A FRAMEWORK FOR NGO-MILITARY COLLABORATION

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Conflict, Security, and Development

by

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A Framework for NGO-Military Collaboration

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What do military professionals need to know about NGOs? The literature on NGOs includes very little about NGO-military relationships in troubled areas. Moreover, the U.S. military fails to convey or encourage an adequate understanding of NGOs in its publications and mid-career military education. Drawing abductively from scholarly literature and inductively from case studies and practitioner interviews, I theorize that the efficacy of NGO-military collaboration varies with the type of NGO (INGO or LNGO) and the type of operation. I crystallize this argument into a typology of NGO-military outcomes. I find that military cooperation with international NGOs is most productive during humanitarian-assistance and disaster-relief operations, whereas military cooperation with local NGOs is most productive during conflict and post-conflict operations.

NGO, NGO-military, civil-military

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NGO, NGO-military, civil-military
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

A FRAMEWORK FOR NGO-MILITARY COLLABORATION, by Major Glenn B. Penner, 79 pages.

What do military professionals need to know about NGOs? The literature on NGOs includes very little about NGO-military relationships in troubled areas. Moreover, the U.S. military fails to convey or encourage an adequate understanding of NGOs in its publications and mid-career military education. Drawing abductively from scholarly literature and inductively from case studies and practitioner interviews, I theorize that the efficacy of NGO-military collaboration varies with the type of NGO (INGO or LNGO) and the type of operation. I crystallize this argument into a typology of NGO-military outcomes. I find that military cooperation with international NGOs is most productive during humanitarian-assistance and disaster-relief operations, whereas military cooperation with local NGOs is most productive during conflict and post-conflict operations.
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<tr>
<td>ACBAR</td>
<td>Agency Coordination Body for Afghanistan Relief</td>
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<td>ANSO</td>
<td>Afghan NGO Safety Office</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
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<td>CENTCOM</td>
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<td>CERP</td>
<td>Commander’s Emergency Response Program</td>
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<td>CHLC</td>
<td>Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cell</td>
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<td>CMOC</td>
<td>Civil Military Operations Center</td>
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<td>CSI</td>
<td>Combat Studies Institute</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>Department of Defense Directive</td>
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<td>DR</td>
<td>Disaster Response</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Geographic Combatant Command</td>
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<td>HA</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<td>Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response</td>
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<td>HOC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Operations Center</td>
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<td>IAD</td>
<td>Institutional Analysis and Development</td>
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<td>International Commission on Voluntary Agencies</td>
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<td>IGO</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Organization</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Nongovernmental Organization</td>
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<td>IRIN</td>
<td>Integrated Regional Information Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>Joint Publication</td>
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<td>Local Nongovernmental Organization</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
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<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCCI</td>
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<td>NCCNI</td>
<td>NGO Coordinating Committee for Northern Iraq</td>
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<td>NGHA</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Humanitarian Agency</td>
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<td>NGHO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Humanitarian Organizations</td>
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<td>NSPD</td>
<td>National Security Presidential Directive</td>
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<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>OE</td>
<td>Operational Environment</td>
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<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
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<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<td>SAR</td>
<td>Search and Rescue</td>
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<td>SERE</td>
<td>Survive, Evade, Resist, Escape</td>
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USAID United States Agency for International Development

USG United States Government

USIP United States Institute for Peace
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Humanitarian agencies base their plans on ill-thought through scenarios with little knowledge of how they will gain access to the populations in danger. UN agencies, dependent on NGOs, look around and see few in the region. Donors are blindly allocating funds with no idea whether potential grantees have an inclination or capacity to take on a new crisis. Military planners assume that civilian entities will somehow appear to fill the governance and service provider gap that results from war.

— International Rescue Committee, 2002

The operational environment (OE) requires comprehensive cooperation between military and civilian actors and state and non-state actors. There are in excess of 36,000 nongovernmental organizations (NGO) operating throughout the world, and the United Nations (UN) lists nearly 20,000 international nongovernmental organizations (INGO). Yet, there is an existing history of NGO antipathy to cooperation and identification with military forces.1 United States (U.S.) military professionals and NGO professionals, despite differing operational approaches, share much in common in regard to commitment and desired ends. Also, they increasingly share the same operational space. In areas where the U.S. military has operated over the last decade, NGOs are increasingly filling roles traditionally played by the state—in fields such as healthcare, development, and governance (Goodhand and Sedra 2007, 50-51). However, there exists a lack of a coherent framework for NGO-military collaboration.

There have been instances of contestation and competition between NGOs and the military in areas where NGOs perceive military encroachment on traditionally NGO domain. NGOs also compete amongst themselves for donor funds. When INGOs and local NGOs (LNGO) operate in the same area, they also compete for influence, and operational space. Due to these competitions and increasingly converging areas of operation, there is a need to study the relationship between militaries and NGOs. Furthermore, in the contemporary environment of reduced military budgets, it is prudent for military officers to seek out and understand more cost-effective methods to accomplish missions. Collaboration with any legitimate organization that can assist in mission accomplishment should be considered.

This study defines an INGO as: a voluntary, non-profit organization of citizens organized on an international level to perform economic or infrastructure development, humanitarian functions, provide information, encourage political participation and conflict resolution, or advocate and monitor policies and practice of governments.

LNGOs are generally smaller organizations and focus solely within the borders of their respective countries, provinces, cities, or neighborhoods. The general term NGO will be used throughout this study unless specification is required.

This thesis will study NGO-military interactions with the primary research question: What do military professionals need to know about NGOs? This study draws abductively from scholarly literature on NGO-military interactions, and inductively from illustrative case studies from both civilian and military sources and interviews relating experiences about NGO-military interactions. I find that military cooperation with INGOs is most productive during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR)
operations, whereas military cooperation with LNGOs is most productive during conflict and post-conflict operations. With this in mind, I produce a typology based on NGO specificity and its relevance to different types of military operations.

**NGOs and Conflict: Historical Connections**

Before proceeding, a concise history of NGOs and their association with military conflicts is helpful. The first humanitarian associations were thought to have begun in 13th century China and aimed at saving drowning victims. Similar ‘humane societies’, such as the ‘Society for the Recovery of the Drowned’, formed in Amsterdam in 1767, were founded in 18th century Europe. Anti-Slavery International, formed in 1839, is the oldest continuously operating humanitarian organization still in existence (Davies 2013, 31). The decades preceding World War I saw the establishment of hundreds of NGOs worldwide with a diverse array of objectives. Regarding NGOs during World War I, Davies writes: “Many groups failed to survive the devastating effects of World War I. At the same time, the vast destruction wrought by the conflict also spurred the formation of myriad new organizations to address its humanitarian consequences. The Save the Children Fund, for example, was established in 1919 to provide relief for children in danger of starvation as a result of war-induced food shortages” (Davies 2013, 33). Save the Children was formed to literally save the children in Germany and Austria “in the belief that compassion dictated extending a helping hand to those most “defenseless” among those who until a few weeks earlier had been the enemies in a bitter war” (Büthe, Major, de Mello e Souza 2012, 577). Also formed in 1919, “the organization now known as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies emerged as another critical actor in the provision of post-war famine relief” (Davies 2013, 33).
The destruction wrought by the war spurned the establishment of thousands of peace and humanitarian NGOs. Similarly, the horrors of World War II resulted in the establishment of some of today’s largest and most well known INGOs—Oxfam and CARE, just to name a few. The U.S. military coordinated with CARE during the Marshall Plan.

The term nongovernmental organization, in its present meaning, first came into use in 1945 in the UN charter. The global divisiveness of the Cold War required NGOs to stress impartiality. For instance, Amnesty International “would work in support of prisoners from each of the first, second and third worlds, thereby emphasizing their impartiality” (Davies 2013, 34). There is a diverse history of NGO-DOD cooperation, for example in 1958; President Eisenhower gave the USS Consolation naval ship to the NGO Project HOPE. The ship was transformed into HOPE’s main vehicle for providing humanitarian assistance (HA) and health education around the world. The ship conducted 11 year-long aid missions to such regions as Indonesia, Africa, and the South Pacific (Pueschel 2013).

The end of the Cold War combined with, heightened global information dissemination, as well as large-scale international involvement in disaster relief efforts resulted in the number of INGOs reaching 18,000 by the year 2000 (Davies 2013, 34-35). This brief history demonstrates that since the twentieth century, NGOs, particularly NGOs often involved in troubled areas where the military operates. Recognition of this association between NGOs and conflict is beneficial to understanding how and why military practitioners should approach potential collaborative relationships.
This study concerns interactions between any military element and NGOs and includes national government-level interagency collaboration with NGOs where military representatives sit at the table. Exchanges between individual government agencies or the interagency and NGOs, and excluding military, are not considered in this study. This study will consider NGO-military interaction during planning, conflict, post-conflict, and humanitarian assistance and disaster scenarios. The terms conflict and post-conflict are used in this study, rather than identifying operations by operational phase (0-V) because NGOs are less familiar with military phased operations than the terms conflict or post-conflict.

**NGOs and Military Doctrine**

Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0 defines an NGO as “a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society” (2012, Glossary-5). JP 3-08 further defines NGOs as “independent, diverse, flexible, grassroots focused organizations that range from primary relief and development providers to human rights, civil society, and conflict resolution organizations. Their mission is often one of a humanitarian nature and not one of assisting the military in accomplishing its objectives” (JCS 2011, IV-11).

Issued in November 2005, DOD directive (DODD) 3000.05 directed that stability operations become a “core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat
operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities.” With this directive, U.S. military units are now tasked with a broad range of stability missions, from peacekeeping to post-conflict reconstruction. Military units conducting these missions could greatly benefit from the expertise certain NGOs possess because they have great experience in these areas. Following soon after DODD 3000.05, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 directed U.S. government (USG) agencies to coordinate efforts to “prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization assistance.” The U.S. Department of State (DOS) was named the lead agency for reconstruction and stabilization missions, however the DOD is key because of its assets, mission scope, and size. For DOD, NSPD 44 necessitated not only USG interagency coordination, but also an increased need to effectively interact with other potential civilian organizations such as NGOs and civil society organizations (CSO).

Joint Publication (JP) 1, the principal joint document for the armed forces of the U.S., charges the services, combatant commanders, and the joint staff with conducting “effective . . . NGO coordination.” It also notes that “CCDRs [Combatant Commanders] and other subordinate JFCs [Joint Force Commanders] must consider the potential requirements for interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination as a part of their activities across the range of military operations within and outside of their operational areas” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2013, 58). JP 3-08 (Interorganizational Coordination During Joint

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Operations) expands upon potential NGO-military interaction. It notes the institutional differences between NGOs and the military, and goes into further detail on the need for DOD cooperation with NGOs. U.S. joint and Army doctrine states the central idea of unified action is “synchronization, coordination and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2013; Department of the Army 2012, iii).

UN doctrine states, “it is incumbent upon the peacekeeping operation to meet regularly and share information with all actors, and to harmonize activities, to the extent possible, by seeking their input into the mission’s planning process and to respond actively and substantively to requests for cooperation” (Guéhenno 2008, 73). UN doctrine specifically mentions the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as a potential partner. It also specifies that humanitarian NGOs will likely be present during operations. Comparing U.S. with UN military doctrine demonstrates that UN doctrine is slightly more prescriptive than U.S. doctrine in terms of recognizing NGO specificity, however both lack nuanced detail of NGOs.

