After eight years of fighting in Afghanistan, the United States currently finds itself deep in a complex, expanding, and ambiguous counterinsurgency war. The counterinsurgency is vexed by centuries old tribal dynamics, porous borders where insurgent fighters and material cross unchallenged, and a nagging question of the legitimacy of the central government. The United States military must regain and leverage lessons from past counterinsurgency wars to quell the deliberations of discontent among America's political leaders and some of its society. One counterinsurgency case study is the French-Algerian War (1954-1962). A detailed analysis of the French-Algerian War can provide valuable lessons learned on strategic political will, the criticality of external support to insurgents, capacity building for indigenous forces, and the use of torture to gain intelligence, and the power of popular support. An understanding of these lessons can benefit in the conduct and execution of counterinsurgency operations; thus, preparing and educating America's military and political leaders for the current counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan.

Counterinsurgency lessons learned from the French-Algerian War (1954-1962) applied to the current Afghanistan War.

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Executive Summary

Title: Counterinsurgency lessons learned from the French-Algerian War (1954-1962) applied to the current Afghanistan War.

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Thesis: After eight years of fighting in Afghanistan, the United States finds itself deep in a complex, expanding, and ambiguous counterinsurgency war. The counterinsurgency is vexed by centuries old tribal dynamics, porous borders where insurgent fighters and material cross unchallenged, and a nagging question of the legitimacy of the central government. The United States military must leverage lessons from past counterinsurgency wars to quell the deliberations of discontent among America’s political leaders and some of its society. One counterinsurgency case study is the French-Algerian War (1954-1962).

Discussion: From 1954-1962 the French military was embroiled in a counterinsurgency and counterterrorism war in Algeria. On November 1, 1954 (All Saints Day), six months after the fall of Dien Bien Phu, multiple attacks were launched by Muslim Algerians against police stations, communication infrastructure, port warehouses, and military installations. The attacks killed seven and wounded four, these attacks where the beginning of the French-Algerian War. The Front de Liberation Nationale, or FLN were responsible for the attacks. Through indiscriminate terrorist attacks the FLN's objective was to exploit and grow the rife between the pied noirs and the Muslim population of Algeria. The French responded with a strategy of pacification, air, sea, and land interdiction, a counterinsurgency in the rural areas of Algeria, and an urban counterterrorist campaign in the city of Algiers. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the counterinsurgency experience of the French-Algerian War and to expose elements that are relevant to today’s U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.

Conclusion: The French-Algerian War provided valuable lessons on strategic political will, the criticality of external support to insurgents, capacity building for indigenous forces during a counterinsurgency, the negative effects of condoning torture for short-term tactical gains, and the power of popular support. American's military and politicians should evaluate the lessons learned so they can apply the knowledge gained to win the current Afghanistan War.
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DISCLAIMER

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Preface

This thesis would not have been possible without the guidance and assistance of my civilian faculty advisor, Dr. Robert B. Bruce. Dr. Bruce provided the conceptual framework to guide my otherwise unconstrained thoughts, as well as input on *le guerre revolutionnaire*, the French military, interrogation methods, and theory and historical counterinsurgency operations. His sage counsel and humor has made writing this paper an intellectual pleasure. Dr. Bruce has my deepest gratitude and respect for giving me something no one can take away, an education.

To my family, thank you so much for allowing me the time to write this paper. Over the past eight years of long and tough deployments they have never faltered in their unwavering support of my duty to our great nation. They are my rock and foundation in life and I am eternally grateful for their patience and love.
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After eight years of fighting in Afghanistan, the United States currently finds itself deep in a complex, expanding, and ambiguous counterinsurgency war. The counterinsurgency is vexed by centuries old tribal dynamics, porous borders where insurgent fighters and material cross unchallenged, and a nagging question of the legitimacy of the central government. The United States military must regain and leverage lessons from past counterinsurgency wars to quell the deliberations of discontent among America’s political leaders and some of its society. One counterinsurgency case study is the French-Algerian War (1954-1962). A detailed analysis of the French-Algerian War can provide valuable lessons learned on strategic political will, the criticality of external support to insurgents, capacity building for indigenous forces, and the use of torture to gain intelligence, and the power of popular support. An understanding of these lessons can benefit in the conduct and execution of counterinsurgency operations; thus, preparing and educating America’s military and political leaders for the current counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the counterinsurgency experience of the French-Algerian War and to expose elements that are relevant to today’s U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. To accomplish this purpose, the paper will analyze the following: geography, insurgent organizational structure and techniques, French political will, external support, indigenous forces, torture, and popular support.

Background

The Algerian insurgency was rooted in the Setif revolt and its bloody aftermath. After the Setif revolt and its suppression, in 1945, numerous nationalistic groups were formed in Algeria. By 1949, French Intelligence recognized Ben Bella as the most influential and dangerous leader
of a group of revolutionaries calling themselves, Organisation Speciale (OS), which had grown to about 4,500 members.¹ In March 1954, Ben Bella, Ali Mahsas, and Mohamed Boudiaf met in Paris to discuss the creation of a new “third force” and by the end of April formed, the Comite Revolutionnaire d’Unite et d’Action (C.R.U.A.) The “Nine” founders were Hocine Ait Ahmed, Ahmed Ben Bella, Mostefa Ben Bouliad, Larbi Ben M’hidi, Rabah Bitat, Mohamed Boudiaf, Mourad Didouche, Mohamed Khider, and Belkacem Krim, all of whom were dedicated revolutionaries and true believers in Algerian independence.² (Reference Appendix A) In early October, the C.R.U.A. was renamed the *Front de Liberation Nationale* (FLN).

On November 1, 1954 (All Saints Day), six months after the fall of Dien Bien Phu, multiple attacks were launched by Muslim Algerians against police stations, communication infrastructure, port warehouses, and military installations. The attacks killed seven and wounded four and marked the beginning of the French-Algerian War. Attacking on All Saints Day was not a coincidence, the Catholic *pied noirs* would be celebrating, the police force vigilance would be at a minimum, and the date would have maximum propaganda effects. The *Front de Liberation Nationale*, or FLN were responsible for the attacks. Through indiscriminate terrorist attacks the FLNs objective was to exploit and expand the rift between the *pied noirs*³ and the Muslim populace. From 1954-1955 the tension between the Muslim populace and the *pied noirs* escalated to the boiling point and spilled over into the volatile political arena, both sides demanded action from their leadership.

