Commanding Coalitions: The Diplomat-at-Arms

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Abstract

In the 21st century the U.S. faces unique challenges in which political and military considerations are inextricably interwoven into international coalitions. To meet these challenges, U.S. diplomatic and defense communities are tasked to work closely together. Most often, the action officer for coordinating these interwoven considerations is the military coalition commander—the topic of this particular research. The pages which follow examine the potential role a Diplomat at Arms plays when appointed to command a multinational effort. Rather than evaluating the overall performance of the coalition commander, this paper portrays a fundamental dilemma for force and statecraft while simultaneously renews an age old argument for civil-military relations.

Coalition command is recognized as a position of delicate authority and one that is tasked to operationally guide an assembly of armed forces of varying cultures, languages, capabilities, customs, and religions. For this reason, diplomats are often advisors to coalition commanders. Nevertheless, history provides widely mixed lessons regarding relationships between diplomats and commanders. Should their traits and responsibilities be more carefully aligned?

This project is a comparative analysis of three case studies—not a study of coalition warfare, where countless volumes exist, but rather a study focused solely on the diplomatic guise of senior-most commanders. To best demonstrate the effectiveness of similar diplomatic traits under dissimilar circumstances, the case studies include formal alliances such as a United Nations-led coalition and a NATO-led coalition, as well as a less formal and ad hoc coalition—all commanded by a U.S. Army General at the turn of the century. Accordingly, three supreme coalition commanders comprise the bulk of this paper: Generals H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Wesley K. Clark, and Tommy R. Franks.

Born out of a chain of biographical, autobiographical, televised and written material, the chapters of this professional paper have the virtues and the defects of such works as well. There is a tendency to popularize, to categorize, and grossly oversimplify. At the same time, this simplified approach is appropriately useful for those unfamiliar with the overall background and training of senior U.S. military officers. The intelligent, forceful, and engaging Schwarzkopf; the genial, instructive, and unifying Clark; and the rudimentary, no-nonsense, and firm Franks practiced separate styles of military diplomacy. However, they each provide valuable insight into defining the warrior diplomat.

Emphasizing the life, the background, and the diplomatic ‘schooling’ of three contemporary Generals best serves the aim of defining a Diplomat at Arms. If the hypothesis that a Diplomat At Arms best serves as a combatant commander of coalitions, then it is equally important to study the skills and attributes which define the successful military diplomat. Thus, the paper concludes by defining a Diplomat at Arms with four top qualities and places emphasis on providing ‘diplomatic schooling’ for potential future coalition commanders.
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Dedication

For my wife. Through three combat deployments and five moves in fewer than seven years, she remains patient and forever supportive.
Introduction

Coalition Commander as Diplomat-At-Arms

The United States has either fought unilaterally or as part of a formal or ‘ad hoc’ coalition in every conflict since World War II. In doing so, the U.S. has learned that the psychological and sociological problems generated by differences among coalition partners in culture, customs, religion, and standards of living require a unique approach to planning military operations.¹ Early in the 21st century the United States faced unique challenges in which political and military considerations were inextricably interwoven. To meet these challenges, U.S. diplomatic and defense communities were tasked to work closely together—overseas, in Washington D.C., and at major military commands within the United States. Now with many overlapping tasks, traits, and responsibilities, does the Pentagon’s future require ‘super-human’ hybrid diplomat warriors at the highest ranks of military service? Is this contrary to the traditional civil-military argument which emerged after World War II?

The U.S. and its allies face an era of perpetual international crises. Military coalitions, comprised from an alliance or as ‘ad hoc’, are here to stay as many strategists argue that fighting as coalitions is the preferred means to wage modern war. How does the US prepare its future coalition commanders? Are there certain diplomatic traits inherent to careers of military service or is this an on-the-job training event for today’s general officers?

The United States, when it has chosen to commit its prominent military strength and national resources, has inevitably found itself as the leading 'stockholder' in all coalitions since the Vietnam War. An armed coalition, in contemporary language, is often based on transient agreements and is less formal than standing alliances. Often the largest contributor, the United States' Defense and State Departments historically assemble, supervise, and subsequently command these coalitions. Therefore, the U.S. time and again charges its senior-most military officials with coalition administrative and tactical command.

Under ideal circumstances, a U.S. military general or flag officer whose career is likely on the path toward commanding a multi-national combined arms effort is molded well in advance of assuming such a vital duty position. Due to his/her rank, career sequence, and presumed qualifications with that rank, these command billets are thus filled as one would anticipate. However, should there be greater examination applied toward schooling and equipping a senior military officer for such a key position? Is it even necessary? What efforts, if any, do the U.S. Armed Forces take to prepare senior military officers who are appointed to lead these complex coalitions?

This vital duty position, which likely carries with it a level of universal responsibility, is more than an operational-level command. It is a position of delicate authority that is tasked to operationally guide an assembly of armed forces of varying cultures, languages, capabilities, customs, and religions. For this reason, diplomats are often provided as advisors to coalition commanders. In its broadest and most original form, diplomacy is the official means by which one state formally relates to other states. Diplomats are,
therefore, considered agents of the State. The same declaration may hold true for a coalition commander.

History provides widely mixed lessons regarding relationships between diplomats and commanders. Fairly recognizable, however, are the overlapping responsibilities granted to these professionals. But, history also reveals that true examples of the “warrior-diplomat” are few indeed. While military strategies continue to directly impact political goals (and vice versa) and diplomacy remains a vital element of national power, it may seem advantageous for a state to ‘grow’ a warrior-diplomat – a commander that may one day lead a coalition. Does a commander who is skilled and ‘trained’ as a Diplomat at Arms prove more effective in coalition warfare?

The U.S. State Department declares that “keen intellect, powerful analytical and negotiating skills, good writing ability, regional and country experience, and language facility” are necessary for successful political-military advisors. Arguably, these credentials hold true for leadership within a military coalition. Indeed, the 2007 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication (JP3-16) highlights four major facets of the role of the coalition commander: Respect of partner opinions and capabilities; Rapport with counterparts through personal direct relationships; Knowledge of partners’ strategic goals, culture, religion, etc; and, Patience in gaining mutual trust. 

Disagreement of national interests has always been a part of armed coalitions in the past and the Joint Chiefs insist that diplomacy also finds its way into negotiations amid modern

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allied commanders. Thus, the market for political-military and diplomatic skills has noticeably expanded into the highest military ranks.

Likewise, a well-known American diplomat and author, Chas W. Freeman, explains that the skills of a diplomat are driven somewhat from natural talent but most are acquired through professional training and experience. He states in *Arts of Power* that a diplomat’s skills are mutually supportive and fall into five broadly related categories: *agency, advocacy, reporting, counseling,* and *stewardship.* In all, he lists twenty-five basic skills of the diplomatic professional. In comparison to the military’s 2007 Joint Publication, 19 of the 25 skills that Freeman insists are necessary for the diplomat are also categorized without difficulty into the DoD’s grouping of *respect, rapport, knowledge,* and *patience.* The six outliers are specific to commerce, finance, language fluency, and international law—which arguably would benefit a military commander all the same. It should come as no surprise, therefore, to give reason to examine both professions within a ‘hybrid’ lens.

**A Civil Military Linkage**

American scholars have debated heavily the subject of “civil-military” relations and ultimately share multiple opposing views and theories. Even so, since World War II these scholars have agreed that two distinct worlds exist, civilian and military; and, that

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4 JP 3-16. The publication also provides doctrine for the Armed Forces of the U.S. when they operate as part of a MNF. It describes joint organizational structures and addresses operational considerations that the commander should consider during the planning and execution of multinational coalition operations.


6 Freeman’s 25 diplomatic skills include: mastery of negotiation, ability to elicit prompt response from own gov’t, sincerity, precision in language, knowledge in history, credibility, political calculation, tact, empathy and ability to influence interests, fluency in host language, poise, acuity in observation, discretion, adaptability, ease of fellowship, scrupulous and vivid writer, selfless dedication, knowledge of host nation history and culture, knowledge of politics, acumen with when to talk and how, humility, loyalty to compatriots, understanding commerce and finance, essentials of military science, knowledge of diplomatic practices and int’l law.
these worlds are fundamentally different from one another. Research indicates that only a few scholars have written on the role that ‘individual’ military officers play in this ‘soldier-statesman’ argument. There are a few scholars, but none have reached the stature of Samuel P. Huntington and Morris Janowitz. Nevertheless, they would likely oppose the concept for a ‘warrior diplomat,’ as both authors emphasized the separation of the two societies and certainly not the blending of responsibilities. Four decades have passed since their theories were published. This paper does not diffuse or encourage either Huntington’s or Janowitz’ works; rather, it attempts to expand their argument by asking where diplomacy fits in this modern civil-military relationship.

There is no doubt that diplomacy remains vital to a world reliant on military coalitions and emerging multipolarity. According to Lord Strang, a former British diplomat who served at the same time Huntington and Janowitz published their theories on civil military relations: “[i]n a world where war is everybody’s tragedy and everybody’s nightmare, diplomacy is everybody’s business.” It seems appropriate, therefore, to expand the study of diplomacy, enhance our understanding of the modern civil-military linkage within coalitions, and question the effectiveness of diplomacy trained and practiced at the highest levels of military command.

As the U.S. time and again charges its senior-most military officials with coalition administrative and tactical command while at the same time placing high expectations for diplomatic faculties, it seems even more vital to understand this correlation. Therefore, the principal objectives for this paper are twofold. First, it closely investigates the background, training, and experiences of three former US-led coalition commanders. Emphasizing the

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backdrop conditions for each commander, this paper highlights any correlations to biographical and professional training and defines the general’s diplomatic experiences prior to his assuming command. After gaining an understanding of the diplomatic faculties of each commander, the paper then focuses on the commander’s time while in ‘control’ of the coalition. Though not an evaluation of the commander’s performance or the performance of the coalition, this paper does examine his diplomatic know-how and its overall effectiveness. Through examining certain internal events within each coalition and external consequences of particular decisions, readers of this paper will ultimately agree or disagree with the author’s value placed on the training and overall use of diplomacy at the highest levels of military combatant command.

This paper, therefore, is a comparative analysis of three case studies—not a study of coalition warfare, where countless volumes exist, but rather a study focused solely on these senior-most commanders’ diplomatic guise. With in-depth biographical research and investigations of particular vignettes within the selected international military coalitions, the intent is to determine the degree of preparation, if any, and determine the significance of diplomacy practiced at these highest levels of command. For the ease of understanding, “diplomacy” as it is used in this context, is defined as the commander’s overall ability to handle the multinational disputes and simultaneously maintain his coalition’s unity. In particular, this study looks at the general’s skill in handling affairs without jeopardizing alliances or operational progress. In addition to a biographical portrayal, an analysis of internal circumstances surrounding the principal commanders during the peak of military coalition operations sets the stage for further discussion. What
sort of diplomat was the U.S. military commander in each case study and how well could he influence allied cohorts?

To best demonstrate the effectiveness of similar command traits under dissimilar circumstances, the case studies include formal alliances such as a United Nations-led coalition and a NATO-led coalition, as well as a less formal and ad-hoc coalition – all commanded by a US Army General at the turn of the century. Accordingly, three supreme coalition commanders comprise the bulk of this paper: Generals H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Wesley K. Clark, and Tommy R. Franks.

**General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr.**

Schwarzkopf was commander of the coalition forces in the Gulf War of 1991. Drawing on documented interviews with senior allied officials and nearly two decades of literature, it is possible to develop a relatively unvarnished portrait of this top allied commander. Many scholars and journalists have written on the conflicts and power struggles within the anti-Iraq coalition and the American high command. How did GEN Schwarzkopf specifically deal with these struggles and strategic obstacles? In his autobiography, General Schwarzkopf exclusively tells his readers of the “form of diplomacy I genuinely enjoyed.” What was the General’s “form of diplomacy”? Was he truly skilled in diplomacy and could he be considered a *Diplomat at Arms*? If so, where did he learn it and was it gained through military experience and training?

Some argue that the Persian Gulf War was an “incomplete success” and others argue that it was a remarkable victory. This paper does not specifically address that

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debate but the opposing views are worth some mention when analyzing the commander’s overall function. One of the principal reasons for studying General Schwarzkopf is to determine to what extent his diplomatic persona and traits helped or hurt the coalition’s short-term and long-term success.

The U.S. Army’s Desert Storm Study Group highlights some of this diplomacy in its 1993 Certain Victory. In it, General Gordon Sullivan also recounts how the ability to develop such an international, joint, and combined team was never tested so dramatically. Of course it is somewhat of a US Army self-aggrandizing account, but undeniably the ability to enlist 34 countries of vastly difference cultures, languages, and capabilities was a seemingly profound step in modern coalition warfare. Managing daily “combat crises” while simultaneously achieving common international objectives superficially seems clear-cut for historians to account for nearly two decades later and thus it welcomes greater analysis. Was General Schwarzkopf’s “form of diplomacy” that effective? If so, what gave this particular commander the know-how to use it?

Going beyond Schwarzkopf’s autobiography and evaluating his experiences and training prior to the Persian Gulf War through the eyes of peers, superiors, and allied cohorts proves quite beneficial to this argument. A second-generation West Pointer and veteran of Vietnam, Grenada, and a well-traveled officer … to what extent did the ‘military experience’ prepare Schwarzkopf for this command? Further investigation into Schwarzkopf’s diplomatic performance and persona, while narrowing to specific relationships and conversations, help demonstrate what role a Diplomat at Arms plays as coalition commander. Particularly, with King Fahd and Prince Khalid of Saudi officials in the Persian Gulf War. It is not as ‘victorious’ in its findings and really highlights the conflicts and struggles among the senior-most officials.
Arabia, GEN Schwarzkopf recalls this diplomatic relationship in detail and invites further analysis. Of the US-led coalitions since Vietnam, this allied effort—and in particular, this commander—provides a civil-military backdrop and historical precedence essential for this paper.

**General Wesley K. Clark**

In *Winning Modern Wars*, Wesley Clark states that “every serious student of war recognizes that war is about attaining political objectives—that the military is just one of several means, including diplomacy, and that all must be mutually reinforcing.” Just four years prior, Clark was commander of Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999. It is this NATO coalition, and Clark’s diplomatic efforts while in command, in which this particular case study evolves.

By examining General Clark’s past while also looking through a diplomatic lens while he served as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), it provides significant insight into an anticipated enhancement of our civil-military argument. A less privileged child whose father died early, a West Point valedictorian and Rhodes Scholar, and a wounded veteran from Vietnam … what in Wesley Clark’s past would have prepared him for coalition (NATO supreme allied) command? Much like the Schwarzkopf case study, readers will see to what extent Clark’s diplomatic persona and traits helped or hurt the NATO’s short-term and long-term success in Kosovo.

Although not necessarily an ad hoc coalition, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) used its predisposed alliance to build a coalition of armed air power with potential for ground troops. NATO’s bombing campaign lasted from March

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22 to June 11, 1999, involving up to 1,000 aircraft operating mainly from bases in Italy and aircraft carriers stationed in the Adriatic. Most of the NATO members were involved to some degree with varying levels of agreement—even Greece, despite its public opposition to the war. Incredible diplomatic efforts to appease the 19 members of NATO, by both Clark and the NATO Secretary General, were evident not just in defining a common operational objective but also in the selection and approval process of airspace authorization and target selection.

In his own written account, *Waging Modern Wars*, Clark emphasizes how to coordinate US objectives with those of other nations … in other words, “diplomacy in uniform.” How did GEN Clark specifically deal with competing objectives? GEN Clark’s contact with the State Department during this time was well known and this, combined with his perspectives on limited war, did not earn him many friends in the military establishment. Clark’s perspective was that both camps must use diplomacy as precursors to war. This four-star general clearly speaks highly of diplomacy as a tool, as well as using force to back it up. Nevertheless, was he skilled in the art of diplomacy? Relevant to this thesis is how the top commander’s diplomatic persona may have impacted the NATO coalition in 1999.

Going beyond biographical analysis and linking past experiences helps to more clearly define Clark’s diplomatic skills prior to taking command. Defining General Wesley Clark’s *diplomatic* role as the Supreme Allied Commander underscores not only his requisite training for the job, but also the impact of diplomacy at this highest level of command. Further narrowing this particular case study to only evaluating Clark’s immediate civil-military and diplomatic performance, while simultaneously leading the
NATO coalition, helps readers come to an informed conclusion on this ‘civil-military
linkage’ argument. Was a Diplomat at Arms in command of NATO in 1999? If General
Clark had a “form of diplomacy,” what was it and how effective was it in gaining allied
success over Milosevic? What gave this particular commander the know-how and was
he adequately prepared?

General Tommy Ray Franks

Franks was promoted to four-star General in 2000 and assigned as Commander-
in-Chief, United States Central Command. It is in this position that the world knows
Tommy Franks best – the culmination of an almost four-decade military career that saw
him lead American and coalition troops in two campaigns in two years – Operation
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq. In his memoirs,
Franks notes that in July 2000, he was “new to diplomacy, [and] not yet used to
speaking obliquely.” In the coming months, however, he was obliged to ‘go to school’
and ultimately realized in this position that he was called upon to practice not only
military command, but also statecraft and diplomacy.

