Corps adopted a new warfighting doctrine, called MW. It transformed the way Marines approached military problems. Through the institutional adoption
of principles including mission tactics, tempo and surprise, the doctrine led to rapid and
spectacular success in operations throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. In three instances of
major regular war (RW) in Kuwait, Iraq and Afghanistan, Marines successfully shattered the
enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which created a
turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy could not cope. Potential
future enemies have observed the fates of Saddam Hussein and the 2001 Taliban government.
Especially after witnessing the earlier demise of the Soviet Union, modern enemies likely see the
futility of confronting the U.S. in conventional technology and armor-driven combat. As a result,
there is a decreased likelihood of the U.S. facing a purely conventional threat in the near
future.4

The Marine Corps in Irregular War, 1991-Present:

In the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Marine Corps confronted its first
extended period of IW since the adoption of MW. The service’s performance over the
subsequent eight years of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations was notably less decisive than
the maneuver-style ground invasion. The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have been
characterized by casualty rates much higher than the initial invasion into those countries, uneven
progress toward strategic objectives and tenuous public support. Units deployed ill-prepared to
face the challenges of population control and civil security missions which awaited them.

From April 2003 until April 2004 in Iraq, the enemy took full advantage of the protection
of the population to conceal his location and agenda. Mao Zedong describes Phases One and
Two of his theory of counterinsurgency as the period during which resistance forces build up

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4 I assert that it is relatively more likely the Marine Corps will face irregular threats than purely conventional threats in the future – not
that the likelihood of conventional threats is zero.

5 For good or ill, the notable standard of extremely low casualty totals that MW has achieved in the invasions of both Afghanistan and
Iraq has become a “de facto” point of comparison for all subsequent operations in the eyes of the public and U.S. policy makers.
support slowly over time, moving closer to a point where they try to achieve peer status with the occupying force. The initial Iraqi insurgency was largely composed of Iraqi Baathist former regime elements (FRE) who were fighting largely to protest the loss of their pensions and prestige as a result of Ambassador Bremer’s order of 23 May 03. FRE were acting consistently with the early stages of a Maoist insurgency during 2003 and 2004. Marines in those years frequently utilized “capture/kill” tactics against the insurgents, which were the natural outgrowth of an enemy-centric COIN approach. This only exacerbated this problem by stoking revenge feuds among these forces with the death of each additional FRE leader. The FRE insurgents, under pressure from U.S. military operations, looked for a lifeline to maintain their strength and found it in Al Qaeda (AQ), who was by the spring of 2004 trying to gain a foothold in Iraq. AQ formed an alliance with the FRE groups, exploiting the lack of U.S. penetration of the population. Although the Al Qaeda elements had designs on trying to take over Anbar Province and use it to establish the base of a new worldwide Caliphate, they misrepresented their intentions to the local populace as a common struggle against a shared enemy – the military.

With the new alliance between these groups, raids to detain or kill a now larger group of targets further solidified anti-U.S. resentment, and became recruiting material among religious extremists who implored radicalized extremists across the world to come to Anbar to engage in jihad. Amidst this evolving insurgency, opportunistic criminals took advantage of the chaos within society to increase smuggling operations and black market fuel sales as well as a host of other criminal activities. As violence broke out across the country starting in April 2004, U.S. forces did not realize that they faced an “insurgency” of at least three major groups. Each subset of the enemy alliance had its own agenda, resources and grievances. No single action in

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iv Bremer’s “Order Number Two” disbanded the Iraqi Army.

v Multiple conversations between the author and various citizens of Ramadi, Iraq indicate that the first elements of Al Qaeda arrived in Iraq during the first months of 2004.
response, therefore, would suffice to influence all groups simultaneously.

“Capture/kill” tactics might have devastated the portion of the insurgency populated by international terrorists, but those same actions would enrage the FRE core of fighters who watched their new allies fall. The criminals would be largely unaffected by those events and would continue to stage attacks to achieve thefts of money or equipment. If U.S. forces shifted tactics to use information operations (IO) to try to erode support of the population from underneath FRE leaders, the AQIZ elements of the insurgency would highlight these actions as consistent with their narrative of the U.S. attempting to control Iraq and remain in Anbar for 100 years. As before, criminals would be unfazed by U.S. nationalistic IO and continue their lawbreaking. From the perspective of U.S. forces, no action – regardless of how brilliantly executed -- seemed sufficient to stop “the enemy,” causing morale to plummet and faith in U.S. tactics to waver.