In June of 1956, under pressure from the *pied noirs* public, Governor-General Robert Lacoste refused clemency for two members of the FLN, Zabane and Ferradj, who committed murder and were imprisoned in the Barberousse prison. They were sent to the guillotine and executed. In response to the executions of FLN terrorist, Ramdane Abane, ordered immediate reprisals,
demanding that for every FLN member executed, a hundred French would be killed indiscriminately. Yacef Saadi was ordered to “kill any European between the ages of eighteen and forty-four, but no women, children, or old people.” From 21-24 June 1956, Yacef’s squads indiscriminately killed forty-nine civilians. The FLN conducted random acts of terrorism in the Casbah section of the city of Algiers. In retaliation, a suspected FLN safe house was blown up by the pied-noir’s counterterrorist group. Three houses in the vicinity were destroyed in the blast, killing seventy Muslims, including women and children. The FLN leadership ordered Ben M’hidi, the appointed leader of the Algiers Autonomous Zone- Z.A.A, and his key operative, Saadi Yacef, to prepare for a major offensive in Algiers. Possessing intimate knowledge of the Casbah’s urban and human terrain, Yacef began building secret passages, hidden walls, and recruiting operatives in the underground of the Cashbah. This was a critical strength of the FLN, knowledge of the terrain and the ability to utilize terrain to reduce the capabilities of the more technologically advanced French Army. In Modern Warfare, Colonel Roger Trinquier, who was General Massu’s intelligence office during the Battle of Algiers, wrote specifically to this point.

“He (insurgent/guerrilla) chooses the terrain and imposes it upon us. It is usually inaccessible to heavy and quick-moving equipment, and thus deprives us of the benefit of our modern arms. We are forced to fight on foot, under conditions identical to those of the guerrilla. On his terrain, which he knows perfectly, he is able to trap us easily in ambushes or, in case of danger, to disappear.”

By late 1956, he had organized approximately 1,400 operators; some were young, European-looking Muslim women. Young and impressionable were the two key traits Yacef targeted in women. Utilizing their European appearance and disguising them as pied noir girls, they would gain access to targets a male operative could not. Motivating the young women with horror stories of murdered Muslim children in the Rue de Thebes building bombing, the women carried out the bombings with extreme prejudice.
The initial FLN bombings struck at the critical vulnerability of the pied noirs, its women and children. The FLN target list included a Milk Bar, popular with pied-noirs returning from a day at the beach, a popular cafeteria on the smart Rue Michelet, a popular spot with pied-noirs students, and an Air France terminal. The bombs were set to explode in one minute intervals; the explosion in the Milk Bar had the most destructive effect, both physically and psychologically. The Milk Bar had glass covered walls which splintered in the explosion creating a secondary fragmentation source. The effect of the bombings were three killed, fifty injured, including a dozen traumatic amputations; many of them children. The bomb emplaced at the Air France terminal failed to explode due to a faulty timer.

The FLN, through Yacef’s bombing operations, crippled the city of Algiers. Schools closed throughout the month of October 1956, Europeans became increasingly paranoid of random attacks. Pressing their tactical/psychological advantage, Ben M’hidi and Yacef decided to assassinate a prominent pied noir leader, compounding and expanding the rift between European and Muslim. Their target was the “ultra” Mayor of Boufarik and President of the Federation of Mayors of Algeria, Amedee Froger. On December 28, 1956, Ali la Point, a young Casbah pimp and key terrorist working for Yacef Saadi, executed the assassination of Froger with three rounds at point blank range. The assassinations, bombings and subsequent string of assassinations were the critical decision point for Lacoste in requesting the assistance of General Salan.

Similar to the beginnings of Algeria, Afghanistan’s history is a two thousand year odyssey of brutal wars and tragedy. Afghanistan’s historic trade routes have attracted many great powers throughout history, Alexander the Great in 330 B.C, the Islamic conquest in 652 AD, and Genghis Khan in 1221 AD. All the aforementioned armies were numerically and technically superior to the indigenous forces of Afghanistan yet all failed to subjugate the Afghan people.
During the nineteenth century, the British Empire fought three brutal wars in Afghanistan in an effort to counter Russian influence in the region. The first Anglo-Afghan War, from 1839 to 1842, ended in a devastating British defeat. As the British Army departed, the Afghan fighters systematically reduced the British force of 16,000 to just one British soldier. The sole survivor, William Brydon, recalled “this was a terrible march, the fire of the enemy incessant, and numbers of officers and men, not knowing where they were going from snow-blindness, were cut up.”

The British invaded Afghanistan in 1878, to begin the Second Anglo-Afghan War and again in 1919 beginning the third and last Anglo-Afghan War. Both wars were plagued by diseases, extreme weather conditions, and an intense domestic opposition. By the end of 1919 the British signed the Treaty of Rawalpindi recognizing Afghanistan’s independence. Rising from the eighty years of war with the British Army the Pashtuns gained power and “founded a dynasty that would rule Afghanistan for nearly five decades, from 1929 to 1978.”

The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December of 1979 and suffered the same fierce resistance from the Afghan populace, as all other invading armies had throughout history. The massive Soviet military was never able to clear and hold territory. From a counterinsurgency perspective the Soviets were never able to gain the support of the Afghan populace. In 1984 the CIA assessed the Soviet’s position as “had little success in reducing the insurgency or winning acceptance by the Afghan people, and the Afghan resistance continues to grow stronger.” The Soviets withdrew in February of 1989, leaving Afghanistan in ruins. The ten years of war had left an estimated one million Afghans killed, approximately three million internally displaced, and more than five million Afghans fled their homeland into neighboring countries.

In February 1989 the Soviet military withdrew from Afghanistan. Soon after the Soviet backed Afghan government failed and Afghanistan was thrown into a civil war. Through the
early to mid 1990’s Afghanistan was controlled by various warlords. In April 1996, Mullah Muhammad Omar, leader of the Taliban, self-appointed himself as Commander of the Faithful; therefore, gained some support from the Afghan populace and from Al Qaeda. Osama Bin Laden, leader of Al Qaeda, supported the Taliban regime with money, training and radical ideology. Based in Afghanistan, Ben Laden began the planning and coordination of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. “Afghanistan became the nexus for the Taliban’s radical Deobandism and Al Qaeda’s global jihad.”

Geography

Algeria is over 900,000 square miles in area, approximately four times the size of France. From the agriculturally based coastal plain, south to the Atlas Mountains, and beyond the mountains, lays the desolate, uninhabitable Sahara Desert. (Reference Figure A1) The Algerian plain was of keen interest to the French government as a source for the agriculture products it imported. Due to the agricultural industry and aggressive nomadic Berbers of the Atlas Mountains, ninety percent of the population resided along the coastal plains of Algeria. In 1954 the infrastructure in Algeria was predominately along the coastline and extended inland for 100-200 miles. The Atlas Mountain range restricted the lines of communications/support to the interior. The insurgent forces thus maintained an advantage in the interior of Algeria and exploited the mountains for food, recruits, and encampments for training. The border regions with Morocco and Tunisia were key terrain in that they provided safe havens for the insurgent fighters to refit, rearm, and recuperate. The knowledge and use of terrain by an insurgent force is echoed by Roger Trinquier in his book Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, COL Trinquier states “the guerrilla’s greatest advantages are his perfect
knowledge of an area (which he himself has chosen) and its potential, and the support given him by the inhabitants." 17

