ELIMINATION OF 1994 GENDER RESTRICTION: WILL EARNING THE RANGER TAB ACHIEVE FULL CAREER POTENTIAL FOR WOMEN?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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Elimination of 1994 Gender Restriction: Will Earning the Ranger Tab Achieve Full Career Potential for Women?

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This thesis examines the linkage between credibility and the qualified Ranger leader within combat arms. It includes organizational culture and the impact on fundamental change. Justification for women’s attendance is not necessary as the authorization to compete was officially accepted and the implementation guidance for opening job specialties has been published.

Full career potential in this study is defined as battalion command within 18-20 years of service. This study will assert that in order to reach full-career potential a combat arms officer should possess a Ranger Tab.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


The purpose of this thesis is to examine the necessity of Ranger School for a woman to achieve full-career potential after being commissioned in one of the combat arms branches. It is intended specifically for an American military audience.

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Lastly, I dedicate this to all the future female Army Rangers. I can only hope I am there to see you cross the finish line.

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<td>APRT</td>
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<td>Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue)</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Valor and sacrifice are no more limited by sexual orientation than they are by race or by gender or by religion or by creed.
—President Obama in Jackson, “President Praises Senate for Repeal of ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”

Nearly a year ago the Secretary of Defense, with recommendation and endorsement from all Service Chiefs, authorized the elimination of the 1994 Direct Ground Combat and Assignment Rule. The elimination of these restrictions has changed both women’s opportunity to serve and how the services integrate women into unit command structures below battalion level. In broad terms this change opens over 13,000 positions and 287,000 jobs within the Department of Defense previously closed to women. For the U.S. Army this changes the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment for 16 active duty Brigade Combat Teams and opens over 4,600 jobs to women on active duty.¹ Women serving as Commissioned Officers, Warrant Officers and Enlisted members will now be integrated.

The conclusion of this study will answer the question if a woman is commissioned as an Infantry Officer must she be developed through the same channels as a male in order to develop similar qualifications. As military personnel, women are provided the same level of appropriate training and have proven their abilities on the battlefield as well as fully integrated enablers with combat forces. At this point in our culture, we should not question an individual’s capability based upon gender, we should question equality amongst the professions and subsequently judge the individual’s capability based upon performance.

¹
Thesis Statement

This study explores women’s status in the U.S. Army 20 years ago and how that, along with public opinion, shaped their assignment options. It will also explore the current implementation guidance of women’s assignments in the Army and discuss implementation guidance directed not later than 13 September 2013.

Background

Under the previous assignment guidelines, a combat or combat-related unit had gender restrictions on personnel assignments due to the nature of the unit’s mission and the geographic locations of primary operations. The command level in which women could be assigned was also restricted. Under direction by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, each service branch has until 2016 to provide explicit evidence to reject the change.

Prior to the announcement this year there may or may not have previously been a designated career roadmap for women serving in direct combat units or combat roles. Typically their career developed through putting their names on the board for challenging positions and/or personally pursuing the “harder” or “choice” jobs that showed their potential. In most recent years positions that became necessity in Brigade Combat Teams, not necessarily combat Military Occupational Specialties (MOS), were filled through immediate requisitions through Branch Managers, regardless of gender. This directly correlates to the attitudinal and societal changes within the U.S. Army as the genders have become better integrated at lower levels over the years.

The way war is conducted has changed with technology and globalization. Thus, the U.S. Army has evolved in the way in which we employ our forces. With it, job
specialty became the leading factor, not gender or ethnicity in deciding which personnel fulfilled various duties.

From a broad historical perspective, women were only initially enlisted in order to be more widely integrated into Army functions beginning with 1948, which were strictly limited to perform medical and administrative functions. In review of the 1991 summary to the President, it was noted that Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape training was a prudent preparation for women who were going to a contingency with the likelihood of capture. This recommendation pointed out that preparing everyone for war was essential, not just personnel in direct combat.

During Operation Desert Storm women comprised approximately 6.8 percent of U.S. forces deployed to the Persian Gulf, of which 26,000 were women in the Army. Their roles were flying reconnaissance aircraft and helicopters, driving supplies and equipment into Kuwait, transporting enemy prisoners of war back into holding facilities, and commanding brigade, battalion, company and platoon size elements in combat support and combat service support areas. Of those 26,000 women, 13 were killed in combat and 2 were taken prisoner of war.

Paying credit to the importance of the ways in which women contributed to the war, the commission also reviewed the fact that Combat Support and Combat Service Support units at times went ahead of combat forces. This allowed the first situation where women may not be in combat jobs, yet they are in many ways on the front lines.

In examination of the topic, it is important to explore how restrictions were placed by gender and how that may have impacted the near 20-year restriction. The former restrictions were in place due to the state of the U.S. Army in the late 1980s into the mid-
In the 1990s, the social, religious, and family practice considerations for Americans were paramount. The U.S. Army was ending combat operations in Grenada in 1983, Operation Just Cause (Panama) in 1989, and Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield in 1991. The U.S. Army faced a downsizing of personnel as the nation determined the new strategic initiative. The state of the nation at this time may have impacted the public views of American family society. At this time in history, women were primarily housewives and within the family construct, which was also composed of one man, one woman united in marriage, and children. This construct would soon change as well.

The opinion of the American population was considered in voting on women’s roles within the services in 1991. On this particular subject, women in combat roles; the explanation of American opinion is included in the Presidential Commission report. The reason a combat exclusion and assignment restriction was implemented was in order to allow women to serve their country in multiple capacities, gender integration, and preserve the traditional family construct of society.

Polls of the American public during the last two years will be examined to provide disparity between opinions of women’s roles in combat and combat units, respectively the RAND poll, and the Gallup poll. Many areas of American culture support the expansion of jobs and the inclusion of women into the combat arms suggesting societal acceptance of women’s increased opportunities to serve in any job specialty and participation in combat. It is expected the societal acceptance has developed over the years in very recent terms influenced by Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.
In examination of social acceptance and attitudinal change there is a most recent and similar topic for review, the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell (DADT) policy, and the *DADT Repeal Act*. The U.S. Army has done a thorough examination on social change and implementation guidance. Like the expansion of women’s roles in the U.S. Army, DADT was steeped in controversy and was nearly a 20-year span between implementation of DADT and the *DADT Repeal Act*. The implementation guidance was delivered by the National Leadership to the forces through the Service Chiefs. This is also how the current implementation guidance for the expansion of positions for women was delivered. The policy was outdated based upon the reality on the ground and the family construct of our service members.

The Army has prided itself on being an equal opportunity employer, specifically in areas of racial, cultural and religious practices. The Army advertises itself for their diverse work force and also for being a leader in the services for possessing the best innovative technology. Within the Department of Defense the Army led with efforts in support of racial integration initiated by President Truman; however, the Army is seen by many to be traditionally averse to social change. The after-action reviews and compliance statistics, as well as impacts on social change, will be examined in relationship to implementation of women’s positions.6

**Problem Statement**

Women’s performance on the battlefield over the last 10 years has not only been exemplary, it helped to foster access to new positions and job specialties such as Female Engagement Team and Cultural Support Team with assignment to Ranger elements and Special Forces operational detachments. These positions specifically forged the
integration of women into combat units and combat roles. These most recent policy changes opened more combat specific professions, assignments to combat units and command opportunities. Additionally the authorization for women to attend Ranger School has further broadened opportunities. However, the modification of Modified Table of Organization and Equipment and assignment opportunities did not affect all MOSs or units, and the Infantry Branch is still off limits to females.

The other dynamic in this study is the bravado of the Ranger Tab and how it effects human interactions within combat arms, the social hierarchy as it may be. This hierarchy exists, and is termed “underlying beliefs” as part of the social culture. In the Army in general, members are credible based upon certifications and position, specifically what is adorned on their uniform, these are termed artifacts. These artifacts are easily discernible, but the underlying beliefs are not. These underlying beliefs reinforce the bravado of the Ranger Tab, which is what makes this a troublesome area for outsiders, in particular such a fundamental change as female Rangers. A recommendation for future research suggests there is a difference in the transition of a women entering smaller units such as Ranger and Special Forces versus the larger Infantry units.