Military doctrine fails to provide a typology of the broad range of NGOs or a framework for how NGO-military interactions should proceed. Specifically, the vast differences between the capabilities and limitations of INGOs, LNGOs, and others are not mentioned. Essentially, the military practitioner is left to determine how, when, where, why, and which NGOs he or she will engage. For the military practitioner, a clearer understanding of the nuances between the categories of NGOs will benefit collaborative engagements.
Looking Ahead

The end state objectives for many military operations, NGOs, and U.S. interagency country plans, are often similar—secure environment, rule of law, stable democracy, sustainable economy, and social well-being. Yet NGOs and the military rarely work together effectively on problems. Some NGOs are military averse because they feel it places them in danger due to the loss of their perceived neutrality. There are military planners and commanders who do not comprehend what NGOs may offer those conducting military missions.

It must not be ignored that NGOs with political agendas can exacerbate situations. Also, the military needs to distinguish between legitimate LNGOs and criminal or terrorist organizations seeking to fund their illicit activities. Because of these and other reasons, military practitioners should have access to a framework for operating with NGOs so as to avoid collaborating with organizations that may not complement their mission or who may be worsening the condition in the OE. In addition, such a framework could save time and resources by guiding military practitioners toward organizations more likely to engage in collaborative efforts. This study demonstrates interaction between INGOs and the military during HADR operations is entirely different during conflict or post-conflict operations.

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LNGOs should not be expected to have the budget, personnel, or political clearance that would allow them to conduct pre-operational coordination with foreign militaries that may operate in their country. Small LNGOs often have deep local roots and would make good partners for military commanders trying to affect change in a given area. However, small LNGOs are unlikely to have websites and may be largely unknown outside their city or country. For this reason, excellent potential LNGO partners on the ground cannot be accounted for in advance. Likewise, large INGOs that are willing to meet with military and other government officials in their home country to provide vital information on a troubled country may be hesitant to work with the military in the troubled country out of fear it may be detrimental to their individual security. Understanding such dynamics would allow the military to better focus their efforts before an operation begins as well as give planners and commanders an idea of what to expect on the ground.

The remainder of this study is organized as follows: Chapter 2 details the relevant scholarly literature on this topic. Much of the literature denotes the institutional differences between NGOs and the military and how it affects their relationship. Another theme prevalent throughout the literature on NGO-military interaction is the requirements of NGOs (logistics and security), and the military (information and access). Chapter 3 provides the study’s methodology for analysis. The methodology utilizes inductive reasoning, is qualitative, and focuses largely on the institutional differences and interactions between NGOs and the military. Chapter 4 incorporates the commonalities and gaps gleaned from the literature and analyzes case studies and practitioner interviews in order to provide a more fine grained typology of expected NGO-military outcomes.
Chapter 5 concludes the study and provides recommendations for future study on NGO-military operations.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The bottom line is we had the transports and they didn’t. But, we leave out the NGOs at our own peril—they will be there whether we like it or not, and we must deal with them positively.

― LTC Roger Blythe, 1997

The purpose of this chapter is to review the relevant scholarly literature on NGO-military interaction where military operations converge with NGO activities. Specifically, the literature will be reviewed to identify gaps, commonalities, collaborative mechanisms, and obstacles to effective NGO-military coordination.

Robert Perito lists five desired end states, critical leadership responsibilities, and key objectives for all NGOs, IGOs, militaries, governments, and private actors participating in peace, stability, and relief operations. The desired end states listed by Perito are safe and secure environment, rule of law, stable democracy, sustainable economy, and social well-being. (2007, xxxvi) These end states combined with the leadership responsibilities and key objectives provide a basic framework for multi-organizational interaction during these operations. However, Perito’s ‘Framework for Success’ does not consider differences in NGOs—i.e. LNGO, INGO. This is an important distinction because as this study will show, certain NGOs are more likely to collaborate with U.S. military forces during certain operational phases.

Chris Seiple examines the relationship between the military and NGOs during humanitarian crises for four named relief operations—Operation Provide Comfort, Operation Sea Angel, Operation Restore Hope, and Operation Support Hope. Operation Provide Comfort was directed at relieving the 1991 Kurdish refugee and humanitarian
crises in Northern Iraq. Operation Sea Angel was the 1991 response to cyclone Marian, which devastated parts of Bangladesh. Operation Restore Hope occurred in 1992-1993 and was aimed at relieving the famine and deteriorating security situation in Somalia. Operation Support Hope was the response to the humanitarian crisis following atrocities in Rwanda in 1994. Seiple provides in-depth analysis on each operation, remarking on the nuances of each operation. This review notes the comprehensive similarities found by Seiple between each operation, following that it details how the operations were notably different, and finally it reviews the recommendations provided by Seiple.

According to Seiple’s analysis, there are several aspects of NGO-military cooperation during humanitarian crises that stand out across all four operations. NGO-military cooperation was largely ad hoc. Institutional and cultural differences between the military and NGOs pervade. NGOs required logistical support for large operations and the military often provided logistical infrastructure for NGOs. NGOs provided the military with accurate information on troubled areas. NGOs were highly cognizant of how their actions affect donor support. NGOs were less security oriented than the military. Finally, Seiple notes the NGO-military relationship worked best when both had something to offer the other. These eight commonalities gleaned from Seiple’s work are beneficial for understanding how future NGO-military interaction will occur, and more importantly how the collaborative relationship can be improved upon. These commonalities, many of which occur throughout the literature will be further analyzed in chapter 4.

Seiple highlights the four aspects as specific to Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq: The Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) was a critical interface
node throughout the operation. Establishing the NGO Coordinating Committee for Northern Iraq (NCCNI) benefitted NGO-military collaborative operations. Limited social breakdown existed in northern Iraq during this time. Finally, U.S. Army Civil Affairs (CA) officers and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)\(^6\) personnel were effective facilitators of NGO-military interaction. Noting that in the instance of Operation Provide Comfort the CMOC and the NCCNI were essential collaborative mechanisms is important for later analysis. Operation Provide Comfort, being a U.S.-led operation may have had a factor in the criticality of the military established CMOC. The NCCNI was an NGO-established organization. These are important distinctions because in later operations CMOCs are ineffective and NGO-established organizations are hesitant to work with military personnel.

Seiple lists five characteristics specific to Operation Sea Angel in Bangladesh. First, in this instance, no OFDA or UN presence streamlined direct NGO-military interaction. Second, the extent of the cyclone was such that only two locations could serve as ports of entry for aid—this contributed to closer coordination. Third, NGOs possessed all needed HA supplies for the affected populace. Fourth, there was no widespread social breakdown in Bangladesh following the cyclone. Finally, a fully functional CMOC was never established.

The CMOC, often the focal point for NGO-military interaction, was not a key player in Bangladesh. Factors that likely contributed to this include: the fact that U.S. military assets did not arrive until two weeks after the cyclone; the U.S. embassy began

\(^6\)OFDA is an agency within the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and is responsible for leading and coordinating the U.S. Government’s response to disasters overseas.
coordinating with NGOs and the central government of Bangladesh almost immediately; the sovereign government in Bangladesh was able to play a large role in the relief efforts. This case is different from other scenarios such as Operation Provide Comfort where the Iraqi government was more threat than help.

The following two aspects were specific to the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) phase of Operation Restore Hope in Somalia: First, a breakdown of the social fabric had occurred in Somalia. Second, the CMOC was collocated with the UN’s Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC), this contributed to the CMOC playing a critical role.

Relief efforts in Somalia can be classified as a complex humanitarian emergency. Widespread famine combined with general social breakdown and the presence of violent paramilitary organizations made relief operations difficult for NGOs and the U.S.-led multinational task force. The lack of a functioning sovereign government, the non-permissive environment, and the lack of an inter-NGO coordinating body largely contributed to the criticality of the military-led CMOC.

Seiple notes four facets specific to Operation Support Hope in Rwanda. First, the U.S. subordinated itself to a UN command structure in this UN-led operation. Second, there was very little face-to-face interaction between NGOs and U.S military personnel. Third, the CMOC was mostly ineffective. Finally, there was widespread chaos and social breakdown in Rwanda.

The UN had a robust presence during Rwandan relief operations and was the overall lead for the larger Great Lakes refugee crisis, which was a result of the mass exodus of Hutus fleeing Tutsis in Rwanda. The ineffectiveness of the CMOC and the limited interaction can be attributed to a limited mandate for the U.S. military. Also,
Operation Support Hope needs to be considered in the context of Operation Restore Hope, which ended the previous year. The unexpectedly long military presence in Somalia initially aimed at providing humanitarian assistance, but devolved into a violent conflict in which over one hundred soldiers from several countries were killed or injured. The fear of more dead troops in Rwanda contributed to the limited mandate and thus limited interaction between the military and NGOs.

Seiple offers three precepts for NGO-military coordination during humanitarian assistance (HA) operations—First, the military cannot be in charge. . . . The second precept is [for the military] to help the helper, specifically the NGOs. . . . The third precept is that the CMOC must be the military's operational focus of effort within a humanitarian intervention” (Seiple 201-202). Seiple also offers four recommendations for future NGO-military interaction. (1) Humanitarian operations must be conducted as military operations pursuant to a political purpose. (2) Collaboration between the NGO and the military should take place prior to the intervention. If not, it should take place during the intervention. (3) NGOs need to develop a stateside mechanism through which they "plug into" the interagency planning process. (4) The important role played by OFDA in facilitating NGO-military collaboration must not be underestimated.

Seiple’s recommendation that collaboration between the military and NGOs best takes place before intervention, but that it should take place during operations at a minimum is true. However the type and level of interaction is not stated.

The crisis in Rwanda and the larger Great Lakes refugee crisis were complex and in such a remote area that NGOs had difficulty communicating with other organizations. The integrated regional information network (IRIN) was established in 1994 as a result of
the Great Lakes refugee crisis. IRIN established the use of e-mail to deliver and receive information from remote regions where humanitarian operations are underway. IRINs goal is to provide universal access to timely, strategic information to support conflict resolution by countering misinformation (Laipson 2008, 5).

Another communication tool that NGOs and the military can use is Relief Web. Relief Web was created in 1996 and initially funded by USAID as an electronic gateway to documents and maps on humanitarian emergencies and disasters. Relief Web is administered by the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) but is considered an independent source. “It pools information from government, academic, and NGO sources, yielding a database with over 300,000 maps and documents dating back to 1981. Relief Web reaches 70,000 e-mail subscribers, in addition to those who access the information through the Web” (Laipson 2008, 5). IRIN and Relief Web could be valuable sources of information for military planners.