In Afghanistan, the Taliban/Al-Qaeda fighters use the terrain as a combat multiplier against any counterinsurgent force. The Taliban have lived in this area for centuries and fought the Soviets for ten years on the same terrain they now fight the U.S. and its coalition partners. The Taliban have a deep operational and tactical knowledge of the terrain, both topographically and human. The Afghan people are tribal and tied to the land which they have an unbreakable love and respect for, that has for generations been past down from father to son. The largest ethnic group in Afghanistan is the Pashtuns, the Taliban are predominately Pashtun’s tribesmen. They live by their tribal culture and laws- Pashtunwali, “a strong set of traditions that are meant to maintain and repair relationships between families, tribes, and clans through extension of blood relations (intermarriages) and a systematic way of resolving disputes between these groups.” 18

An understanding of the insurgent’s culture is a long-term strategic lesson learned from the French-Algerian War. By examining the insurgent’s culture, a counterinsurgent force can better understand his ideology, motivation, and narrative. Such an understanding will allow the counterinsurgent to build an accurate picture of the insurgent and enable him to identify the following:

- Root cause or causes of the insurgency
- Extent to which the insurgency enjoys internal and external support
- Basis on which insurgents appeal to the target population
- Insurgent’s motivation and depth of commitment
- Likely insurgent weapons and tactics
- Operational environment in which insurgents seek to initiate and develop their campaign and strategy 19
Insurgent Organizational Structure and Techniques

The FLN, Al-Qaeda, and the Taliban are very similar in organizational structure; all are based on Mao Zedong’s classic guerrilla organizational model of an independent guerrilla division.\(^\text{20}\) The FLN divided Algeria into six operational theaters, wilayas, each theater was subdivided into four or five zones, mintaka, each zone into five regions, nahia, each region into four or five sectors, khazma, and finally each sector into communes, or douar.\(^\text{21}\) (Reference Figure B1) The City of Algiers was its own zone in which the FLN anchored its urban terrorism operations. At the strategic level, the FLN wilaya’s commanders made up a war council which directed and coordinated the entire war effort, including logistics and propaganda. Zones at the operational and tactical levels were commanded by a four member council, comprised of a political-military leader, a political assistant, a military assistant, and an assistant for external liaison and intelligence.\(^\text{22}\) The communes were nebulous and paranoidal cellular in design, so that members of one cell did not know the members of any other cell.

The FLN commanders implemented a number of committees, staffed by their intellectuals, to assist the commanders with external liaison and intelligence. In Modern Warfare, COL Trinquier outlines the following FLN committees:

- Liaison Committee – maintained communications with the wilayas commanders, with the Committee for External Coordination (became the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic), and with external support apparatus in Tunisia, Morocco, and France.
- Information Committee – became the special services
- Editorial Committee – United Nations (UN) liaison element, maintained dossiers on UN members and persons of interest, propaganda and information operations for the FLN.
- Justice Committee – general surveillance of French citizens of Muslim origin; judged cases between Muslims in civil and criminal law; imposed various fines.
- Financial Committee – gathered funds from the population at large, using units of the FLN, and in larger amounts from big companies, banks, leading merchants, etc.
- Health Committee – almost non-existent in Algeria. The wounded and sick insurgents where cared for in secret hospitals in the cities.
- Trade Union Committee – maintained permanent contact with various syndical organizations.\(^\text{23}\)
In contrast to the nationalist inspired insurgency of the FLN, Afghanistan’s insurgency is based on religious ideology; it operates under the overarching influence of Al-Qaeda’s unwavering belief in the sect of Islam called Wahhabism and the Taliban’s enforcement of the ultra strict Sharia. The strategic inner circle of Osama Bin Laden comprises the Shura/Advisory Council; this council advises Bin Laden on internal and external affairs and directs the overall strategy of Al-Qaeda’s operations. (Reference Figure C1)

- **Sharia/Political Committee** - Responsible for issuing fatwas.
- **Military Committee** - Responsible for conceiving and planning operations, as well as managing training camps and coordinating with Taliban commanders.
- **Finance Committee** - Responsible for fund-raising, and the concealment of assets.
- **Foreign Purchases Committee** - Responsible for the acquisition of foreign weapons and supplies.
- **Security Committee** - Physical protection, intelligence, and counter-intelligence.
- **Information Committee** - In charge of propaganda.

The Taliban organizational structure varies between provinces, but generally follows a generic pattern of a rural based clandestine network structure. It incorporates a standing, full-time guerrilla force that move from valley to valley to fight and a part-time network of Taliban friendly villages that support the full-time fighters. Afghans account for the bulk of the insurgent fighters and are directed by senior Taliban leaders, mostly Afghans, based in Pakistan. By establishing “shadow governments” at varying levels, they influence the populace through subversive means. General Stanley McCrystal’s Commanders Assessment addresses the foreign fighters and the main Taliban elements operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan;

“They are aided by foreign fighters, elements of some intelligence agencies, and international funding, resources, and training. Foreign fighters provide materiel, expertise, and ideological commitment. The major insurgent groups in order of their threat to the mission are: the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), the Haqqani Network (HQN), and the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HiG).”24
These Afghan insurgent groups coordinate their activities loosely with some operations achieving significant unity of purpose and even some unity of effort. They do not have a formal command-and-control structure, or a single overarching strategy or campaign plan. In following Mao's design, the individual group has a specific strategy, develops annual plans, and allocates resources accordingly by committee input to the operational commander. "Each group has its own methods of developing and executing these plans and each has adapted over time."\textsuperscript{25} 

The Taliban maintain the insurgency's initiative through their constant supply of new recruits, foreign and home grown fighters. "In districts close to the Pakistan border, young men graduating from Pakistani madrassas also swarm across the frontier to join the full-time force when it engages in major combat – as happened during the September 2006 fighting in Kandahar Province, and again in the 2007 and 2008 fighting seasons."\textsuperscript{26} 

In David Galula's \textit{Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice}, Galula writes about the two patterns of insurgent doctrine; Orthodox (Communist) and the Bourgeois-Nationalist Pattern.\textsuperscript{27}

\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
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\textbf{Orthodox Pattern Steps} & \textbf{Bourgeois-Nationalist Pattern Steps} \\
\hline
1. Creation of a Party & 1. Blind Terrorism \\
2. United Front & 2. Selective Terrorism \\
3. Guerrilla Warfare & \\
4. Movement Warfare & \\
5. Annihilation Campaign & \\
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The Orthodox Pattern is steeped in Mao Zedong teachings, where the end state is, after the revolution; a complete Communist state is established. This pattern also takes an exorbitant
amount of time, patience, and organizational skills. “The insurgent leaders in Algeria were in a hurry; they chose another pattern already tried to a certain extent in Morocco, which constitutes in essence a shortcut and is better adapted to the Arab mind and temper.” The goal of the Bourgeois-Nationalist Pattern is “generally limited to the seizure of power”. This seizure of power is conducted by a nebula, small, but dedicated group of insurgents backed by a limited organization. The FLN, at its core, has nine ideological organizers backing tribal groups in the interior and small, hyper-violent terrorist cells in the urban centers of Algeria.