Light Infantry units have rich traditions that are deeply rooted in their history, which up to present day did not include women. In future chapters we will examine culture and explain its development through long standing tradition and history. In chapter 4 the underlying beliefs will be discussed as a primary focus for such fundamental change as women possessing Ranger Tabs and whether or not women will be capable of full career potential or breaking the Kevlar ceiling as they break into this world. The question remains, will a woman attend Ranger School in order to achieve full-
career success? Is there potential for a woman to break the Kevlar ceiling? Will a woman be an 11A (Infantryman, Commissioned Officer MOS) or only be capable of earning the Ranger Tab?

**Definitions of Key Terms**

**Direct Combat:** Engaging an enemy with individual or crew served weapons while being exposed to direct enemy fire, a high probability to direct enemy contact with the enemy’s personnel and a substantial risk of capture. Direct combat takes place while closing with the enemy by fire, maneuver, and shock effect in order to destroy or capture the enemy, or while repelling the enemy’s assault by fire, close combat or counterattack.

**Grunt:** Word used to describe an Infantryman, describing the sound made when heaving a heavy load onto one’s body.

**Kevlar Ceiling:** A term used to describe the limitation on women’s in positions within the military. Direct relation to the combat restriction on women; it is the limitation of participation in and assignment specifications of women leading men in combat arms.

**Assumptions**

In determining research direction for the thesis topic there are multiple assumptions that can be made in order to support research, there are five assumptions identified by the researcher.

1. There is a population of female candidates, albeit small, willing to attend Ranger School.

2. There are female Officers willing to be transferred to or Cadets to be commissioned as Infantry Officers.
3. Physical fitness standards or completion requirements will not be changed to accommodate gender at this time.

4. Women who earn a Ranger Tab will be placed in a variety of units from the Ranger Regiment to below battalion level in Brigade Combat Teams.

5. The initial class of female Rangers will be of various ranks, backgrounds, and MOSs in order to properly diversify amongst the service.

Limitations

Due to the requirement of completion of this thesis no further research was conducted after 20 September 2013. Published guidance and updated policy as of 13 September 2013 was included.

The study also focused primarily on the Infantry Branch. The consideration for including all combat arms branches was maybe, and was determined too broad a perspective to achieve the topic of analysis and conclusion. Using the Infantry Branch as the focus of the study allowed analysis in career progression, transferability, and expected career milestones. Additionally, it is assumed the Infantry community will be the primary field in which women are integrated first.

Due to the environment of the researcher (Fort Leavenworth, KS), no observations or social data could be observed of the social hierarchy of an infantry unit during the period of study.

Delimitations

The inclusion of women to Ranger School is a highly controversial issue. Further stressing the topic is the added integration of women into below battalion level and in
combat MOSs. Given the developing bulk of information regarding the topic and potential longitudinal study this thesis did not cover implementation plan, family planning considerations, health concerns during training, or a physical developmental program for women. However, these are recommended in chapter 5. Nor has this study compared the Army plan with other services. Registration for selective service was not mentioned in this study. Finally, there was not an opportunity to compare candidates that would be physically capable of attending Army Ranger School. The author was only capable of making a recommendation.

Summary

This study seeks to explore the correlation between social change, and the current modern battlefield as it affects women’s roles within the U.S. Army and how that impacts employment opportunities. It further explains the possibility of a woman serving as an Infantry Officer within the Army and achieving a degree of career potential and satisfaction as such. Chapter 2 will present doctrine and policy, history of the 20-year Direct Ground Combat and Assignment Rule policy and the current Army position. It will also briefly discuss the supportive and unsupportive positions of the policy change. This chapter seeks to present all relevant objective information regarding the current Army policy and implementation guidance.

1Army Human Resources Command, Military Personnel Message 13-247, “Expanding Positions for Assignment of Women.” Army Human Resources Command, Ft. Knox, KY, 12 September 2012, specifically outlines which Brigade Combat Teams and at which levels women will be assigned. It affects active duty and reserve units. This message also includes implementation training required of the personnel in the Brigade Combat Team.

3 Ibid., C-47.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 These comparisons come from U.S. Army websites, public information documents regarding implementation of the DADT Repeal.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The following chapter presents doctrine and policy, history of the Direct Ground Combat and Assignment Rule policy and the current Army position regarding assignment of women within the Army. Presenting historic and current information will support the conclusions provided in chapters 4 and 5. The following review seeks to aid the reader in concluding whether or not fundamental change is possible within the U.S. Army and if that change begins with competition for a Ranger Tab or with organizational culture. Ultimately this answers the question if earning the Ranger Tab will assist women in achieving full career potential.

Being an Army Ranger is a time-honored privilege, as marked by historical moments in our nation’s wars. The Army Ranger came into existence in 1789 when Major Robert Rogers wrote the 12 rules of Ranging, thus coining “Rogers Rangers.” On the modern battlefield, as seen throughout history, land forces are essential to fighting and winning. This is the purpose of the U.S. Army Rangers. Their purpose is to be elite light infantry soldiers capable of complex operations in sensitive environments. Rangers are a strike force. They operate through direct action, airfield seizure, special reconnaissance, personnel recovery, clandestine insertion and sensitive site exploitation. All of these missions require a small unit capable as a strike force.¹ Rangers are expected to be mentally and physically fit, capable of making sound judgments and reasoned decisions, and deploy at a moment’s notice.
In the year 2016 the first group of women will attempt Army Ranger School. In the past, women have served in light infantry units as enablers or sustainers. For the majority of Ranger qualified personnel, they are Ranger qualified elite Infantrymen. The difference for women now becomes that they are members of the special operations population as an elite light infantryman.

There are two ways to enter the 75th Ranger Regiment. One is through the Ranger Indoctrination Program, and the other through completion of Ranger School. The Ranger Indoctrination Program is for enlisted members only. Officers enter the Regiment either through the Ranger Training Battalion or after completion of Ranger School and serving in a key leadership position in a traditional unit.

The Ranger Indoctrination Program consists of a four-week training program that indoctrinates new members to meet specific performance standards within the Regiment. It includes physical fitness, history, combatives, knots, combat lifesaver and various other criteria. This provides them an opportunity to serve within the Regiment and attempt Ranger School. This allows an Infantryman to be assigned to the 75th Ranger Regiment immediately following Airborne School. This option is primarily for enlisted personnel who transfer immediately after completion of One Station Unit Training and Airborne School. This option is generally for a pool of individuals that are not specifically taking the Airborne Ranger career path, as that is directed at time of enlistment. These members may be recruited during Airborne School and may not necessarily be Infantrymen (11B); the Regiment requires the majority of job specialties. After successful completion of the Ranger Indoctrination Program the soldier is a Ranger, but not Ranger qualified. Possessing a Ranger Tab is mandatory for promotion to non-commissioned officer within
the Regiment; therefore these men will be groomed to meet the physical and psychological
demands of Ranger School. They will also be given time, and possibly multiple attempts
at gaining the Ranger Tab.

After completion of Army Ranger School an officer can be assigned to any of the
Army Divisions, including the 75th Ranger Regiment. However, this is not generally the
case for officers, as their orders are published prior to their attendance at Officer Basic
Course and Ranger School by their commissioning source. Therefore, a second lieutenant
enters Ranger School with the knowledge that his assignment could change if
unsuccessful. Understandably it is in order to manage expectations and tailor entry into the
Army individually.

The 20-Year Policy

For 20 years the U.S. Army placed a limitation on the assignment of women in
direct-combat units or working in direct combat related job specialties, called the Direct
Combat and Assignment Rule. However the Army gleaned that although the 1994
exclusion policy was designed to further integrate women among the Army ranks, while
keeping them from direct combat, soon became outdated and is now irrelevant. The policy
has forced commanders to make decisions that were, at times, in violation of the 1994
policy simply because the modern battlefield required women in specific roles and that it
is also asymmetrical and non-contiguous.