David Byman investigates what the military can do to improve coordination with relief agencies. Byman echoes much of Seiple’s work in perceiving several impediments to military-NGO coordination. These impediments, according to Byman, include differences in organizational culture, centralized military vs. decentralized NGO structures, and differing values and lifestyles between some NGOs and military officers. Another impediment, Byman writes: “NGOs often wonder why well-armed U.S. military units emphasize force protection while working in areas where NGOs have long operated without protection. Because of these cultural differences, NGO and military officials often do not understand each others priorities or procedures and resent what they see as indifference on the other side” (2001, 104). Byman also notes many NGOs are concerned
that working with the military will damage the perception of neutrality and impartiality they believe is essential to their work.

Byman offers the following to improve NGO-military cooperation:

To improve its ability to coordinate with NGOs, the United States’ various Unified Commands should designate a humanitarian affairs advisor to be responsible for pre-crisis liaison with relevant agencies in the UN family and NGOs. . . . All NGO officials interviewed by this author stressed the importance of personal relations—‘We want someone in our rolodex to call’ noted one official. The adviser should also track command personnel with experience in complex emergencies and know which individuals have relations with relief personnel. . . . In the American case, many fixes require action across the U.S. government, involving the services, the military commands, the joint staff, the Defense Department and civilian agencies. (Byman 2001, 109-110)

Byman builds upon Seiple in noting the differentiation between NGOs and that certain organizations make better potential partners than others. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) for instance, is fiercely committed to its perception of neutrality and is therefore a poor potential partner for the military in many cases. Byman recognizes other INGOs, such as the International Rescue Committee (IRC), CARE, and Save the Children as less reluctant to working with the military to plan and conduct operations. After identifying NGO partners “for more selective engagement, the military should take steps in advance of any crisis to improve relations and familiarity” (Byman 108). These steps, Byman concludes, include incorporating NGOs into the planning process and collaborating to plan and conduct training exercises.

LTC David Levine’s SAMS monograph, “Coordination Without Borders Assigning US Military Officers to NGO World Headquarters: Rhetoric and Reality,” recommends assigning U.S. military officers to NGO worldwide headquarters as the best means to increase NGO-military collaborative efforts (Levine 2008). This recommendation was influenced by Perito (2007) and builds upon Byman’s call for
increased NGO-military collaboration during the planning, and pre-operational stages. Levine’s recommendations, if implemented would likely increase NGO-military collaboration during operations.

Rietjens, Van Fenema, and Essens write about the incorporation of military, NGOs, and others during planning exercises. This study examines the coordination and training demands of military, NGO, intergovernmental organization (IGO), UN, and other civilian agency cooperation during “crisis operations”. The article looks closely at Common Effort, a large multinational military exercise hosted in Germany by the German and Dutch Armies in September 2011. Common Effort incorporated many of the numerous relevant civilian organizations involved in HADR, conflict, and post-conflict operations.

Rietjens, Van Fenema, and Essens point out that for NGOs collaboration with the military can be daunting due to the differing protocols by different militaries in multinational operations. They note that as of 2007 there were 102 different national caveats that needed to be considered in Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). “These include rules on patrolling by daylight only or rules that geographically bound troop deployment. Caveats are necessary for legitimacy in military’s home countries. Yet this further complicates the general stance of civil actors, be they humanitarian organizations, local populations or authorities, toward cooperating with the military” (Rietjens, Van Fenema, and Essens 2013, 20). Common Effort was an attempt to familiarize NGOs, IGOs, and militaries with each other’s practices and procedures with the intent that during real-world actions their collaborative efforts would be smoother.
The exercise was deemed beneficial by members of the American, German, and Dutch militaries in part because of the presence of actual NGOs. Often, training exercises involving “NGOs” are actually contracted personnel hired to play the role of an NGO during the exercise. In some cases the “actor” hired to play an NGO during a military exercise may or may not even have experience with an NGO. All parties involved in Common Effort reported that working with real-world counterparts was beneficial for two reasons. First, working with actual professionals from other fields benefitted the exercise and contributed to a sense of realism. Second, many cross-field friendships and professional connections were made during the exercise. These pre-operational connections, as Byman (2001, 109) pointed out, are what many NGOs feel is a requirement for success during collaborative operations. Based on their analysis they postulate that a “deliberate and structured contact approach should be used as an effective mechanism to improve open orientation towards other parties, increase understanding and building [sic] cooperation” (Rietjens, Van Fenema, and Essens 2013, 20).

Classification of NGOs has long been a challenge. Increasing the precision of the general NGO taxonomy would make collaboration at all levels easier to facilitate for not only the military but also other practitioners. At the root of the NGO classification issue are two variables—NGO relations with civil society, and NGO relations with states (Vakil 1997, 2059). Lawry categorizes four basic types of NGOs—humanitarian aid, advocacy groups, faith-based groups, and missionary aid groups (2009, 49).

Humanitarian aid NGOs are involved in emergency aid operations as well as economic, health, and infrastructure development. Advocacy groups “do not supply aid per se but instead focus on advocacy issues specific to the disaster to draw public attention with the
aim of changing international, domestic, or host country policy. Recent examples of such type of advocacy include women’s rights in Afghanistan, and the genocide in Darfur” (Lawry 2009, 52-53). Faith-based NGOs were often founded based on religious principles, but do not engage in proselytization. Conversely, missionary aid groups were founded on religious principles and closely link their aid programs with proselytizing. Missionary NGOs, because they may cause controversy or create separation of church and state issues, should be avoided as collaborative partners for the military.

Humanitarian aid INGOs are further divided into three strands by Abby Stoddard—religious, Dunantist, and Wilsonian. Religious NGOs are the oldest traditional humanitarian INGOs and see themselves as fulfilling a role in both secular society and the church. “Dunantist humanitarianism is named for Red Cross founder Henry Dunant. The oldest of today’s ‘super-NGOs’, Save the Children UK, was created in the Dunantist image at the end of the First World War” (Stoddard 2003, 2). MSF (Doctors Without Borders) is one of the most well-known NGOs today. Dunantist INGOs generally receive a lower percentage of their funds from governments and view their role as separate from state interests. Dunantist NGOs generally focus on longer-term humanitarian projects and have a greater focus on advocacy rather than immediate aid delivery.

“Wilsonian humanitarianism characterizes most U.S. NGOs. Named for President Woodrow Wilson, who hoped to project US values and influence as a force for good in the world . . . CARE, the largest and quintessentially American NGO, came into being during the Marshall Plan after the Second World War” (Stoddard 2003, 2). Wilsonian INGOs generally have a shorter-term focus than Dunantist INGOs and are more focused on relieving immediate suffering. Stoddard indicates that Wilsonian NGOs, because of
their pragmatic rather idealistic focus, are more likely to cooperate with the U.S. military. However, she writes that even the U.S. based Wilsonian NGOs “draw the line at using humanitarian deliveries for specific political aims” (Stoddard 2003, 3). This is an important distinction for military planners to consider, because all military operations inherently have political aims.

If the military were to rank order which of these NGOs types—Wilsonian or Dunantist, would make a better candidate for collaborative operation, the Wilsonian would be the best candidate. By choosing to focus initial efforts on collaborating with Wilsonian NGOs, the military could save time that might otherwise be wasted trying to work with a Dunantist NGO that has no intention of collaborating with the military. This being said, by no means should the military discount possible coordination with Dunantist or any other organization that may complement military operations. This is purely meant as a way for the military to prioritize its efforts when faced with limited planning or preparation time.

Religious NGOs, by Stoddard’s definition, comprise both religious-based and missionary NGOs. Lawry’s differentiation of the two is essential for the military so as to avoid working with missionary NGOs which could have potentially detrimental effects for military efforts. Consideration of the different types of NGOs, as portrayed by Lawry and Stoddard, will factor into the typology and framework provided later in this study.

In forming a typology of specific NGOs by relevance to military operations, it is important for the military to recognize the differing operational approaches of different types of NGOs. “Development NGOs seek a lasting impact on the “root causes” of suffering, rather than alleviating suffering in the short term” (Büthe, Major, and de Mello
Any military practitioner could potentially face a situation where the need arises to collaborate with NGOs to deliver aid supplies to alleviate suffering. Following addressing immediate needs, the military may need to address longer-term causes of suffering. This would potentially require collaboration with a different type of NGO—development NGOs. This is an opportune point to note that these different operations also dictate collaboration with different government and international agencies. For the U.S. military, alleviating short term suffering following a disaster would likely require coordinating with OFDA, whereas long-term development needs to be coordinated with DOS and USAID.

When planning or conducting NGO-military collaboration, another classification category that should be considered is the national origin of an NGO. During NATO operations in Kosovo, INGOs were suspicious of, and roundly criticized NATO involvement in Kosovo for blurring the lines between combat operations and humanitarianism. However in 1999, several U.S. NGO officials met with President Clinton and “welcomed NATO’s focus on humanitarian action and supported the assistance provided by NATO in Kosovo” (Gheciu 2011, 101). From this, it could be assessed that U.S.-based INGOs have a history of approving of the U.S. military conducting foreign humanitarian assistance. Since the U.S. military is frequently a major actor in international humanitarian assistance missions, my typology will take this into account. Noting that U.S. NGOs approved of U.S. humanitarian action, Gheciu’s study would benefit from looking at how non-U.S. NGOs react to their military conducting foreign humanitarian assistance operations.
Understanding how NGOs are funded is also beneficial to understanding what motivates NGOs to collaborate or eschew working with other particular organizations. NGOs receive their funding from a variety of sources—governments, the UN, large sum contributors such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and smaller sum private donors. Considering the donors contributing to an NGO is essential to understanding NGO motivation because in most cases NGOs are beholden to the donors whom they rely upon for their existence. Much of the international humanitarian assistance and development aid is conducted by NGOs contracted from governmental development agencies such as USAID, the UKs Department for International Development, or Sweden’s International Development Cooperation Agency. Donations from private contributors are an increasingly large component of NGO operating budgets. As of 2005, “private donations accounted for more than 60 percent of the estimated $26.9 billion worldwide budget of international humanitarian and development nongovernmental organizations” (Gatignon 2007, 6). As Stoddard noted, Wilsonian INGOs generally have a higher percentage of their budget comprised from government donations.

Wells and Hauss note that military and NGO operations began to converge following the end of the Cold War and during the humanitarian crises of the 1990s. This convergence continued on the battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan following September 11, 2001. However, they present the Asian tsunami of 2004 as a significant event in realizing the potential of NGO-military cooperation. “The Navy deployed the carrier Abraham Lincoln and the hospital ship Mercy to Indonesia. . . . Two things became clear very quickly. First, the military can work with NGOs when they share a common purpose. . . . Second, the U.S. military has capacities that no other organization in the
world can match” (Hauss and Wells 2007, 485). Hauss and Wells posit poor information sharing platforms as the traditional primary obstacle to more active NGO-military interactions. They also point out the most significant positive development in post-September 11th DOD-NGO interaction is the mere fact that cooperative dialogue has increased and DOD has begun to focus on the issue. Specifically, they point to NGO involvement in establishing the Winning the Peace course at West Point and the Peace Keeping and Stabilization Operations Institute at the U.S. Army War College. Hauss and Wells’ article principally offers a recent historical account of DOD-NGO relations and fails to offer any concrete recommendations for increasing future DOD-NGO cooperation.