U.S. forces faced major difficulties in successfully exploiting these historically predictable seams in the insurgency. Specifically, U.S. forces lacked the language skills to navigate and gain knowledge of Iraqi society. They suffered from a lack of sufficient weaponry for fighting COIN with precision – most notably money to fund work projects and influence vulnerable citizens. Of all the difficulties encountered by Marines, however, the lack of the ability to identify the enemy amongst the native population was by far the most profound.

Did The Marine Corps Apply Maneuver Warfare Principles in Irregular War?

In retrospect, U.S. assumptions for the post-war period were seriously flawed. There was no coherent design for reconstruction – the so-called “Phase IV.” As a result, the existing enemy-focused nature of the invasion translated by default into an enemy-oriented model of COIN as
the insurgency built strength and emerged publicly. Natural U.S. strengths of airborne surveillance, firepower and targeting methodology came to dominate friendly operations, creating a dynamic where the U.S. attempted to “kill its way out of the war” by consistently focusing on “capture/kill” missions against high value enemy targets.

By 2006, the focus on “capture/kill” tactics had created an atmosphere of incredible violence. The operational design of enemy-oriented COIN was poorly matched to the environment, causing widespread destruction which failed to root out the entrenched, invisible enemy and left civilians increasingly desperate. U.S. combatants unaware of the mis-match between tactics and the nature of the battlefield felt they were fighting more of a war by attrition than a war of maneuver.¹⁰ Instead of the MW hallmarks of rapid system collapse and minimal casualties, Marines found themselves in a grinding, bloody effort against an enemy who didn’t seem to weaken despite various alternating, focused U.S. tactics. Without the capability to measure progress by successful governance metrics or host nation security force capability, attrition-style metrics like number of patrols completed, enemy WIA/KIA and 24-hour patrol coverage across the battlespace seemed to be the feedback demanded by higher headquarters.

The tactics and techniques which would later be employed as CP first came to the attention of Marines when they began to enable leaders to detect and measure the disconnect between current tactics and the operational environment. By forcing contact between Iraqi homeowners and civilian shop owners and Marine patrol leaders, CP drove Marines to collect different metrics of tactical successes or failures. Through analysis of social relationships and business dealings between Iraqi citizens – which link analysis⁶ causes to jump off the page – the foundational nature of economics as a primary factor of daily civilian activities emerged.

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⁶“Link analysis” is a critical technique of Combat Policing which identifies social, financial, military or other relationships between members of a society that would otherwise be unobservable to an outsider. It is covered in more detail in subsequent sections.
CP exposed the network-centric nature of the insurgency and helped to add precision to the effort to separate, identify and target its component parts. As increasing specificity enabled Marines to actually template their enemy, a sizable minority of the enemy appeared to Marines as simply common thugs without a robust political agenda. From this analysis of the enemy as populated by thugs and common criminals at the foot soldier level, lines of thought and exploration went out from Marines to civilian police departments in 2004 in-between deployments overseas. This was an outreach that was initially met with skepticism by some leaders who dismissively insisted that military enemies were significantly distinct from common criminals. Despite this criticism, many Marine leaders persisted in the effort. They quickly realized the best way to silence criticism of the military-law enforcement combined approach was to be able to describe the similarities between insurgent and criminal in terms that would be understandable to the typical front-line Marine.

An Examination of Similarities between Counter-Gang Operations and Irregular War

The similarities between gang warfare and IW are striking and were recognized by junior officers and Marines in Iraq as early as 2004. There is some official foundation for these opinions, when one examines how similar some national-level organizations define these two practices. The Department of Defense defines a terrorist organization as:

“a group of individuals that endorse the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological.”

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vii Leaders of the insurgency were often foreign fighters or major FRE figures, but many of the numerically much larger group of foot soldiers were simply individuals trying to make a living in an economically difficult environment.
The Department of Justice defines a gang as:

“...A group or association of three or more persons who may have a common identifying sign, symbol or name and who individually or collectively engage in criminal activity which creates an atmosphere of fear and intimidation.”

Fear and violence are common tools of both terrorists and gang members.