Over the course of recent history, specifically the 12 years of the Afghanistan
conflict in which the U.S. has been engaged, women have not only fought on front lines
but have been killed by enemy action. The modern battlefield is four dimensional: land,
sea, air and cyberspace. Technology has both changed intelligence gathering and the way
we engage the enemy. Small unit tactics fully incorporate combat multipliers, or enablers, to achieve results within communities. With these changes the employment of women in combat has changed at the tactical level.

At the time of the 1991 Presidential Committee on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces the U.S. was ending their participation in Operation Just Cause (Panama) and Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield. The U.S. military needed to reorganize and determine the next strategic direction. The Department of Defense also learned from the invasion into Panama in which the Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Army were used in joint force operations. It identified to the civilian leadership of the nation, then-President George H. W. Bush and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, that the doctrine for joint operations must be refined.

Current Policy

The 2013 Army Posture Statement clearly defines the role of the U.S. Army within joint force environments. This further supports the full integration of conventional and force multipliers. The Army Vision states:

The Army is regionally engaged and globally responsive; it is an indispensible partner and provider of a full range of capabilities to Combatant Commanders in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational environment. As part of the Joint Force and as America’s Army, in all that we offer, we guarantee the agility, versatility and depth to Prevent, Shape and Win.³

The U.S. Marine Corps is currently leading the program for women’s integration into the infantry. In early 2013 two female Marines attempted the Infantry Officer Course. Although unsuccessful, they were permitted to break ground. There are currently 15 female Marines in the enlisted infantry training at Camp Geiger, North Carolina, training
under the same standards. General James F. Amos, Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, stated his intention to have 92 women apply for the course by 2016.

As of this study no female has successfully completed the Infantry Officer Course for the Marines, but the option is no longer off the table. In fact, they are testing enlisted women’s ability to complete their profession as a “grunt.”

After the elimination of the exclusion policy, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated the Department of Defense is pursuing all avenues in order to provide the most opportunities for women in order to help provide greater upward mobility. Following suit, the U.S. Army has now broached the topic of women in combat positions, amongst other topics in the 2013 Army Posture Statement. As the Army Vision states, being globally responsive and providing full range of capabilities is no longer about gender or race. It is about professionalism and leadership. The 2013 Posture Statement:

The Army is committed to ensuring that female Soldiers are provided career opportunities that enable them to reach their highest potential while enhancing overall Army Readiness. Over the last year, the Army opened more than 13,000 positions to women. In January 2013, the Department of Defense rescinded the Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, thus enabling the elimination of unnecessary gender-based restrictions for assignment. The Army is currently developing, reviewing and validating occupational standards, with the aim of fully integrating women into occupational fields to the maximum extent possible. We are proceeding in a deliberate, measured and responsible way that preserves unit readiness, cohesion and morale.

In the 2013 Army Posture Statement, Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond Odierno specifically states the Army must “Develop Adaptive Leaders” and grow “Ready and Resilient” Soldiers. In his address to the Command and General Staff College Class 13-02, he stated leader development is his number one priority. Leader development is the source that will keep the force professional, grow future leaders and ensure mission command.
Leaders that are adaptive are capable of facing adversity, remaining resilient, and providing solutions to complex problems. Soldiers who are ready and resilient are far better capable of being part of a cohesive team, meeting the Army’s mission. These two factors will be the hinge for leaders capable of effectively managing the institutional change associated with the incorporation of women into combat arms and Ranger School.

**Implementation Guidance**

The Secretary of the Army, John McHugh, issued Army Directive 2012-16, *Changes to Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers*, in June 2012 after the announcement was made. In his memorandum the Secretary of the Army acknowledges the outdated policy is the reason for the adjustment.

Effective 14 May 2012, the portion of the 1994 Department of Defense Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule that permits the Services to bar the assignment of women to units and positions doctrinally require to physically collocate and remain with direct ground combat units was rescinded. AR 600-13, published in 1992, has not kept pace with the changing operational environment and personnel requirement of the last 10 years and does not reflect these recent changes to DoD policy.⁸

Implementation guidance for expanding positions for women was published in Military Personnel Message 13-247, *Expanding Positions for Assignment of Women* in September 2013, one year after the directive changing policy.⁹ Since is was the first announcement of official change it essentially began the first phase of the two-phase implementation guidance. The first phase is to inform the public. The second phase involves the Army Research Institute which is tasked to conduct assessments as the implementation progresses.

While phase one is essential to aligning the U.S. Army with its support base, phase two is key to evaluating the change while providing input for future adjustments. There
are multiple ways to further integrate women. For the purposes of this study the focus remains on integrating Ranger qualified women into combat arms.

**Career Progression and Full-Career Potential**

Completing Ranger School as a second lieutenant and prior to arrival to an infantry company will determine key positions and future commands. The first and most important position is platoon leader as it predicates the positions in company headquarters, or higher echelons and gains immediate leadership experience. During both conflicts it was highly competitive to be in command of a platoon or company due to the nature of decentralized operations. These assignments allowed young junior officers to gain credibility among their chain of command, unit and subordinates.

The graduation rate of a second lieutenant from Ranger School is approximately 40 percent. On average, the Maneuver Captains Career Course starts with 69 percent of all infantry captains Ranger qualified with the remainder afforded the opportunity to attend immediately following the completion of the Maneuver Captains Career Course. This point is highlighted to emphasize the potential effect it could have on an infantryman’s career path if they fail to complete Ranger School within the first two years of service. While it does not exclude one from being competitive amongst their peer group, it can potentially change assignment to the first duty station or other career opportunities such as assignment to Ranger Regiment or one of the major light infantry divisions.

Figure 1 depicts an expected career path of an Infantry Officer from commissioning as a second lieutenant to up to nine years of service and primary zone selection to major. As illustrated by the navy colored boxes, the Professional Military Education (PME) serves as career milestones as predicted through time. In the remainder
of the boxes it shows which milestones an Infantry Officer should complete in order to seek career satisfaction. By placing career milestones over time the figure indicates a competitive system. Missing key milestones can slow upward mobility. The most important milestone is completing Ranger School within the first year of commissioning, immediately following the Basic Officer Leaders Course. This appears as the first milestone towards full-career potential.

A potential transfer opportunity for young women interested would be the Volunteer Transfer Incentive Program. This program holds a board every quarter and publishes eligibility criteria to the Army. The key is the officer’s basic branch must be willing to approve the loss and the gaining branch takes the transfer. The figures also show potential transfer windows for interested candidates.

Figure 2 highlights the Junior Officer Broadening Assignment window beginning in the two and a half-year to four-year mark. The possible Junior Officer Broadening Assignment positions are with the Ranger Training Battalion, Infantry Training Battalion, The Old Guard, and the Combined Training Center. According to the Office of Chief of Infantry, personnel assigned to the Ranger Training Battalion are not required to be Ranger qualified, only Ranger Assessment Selection Program qualified.
Figure 1. Career Map Commissioning to Nine Years

*Source:* Infantry Branch, Human Resources Command, “Company Grade Infantry Officer Timeline,” Infantry Branch, Ft. Knox, KY, 25 September 2012. This figure shows the ideal career path from commissioning to eight years of service.
Figure 2. Career Map Commissioning to 20 Years

Source: Infantry Branch, Human Resources Command, “Company Grade Infantry Officer Timeline,” Infantry Branch, Ft. Knox, KY, 25 September 2012. This figure shows the ideal career path of an Infantry Officer over the course of 20 years.

Supportive Arguments

The U.S. Government, its military, and American culture has been engaged in constant conflict since 2001. The military culture is now experiencing what is known as “pre 9-11” and “post 9-11” service members within its ranks: Those who joined before the 11 September 2011, attack on the Twin Towers tend to have enlisted for longer term career purposes. Generally those enlisting after 2001 entered with the expectation of going to war. As our culture has become desensitized to a decade of war, this most likely has
contributed to the more positive perception of women among combat units, in combat roles, or collocated with males and becoming full participants in a war zone.

Not only has the culture of the U.S. Army changed, so has the construct of the traditional American family. This is relevant because women’s roles within society have changed. Today’s societal norms and practices are adaptations of those from 50 years ago.¹³

At the establishment of women’s rights in the 1950s many other milestones have been accomplished. Women embraced this movement by becoming part of the work force, obtaining higher educational degrees and certifications, and soon becoming war heroes as well. Since then women have become heads of corporations, held high national offices and become national level leaders.