Galula argues, “The purpose of blind terrorism is designed to get publicity for the movement and its cause by focusing attention on it, to attract latent supporters.” The vehicles for the publicity is random bombings, assassination, arson, and other spectacular attacks all conducted in a concentrated, synchronized frequency to keep the populace in a state of confusion and fear. According to Mohamed Boudiaf, “no more than 400-500 Algerian nationalist took part in the terrorist actions on D-Day” (All Saints Day). During the Battle of Algiers, Ben M’hidi, Yacef Saadi, and Ali la Pointe coordinated the Comite de Coordination et d’Execution (CCE) with an estimated 1400 terrorist/informants/operators, ranging from women, to pimps, to common street thugs. This relatively small group conducted deadly operations in the Casbah for over a year before being infiltrated and crushed by the French Service Action and the French Paras.

The second step in the Bourgeois-Nationalist Pattern is Selective Terrorism. Its overarching purpose is to “isolate the counterinsurgent from the masses, to involve the population in the struggle, and to obtain as a minimum its passive complicity.” For the insurgent it is a control mechanism on the population, “the battle for silence.” Galula explains that this is accomplished by killing low-ranking government officials who work close in with the population; policemen, mayors, and teachers, bombing French schoolchildren to elicit reprisals against Muslims, and
enforcing strict observances of the Islamic rites. Many examples of this exist in the French-Algerian War; individual attacks on *pied noirs* and Europeans throughout the war, but the salient examples are the assassination of the Mayor of Boufarik and President of the Federation of Mayors of Algeria, Amedee Froger, and the attempted assassination of General Salan. While General Salan was not harmed in the attack, a major on his staff was killed and Salan's ten year old daughter was injured in the attack.\(^{35}\)

The Taliban in Afghanistan use selective terrorism in the exact style as the FLN to win the battle of silence. Acid attacks against young girls traveling to school, murdering school teachers, suicide bombings against the populace, and burning of new construction projects funded by NATO/ISAF are prime examples of this pattern. In August of 2009, General McChrystal released his NATO International Security Assistance Force Commander’s Assessment; the following excerpt speaks directly to the selective terrorism the Taliban are conducting on the Afghan population.

"The insurgents wage a silent war of fear, intimidation, and persuasion throughout the year—not just during the warmer weather fighting season—to gain control over the population. These efforts make possible, in many places, a Taliban "shadow government" that actively seeks to control the population and displace the national government and traditional power structures."\(^{36}\)

In one operation during March of 2010, the Taliban conducted a series of selective terrorism bombings in Kandahar, including two car bombs, six suicide attackers on motorbikes and bicycles, and homemade bombs, killing 35 Afghans. The Taliban insurgents targeted the city's prison, police headquarters, a wedding hall next door and other areas on roads leading to the prison. The insurgent's military objective was to free imprisoned Taliban fighters from the city's central prison, while failing in their tactical objective they succeeded in demonstrating the
GlRoA’s inability to provide security to the population of Kandahar. After the bombings a Taliban spokesman said, "With all the preparations they have taken, still they are not able to stop us." This is the essence of insurgents using terror as a tactic in an insurgency, by using terror as a tactic, the insurgents influence popular support of the government, negative recruitment of government forces and positive recruitment of more insurgents, and gain international jihadist support from Islamic-centric savvy information operations. General McChrystal spoke directly to this tactic in his *Commander’s Assessment*:

"Insurgent military operations attract more attention than this silent war but are only a supporting effort. Violent attacks are designed to weaken the government by demonstrating its inability to provide security, to fuel recruiting and financing efforts, to provoke reactions from ISAF that further alienate the population, and also to undermine public and political support for the ISAF mission in coalition capitals." 

Galula brings forth an interesting and critical aspect of the Bourgeois-Nationalist Pattern that is applicable to both the French-Algerian War and the current Afghanistan War. Galula writes in the Selective Terrorism step that the insurgent must "destroy all bridges linking the population with the counterinsurgent and his potential allies." This thought process can be applied to the actions of the Taliban/Al-Qaeda cells operating in Kabul. The Taliban/Al-Qaeda cells frequently target small NATO/ISAF member Nations, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and the local population in and around Kabul. Such attacks carry a strategic, operational and tactical dynamic effect; at the tactical level the attacks widen the distance between the population and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GlRoA). At the operational level, the attacks targeting the ANSF not only attrite these small forces but also hamper recruiting efforts. There are many examples of how these attacks affect the war strategically. The first and most important, tactically and strategically, is the continually growing rift between the population and the GlRoA and her allies. The Taliban attack the population in an attempt to impose its will on
the population and to send the message that the GIRoA cannot protect you, only the Taliban can provide this protection. Galula postulates that "by threatening the population, the insurgent gives the population the excuse, if not a reason, to refrain from cooperating with the counterinsurgent." This is the cornerstone of population-centric counterinsurgency and the bedrock foundation of American counterinsurgency policy in Afghanistan.

Influence of Political Will

In the decade after World War II, the perfect insurgency storm was being created. Communism was on the rise through the influence of Mao Zedong’s writings and teachings. Revolutionary nationalistic movements in historical colonies were gaining international attention and the popular support base for the colonial empires was waning. The French military, specifically the French Army, "lingered a nagging complex about its inferior role alongside the vast British and American war machines perforce imposed upon it by 1940." The humiliating defeat at the hands of the Germans and the subsequent German occupation of France played a significant part in the “mind set” of the French military commanders/soldiers, post WWII. Colonialism versus Nationalism was the catalyst that started the underground nationalism movement which led to the French Indochina and the French-Algerian Wars. One is required to study the French-Indochina War to understand the mentality and actions of the French Army commanders and soldiers during the French-Algerian War.

To add to this psychological inferiority complex is the view of the political leaders and French civilians from the vantage point of the French professional military officer/NCOs who served in Indo-China and Algeria. Disillusioned, dissatisfied, and disgusted with the "conduct of the civilian ruling groups, the experience of defeat in colonial wars, psychological alienation and
the very vitiation of forceful democracy in France," led to the French Army’s intervention into politics. No longer did the French military commanders view the government as France, but where concluding in their minds that the French Army equaled France. The French Army envisioned itself as fighting a war, sanctioned by the French government, for a democracy that was intentionally thwarting its efforts through indecision, ignorance, and duplicity. “The government had given orders to fight these wars, and presumably to win them; what the government had not furnished were the means or the compatible political direction.” This bitterness, born of the sweat, blood and tears of the French Indochina and Algerian Wars, spawned the term la guerre revolutionnaire.

La guerre revolutionnaire (revolutionary war) is a term used to draw “coincidences of design and strategy between Indochina and Algeria.” It postulated that if the counterinsurgent used insurgent tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) he could influence the insurgents decision cycle and frustrate his strategy. This philosophy became a badge of honor, a call to duty, to the professional French soldier; it encouraged and rewarded result-oriented leadership and resourcefulness at the lowest levels.