Additionally, the social factors and behaviors that drive individuals to form gangs are similar to the factors and behaviors that drive groups in modern IW to coalesce into multi-nodal factions like those observed under the umbrella of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQIZ). The value in examining warfare through the lens of gangs is that the behavior of civilian police as they execute operations against gangs is almost identical to the challenges that regular military units face as they implement operations against enemies in COIN. Police counter-gang operations provide a model for penetrating an organization that uses the civilian populace to provide cover for their operations. The objective in studying police response to gangs is to arm Marines with techniques for responding to insurgents or terrorists.

In each instance, large organizations face challenges of identifying an enemy who operates in civilian environments, concealing themselves among the population. As Marines struggled with the difficulty of identifying the enemy in Iraq during 2003 and 2004, studies of how detectives in the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) identified gang members years earlier proved informative. During the rise of gangs in Los Angeles years ago, police officers began to realize that red or blue colored bandanas worn on the head or arm marked gang members and their territory. As bandanas became known as indicators to police, gang members
switched to colored shoelaces. As those indicators gained notoriety, gangs moved to more nuanced methods\textsuperscript{viii} of self-identification.\textsuperscript{14}

In Anbar, knowledge of these simple facts keyed Marines to pay attention to civilian styles of dress. Track suits soon emerged as an indicator of enemy presence – in a society where the flowing dishdasha is standard, those who wore sneakers and snug clothing often did so in preparation to flee the scene in the aftermath of an impending attack. Focus on color affiliation also keyed Marines to green flags and clothing as indicators of Shiite aggression.

Over time, in LA, the cat and mouse process of evolving physical identifiers became a low-payoff effort for the police as gang members became more discreet with dress and physical identifiers. Visionary counter-gang officers saw potential for a significant advantage that could be gained by tracking gang members through their social and financial relationships in order to pattern their activities.\textsuperscript{15} In actions that would be copied by the military years later, the LAPD formed the Los Angeles Regional Gang Integration Network (LARGIN), which shares many common characteristics with modern-day military tactical intelligence fusion centers. Through the use of sophisticated software like “Analyst’s Notebook,” LARGIN officials began methodically mapping which apprehended gang members were related to others by family blood, then by criminal conduct, and then geographic areas of operation. This mapping produced the discovery that key individuals were serving as communications hubs between most of the common criminals in a region of Los Angeles. With the knowledge gained from this analysis of the relationship links (later called “link analysis”), officers were able to discern power brokers previously invisible within society and target those brokers in order to affect the system.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{viii} To a new student of gang identification, this may seem counter-intuitive since today very public and visible prison tattoos have come to dominate gang identification methods. Tattoos only became popular as identifiers when police achieved such information dominance with link analysis that there seemed to be no point in trying to conceal individual gang affiliations. The end result is informative: link analysis drove gang members to a position where it was impossible to hide, so instead they began to proudly proclaim loyalties, making the job of police easier.
These effective methods for identifying the enemy were resisted within the Marine Corps, furthering the characterization of the service being slow to adopt opportunities to maneuver on the enemy in IW\textsuperscript{ix}. After observing the capabilities of Analyst’s Notebook at LARGIN in the spring of 2005, several officers in west coast infantry battalions tried to purchase the program within the Marine supply system for use on deployment. Despite the demonstrated power the program had in helping to transform gang operations in LA, Marines outside of high level intelligence headquarters were forbidden from making the purchase.\textsuperscript{17} By 2007, however, as military techniques evolved, Analyst’s Notebook became the Marine Corps’ standard link analysis tool, resident in every infantry battalion intelligence shop. It played a decisive role in helping to drive the exploitation of ‘surge’ manpower to maximum effect. “With a two year head start, surge operations might have been made unnecessary by uniformly more effective infantry battalions throughout 2006.”\textsuperscript{18}

Another key similarity between gangs and the IW enemy derives from the extent to which money drives enemy operations. In a classic military operation, enemy finances do not factor in a major way in the analysis of enemy capabilities.\textsuperscript{x} Instead, capabilities are traditionally measured in terms of battalions, tanks, trucks, artillery, logistical capability and related assets. A study of police responses to gangs, however, provides valuable lessons about the pervasive extent to which money facilitates armed resistance. According to Special Agent Nelson Delgado of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), “Money and power are at the center of the formation of gangs, and drugs provide the revenue.”\textsuperscript{19} Neither gangs nor insurgent

\textsuperscript{ix} Because link analysis was non-standard, institutional resistance to unusual training plans or communications regulations forbidding the purchase of electronics of software without a communications colonel’s approval prevented early adoption of these new techniques. In most circumstances, the resistance was based on a lack of familiarity and ignorance of the most pressing problems facing the infantry (enemy identification) and not a lack of willingness to support the war effort.