Understanding all variables mentioned, and understanding that any nation’s Army is a reflection of its people, research on public opinion was included. Gallup is one of the nation’s top polling companies that collects information from national and international audiences in order to provide leaders with various options to pressing problems. Gallup has conducted a survey on the opinion of Americans since 1990 on the inclusion of women in combat roles within the military. The most recent survey was conducted upon the announcement by the former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta to rescind the 1994 exclusion policy. Figures 3 and 4 represent survey data that included a random polling of 513 adults 18-50+ years old residing in the 50 states, including the District of Columbia. The results of the survey show the majority of Americans support the Pentagon’s new policy allowing women to serve in combat roles. Both men and women favor this policy change.¹⁴
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates of polling</th>
<th>Question wording</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sep 7-8, 2007</td>
<td>Do you think women should or should not be allowed to hold combat jobs in the U.S. armed forces?</td>
<td>Yes, should (74%); No, should not (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 20-22, 2005</td>
<td>Do you favor or oppose having women serve in combat zones as support for the ground troops?</td>
<td>Favor (66%); Oppose (32%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 5-7, 2003</td>
<td>Do you think women in the armed services ...?</td>
<td>Should get combat assignments on the same terms as men (37%); Should be able to get combat assignments only if they want to (45%); Should never get combat assignments (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 14-16, 2001</td>
<td>I will read you a list of jobs in the military that are considered combat jobs. Do you favor or oppose having women serving as ground combat troops?</td>
<td>Favor (52%); Oppose (46%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 10-11, 1992</td>
<td>Do you favor or oppose allowing women in the military into combat jobs?</td>
<td>Favor (55%); Oppose (42%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 30-Apr 5, 1992</td>
<td>Do you favor or oppose allowing qualified women in the military to serve in combat?</td>
<td>Favor (74%); Oppose (24%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3. Gallup Poll Historical Data

Figure 4. 2013 Gallup Poll Support for Women in Combat


The *Washington Post* published a Pew Research Center Poll that included not only public opinion, but also potential effects on mission effectiveness. The survey, in figures 5 and 6, randomly surveyed of over 1,000 adults of both civilian and military households. The results show over 65 percent support the new policy placing women in combat roles. In comparing military preparedness levels, 29 percent of those polled felt it increased effectiveness and 49 percent stated no discernible change.
### Women in military combat roles

Q: Do you support/oppose allowing women to serve in ground units that engage in close combat?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Oppose</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>66</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Men</strong></td>
<td>55</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Women</strong></td>
<td>66</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democrats</strong></td>
<td>76</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Republicans</strong></td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independents</strong></td>
<td>65</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Veteran households</strong></td>
<td>63</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Military veterans</strong></td>
<td>65</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-veteran households</strong></td>
<td>57</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 5. 2013 Pew Research Center Poll, Women in Combat

Figure 6. 2013 Pew Research Center Poll, Effect on Military Effectiveness


Major John G.S. Rogers, New Zealand Defense Forces, conducted his MMAS thesis on the New Zealand Defense Forces integration of women in combat arms. In his review of the research material, the Burton Report, in which it discussed four potential outcomes of the integration. The first potential outcome is operational effectiveness is not affected at all. The second potential outcome is operational effectiveness is enhanced. The third potential outcome is operational effectiveness is degraded, and the fourth potential outcome is that some aspects are enhanced and some are degraded.15
The report stated a limitation to research in which the lack of a live combat environment made it nearly impossible to gain objective measures of effectiveness. In contrast to that limitation, conflicts over the course of 12 years involving the U.S. have potentially influenced these four outcomes in our research, which provides the policy be revised to match the operational environment.

The conclusion of the *Burton Report* is that strong leadership will be essential to the full integration of women into every military employment. It also concludes that appointed leaders be held personally accountable for fair and equal treatment of all unit personnel. The requirement on Army leadership already exists and practical applications of leadership are also established. The summary of his thesis was that integration was not as complex as the New Zealand Defense Forces Army had seen and proved Burton’s theory in that integration enhanced operational effectiveness.

**Unsupportive Arguments**

The majority of counterarguments have to do with subjective information, in an effort to balance research methodology portions with objective and subjective information as presented. Sentiments regarding women’s attendance at Ranger School were pointed towards concern of changing of the standards to be gender-neutral. There was also a concern that standards will be bent in order to meet the directed inclusion, thus degrading the prestigious reputation of the Army Ranger. There is the possibility of negative impact on the social hierarchy within the combat arms world.

The *Military Times* completed a poll study that surveyed a population of military members on the topic after the announcement by the Secretary of Defense. It was published in a report on the Center for Military Readiness website. It surveyed “combat
troops,” an undefined group that may have included more than all-male “tip of the spear” fighters. Of those surveyed 46 percent said they “think it's a bad idea.” Another 17 percent answered neutral or no opinion and would pay attention to the outcomes. Lastly, 37 percent of the respondents supported the change.16 While this is not an overwhelming disparity of opinion, it indicates that there may be a population that is impressionable and open to see the change.

Another argument is that women are not anatomically capable of handling Ranger School. In other words, women are not physically capable of the lifestyle required. There are many written opinions, blogs, and news articles regarding the topic. Mainly, there are personal opinions, while some are from credible news agencies conveying a sentiment of a population sample.

The argument against the inclusion of women in combat roles is partially corroborated by the opinion of U.S. Marine Captain Katie Petronio in her 2012 article “Get Over it! We Aren’t All Made Equal,”17 when she returned from deployment with the Marines relating the physical effects of required protective gear and the combat environment on her body. According to her statements, a year of operations in the harsh combat environment left her with muscle atrophy, mental stress, and infertility. While she was capable of completing her mission and meeting mission requirements, she suggests there are lasting physical effects of women in ongoing combat operations during deployment.

Summary

The rescinding of the exclusion policy was provided to the U.S. Army, and all other services, after long and careful consideration of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and all Service Chiefs. Organizations that should remain prohibited to women were given enough time to justify the assignment requirement. The bottom line is the policy did not match the operational picture, or composition of tactical units.

The opportunity has presented itself for women to attempt competing for Ranger School and working in combat MOSs and in command positions below battalion level. Army leadership and the Office of the Chief of Infantry will be the trailblazing organizations to effect the potential institutional change and provide leadership through a fundamental change in organizational and operational policy.

The following chapter includes the research methodology, in which the researcher had to consider the assumptions, current policy, and available information. The assumptions were primarily that there are women willing to compete for a Ranger Tab, and there are combat units willing to employ these women. This directed the methodology and analysis in discovering which components of the Army required change, be it fundamental change, climate and cultural change, or simply updating material.


2Gary L. Fox, Director, Office of the Chief of Infantry, e-mail correspondence with author, 21 October 2013.


6 Odinero and McHugh, 13.

7 Ibid., 14.


10 Infantry Branch, Human Resources Command, “Company Grade Infantry Officer Timeline.”

11 Voluntary Transfer Incentive Program is a transfer program from one branch to another, officially changing one’s primary job specialty. Transferring is voluntary and the volunteer must be eligible to transfer by being within the appropriate year groups and qualifications.

12 Fox.

13 The role changes of traditional family, and the definition of an American traditional family is relevant to the topic, but it is not included in length in this study in order to focus the research topic.


CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

There is no question that the pace of our nation at war challenges our Army. This state of war requires us to challenge old paradigms, to be flexible and adaptable.
— GEN Peter Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army, Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services

Introduction

The method to determine attendance at U.S. Army Ranger School is solely determined on desired profession and the competition within that profession. The research methodology will illustrate the necessity for a woman to obtain a Ranger Tab in order to achieve full-career potential as an infantryman or combat arms officer. The author will illustrate this through unit standards, and organizational culture as justification for combat arms professionals to obtain credibility. Women will pursue career paths similar to men, as some have done for near 20 years. Currently, women are fulfilling roles alongside conventional maneuver forces or special operations in such positions as enablers within human terrain teams, or as company level support to maneuver forces, Female Engagement Teams, or as Cultural Support Team members.