As the supreme commander of coalition forces in the 2003 invasion of Iraq,
Frank’s force was coined as the ‘Coalition of the Willing’. This ad-hoc coalition was
comprised initially of US, United Kingdom, Australia, Poland, and Denmark. Frank’s
role as the commander of the US-led coalition invading force into Iraq is the focus of this
particular case study.

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12 Franks 311. General Franks admittedly remarks how he was called upon to practice both statecraft and
diplomacy. His memoirs indicate that many nights were spent in tents, hotel rooms, and officer quarters across the
Middle East studying philosophers and essentially “going to school” on diplomacy. He deduced that war was
ultimately a continuum of interaction between nations, factions, and tribes.
Investigating the background and make-up of GEN Franks and how he commanded this ad hoc coalition proves invaluable in defining more contemporary diplomatic roles of such an esteemed appointment. President Bush defined General Franks as “a down to earth, no-nonsense guy;” however, what ‘diplomatic’ traits of Tommy Franks may have helped, or quite possibly hurt, the initial accomplishments of this 2003 ‘coalition of the willing.’ How he handled the domestic politics and the multinational aims is worth greater analysis and will certainly not end with this paper.

Frank’s autobiography, *American Soldier*, tells that he came from humble beginnings and that he took lessons from every point in his life to help shape the military doctrine that was used in the 2003 invasion. The question relevant to this research, however, is what lessons prepared GEN Franks for the task of commanding a multinational coalition? There are countless journals and books already written on the appropriateness of the Iraq invasion of 2003 and this study will steer clear of that debate. Nevertheless, the controversial objectives of this coalition highlight the international struggles that the commander faced while conducting his war strategy. How did GEN Franks specifically deal with these struggles and strategic obstacles?

Interestingly, Franks admits that the U.S. needs friends and allies in any region that it conducts military operations; and more specifically, they are needed in the Middle East. He knew in 2003 that he “had to build confidence and trust – the kind of trust that could only be maintained through personal diplomacy.”¹³ He clearly knew the importance of diplomacy within his command, but was he diplomatic?

Going beyond Frank’s biographical analysis and linking this research into the internal struggles of Operation Iraqi Freedom’s ‘coalition of the willing’ proved

¹³ Franks 318.
worthwhile for this argument. Was a Diplomat at Arms in command of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003? If General Franks had a “form of diplomacy,” what was it and how effective was it in gaining allied strategic cooperation? What gave this particular commander the know-how and was he adequately prepared?

Rationale

Comparing the effectiveness of a UN-led, a NATO-led, and a US-led coalition commander is a daunting task and only reserved for the most qualified and senior military and coalition experts. Such an endeavor, despite its relevance and overall importance to the future of American led coalitions, is not the objective for this thesis paper. In fewer than 120 pages, this paper examines the potential role a Diplomat at Arms plays when appointed to command a multinational effort. Rather than evaluating the overall performance of the coalition commander, this paper portrays a fundamental dilemma for the use of force and statecraft while simultaneously renews an age old argument for civil-military relations.

At no other time in history has an overwhelmingly capable military been so demonstrably multiethnic than the United States’ current force structure. Among its Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) are packets labeled “halal” for Muslims, “kosher” for Jews, and “Mexican,” or “vegetarian” for those inclined. A Japanese-American has held the top position of the US Army and as of 2008, there were 57 female flag or general officers serving in the active military. In essence, the US military continues to redefine and prove its capability as a ‘melting pot’ of combatants and leaders. But, what about training for and

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fighting as a multi-ethnic coalition? More specifically, what training is provided for potential future coalition commanders?

As the paper suggests, its readers will see that coalition command, with its multidimensional constraints and responsibilities, is not too unlike that of a Foreign Service Officer and career diplomat. Indeed, traits for both professions are increasingly more comparable as the Department of State and the Department of Defense continue to receive markedly parallel tasks. In Masters of the Art of Command, the authors state that a coalition commander historically demonstrates tact and carries a level of sensitivity unique only to this position, and “[i]f he is not inclined to respect a point of view valid to one of his allies, he is not likely to gain cohesion … normally required for success.”

Commanding among international partners, specifically at the level where negotiations take place and multinational strategic decisions are made, is a subject worth investigating well beyond this paper. At a minimum, the following chapters investigate and highlight how certain diplomatic traits leading up to command were either obtained or neglected throughout three separate careers of military service. It is a comparative analysis of major qualities that are either observed or absent in three coalition case studies. This effort, therefore, asks one to consider if there is a pat solution to molding a supreme military commander.

Specifically addressing conflicts within coalitions, Martin Blumenson and James Stokesbury state that “there are no pat solutions on how to reconcile the differences; only good sense and understanding, which lead to perception and wisdom.” The next several chapters therefore represent a number of possible lessons learned but no bona fide pat

16 Blumenson 315.
solutions by studying ‘supreme’ coalition commanders. All conflicts and coalitions are uniquely different. The contribution that this academic study provides rests on defining a coalition commander’s liable role as a *Diplomat at Arms* and evaluating the effectiveness of diplomacy practiced at the highest levels of military command. If certain traits prove vital to coalition success and one gains a greater sense and understanding of coalition command, then it may be just as vital to examine how others may well obtain indispensable “perception and wisdom.”

**International Military Coalitions**

For more than a decade, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff's conceptual template for future warfighting has remained the same. *Joint Vision 2010*, stated "[a]lthough our Armed Forces will maintain decisive unilateral strength, we expect to work in concert with allied and coalition forces in nearly all of our future operations, and increasingly, our procedures, programs, and planning must recognize this reality." It is true over the last decade that there have been NATO coalitions, UN coalitions, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and coalitions to assist in natural disasters.

*A coalition* is an arrangement between two or more nations for common action and in this study, military action. One of the foremost references by military officers studying coalition operations in the 21st century is a handbook developed through an international military partnership of America, Britain, Canada, and Australia, entitled *Coalition Operations Handbook*. Its most recent edition was published in April 2008 and

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17 Coalition Warfare. A Selected Bibliography Compiled by Virginia C. Shope in December 1999 compared with a comparable compilation ten years later at the Army War College archival website. U.S. Army War College Library Carlisle Barracks, PA.
is the fourth edition of its kind. In it, military officials highlight that as nations seek opportunities to promote their mutual national interests or seek mutual security against real or perceived threats, coalitions are created. Contrary to what most military manuals have previously focused, its emphasis is also on cultural, psychological, economic, technological, and political factors. Coalitions, which are created for limited purposes and for a set time, do not afford military planners the same political resolve and commonality as a singular deployment of troops or a long standing alliance. In fact, according to this handbook, military planners must closely study the political goals of each participant as a precursor to detailed combat planning.

Furthermore, coalition operations involve a comprehensive approach that includes other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and international and regional organizations. This blending of capabilities and political legitimacy makes the appointment of its commander all the more vital. As Commander in Chief the President always retains and cannot relinquish national command authority over U.S. forces. National command includes the authority and responsibility for organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, planning employment, and protecting military forces. As explained in the US DOD Joint Publication 3-16 on Multinational Operations, the President also has the authority to terminate U.S. participation in multinational operations at any time. Once he has appointed a commander, the command authority for an international coalition is normally negotiated between the participating nations. Command authority could vary from nation to nation and could range from operational

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control (OPCON), to tactical control (TACON), to designated support relationships, to coordinating authority.¹⁹

Building a multinational force starts with the political decisions and diplomatic efforts to create a coalition or spur an alliance into action. It cannot go without saying that the commander designated for such a task must be capable of dialogue and coordination between potential and certain participants. At a minimum, it is necessary to sort out basic questions at the international strategic and operational level and usually, the implementation and direction of armed troops. These senior level discussions could include organizations like the UN or NATO, existing coalitions or alliances, or individual nations … but nevertheless, they require someone with a unique set of qualifications and talent and likely several advisors. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper has materialized into how best to define this Diplomat at Arms.

Methodology

The contribution that this academic study provides rests on defining a Diplomat at Arms and evaluating the effectiveness of diplomacy practiced at the highest levels of military command. At a minimum, the following three chapters investigate and highlight how certain diplomatic traits leading up to command were either obtained or neglected throughout three separate careers of military service.

Each chapter highlights the biographical data of its main character, a former multinational coalition commander. The chapters provide analyses of professional,

¹⁹ In accordance with U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL 3-0: OPERATIONS. OPCON: Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. TACON: Tactical Control is the authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Coordinating authority: is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised in OPCON or TACON.
educational, and cultural experiences from youth to adulthood. In essence, the
general’s diplomatic guise is examined prior to his appointment for such a vital
command. Vignettes from the General’s command tenure are included to demonstrate
where his traits were effective or not. Some of the most telling observations while in
command actually come from those who served on the coalition staffs, as well as those
from the international partners, political advisors, and foreign services. In essence, the
methodology for studying Generals Schwarzkopf, Clark, and Franks are identical in
order to set the stage for a comparative analysis of major qualities that are either
observed or absent in these three coalition case studies.

By the manuscript’s conclusion, readers will know which four traits would seem to
stand out as ‘fundamental’ for future multinational coalition commanders. In other
words, what is the makeup of a Diplomat at Arms?
Chapter I

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf and the Persian Gulf War

Relying upon autobiographical literature is problematic. Humphrey Carpenter, one of Britain’s most recognized biographers, stated in 1982 that an “autobiography is probably the most respectable form of lying.”\(^{20}\) Carpenter’s comical exaggeration may not be taken lightly by a career military officer and West Point graduate who states that honor and integrity are foremost in his personal values, but his point is well understood.\(^{21}\) Therefore, a truer biographical sketch and historical analysis of H. Norman Schwarzkopf’s performance in the Persian Gulf War must also include views from disinterested players, agenda-driven press accounts, and close trusted advisors. No doubt a proper balance is necessary in compiling the most accurate personal and professional background for such a famous general.

Roger Cohen and Claudio Gatti provide a biographical portrayal *In the Eye of the Storm* that includes more than one hundred interviews conducted in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. These interviews range from close family members and West Point classmates to subordinate and superior officers, as well as foreign officials. Additionally, General Schwarzkopf’s televised interviews with Barbara Walters of ABC Television and David Frost of Public Broadcast television constitute an invaluable source. The documentary series *The Gulf War* by Films for the Humanities and


\(^{21}\) Upon receipt of the Academy of Achievement award on June 26, 1992, Schwarzkopf specifically tells the audience that “West Point gave us a creed to live by: ‘Duty, Honor, Country.’ And not everybody who graduates from West Point, of course, lives by that creed for their entire life, but I have. I mean, it just became a way of life for me.” Transcript viewed at [http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/printmember/sch0int-1](http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/printmember/sch0int-1) (accessed 15 DEC 09).
Sciences provides insight on how Saudi, Jordanian, Egyptian, and Kuwaiti leaders viewed the temperamental general. Written correspondence with career diplomats and political advisors proved very useful in this biographical sketch and historical research on the Persian Gulf War’s coalition headquarters. Through televised media, countless published interviews, and seven biographies on General Schwarzkopf’s role in the UN’s coalition, one is likely more capable of balancing autobiographical literature with biographical fact. This section considers Schwarzkopf’s background, education, and overall training in the most accurate and candid means possible. It also addresses Schwarzkopf’s “military diplomacy” during the Persian Gulf War and demonstrates how his background experiences and training conditioned his diplomatic actions as coalition commander.

**Biographical Sketch**

As General H. Norman Schwarzkopf approached King Fahd of Saudi Arabia in August of 1990 in an effort to convey the urgency of defending his kingdom and oil resources from a potentially threatening Iraqi force, history was repeating itself. In a bit of irony, General Schwarzkopf’s father, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Sr., had advised another Middle Eastern leader, the Shah of Iran, during World War II. Now, for a second time, another American general, the namesake of the first, was banking on his learned military diplomacy to help U.S. relations in the Middle East. So what was the

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“diplomatic make-up” of General Norman Schwarzkopf prior to this meeting in Saudi


Arabia?23

Norman Schwarzkopf, Sr., served in World War I and was recalled to active duty in World War II to serve in Iran. Absent from Norman, Jr. for four years during the war, his father requested his presence in Tehran. Norman's response was, “When do I leave?”24 On August 22, 1946, Norman Schwarzkopf departed for Iran and began what he called “the start of my military career because, from then on I lived in an Army world.”25 This marked the beginning of his diplomatic ‘schooling’ as well.

Twelve years old and on a five day journey to Iran, Schwarzkopf set foot in Newfoundland, Labrador, the Azores, through Europe and stopped in Cairo, Baghdad, and finally Tehran. Schwarzkopf quickly adjusted to his new environment. Norman's classmates at the Presbyterian Mission School in Tehran were a hodgepodge of Americans, Iranians, Armenians, White Russians, German Jews, and Palestinian Jews. Learning how to impress the American tradition of hand-holding on young Armenian girls, and patiently listening to Palestinian teenagers plotting terrorist futures against Britain, H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr. was maturing fast in this immersion of many cultures.26

The pleasures young Schwarzkopf experienced in the exotic world of post-war Iran did not last forever. In 1947, the Army transferred Schwarzkopf’s father to Geneva,

23 “Diplomatic make-up” is defined in this context as the make-up, or the composition and way an individual is formed or trained to conduct diplomacy. How the General learned to negotiate, remaining cognizant of varying cultures, and all the while compel cooperation within the coalition is what is meant by “diplomatic.”


26 Both Roger Cohen and Claudio Gatti’s In the Eye of the Storm: The Life of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf and Tim McNeese’s H. Norman Schwarzkopf tell readers these stories of cultural immersion at the Presbyterian Mission School in Tehran.
Switzerland. The entire family was united again and Norman attended a boarding school, Ecole Internationale (Ecolint). His greatest challenge at the new school was language. An early appreciation for mastering a host language was impressed upon the young teen. Nearly everyone spoke French and after only a few months, he was quite comfortably speaking French. One year later, his family moved to Germany where he adjusted, again to a new culture and new language. Thus, Norman Schwarzkopf’s experiences since leaving the United States in 1946 made the young adult Norman a well-rounded person, one who was familiar with several languages and knew his way around Europe. His youthful experiences spanned from the deserts of Iran and North Africa to the streets of Rome and Berlin. He was a curious mixture of American, Indo-European, and everything in between. When interviewed by the Academy of Achievement in April 2008, Schwarzkopf relished this youthful experience:

There's no question about the fact that the teenage years that I spent abroad had a tremendous impact upon my entire life, from that time forth. I mean, I got to know people of so many different nationalities, of so many different cultures, of so many different ethnic backgrounds. In meeting all of these people of so many different make-ups, it was a wonderful education for me. It taught me that there's more than one way to look at a problem, and they all may be right, you see. So, it gave me a certain tolerance. Maybe tolerance isn't the right word, because tolerance implies that there's intolerance before. It's not that, but it just gave me an appreciation for people. Judge them as you find them. Never prejudge anybody based upon any of those things that sometimes people are prejudged. That's lived with me for the rest of my life. It gave me the ability to be flexible, to get along with people of all different nationalities.

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Returning to the United States in August 1950 and determining that the military profession was for him, Norman Schwarzkopf set out to prepare for cadetship at the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. He had been accepted to Valley Forge Military Academy (VFM) on an athletic scholarship and the 16 year old Norman knew that this was his chance to prepare for West Point. At six-foot two-inches and 200-pounds, the young football player who had much experience living in the world beyond America, excelled at VFM and later at West Point.

Norman Schwarzkopf accumulated an exemplary record of performance at West Point. A tall, barrel-chested young man, he found the most challenging aspect of his cadet experience to be keeping his weight under control. Though at glance it may seem insignificant, there is much to say about one's humility toward other's struggles when looking at his lifelong struggle with weight gain. It was part of his life which he never managed to fully bring under control. In his memoirs, he states that his father taught him honor and his mother taught him tolerance.29 One could argue that his weight problem may have taught humility and compassion, traits that would stay with Schwarzkopf throughout his lifetime.