Taylor Seybolt defines the humanitarian assistance community as “the people in need, national governments, UN agencies, NGOs, political missions, military contingents, and donors” (Seybolt 2009, 1028). Seybolt studies network development and mechanisms of operability throughout the entire complex humanitarian assistance community. He hypothesized that in the seven years between crises in Rwanda in 1994 and Afghanistan in 2001 the humanitarian assistance community would become more connected, less centralized, increase information sharing, and shared decision-making. Despite the relative broadness of Seybolt’s work, his analysis and findings have bearing on a direct military to NGO relationship. Seybolt analyzed the responses by the HA community at large to determine if improvements were made to the HA community’s ability to operate as a more cohesive network in aiding stricken populations.

Following the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, Seybolt found an unprecedented level of cooperation between the U.S. military, its allies, and NGOs at U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) Headquarters at MacDill Airbase in Florida. NGOs joined their civilian counterparts in the U.S. government to participate in planning and information exchange sessions run by the military to coordinate the humanitarian response. The presence of NGO and UN personnel at CENTCOM allowed for informal connections to be made. “The mix of formal and informal interaction on a daily basis, with feedback to higher levels within organizations, enabled very different types of organizations (humanitarian and military) to inform each other about their capabilities and expectations” (Seybolt 2009, 1043). Cooperation between NGOs and the military at the operational level in Afghanistan in 2001, Seybolt found, was less than ideal. Information sharing was largely ad hoc and NGOs resented the perceived threat to their impartiality inherent in cooperating with the provincial reconstruction teams (PRT). Overall, Seybolt assessed the cooperation between the military and NGOs in 2001 Afghanistan as successful. This is largely because of the planning done at CENTCOM and despite poor operational interaction in Afghanistan.

Seybolt found that NGOs and the UN worked well together in Afghanistan. He cited the UN’s Joint Liaison Center as the primary mechanism for their coordination. Due in large part to the Joint Liaison Center, “The World Food Program reported delivering an enormous amount of food during December 2001, and credited its own staff, donors, neighboring countries, and NGO implementing partners” (Seybolt 2009, 1044).

From Rwanda in 1994 to Afghanistan in 2001, Seybolt’s findings indicate military-NGO cooperation has proceeded in what he terms a “lumpy evolution”. He found increased information sharing between the military and NGOs. However, though a
step forward, the planning efforts with NGOs at CENTCOM did not rise to the level of joint planning. Furthermore he writes:

In Afghanistan, the US played three roles: a belligerent in the war, the major humanitarian assistance donor, and a direct provider of aid. The resulting culture clash between humanitarian and military organizations may well have deepened distrust between them so much that future cooperation will be nearly impossible. There is reason to believe that the US government, and possibly others, will see great advantage in the future in using emergency relief assistance as a way to ‘‘win hearts and minds.’’ If this happens, the system could experience a great deal of turmoil. (Seybolt 2009, 1046)

In more closely coordinating with NGOs, it would be more likely that criticism of governments being a belligerent, major donor, and a direct provider of aid could be reconciled to the point that it was less contentious. In his conclusion, Seybolt indicates that building trust between the entire system of humanitarian assistance actors, and realizing that information, as a positive sum commodity is essential to effective future cooperation.

Francis Kofi Abiew builds upon the work of Byman and others and is chiefly concerned with NGO-military relations during peace operations. Abiew points out that the large number of NGOs operating in a conflict area (sometimes over 250) makes coordination at any level difficult. Abiew writes of another impediment to effective NGO-military collaboration: “The practice with the US military, for instance, is that only civil affairs officials, who are mainly reservists, regularly work with NGOs. Thus, obtaining the relevant knowledge before a crisis erupts, when the reserves are less likely to be deployed, is difficult” (Abiew, 30). He also notes many NGOs are more reticent to working with the U.S. military than other militaries because the U.S. military is viewed as having a political agenda. Abiew also highlights the effectiveness of coordination mechanisms in the field such as CMOCs.
The American Journal of International Law reported a July 2007 agreement signed by DOD and several nongovernmental humanitarian organizations (NGHO). The agreement, signed by the U.S. Institute for Peace (USIP), DOD, the Department of the State (DOS), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), USAID, and InterAction\(^7\) established a set of guidelines to facilitate interaction between DOD and NGOs. The *Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments* establish a set of guidelines and recommendations for NGO-military interaction. One of the stated intentions of the guidelines is to establish a differentiation between military and NGO personnel in the field by establishing uniform, meeting place, and transportation guidance, etc. A major point of contention between NGOs and the military addressed is the wearing of civilian clothes by military personnel conducting HA operations (Wright 2010, 197-198).

Guideline 1 states, “When conducting relief activities, military personnel should wear uniforms or other distinctive clothing to avoid being mistaken for NGHO representatives” (USIP 2005, 1). The recommended processes listed in the guidelines include procedures for NGO-military dialogue during contingency planning operations, procedures for accessing each others assessments, recommendation to establish an NGO liaison officer inside GCC headquarters, and lists organizations with potential to serve as a bridge between NGOs and the military. The guidelines also state that in situations where there is not a specified actor to serve as a bridge between NGOs and the military, a

\(^7\)InterAction is an umbrella organization that represents the interests of several U.S. based NGOs.
U.S. military Civil Affairs cell should serve as the primary point of contact between NGOs and the military (USIP 2005, 2).

A USIP press release which stated “military and NGO leaders intend to promulgate the Guidelines throughout their communities via media and education channels: NGOs will publish the Guidelines in their newsletters and literature, the military will incorporate the Guidelines into joint military doctrine publications” (USIP 2007) These guidelines have indeed been incorporated into U.S. joint doctrine. Regarding the “Guidelines” JP 3-08 notes they “should facilitate interaction between the Armed Forces of the United States and NGOs” (JCS 2011, 107).

Ramin Shirzay examines how the military, specifically provincial reconstruction teams (PRT), have interacted with non-governmental humanitarian agencies (NGHA). Referring specifically to the apprehension of NGHAs to working with the PRTs in Afghanistan, Shirzay writes “the repeatedly expressed concerns by NGHAs are: undermining of humanitarian principles, overlapping and unsustainability of projects, increasing figures of targeted NGHAs by insurgents, and ultimately limiting the space for humanitarian actors in the local communities” (Shirzay 2012, 4). Shirzay determines that “military involvement in development and humanitarian activities, undermined the humanitarian principles, overlapped the implemented projects, fueled the violence, and finally reduced the space for humanitarian actors in most of the Afghan communities to operate” (Shirzay, 5). This essay highlights NGO criticism of military involvement in HA activities, and to be sure this is an issue that must be considered if truly collaborative relationships are to exist. Shirzay’s essay is deficient in its lack of a military perspective
on the HA issue. Had Shirzay explored the military perceptions of the HA issue in Afghanistan the essay would have had more far-reaching implications.

Alexandra Gheciu examines cooperation between NATO and INGOs during peacebuilding operations. She classifies peacebuilding as a subfield of international security. As such peacebuilding by any organization is susceptible to broader changes in international security. She suggests, “Rapid transformations in peacebuilding since the 1990s have blurred the boundaries between activities performed by military and civilian actors, and have destabilized existing norms governing the roles of various actors involved in postconflict reconstruction” (Gheciu 2011, 96). Blurred boundaries, in the case of increasing NATO military involvement in arenas traditionally led by NGOs, was essentially a change in the rules of the game. Military involvement in development or humanitarian assistance operations will inevitably lead to a more linear operational structure. NGOs are far less linear, accustomed to greater autonomy than the military, and operate more by consensus than hierarchical guidance. Gheciu relays the following from an interaction between a NATO Kosovo Forces (KFOR) military officer and an NGO official:

“Gentlemen,” complained a senior NGO official, “I’m not in your chain of command.” “Then you are out of control,” shot back one of the officers. “No, I’m a humanitarian professional,” countered the NGO official. Later a KFOR official lamented that “nobody can tell an NGO what to do, whereas in military operations the highest needs would have the highest priority and would be addressed first.” (Gheciu 2011, 103)

This conversation is indicative of the NGO-military working relationship throughout troubled areas in which the military operates.

Haldun Yalcinkaya explores NGO security mechanisms and writes there are traditionally three dimensions, all being insufficient individually, for NGOs to secure
their environment—judicial, theoretical, and practical. He argues “the innovation of ANSO [(Afghan NGO Safety Office)] has created a new dimension for NGO security in unsecured environments, namely as an NGO-military security collaboration rather than cooperation or coordination” (Yalcinkaya 2012, 490). The ANSO works with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to receive the latest security updates which it passes to NGOs in the field. ANSO maintains contact with NGOs during operations and requests in extremis support from ISAF when necessary for NGO workers in danger. For NGOs, in extremis support from the military can be the difference between life and death. In a quid pro quo relationship, military preparation and conduction of in extremis support of NGOs can be seen as the military doing its part to support NGO operations. This presents an opportunity for an NGO-military collaborative mechanism.

NGOs expecting the possibility of in extremis support, could also be provided the opportunity to train on personnel recovery standard operating procedures or basic survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) techniques. Training opportunities, such as those discussed by Rietjens, Van Fenema, and Essens (2013) have demonstrated that collaborative training exercises are valuable for two reasons. First, the training itself is valuable for understanding each others common methods. Second, the contacts made and personal networks expanded can be invaluable when collaborative opportunities present themselves.

Yalcinkaya writes that NGOs prefer the word “collaboration rather than cooperation or coordination” in a somewhat tangential (but important) aspect of this article. He writes that many NGOs associate the words cooperation and coordination with control and that they prefer to use the word collaborate when dealing with the military so
as not to harm their principles. Likewise, the ANSO had previously been named the Afghan NGO Security Office. The word security was replaced with safety because “among NGOs, the term “security” was evoking a relation with military institutions” (Yalcinkaya 2012, 502). Understanding NGO terminology or learning their “language” would be a positive byproduct of joint training exercises and could facilitate NGO-military collaboration. This theme will be expanded upon in chapter 4 of this study. While Yalcinkaya clearly states the incentive for NGOs to collaborate with the military (ISAF)—security, he does not sufficiently address what incentives the military has for collaborating with NGOs—presumably the completion of reconstruction, governance, and development efforts.