The most important topic in regard to the individual in this study is physical fitness and mental toughness. Women are typically physically less developed than men, and it is common knowledge that their weight distribution and power sources differ anatomically as well. Research pertaining to the physical requirements to prepare for Ranger School used the Army Physical Readiness Training (APRT) as a guide for comparison. Currently the physical standards are not set to change to be gender-neutral or gender-specific; therefore all candidates must prepare themselves according to the established standards.
A research recommendation within chapter 5 is the development of a physical training program to better develop candidates in order to achieve a higher graduation rate. The conclusion of this study suggests that the social hierarchy within each specific Army branch, or career field, will be impacted by the opening of combat positons and women’s competition for the Ranger Tab. The assertion can be made that women in combat arms units are equally as capable as men; however, gender is still part of the social hierarchy due to credibility from experience and specialties. An assertion can also be made that earning a badge will be enough to change behaviors or unit culture quickly.

**Research Questions**

After consideration to the variables surrounding achievement of full-career potential, the researcher identified four primary questions to assist the analysis within chapter four. The analysis concluded that women’s attendance to Ranger School is not the solution to change, it will also require Army culture to change.

The first and most prominent question is: Does a light infantryman require a Ranger Tab in order to have full-career potential and satisfaction? The unseen, unwritten rules of the infantry branch are that a Ranger Tab is required to achieve career success in an ideal timeframe. A supportive argument to the answer is the potential domino effect that may occur from not possessing the tab. The career timeline published by Human Resources Command, Infantry Branch (figure 1) illustrates this for the reader. It clearly shows completion of Ranger School at the onset of one’s career. An officer’s career progression is set on course by obtaining Professional Military Education (PME) and Joint Officer Broadening Assignments type milestones. It is a reasonable assertion that officers who do not obtain specialty skills do not gain diversity within their career, which
potentially becomes a limiting factor. The U.S. Army is competitive for key developmental assignments simply because not every officer has the opportunity. If the officer timeline is executed as prescribed it lines up key assignments, developmental assignments, PME, and additional small schools to achieve lieutenant colonel within the 18-year time frame.

It is otherwise supported by Schein’s model of organizational culture. The underlying beliefs within a light infantry unit suggests a young infantryman, officer or enlisted, cannot lead at a direct level without a Ranger Tab. In other MOSs that are still within combat arms, junior officers who have a Ranger Tab are generally selected first for direct level leadership positions.

Additionally, an officer in the initial year of commissioning, on the course of “Airborne Ranger” will most likely not be assigned to an airborne light infantry organization if they do not pass Ranger School at the first attempt. That leads to further delay of key assignments within the first two years of commissioning and potentially missed opportunities if not corrected early on.

The next research question pertains to the ability of women to prepare for the rigors of the training environment. There are two components to this training, physical and psychological, which is also known as mental toughness.

The second question is: What physical and psychological training would a potential female candidate need to be prepared to compete for a Ranger Tab? And what kind of leader would she be required to be? This question is essential to dividing the physical requirements under the APRT verses the Ranger Athlete Warrior program. Using familiar doctrinal terms and applicable models this study suggests factors that may not
already be included in the implementation guidance. It also incorporates the leadership requirements of not only women, but also men as this change is implemented.

The physical requirements of a woman will be in the majority of the preparation phase. A candidate’s physical ability must be assessed to consider endurance, strength, and intestinal fortitude. This also includes mental toughness and psychological training. The body will go through physical fatigue, sleep deprivation, illness and many other issues, all while being required to execute superbly. These variables simultaneously challenge individual mental toughness. The candidates must possess emotional intelligence, and moral courage to continually press for the will to continue. Research suggests that a training program with rigorous and calculated physical development will simultaneously develop mental toughness.

The third question is: Why would it be a potential issue for a woman to obtain a Ranger Tab? This question has multiple variables to the potential solution. For this study, the answer will consider the possibility that job opportunities will become more competitive after the completion of operations in Afghanistan and the announced 2013 reduction in force. There is a potential for concern as the Army faces a reduction in 2014, and the posture statement refers to “leader development.” The conclusion is only the most capable professionals will be retained, regardless of gender. However, specialty will matter as the Army is performing calculated reductions by branch specialties. If a Ranger Tab is a discriminating factor, and in this study it is, the tab ensures the best infantry officers are in those positions and retained.

The last remaining question addresses the organizational culture, perceptions, and traditions that suggest this change will have impact on the social aspect of this
fundamental change. Consideration for the potential long-term effects this change has on the Army must be made.

The fourth question is: How can leaders achieve institutional change? This begins with changing the underlying assumptions of the organization, specifically the infantry. Changing invisible things such as sentiments, attitudes, personal opinions, and beliefs (religious and morale) will be the hardest challenge.

The Kotter Model, an eight-step process for major change, may be utilized to assist with displaying key points. Specifically, gaining and maintaining a guiding coalition will be essential to success. This team must have the power to change status quo, and the ability to work together to communicate this change. Specifically, there will need to be credible commissioned and non-commissioned officers on this team; direct level leaders such as battalion commanders and command sergeants major who possess a Ranger Tab. Secondly, using step eight; of Anchoring will assist the change to be rooted in historic events that have both tangible and intangible results. This change will need to be implemented through precise and unequivocal orders in order to introduce these women into the ranks. There is not necessarily room for trial and error, as this must have lasting and enduring effects in order for it to take hold over time.

Lastly, leaders at all levels will have to lean forward in building a team that fully integrates females. To some, this does not sound hard to accomplish, but in the context of group thinking or group learning it is difficult.

After completing the literature review and research methodology the researcher has prepared an analysis by presenting a comparable Army policy, physical and mental toughness preparedness and identified areas requiring fundamental change. After a
thorough analysis of the research question, will earning the Ranger Tab assist women in achieving full-career potential, the primary variable is shifting organizational culture? The following chapter will assist in explaining the importance of organizational culture and how it effects this fundamental change for the U.S. Army.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

The original goal for the researcher was to answer the primary question: “How does a woman obtain full-career potential within combat arms?” The second goal was to establish if earning a Ranger Tab would increase her success level. The analysis presented in this chapter will not only address that question, but the further implications of the question as it pertains to group learning, organizational culture and policy changes.

The primary issue surrounding women’s incorporation to combat MOSs, combat MOS positions below battalion level and as Army Rangers is the organizational culture of the unit. As described in chapter 2, the composition of Special Forces operational detachments and Ranger teams are very small from the battalion to team composition. In the infantry, the compositions are large from battalion to squad. In these scenarios, Ranger and Special Forces personnel are trained in all specialties, technical and tactical requirements. Their credibility is then based upon individual performance within a small composition. Conversely, larger elements have different variables, although similar, for performance measurement. Additionally each individual is not completely trained in the same areas and their specialties grow through opportunities and career progression. It may be quite challenging for personnel transferring into both of these scenarios. The credibility obtained from an officer obtaining any specialty badge is evident in Army culture. The instant credibility is displayed through the badges, or artifacts, we wear on our uniform. Because Army personnel identify easily with artifacts, the instant credibility a person receives makes them easily integrated into a community and builds comradarie.
The 20-Year Policy in Comparison

The DADT policy is a close comparison to the purpose and lifetime of the policy. It is also an example of a policy not matching or reflecting the modern battlefield.

Comparatively, the DADT was a near 20-year policy, designed as a way for tolerance of closeted homosexual and lesbian service members, as the nature of their personal conduct was prohibited for service. This was set as policy in 1994 in order to manage professional and personal expectations within the Army Structure. This policy was enacted in order to maintain good order and discipline and morale of service members. Under this policy it also forced combat decisions of direct level leaders and personnel alike. Regardless of the leader’s opinions, perceptions, or beliefs on the matter, they had an obligation to enforce or deliberately chose not to enforce published guidance and regulations. As with the gender exclusion policy, personnel had to make personal lifestyle choices and some served knowing there were potential risks.

The DADT Repeal Act officially ended the DADT policy in September 2011 after endorsement from the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Service members could now serve openly gay. This began the last and largest paradigm shift and fundamental change for the U.S. Army.