\textsuperscript{x} This is particularly true, historically, at the operational and tactical level. In modern war, however, “threat finance” is one of the most important subject matters for infantry forces to be knowledgeable about at the tactical level.
groups have the finance base of a national, sovereign government, so competition for funds is a major consideration in both circumstances.

In Iraq, excessive taxation to fund the insurgency was one of the chief complaints Iraqi citizens had against AQIZ, and which partially accounted for their decision to rebel. Based on police data which indicate many youths join gangs because it is the only way to attain security, military officers in Anbar Province tried to use money to separate ground level operators from the larger insurgency. If a citizen would take $100 to lay an IED so he could provide for his family, the thinking went, he could be lured from the insurgency with the promise of routine work. High level military decision-makers seemed unresponsive from 2004 through 2006 to the use of money as a weapon. Controls were held at too high a level and “day labor” was completely ruled off limits. Visionary officers ended up obtaining funding for “day labor” through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 2006, when that technique took off as a method to drain manpower from an insurgency whose foot soldiers had finally lost their appetite for war and went looking for an alternative way of making a living.

AQIZ never used drugs to finance operations in any detectable amount but they did sell gasoline on the black market, steal oil from national storage facilities and create a shadow government to administer the formal trappings of government. The military, in the future, must be careful not to be too quick to dismiss the reality of terrorist financing as the potential center of gravity of their enemy – a dismissal which often occurs because money is a subject matter outside the traditional realm of study for military officers. All avenues of finance, as well as the infrastructure used to establish governance, exposes the enemy to potential discovery of his methods by forces schooled in police investigative techniques.

"Day labor" refers to a variety of programs eventually approved in Iraq which allowed U.S. civil affairs detachments (and later front line infantry and other units) to pay Iraqis a day’s wages to perform manual labor like clearing rubble from an area. Often a formal civil affairs project would follow, such as the construction of a soccer field or business building on the newly cleared site. Day labor programs allowed Iraqis to support their families while reducing areas IEDs could be concealed for use against U.S. forces, among other things.
To illustrate the importance of mastering this new battlefield, consider the significance of traditional “police” subject matter on the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2005: “There’s no question at all that the Taliban has been increasingly involved both directly and indirectly in narcotics” says Seth Jones, a RAND Corporation analyst. Gretchen Peters, a journalist, conducted an extended examination of drug money and its impact on Taliban operations in her book “Seeds of Terror.” “In 2006, Afghanistan produced the largest illegal narcotics crop a modern nation ever cultivated in a single harvest. Two thirds of it was grown in areas where the Taliban held sway. It was no coincidence that it was also the bloodiest fighting since Mullah Omar’s regime was toppled five years earlier.”

The Taliban had been dependant on AQ for financing...such that instead of referring to AQ as state sponsored terrorists, analysts actually referred to the Taliban as terrorist sponsored government. As AQ came under increasing U.S. pressure and fragmented, the Taliban found itself starved of funds. To achieve financial independence, they turned to drugs. Taliban leaders established an infrastructure and arrangements to encourage farmers to grow poppies, and established a tax system of the production and exportation of heroin. Once a belligerent group completes a transformation to using drugs as a funding source, they develop orders of magnitude more resilience and longevity as an organization. No other funding source provides as much financial profit for the small effort and bulk.

Peters points out that “Terror groups have every incentive to seek financial independence...Out of 128 conflicts studied, the 17 in which insurgents relied heavily on “contraband finances” lasted five times longer than the rest.”