Like most hopeful young officers, Schwarzkopf studied war, military leadership, and battle tactics. His interest in General George Patton and General Tecumseh Sherman, as well as Hannibal and Alexander the Great, might have given him a sense of ‘greatness’ which he may have felt compelled to reach. Graduating in the top ten percent of his class on June 5, 1956, Schwarzkopf knew that West Point had sharpened his destiny:

29 Schwarzkopf 14.
I loved my country, of course, and I knew how to tell right from wrong, but my conscience was still largely unformed ... West Point saved me from that by instilling the ideal of service above self. It gave me far more than a military career—it gave me a calling.\(^{30}\)

In 1959, Lieutenant Schwarzkopf became an infantry platoon leader in Berlin, where he thrived and later served as aide-de-camp for Brigadier General Charles Johnson. After obtaining a Masters degree in missile mechanics and aerospace engineering, Schwarzkopf returned to West Point to teach. During this time, his interest in the U.S. involvement in Vietnam eventually consumed him. For Schwarzkopf, Vietnam became his first calling. It also likely served as his first military posting where diplomatic skills were tested. He was assigned in June 1965 as a field advisor to the Vietnamese airborne division. His orders instructed him to blend into the South Vietnamese formations. While in Vietnam, the Army provided him interpreters and he lived among the South Vietnamese, ‘blending in’ the best that he possibly could. The South Vietnamese troops once observed Schwarzkopf threaten an American helicopter pilot who refused to take South Vietnamese casualties. Hanging onto the skid, he demanded the pilots evacuate the Vietnamese dead soldiers “just as they would an American casualty.”\(^{31}\) This action, and others, did not go unnoticed and Schwarzkopf was quickly embraced by his “South Vietnamese companions and friends.”\(^{32}\)

His second tour in Vietnam was as battalion commander, and was nothing like his first tour. In July, 1969, his reintroduction stirred deep feelings of anger and frustrations with the state of army troops and the war’s aims. Nevertheless, by the time Schwarzkopf completed his tour of duty in June 1970, he had received three Silver

\(^{30}\) Ibid 72.
\(^{31}\) Ibid 132.
\(^{32}\) Ibid 121.
Stars, two Purple Hearts, and three Bronze Star Medals. What stands out in researching his tours in Vietnam is his compassion for the South Vietnamese and their plight against the North. As he stated, he was “impressed by our hosts and sympathetic toward them …[we] fought by their sides, and learned to regard them with great respect.” This feeling never left Schwarzkopf, even as he watched news reports of the airborne brigade he advised in 1965 get decimated by the Vietcong ten years later. This experience in Vietnam exposed Schwarzkopf to the difficulties of negotiating using interpreters; taught him how to coordinate military operations at the tactical level within an agreed upon ‘alliance;’ and also, highlighted the importance of giving the perception of impartiality.

In 1978, Schwarzkopf was sent to Hawaii where he served as Deputy Director for Plans, U.S. Pacific Command. This “fulfilling” job tested his organizational as well as diplomatic skills learned in the previous two decades. He thus served diplomatically as a representative of the Pentagon with U.S. allies in the Pacific from the west coast of the U.S. to the east coast of Africa –essentially covering over half the world. He travelled and planned military base negotiations in Korea, Taiwan, Australia, and, quietly, with his Japanese military counterparts in the hotels of Tokyo. In this capacity, Schwarzkopf honed his skills in international negotiations and military diplomacy. It is also where he learned to “relish the opportunity to be among people of other countries.”

33 Ibid 126.
34 Ibid 203.
36 Ibid 314.
Returning to Germany in 1980 as the assistant commanding general of the 8th Infantry Division, he became known as a very hands-on commander, and one who was extremely accessible to his men. Furthermore, he immersed his family and the infantry division’s leadership into the German community. They all participated in *Volkmarschverein*, a German social tradition, and visited the entire countryside chatting with Germans along the way (in the native language). His multicultural sensitivities had developed early on, as evidenced by relationships and community events coordinated while assigned in Germany. His headquarters in Mainz was warmly accepted by the townships. The regional mayors hosted Pope John Paul II and a crowd of three hundred thousand local nationals in November, 1980. As this Division’s Deputy Commanding General, Schwarzkopf displayed unique “diplomatic charisma” while simultaneously preparing 8th Mechanized Infantry Division for war.

By 1987, the U.S. Department of Defense recognized General Schwarzkopf’s diplomatic talent and he became the senior military member of the U.S. Military Staff Committee at the United Nations (UN). In some ways, this new assignment placed Schwarzkopf in situations he had seen earlier, but situations that his father dealt with in Iran, not him. In this new capacity, General Schwarzkopf was constantly meeting with foreign representatives and foreign military and state officials, which no doubt required him to demonstrate and use diplomatic skills. His performance in this ‘additional duty position’ likely contributed to him being selected for a fourth star and command of U.S. Central Command in 1988.

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38 McNeese 80.
At his new posting at Central Command in Tampa, Florida, Schwarzkopf became the chief of a U.S. Defense Department headquarters designed to monitor and coordinate the ability of America’s military forces to deploy to potential conflict areas. His office monitored activities in Northern Africa and several Middle Eastern nations, including Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other Persian Gulf nations. It should be of no surprise that General Schwarzkopf’s first priorities at Central Command included developing stronger ties with the nations of the Persian Gulf region. To that end, he promptly visited many of the Middle East nations, dressed in traditional Arab *dishdasha* robes when necessary, and sat down with Arab leaders “playing the role of diplomat more than military commander.”39 General Schwarzkopf soon found himself in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee urging them to ease restrictions on arms sales to the Arab moderate countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. He did not get very far, but the minor concessions he did get helped boost his credibility with these countries. General Schwarzkopf, even before the beginning of the Gulf War, showed he had the insight on the importance of this region of the world. He knew that maintaining good foreign relations in this region was crucial for CENTCOM. His overall demeanor and sensitivity to the Arab culture impressed many leaders in the Middle East. As commander, he immersed himself in the region learned that ‘how you say things’ and ‘interpersonal relationships’ weighed heavily.

After looking closely at General Schwarzkopf’s background in military diplomacy, it seems he had unknowingly prepared himself to lead an international military coalition all his life. Yet, despite his own personal experiences in the Arab world and Europe, as well as his strong understanding of allied culture and military capabilities, was he up to

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39 McNeese 84.
the task of leading this United Nation’s war against Iraq? How integral was his
diplomacy in orchestrating the coalition and then commanding that force in combat?
There are at least three major events during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm
that help determine the effectiveness of General Schwarzkopf as a Diplomat at Arms.
The second part of this chapter therefore focuses on Schwarkopf’s military diplomacy
before, during, and after the conflict.

Coalition Commander, Persian Gulf War

On July 10\textsuperscript{th}, 1990 Kuwait agreed to abide by quotas in a meeting of oil ministers
in Jeddah, but chose to not meet Saddam Hussein’s excessive demands for territorial
rights. Seven days later, Saddam threatened military action against Kuwait if it did not
comply and within the same week told Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak that Iraq
would not invade Kuwait. By August 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 140,000 Iraqi troops and 1,800 tanks invaded
Kuwait, spearheaded by two Republican Guard divisions.\textsuperscript{40} In response, on the same
day, the United Nations Security Council passed with a 14-0 vote calling for Iraq’s
immediate withdrawal.\textsuperscript{41}

Many scholars and journalists have written on the conflicts and power struggles
within the anti-Iraq coalition and the American high command in the Persian Gulf War.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{40} Yetiv, Steve. \textit{The Persian Gulf Crisis}. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press Guides to Historic Events of the
\textsuperscript{41} UNSCR 660. \url{http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/10/IMG/NR057510.pdf?OpenElement}
(accessed on 2 OCT 09)
\textsuperscript{42} Some of the best examples are: Freedman, Lawrence and Efraim Karsh, \textit{The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991:}
underlying the Gulf War and probes the strategic calculations of all the participants. Also, Gordon, Michael R. and
GEN(R) Bernard E. Trainor. \textit{The General’s War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf}. New York: Little,
Brown, and Company, 1995. This book is a compilation of interviews from top allied officials in the Persian Gulf
War. It really highlights the conflicts and struggles among the senior-most officials. And finally, Khaled ibn Sultan.
\textit{Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander}. New York: Harper Collins,
1995. Prince Sultan argues that Saudis played a more critical political and military role in Desert Storm.
How did General Schwarzkopf specifically deal with these struggles and strategic obstacles? What was Schwarzkopf’s “form of diplomacy” that he genuinely “enjoyed” during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm? Was this “new breed” of general truly skilled in diplomacy and could he be considered a Diplomat at Arms?

To address these questions, it is beneficial to see how a few ‘trained’ diplomats viewed Schwarzkopf. Additionally, by selecting three critical stages of the Persian Gulf War, Schwarzkopf’s diplomatic guise becomes even more evident. Therefore, the following pages will look at the general’s early diplomatic role in the U.S. envoy to Saudi Arabia, four days after Iraq invaded Kuwait; his efforts at one of the most critical stages of the war, when Iraq attacked Israel with ballistic missiles; and, finally, at the controversial Safwa ceasefire negotiations at the war’s conclusion.

Ambassador W. Nathaniel Howell, the political advisor to Schwarzkopf’s predecessor at U.S. CENTCOM, General George Crist, USMC, had known Norman Schwarzkopf since 1987. As the U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait, Howell hosted Schwarzkopf twice before the Iraq invasion. He stated, “[Schwarzkopf’s] performance in Desert Storm was impressive, but not as astounding in my view as some accounts make it.” Ambassador Howell particularly highlighted the general’s overall performance and large effort in “massaging the pretensions of the Saudis” prior to deploying troops in Operation Desert Shield. “There were a lot of “right people in the

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43 Schwarzkopf 322. Schwarzkopf tells his readers in his autobiography that being at CENTCOM gave him an opportunity to exercise the “form of diplomacy I genuinely enjoyed.”
44 Cohen, Roger and Claudio Gatt, In the Eye of the Storm: The Life of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1991, p. 8. This “new breed” is of a “classless general” as evaluated Lawrence Goldman, a historian and Fellow at St. Peter’s in Oxford. His study on Schwarzkopf later concludes that “[he was] also a man with a brilliant grasp of his task … in the end, there was widespread praise and respect for him.”
45 Email dialogue between author and Ambassador Nathaniel Howell. This quote comes from email titled “Comments,” dated 26 October 2009.
46 Ibid, “Comments.”
right posts at the right time,” according to Howell. 47 Though certainly not alone in diplomatic efforts, General Schwarzkopf’s choosing to address Saudi pretensions was central to the coalition’s success and is worth greater analysis.

In a 2003 video documentary by Films for the Humanities and Sciences, the producers interview several Egyptian, Kuwaiti, Saudi, Jordanian, and Iraqi officials. In it, these military and political (often hereditary monarch) leaders give a sense of the dynamics within the establishment of the Desert Shield coalition. At just over three hours of edited interviews from nearly all the chief Arab and American players, one begins to understand how others viewed the dynamics within the coalition. One also appreciates how military diplomacy contributed in helping prepare, conduct, and conclude the war. Many of the Arab senior military commanders, especially General Prince Khalid al Sultan of Saudi Arabia, present a relationship that was not necessarily subordinate to Schwarzkopf’s “hot head.” 48 Eleven years after the war, however, all of the officials, including U.S. officials, make note of Schwarzkopf’s ability to persuade King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. What, in particular, was Schwarzkopf’s pivotal contribution in “massaging Saudi pretentions”?  

Staging a Coalition

Four days after Iraq invaded Kuwait, U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney led an envoy to Saudi Arabia to apprise King Fahd of the Iraqi threat facing his country. He also hoped to gain permission for the entry of thousands of American troops into the kingdom. Accompanying Cheney was General Norman Schwarzkopf, Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates, Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and Chas

48 Cohen 8. A view shared by several in the beginning of the conflict, especially the British.
Freeman, U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia. Chas Freeman, who wrote *Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy* six years after the Persian Gulf War, would later insist that “the selection of those who will negotiate for them with foreign states is among the most important decisions statesmen must make.” President Bush therefore felt confident in his team’s ability to persuade King Fahd; and, it seems Schwarzkopf may have been the pivotal ‘diplomat’ at this initial meeting.

In an interview with PBS’ Frontline five years after the war, General Schwarzkopf reflected on the importance of this meeting in Jeddah:

> It was absolutely necessary to have the Saudis' permission to come in because of the sovereignty of the nation of Saudi Arabia and the number of forces we were going to bring into the country … it was absolutely necessary to have their approval. As we were flying over in the aircraft to meet with the King of Saudi Arabia, Secretary Cheney called me in and said, "You know, you've been working in this area for a couple of years now and you know these people, what do you think will happen?" And I said, "I think what will happen is we'll make our presentation and they'll listen very carefully and then they'll say 'Thank you very much, we'll let you know', and we will get back on the airplane and fly back to Washington with no decision."

From this observation, one can only speculate as to the sequence Secretary Cheney chose to present the American stance to King Fahd. However, when it came time to meet with the king, Cheney first gave a “low-key presentation, outlining the threat but not exaggerating it.” Unless the Saudis agreed to the deployment of American forces, the Saudi kingdom risked becoming another Kuwait, Cheney explained. His briefing, not particularly moving to the Saudis, guaranteed that after the crisis, the Americans would take steps to build up the Saudi defensive capabilities and assured the king that

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49 Freeman 101.
American forces would stay only as long as they were wanted. After Cheney’s presentation, there was still clear dissention among the Saudis according to Chas Freeman, the only American in the mission who had a limited command of Arabic. The next presenter, General Schwarzkopf, no doubt changed the dynamic of the room.

Prince Sultan (King Fahd’s brother) and Ambassador Freeman captured the diplomatic victory best in interviews eleven years later. Freeman said that Schwarzkopf, “a very large man, quietly approached and got down on one knee in front of the king.” Schwarzkopf, in full military dress uniform, opened a notebook on his knee and in what is best described as a submissive and respectful way, and conveyed the urgency of the security situation directly to King Fahd. In Schwarzkopf’s words, “I was quite relaxed, I had a sense of urgency to get the message across, to deliver the correct information, to make sure the Saudis understood what was going on, but I had no expectations...” From his time as a youth or from his early days in command, Schwarzkopf’s immersion into ‘foreign culture’ had paid off.

This may have been deliberate. It seems General Schwarzkopf knew how to present the American case to King Fahd in a manner that would strike at the king’s core. This diplomatic maneuver by Schwarzkopf was observed by Prince Sultan who attempted to caution the king in making a hasty decision without consultation. He clearly knew the persuasive power being projected to the king. In nearly all written accounts and in the interviews conducted regarding this momentous meeting in Jeddah, it seems that whatever Schwarzkopf presented in this notebook—and, how it was

52 “Not particularly moving” is concluded after hearing the interviews of Chas Freeman (U.S. Amb) and Prince Sultan of Saudi Arabia in the Film for Humanities and Sciences’, The Gulf War, Part One.
53 Film for Humanities and Sciences, Part I.
54 PBS Frontline Interview, 1996.
55 Film for Humanities and Sciences, Part I.
presented—is what finally turned the tables in favor of deploying U.S. forces into Saudi Arabia. Years later, well after his memoirs were published, General Schwarzkopf reflected on the photos of Iraqi tanks on Saudi soil that were in his notebook:

I didn't realize at the time but I think that was very significant in the King's ultimate decision, I think he was infuriated that, in fact, the sovereignty of Saudi Arabia has been violated by these tanks even though it was on a piece of sand out in the middle of nowhere, he was still very upset by this.\(^{56}\)

The king gave his assent. The sanctity of his kingdom and the security of the Saudis were not to be taken for granted. The largest accumulation of field troops in an international conflict since World War II would now be underway. The U.S. wasted no time; and, with urgent deployments, problems of competing cultures no doubt would arise. Along with Schwarzkopf’s keen cultural awareness and reverence demonstrated at the king’s palace, he promptly issued his first “General Order #1” and informed the Saudis. The directive for U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia noted that “Islamic law and Arabic customs prohibit or restrict certain activities which are generally permissible in Western societies.”\(^{57}\) Alcohol was banned, pornography was banned, bibles were discretely held, Riyadh was off-limits, and American troops were not permitted to wear shorts or short sleeves by Schwarzkopf’s orders. In staging a coalition, General Schwarzkopf’s diplomatic guise proved quite effective. A *Diplomat at Arms* had been placed in command of this international coalition.

**Iraq attacks Israel**

The period in the Persian Gulf War where Schwarzkopf’s diplomatic guise would be most challenged occurred when Iraq successfully launched ballistic missiles at

\(^{56}\) PBS *Frontline*, 1996.