After analysis, the French Indochina War solidified the French doctrine of la guerre revolutionnaire, and the tactics, techniques, and procedures’ employed during the French Algerian War. The despondent and disenfranchised feelings of the French military establishment galvanized their beliefs in la guerre revolutionnaire and enraged them with the French political culture. As historian Alf Heggy argued: “Their army, they felt, had been defeated in Indochina because the civilian leaders in Paris had stabbed it in the back. French military honor required a success to vindicate the earlier failure.” Throughout history, there are two words that spawn strong beliefs in which a professional army is built upon and inspire men to accomplish
unbelievable objectives; honor and loyalty. The French Army believed that its honor was committed to the preservation of French Algeria and its loyalty to the European settlers and to the Muslim soldiers who fought with them in Indochina. French Algeria was sentimentally interwoven with the French Army’s history and became a substitute for the French Government. The French military commanders refused to allow another defeat because of weak political will, the professional soldiers would ensure a victory at all costs. The professional French Army felt that they had lost their honor; they saw the war in Algeria as a means to regain its honor and prove their loyalty to the French people of Algeria.

The RAND Corporation conducted an analysis of all insurgencies since 1945 that showed that “successful counterinsurgency campaigns last for an average of 14 years and unsuccessful ones last for an average of 11 years and approximately 25 percent of insurgencies were won by the government and 11 percent were won by insurgents that lasted more than 20 years.”46 Overlaying the aforementioned statistical evidence onto the present geo-political landscape in Afghanistan reminds us that American politicians and the American public cannot lose their will as the French did during the French-Algerian War. Even if waged correctly from the beginning, counterinsurgencies require time, treasure, and blood to win. The alternative of a nation losing its will in warfare is even more traumatic to its military and populace, as there is no prosthetic for an amputated spirit.

External Support

The ability of an insurgent group to gain external support has a direct influence on its success or failure. The French-Algerian War is a perfect case study of the influence of external support and how cutting off that source can severely affect an insurgency. The FLN received valuable
support from its neighboring Arab countries in the form of military material, funds, and political support and refuge. “In 1958 Arab League contributions to the FLN totaled around twelve billion French Francs, 75 percent of which came from the United Arab Republic (Egypt).”

In 1956, after gaining independence from France, both Tunisia and Morocco provided aid to the FLN and granted them sanctuary. The FLN utilized these neighboring countries as supply distribution centers, sanctuaries to rearm, refit and recruit, and training bases. Early in 1957 the French decided to isolate Algeria from external influence by building a 200-mile-long barrier along the Algerian-Tunisian border, the Morice Line. The French would also later erect a similar border fence on the Algerian-Morocco border. (Reference Figure E1) Named after the French Minister of Defense, the Morice Line consisted of a high-voltage electrified fence equipped with a master control board that could indicate, within a few meters, any cut in the fence line. The fence was protected by an integral system of barbed wire fences, anti-personnel mine fields, blockhouse gun emplacements, flood lights to illuminate the fence and blind approaching raiders, and radar sets to detect movement beyond the floodlights. The Morice Line coupled with an aggressive air-mobile interdiction force was so successful that by 1960, “the insurgents had no more than 5,000 members, no firm area from which to conduct and plan offensive attacks, and no real objective beyond survival.”

In concert with the physical barriers, the French military aggressively controlled the air and coastal battle space of Algeria. The most ingenious example of air interdiction by the French Air Force was the interception and force landing, in Algerian territory, on 22 October 1956 of a plane carrying Ben Bella and other important members of the External Delegation en route to Tunis from Rabat. All were subsequently imprisoned in France for the duration of the war and forced the FLN to reorganize their external leadership.
The French maritime interdiction operations were also successful in preventing the delivery of weapons, ammunition, and military aid to the FLN in Algeria. The two most salient examples were the seizure of the cargo freighters *Athos* and *Lydice* in 1956 and 1959. The *Athos* carried over 70 tons and the *Lydice* over 581 tons of weapons and ammunition through measures such as these, the French military succeeded in neutralizing external military support to FLN insurgents inside Algeria. By the end of 1958, most of the FLN insurgent formations had regressed "into small-scale terrorist attacks, sabotage, or occasional raids on isolated French outposts."\(^{50}\)

In *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, Seth Jones points to two forms of external support; foreign governments, or international networks providing direct assistance in training, operations, money, arms, logistics, diplomatic backing, and other types of aid, and the freedom to use foreign territory as a sanctuary.\(^{51}\) With the above examples in mind, it is clear that a critical lesson to be learned from the French-Algerian War is to secure and control borders in order to prevent external support to an insurgent force. Afghanistan's porous borders are the Achilles heel of the U.S./ISAF/NATO forces and the Taliban's greatest advantage. In the last 10 years, Pakistan's government and specifically the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), has supported the Taliban with intelligence, military material, and medical support. Afghanistan and Pakistan share a 1,160-mile border; Pakistani leaders have historically viewed the ability to influence Afghanistan as critical for strategic depth to balance the Indian Government's close relationship with the Afghan Government. In his Commander's Assessment, General McCrystal wrote: "While Indian activities largely benefit the Afghan people, increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan or India."\(^{52}\) The Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Balochistan Province in Pakistan provide the Taliban with a sanctuary to rest, rearm, and refit their forces.
Every successful insurgency in Afghanistan since 1979 enjoyed a sanctuary in Pakistan and assistance from individuals within the Pakistan government, such as the Frontier Corps and the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI). Every successful counterinsurgency is earmarked by the prevention of external support to the insurgent forces and secured borders. Afghanistan’s government, with help from the U.S. and coalition forces, must address the control of the Pakistan border region and its support to the Taliban.

Indigenous Forces

The French Army had been using foreign troops since 1807 and North Africans since 1840. The French military in Algeria was supplemented by harkis, Algerian Muslims, self-defense forces, and Algerian reservists of European descent. During the French-Algerian War over 180,000 Algerian Muslims would serve in regular and auxiliary units under the French flag. These loyal harkis knew the Algerian terrain, provided low-level intelligence from the local populace and assisted with gaining local populace support. In the current counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan, U.S and ISAF forces are leveraging indigenous forces in kinetic operations, intelligence gathering, civil affairs, and border security.

In Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, Seth Jones enumerates four points on the importance of indigenous forces in a counterinsurgency war.

• U.S. forces are unlikely to remain for the duration of any counterinsurgency effort, at least as a major combatant force

• indigenous forces usually know the population and terrain better than external actors and are better able to gather intelligence

• a lead U.S. role may be interpreted by the population as an occupation, eliciting nationalist reactions that impede success
• a lead indigenous role can provide a focus for national aspirations and show the population that they—and not foreign forces—control their destiny

General McChrystal echoed this philosophy in his *Commander’s Assessment* “ISAF will become radically more integrated and partnered with the ANSF to enable a more rapid expansion of their capacity and responsibility for security.”