Logistics and security are two of the most important and well-known capabilities that militaries can provide NGOs in conflict areas. However, military practitioners need to understand the significant capabilities NGOs bring to conflict areas, such as—local, national, and regional expertise, rapid deployment, and enduring commitment to their programs. The capabilities, capacities, and limitations of NGOs should be understood prior to engaging in collaborative efforts by the military. There are three beneficial capabilities NGOs can provide: (1) flexibility to operate with all actors, (2) long-duration physical presence in conflict zones, and (3) ability to deal with more subjective aspects of conflict that official processes cannot (Chigas 2007, 553). NGOs are not restricted from dealing with illegitimate organizations in the same manner that government agencies are. Due to this flexibility, Chigas notes NGOs are an effective mechanism for engaging illegitimate organizations at the grass roots level (2007, 561).
Conducting reconciliation and mid to low-level diplomacy are examples of advocacy NGO activities. Recent literature on diplomacy delineates different tracks (or levels) of diplomatic efforts. Track one involves direct, high-level government or intergovernmental organization (IGO) diplomacy. Track one diplomacy could be described as traditional diplomacy between states. Below this are two more tracks, two and three. Track two diplomacy involves “unofficial dialogue and problem-solving activities aimed at building relationships and encouraging new thinking that can inform the official process. Track two activities typically involve influential academic, religious, and NGO leaders and other civil society actors who can interact more freely than high-ranking officials” (USIP 2013). NGOs work as intermediaries and advisors during track two (Chigas 2007, 558-559). Track three diplomacy is “undertaken by individuals and private groups to encourage interaction and understanding between hostile communities and involving awareness raising and empowerment within these communities. Normally focused at the grassroots level, this type of diplomacy often involves organizing meetings and conferences, generating media exposure, and political and legal advocacy for marginalized people and communities” (USIP 2013). Chigas provides a slightly more detailed description of track three:

In track three diplomacy, NGOs work with people from all walks of life and sectors of society to find ways to promote peace in settings of conflict. These efforts aim at overcoming revealed forms of direct, cultural, and structural violence, transforming unjust social relationships and promoting conditions that can help to create cooperative relationships. (Chigas 2007, 559)

An NGOs non-official capacity can be utilized by the military to indirectly engage illegitimate organizations. NGOs are not restricted from dealing with illegitimate organizations in the same manner that government agencies are. Due to this flexibility,
Chigas notes that NGOs are an effective mechanism for engaging illegitimate organizations at the grass roots level (2007, 561). Military practitioners who have managed established relationships with NGOs could benefit if they are given access to information garnered from illegitimate organizations. This being said, NGOs should not be treated as collection assets if the intent is to participate in a collaborative relationship. The need to engage each other with mutual respect in a quid pro quo relationship is elaborated upon in chapter 4.

Chigas also lists three primary conditions that limit the role of NGOs in conflict situations—(1) hostile political environment, (2) donor agenda/timeline, and (3) poor NGO strategies (2007, 570-573). If an NGO is conducting track three diplomacy in a state that is hostile to their efforts, the NGO is susceptible to intimidation efforts such as having visas denied, intimidation, or worse. NGOs, being dependent on donor support, are beholden to their donors. As such, NGOs may not be able to focus on an area deemed critical by the military. Like any military operation, NGO programs, when not properly planned risk exacerbating conflict situations.

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to clearly identifying the key salient points from the literature. Identifying commonalities, gaps, mechanisms for collaboration, and obstacles to collaboration is necessary for defining a typology of NGOs and developing a framework for future collaboration. These points will also be analyzed further in chapter 4 of this study.

Commonalities in the Literature

Though the literature is broad and diverse, there are several aspects that stand out because they appear multiple times. This section highlights the most important
commonalities found in the literature. (1) Institutional and cultural differences between NGOs and the military need to be overcome if collaborative efforts are to succeed. (2) NGOs fear cooperation with the military will damage their perception of impartiality and neutrality. (3) Personal relationships are important at all levels during collaborative efforts. (4) Advisors and liaison officers may assist collaborative efforts. (5) Distinctions are recognized between the different types of NGOs (humanitarian aid, religious, etc.). (6) In the NGO and scholarly communities, distinctions are recognized between the different levels of NGOs (INGO, LNGO). (7) INGOs were suspicious of and hesitant to work with the U.S. military. (8) NGO and military operations increasingly converged in the 1990s. (9) NGOs often need logistical support and security to maximize their capabilities. (10) The military needs accurate and timely information in order to maximize their capabilities. (11) There is a general lack of trust between NGOs and the military (related to number one in this list). (12) During operations, there is a need for coordinating mechanisms. (13) NGOs work well with the UN. (14) NGOs are beholden to donors.

The following two subchapters—collaborative mechanisms and obstacles to collaboration, are not exclusive from the commonalities gleaned in the literature, in fact there is overlap in content. Their purpose is meant to highlight these areas the literature reveals as facilitating or hindering NGO-military cooperation in order to be utilized for analysis in chapter 4.

**Collaborative Mechanisms**

This study defines a collaborative mechanism as something that brings NGOs and the military together to produce a beneficial outcome that otherwise would not have
occurred. The following seven points are the identified NGO-military collaborative mechanisms as portrayed by the literature. (1) NGO-driven coordinating bodies such as the NCCNI in Iraq. (2) Military-led coordinating bodies such as a CMOC. (3) UN coordination centers such as the HOC in Somalia. (4) Military in extremis support of NGOs. (5) U.S. military Civil Affairs units. (6) Civil-military exercises such as Common Effort. (7) NGO-military coordination with and through USAID or its OFDA and their equivalents.

Obstacles to Collaboration

Obstacles to collaboration between NGOs and the military include a general lack of trust related to cultural differences. Another obstacle is NGO need for political impartiality versus inherent political nature of military operations. Differing perceptions of security requirements has been another issue affecting collaboration. For the military security is often a paramount concern, especially in new OEs. NGOs may be more familiar with an area and resent the military conducting parallel operations with armored vehicles and weapons while the NGO takes no security precautions. A final obstacle is that NGOs find differing national caveats of militaries during multinational operations makes it difficult to coordinate with the military.

Identified Gaps in the Literature

The literature fails to describe broad collaborative mechanisms for NGO-military interaction. The USIP Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations and the USIP-InterAction Guidelines are non-binding attempts at establishing a basic framework for NGO-military interaction. However, for those large segments of the
military population unfamiliar with fundamental NGO operations and characteristics, there is nothing to guide their interactions.

Lawry’s *Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military* is certainly a good introduction to NGO-military interaction for the military professional. It depicts coordinating bodies such as military CMOCs and the (NGO led) NCCNI in Iraq. However what is missing from this guide is a detailed portrayal of how these coordinating mechanisms are formed and how they operate. There is no delineation between different levels of NGOs (i.e. LNGO, INGO). Furthermore, there is no distinction between how the genesis of joint NGO-military coordinating bodies affects collaboration. This would be most beneficial in determining which agency is best postured to establish a coordinating mechanism for collaborative operations—the UN, the military, or NGOs.

JP 1 and JP 3-08 require DOD units to conduct effective coordination with NGOs. U.S Army Unified Action doctrine stresses synchronization, coordination and/or integration with (among others) NGOs. U.S. DOD doctrine does not provide sufficient guidance on which types of NGOs to engage for potential collaboration or how military practitioners can maximize collaborative efforts with NGOs. Furthermore, DOD doctrine does not even provide a distinction between different types or levels of NGOs.

The following chapter details the research methodology for this study. Following chapter 3, chapter 4 incorporates the literature review, analyzes case studies, and practitioner interviews with the intent of establishing a distinct typology of NGOs for military reference and a framework for future collaborative NGO-military interactions.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The methodological approach of this paper facilitates the construction of a theory of NGO-military interactions. This methodology is influenced by Staniland (2012) and offers a plausible theory based on real-world empirics found in scholarly articles, case studies, and practitioner interviews. The theory predicts that a military's operational outcome varies with the type of operation a military engages in and whether the military cooperates with local or international NGOs. This study analyzes INGO-military and LNGO-military collaborative efforts during disaster, post-conflict, and conflict operations.

Abductive reasoning is utilized to draw salient points from observations found in the scholarly literature of chapter 2. Abductive reasoning, sometimes “called reasoning by hypothesis” (Plutyinski 2011, 2) is an appropriate method for analyzing the observations in the literature review. Perez writes, “that ‘mindful’ abductive reasoning entails drawing from established scholarly theories (among other sources of perspective) to inform the process by which we come up with explanations of and interventions in complex cases” (2013). The scholarly articles are generally less specific and less limited in scope than the case studies and interviews covered in chapter 4. In chapter 2, this study dissects the observations in the articles and provides the likeliest possible explanation for the data set in the form of identified commonalities, collaborative mechanisms, and obstacles to collaboration.

Inductive reasoning is utilized to analyze the raw textual data found in the case studies and practitioner interviews introduced in chapter 4. “In inductive reasoning,
scientists—principally concerned with theory formulation—attempt to discern general, stylized facts common to specific cases. These commonalities form the basis of a theory” (Perez 2013). Inductive reasoning is used to analyze the practitioner interviews and case studies because they are more specific and generally limited in their scope. The case studies provide observations on specific operations and the interviews provide observations on a specific operation or an individual point of view on one or two operations. The significant points from chapter two are brought forward and analyzed with case studies and practitioner interviews in chapter 4. These observations and outcomes will be applied to introduce an original theory for NGO-military collaboration by operational type.

The independent variables in this study are (1) the type of NGO-military interaction, and (2) the type of operation—disaster, conflict, or post-conflict. This study analyzes six potential types of military operational interactions with NGOs, as demonstrated in figure 1. I theorize the type of NGO-military interaction will affect the dependent variable (operational outcome).

![Independent Variables—Military-NGO Operational Collaboration](source)

Figure 1. Independent Variables—Military-NGO Operational Collaboration

*Source:* Created by author.
The dependent variable in this study is the operational outcome of NGO-military collaboration. The operational outcome of the interactions between NGOs and the military, as depicted in each of the six cells, will be analyzed and recorded in chapter 4.

A causal logic, or explanation, is attributed to each independent variable and the operational outcomes (dependent variable). Identifying which of the four causal logics—structural, institutional, ideational, or psychological serves to best demonstrate how operational outcomes are reached (Parsons 2007). Causal logics contributing to each of the six operational outcomes will be described in chapter 4.

A methodological weakness of this study includes asymmetrical data sets. That is, there is more data available on certain types NGO-military interaction during different operations. The asymmetry is most pronounced in disaster response operations where there is a limited data set on LNGO-military collaboration and a large data set on INGO-military collaboration during these operations. Another weakness is that abductive reasoning extracts the hypothetical observations from authors in chapter 2 without distilling their validity.

Strengths of this methodology include drawing from multiple data pools—scholarly articles, case studies, and practitioner interviews. These sources derive from a diverse array of peer-reviewed journals, the U.S. Army’s Combat Studies Institute (CSI), and NGO case studies and reports. Drawing data from a diverse array of sources, utilizing abductive reasoning to draw from established scholarly theories on interventions in complex cases, and using inductive reasoning to discern general, stylized facts common to specific cases gives this study applicability across both the scholarly and policy-making communities.
The following chapter applies the methodology discussed in this chapter to analyze NGO-military interaction during conflict, post-conflict, and disaster operations. Chapter 5 will conclude the study and provide recommendations for military application of its findings.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

Coordinating the activities of NGOs could be likened to herding cats.
— Francis Kofi Abiew, 2010

The evidence is far from optimal, but optimal evidence does not exist for problems such as those explored in this book.
— Stathis Kalyvas, 2006

The Kalyvas quote rings true when studying NGO-military interaction by operational type. The evidence of interactions during certain operations is quite large, while other potential operational convergences are lacking in great detail. This chapter analyzes military involvement in the six operational sectors depicted in figures 1 and 2. The sectors analyzed are LNGO-military interaction and INGO-military interaction by type of operation—disaster, post-conflict, and conflict. The data is derived from the literature examined in chapter 2, and case studies and practitioner interviews introduced in chapter 4. The case studies are from two sources—CSI and the International Commission on Voluntary Agencies (ICVA). The practitioner interviews are solely from CSI.