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xii If this seems surprising to any readers, it should not. This use of drugs puts the Taliban in the same company as Jaish Islamiyah in the Philippines as well as many other militant organizations in the past.
As the Taliban’s conversion to a narco-military criminal organization became established, U.S. military leaders seemed to choose to allow the transformation to occur. Just as the military was previously reluctant to engage in financial or commercial arenas of warfare, so too was leadership reluctant to engage on the drug angle...even though it has come to define the strength of the enemy. Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. Secretary of Defense during that period, flatly stated “We don’t do drugs.” It would be difficult to imagine a leader stating “We don’t address enemy tanks” or “We don’t occupy hilltops,” but ignoring drugs in modern IW is just as incredible as ignoring tanks or terrain in RW.

An Examination of the Applicability of Using the Same Techniques in a Military Environment

It is entirely possible to utilize police approaches and techniques to counter the actions of irregular enemies in a military environment. Although civilian police designed the tactics, after-action comments from battalion after battalion cite the viability of CP to function in a military environment. Critics point out police activities are designed to produce prosecutions while military operations are designed to defeat the enemy – a distinction which implies if the military focuses on the process of evidence collection or chain of custody paperwork they will fail at the primary mission of destroying the enemy. This critique is shortsighted, and an examination of how important CP was in the overall response to the IED threat in the last decade illustrates the flaw in the “police versus military” line of argument.

Enemy forces achieved a significant and completely unexpected success with the IED. The U.S. effort to minimize the effectiveness of this devastating weapon was non-existent prior to the invasion of Iraq. It became a crash program executed simultaneous to on-going combat
operations. The counter-IED (CIED) effort began as a hunt for the triggerman, but was of limited utility. Major Timothy Powledge made a typical observation of U.S. infantrymen in 2004 when he noted, “My battalion was attacked by 315 IEDs. In only 4 cases were we ever able to pursue a triggerman. We never killed one.”

As a result of many experiences like this, CIED response evolved away from the initial focus on the triggerman to approach IEDs as a chain of human actions that could be broken. Police and counter-gang tactics were critical to these ends, because they provided a framework to attack networks – the network of IED construction and emplacement. The CP program began as a baseline effort to understand how the insurgency operated, but it evolved into the Marine Corps’ major effort in the rush to counter IEDs. As opposed to other prominent programs that approached the problem from the perspective of equipment, CP demonstrated the weapons could be largely avoided by applying human analysis to the production network and creativity toward operating where and when the weapons were not active.

It is important to evaluate the success of the CIED response because this problem is not going away. 550 IEDs detonate worldwide every month, in dozens of countries. Ralph Morten, the founder of the Combat Policing program, stresses the network-focused nature of the IED problem, stating, “Every part of the IED chain and attack process is human driven. Practicing the human contact elements of Combat Policing minimizes the enemy’s ability to move freely and lessens their ability to conduct surveillance.”

Not only does Combat Policing limit enemy movement in the local theater, but when combined with evidence collection protocols, the program promises to do so far into the future. CP techniques provide original, first-hand intelligence in a war that the enemy chooses to fight

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xiii Early developing military doctrine initially focused on the identification, disruption and killing of IED triggermen as the most effective way to prevent IED strikes. As that technique proved utterly ineffective on any large scale, the transition toward a network-centric view of the IED production and employment “system” began to emerge.
indirectly. Fingerprints on the tape used to construct IEDs, scratches on bullet fragments found by both Marines and surgeons, and iris scans obtained at checkpoints are all elements of intelligence data which can be used to isolate enemies well into the future. Due to the modern rise of non-state actors like AQ, it is likely the enemy tactics utilized in this war will be repeated for decades in a growing number of theaters from where they are observed today. Once fingerprints, iris scans and ballistic information are entered into national databases, the ability of those aggressors to continue attacks is reduced. In March of 2011, two Iraqi refugees in a rural town in southern Kentucky were apprehended by the FBI for activities including the intent to traffic money and weapons back to Iraq. They were identified through fingerprints taken in Kentucky which matched sets taken off of an exploded IED in Anbar Province, Iraq in 2006.32

An Examination of Combat Policing’s Results Where it was Applied

The impact of CP where it has been applied is significant and transformative. It was first used in Iraq. Marines not formally trained in CP independently realized the need to remove the enemy’s anonymity. When presented with CP in the workup for their next deployment, the program helped reduce the anonymity problem through link analysis and network penetration. Then, as the CIED effort became more prominent when IED explosive power increased, Marines realized the problem called for a systematic approach to CIED. CP developed into the network penetration technique used to dismantle the human chain of producers, emplacers and triggermen. The Marine component of U.S. Central Command (MarCent) now requires CP as a training requirement for all infantry battalions deploying to the CentCom theater, stating that CP “enables units to gain new perspective on the behavior of local civilians, develops their ability to pattern neighborhoods, and improves their ability to interact effectively with local
populations. It “contributes to understanding human terrain mapping, capturing local insurgents and defeating the insurgent networks that are aligned with criminal elements.”