Currently, there are two initiatives shaping the indigenous forces framework in Afghanistan; Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3), and the Local Defense Initiative (LDI). The Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) is designed to create village-level indigenous security in partnership with GIRoA and local shuras. While still in its infancy, the Local Defense Initiative (LDI) is a program of arming and training local militias to defend their villages from insurgents. Very similar to the French military employing, *harkas*, in rural Algeria, the Afghan “*arbaki*” would be utilized by ISAF forces in rural Afghanistan to protect the local populace against Taliban attacks, thus; relieving ISAF and ANSF forces to concentrate on kinetic operations and to secure more villages from Taliban attacks and activities.

**Popular Support**

Out of the numerous lessons learned from the French-Algerian War, the most apropos is the lesson of the power of popular support. As Mao Zedong wrote and taught his insurgent leaders, “The richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people.”

Popular support is a common goal for both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent. Both winning support and preventing insurgents from gaining support are critical components of any counterinsurgency. For an insurgent, popular support equates to critical assistance in obtaining money, logistics, recruits, intelligence, medical, and other aid directly from the local population. The French military implemented the technique of *quadrillage*; to engage and map the population, gather
intelligence on insurgent activities, rapidly engage and destroy insurgent cells/formations, and to protect the population from insurgent attacks.

*Quadrillage*, or grid was the primary military tactic employed by the French military in Algeria during 1956-57. The tactic consisted of two elements; emplacing static forces in all major cities, towns, and villages to man defensive strong points and to gather intelligence on the rebel forces in that area, and to map, track and engage the population with the *Sections Administratives Specialisees*57. The second element consisted of mobile reserves, with the mission of inserting quickly into an area to reinforce the static troops or operating independently to engage enemy rebel formations or sanctuaries. Requiring a massive amount of troops, *quadrillage* employed up to 400,000 French soldiers by the end of 1957. Ninety percent of the French forces enforced the *quadrillage* system from their defensive, static positions. “The lion’s share of the most dangerous assignments, the offensive operations, was carried out by 30,000 to 40,000 highly mobile and aggressive intervention troops, drawn from the 10th and 25th Paratroop Divisions, the 11th Division, and smaller detachments of naval and air commando units.”58

Incorporating both military and non-military techniques the *quadrillage* was used in urban and rural areas. In urban terrain, a grid system was established and an indigenous civil structure was given the responsibility of controlling, through appointed subordinates, all people in the grid. Military units, the SAS and local police took a census, established identities, issued census certificates and conducted check points to stem the flow of rebel supplies leaving the cities. In rural areas, the French military conscripted an indigenous self-defense force, *harkas*, to assist in the protection of the population and to relieve French forces in pursuit operations into the interior mountains.
The quadrillage system had been used in Indochina, with mixed results. Static and defensive in design it offered limited, quick offensive capabilities in mountainous, jungle terrain. It obtained better results in Algeria, mainly due to the freedom of maneuver the terrain offered in Algeria over the jungle terrain of Indochina. The French military honed their assault and support tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) in the Indochina War and were able to apply the TTPs in Algeria.

While no system like quadrillage exists in Afghanistan, the U.S. and ISAF version is an array of counterinsurgency techniques focused on gaining the popular support of the Afghan people, using a by, with and through approach. Under the strategic umbrella and anchored in the Galula inspired "population-centric counterinsurgency," the U.S. and ISAF have implemented the Local Defense Initiative (LDI), Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3), and Tribal Engagement by U.S. Special Force's ODAs. By building the indigenous forces to a legitimate and professional status, these programs and initiatives are at the core of gaining the popular support of the Afghan people. In General McChrystal's Commanders Assessment, he outlines six new tenants in his "New Operational Culture" aimed at refocusing ISAF forces to gain and retain the support of the Afghan populace. The new tenants are: improve understanding of the Afghan people and culture, build relationships, project confidence, decentralize C2 to remove excessive bureaucracy, re-integration and reconciliation of turned enemy fighters, and increase economic support to counterinsurgency funding programs. The end state of the new operational culture is found in the assessment:

"ISAF, with the ANSF, must shift its approach to bring security and normalcy to the people and shield them from insurgent violence, corruption and coercion, ultimately enabling GIROA to gain the trust and confidence of the people while reducing the influence of insurgents. Hard-earned credibility and face-to-face relationships, rather than close combat, will achieve success."

22
Conclusion

There is no cookie cutter approach to counterinsurgency; each counterinsurgency must be custom-made to fit the specific strategic, operational and tactical situation. By analyzing past counterinsurgency lessons learned, current leaders can burn off the Clausewitzian "fog of war" and win the Afghan counterinsurgency war with a broad foundation of varying counterinsurgent theories that addresses all insurgent activity. It is critically important to look back at successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgencies to avoid the "generalization" pitfall. Currently it is chic to damn the French, in America, for their use of draconian tactics during their counterinsurgency war. Many revisionist historians lose sight that it was neglect of a strategic information operations and the loss of political will that ultimately lost the Algerian War, not the single tactic of a counterinsurgency campaign waged brilliantly by the French military. Many historians, political figures and military leaders have ardently embraced the population-centric theory of counterinsurgency as the only viable counterinsurgency option in Afghanistan; therefore descending into the "generalization" pitfall.

The French-Algerian War provided valuable lessons on strategic political will, the criticality of external support to insurgents, capacity building for indigenous forces during a counterinsurgency, the negative effects of condoning torture for short-term tactical gains, and the power of popular support. American's military and politicians should evaluate the lessons learned so they can apply the knowledge gained to win the current Afghanistan War.
Notes

1 As the old generation of nationalist faded into the shadows, a new generation of “nationalist” pick up the call and moved forward with knowledge of warfare and a thirst for Marxist and Mao’s revolutionary philosophy. Ahmed Ben Bella had been a soldier in the French Army, serving in the 1940 campaign; he was awarded the Croix de Guerre. After the fall of France, he joined a Moroccan regiment to fight at Monte Cassino and all through the Italian campaign, rising to the rank of warrant officer. It was during the Italian Campaign that Ben Bella formed a lasting admiration for the Italian resistance. But upon his returned to Algeria in 1945, he was disgusted and disillusioned with the events that had taken place in Setif and with the political state of affairs, he refused the commission he was offered and instead entered local politics. He became a successful municipal councilor, but a “plot” to neutralize him by the administration ended in gunfire. Ben Bella claims that “the administration attempted to neutralize him by means of a plot involving another Muslim set up to confiscate the farm his father had left him.” As a result Ben Bella changed his name and went underground with Messali’s M.T.L.D as a “clandestine militant.” Sickened with the corruption of the M.T.L.D, Ben Bella founded a splinter group called the Organisation Speciale (O.S.), its pledge was to “fight colonialism by all means, legal or illegal.” The O.S. was “in effect the first nationalist body dedicated to preparing for an armed conflict with France—now considered inevitable—and thereby it became the immediate predecessor of the FLN.”