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Figure 2. Typology of NGO-Military Expected Outcomes

Source: Created by author.
Figure 2 details the expected outcomes of NGO-military interaction by operational type. This study finds that the military can expect collaboration to occur with INGOs during disaster response operations and with LNGOs during conflict operations. During disaster operations it can be expected that LNGOs and the military will operate in separate spheres. Evidence suggests that LNGOs may be involved in disaster response operations, however the extent of a disaster and the nature of military responses does not engender collaborative operations. In other words, if LNGOs conduct disaster relief operations it is done separate from the military. During post-conflict operations, the military can expect limited collaboration with LNGOs and a tacit coexistence with INGOs. LNGOs are not averse to operating with the military, but the nature of post-conflict operations does not suggest a full collaborative relationship is likely to occur.

This study assesses there is likely to be a tacit coexistence between INGOs and the military during post-conflict operations because both organizations perform critical functions in parallel. INGO commitment to impartiality limits collaborative efforts though. This commitment to impartiality also affects the INGO-military relationship during conflict operations. Taking sides during inherently political conflict operations is what militaries usually do. This is anathema to INGOs and as such they have a profound ideological clash with the military. The remainder of this chapter explains in greater detail how the typology in figure 2 was achieved.

Disaster

Two disaster relief operations are considered in this study—operations following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, and Operation Sea Angel following the 1991 cyclone in Bangladesh. It is noteworthy that of the six sectors to be analyzed, LNGO-military
interaction during disaster relief operations has the smallest data pool from which to study. INGO-military interaction during disaster relief operations has a far greater pool of data available.

**LNGO-Military**

The global response was rapid and robust following the 7.0 earthquake centered on Port-au-Prince on 10 January 2010. According to some reports, the earthquake killed over 200,000 people and left over 1.3 million homeless. Many key Haitian government structures were destroyed in the earthquake and many essential civil servants were killed or lost family members. This contributed to a chaotic Haitian government in the initial months of the response and recovery.

The ICVA NGO case study reports some CSOs and LNGOs did contribute to the relief efforts but it gives no detail on military interaction with these types of organizations. It does, however note: “coordination between the international and humanitarian community and their national and local counterparts within the Haitian government and civil society has been particularly weak, resulting in weak national and local ownership” (Hedlund 2012a, 11).

This study found no evidence of LNGO-military collaboration in Bangladesh. The lack of reported LNGO-military interaction could be due to one or more of several factors, including—the massive INGO response, substantial military response, effectiveness of the government of Bangladesh, or the relative short duration of the international response.

There is some evidence LNGOs do conduct relief efforts following disasters, and this study does not discount them. However, this study found no information on LNGO-
military collaboration during relief efforts. For this reason, I posit the expected outcome of LNGOs and the military operating in disaster relief operations to be separate operational spheres (see figure 2). That is, the military will likely conduct its operations independently or with other non-LNGO organizations. LNGOs, if they are conducting operations will not likely be working with the military.

A recent study suggests military forces might serve as the initial engine for start-up of LNGO relief operations following disasters, but host nation organizations (LNGOs and CSOs) must drive projects to institute positive changes in the environment. More specifically, David notes that local organizations can significantly increase the effectiveness of civil military operations and help limit the footprint required by military forces (David 2013). David’s theory suggests that the military and affected populations could benefit from the military seeking out operational LNGOs and providing them with seed money or logistical help in support the relief effort.

The dearth of evidence on LNGO-military interaction may be due to a structural causal logic. “Structural claims explain what people do as a function of their position vis-à-vis exogenously given ‘material’ structures like geography, a distribution of wealth, or a distribution of physical power. People’s actions vary as their position in a given material landscape varies” (Parsons 2007, 9). Of the organizations considered in analysis of disaster relief operations, only LNGOs were completely inside the country when the disaster occurred. As such, they have the greatest likelihood of having their operationally ability affected by the disaster. The structural effects included the physical structural damage to the operational ability of LNGOs and the chaos and diffusion of power within the country following the earthquake. Parsons writes, “we should reserve the
institutionalist label for claims in which institutions cause something—in which the configuration of formal or informal organizations, rules or norms around someone causes her to act in certain ways” (Parsons 2007, 67). This succinctly explains why structural rather than institutional causation explains why LNGOs and the military are likely to operate in separate spheres during disaster response operations. The physical structure of the environment has greater impact to this relationship than the rules or norms of the military or LNGOs.

The lack of literature or case study evidence on LNGO-military collaboration during disaster relief operations leads to the conclusion that the military should focus its collaborative efforts on INGOs during humanitarian operations. Military planners at the GCC or equivalent level should not ignore LNGOs though. Databases of LNGOs where humanitarian emergencies may arise should be maintained in the event LNGO assistance could benefit military operations. However, the bulk of the planning and operational efforts during humanitarian operations should be given to INGOs.

**INGO-Military**

Two coordination centers were established in Haiti within the first week following the 10 January 2010 earthquake. One was established by the UN and the other by the U.S. military. The United Nations Disaster Assistance Coordination team established a virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Center to coordinate 52 search and rescue (SAR) teams. The UN coordination center was the primary interface mechanism for INGOs and non-U.S. military contingents. The U.S. military established the Joint Operations and Tasking Center, which allowed INGOs and humanitarian workers to
access the airport and request military assets and security for their relief and recovery operations (Hedlund 2010a).

USAID contracted InterAction to establish an NGO coordination office for the 82 U.S.-based INGOs operating in Haiti following the earthquake. InterAction’s NGO coordination office served as the primary liaison point for U.S. military and USAID interaction with U.S. INGOs. Its office was located as close as physically possible to UNOCHA’s main office in Port-au-Prince (Hedlund 2010a). Military support to INGO relief efforts largely consisted of securing ports and storage facilities and air and ground logistical support.

The effects of the earthquake and an extended history of ineffective government institutions contributed to the Haitian government not being closely involved in the relief efforts or security. The security situation in Haiti was such that military contingents sometimes carried weapons when conducting their operations. Because rioting and looting occurred in many areas of Haiti this study assesses there was a partial breakdown of society. The loss of many key government structures and officials certainly exacerbated this situation. This study has found that most military operations in response to disasters alone have a short duration. Haiti was no different with all international military contingents gone by 1 April 2010.

Physical conditions resultant from cyclone Marian were a major consideration during Operation Sea Angel. The extent of the damage was such that only two points of entry were available for delivery of humanitarian assistance supplies and personnel. Also, the Bangladeshi Army was capable of providing transportation for supplies inland to much of the country. During this operation participants in the relief operation reported
that no UN or OFDA presence led to a streamlining of the NGO-military relationship. A fully functioning CMOC was never established, as such the CMOC did not play a large role in Bangladesh. Due to limited points of entry much of the relief operation was conducted and coordinated from naval ships. There were never more than 500 U.S. military personnel on the ground in Bangladesh (Seiple 1996).

The military response consisted of the Bangladeshi Army, all U.S. military branches, and military elements from Great Britain, Japan, and China also contributed to the operation. INGO-military collaboration in Bangladesh largely involved INGOs reporting where and what type of assistance was needed. The military would then utilize naval assets to deliver the aid.

The security situation in Bangladesh was stable and military contingents did not generally carry weapons. One of the reasons for this was the maintained social fabric in Bangladeshi society. Other operations such as Somalia and Rwanda witnessed the unwinding of normal social life, while others like northern Iraq during Operation Provide Comfort and Haiti saw a partial breakdown of society.

Because INGOs were prepared to meet the humanitarian assistance needs of the populace following the cyclone, the military was mostly required for its air and naval logistical assets. This presents a point for future anticipatory coordination between INGOs and the military. INGOs and militaries both have large stockpiles of food, water, shelters, medicine, etc. to be administered following disasters. Inventory lists of stockpiled supplies should be shared between NGOs and the military to facilitate collaboration during future humanitarian operations.
Some of the differences between NGO responses and NGO-military collaboration can be attributed to the different types of disasters. Earthquakes do not allow for pre-operational planning. Cyclones and hurricanes may give NGOs and the military a few days to prepare a response plan. Famines or genocidal conflicts offer varying times for pre-operational planning. Conducting interagency and NGO-military exercises and information sharing on a regular basis would facilitate increased readiness and collaboration when real-world NGO-military operations occur.

The expected operational outcome of INGO-military interaction during disaster response operations is collaboration. The evidence from Haiti and Bangladesh demonstrate the willingness of INGOs to collaborate with the military during disaster relief operations. Institutional and structural causal logics explain why INGOs and the military are likely to collaborate during disaster relief operations. Parsons writes, “institutional claims explain what people do as a function of their position within man-made organizations and rules (and within the ‘path-dependent’ process implied by man-made constraints: people’s choices at time $t$ alter their own constraints at $t + 1$)” (2007, 9). INGOs often have a commitment to impartiality as part of their operational philosophy (rules). This, as the study shows later, is often problematic for the INGO-military relationship. However, disaster response operations are less likely to be politically motivated. Therefore, INGO-military collaboration is more likely because INGO rules and norms make them less averse to collaboration with the military during disaster response operations. The physical structure of the environment following natural or man-made disasters also drives collaboration between INGOs and the military. The
need to aid stricken populations in areas accessible to only the military or technically skilled INGO SAR personnel further drives this convergence.

**Post-Conflict**

This study will analyze NGO and military efforts during post-conflict operations in Iraq (Operation Provide Comfort), Operation Support Hope in Rwanda and Zaire, and Kosovo. The post-conflict relief and development operations in Kosovo and Rwanda both occurred in environments that had seen violent ethnic cleansing. Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq was a U.S.-led coalition aimed at staving off a humanitarian disaster for the Kurds fleeing Saddam Hussein’s feared wrath in Iraq following Operation Desert Storm. Incidentally, the Kurds were fleeing what they feared would be ethnic targeting from the Hussein regime.

**LNGO-Military**

NATO involvement in Kosovo was a key point in NGO-military cooperation. Sometimes referred the first humanitarian war, Kosovo demonstrated the willingness and capability of NATO to conduct peacebuilding operations. NGOs (primarily INGOs), feeling their territory was being trampled upon, resented what they felt was NATO overstepping into the humanitarian assistance realm.

In Kosovo, the largest inter-NGO organization was the INGO Council. Two other inter-NGO bodies existed in Kosovo at the time—the Islamic Council of NGOs, and the Local NGO Council. The need for relief and reconstruction far exceeded the contingencies the INGO Council had planned for. Because the INGO community was not prepared for the level of effort required and the UN was slow in establishing operations,
in Kosovo “some NGOs worked directly with the military in contravention of basic humanitarian principles, showing that not every NGO was concerned with coordinating positions” (Currion 2012b, 2). Many of the NGOs that worked with the military were LNGOs.