\(^{57}\) *Desert Shield General Order #1*, [http://www.3ad.com/history/gulf.war/general.order.1.htm](http://www.3ad.com/history/gulf.war/general.order.1.htm) (accessed on 22 Oct 2009).
Israel. In fact, much of Saddam’s direct response to Schwarzkopf’s offensive involved the launching of his “scud” missiles. These surface-to-surface missiles were once Soviet missiles that, although unreliable, were still capable of devastating a generalized target and of carrying chemical or biological warheads. During the first 48 hours of the coalition’s air assault, Saddam’s forces launched eight scuds, seven targeting Israel.58 This proved problematic for a coalition in which nearly half of the troops felt animosity toward Israel. In some instances, coalition troops cheered when the news broke of Israel being attacked.59 Therefore, whatever its failings as a missile, the scuds fired at Israel made it politically and diplomatically explosive. For Schwarzkopf, the questions were: “[How] would Israel respond? And how would his coalition, with its several Arab members, hold together in the event of [Israeli] retaliation?”60

Historians document this sensitive time in the coalition quite differently. Roger Cohen emphasized that Bush, Cheney, and Schwarzkopf all recognized the importance of keeping Israel out of the war and thus began a heavy “scud hunt” and diplomatic effort to appease the Israelis. Israel was offered the use of U.S. Patriot antimissile batteries and was promised that some allied aircraft would be diverted to become scud busters. In interviews long after the war, the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, insisted that America would not cooperate with Israel’s requests to retaliate. He said “for us it was impossible to do something militarily against the Iraqis without coordination with the Americans … it was impossible … America would not

58 Yetiv, 35 and McNeese, 103 and Cohen 270.
59 Some Egyptian and Jordanian troops cheered according to Jordan’s Prime Minister in the Humanitarian and Sciences documentary film.
60 Cohen 271.
Steve Yetiv, another historian of the Persian Gulf War, indicates that the U.S. President and State Department knew the importance but Schwarzkopf felt that the “scud hunt” was a “diversion from attacks on more important targets” and that his commands for some time were “overruled by Secretary Cheney,” who believed more than Schwarzkopf in the sensitivity of the situation with Israel.62

In his memoirs published in 1992, General Sir Peter de la Billiere, the commander of all British forces in the Gulf War, recalls how seriously Schwarzkopf and the entire coalition’s leadership took the Saudi requirement to keep Israel out of the war. Billiere recalls how Prince Khalid insisted that “[keeping Israel out of the war] was a prerequisite for using Saudi territory.”63 That said, the British general also knew how close Israel came to entering the conflict:

> Only by a hair’s breadth did [Saddam’s] scheme to entrap Israel fail on that second night of the war. At one stage we heard that the Israeli’s had many F-16s airborne and only heavy international pressure prevented them from launching a raid which might have had disastrous consequences. At the hub of operations in Riyadh we were aware that intensive diplomatic negotiations were in progress and Norman himself spoke frequently to a high-level Israeli contact.64

The high-level Israeli contact that Schwarzkopf was speaking to was likely the Defence Minister, Moshe Arens. Arens argues that the American coalition commander “did everything he could by dragging his feet, not clearing air corridors, not clearing the area so we could retaliate militarily against Iraq.”65 Somewhere amidst these conflicting

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61 Quoted from 2003 documentary film, Humanities and Sciences The Persian Gulf: Part II.
62 Yetiv 35-6.
64 Del la Billiere 205.
65 Humanities and Sciences documentary film on The Persian Gulf: Part II.
documents lies what really transpired at the military’s headquarters in Riyadh. When questioned by PBS’ *Frontline*, General Schwarzkopf answered quite passionately.

Washington’s approach to the scuds was purely a political approach. My approach was purely a military approach. Washington was very concerned about the pressure that was being brought to bear within Israel as a result of the scuds landing on Israel. ...[I]f we couldn’t convince the Israelis we were doing everything that could possibly be done to stop the scuds, ... they would intervene, with subsequent impact on the coalition.\(^6^6\)

Deliberately, the coalition commander not only offered Patriot batteries and agreed to launch sorties as “scud hunters” in an effort to appease Israel, but he also refused to give Israel the aircraft “mode 4” transponder codes necessary to identify friend or foe in the skies. In fact, the coalition headquarters refused to clear air corridors for requested Israeli F-16 strikes, and essentially, stalled the Israelis long enough to keep them at bay for the remainder of the short war. A diplomatic chess game was underway with Saddam making the first move; however, the unity of command and the united diplomatic efforts of the American-led coalition were able to checkmate Saddam and keep Israel out of the war. The risk of a divided coalition subsided due to a series of overt State Department and covert CENTCOM diplomatic endeavors. A logical conclusion one could make is that if a senior military commander was insensitive to the vulnerability of the Arab-Israeli relationship then hasty action could have been catastrophic; whereas, in this highly delicate situation, General Schwarzkopf and his fellow senior military officers proved triumphant, operationally patient, and politically savvy.

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Schwarzkopf at Safwan – Hierarchy of Coalition Military Diplomacy

The final period of the Persian Gulf War provides some of the best insight into Schwarzkopf’s diplomatic skill. General Norman Schwarzkopf’s military diplomacy and political savvy was certainly brought to task in a tent at the Iraqi airfield in Safwan. Less than one week after the end of the ground war, on March 3, 1991, Schwarzkopf met with Iraqi commanders and government officials, along with coalition commanders from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Great Britain, and France. Once the allied coalition was in a position to claim victory over the Iraqi forces, Schwarzkopf became the chief coalition spokesman for coordinating all cease-fire objectives. His performance in this capacity remains one of the most controversial elements of the Persian Gulf War. Was the coalition commander prepared with the proper war-termination strategy and was a Diplomat at Arms present in Safwan?

The great Prussian military strategist, Karl von Clausewitz, emphasized how military force should be used as an instrument to achieve political goals. There is no doubt that President Bush and the United Nations Security Council were effective during the crisis in meeting political goals; however, debate exists on whether more attention could have been devoted to the issue of how to translate the overwhelming military victory into an equally impressive political victory over the Iraqis. In Frontline interviews after the war, both Richard Hass and Brent Scowcroft indicate that the post-victory planning was less than adequate by the U.S. Administration.67 By not demanding Saddam’s presence at Safwan and not providing instructions from Washington on how

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to negotiate at Safwan, the international UN coalition relied upon Schwarzkopf and his ‘apolitical’ military terms. So what transpired?

Steve Yetiv interviewed Ambassador Chas Freeman in Washington, DC in 1996 while researching his book *The Persian Gulf Crisis*. In it, Freeman reveals that he had pressed the Bush administration, on behalf of Schwarzkopf, for a war-termination strategy well before Safwan. Freeman felt “no real action was taken [because] the administration was concerned that the coalition would break down if such a strategy were formulated and leaked.”68 By all accounts, Schwarzkopf was “agitated” when he received little to no direction from Washington regarding the talks at Safwan.69 In contrast, Gordon and Trainor argue in *The General’s War* that “Schwarzkopf did not seek any political guidance from Cheney or his aides.”70 Though one may never truly know the guidance Schwarzkopf received from U.S. officials, the outcome at Safwan gives significant credence to the guidance provided by the United Nations.

Schwarzkopf headed to the Safwan negotiations with the intent to terminate the war cleanly, period. With *Frontline*, he recalled the arrangements:

> When the Iraqis arrived at Safwan I wanted to make very sure that they completely understood the overwhelming military power that their armed forces had faced on the ground and I also wanted to make it very clear to them that we were completely capable of resuming hostilities at any given time and quite frankly, inflicting great damage upon them if we chose to do so.

> I didn't want them to arrive thinking this was a meeting of equals, I wanted them to clearly understand that this was the victor over the vanquished when they sat down at that table.71

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68 Yetiv 44.
69 Yetiv 45, interviewing Freeman in 1996.
70 Gordon 444.
It is important to note that in Schwarzkopf’s journey to Safwan, he toured a pillaged and decimated Kuwait just prior to his first face-to-face meeting with his counterparts. British General de la Billiere, who traveled with Schwarzkopf along the way, said in his memoirs, “Kuwait City is a disgraceful example of the worst excesses of the Iraqis. The treatment of human beings is not for description in a letter – tenth century behaviour or worse.” Schwarzkopf was angered by what he saw as depicted in his memoirs. It confirmed all his contempt for Saddam: “this was not the work of an army but of a marauding band of armed looters in uniform.” With a stern and commanding presence, Schwarzkopf, on his way to Safwan, very well could have been portrayed as a triumphant warrior set out to ‘punish’ the conquered.

A Diplomat at Arms commander may likely not have been in Safwan. Rather, a triumphant military general with the largest and most lethal force assembled in history had arrived … with very little criteria for dealing with the “vanquished.” Schwarzkopf’s priorities were: 1. locate and retrieve coalition prisoners of war and the dead; 2. clearly define demarcation boundaries and priorities of retreat; and, 3. make it clear that the Iraqi military lost to an overwhelmingly powerful force. At first glance these top priorities, shared by advisors in his short flight to Safwan, were strictly military and had no political terms whatsoever. For a politically and diplomatically savvy general, why was this the case?

The answer lies in determining whose objectives Schwarzkopf most adequately represented. The meeting lasted for two hours, and was observed by allied generals

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72 De la Billiere 308.
73 Cohen 304.
74 These top priorities are not listed; however, from reading Schwarzkopf’s memoirs, accounts by historians, and Chas Freeman’s interview, I have taken the liberty to generalize the top three priorities of his meeting in Safwan.
from Britain, France, Kuwait, Egypt, Syria, and other coalition partners. The talks, as described by de la Billiere, “started off cool, and it never really got any warmer.”

There were no discussions on the conduct of the war, no shop talk; all was focused on the immediate problems of implementing the cease-fire. “I would describe the Iraqis as pushing to see this resolved as quickly as possible and agreeing to everything they needed to,” de la Billiere said. The meeting was recorded on tape and by a stenographer with the entire transcript declassified in 1996. Balancing the transcript with Prince Khalid’s, Chas Freeman’s, General de la Billiere’s, and General Schwarzkopf’s recollections on the Safwan talks, one comes to some general conclusions regarding whose objectives were met. The resulting terms were simple, stringent, and relatively fair: 1. all prisoners of war and abducted Kuwaitis were to be returned; 2. hostile and provocative actions were to cease; 3. the annexation of Kuwait was rescinded; 4. Iraq accepted liability under international law for war damages, returned all seized property, and agreed to help rebuild Kuwait; and, 5. the locations of minefields and obstacles were to be disclosed.

Schwarzkopf departed the meeting saying that they had “agreed on all matters and made a major step toward the cause of peace.” By saying “all matters,” he was no doubt referring to the terms of UN Resolution 686, which had been passed by the

75 De la Billiere 312-315
76 Ibid.
UNSC the day prior by a vote of 11-1, with three abstentions. Critical of Schwarzkopf’s agenda at Safwan, high-level U.S. officials (namely Secretary Cheney and Brent Scowcroft) argued extensively over his permitting Iraqi helicopters to fly and not insisting on Saddam’s political humiliation and subsequent dissolution of power. Years later, many argue that the U.S. interests were not adequately represented at Safwan. With such a dominant military force and clearly defeated adversary, the U.S. was in an incredible position to impose more severe terms but chose not to. Therefore, and in light of the current situation, it suggests that more could have and probably should have been done in the form of weakening Iraq’s Republican Guard and imposing more humiliating cease-fire terms. But, it is important to highlight that most critics of Safwan and Schwarzkopf’s role are limited to U.S. officials’ accounts. Whereas, by looking strictly through what interests the United Nations Security Council and the multinational coalition had established, General Schwarzkopf not only met the terms for those he represented, he also did so within the charter he commanded. Arguably, his representation for the coalition outweighed the interests of those who had appointed him for the position –the U.S. military and political establishment. This may very well have been the best decision for the coalition, but not in the best interest of the United States. The U.S. returned to remove the Iraqi regime in 2003.

Conclusion

The U.S.-led coalition used many forms of diplomacy, various types of sanctions, and, as a last resort, force to achieve the objective of reversing Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. As Steve Yetiv, a Middle East foreign policy expert, argued a year later, “the

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Gulf War was a classic case of war as simply the continuation of diplomacy by other means. General Norman Schwarzkopf proved himself a military leader adept enough to work in this changed world, and in the space of a few months forged a coalition of soldiers from countries as various as France, Bahrain, Egypt, and Bangladesh. He valued Islam, demanded respect for Arabs, and was sensitive to other cultures not just in this war, but his entire life. Even as a triumphant commander arriving at Safwan, he never gave the sense that the United States was riding “roughshod” over others. Schwarzkopf did not permit the humiliation of the Iraqi generals and colonel, who were escorted by two Bradleys, two M1A1 tanks, and two Apache helicopters, to meet him in Safwan with military dignity. While there, Schwarzkopf secured all UN mandates and coalition “matters,” but not necessarily the expectations generated by U.S. political pressures.

The Persian Gulf War marked an era of high military technology, an era of highly skilled professional soldiers, and a new era of General Colin Powell’s doctrine of decisive force. It was also an era where the U.S. avoided the pitfalls recalled from the Vietnam War. Amidst so much transformation in modern warfare, a Diplomat at Arms, deliberately or not, was placed in command of this multinational coalition. At first, General Schwarzkopf defied the mold one would suspect for this position. He was overweight, short tempered, and as documented by the British and French, he was a

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80 Yetiv 45.
81 “riding roughshod over others” is a phrase encountered after the author’s interviews with LTG Mixon and Amb Salmon, specifically regarding U.S.’ greatest mistake when placed in coalition command. Both senior officials argued separately as this being the gravest mistake possible in such a sensitive environment. Schwarzkopf only appeared ‘roughshod’ when attempting to guide coalition leaders’ response to media questions during the war. See 3 March 1991 Boston Globe article “Diplomacy is Not His Forte” by Walter Robinson for the best example of Schwarzkopf ‘coaching’ Saudi Prince Khalid.
“hothead” and “appeared as a troublesome figure, a gung-ho blusterer.” 82 When introduced to the world, Schwarzkopf was certainly less reassuring than Colin Powell, the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Some argue that his deputy, the more refined, “skillful and disciplined professional,” Lieutenant General Calvin Waller was provided as a safeguard for those wary of Schwarzkopf. 83 Looking more closely at General Schwarzkopf’s career, his personal and professional background, and his deliberate actions, one concludes that his sharp temper was not aimed at people, it was usually aimed at events. His command face and sometimes “classless” behavior in the end never interfered with the widespread praise and international respect for him.

With an education in diplomacy provided by his father’s influence and life-long experiences, and absolutely no military schooling for coalition command responsibilities, General Schwarzkopf was one the most important men to “be in the right post at the right time.” 84 Air Vice Marshal Ian Macfayden, the chief of staff of the British forces in the Gulf, when questioned about General Schwarzkopf, said it plainly. “He was a considerable diplomat, even as one sensed that he could overpower people if he wanted.” 85 Also the French, according to Lieutenant General Roquejoffre, their commander, were surprised with Schwarzkopf’s sensitivity, his political adroitness, and his mastery of the military art:

He appeared at first as something of a brute. But then people realized that he was in fact extraordinarily sensitive, with an unusual ability to listen to others and put them at their ease. There have been so many great generals for whom human life does not count that much. But he came across as a man who cared about each individual life.

82 Cohen 8.
83 A conclusion based on the views at the time of several senior military officers. “Skillful and disciplined professional” was taken from President Bill Clinton’s public release upon notification of LTG Waller’s death in 1996. Multiple open sources, specifically taken from http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/cawaller.htm on 1 Nov 09.
84 Interview, Amb Howell, 29 Oct 2009.
85 Quoted in Cohen 8.
Moreover, he was a diplomat and a politician as well as a military man.\textsuperscript{86} 

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, a self-taught and instinctive \textit{Diplomat at Arms}, had successfully commanded a thirty-three nation coalition and conducted military diplomacy to a degree comparable to General Eisenhower in World War II.

\textsuperscript{86} Quoted in Cohen 312.
Chapter II:  
General Wesley K. Clark and Operation Allied Force

In the previous chapter, a short discussion on the necessary and careful use of autobiographical research provided the backdrop for portraying a fair and scholarly review of General Schwarzkopf’s life and diplomatic contributions in the Persian Gulf War. Similarly, the second senior military officer chosen for this study not only published memoirs, *Making Modern War* and *A Time to Lead*, but General Wesley Clark also remains politically charged as a U.S. Presidential candidate in both 2004 and 2008. Although Clark launched two unsuccessful presidential campaigns, he has received, more or less, celebratory treatment by authors and journalists in recent years. While writing a balanced portrayal of the former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) seems that much more challenging, it remains possible that Clark’s early life, education, military training, and on-the-job experiences are well-captured by various scholars, as well as many military and diplomacy professionals worldwide.

General Wesley K. Clark’s military and educational experiences took him from Oxford to Vietnam and from the Pentagon to Latin America, culminating in his appointment as NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. Clark refers very little to his youth and educational experiences in his two widely recognized memoirs, *Waging Modern War* and *Winning Modern Wars*, but he covers it in detail in his 2007 autobiography, *A Time to Lead*. By reconstructing his story primarily from newspapers

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and interviews with co-workers, his diplomatic persona can be pulled also from the multiple articles he has published and especially in the biography written by Antonia Felix. Most recently, Clark wrote the ninth chapter of the classic *Military Leadership*, 6th ed. The chapter's title, “The Potency of Persuasion,” is very telling of the degree of emphasis Clark places on the marriage of force and diplomacy. Even more so, the eleventh chapter of his autobiography is “Diplomacy, Diplomacy, Diplomacy.” Looking more closely at Clark’s experiences, one will conclude that he developed a set of skills unique and simultaneously at odds within the military profession. He was an armed diplomat who held the highest rank in the U.S. military upon his retirement.