Addressing Unsupportive Arguments

Chapter 2 contained the primary sections countering women’s participation in Ranger School. The first was the concern of standards being lowered in order to include both genders, and gender-neutral standards. The second argument was that women are anatomically incapable of handling the rigors of Ranger School.
The first argument that the physical standards will be made gender-neutral is an axiom. The published physical standard is not being considered for revision. The APRT states units are capable of conducting unit physical training specific to their job requirements. Secondly the published standard is the enforced standard. Disproving this is supported by correspondence with Office of the Chief of Infantry. A statement provided to the researcher states; “Currently there are no plans to alter or change existing medial, mental or physical requirements or standards. The individual Ranger student and their chain of command are responsible to ensure the student can complete the rigors of the course.”

The second point was that women are not anatomically built to withstand the rigors of Ranger School. Both genders will struggle with the rigors of the toughest Army school. Women can be equally prepared through a rigorous physical development plan. A common phrase is that people train to the standard, only few exceed it. Any person is capable of completing the course otherwise there would be no graduates. The women who will compete to be Army Rangers can be classified as a three-time-volunteer. They have volunteered to enlist in the Army, become an Airborne Paratrooper, and finally an elite Army Ranger.

Voluntary Transfer Program

The most concerning part for any officer transferring from one branch to another is their level of tactical and technical knowledge. This is the primary point of concern if a female officer would transfer to combat arms, or a previously restricted assignment.

As stated in the “Company Grade Infantry Officer Timeline,” an infantry officer learns all tactical tasks and technical competencies in Officer Basic Course and
immediately attends Ranger School. A first year officer is indoctrinated and trained on
tactical tasks. As with other first year officers their knowledge is limited. However, they
are prepared and developed to compete physically and mentally for the Ranger Tab.

One benefit of an earlier transfer, as well as attending Ranger School prior to
arriving to an operational unit is the credibility of the individual, which can most affect
the direct level of leadership. When a young officer begins their career this is where they
are most impressionable and also most scrutinized. This is the time in which direct level
leadership positions are highly competitive and sought after.

Officers who qualify for transfer will most likely have a broader more general
knowledge base, and in their former branch specific Army functions. They may not be as
knowledgable in infantry tactics, this would support that a preparatory course be
conducted. If that officer is within two to four years of service, their transferability is an
acceptable risk according to an ideal career progression as indicated by figure 2, “Infantry
Officer Timeline.” Assuming that an Officer has already obtained a Ranger Tab before
transfering to the Infantry, they may still achieve full career potential by years 8-12. The
officer has time to obtain key assignments if their PME schedule is placed correctly.
When PME is not placed correctly the officer runs the risk of forfeiting developmental or
broadening assignments to fulfill earlier career possibilities.

Physical Fitness and Training

Preparation for Ranger School requires physical and psychological fitness. The
fundamentals of correct execution of mandatory tasks is essential to sustaining physical
health. Injury is the primary factor to failure during the course. Psychological fitness
refers to a person’s resiliency and the will to continue. Leaders must possess mental
agility, and the ability to operate one’s body while being physically and mentally exhausted.

The APRT was updated in 2012 and designed with the goal of developing soldiers who are already physically capable and ready to perform their duty assignments or combat roles. APRT develops the physical fitness and health of individuals, which in turn maintains a unit’s combat readiness. APRT states:

The Army’s PRT System consists of three phases: the initial conditioning phase, the toughening phase, and the sustaining phase. The initial conditioning phase prepares future Soldiers to learn and adapt to Army PRT. Toughening phase activities develop foundational fitness and fundamental movement skills that prepare Soldiers to transition to the sustaining phase. Activities in the sustaining phase develop a higher level of physical readiness required by duty position and/or C- or D-METL. Reconditioning restores Soldiers to physical readiness levels that allow them to safely re-enter the toughening or sustaining phase. Types of PRT include on-ground, off-ground, and combatives. Within these types of training are three fundamental components: strength, endurance, and mobility. Phased training of these components is guided by the overarching principles of precision, progression, and integration. Finally, Army PRT optimizes physical performance within an environment of injury control.2

APRT is designed with three phases and three principles. This is done with the recognition that not every soldier is at the same physical fitness level, nor of the same body composition. As a result, the APRT phases apply to their athletic endurance and strength and are tailorable for ability groups.

The three principles of the APRT are precision, progression, and integration. Precision is for optimal performance of PRT activities, simply having correct execution to prevent injury or bad practices. Progression is the systematic increase in intensity, duration, volume, and difficulty level. Essentially it is accurately scaling efforts to allow maximum exertion and build endurance and strength. Integration is the balance of variety, execution, and recovery to build physically fit soldiers.
Using the APRT phases and principles allows unit leaders the latitude to train their soldiers to best perform the rigors of their MOS. The APRT has introduced and explained the overtraining syndrome so unit leaders can identify the physical levels and potential limitations of their soldiers.

With any activity that involves physical exertion of the human body, it takes supervision to train and manage progress. Leaders must be cognizant of physical limitations and be able to identify potential training problems and risks. Properly assessing soldiers and preparing training plans provide commanders and non-commissioned officers to mitigate identified factors and accept prudent risk where possible. Commanders must be educated and aware of their training program to avoid potential overuse, which can have lasting effects on a soldier. The APRT refers to over-exertion as Overtraining Syndrome.

The Overtraining Syndrome has three components: overreaching, overtraining and overuse. It occurs from excessive frequency, intensity and/or duration of training that may result in extreme fatigue, illness, or injury. Overreaching is the earliest phase and is generalized to extreme muscle soreness resulting from an inadequate rest/recovery cycle. This can have both positive and negative results. It can be used to stack gains if managed properly or build endurance; and if ignored or followed with poor nutrition it can produce negative effects. Overtraining occurs when the proper balance of exercise, recovery and nutrition exists. Overuse is defined as both overreaching and overtraining resulting in an injury, which can be acute or chronic, ultimately decreasing unit readiness.
Figure 7. Graphical Explanation of Overtraining Syndrome and Adaptations


In review of initial Basic Officer Leaders Course, both the A and B courses prepares them physically to meet the required standards of the PME and APRT. This is primarily the toughening phase and does not prepare candidates for the rigors of Ranger School; however it may be an ideal location to begin. As stated in Army PRT:

The training program in BOLC A brings Soldiers up to a level of physical readiness that prepares them for the rigors of BOLC B. Cadets and officer candidates report to BOLC A at various levels of physical readiness and ability. During the first weeks of training, the focus is on progressive training of the whole body. It is recommended that Soldiers in BOLC A perform toughening phase activities during PRT sessions. Soldiers in BOLC B transition to
performing sustaining phase activities during PRT sessions. To minimize the risk of injury, Soldiers perform exercises precisely and the intensity progresses gradually. Commanders should evaluate each new Soldier who falls below the BOLC A standard and give special assistance to improve deficiencies. Again, more PRT is not necessarily better. Instructors emphasize quality of the training, not quantity of exercises performed. Commanders and PRT leaders need to realize that it takes at least six to eight weeks to begin positive changes in physical fitness levels; therefore, some Soldiers may require additional time to make the improvements required to meet Army standards.4

Most, if not all, soldiers who are poised to become an Army Ranger have long surpassed the goals of the Army fitness standards. The physical training required to be prepared to withstand physical exertion during Ranger School is not obtained through Army PRT. This is the Pre-Ranger Course and “Ranger PT.”

RAW PT

The Ranger Regiment has its own training program, the Ranger Athlete Warrior, and consists of functional fitness, performance nutrition, sports medicine and mental toughness. A common phrase of the Army Ranger is “You don’t know how tough your next enemy will be. Assume he’ll be very tough.” This philosophy lends to the constant high physical abilities that are displayed by Army Rangers. Ranger Athlete Warrior is a progressive fitness program; in relation to APRT, it is an extension of toughening, and its purpose is to build a holistic physically fit soldier.