3 Horne, Savage War of Peace, p. 30. There are at least two schools of thought on the origins of pied noir; one, on account of the black polished shoes worn by the French military; the other based on the somewhat patronizing view of metropolitan Frenchmen that the colons had had their feet burned black by an excess of the African sun.

4 Horne, Savage War of Peace, p. 183

5 General Paul Aussaresses. The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria 1955-1957. New York: enigma books 2002, Yacef Saadi was a banker in the Casbah, Algiers and a key member of the Comite de Coordination et d’Execution (CCE) under Ben M’Hidi. Saadi headed a terror network of 1,400 operatives.

6 Horne, Savage War of Peace, p. 184

7 Aussaresses, Battle of the Casbah, p. 64-65. The “autonomous zone” or ZAA (Zone Autonome d’Alger), which was both political and military organization, had been set up by the FLN to patrol the Muslim areas of Algiers, and the Casbah in particular....The objective of this “autonomous zone” was to greatly increase the number of terrorist incidents and quickly force the (French) government into a dead-end. There were at the time 3 to 4 attacks daily inside Algiers, mainly targeting civilians and the tendency was clearly increasing.

9 Horne, *Savage War of Peace*, p. 187


11 Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires*, p.7

12 Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires*, p.8

13 Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires*, p. 35

14 Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires*, p. 68


16 Woodmansee, *Revolutionary Warfare*, p. 100

17 Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, p. 62


21 Woodmansee, *Revolutionary Warfare*, p. 103

22 Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, p. 10


25 *Commander's Initial Assessment*, p. 2-6


29 Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 39

30 Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 39

31 Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 39

32 Horne, *Savage War of Peace*, p. 184-207

33 Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 40

34 Galula, *Pacification in Algeria*, p. 15

35 Aussaresses, *Battle of the Casbah*, p. 106

36 Commander’s Initial Assessment, p. 2-5,2-6


38 Commander’s Initial Assessment, p. 2-5,2-6

39 Galula. *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 40

40 Galula. *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, p. 83

41 Horne, *Savage War of Peace*, p. 175. The Nazi occupation following 1940 may have left other, unpleasant, legacies to the Algerian War. John Gale, a young British war correspondent who suffered a nervous breakdown following his experiences in Algeria, records a threat made to an F.L.N. suspect by a young para: “I’ll shoot your whole family like mine was shot by the Germans.”


43 Kelly, *Lost Soldiers*, p. 8

44 Kelly. *Lost Soldiers*, p. 9. The US had a similar, but much more political term, The Second Red Scare (1947-1957). It differs vastly from the French term in that the French term is military based and included revolutionary warfare. Both are based on the fear of the Soviet threat, spread of Communism, after World War II.


48 Woodmansee, *Revolutionary Warfare*, p. 112


50 Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, p. 228


52 Commander's Initial Assessment, p. 2-11

53 Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, p. 22

54 Commander's Initial Assessment, p. 2-15


56 Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, p. 13

57 *Sections Administratives Specialisees* – French military units dedicated to providing services to the Muslim populations in a designated area.


59 Commander's Initial Assessment, p. 2-12-2-14

60 Commander's Initial Assessment, p. 2-12
Appendix A

FLN LEADERSHIP

Ahmed Ben Bella - Founding member of the FLN, arrested with four other Algerian leaders in October 1956 when his plane was forced to land in Algiers, freed in 1962, became the first president of the Algerian Republic, later overthrown in a military coup in 1965.

Ali Maktoum - A founder of the FLN in France, he became a delegate political-military in eastern Algeria, then a member of the National Council of the Algerian Revolution (CNRA). Also a member of the Political and Secretary of the FLN, he was named after independence in 1962, Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, Ben Bella. After the takeover of Houari Boumediene June 19, 1963, he joined the Council of the Revolution. Quickly disagreed with the new power, he went into exile in France in 1966. He finally returned to Algeria in 1981, two years after the death of Boumediene.

Mostefa Ben Bouabdellah - He played an important role in the Special Organization (CS), in which he was an intense political and military involvement. Financer and Secretary General for the CS and Director for the FLN. He was a member of the Committee of the Six Insurgent Leaders. He led in the outbreak of the Algerian War from 1 November 1954 in the Aures region. He was arrested on 11 February 1955 in Tunisia and was sentenced to death by the court of Constantine, then imprisoned at the Central Prison of Constantine. He escaped in November 1954 with other prisoners, including Tahar Ziani. Ben Bouabdellah died on 22 March 1955 with Abdallah Amrani—one of his close associates—in the blast following the detonation of a radio bomb parachuted by the French army.

Mohamed Khider - Mohamed Khider was one of the original leaders of the FLN, having been previously active in its nationalist predecessors, the Étoile Nord-Africaine and Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA) of Messali Hadj. He played an important role during the first years of the Algerian War (1954-62), mainly representing the FLN externally. In 1956, he was part of a group of FLN politicians captured by the French in an airplane hijacking. Two years later, while imprisoned in France, he was an elected member of the PPA's exile government, holding the symbolic post of Minister of State. He was released in Algeria became independent in 1962. Khider then took on the role as Secretary-General of the post-war Party of FLN, with control over finances, but quickly fell out with President Ben Bella. Among the causes were political differences, personal rivalries, and opposition to Ben Bella's increasingly autocratic rule. Ben Bella refused Khider's requests to allow the FLN into the decision-making process, and replaced him as Secretary-General. In 1963, Khider went into exile in Switzerland, bringing $12 million to $14 million of party funds with him, saying they would be used to finance a political opposition to continue the "genuine" nationalist tradition of the FLN. In 1967, he was assassinated in Madrid, Spain.

Mohammed Boudiaf - Boudiaf - Responsible for organizing the OS network in the Setif region, storing arms, collecting funds and preparing guerrilla forces. He was sentenced to between 2 to 10 years in prison by the French authorities, but avoided arrest. Boudiaf was by this time a main leader of the FLN's interior. To help implement the FLN's policies of independence, under the nom de guerre 'Abigail', he acquired a reputation as one of the FLN's most effective and ruthless guerrilla commanders, and was nicknamed the "Algerian Beria" by outside observers. He was a member of all three issues of the FLN's exiled government, the GPRRA, in various ministerial capacities. On independence in 1962, he opposed the victorious military-backed takeover of Ahmed Ben Bella, and was arrested. On his release, he left politics and spent the remainder of his career in various non-political bureaucratic and business posts. He today lives in Algiers.

FLN LEADERSHIP

Larbi Ben M‘Hidi – One of the historical leaders of the FLN; organized the network of terror inside the city of Algiers; main mover behind the failed general strike of January 1957; arrested by COL Marcel Bigeard's paratroopers; executed by hanging, personally carried out by General Aussaresses; death was always ruled a suicide until now.

Yacef Saadi – Below in the Casbah and key member of the CCE under Larbi Ben M‘Hidi; headed a terror network of about 1,400 operatives, including women; arrested in 1957 at the end of the Battle of Algiers; accused by General Aussaresses of revealing the hiding place of Ali la Pointe to French intelligence.