General Clark’s charisma and diplomatic talent are no secret, and it is widely accepted that he had the attention of certain Secretaries of Defense and Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs along the way. The Army, however, may not have thought as highly of him as one might suspect. Clark’s last three assignments were as head of strategic plans on the Joint Staff (known as J-5); commander in chief of U.S. Southern Command; and the SACEUR post. In none of the three was he the nominee of his own service. As shown in this chapter, Clark’s performance in Operation Allied Force at the end of his career only deepened the divide from his military contemporaries.

It has been said that General Clark has a “different brand of charisma,” that he is “small, taut, intense, and rarely lets slip much about his feelings.” The European and American public were quite familiar with Wesley Clark’s charisma and generalship at the immediate onset of Operation Allied Force, but there’s more the public may not have

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known. After more than three decades of commanding troops in and out of combat from Vietnam to Bosnia, what was the diplomatic make-up of this man forced to lead NATO’s first major combat action? Did the Army train him to be a diplomat?

In the same manner as the chapter on General Schwarzkopf, the first section of this chapter provides General Wesley Clark’s background, education, and overall training in the most accurate and candid means possible. Summarizing the general’s complete life experiences is best left to biographers; therefore, this emphasis on Wesley Clark deals specifically with his diplomatic experiences and training received along the way to commanding the Kosovo air campaign in March, 1999. Thus, the second part focuses only on Clark’s military diplomacy specific to the Rambouillet Agreement and Operation Allied Force in 1999. To what extent did his background experiences and training directly impact his diplomatic actions as NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander?

Biographical Sketch

To answer this, one must first look at Clark’s experiences while facing adversity in his youth. Clark’s original last name at birth, Kanne, came from his biological father, Benjamin Kanne. Kanne, an attorney and Chicago politician, died at home while young Wesley was only four years old, leaving him without a father and without realizing the Jewish part of his family history until he was an adult and in his twenties. Wesley’s mother, pushing for strong education and responsibility, moved home to Arkansas after her husband passed away. At this point, “Wesley had a sort of second birth between the ages of four and five.” A southerner now and adopted by his stepfather, Wesley Kanne Clark had a new last name and dealt with some devastating personal setbacks in

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90 Clark’s mother withheld his Jewish heritage deliberately due to the prejudice in Arkansas at the time. This is portrayed well in Clark’s memoirs, emphasized by his recollection of the desegregation of schools in Arkansas.
Arkansas. One might even assume that just as young Norman Schwarzkopf learned humility with a weight problem throughout his youth, Wesley Clark likely learned modesty from a speech impediment, thick eye-glasses, and flat feet.

By eighth grade, Wesley Clark had overcome his personal setbacks and became involved in civic responsibilities and service organizations. He rose to the top academically and excelled at competitive swimming throughout high school. In these formative years, however, and contrary to what was observed with Schwarzkopf, Clark had very few ‘diplomatic’ experiences or prophetic realizations of his future potential. Despite excelling for a year in a military school in Tennessee, it seems the greatest political lesson learned during this period occurred by experiencing first-hand the disputes over desegregation in Little Rock in 1957.

Understood by statesmen and Foreign Service officers alike, mastering the art of negotiation remains a top skill for any diplomat. Wesley Clark, as a young teenager, dealt with some of our nation’s most heated arguments – racism. He witnessed protests, violence, legal actions, and finally the military-enforced racial school integration. His high school was one of the three chosen in Arkansas for forced integration at a time when the state voted 7,561 for integration and 129,470 against.92 Reflecting years later, General Clark remarked on these lessons:

People argued superficially about facts, but the real disagreements were about principles. Each side mustered many of them. To make headway in any discussion, you had to work on small, specific areas of discussion where some agreement might be found. And in the process, you risked being misunderstood or even attacked by both sides.93

92 Felix 37.
Clark’s high marks throughout high school, his community involvement with the local Boys’ Club, and his swimming success eventually merited a congressional appointment and selection to attend the United States Military Academy at West Point. Reading through all the cadet experiences while Clark was at the academy, it is quite clear that the most influential extracurricular activity for him was his involvement in the Army’s collegiate debate team. For his potential future in marrying force and diplomacy, this part of Clark’s cadet experience may have prepared him more than any other. Debating controversial topics at a minimum required Wesley Clark to master preparation, presentation, writing, critical thinking, speaking, and body language in front of highly critical audiences. He states in A Time to Lead that “this experience, perhaps as much as anything at West Point … bonded me to the military and … my potential service.”94 In fact, Clark did quite well debating. He and his partner won all five debates at a national tournament in Dartmouth in 1964, with Clark declared “Best Public Speaker.”95

Wesley Clark’s early life, to include his early adult life, did not include much travel abroad. Besides Illinois and Arkansas and the states between, West Point, New York was the furthest he’d been from home until the age of twenty. Cadet Wesley Clark was finally sent to Germany for four weeks to gain experience leading troops prior to his senior year at the academy. In his desire to gain proficiency in the Russian language, Clark and a classmate also arranged for a ten-day trip to Russia. This first experience as an American representative abroad took him from Bamberg, Germany to Moscow.

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94 Clark 57.
Leningrad, Kiev, Copenhagen, Amsterdam, Paris, and the French Riviera.\textsuperscript{96} It was during this trip in the summer of 1964 that he experienced first-hand the “Soviet propaganda guns turned on America.”\textsuperscript{97} He therefore witnessed competing ideologies, economies, and cultures as a young adult with this month-long immersion throughout parts of Europe.

Graduating top in his West Point class of 1965, Wesley Clark became a Rhodes Scholar and studied at Oxford. While there, he was brought to task in representing U.S. interests abroad to fellow international students. Once, he was paired with an assistant from the South Vietnamese embassy, a British Communist labor leader, a Pakistani student leader, and an American draft dodger in a heated debate on the American presence in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{98} Now, only 22 years old, Clark stood firm arguing his beliefs, all the while honing his diplomatic skills in front of an intellectual and argumentative audience. Later on, after his combat tour in Vietnam as a staff officer and then later as a company commander, the U.S. government provided Wesley Clark the first of four significant international dealings where he was an active participant. He interacted daily at the Army’s Command and General Staff College with foreign military officers from Britain, Israel, Jordan, Ethiopia, South Vietnam, Cambodia. In all, more than one hundred officers from dozens of countries were in his same class.\textsuperscript{99} This was a gentle introduction to competing martial and diplomatic interests.

By 1975, Wesley Clark could be described as: a ‘Yankee’ that turned into a southerner; a speech-challenged pupil who became a champion debater; a Jew who

\textsuperscript{96} Felix 65.
\textsuperscript{97} Clark 59.
\textsuperscript{98} Clark 62-66.
\textsuperscript{99} Felix 96, and Clark 106.
became a Baptist, who in turn accepted Catholicism; and, finally a wounded combat veteran who became a professor and scholar at West Point. It is no surprise that Clark was selected for the prestigious White House Fellowship later that same year. In this capacity, Clark gained unprecedented diplomatic and political experience. As a special-assistant to cabinet-level officials, White House Fellows traveled abroad and in Clark’s case, accompanied the Office of Business and Management “on a diplomatic trip, the purpose of which was an examination of U.S. foreign assistance requirements in Israel, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt.” Clark’s diplomatic training as a Fellow included meetings and personal acquaintances with familiar names like Shimon Peres, Yitzhak Rabin, and visiting familiar hotspots throughout Africa as well. Clark, accompanying the envoy with limited duties as an observer and paid note taker, gained his second significant on-the-job experience in international relations. Little did the U.S. government know that a Diplomat at Arms was in training.

The Army recognized Wesley Clark’s early success as a charismatic and savvy intellectual. He was selected to be General Alexander Haig’s assistant executive officer and speech writer at the Supreme Allied Commander’s headquarters in Belgium in 1979. In preparation for his eventual inheritance of the SACEUR position nearly twenty years later, Clark reflects on this third major training opportunity:

I watched in admiration as [Haig] worked the diplomatic and military channels in NATO and with the Pentagon. I had learned … that the U.S. must live up to its obligations, especially to allies in wartime; that the U.S. must support its friends and allies, but must also consult and listen, particularly in Europe and in the Middle East; and that public quarrels and name-calling with actual or potential adversaries are to be avoided as much as possible.101

100 Clark 112.
101 Clark 114.
Returning to leading troops, Wesley Clark, an officer promoted early to Major, Lieutenant Colonel, and Colonel, attended the National War College in 1983. While there, he befriended future statesmen and diplomats from around the world. One of his classmates, Ambassador Nat Howell commented in an interview that “[Wes] was not a particular standout in the class … but in my view was handed a tougher than need be assignment in Kosovo. He had his hands tied behind him.”

Howell’s personal observation proves very discerning as the second part of this chapter explains. Clark later commanded varying levels of responsibility from a brigade at Fort Carson to a division at Fort Hood. Despite the criticality and magnitude of these commands, the events that unfolded or lessons learned, it was his selection as the J-5 that provided the fourth and most significant diplomacy lesson for this future Supreme Allied Commander. The J-5 position, previously held by General Barry McCaffrey, was a senior position on the Joint Staff that dealt with political-military affairs around the world.

Clark’s first days in this new position “were a hands-on immersion course in U.S. foreign policy, as he delved into crises that flared up all over the globe.” It was 1994 and underlying everything that the now three-star General Clark was responsible for in U.S. Defense strategic thought was the fighting in Bosnia … and the power struggles between all the republics of the former Yugoslavia. The J-5 position required in depth studies in foreign crises and provided a link between State Department and Defense Department strategic planning. Thus, there is no doubt that Clark’s two-year

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102 Author’s email dialogue with Ambassador Nathaniel Howell in response to ‘How well do you know Wesley Clark? Any observations?’: Wes was a classmate of mine at the National War College [Class of 83], as were Hugh Shelton, Dan Christman and a number of others. He was not a particular standout in the class … In my view, Wes was handed a tougher than need be assignment in Kosovo and had his hands tied behind him by publicly denying him a credible threat of escalation. It is an interesting case study precisely because coalition needs seems to have set these limits on his flexibility.

103 Felix 124.
assignment as the J-5 prepared him for an upcoming command in the middle of a war in the Balkans. A closer look at his contributions specific to the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995 is worth highlighting in this paper.

Rather than rely solely upon the biographer or Clark’s account of his contributions, Richard Holbrooke, the assistant secretary of state for European and Canadian Affairs and chief of the negotiations for Dayton, described the General’s situation well in To End a War, published in 1999:

[Clark] was in a complicated position on our team ... Assignment to a diplomatic negotiating team offered some exciting possibilities, but it could be hazardous duty for a military officer, since it might put him into career-endangering conflicts with more senior officers. Clark’s boyish demeanor and charm masked, but only slightly, his extraordinary intensity. No one worked longer hours or pushed himself harder than Wes Clark.  

Definitively, Holbrooke mentored and coached Clark along the way while Clark, an astute pupil, mastered his persuasive and diplomatic guise. As the Kosovo analysis will show, however, Holbrooke’s observations were prophetic.

Wesley Clark’s personal contributions to the Dayton Agreement were likely kept quiet early on due to the implications, or perceptions, of a uniformed military officer carrying the heavy workload of a ‘peace’ agreement. Nevertheless, his personal commitment and heated conversations with the competing republics’ representatives are captured in both his and Holbrooke’s memoirs. In the end, Clark prepared and negotiated the entire military annex for the Dayton agreement and individually teamed with Jim Pardew to work the territorial divisions of Bosnia:

At one point, I was in Moscow with Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, pleading with the Russian foreign ministry; at another I found myself delivering a late-night briefing to the assembled NATO

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ambassadors in Brussels. In the end, I arbitrated the final details on the map that would divide Bosnia … [we] spent hundreds of hours arguing with some of the worst, most difficult people in the world, including war criminals …

In *Waging Modern War*, Clark recaps the efforts in Dayton with a chapter describing three months of “frantic diplomacy” and interagency cooperation. Although, somewhat self-serving in his account, much of it is verified by Holbrooke’s generosity in *To End a War*. What is most true, however, is that Clark had received more in-depth training in military diplomacy than many other senior military officers … and, while doing so, Lieutenant General Wesley Clark had learned from his mentor, Richard Holbrooke, a clear sense for using military force to back diplomacy.

Clark, the NATO Supreme Allied Commander: Rambouillet, Chinese Embassy Bombing, and Pristina Airport

In March 1996, Wesley Clark was named to the four-star post of commander in chief of the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), based in Panama. During this command, he took an intense study of Spanish and thus he was now multilingual with Russian, German, Spanish, and English. It is unknown his degree of proficiency in each language, but one may assume, based upon documented interaction with non-English speaking officials, that it was conversational at times. With less than a year at SOUTHCOM, and not without controversy, General Wesley Clark found his way to one of the most diplomatic demanding positions in the U.S. Armed Forces … he was now

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105 Clark 183.
107 A close relationship and professional bond, or rather a diplomatic mentorship by Holbrooke, can be seen throughout all of Clark’s memoirs and is confirmed in Holbrooke’s account as well. Specifically, *Waging Modern War* pp 60-66 and Holbrooke’s *To End a War* pgs 118, 252.
the NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and repositioned to the command’s opulent headquarters in Mons, Belgium.

Prior to discussing Clark’s three most significant diplomatic endeavors while in this command, it is necessary to take a brief look at the situation leading up to the Kosovo War and NATO’s subsequent actions. As mentioned, in the former state of Yugoslavia, different ethnic and religious groups seceded and claimed self-determination at the fall of the Soviet Union. The Slovenes, Serbs, and Croats carved out independent republics in the early 1990s, but the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina were less successful. After 1992, Bosnian Muslims were subjected to a campaign of ethnic cleansing by both Croatian and Serb forces. For more than five years, despite the massacres and devastation to civilians, the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were divided over how to respond. Even though Holbrooke and Clark’s leadership and influence in the Dayton Accords eventually helped stop the Bosnian civil war between Muslims and Serbs in 1995, Kosovo’s violent independent movement gained significant momentum. In 1997, the Kosovo Liberation Army began attacks on Serbian security forces in Kosovo and prompted a retaliatory crackdown by Serbian President Milosevic. As human rights conditions deteriorated and it became clear that the international community would not stand aside this time and observe another Bosnian-style massacre of Albanians, American and European diplomats became increasingly involved.108

The focus of the first major diplomatic endeavor by the new SACEUR is therefore on the development of the NATO ultimatum issued to Milosevic, known as the Rambouillet Accords. The other two endeavors worthy of further analysis for this paper are Clark’s air campaign, in particular target selection and collateral damage, and finally, dealing with the Russians at Pristina Airport at war’s conclusion.

**Wesley Clark at Rambouillet**

“Rambouillet is now the great ‘what if …?’ of modern Balkan history.” General Clark and NATO leaders attempted to force the Serbs and Kosovar Albanians to sign an agreement at Rambouillet (February 6-23, 1999) that gave NATO the right to control Kosovo militarily, while ensuring Albanians they would be able to vote in a referendum for independence three years later. Neither side was initially willing to accept the ultimatum. The Serbs refused to surrender sovereign control over their own airspace, not to mention Kosovo. The Albanians were not interested in waiting to gain their independence. In the end, the Albanians were convinced by Clark and other negotiators to sign the agreement on March 18 and the stage was set for the NATO bombing of Serbia and Kosovo, which proceeded on March 24. Wesley Clark’s pivotal role in this agreement is worth greater analysis.

To the critics of Rambouillet, General Clark emphasized force much greater than he did diplomacy. *In Waging Modern War*, one could see how the military commander may have relied too heavily on Milosevic’s gamble against NATO really taking forceful...
action against him. As emphasized by Andrew Bacevich in *The New American Militarism*, President Milosevic called Clark’s diplomatic bluff on air strikes, and unfortunately, “[w]ell, then we’ll bomb” became the catalyst for NATO’s obligation to follow through with its coercive diplomacy. In Bacevich’s assessment of Rambouillet, General Clark proved that professional soldiers did not necessarily understand war better than civilians and that Americans in particular should be leery of “field commanders [who] fancy themselves clever enough to straddle both worlds” of war and politics. Clark made a few assumptions based on his diplomatic experience in the region and ultimately demonstrated that his belief in national power involved the use of credible military force to back it up. He pledged to “systematically and progressively attack, disrupt, degrade, devastate, [and] ultimately destroy” the Serbian military if Milosevic did not halt attacks. Furthermore, Clark’s guidance to his staff in preparing the military agreements for the Rambouillet negotiations more or less was to model them after the Dayton Agreements. In doing so, he likely underscored the impact that an occupying presence like that which occurred in Bosnia would not fit neatly into the situation in Kosovo.