The relatively small physical size of Kosovo affected NGO operations in a positive way Kosovo:

Unlike many other post-conflict countries, Kosovo was small and secure, making it significantly easier for INGOs to develop their work. The needs within Kosovo were comparatively clear (although the lines between “relief” and “development” were blurred) and, apart from the emergency need for shelter, not huge in scale or scope. In practical terms, nearly every NGO had their head office in Pristina, a small city where all important meetings were held within a one square mile area. (Currion 2012b, 8)

Prior to the winter of 1999-2000, the UN assessed its preparations with the NGOs for the returning Kosovar Albanian refugees as inadequate. Due to the inability of the UN and INGOs, NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) was requested to mitigate potential problems with winterizing the refugee facilities. KFOR provided logistical infrastructure for both LNGO and INGO operations aimed at winterizing refugee facilities. This is an example of a typical point of LNGO-military collaboration—LNGOs provided materials, expertise, and local knowledge while the military provided logistical support. For the military practitioner, providing LNGOs with logistical support can serve as their contribution in a quid pro quo relationship aimed at utilizing LNGO expertise, materials, or information.

During this post-conflict operation the presence of three separate inter-NGO organizations—one LNGOs, one INGOs, the other religious NGOs is significant. The ICVA case study on post-conflict operations in Kosovo provides evidence of
convergence between different types of NGOs and does not report over burdensome competition between INGOs and LNGOs. This is an important point because, as this study will show later, competition between INGOs and LNGOs can be troublesome during conflict operations.

There is evidence of LNGO-military collaboration in Kosovo but this study found no evidence of LNGO-military collaboration in Rwanda or Iraq during Operation Provide Comfort. The rapid onset and ferocity of the violence that occurred in Rwanda and in the Kurdish dominated areas of northern Iraq did not allow for LNGOs to operate even if they had been previously present.

The expected operational outcome for LNGO-military interaction during post-conflict operations is limited collaboration. This expected outcome is such because the reported collaboration is certainly greater than LNGO-military interaction during disaster relief operations. However, the level of collaboration between LNGOs and the military is not as great as during conflict operations as this study demonstrates later in this chapter.

This study assesses structural causality as an explanation for the expected operational outcome for LNGO-military interaction during post-conflict operations. Regarding the structural causal logic, Parsons writes, “we need more of a mechanism that makes action into a ‘direct function’ of a concrete external environment” (2007, 52). LNGO-military interaction during post-conflict operations are greatly influenced by the external environment. Institutional causality is not a sufficient explanation because the physical and political structure are the primary factors in the LNGO-military relationship during post-conflict operations. The security conditions and general political chaos in
Iraq and Rwanda were not conducive to NGO operations. In Kosovo however the security situation allowed for points of collaboration between NGOs and the military.

**INGO-Military**

In Iraq during Operation Provide Comfort, the U.S.-led military coalition worked extensively with NGOs, such as CARE and the International Rescue Committee, to deliver relief supplies and establish refugee centers for the fleeing Kurds. However, during the initial weeks of the crisis there was no NGO presence. U.S. military Special Forces and Civil Affairs personnel had to perform the bulk of the humanitarian assistance mission until the NGOs began to fulfill that role (Seiple 1996). INGO-military collaborative in northern Iraq benefited from two effective coordination centers—the military CMOC, and the NGO-led NGO Coordination Center for Northern Iraq (NCCNI).

Operation Provide Comfort is classified as a post-conflict operation because it occurred in the wake of Operation Desert Storm and the ensuing brutal crackdown on the Kurds by the Saddam Hussein regime. However, the high level of NGO-military cooperation can be attributed to the fact that it was largely a humanitarian operation aimed at relieving immediate suffering. There was no reported collaboration between the military and NGOs to conduct long-term development or reconstruction operations.

During Operation Support Hope in Rwanda and Zaire “there was no official interface between NGOs and the American military” (Seiple 1996, 160). This was because the UN led this operation and INGOs dealt directly with the UN. Also, the INGO community wanted the international relief effort to remain impartial (Seiple 1996). Fear of losing military personnel, such as what happened in Somalia, was also a factor in the
U.S. military subordinating itself to the UN and playing a relatively limited role. The
U.S. military provided logistical support, surveillance aircraft to track refugees, and
airport security for the UN. The UN in turn conducted direct coordination with INGOs to
deliver assistance.

In Kosovo there was a more established NGO presence than Iraq or Rwanda.
Eleven NGOs formed the INGO Council of Kosovo in January 1999. The INGO Council
comprised nearly all INGOs operating in Kosovo prior to Operation Allied Force (aka
Operation Noble Anvil). During the offensive, the INGO Council relocated to
Macedonia. Following the air war, nearly 400 NGOs flooded Kosovo seeking to assist in
the relief efforts. Of these, approximately 60 joined the INGO Council. INGO-military
interaction in Kosovo was similar to LNGO-military interaction, largely consisting of
NGOs providing information and the military providing logistical support of
winterization efforts for returning refugees. INGOs conducted long-term development
and reconstruction efforts independent from KFOR operations.

The expected operational outcome for INGO-military interaction during post-
conflict operations is tacit coexistence. INGO and military operations can be expected to
converge to alleviate humanitarian crises but INGOs are less amenable to collaborating
on longer-term operations.

Structural and institutional causality explains the relationship between INGO-
military interaction and expected tacit coexistence during post-conflict operations. The
security situation, particularly in Iraq and Rwanda, did not allow for much LNGO
operations. This created a need for INGO capabilities and the military was a willing
partner during the post-conflict operations studied here. The humanitarian assistance
portions of the post-conflict operations did not present a moral quandary for INGOs collaborating with the military. Following collaboration between INGOs and the military to alleviate immediate human suffering there is little evidence of INGO-military collaboration on long-term development and reconstruction operations.

Conflict

For this study, a conflict environment is defined as one in which the military is actively conducting violent combat operations. NGO-military interaction in Afghanistan and Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom will be considered.

LNGO-Military

In a 2007 interview with CSI, LTC Bennett Sunds explained that at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom the military found that in northern Iraq, the Kurdish political groups had maintained meticulous database of LNGOs and INGOs in their areas. Because of the database it was easier to contact NGOs and make logistical coordination for NGOs to provide humanitarian assistance throughout Iraq (Brand 2006). This is indicative of a high level of local and regional ownership in the northern, Kurdish dominated area of Iraq. Local ownership such as that explained by LTC Sunds seen is a recurring theme in the literature and case studies on NGOs in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan there was competition between INGOs and LNGOs. Dealing with competition between INGOs and LNGOs should be a planning consideration for military operations. If the capabilities of these organizations and their motivators are understood their value for collaboration with the military can be maximized. In Iraq, following the 2003 invasion there was also competition between INGOs and LNGOs. There was a
robust LNGO presence seeking to provide assistance at the local and national levels. The relatively effective Iraqi government institutions contributed to LNGOs receiving funds to provide assistance.

There is a large body of evidence in the literature, case studies, and practitioner interviews indicating LNGO-military collaboration during conflict operations (Brand 2006; Currion 2012a; Hedlund 2011b; Ives 2008; Rogers 2007). Conflict and stability operations are inherently more political than humanitarian operations. INGOs are more reluctant than LNGOs to collaborate with the military in such operations largely because of the political nature of conflict and stability operations. As such, military planners should account for the desire and eagerness of LNGOs to participate in development activities in their home countries.

In Afghanistan from 2002-2009 UNOCHA held a monthly civil-military working group attended by ACBAR, other NGOs, CSOs, and ISAF. This meeting went defunct in 2009 because, among other reasons, LNGOs felt their voices were being drowned out by the larger INGOs and ceased participation. “These issues exacerbated some of the previously minor divisions between international and national NGO members. While INGOs could afford to refuse funding from the PRTs based on their principles of neutrality and impartiality, national NGOs were in a more difficult position, since they had more difficulty accessing funds” (Currion 2012a, 5). LNGOs faced similar issues as the national NGOs mentioned by Currion regarding interaction with the Afghan government. LNGO need for funding makes them more likely to coordinate with military entities in exchange for funding.
Commander Varney, a U.S. Navy submarine officer, commanded a PRT in Paktika, Afghanistan in 2007. When he assumed command of the PRT there were no NGOs operating in Paktika province. In a 2008 CSI interview, Commander Varney states this was because the NGOs primarily followed the UN security assessments and the UN had declared the entire province unsafe due to the poor security situation. However, Commander Varney stated he knew certain districts in the province were tenable for NGO operations and there was a need for increased medical care. Bypassing the UN, Varney went straight to LNGOs to let them know that security was better than the UN reported. His efforts to have the PRT coordinate directly with NGOs resulted in four LNGOs each establishing a medical service clinic in separate districts of Paktika province (Ives 2008). This highlights the importance and effectiveness of direct LNGO-military coordination during conflict and post-conflict operations.

Commander Varney’s comments also indicate that it is more beneficial for NGOs to rely upon consultation with the military for security assessments than the UN. In this case study, the net result of the PRT providing security assessments to NGOs was the establishment of four new medical clinics in Paktika province. This is a win-win-win situation because the military is presumably working toward its development line of effort by increasing indigenous access to health care; the NGO is able to do its job (and thus please donors); and the populace benefits simply by receiving medical treatment.

Major Jibril was a U.S. Army Reserve CA officer who served in Iraq as the director of the NGO Assistance Center from March to October 2004. The NGO assistance center was a component of the larger Iraqi-led Iraq Assistance Center. Though she did work with large INGOs such as CARE and Oxfam, she primarily worked with
LNGOs in order to determine if they were legitimate assistance organizations or illegitimate organizations seeking funding for dubious activities. In a 2008 interview with CSI Jibril conveyed:

The vast majority of these NGOs were very small groups of Iraqis who just wanted to help others and were very good at addressing acute, immediate needs. While the American military was very willing to assist the NGOs, most preferred to operate alone because proximity to the Americans was seen by the enemy as taking sides, thereby making the NGO a terrorist target. (Rogers 2006, 1)

She mentions that “many international NGOs view the American military as aggressors while maintaining their neutrality towards all parties, but most Iraqi NGOs did not” (Rogers 2006, 1).

Jibril notes that U.S. commanders in Iraq were eager to contribute toward assistance efforts. However, it was not uncommon for LNGOs to be attacked or receive threats following a visit from U.S. soldiers seeking information or looking for ways to assist an organization. This was obviously problematic for U.S. military units conducting stability operations and eager to spend commander’s emergency response program (CERP) funds. It also highlights the need for a framework for NGO-military interaction because military units intending to assist in humanitarian efforts should understand how to engage NGOs. Jibril, working from the Green Zone in Baghdad had little issue coordinating with LNGOs. She reported INGOs however remained reluctant to direct interaction with the U.S. military. Jibril points out that USAID was an effective intermediary between the U.S. military and INGOs. She states, “I could work with USAID, which would then work with Mercy Corps and pass information down to them. But [INGOs] were not interested in working directly with us as a military force” (Rogers 2006, 6).
In this interview, Major Jibril reflects her opinion that a vast under utilized resource for the military and NGO development and assistance communities are the women of Iraq. Regarding this, Major Jibril stated:

The female-run NGOs were actually the best funded, the best organized and got the most done. They’re amazing and strong people, and we could have made so many more inroads with the NGOs if we had looked at that. It was very hard, though, to get even the CA people to realize that women are part of the answer. Women are a huge part of undermining the insurgency because they would bring a different kind of peace. Insurgencies are built neighborhood by neighborhood like gangs and if the women resist, the men will resist; but we didn’t give them that support. (Rogers 2006, 7)

The NGO Assistance Center, being a sub-organization under the larger Iraqi-led Iraqi Assistance Center, was inherently tied to the Iraqi Ministries. The Iraqi central government had approving authority for funds released to NGOs. The relative stability of government institutions in Iraq allowed for smoother interactions with between actors in the action arena. Juxtaposing the situation in Iraq in 2004 with that of the chaotic Haitian government in 2010 yields the conclusion that host-nation government ability affects the NGO-military collaborative process. The large number of Iraqi NGOs eager to assist in humanitarian assistance and rebuilding the country could be interpreted as a strong sense of indigenous national ownership not seen in other situations.