Combat Policing, not surprisingly, continued to have effects as the Marines left Iraq in large numbers and surged forces into Afghanistan. Ralph Morten, who travels the theaters of operation where his program is being implemented, went to Afghanistan in the summer of 2011. At Camp Leatherneck, he made liaison with members of the CIED task force, which is an entity separate and distinct from the CP program. Morten asked to review recent “significant acts” and found an incredible sample of complex attacks. He asked what was being done to help counter the obviously experienced local IED networks on a tactical level. The response was telling and illustrates some of the differences between national initiatives like the CIED task force and Morten’s tactical level “concept of operations” for defeating IEDs. The CIED task force member emphatically stated that every effort was being expended, including the use of every available technology fielded at the time. There didn’t seem to be anything else that could be done.

An example of Morten’s alternative approach on that trip provides a stark contrast to the equipment-centric nature of the CIED Task Force model. Morten traveled to Garmsir in Helmand Province during July 2010. As he teaches Marines during the CP pre-deployment training, he routinely reviews intelligence websites and professional journals to keep current on emerging threats. Several months earlier, a British newspaper had published an article detailing Taliban and Al Qaeda training programs run by Iranian Special Forces elements in the Iranian city of Zahedan over the previous months. By this point in the war, the Zahedan-centered Taliban training sites had become well-known. As Morten arrived to participate in a series of patrols with rifle squads from a Marine infantry company, he heard combat orders full of tactics:

- Morten found repeated instances of a wide variety of tactics: multiple IED strikes, command wire detonated IEDs, suicide bomber attacks, victim actuated IEDs, complex attacks with integrated small arms fire, and IEDs designed to defeat magnetic sweeps by engineers on the ground.
- The author intends CP to be viewed as complimentary to the equipment-centric approach, not superior.
traditional details of military operations, like actions expected in case of an ambush, or locations
to meet if a Marine becomes separated from the unit. He did not hear any instructions to watch
for common indications and warnings of the presence of terror cell leaders, IED network assets
or suicide bombers. In an area of the world where last names and dates of birth are not tracked
widely enough to be useful in the same manner they are to U.S. law enforcement officers, the
identifiers of license plate markers and the presence of radio antennas on buildings are more
reliable indicators of enemy activity.

Morten privately questioned the squad leader about watching for these indicators, after
the conclusion of the combat order. The sergeant informed Morten that he “owned the town and
the marketplace” and “there are no license plates on vehicles or antennas on buildings” in such a
remote area of Afghanistan. Within minutes of arriving at the marketplace, Morten observed
both indicators in several locations, in plain view. The squad leader sheepishly indicated, in
retrospect, he had never really paid attention to those indicators. When Morten asked an
interpreter to read several of the license plates, he informed the Americans they marked the
vehicles as being registered in Zahedan and Tehran, Iran.

Relying on skills which seem extraordinary to Marines, but which Morten insists are
instinctive to police in the habit of investigating networks of threats, Morten walked directly into
the nearest shop he could observe which sold phones. After a moment of strangely tense
conversation with the shopkeeper, he peered behind the counter and found a man, at the
shopkeeper’s feet, lying prone in an attempt to hide his presence. Morten took identification
papers from the man, which indicated he was Iranian and lived in Zahedan.

xvi What was missing were details like known license plate data on wanted individuals, or prioritized lists of various communications
equipment like large radio antennas that would be unusual for private citizens to use for entertainment.