Jim Judah’s *Kosovo: War and Peace* gives a relatively unbiased investigative journalist’s account of this controversial period. In it, he defines Chris Hill’s and Wolfgang Petrisch’s “diplomatic half” of Rambouillet as a “talk of peace” and consensus

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113 Bacevich 58. The author was speaking of the events in the 1990s that blurred the distinction between war and politics with senior military officials. He specifically criticized Clark by saying: “One such was General Wesley K. Clark.”
building.\textsuperscript{116} Whereas, as he later explains that the other half –authored by General Clark’s staff- “came in the form of threats.”\textsuperscript{117} According to Judah, NATO officers had been told that implementation was non-negotiable, and therefore the Appendix B, as it was called, was “a sort of military wish-list.”\textsuperscript{118} It seems despite Clark’s overwhelming ability to negotiate and despite his keen diplomatic awareness, he may have fallen short in approaching Rambouillet with a product amenable to the negotiations at hand. In his defense however, according to Clark’s memoirs, he insisted that he be involved personally at Rambouillette in order to negotiate the controversial appendix. He also explains that his staff was running a “three-ring circus” and may have been overwhelmed at the time of its release. One may conclude from this that the shortcuts taken in preparing Appendix B coupled with relatively no representation of that appendix when negotiated by civilians may have caused the Rambouillet Agreement to stall.

Whether one agrees with scholars like Bacevich who argue that Clark mismanaged Operation Allied Force and had terrible “shortcomings as a strategist,”\textsuperscript{119} one thing remains certain from Rambouillet: due to the restraints placed upon him by the U.S. Secretary of Defense, we may never know to what extent the Diplomat-at-Arm’s presence at Rambouillet could have prevented NATO’s ‘war’ against Serbia. Clark was never allowed to personally participate in the talks and had to negotiate by proxy.\textsuperscript{120} As the military head of NATO, he ordered the bombing to begin on March 24, 1999, enforcing United Nations Resolution 1199.

\textsuperscript{116} Judah 195.
\textsuperscript{117} Judah 195.
\textsuperscript{118} Judah 210.
\textsuperscript{119} Bacevich 59.
\textsuperscript{120} Clark, \textit{Waging Modern War} p. 169-170. Clark was permitted one trip to Rambouillet, but was only permitted to “explain the proposed military annex.” Per order of Secretary Cohen, who first prohibited Clark’s trip, he could not participate in the negotiations. One must wonder what impact Clark’s involvement might have had?
Wesley Clark—Target Selection and Keeping NATO Whole

The NATO air and missile campaign, Operation Allied Force, began at 1400 EST (1900 GMT) on March 24, 1999. The attacks began with air- and sea-launched cruise missiles that were targeted largely on air defense and communications targets. At war’s conclusion, there were no NATO combat losses in approximately 38,000 sorties, no cases of fratricide, and only minimal casualties due to accidents. While a B-2 strike that was mistargeted against the Chinese embassy in Belgrade proved to be the case with the most serious political backlash for Clark and his command, collateral damage was an issue throughout the campaign. In large part due to the U.S. and NATO’s complicated and parallel command structures, the targeting methodology of the Operation Allied Force remains controversial. The target selection process and the diplomatic dancing required by the Supreme Allied Commander is therefore the focus of this second vignette discussion.

Wesley Clark initially proposed a 2-day air strike with two separate anticipated responses to Milosevic’ continued determination. The U.S. Department of Defense’ report on the lessons of the war explains that NATO ultimately was forced to rush into massive escalation, and was forced to take a completely new approach to the conflict by mid-April. At the beginning of the air campaign, NATO headquarters had 50 pre-approved targets with 53 targets destroyed on the first day. Then, escalation became the new theme for Clark as Milosevic stepped up ethnic killings immediately. Wesley

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122 Cordesman 98.
Clark’s plea for escalation was heard after a few days of intense meetings with the NATO Secretary General, NATO planners, and the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The ethnic killings by Serbian forces had intensified unexpectedly in response to the air strikes and the number of refugees was rapidly approaching one million. How did the General persuade the NAC to accept bombing Kosovo at an unprecedented level?

He didn’t. Clark is reported having said at a NATO planning conference on March 27 that, “I don’t want to get into something like the Rolling Thunder campaign, pecking away indefinitely … We got to steadily ratchet up the pressure … We also need to become increasingly relevant to the situation on the ground. Otherwise we are a risk of being paused indefinitely. We’ll lose public support.” He also states years later that “how to link the process of striking targets with [the] political objective became the overriding issue of the campaign.”

Clark’s greatest ally in the political realm was no doubt the NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana. Reading Clark’s memoirs and much of Dana Priest’s interviews of this period, it seems that Clark successfully convinced Solana of the merits of his position on March 28th. Solana then met and argued with the NAC, and by March 30th the Council had left the decision to escalate with the Secretary-General. Several days later, he gave Clark necessary authority to escalate. The General had been very deliberate in his personal involvement with Solana.

After the diplomatic victory of maintaining NATO’s alliance during an escalation, management of the air strikes continued to consume General Clark’s efforts. In this 78-

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124 Cordesman 26.
126 Clark, A Time to Lead 211.
day air campaign, the range of targets rapidly expanded. It should be noted that several of NATO’s commanders disagreed that there was a smooth and orderly pattern to the escalation and the U.S. DOD has formally admitted to this fact in its report.\footnote{Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Forces After Action Report DOD.} Remarkably, the actual choice of targets was often determined by a combination of politics and military tactics, and not without France and several other NATO countries putting political limits on the number and nature of the sorties flown. Clark summarized these efforts by saying:

> The fixed targets had to be approved legally and at the political levels in Washington, London, and Paris. It was a constant fight, with air commanders pushing for more targets and politicians asking questions about unintended consequences while trying to weigh benefits versus risks. Political leaders knew the alliance would lose its public support if our strikes resulted in a significant number of casualties among innocent civilians.\footnote{Clark, \textit{A Time to Lead} 213-214.}

Clark knew there “was a political limit as to how long we could extend the campaign” and keep NATO as a whole.\footnote{Clark, \textit{Waging Modern War} 240.} The political limit was reached when collateral damage reports came in. The Serbian claims regarding collateral damage that received the most political attention involved 12 major incidents from April 5\textsuperscript{th} through May 14\textsuperscript{th}: a laser-guided bomb hit a train on a bridge near Leskova; a convoy of farm machinery was bombed by a pilot believing they were Serb soldiers; a missile hit a hospital and market place near Nis; a malfunctioning bomb killed several schoolchildren; and, a farmhouse with 80 Albanians locked inside was bombed killing everyone inside, and many, many more instances.\footnote{These collateral summaries are taken from comparing Serbian reports in Cordesman’s book on pp 102-103 and Clark’s memoirs, both \textit{Waging Modern War} and \textit{A Time to Lead} pp. 214-15.} The most notorious bombing mistake of the war was caused by a B-2, striking Belgrade during the night of May 7\textsuperscript{th}.
The target was a Milosevic logistical center, but due to an error in labeling, it was in fact the Chinese Embassy. Four staff members were killed and an intense diplomatic crisis unfolded. It was Wesley Clark’s reminder that “technological brilliance was still at the mercy of human frailty.”

Public pressure was naturally very intense toward General Clark and his staff. The NATO ambassadors were concerned and their individual governments were being subjected to widespread criticism. Understanding this dilemma, Clark quickly addressed Admiral Guido Venturoni, NATO’s Chairman of the Military Committee, who had been sent to increase political pressure on the Supreme Commander. Clark said:

Guido, I understand what you’re telling me about the reaction to the Council and we are revising procedures. But if we try to prevent all civilian casualties, we’ll never strike another building. We’ve already ceased bombing trucks. There are human hostages under bridges, so we’re not bombing bridges in Kosovo. There’s an intense desire that we’ll never have civilian casualties again. But we will –this kind of incident will happen again. It’s inevitable.

The Diplomat at Arms’ best display of honesty and compassion was seen in this charismatic and timely response to NATO’s bombing mistakes. He implored to the diplomats of NATO and the ambassadors abroad, “you’ve got to continue to standup for us in the Council –we’re all in a tough predicament.” They trusted the general and saw the compassion and sincerity in his errors made along the way. The diplomatic general reminded his contemporaries and superiors, “It was why I prayed every night … and it is why war must always be a last, last, last resort.” The air and missile

campaign clearly succeeded in doing steadily greater damage to Serbian military capabilities and 78 days after its onset, Serbia was forced to concede.

**Wesley Clark and the Incident at Pristina Airport**

Just after the air campaign ended, from 12 to 26 June 1999, there was a brief but tense standoff between NATO and the Russian Kosovo Force in which Russian troops occupied the airport at Pristina. After securing an agreement that integrated Russian forces into the peacekeeping duties, independent of NATO, the standoff ended. It appears; however, that amidst the drama that unfolded, some military diplomacy prevailed. Clark’s role in this vignette is the third and final observation.

General Sir Michael David Jackson was deputy to General Clark at NATO. He is best known for refusing to block the runways of the Russian-occupied airport, per Clark’s orders. Had he complied with General Clark’s order, there was a chance that the British troops under his command could have come into armed conflict with the Russians’. Jackson, having observed Clark’s political and diplomatic charisma for some time now, it may be assumed, knew that without prior orders from Britain, this act would have led to much controversy. On the other hand, defying Clark would have meant disobeying a direct order from a superior NATO officer. Jackson chose the latter, reputedly saying to Clark, “I won’t start World War III for you.”

Clark, having obtained NATO approval for the action from Secretary General Solana, could not standby and let this defiance get in the way of NATO’s control of Pristina Airport. In a diplomatic offensive, Clark went directly to the leaders of Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria to establish a no-fly zone to prevent the Russians from flying into Pristina. The order went through and Russia’s two transport planes were not able

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135 Felix 147.
to fly their missions. NATO then held talks. Clark’s guidance was to clarify what kind of patrols the Russians could have in northern Kosovo. In what began as a potential insubordinate response to a direct military order, Clark had taken the diplomatic high ground and what resulted was unprecedented in European history.\footnote{By not reacting emotionally to what some considered insubordination, Clark networked and negotiated with regional leaders. In essence, he bypassed the refused order and found a diplomatic solution persuading others to restrict Russian use of the airfield.} His personal involvement with heads of state and in negotiating the airspace maneuver, resulted in the first-ever Russian cooperation with NATO and in view of their acceptance of a peace keeping mission, in essence became a NATO member-at-large. Of course, Russians would disagree with this broad statement. Nevertheless, Clark had successfully juggled the political, diplomatic, and strategic demands of his position as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and studied the art of diplomacy while there. His mastery of diplomacy came at a price, however. It brought a sudden and premature end to his military service.

**Military Diplomacy Comes at What Cost?**

On the diplomatic front, Clark had an overwhelming victory in maintaining NATO’s alliance throughout the challenges of its first significant use of military force. The top five NATO countries liaised daily and this liaison brought together either the foreign ministers or heads of state of Britain, France, the US, Germany and Italy, or their political directors, in direct contact with the NATO Secretary General and by default, General Wesley Clark. Furthermore, it is well established that General Clark worked directly with three of the Clinton administration’s top players – Madeline Albright, National Security Advisor Samuel R. ‘Sandy’ Berger and Defense Secretary William S. Cohen. His efforts to obtain political approval at key stages in the campaign often
meant that as the NATO Supreme Commander he worked around his US Army and sometimes Joint Defense Department uniformed chain of command.\textsuperscript{137} For the military historian, this troubled relationship is worth greater study, but in this paper it is worth highlighting the personal cost paid by Wesley Clark.

Today, Clark insists he never went around the chain of command. He argues that his job as NATO commander was a "two-hatted" position, partly a U.S. military role and partly a diplomatic post—leading the 19-nation coalition. He contends the latter role required him to assist the secretary of state and other White House officials. In studying his role at the Rambouillet Treaty, in the air campaign’s handling of target selection, and the events at Pristina Airport, one begins to see how it may be viewed that Clark often crossed the line and stepped beyond his authority. One could argue that most of the Pentagon believed Clark crossed the line. "He should not have been going to Sandy Berger and Madeline Albright," said retired Gen. Thomas McInerney. 

"[His] chain of command was to the Secretary of Defense and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."\textsuperscript{138} One retired defense official in an interview with National Review stated that Clark "saw himself as having a direct line to the White House. Clark had his own point of view. He knew, in his heart, he was in tune with what Madeline Albright and Bill Clinton and the White House wanted, and he pushed it. The Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs didn't agree, but he decided he didn't really

\textsuperscript{137} Although captured in many articles and editorials and roughly challenged by Clark in his memoirs, the author bases this conclusion on un-biased assessments. In particular, Tim Judah’s \textit{Kosovo: War and Peace}, Chapter 9 provides some of the best analysis on the Clark, Clinton, Albright, Berger, Cohen relationship without addressing the conflict this posed with the military chain of command. Judah’s not knowing or understanding the conflict Clark had with his Army chain of command makes his assessment that much more believable and accurate. Other authors seem to have an agenda or emphasize the drama for readership.

have to listen to them.”

What’s more telling, however, is that Clark’s relationship to the Clinton administration was not unlike the relationship he had with officials and political dignitaries throughout Europe. The Pentagon did not expect him to have the same relationship with the U.S. leadership at the White House.

The risk he took in pushing hard to do what he believed necessary as an armed diplomat with unprecedented global reach had taken its toll on Wesley Clark’s career. The Pentagon retired Clark three months early with the President’s endorsement. Nevertheless, President Clinton highlighted it best in his awarding Clark the Presidential Medal of Freedom by saying Wesley Clark “summoned every ounce of his experience and expertise as a strategist, soldier and statesman to wage our campaign in Kosovo. He prevailed miraculously …” The cost; however, was a premature termination of his assignment and military career. To be a true Diplomat at Arms, it appears one must be willing to accept the assumed risks.

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139 Ibid
140 Clark, A Time to Lead 225. Italics placed by author for emphasis only.
Chapter III
General Tommy R. Franks and CENTCOM’s Coalitions

General Tommy Franks retired from the U.S. Army on August 1, 2003 with the most distinctive experience of wielding supreme command in two wars: Afghanistan and Iraq. As the military commander, he launched America’s armed offensive in the war against terrorism and participated in what he called “covert diplomacy” to help secure international cooperation.141 Despite his high profile role, General Franks shunned the limelight and in many regards differed greatly from Generals Schwarzkopf and Clark. Since his retirement, Franks published his autobiography entitled American Soldier. Although his memoirs make up the bulk of this biographical sketch, they are cross-referenced by the few interviews he conducted with BBC News, PBS’ Frontline, and especially the public contributions from the General Tommy Franks Leadership Institute and Museum. Biographers have yet to publish on the life of Tommy Franks. However, his extensive military career is well-documented in the form of training certificates, awards, and publically displayed memorabilia.

General Tommy Franks’ military and educational experiences took him from Oklahoma to Vietnam and from the Pentagon to U.S. Central Command. He began as a private who volunteered to serve during Vietnam and retired as a four-star general 38 years later. By reconstructing his story primarily from American Soldier and from interviews of those who served alongside, Franks’ level of diplomatic ‘schooling’ becomes apparent. Arguably, Franks may have been the least prepared when

141 Franks, Tommy R. American Soldier: General Tommy Franks, New York: Harper Collins, 2004. “Covert diplomacy” is what Franks categorized as the way he personally contributed to the effort to build international cooperation for the wars. Chapters 6 & 7 of his autobiography emphasize his efforts in maintaining the coalition.
compared with Schwarzkopf and Clark, but he proved most capable when given the situation from 2001-2003. His ‘diplomatic schooling’ occurred very late in his career and really did not begin until his first assignment in the Pentagon as a general officer and later in South Korea as division commander. As Major General Robert Scales highlights in *The Iraq War: A Military History*, “[t]he American Military has never done a good job in educating its senior officers for the role of combatant commander, but Franks was a willing learner.”

The *USS Cole* bombing occurred in the Yemeni port of Aden only three months after Franks assumed his new job as Commander in Chief, Central Command (CENTCOM). Both the *USS Cole* and the 9/11 attacks occurred during General Franks’ watch at CENTCOM. Thus, he had a reasonably steep learning curve until leaving the job in July 2003. Commenting on his time spent with the General at an international conference in 2001, Ambassador W. Nathaniel Howell explained that “[Franks] impressed me as highly intelligent and inquisitive.” These traits likely assisted Franks more than any other as he commanded President Bush’s ‘Coalition of the Willing’ in 2003.

Not everyone agreed on Franks’ overall capabilities as commander and strategist. Regarding the war in Iraq in particular, Retired General Anthony Zinni told CBS in a *60 Minutes* interview in 2004 that “[t]he president is owed the finest strategic thinking. He is owed the finest operational planning. He is owed the finest tactical

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143 Howell, W. Nathaniel. Interview conducted with author. Extracted from email message dated 26 Oct 09. More important later on in this paper is Howell’s point that “I doubt that he was in a position to do much about negative attitudes to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Those battles were lost by the White House and, to a lesser extent, State before he even jumped off. The actual campaign was impressive but he did not have the manpower and resources to consolidate and follow up.
execution on the ground. … He got the latter. He didn’t get the first two.” A Pentagon correspondent for The Washington Post, Thomas Ricks, is the author of Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. His opinion of General Franks is clear:

Franks is a puzzlement to me. The only thing I can tell is he’s kind of like a hole in the donut. At the center of a good general there needs to be strategic thinking, and I’ve never seen any of it in Franks. I think basically he became a taxi driver, and he said: "OK, they've given me the address -- Baghdad. I'll get there as fast as I can." And when you get there, you say, "Well, it's kind of the wrong address," and he says, "I don't care; I got you here fast."