Ali la Pointe – Alias of Ali Amar, a young Casbah pimp and key terrorist working with Yacef Saadi; murdered Amedee Froger in December 1956; killed in an explosion set by paratroopers in the Casbah in October 1957.

French Army Leadership

**General Raoul Salan** - Former French Army Commander in Indochina; intelligence specialist; commander in chief of the 10th military region covering Algeria 1956-1959; in 1961 led failed military coup against de Gaulle's government; leader of the OAS; condemned to death in absentia, amnestied by General de Gaulle.

**General Jacques Massu** - Fought with the Free French in WWII, served in Indochina; Commander of the 10th DP; named Prefect of Algiers in 1956; OIC of counterterrorist operations during the Battle of Algiers; member in the overthrow of the Fourth Republic.

**Colonel Yves Godard** - Commanded the 11th Shock Battalion after Aussaresses in 1948; fought in Indochina; served as General Massu's Chief of Staff during the Battle of Algiers as intelligence director; became a leader of the OAS.

French Army Leadership

Colonel Roger Trinquier – served in Asia from 1938 to 1954; specialist in psychological warfare; spent years fighting behind Vietminh lines in Indochina; led intelligence officer with Paul Aussaresses on General Massu’s secret staff; became a mercenary in the Katanga.

Colonel David Galula – Graduated from St. Cyr Military Academy in 1939. He served in the French army in the North Africa campaign and during the liberation of Italy and France during WWII. In addition, he later served in China, Greece, Indochina, and Algeria. Died in 1967.


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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>France occupies Algiers</td>
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<td>1847</td>
<td>Abd-el-Kader surrenders</td>
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<td>1871</td>
<td>French loss of Alsace-Lorraine steps up colonization of Algeria</td>
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<td>1936</td>
<td>Blum-Viollette reforms for Algeria: not implemented</td>
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<td>1940</td>
<td>Fall of France</td>
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<td>1942</td>
<td>8 November: Allied landings in Algeria and Morocco</td>
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<td>1945</td>
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<td>1954</td>
<td>7 May: Fall of Dien Bien Phu in Indo-China</td>
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<td>1955</td>
<td>18 June: Mendes-France comes to power</td>
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<td>1956</td>
<td>25 January: Soustelle appointed governor-general</td>
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<td>1955</td>
<td>2 February: Mendes-France falls</td>
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<td>1956</td>
<td>18-24 April: F.L.N. attend Bandung conference of “Third World”</td>
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<td>1955</td>
<td>19 May: F.L.N. massacre pieds noirs at Philippeville</td>
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<td>1956</td>
<td>26 January: Mollet succeeds Faure as prime minister</td>
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<td>1956</td>
<td>2 February: Soustelle goes, replaced by Lacoste</td>
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<td>1957</td>
<td>18 May: Palestro Massacre of French conscripts</td>
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<td>1957</td>
<td>20 August: Soummam Conference establishes F.L.N. policy</td>
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<td>1957</td>
<td>30 September: Yacef’s girls bomb Milk-Bar and Cafeteria: Battle of Algiers begins</td>
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<td>1957</td>
<td>16 October: Interception of Athos, loaded with arms from Egypt for F.L.N.</td>
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<td>1956</td>
<td>2 October: Ben Bella hijacked and imprisoned by French</td>
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<td>1957</td>
<td>5 November: Anglo-French landings at Suez</td>
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<td>1957</td>
<td>14 December: Salan appointed Commander-in-Chief in Algeria</td>
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<td>1958</td>
<td>7 January: Massu’s paras take over Algiers</td>
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<td>1958</td>
<td>28 January: General strike begins in Algiers – broken by paras</td>
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<td>1958</td>
<td>21 May: Mollet falls: France is 22 days with no government</td>
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<td>1957</td>
<td>31 May: Massacre of peasants by F.L.N. at Melouza</td>
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<td>1958</td>
<td>2 July: J.F. Kennedy’s speech supporting Algerian independence</td>
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<td>1958</td>
<td>24 September: Yacef captured: Battle of Algiers won by Massu</td>
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<td>1958</td>
<td>5 November: Gaillard succeeds Bourges-Maunoury as prime minister</td>
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<td>1958</td>
<td>26 December: Liquidation of Ramdane Abane</td>
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<td>1959</td>
<td>7 January: Saharan oil begins to flow</td>
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<td>1959</td>
<td>8 February: French bomb Sakiet in Tunisia</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>15 April: Gaillard falls: France 37 days with no government</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>13 May: Algiers mob seizes government buildings and demands de Gaulle</td>
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<td>1959</td>
<td>1 June: de Gaulle becomes prime minister</td>
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<td>1959</td>
<td>4 June: de Gaulle makes triumphant visit to Algeria (“Je vous ai compris”)</td>
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<td>1959</td>
<td>19 September: G.P.R.A. (Provisional Government of the Algerian Revolution) formed</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>3 October: de Gaulle offers paix des braves to the rebels</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>12 December: Challe and delouvrier replace Salan</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>21 December: de Gaulle is elected president of France</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
1959
22 July: Operation “Binoculars”; climax of Challe offensive
16 September: de Gaulle offers Algeria “self-determination”

1960
19 January: Massu sacked for attacking de Gaulle’s policy
24 January: “Barricades Week”; “ultras” shoot gendarmes
29 January: de Gaulle speaks, revolt collapses
23 April: Challe “promoted” away from Algeria
10 June: Si Salah makes abortive peace approach to de Gaulle
25-29 June: French peace talks with F.L.N. at Melun fail
6 September: “Manifesto of the 121” inciting conscripts to desert
28-29 September: Ferhat Abbas goes to Moscow and Peking
23 November: Joxe and Morin replace Delouvrier
9-13 December: Muslim backlash as de Gaulle visits Algeria
20 December: United Nations recognizes Algeria’s right to self-determination

1961
25 January: O.A.S. emerges: assassination of Maitre Popie
20-26 April: “Generals’ putsch” in Algiers; de Gaulle triumphs
25 April: France explodes atomic bomb at Reggane in Sahara
19 May: 19 O.A.S. explosions in Algiers
20 May-28 July: First peace talks at Evian fail
19-23 July: Fighting between France and Tunisia at Bizerta
8 September: Assassination attempt on de Gaulle at Petit Clamart

1962
7 February: Bomb intended for Malraux in Paris blinds girl of 4
February: O.A.S. kill 552 people
7-18 March: Second Evian peace talks: agreement signed
19 March: Cease-fire between French and F.L.N.
20 April: Salan captured
17 June: Truce between O.A.S. and F.L.N.: exodus of pieds noirs
1 July: Referendum on independence

1965
19 June: Boumedienne overthrows Ben Bella
15 September: Ben Bella becomes president

Bibliography

Primary Sources


*Commander’s Initial Assessment, 30 August 2009*. Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan


Secondary Sources


Satellite Image of Algeria

Topographic Map of Algeria
Al-Qaeda Organizational Structure
Figure D.1  Afghanistan

*Source: www.longwarjournal.com*