xvii Morten’s expectations were not extraordinary or unfair – this data and these techniques had been part of the Combat Policing pre-
deployment training of every Marine infantry battalion since 2006 and had been widely used in Iraq.
At this point, although there was no smoking gun evidence of the sort that is required for U.S. forces to detain suspected criminals today,\textsuperscript{37} Morten was able to illustrate to the squad leader that the IEDs which affect his squad are likely being purchased, assembled, emplaced and surveilled in full view of their daily patrols. The critical missing link which prevented the Marines from detecting this likely enemy activity was simply Morten’s habits of knowing which indicators to look for based on an understanding of the human chain of interactions which characterize criminal activity. This example illustrates well how CP is an integrating function of the existing warfighting functions of intelligence, command and control, maneuver and potentially fires. The Marine Administrative message which announced Combat Policing’s formal certification described it as a program which was “intended to operationalize”\textsuperscript{38} infantry observation and hunting skills. Indeed, using the example of the marketplace squad patrol, no other sentence could describe that unit’s need so starkly.

Recommendations

To maximize the effectiveness of infantry operations in an increasingly resource constrained environment, Combat Policing must be integrated into the infantry training cycle. Unfortunately, that cycle is already crowded – any additions to the IW training cycle compete directly with training that must occur to prepare units for regular war. Although these IW skills are quite likely to be used during real world contingencies in the near future, military professionals cannot simply wish away the possibility of a major conventional war as they design training. “Future warfare must be assumed to encompass both regular and irregular combat.”\textsuperscript{39}

A solution for institutionalizing CP is to add a major training exercise centered on these techniques once every five years into the training cycle of infantry battalions.\textsuperscript{40} This will initially
result in uneven expertise in the subject matter throughout the Marine Corps, in the same manner
that units throughout the 1990s had varying amounts of experience in jungle warfare, desert
warfare, mountain warfare and arctic warfare. Exercises centered on each of those environments
were executed regularly, but it was unlikely that a single infantry battalion conducted all of them
sequentially during a typical Marine’s three-year tour. Instead, a baseline level of experience
built up over time in each subject throughout the service as the cycle executed repeatedly over
years. When real-world events required large portions of the service to engage in desert warfare,
experienced career Marines and key leaders had the requisite knowledge to ensure success. So
will it be in the future with the observation and network defeating skills associated with CP.

Not surprisingly, due to his extensive experience with the CP program, Ralph Morten has
his own views on the highpoints of recommended actions. He stresses “CP should be looked at
as a CONOPS…not just a technique.” Effective observation and analysis of a Marine’s
environment is as basic a skill as can exist in infantry operations. The Marine Corps should stress
the integrating nature of CP into common tactical problems, demonstrating the value of learning
about the components of any threat network that affects Marines in order to defeat that network.
This is a much more practical skill on the modern battlefield than a traditional early military
education of “two up, one back” and other building block data of tactical thought. Morten
stresses leaders “must develop a plan to indoctrinate young personnel early in their careers.
Average Marines need to know as much about key battles like Garmsir, Ramadi or Marjah – and
the techniques there which led to victory -- as they do about Iwo Jima or Belleau Wood.”

Morten is not the only well-known trainer who sees the value of the program. Retired
Australian Army Lieutenant Colonel and current Department of Defense advisor David Kilcullen
recently cited the tactical actions of 2d Bn, 7th Marines in the Zaidon area of Anbar Province as a
model for CP. Leaders in that unit built link analysis diagrams and target background information to such robust levels that when individual targets were confronted with the volume of information known about his activities by Iraqi police forces, many of the enemy targets would “turn” and become informants for the police. This is a major victory for both the CP program and the general methodology of counter-gang tactics applied in military venues.  

Demonstrating concrete steps toward institutionalizing the power of police techniques in war, the Commandant of the Marine Corps recently ordered that separate Law Enforcement (LE) Battalions be created in each active duty Marine Expeditionary Force. They will be activated starting in May 2012. This is excellent…but leaders must make sure the LE battalions do not consolidate decision-making authority on CP policy. CP should be a "conops" throughout all infantry operations. It is a key skill for effective problem framing. It is not a TTP with community-specific authority.

The current wars already provide a telling example of the danger of consolidating a key enabler into a specific community. The Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) community is solely responsible, per theater-level orders, for the disarming and destruction of all IEDs discovered in the battlespace. The requirement, like many others do, began out of positive intent – ensuring that qualified technicians could visually inspect each weapon to watch for any emerging trends in design which could be exploited. Undoubtedly, maintaining that awareness is important, but combat engineer Marines in every infantry battalion also possess the skills to simply detonate IEDs in circumstances where complying with the EOD requirement places infantry Marines at risk. Infantry units are vulnerable when they are anchored to a static location on a dangerous battlefield while low-density EOD assets receive the notification, make
preparations for the mission, and travel to the site of the discovery. While based on a valid initial intent of device examination, the singular requirement that the EOD community destroy all IEDs has created a chokepoint of ‘enabler’ availability that results in significant negative repercussions for mainline units.