Drawing on recollections, transcripts, and interviews, it is plausible to define the diplomatic make-up of the general forced to command both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Did the Army train him for the job? Was he a Diplomat at Arms? In the same manner as previously portrayed, the first section of this chapter provides General Tommy Franks’ background, education, and overall training in the most accurate and candid means possible. Likewise, this emphasis remains primarily with his diplomatic experiences and training received along the way to commanding at CENTCOM. The degree that General Franks performed as a Diplomat at Arms is also evaluated in the next several pages. Thus, the second part focuses only on Franks’ military diplomacy specific to the USS Cole bombing in October 2000 and the covert diplomatic efforts that helped secure international cooperation for the wars. To what extent did his background experiences and training directly impact his

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diplomatic actions as the Commander in Chief, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) and as the commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq?

**Biographical Sketch**

Of the three officers’ memoirs, one might conclude General Franks’ recollections to be the most self-serving. While the true Norman Schwarzkopf in *It Doesn’t Take a Hero* may not be wholly portrayed, the overall product bears similarity to the most genuine accounts of Operation Desert Storm. The same can be said about Wesley Clark’s *Waging Modern War* and *Allied Force*, despite the abbreviated duty of high command at NATO and Clark openly ‘setting some records straight.’ In *American Soldier*, General Tommy Franks shows less humility by his insistence that the ‘victories’ in Afghanistan and Iraq were a direct result of his leadership and “out-of-the-box” thinking. Therefore, the greatest contribution of his memoirs rests in the first half, explaining how a kid from west Texas – a college dropout – makes it to four-star general. The second half of *American Soldier* deals with Franks’ CENTCOM duties and requires greater scrutiny, for it is colored in profanity, name-calling, and self-promotion.

When he was a junior in high school, Tommy Franks learned that he was adopted. Raised as an only child of working-class parents, he was “living the American dream:” exploring the outdoors and playing ball, rebuilding motorbikes and drag racers, chasing girls and drinking beer. Not much in the form of ‘diplomatic schooling’ can be derived from his youthful experiences. Franks was surrounded by small town America in Oklahoma and then again in Texas. He explains that as a young adult “[t]he only folks I’d ever met were white.” In the summer of 1963, Franks left home for college at

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146 Franks 25.
147 Franks 20.
the University of Texas in Austin. His thirst for alcohol, interest in drag racing, involvement in fraternities, and desire for girls no doubt contributed to his 0.5 grade point average at the end of his first semester. In an exclusive interview in 2003 with Cigar Aficianado, General Franks said “[w]hen I was growing up, I had a little difficulty with priorities. You know, I couldn't decide, at one point in my life when I was young, that studying and getting an education was as important as other things to me. And so I prioritized education a bit lower than I should have.”148 Franks dropped out of college and joined the Army as a crypto-analyst in the Military Intelligence branch. By 1967, he earned his commission through Officer Candidate School and was off to Southeast Asia for a year of combat in Vietnam.

Tommy Franks’ carefree pursuits in boyhood and his heavy drinking as a young adult carried over into his performance in Vietnam. Not taking anything away from his heroism as a battery commander nor his awards for valor in combat, it is appropriate to remain critical of this period in Franks’ career, just as the other senior officers in this study. As a Field Artillery officer, Franks’ first exposure to international coalition rules of engagement would be in the form of obtaining clearances for fire missions. Franks coordinated for mission approval from his U.S. Army chain of command, then from the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, and finally from the Government of South Vietnam. Resourceful in combat, Franks found ways to work around this requirement by using his commander’s initials (authorized of course) and preceding his requests with “in

contact.”¹⁴⁹ This action later sparked an official investigation after he called for the intense bombardment of a densely civilian-populated district of Saigon. Franks’ battalion commander assumed full responsibility and retired shortly afterwards.

The young LT Franks had failed out of college, “drank beer … followed by a few shots of Wild Turkey” after each mission, dropped homemade Mason jar bombs from airplanes, and barely escaped punitive action from the use of air strikes and excessive shelling.¹⁵⁰ At the end of the war, Franks was a captain with three purple hearts and two bronze stars for valor who had earned a reputation for being ambitious. Serving in the Cold War army of the 1970s and 1980s, Tommy Franks advanced rapidly in rank while seeking out tough, demanding jobs, and delivering results. In 2003, when asked how he went from college drop-out to four stars, he responded by saying:

[M]y background in the military reflects choices to do hard things, things that people would, perhaps, think of as hard. You know, if the choice was to spend more time getting a military education or spend more time with boots on in the field, I just always opted to spend time in the field. My own good judgment over the course of many years, and surrounding myself always with people smarter than me, probably resulted in whatever success I’ve enjoyed.¹⁵¹

Franks commanded a company in Germany in 1973 and returned there to command a battalion in 1981. In the interim, he finished his degree at the University of Texas at Austin. Soldiering and training stand out as his strong suits during this period. As far as diplomatic schooling goes, Franks held three positions in his military career which likely influenced his diplomatic guise. His first exposure to generalship and the

¹⁴⁹ Franks 67.
¹⁵⁰ Franks 94, 95-106, Although his memoirs describe events in Vietnam in vivid detail, Franks took to soldiering with the same alacrity as his youth in OK and TX. His combat stories begin and end with drinking alcohol and despite his efforts to show “out of the box thinking” as an early military officer, he comes across as a very rough-around-the-edges Artillery officer who does not necessarily consider the long-term effects of his decisions.
¹⁵¹ Shanken Interview
pragmatism in politics occurred as a major during the four years he worked as an inspector general at the Pentagon. In his words, Franks received "a real education in Army and Washington politics … Tommy Franks matured as a bureaucrat during those four years."\footnote{Franks 133.} In this capacity, Franks assisted two Army Chiefs of Staff by helping them prepare for congressional testimony. Although more of a political schooling than diplomatic, this duty also taught Franks an important lesson in generalship –that moral turpitude was not tolerated in senior military ranks. In this job, he was privy to high profile investigations which led to the end of a few senior officers' careers due to poor ethical decisions.\footnote{The Army Inspector General’s Office (IG) are “honest brokers and consummate fact finders. Their primary tools include training, inspecting, assisting, and investigating.” At the senior level, IGS may investigate allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse, and will occasionally inquire into allegations concerning standards of conduct for military officers. \url{http://wwwpublic.ignet.army.mil/History_of_the_IG.htm} (accessed 17 Dec 09).} Little did he know, Franks himself would be wearing four stars, would be required to uphold the same high ethical standards, and would testify before congress only two-and-a-half decades later.

The second military assignment which afforded Franks an opportunity to learn skills in diplomacy occurred well after his time at the Army War College and brigade command (DIVARTY) at Fort Hood. Although he had acquired a Masters Degree in Public Administration and even though the Gulf War of 1990-91 found him a brigadier general and Assistant Division Commander of the 1\textsuperscript{st} Cavalry Division, leading the advanced party into Saudi Arabia, General Franks’ truest exposure to military diplomacy did not occur until he was assigned to South Korea. In 1994, he was selected to be the G3 for Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea, and a year later for command of the 2d Infantry Division in South Korea. For over two years he was dealt the responsibility of commanding the U.S.’ initial response to a North Korean assault on the
peninsula. It was his job to prepare the Infantry Division “for a war everyone hoped would never come.” In this capacity, Franks had to learn to work closely with his Republic of Korea–Army counterparts and how to deal with an international host country and all its inherent complexities. He specifically learned to negotiate with the Republic of Korean leadership; he realized the tact which was required to obtain agreement; and, he observed the inner workings of the Combined Forces Command dynamics in Seoul as it Chief of Operations. These lessons would prove invaluable.

Taking command of the Third Army, Army Forces, Central Command (ARCENT) in May 1997, Franks received his final major lesson in diplomatic schooling before commanding at CENTCOM and OEF/OIF. Although based out of Atlanta, Lieutenant General Franks often traveled to the Middle East and was required to meet with several Arab leaders. His boss, General Anthony Zinni, CENTCOM’s Commander in Chief, held an “affinity for foreign culture” and spoke the language, ate the food, and immersed himself in the culture of his area of responsibility. Fulfilling his duties, Franks traveled frequently and observed how his boss performed in this environment. He saw first-hand the importance of developing personal relationships in the region. During his three year tour of duty as ARCENT commander, he participated in two Bright Star exercises in Egypt and gained a reputation for “getting things done.” Bright Star is scheduled every two years as a multinational effort designed to enhance military cooperation among U.S. and coalition partners in the Middle East. Its underlying mission is to

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154 Franks 183.
155 Franks 186.
156 An observation held by a senior military staff officer who attended most every battle update brief at ARCENT HQ. He prefers to remain un-named.
strengthen joint commitment to regional stability and mutual interests in ARCENT/CENTCOM’s area of responsibility. As it is ARCENT’s largest military exercise, Franks had to become closely affiliated with participants from 11 countries and involved to some degree with 33 observer States’ during these exercises in 1998 and 2000.157

Franks held the post at ARCENT until June 2000 when he was selected for promotion to general and assignment as Commander in Chief (CINC), United States Central Command (CENTCOM). His performance in this job is the subject of the next section and, more specifically, Franks’ diplomatic expertise is examined in detail. General Franks writes knowingly of a “continuum of interaction between nations, factions and tribes” and translates that insight into his very own “Five Cs” theory of international politics.158 He claims that all interstate relationships fit into one of five categories across a spectrum: Conflict, Crisis, Co-existence, Collaboration, or Cooperation. Whether for good or for ill, General Tommy Franks ascended to command of CENTCOM and would take on a responsibility he defined as moving “these states as far along the Five C continuum as possible –from conflict to crisis to co-existence and beyond.”159 The Franks who reduced international politics to “Five Cs,”

157 Participants of 70,000 troops in Bright Star 99 included: Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and the U.S. Observer States in Bright Star 99 included: Algeria, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Burundi, Canada, China, Congo, India, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Syria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. This information was gathered from two articles, one at GlobalSecurity.org http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/bright-star.htm and the other at the Army’s Stand-To Archives at http://www.army.mil/standto/archive/2009/10/23/

158 Franks 203-4. Conflict: the armed forces of two nations or more become engaged in combat; Crisis: Usually causing conflict due to a state of angry tensions between opponents; Coexistence: one step removed by overcoming antagonisms to live side-by-side; Collaboration: an endeavor where parties worked toward their mutual benefit; and, Cooperation: open borders, joint commercial and gov’t enterprises, harmony and progress.

159 Franks 204.
and claims to be the sole author of the ‘grand strategy’ in Afghanistan and Iraq, is therefore the focus of the next section.

**CINC CENTCOM: USS Cole, Covert Diplomacy, and Grand Strategy**

Just three weeks after taking command of CENTCOM on July 7th, 2000, General Tommy Franks would make a journey similar to that of a typical diplomatic envoy, carrying him from Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and eventually Pakistan. The magnitude of CENTCOM’s regional influence had grown beyond that outlined in the Schwarzkopf chapter and Franks’ area of responsibility was immense and filled with even greater regional instability. Historian John Keegan described General Franks in his book, *The Iraq War*, as a “markedly different character from Schwarzkopf, less of a showman, less overbearing and more thoughtful …[he had] an acquired openness to the armed forces of other countries, an enquiring mind, an ability to think on his feet and a remarkable freedom from the doctrinaire approach so often characteristic of the products of Sparta-on-Hudson [West Point].”

According to his memoirs, in the first few months of meeting with heads of state, General Franks’ “world was becoming a lot more complex” at CENTCOM and that he “was still new at diplomacy, not yet used to speaking obliquely.” He later tells his readers that *terrorism* was the leading topic of discussion with key Arab leaders during this visit. In a bit of irony, the defining days of Franks’ military career would be spent combating terrorism by launching what may yet be the longest lasting war in American military history.

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161 Franks 206.
Prior to discussing Franks’ three most significant diplomatic endeavors while in this command, it is necessary to take a brief look at the situation leading up to the USS Cole bombing and the American military efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The catalyst for the U.S. military’s offensive in 2001 was al Qaeda, a terror network led by Osama bin Laden. In a list of al Qaeda victories, the attacks on 11 September 2001, was actually their seventh successful mission according to Michael Scheuer, the former head of the CIA’s Bin Laden Unit. The previous six major “victories” were: Aden, Yemen (1992); Mogadishu, Somalia (1993); Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (1995); Dhahran, Saudi Arabia (1996); Nairobi, Kenya, and Tanzania (1998); and, again, Aden, Yemen (2000).\(^{162}\) According to Scheuer, bin Laden and al Qaeda had been based in Afghanistan since May 1996 and had officially declared war on America in 1999.

Although an entirely separate research agenda could be laid out explaining the Islamic phenomena facing American political and military leaders at the turn of the century, it remains necessary to point out some of the complexities presented to CENTCOM when directed to ‘attack.’ The U.S. arch enemy, essentially Franks’ counterpart, was a man who constructed not just the USS Cole bombings and the 9/11 attacks, but one who was articulating a consistent, convincing case that an attack on Islam was underway and was being led by America. Osama bin Laden was the mastermind and al Qaeda became CENTCOM’s declared enemy. The minimum one should understand when looking at the diplomatic challenges facing General Franks in his new area of responsibility might best be described from the perspective of America’s enemies. In a complex array of events in the Middle East over the previous decade,

\(^{162}\) Scheuer, Michael. *Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror*, Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, Inc., 2007, p.22.
America was now regarded by many Muslims as a nation that: supports and protects Arab tyrants from Rabat to Riyadh; has abandoned multiple generations of Palestinians to life in refugee camps; and, blindly supports Israel, arming and funding anti-Muslim violence and preventing Muslims from arming sufficiently to defend themselves. Al Qaeda exploited this belief and successfully recruited, trained, and equipped its ‘soldiers’ to attack Americans. Even before the USS Cole bombing, Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia told Franks, “America could have many friends in the Muslim world, but Israel divides us. Unless there is peace, terrorism will spread around the globe.” \[163\]

The focus of the first major diplomatic endeavor by the new CENTCOM CINC is therefore on his response and diplomatic contributions after the USS Cole bombing at the Yemeni Port of Aden. Although not yet wearing the hat of Multinational Coalition Commander, this event highlights his efforts in ‘personal diplomacy’ in the Middle East. The other two endeavors worthy of further analysis for this paper are Franks’ efforts to conduct ‘covert diplomacy’ in Operation Enduring Freedom in particular, and finally, his development of the coalition’s ‘grand strategy’ in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

**USS Cole**

General Franks’ initial response to the USS Cole incident was to send his security director, Brigadier General Gary Harrell down to Yemen and “treat it like a crime scene.” \[164\] He then traveled to Yemen and visited the USS Cole. By directive of Secretary Cohen, he also visited with the Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Working closely with American Ambassador Barbara Bodine, Franks took her

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\[163\] Franks 206.
\[164\] Franks 218.
recommendation and listened to what the President had to say. Franks trusted his own instincts on reading Saleh and took his comments as sincere. In what may have been Franks’ first opportunity to read Arab culture in uncertain times, he seemed to know that the concern the Yemeni President held for the Cole’s crew was not shaded in cover-up. This visit was extremely productive for Franks, who shared a mutual distrust of the press with President Saleh. It was during his casual conversation about “accusations in your press” that Franks was provided two videotapes of port activity and the identity cards of men the Yemeni government felt were responsible for the attack. Confirmed by Ambassador Bodine, much of the Yemeni-American relationship strengthened as a result of “tough diplomatic decisions” that she, along with senior military officials, made at the time.