The Ranger Athlete Warrior methodology allows its program to be tailored and focused on conditioning varied physical requirements and to be educational. The program focuses on muscular endurance and building stabilizing muscles as well. This serves the body well in high stress or complex activities such as rope climbs, traversing platforms or long periods of exertion.
One of the four principles of Ranger Athlete Warrior is mental toughness. The Ranger methodology directly correlates mental toughness to performance.\(^5\) Mental toughness is composed of an individual competency of sports psychology, peak performance, focus, stress management, commitment, confidence and arrogance. Toughness can be objectively measured through combat experience, deployments, and schools. This is a principle of focus because mental fatigue degrades performance and can become dangerous for individuals and teams.

After reviewing the Army PRT, it can be deduced that the program is not capable of preparing an individual to attend Ranger School. Let us review key points. The Army PRT Manual states:

Overreaching has both positive and negative results. When planned as part of the periodized training program, overreaching allows for the suppression of performance while developing tolerance. For highly conditioned Soldiers, overreaching is a planned component of their training for peak performance. Their higher fitness levels allows for a tolerance to this more intense training with proper rest/recovery and nutrient intake. Short term overreaching followed by an appropriate tapering period can elicit significant strength and power gains.\(^6\)

Preparing the human body for rigors such as exhaustion, fatigue, physical and mental stress takes a controlled environment. Training should be completed in an environment that can be controlled in order to safely build endurance. In a statement from the Office of the Chief of Infantry it was stated that the responsibility still lies with the unit to fully prepare individuals for the rigors of Ranger School.

Most men who attend Ranger School have had numerous years of physical development in weight training and/or contact sports, which have conditioned them mentally to push through rigorous events.
Below is a list of notable Army Rangers who have a shared background.

GEN Stanley McChrystal (West Point Graduate, Commanded in 75th RR)
MG James E. Rudder (Rudder’s Rangers, 2nd Battalion Command in WWII)
BG William O. Darby (Darby’s Rangers, Service in WWII)
BG Pete Dawkins (Heisman trophy winner, West Point Football)
COL Henry Mucci (West Point Equestrian Team, Lead Rangers in WWII)
COL Brian Mennes (West Point Rugby, Battalion Command 75th RR)
CPT Michael Kelvington (West Point Football, 2013 MacArthur Award Winner)
CPL Pat Tillman (Former NFL Player)

Below is a list of three notable service women with a shared background.

GEN Ann Dunwoody (First female Battalion Commander, 82nd Airborne)
CPT Kelly McCoy (First female awardee of the Bronze Star with “V” device)
SPC Monica Lin Brown (Silver Star Recipient)

Organizational Culture

Organizational culture is explained by Edgar Schein as the customs and rights of an organization. He explains that culture is displayed in values, behavior patterns, rituals and traditions. If culture is present in an organization, it implies that the organization possesses structural stability, patterning and integration. And lastly, culture is accumulated through shared learning from shared history. This implies that culture is multidimensional and multifaceted.7

Schein displays organizational culture in an illustration of layers. These layers represent the seen and unseen components of culture, defined as Artifacts and Behaviors, Espoused Values, and Underlying Beliefs. These layers explain how personnel within the organization function. Older members, or assimilated members, have committed to these; younger members will assimilate. The organization needs all three layers to have culture, if any of the three layers are not aligned or missing within the organization there may be potentially disastrous negative impacts. This misalignment can have greater affects than
just dissention in the ranks or a poor command climate; however these are the easiest irregularities to identify. By the same token, if these items are not present, the organization is void of culture.

The visible, tangible items of a culture, or what is on the surface, are known as Artifacts and Behaviors. They may not always be obvious, and can be difficult to decipher by outsiders. However, they are present and directly associated with the organization and it is values. Relative to the Army, artifacts may be a branch insignia, the maroon beret, or a Ranger Tab. Behaviors are such things as salutes, the exchange of common courtesies, and physical appearance.

Espoused Values are generally the beliefs of the group, primarily consisting of the vision, purpose, and goal of the organization. It also provides the right and wrong of the standards based system. Within the organization the established espoused values will essentially police conduct and direct behavior.

Underlying assumptions are invisible. They are the things not usually stated, but commonly known. This is the most important of the three elements, as these are the hardest to change or effect. It is the most challenging because underlying assumptions are rooted in a shared history, suggesting that this is the area of most importance and therefore most resistance.

These levels of culture are nested, or intertwined with group behaviors, through group learning. This is relevant because it links the underlying beliefs, invisible norms, to the group’s learned internal behavior. Group boundaries such as who is in, and who is out, are generally determined by the leader. We also know it is human nature to be
individually competitive, yet desire to be a part of a group that has a shared understanding.

The widely understood reputation of the Ranger Tab in large organizations is the key underlying assumption that will be the hardest to change. In the infantry, the most widely identified underlying belief is that of possessing a Ranger Tab. As an artifact, and underlying belief, it sets men apart and is a point of competition and a shared bond within their field. This will be a long endured effort to change, beginning with the guiding coalition.

An additional aspect of group boundaries, in a more complex organization, is the distribution of power. The distribution of power refers to who has the most credibility and who is the influencer, possesses power, or distribution of authority. In groups we know that power is either earned or given, the known doctrinal term for this is formal and informal leadership.

In order to transition into this period of institutional change, Army Leaders at the organizational and direct levels must call on aspects of leadership they may not have been required to use before. Army leaders in a multitude of units and job specialties can truthfully place the right person in the right position, which may be choosing a woman over a man. Army leaders must understand the difference between their personal opinion and their obligation to uphold the laws of the President of the United States. They must also be willing to act at a moment’s notice when adversity happens. This will call upon the character, presence and intellect of organizational and direct level leaders.
Excerpts from the Kotter Model

John Kotter’s Model for change consists of eight stages, which can also be identified as fundamental errors that undermine transformational change. Kotter believed change is inevitable and constant, and companies that fail to adapt to this environment will fail. Because the Kotter Model is a familiar model for change within this Army institution, a review of steps two and eight will focus the discussion.

The Kotter Eight Step model is as follows:

Step one: Establishing a sense of urgency
Step two: Creating the Guiding Coalition
Step three: Developing a vision and strategy:
Step four: Communicating the change vision
Step five: Empowering broad-based action
Step six: Generating short-term wins
Step seven: Consolidating gains and producing more change
Step eight: Anchoring

It is the author’s hypothesis that leadership is the beginning point for indoctrination of the new Army policy. The current established leadership within the Army and the instructors at Ranger School who will be part of the guiding coalition. It is imperative to the implementation of women’s new combat roles and attendance to Ranger School that this endeavour be led by senior and mid-level leaders throughout the Army.

New approaches to Army culture will be the next imperative to success. As explained in organizational culture, the three levels that compose culture are also the most time consuming to change. New approaches, correct leadership, and a professional force will be what anchors the fundamental change in our nation’s history. Anchoring is
defined as being applicable and take hold in the organization. The Army’s ability to anchor this new policy will ultimately begin the fundamental change required.

Summary

Presentation of the information available supporting the study suggests the true goal of achieving full-career potential relies upon two parallel truths. The first, obtaining a Ranger Tab, is the first variable to effect fundamental change. Consequently, fundamental change will affect organizational culture. Properly preparing individuals to achieve the small victories will encourage this process. The remaining chapter will present conclusions supporting this theory. It will also present recommendations for the current policy makers and future related study that may benefit Army policy and areas of relevance that could not be covered.

1Fox.


3Ibid., 5-2.

4Ibid., 4-2.


6Ibid., 5-2.


9 Ibid., 68.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

What we are saying is that women may be assigned to any job they are qualified for, we are making a recommendation. We are saying, ‘Let’s remove barriers.’ And I think people are very qualified to do certain jobs, but because of their gender, they are not given the opportunity to do them.

— LTG (RET) Julius Becton, Address to the National Defense University Conference

Introduction

The researcher began with the primary question: After the rescinding of the 1994 ground combat exclusion, will earning the Ranger Tab will assist women in achieving full career potential? The study also focused primarily on the Infantry Branch. The consideration for including all combat arms branches was maybe, and was determined too broad a perspective to achieve the topic of analysis and conclusion. Using the Infantry Branch as the focus of the study allowed analysis in career progression, transferability, and expected career milestones. Additionally, it is assumed the Infantry community will be the primary field in which women are integrated first.