Marine Corps leadership must ensure that similar inefficiencies are not created by the active duty Military Police (MP) community consolidating decision-making and “advocacy” authority about CP. MPs may be the correct lead agent for the development of certain equipment and fielding issues, but as a profession they are focused on “training in non-lethal weapons use, anti-terrorism/force protection operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, civil unrest and other security operations.” Infantry Marines are focused externally on the defeat of the enemy. CP is an enemy-oriented skill set which enables infantry proficiency. It must not become the sole purview of the LE battalion command structure.

Conclusions

IW will not go away in the wake of the drawdowns from Iraq and Afghanistan. Although Marines will certainly re-focus our effort on returning to our amphibious roots, IW remains more likely in the coming decade than regular, high-intensity combat engagements.

CP should become an integrating, synchronizing primary skill, much the same way that patrolling is viewed in the infantry community. Units which can patrol with expertise, can also typically ambush, raid and call for fire effectively. Marines who can master CP can also expertly run a company level intelligence cell, adjust operations based on trend analysis and effectively problem frame. In the future, the service will have to fight conflicts across the military spectrum,

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xviii It is not uncommon for infantry units to have to wait for two hours in the vicinity of an undetonated IED discovery. Procedures have improved over time but distances still often remain vast. Enemy forces, observing these patterns, also exploit them by emplacing dummy IEDs intended to catch the attention of the infantry. More powerful and better concealed IEDs in the close vicinity are then detonated on the EOD teams when they arrive in vehicles that are often visually distinctive from the common “gun truck” used by infantry forces.
and the observation, investigation and network attack skills CP develops in Marines will enable them to innovate in the future. If uniformly embraced and integrated into the existing framework of MW, CP offers new perspectives on military problems and develops new methods of penetrating enemy systems that promise to transform future infantry operations on a scale similar to any recent transformational capability, from night vision to precision munitions to the adoption of MW itself.

CP should rise at least one level higher than its current position in the “institutionalized” hierarchy of the Marine Corps training. As an existing MarCent pre-deployment requirement, the program currently receives frequent and high-level exposure to both junior Marines and the Corps’ future leadership. It must now become a routine operational training requirement\(^\text{xix}\) because IEDs and enemies hiding within civilian populations will remain elements of future war. The CP which has evolved to address those threats must also remain. The danger is that if CP is only a MarCent deployment requirement, then when current deployments to the Central Command theater cease, so too will the program and the expanded infantry capabilities it produces.

As we conceive of the battlefield of the future, CP unquestionably has a place. Charles Snyder of the State Department sees “more and more blending of counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence required in our approaches to a more and more integrated threat.”\(^47\) This observation of an increasingly complex enemy and threat environment is widely shared in defense circles. John Schmidt, the original author of the Marine Corps MW doctrine, notes, “As traditional threats of crime and military operations converge, the appropriate response is one of a convergence of police and military tactics.”\(^48\) Special Agent Delgado of the FBI

\(^{47}\) An “operational training requirement” is intended to communicate that CP would be a required component of any progression of peacetime deployment preparation training. This is a much more integrating designation than the program’s current status as merely a “CentCom OIF/OEF pre-deployment training program requirement” as the next few sentences make dear.
illustrates what those converged police/military tactics might look like, stating, “there are two ways to penetrate networks: One is to know the terrain well enough to be able to recognize the patterns of activity which give them their power. Much of this must be done covertly, and technology can be very useful. Or, the only other way is to co-opt a member of that network.” Combat policing gives Marines the ability to penetrate enemy organizations through superior knowledge of the enemy’s terrain and operating patterns, building information superiority that leads to decisive defeat of the enemy if operations escalate to direct confrontation. As the scale of that knowledge and information superiority becomes obvious to the enemy, as the example of 2/7 illustrated, CP also makes the enemy co-option more likely without firing a single shot.
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