Structural causal logics explain NGO-military collaboration during conflict operations. Conflict often leads to a physical environment in need of reconstruction and populations in need of assistance. The nonmanipulable man-made physical structure of conflict environments drive NGO-military collaboration.
Following the withdrawal of the Soviet military from Afghanistan in 1998, NGOs enjoyed a great deal of independence because of the lack of a functioning government. The primary coordinating body for NGOs operating in Afghanistan, the Agency Coordination Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) was formed by NGOs in 1998 and based in Peshawar, Pakistan. NGO freedom to operate was somewhat curbed when the Taliban came to power in 1996 and halted NGO projects they deemed inappropriate. Following the post-September 11th U.S.-led invasion and the subsequent arrival of coalition forces and the UN, NGOs working in Afghanistan were faced with a new paradigm. The establishment of an internationally recognized Afghan government and the renewed international focus on Afghan development contributed to the paradigm shift. The legitimate Afghan government added another actor to the arena that could facilitate NGO-military interaction, however from the NGO perspective it somewhat decreased their freedom to operate. Going in to Afghanistan in 2001, the United States was well aware of the need to provide humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people. CENTCOM accounted for this in its campaign plans. NATO conducted airdrops of humanitarian supplies to include food, water, and other essential items during the early stages of the campaign.

For Operation Enduring Freedom INGO-military convergence began during pre-invasion planning sessions in the U.S. Following the invasion, both NGOs and the military were primarily concerned with relieving the immediate humanitarian crisis. Once the situation was stabilized to pre-invasion levels the military became involved in limited-scale development work through PRTs as part of its counterinsurgency campaign.
INGOs also conducted development work, but INGO need for impartiality limited their willingness to work directly with the military. In both Iraq and Afghanistan INGOs were more likely to collaborate with USAID or other government international development agencies than directly with the military.

NATO’s humanitarian assistance operation was controversial amongst the NGO community because some felt CENTCOM’s humanitarian assistance mission was ill-planned and only meant to serve a political purpose. NGOs criticized the NATO humanitarian assistance response of dropping aid pallets at the same time as running a bombing campaign as deceptive. For CENTCOM, “the humanitarian aspects of the plan would set conditions by providing initial relief and creating a secure environment into which the IOs and NGOs could then move and begin their operations” (Wright 2010, 50-51). NATO humanitarian assistance was critically important because most NGOs had fled to Pakistan during the early, kinetic stages of the invasion. This contributed to a dearth of non-military organizations capable of offering humanitarian assistance. According to Wright, following major combat operations, “CENTCOM planned to rely on the existing infrastructure as much as possible and to allow Afghans, NGOs, and Coalition partners to take the lead, especially on reconstruction operations” (2010, 51). In essence, CENTCOM acknowledged it needed to play a large role in providing humanitarian assistance, but had no initial intention of getting involved in development work, which was traditionally conducted by indigenous governments, INGOs, LNGOs, and international government development agencies.

In late 2001, U.S. Army CA units established Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLCs), which were like CMOCs but solely focused on coordination and
assistance of humanitarian assistance distribution. “The CHLC concept proved so successful that it inspired the creation of experimental Joint Regional Teams, which would later evolve into Provincial Reconstruction Teams that would be subsequently deployed throughout Afghanistan. The Coalition’s decision to provide direct delivery of humanitarian assistance and quick action projects also signaled a move away from the partnership with NGOs and IOs” (Wright 2010, 195).

Soon after September 11th, LTC Sunds’ CA team was sent to Pakistan to assist the civil-military response to the unfolding situation in Afghanistan. His interaction with LNGOs and INGOs in Pakistan is congruent with the ICVA case study. His team worked out of a CHLC. He notes that information on the security situation in Afghanistan was passed directly to NGOs or through the UN. He recalls that his team worked extensively with the U.S.-based INGOs Samaritan’s Purse and CARE International. Interaction between the military and INGOs primarily consisted of passing security updates and assisting with logistical aspects of providing humanitarian aid (Brand 2006).

In Afghanistan, ISAFs approach to development was to funnel efforts through PRTs. INGOs complained that PRTs “blurred the lines between civilian and military development activities, and consequently between civilian and military actors” (Currion 2012a, 5). The inherent political mission of the PRTs left little room for collaboration with INGOs committed to impartiality.

Many of the same issues between INGOs and the military in Afghanistan were also seen in Iraq beginning in 2003. USAID funded several large U.S.-based INGOs and implemented the Joint NGO Preparedness Initiative (JNEPI) to prepare for the post-combat relief operation following Operation Iraqi Freedom. “However many non-US
(and a few US) [NGOs] were concerned that humanitarianism was used to justify the invasion…As such, JNEPI did not gain a sufficient audience and acceptance amongst the wider NGO community due to its sources of funding and its real or perceived association with the Coalition Forces” (Hedlund 2012b, 1). Finding the JNEPI an insufficient coordination mechanism, fourteen INGOs who had maintained a pre-invasion presence, independently established the NGO Coordinating Committee in Iraq (NCCI) in April 2003. At its inception the NCCI was an NGO-pure coordinating body, focusing on all service sectors throughout Iraq. NCCI coordination with the UN occurred primarily through the OCHA in Baghdad. As the security situation in Iraq deteriorated throughout 2005-2006, NCCI shifted its focus to funding local LNGOs. “This was considered competition by INGOs doing similar work and was not well received by member agencies” (Hedlund 2012b, 3). Between 2006-2008, competition and squabbling between LNGOs and INGOs combined with high turnover rates at the NCCI decreased effective coordination to the point that “a decision to dissolve the NCCI coordination structure appeared imminent.” However, “since August 2009, NCCI has experienced a renaissance. A new executive coordinator has led the consolidation of the NCCI structure and staff and revived the NCCI field presence, in part by increasing local participation and representation” (Hedlund, 4). Though not specified, it is likely that the increase in “local participation and representation” is recognition of the important role played by LNGOs in conflict and post-conflict environments such as Iraq in 2009.

The desire of INGOs to remain impartial should be respected if the military intends to maintain collaborative relationships with INGOs during future operations. As noted earlier, INGOs have been willing to collaborate with the military prior to combat
operations in order to stave off humanitarian disaster. For this reason, INGOs should continue to be engaged in the military planning process with the mutual understanding that their efforts in planning will only be used to alleviate suffering. Assuredly, future INGO-military pre-operational planning for combat operations will be contentious within the NGO community and discretion should be paramount if this collaborative relationship is to occur in the future.

Ideologically, the military and INGOs are most at odds during conflict operations. Combat operations are inherently impartial and therefore incongruent with the objectives of most INGOs. For this reason I assess the expected outcome to be a clashing of ideologies. A caveat to this is that INGOs have shown willingness to coordinate efforts for purely humanitarian and impartial relief aspects concurrent to combat operations. For the military, collaboration with INGO for anything other than impartial provision of humanitarian assistance should not be expected.

Institutional causality explains the clashing ideologies between the military and INGOs during conflict operations. Parsons writes, “we should reserve the institutionalist label for claims in which institutions cause something—in which the configuration of formal or informal organizations, rules or norms around someone causes her to act in certain ways” (2007, 67). Militaries conduct the political will of their governments and are therefore impartial. INGOs aim to maintain impartiality as they believe it is the key to their literal survival in the field and essential to keeping donor funds flowing. This divergence of ideologies is most at odds during conflict operations.

This study finds that operational efficacy between the military and NGOs varies by type of operation and by type of interaction. Based on inference from the literature,
practitioner interviews, and case studies I theorize the military can expect the highest level of collaboration with INGOs during disaster relief operations and the highest level of cooperation with LNGOs during conflict operations. NGO-military interaction during post-conflict operations ranges from limited collaboration to tacit coexistence. LNGOs have a limited ability to operate in disaster response operations. INGOs are ideologically opposed to collaborating with the military during combat operations. The need for impartiality is the most important factor for INGOs to consider when considering potential collaboration with the military. The ability or inability for LNGOs to conduct operations and the willingness to accept military funding are the primary factors when considering military collaboration.

The military should apply this theory for NGO collaboration in its doctrine and mid-career education. A nuanced understanding of which type of NGOs are most likely to engage in a collaborative effort with the military can save time and resources by focusing military efforts toward the type of NGO most likely to collaborate with the military. Incorporating this theory into mid-career military education instruction will allow future military planners and commanders to approach NGOs in a manner more conducive to collaborative operations. Expanding the depth of detail on NGOs in military doctrine will give military practitioners a greater knowledge base for conducting effective collaborative operations.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the unfolding nature of [the NGO-military] relationship, tidy conclusions are out of the question.

— Chris Seiple

Conclusions

The prospect of potentially collaborating with literally hundreds of autonomous NGOs, all beholden to different constituencies and pursuing independent agendas seems daunting. This study and its findings offer a means to engage NGOs in a manner that is less overwhelming. The literature review identified commonalities, collaborative mechanisms, and obstacles to collaboration and revealed an avenue for NGO-military collaboration. By analyzing these points, considering relevant case studies, and practitioner interviews this study has developed a typology of expected outcomes for NGOs and the military by type of operation. The typology of expected NGO-military outcomes proffered in this study offers the military practitioner a more orderly means to engage NGOs.

The findings of this study have revealed a more gradated understanding of the broad term NGO. Military doctrine does not sufficiently address these distinctions, though the literature is rich with the distinctions between all types of NGOs. INGOs and LNGOs are distinctly different organizations. They have differing approaches to impartiality, different constituencies, and vastly different capabilities. As such, the military needs to approach these organizations in different manners. Military doctrine should be updated to reflect a more nuanced understanding of NGOs. Understanding their
differences should lead to increased collaborative efforts that will benefit military operations and NGO programming.

**Recommendations**

Topics for further study uncovered include the following: (1) NGO-military collaboration when multiple militaries conduct non-coalition operations, (2) LNGO-military interaction in disaster and post-conflict operations. There is evidence in literature from the NGO community that differing national caveats negatively affects desirability of NGO-military collaboration. Gaining a better understanding of operations, such as those that occurred in Haiti and Bangladesh, where military forces conducted operations outside of a coalition effort would benefit future efforts. There is a small data pool of information on LNGO-military interaction during disaster and post-conflict operations. By conducting a detailed study of how these interactions have proceeded or why they don’t occur could further contribute to the typology offered in this study.