The conclusion of the study is that all Infantry officers, male and female, should participate in Ranger School earlier rather than later in their career to achieve full career potential. Ranger School should be completed for the officer to meet career milestones, promotion eligibility and enhanced broadening assignments. The Infantry Branch has a prescribed career timeline; however, it is just that, a timeline. Missing key assignments or PME could potentially cause a domino effect and force an officer to prioritize what is
achievable. Secondly to this point, the credibility and bravado presented by a woman wearing that artifact will be a necessity to be competitive with male counterparts.

An officer may be successful without the Ranger Tab; this is common in other combat arms fields. However, it can be stressed that the competitive nature of combat arms requires a woman to be Ranger qualified. Supporting this theory could be Ranger qualified junior officers who possess more credibility and potentially obtain leadership opportunities based upon that key factor. Similar to the qualifications of Airborne, Sapper, Pathfinder, or Air Assault badge, more positions are available due to their experience level and knowledge base. As a female officer, it matters that you possess any of these qualifications and will be a discriminating factor within each community respectively.

Conclusions

The summation of this thesis is that women will be required to attend Ranger School in order for the Army to truthfully change the paradigm and uphold its intention to provide upward mobility. The completed analysis supports the assumption that full-career potential, at this time in the U.S. Army is achievable being Ranger qualified. It is also concluded that the full-career potential can be achieved only after the fundamental change within the Army takes place. The fundamental change is resolute on the ability of the Army to manage women’s indoctrination as Army Rangers within all levels of the Army.
Recommendations for Policy Changes

The following recommendations pertain to valuable policy additions, changes, and development points for Army doctrine. The limitations to this study did not allow for development of the following key points.

Change Section III Policy, Para 1-12a Overall policy for the female soldier of Army Regulation 600-13, Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers (27 March 1992). Change to read “The Army’s assignment policy for female soldiers allows women to serve in any officer or enlisted specialty or position except in those specialties, positions, or units under explicit exclusion by the Chief of Staff of the Army or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”

Develop a training program at the highest level possible that is similar to Ranger Indoctrination Program, but tailored to physically develop female strength, endurance, and knowledge on physical training. According to Office of the Chief of Infantry it is still the unit’s responsibility to develop its members for Ranger School. The necessity for physical and psychological preparation for Basic Officer Leaders Course, Voluntary Transfer Incentive Program, and Pre-Ranger is simply to point out female candidates potentially have lacked this preparation over the course of years in service or years prior to service and will require a planned, pointed physical and psychological training in order to prepare. It is highly encouraged that policy makers consider that units will not have a uniformed preparatory course or similar knowledgeable trainers and this may cause further stress among the Army. Stress in organizations should be avoided during this period of change.
Recommendation for Future Studies

The following points were relevant to the thesis material and if developed can greatly add to the future Army policy and our dedication to being a ready and resilient force. The topics below could not be developed due to time limitations of the course study.

Of significance to individual career satisfaction and understanding community thinking and individual motivations, further research can be conducted on the current American family composition. Research could be completed on the evolution of the traditional American family over the last 50 years which would support women’s professional aspirations. A potential starting point is the 1960s to 2013; however, major changes in women’s achievements and professional diversity have occurred since the 1980s. Analysis of research suggests industrialization and globalization are the largest contributing factors to change of the already diverse American Family, and societal role changes.

This study has the potential to provide a longitudinal study with comparative comprehensive data. This topic should be reviewed in approximately five years to annotate developments or potential revisions to policy or doctrine. One primary source of analysis can be the initial group of U.S. Marine Corps women who are training to become infantrymen. The U.S. Marine Corps is headlining the implemented change. Their approach may be valuable to incorporate to the U.S. Army in the future.

An internal factor to organizational culture and community interaction is the social hierarchy. It is valuable to research internal group dynamics with delineation’s of morality or utilitarianism, such as Amaitai Etzioni. Studying how this fundamental
change has been implemented and any summations will assist the Army in better understanding its community. This may also complement explanation for the effects of integration of women into units as Army Rangers.

Summary

The focus of the study is gender because that is the only limiting factor that remains. Women have proven themselves time and again in their devotion, patriotism, valor, leadership, and many other commendable attributes. In competitive physical programs, for each men’s team there is generally a women’s team. It is not that women are not present or passionate about excelling; it is that outdated policy precludes participation. Perhaps the Army is questioning what happens to its internal culture by this last incorporation of the female gender. Or perhaps the Army is unwilling to take the risks associated with reflecting today’s society. This will change Army culture and have greater impacts for many years. Positions, specialties, and full-career potential will be provided to each individual that pursues it.

I am committed to keeping the force involved and informed throughout this effort. If we move forward in a connected, reasoned manner, we will be able to face the uncertainty of the next decade and emerge a stronger force. I am committed to maintaining the highest standards and delivering the most qualified ARSOF operators to this Nation, regardless of gender.¹

¹LTG Charles T. Cleveland, Commander, U.S. Army Special Forces Command, Memo to ARSOF Members.
GLOSSARY

Battle Drill: a collective action rapidly executed without applying a deliberate decision-making process.¹

Broadening: his position will provide exposure to experiences outside the officer’s core branch or functional area competencies. Broadening assignments develop a wider range of knowledge and skills, augment understanding of the full spectrum of Army missions, promote practical application of language training or increase cross-cultural exposure and expand officer awareness of other governmental agencies, units or environments.²

CBRNE: Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive categories normally associated with weapons of mass destruction.

Conflict: (Army) A political-military situation between peace and war, distinguished from peace by the introduction of organized political violence and from war by its reliance on political methods. It shares many of the goals and characteristics of war, including the destruction of governments and the control of territory.³

Culture: A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, which has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way you perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.

Developmental: A position that enhances some aspect of war fighting skills, increases their level of responsibility, develops their understanding of interoperability among Army branches, or exposes them to branch related force/JIIM opportunities that directly contribute to success as an agile and adaptive leader.

Direct Ground Combat: (change from Direct Combat)⁴ Engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with hostile forces personnel. Direct ground combat takes place well forward on the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver or shock effect.⁵

Full-spectrum Operations: The Army’s operational concept: Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. They employ synchronized action – lethal and nonlethal – proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables of the operational environment. Mission command that conveys intent and an appreciation of all aspects of the situation guides the adaptive use of Army forces.⁶
Key Assignment: A position that is deemed fundamental to the development of an Officer in his or her core war fighting competencies. Formerly called a “BQ” position, frequently referred to incorrectly as a “KD position”. The “aperture” has been opened for Key jobs, e.g. for a Major, no longer just S-3 or XO.

Leadership: Is the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.

Overreaching: Refers to the earliest phase of overtraining. It consists of extreme muscle soreness that occurs as a result of excessive training with inadequate rest/recovery between hard training sessions.7

Overtraining: Occurs when training involves excessive frequency, intensity and/or duration of training that may result fatigue, illness or injury. This can occur within a short period of time such as days or cumulative weeks.8

Overuse: Is continued overreaching without adequate rest/recover and nutrient intake that leads to overtraining and eventually overuse injuries. The effects of overuse training may last weeks or months, inhibiting Soldier performance and possibly cause acute or chronic injuries that may limit or end a Soldier’s term of service.9

Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE): A requirements document that prescribes the capabilities, organizational structure, and the minimum mission essential wartime requirements (both personnel and equipment) necessary for a military unit to accomplish its doctrinal mission and the capabilities required by the unit to perform its core functions and assigned universal tasks to fulfill its designed purpose. It is the basis for an authorization document, the MTOE.10

Threat: Any specific foreign nation or organization with intentions and military capabilities that suggest it could become an adversary or challenge the national security interests of the U.S. or its allies.11


2Headquarters, Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1 February 2010).


4Secretary of the Army, Memorandum, Army Directive 2012-16, 2.
5Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Direct Combat Definition and Assignment
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6Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24.2, Tactics in
Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 21 April 2009),
Glossary-11.

7Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-22, Army Physical

8Ibid., 5-1.

9Ibid., 5-3.

10Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 71-32, Force
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