General Franks’ most significant contribution after the USS Cole bombing came on October 25th. He gave a thorough and candid testimony to the House and Senate Armed Service Committees less than two weeks after the attack. Many tuned in to see how the U.S. might respond militarily to this terrorist attack, and by default General Franks became the military’s talking head anticipated to lead an American offensive. The entire transcript can be viewed on the Senate Armed Service Committee’s web page. Franks' testimony covered five main areas: the facts laid out as an update on the situation, the reasons for U.S. military presence in the region, CENTCOM’s missions, U.S. relations with Yemen, and the selection process for the use of Aden as a refueling

165 Franks 223.
166 Bodine, Barbara. “9/11 Miniseries Is Bunk,” L.A. Times, 8 September 2006, Downloaded at http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/opinion/la-oe-bodine8sep08.0,5534125.story (Accessed 8 Nov 09). The Ambassador was accused of denying some journalists and even FBI inspectors access into Yemen. She contends that for security reasons she had to make some ‘tough diplomatic decisions’ but always in coordination with military planners. Amb. Bodine is not complimentary of the FBI or other law enforcement techniques used inside Yemen.
Most evident, however, was his insistence on international cooperation and an underlying tone of clearing Yemen of criminal responsibility. As the senior military commander, he spoke with diplomatic authority by saying:

I must acknowledge the contributions of the many governments and allied military forces that have provided responsive support. The Government of Yemen provided initial medical support and continues to provide security forces to protect U.S. Government officials arriving in the area. France and Djibouti helped with initial medical evacuation and treatment. Royal Navy ships HMS Marlborough and HMS Cumberland provided damage control and other assistance. We have received expedited overflight clearances, as well as the use of air bases from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar.¹⁶⁸

No American offensive came as a result of the attack on the USS Cole. Despite Franks telling Richard Clarke and the National Security Council on January 9, 2001 that “[w]e’re standing by for target coordinates,” no operational recommendation or single page of actionable intelligence came from the NSC.¹⁶⁹ What resulted, nevertheless, was a noticeably improved Yemeni-American relationship. In particular, a level of trust developed between Franks and President Saleh during this period—no doubt reinforced by the loyalty displayed at Frank’s Congressional testimony in July. Understanding this bond of personal diplomacy, President Bush would consistently call upon Franks to do the heavy negotiating with Saleh at key times during the War on Terror.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.
¹⁶⁹ Franks 227. In Clarke’s defense, his book Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror, is an attempt for his to explain that his pleas to eliminate al Qaeda came upon deaf ears in the scandalous Clinton year during the Cole bombing and later with the Bush administration simply because they (Wolfowitz mainly) considered al Qaeda one of Clinton’s “odd actions”, New York: Free Press, 2004 p 224-226, 227.
Covert Diplomacy in Operation Enduring Freedom

Two months after the 9/11 attacks, al Qaeda’s infrastructure, most of the Taliban fighters, and nearly all of bin Laden’s assets were destroyed. General Franks felt that the war was “going great” and the National Security Council turned its efforts toward pressing Britain, Jordan, France, and Turkey to play a leading role in the coalition’s long-term strategy. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld called it, “it might be some sort of coalition of the willing” from then on.

In what General Franks refers to as “covert diplomacy” in his memoirs, he dutifully responded to the task Secretary Rumsfeld assigned him. Bob Woodward captured the assignment best:

Franks needs to push the Afghan people on the need to choose – freedom for themselves or to continue under the illegitimate Taliban regime” … [Rumsfeld] wanted the general to assist in the political task of motivating the Afghans and also working all this out through the liaison missions, referring to the countries that had senior officers at Franks’ Tampa headquarters.

Clearly, General Franks received a political objective from Rumsfeld but was provided military assets to perform it. This called for unprecedented efforts from CENTCOM.

Throughout American Soldier, Franks makes it abundantly clear that he views political considerations more as a distraction, if not an outright impediment. Likewise, this plain-spoken intuitive general known for “decisive force” frowned upon those in suits who dictated political objectives. In discussing his ‘covert diplomacy’ in reaching an understanding “soldier-to-soldier” with Pakistan’s President Musharraf in the run-up to

171 Woodward Bush at War 306.
172 Woodward Bush at War 273, 306.
Operation Enduring Freedom, Franks writes that were it not for the “diplomatic envoys in business suits [who] had hectored soldier-politicians such as Musharraf about human rights and representative government,” this could have been worked out years ago.\textsuperscript{174} In essence, Franks may not have preferred the diplomatic responsibilities handed to him, but once committed, he would demonstrate that he was more than capable.

Although General Franks dealt daily with committed allies, potential allies, and with the political task of obtaining allies in Rumsfeld’s Coalition of the Willing, the most significant diplomatic maneuver by Franks actually occurred in a secret meeting with the Northern Alliance leadership on a C-17 airplane in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. Captured in several accounts, the most credible and thorough review of what occurred comes from the CENTCOM deputy, LTG Michael DeLong, in a \textit{Frontline} interview conducted on February 14, 2006. In this meeting, Frank’s ‘covert diplomacy’ comes in the form of a ‘good cop – bad cop’ role playing scenario with the Northern Alliance and an un-named senior CIA official.

The head of the Northern Alliance was Mohammed Fahim Khan, who ended up being the first vice president under Hamid Karzai. The C-17 secret meeting was held on a runway at night with the cargo bay loaded with green bags full of $100 bills. As DeLong points out, “Franks [knew] to get the Northern Alliance to be his army, he has to trust \textit{them}, and they have to trust \textit{him}.”\textsuperscript{175} He knew that the Afghans were some of the fiercest fighters in the world and that they operated typically from influence and money. “If you want them to do stuff, that’s how you get it done,” according to DeLong. As the good cop, the CIA official dealt with Fahim’s requests for weapons, ammunition, and

\textsuperscript{174} Franks 214.
financial support. As the bad cop, General Franks responded with frustration, nearly


topping the negotiating table and stomped out of the airplane to smoke a cigarette. Franks was tactful and effective in this situation. For a military diplomat, understanding one’s audience and knowing ‘what’ and ‘how’ to say the appropriate verbiage is paramount. General Franks’ covert diplomacy was therefore very effective.

The negotiation technique and personalities ultimately prevailed. The Northern Alliance agreed to fight America’s ground war against the Taliban with minimal U.S. troop involvement. DeLong stated that General Franks ended the negotiations once they agreed upon an amount of payment ($5 million according to Franks) and said to General Fahim that “you have my trust that you'll have firepower when you want it and the people embedded in your armies where you need it.”176 The greatest diplomatic endeavor which would launch the ground war in Afghanistan was underway, giving credit to General Franks’ role playing. He complied with his unprecedented military ‘duty’ to become involved in the political objectives of Operation Enduring Freedom.

**OIF: Grand Strategy**

“No one knows the pressure I will put on you to get to Baghdad … you will assume risk,” General Franks told his generals on December 7, 2003.177 That was the plan. Get to Baghdad, and fast. As Bob Woodward mentions in State of Denial, “[t]he Powell Doctrine of trying to guarantee success was out. Rapid, decisive warfare was now in.”178

The third and final endeavor selected to study General Franks’ diplomatic guise is in the grand strategy of the Iraqi invasion itself. Though he received the military

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176 Ibid.
missions associated with Operation Iraqi Freedom and dealt with resistance at the Pentagon and State Department, Franks makes it clear in American Soldier that the grand strategy was his alone. Despite many contrary opinions to this declaration, for the purposes of this paper it is appropriate to give him credit and grant complete authorship of OIF.

The Franks vision for OIF was one that placed a premium on speed, surprise, deception, precision weapons and the integration of all services and nations into a fully unified fighting team. As Andrew Bacevich critically points out, however, “the Franks who reduces international politics to “Five Cs” offers up a similarly schematic notion of strategy.” When Secretary Rumsfeld first asked General Franks to begin planning the invasion of Iraq, Franks sat down and sketched out on a legal pad what he titled “Lines and Slices: Working Matrix” for decisive victory in Iraq. The resulting matrix consists of seven horizontal ‘lines of operation’ intersecting with nine vertical ‘slices’ that keep Saddam in power. For our purposes, it is beneficial to examine the matrix more closely (see figure 1).

There was nothing tactically or even operationally wrong with Franks’ matrix for victory, but it failed to consider foreign involvement and ignored regional cause and effect relationships. As a military strategist, it should be expected that General Franks should be competent in his ability to portray how to gear up his force for war and ultimate victory. However, as the self-proclaimed author of the grand strategy for the Iraqi invasion in 2003, Franks’ matrix had some shortcomings that only time and events can best highlight. The first observation is that there is no political context to this grand

179 Bacevich 133.
180 Franks 340. This matrix is reprinted in its original handwritten form.
181 Franks 340.
strategy as it focuses entirely on the impending fight. Second, it pays no attention to the aftermath. According to Franks, the matrix “is what you call your basic grand strategy” (emphasis on the original). But, the matrix merely defines the problem only in terms of Iraq and Saddam. It makes no reference to culture, religion, ethnic identity, or moral dimension. Furthermore, in his horizontal lines of operations, there is no mention of formal alliances, ad hoc coalitions, international partnerships, nor any sort of power relationships. In summary, the matrix originally provided to Secretary Rumsfeld on December 12th, 2001 was devoid of all characteristics that would be expected from a true Diplomat at Arms tasked to lead a coalition’s grand strategy in a time of war.

A rapid and decisive operational victory ensued with the capture of Baghdad on April 9th, symbolized by the televised fall of the Saddam statue. The ‘grand strategy’ stopped short of what to do after taking Baghdad. As John Keegan points out, this shortfall had “subjectively made the world more divided than it had been when the ‘war on terror’ was undertaken after the atrocity of 11 September 2001 [and]… the Muslim world in general, the Arab world in particular was confirmed in its grievances.”

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182 Franks 341.
Franks’ Exit Strategy

In evaluating General Franks’ capabilities as a military diplomat, he gets mixed reviews. In some respects, he may have been the right general in the right point of American history. His secret meetings with the Northern Alliance, gaining the trust of President Saleh, and in obtaining diplomatic progress with President Musharraf of Pakistan are just some of the key examples. In other regards, Franks may have been myopic in strategic thought. One preliminary conclusion that this research shows is that the general who is considered a Diplomat at Arms would not only understand and tackle
political objectives during a time of war, but would also welcome the debate in his strategic planning. For better or for worse, Franks did neither. History will never know if General Franks’ capabilities as a coalition commander would have helped in the latter phases of OEF and OIF.

General Franks retired very quickly after the fall of Baghdad. A Pentagon correspondent for *The Washington Post*, Thomas Ricks, who authored *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* implies that there is a lot of resentment about his retirement by saying “Franks put down his rucksack.” In an interview with PBS *Frontline*, Rick’s explains that there’s a kind of suspicion inside the military that once Franks knew the plan was going to head south, he wanted out.184

This chapter began by explaining how General Tommy Franks retired after serving his nation in uniform for more than 38 years. He served heroically and honorably and held the ranks of private and four star general. He was talented in the art of war, seen as an intellectual and fast learner, and by most accounts held many of the traits necessary for a *Diplomat at Arms*. However, Franks’ weakness as a senior military commander is seen as one reads his memoirs with a critical eye of military officership. That is, General Tommy Franks held a level of ‘toughness’ and ‘military arrogance’ which may have helped carry him to the top ranks of the military but simultaneously posed long-term risk. As thoughtful as Keegan makes him out to be, Franks attacks his peers, subordinates, and senior officials in his book with a level of arrogance and profanity that is well beyond Keegan’s portrayal. To those who worked

with Franks, this comes as no surprise. Yet, in evaluating the diplomatic guise of the general, it comes as a significant distraction.

In the same three months of April thru June 2003, Franks retired at CENTCOM and all of the ground commanders in Iraq were replaced. Franks and the Army selected the most junior Lieutenant General, Ricardo Sanchez, to handle the final phase of the war in Iraq and was given very few resources and a terrible command structure. By the time the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff were replaced, it almost seemed like Franks and his teammates were saying: "Great job. Now, you guys play the next game. We're out of here." Although Franks may have had little to do with the battle against negative attitudes toward OIF, he nevertheless “jumped off.”

The combat general had declared victory in his battle, yet left the war to be won by others.

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185 Howell, W. Nathaniel. Interview with author, email dated 26 Oct 09. “He jumped off” is a prevalent view from those close to CENTCOM in the immediate years after Franks’ retirement.
Chapter IV

Findings

A broader study of general officers might have placed greater focus on other qualities and different vignettes, and some of which may have been downplayed in the three men studied here. However, it was the notion at the onset of this research that emphasizing the life, the background, and the diplomatic ‘schooling’ of three contemporary generals would better serve the aim of defining a ‘Diplomat at Arms’ and describing which attributes stand out as beneficial for a coalition commander.

In Command in War, Martin van Creveld explains that the best system of command “is always to have a genius in charge, first in general and then at the decisive point.”186 Van Creveld further states that however excellent in principle, this advice is less than useful in practice: “the problem consisting precisely in the inability of military institutions to achieve certainty … in producing a steady supply of geniuses.”187

Another author, Edgar F. Puryear, specifically studied America’s top military brass his entire adult life. In his research, he focused on what allowed senior officers to rise above the rest and also compiled a notable list of attributes specific to some of America’s “Great Captains.” He wrote that “altruism, patience, and dedication” defined the leadership of George C. Marshall and that “duty, honor, and country” defined Douglas MacArthur. He noted that “soldier, statesman, and diplomat” best described Dwight D. Eisenhower, while “blood and guts” was the adage for George S. Patton.188

Thus, leader attributes are unique to each general’s personality, but as Puryear argues

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187 Ibid.
in *19 Stars* and *American Generalship*, there are common and essential traits amidst these commanders. In his two books on generalship, Puryear lists high character, integrity, humility, selflessness, concern for others, reverence, and showmanship as attributes displayed by America’s top generals.

At the turn of the century, the world was introduced to “the bear” or “Stormin’” Norman Schwarzkopf, and to Wesley Clark, who some referred to as a “perfumed prince.” The down and dirty Tommy “pooh” Franks would later debut as the Texan who led coalition troops in two wars and operationally launched America’s long war against terrorism. All three of these general officers demonstrated distinctly different attributes and approached coalition warfare in uniquely different ways. Thus, they each represent the principal figure within the coalitions examined for this paper.

The study began by suggesting certain diplomatic traits would benefit a general commanding a multinational force. In nearly four decades of research, Edgar Puryear’s focus on leadership traits for ‘American generalship’ remains fittingly centered on defining “character.” However, this particular analysis of generalship is similar in format yet different in context. It is strictly limited to *coalition* generalship and is centered on defining the *Diplomat at Arms*. The findings which follow are certainly not definitive and do not offer a pat solution for the American senior military commander in the 21st century, but give suggestion to modern coalition leadership studies. In essence, ‘military diplomacy’ is touted as necessary schooling for the future coalition commander.

As outlined in the previous chapters, not every vignette within each coalition necessarily reflected that a true *Diplomat at Arms* was in command. Nevertheless, the

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General directed his coalition with a combination of born and learned skills which underscored the importance of diplomacy. Only on a few occasions did his actions fall short of what might have been expected from a military officer trained in diplomacy. In looking for the "genius in command," it becomes even more appropriate to analyze the three Generals' diplomatic guise in hopes of capitalizing on the importance of this attribute. For when diplomacy fails to prevent a war, at least diplomacy may be used to help win a war.

The idea here was to compile a list of differences in the generals' backgrounds and personalities. Second, the more challenging step was determining to what extent the three generals were ‘diplomatically’ prepared for coalition command. The three generals took separate career paths and ended up with similar duty titles and the same rank, despite uniquely different training opportunities. Most important to the thesis, however, is the third and final step of this analysis. That is, to determine what diplomatic attributes stood out as most helpful when placed in this position of responsibility. Accordingly, this paper materialized into three findings and concludes with how best to define a Diplomat at Arms in four top attributes.

**Finding 1: Differences**

In comparing the backgrounds and careers of these three young men who later achieved great distinction as military leaders, one can see some significant differences. All three exhibited tremendous ambition but at different times. Wesley Clark excelled at the earliest age with his community involvement, swimming medals, and high marks in school. Norman Schwarzkopf’s ambition was less evident until his teenage years when he began to stand out academically in high school and play team sports. Clark
graduated top in his class at West Point and Schwarzkopf graduated 43rd. Tommy
Franks’ ambitious nature was not evident until the Vietnam War, where his valorous
efforts in combat were seen as innovative and determined.\textsuperscript{190} Franks later graduated
from UT Arlington as a model student, after earlier dropping out two years into his
studies at UT Austin and joining the Army.

In 33 years of military service, Wesley Clark spent only seven and one-half years
in command with troops from platoon to division level. The rest of his service was as a
staff officer, an aide or general's executive officer, a post-graduate student, and at the
White House, or at a high level headquarters. General Franks, however, spent nearly
all of his preparatory time in command of troops. Retired GEN Barry McCaffrey said
Franks “has been in charge of people, machinery, and money since he was barely out
of high school.”\textsuperscript{191} General Schwarzkopf commanded in Vietnam, was a major player in
Grenada, and served a distinctly balanced set of staff positions at all levels of the Army.
All three officers were wounded in Vietnam, all three served their nation heroically in
uniform, and all three published their memoirs describing events from childhood to four
star command. Schwarzkopf focused his memoirs with gratitude and humility, Clark
wrote of Balkan strategy and setting records straight, and Franks wrote about those who
got in his way. More relevant to this study is how they interacted with heads of state
and foreign officials.

\textsuperscript{190} Franks’ interest in technology, advanced communications, and non-standard tactics was observed by his superior
officers and supported by the achievement awards received in Vietnam. As an artilleryman, he was recognized with
by receiving an Army Commendation Medal with valor and an Air Medal with valor. Both awards were for actions
outside the scope of his normal duties, \url{www.tommyfranksmuseum.org} (accessed 5 Dec 09).
\textsuperscript{191} Benac, Nancy. “Sharp Mind Behind General’s Soft Drawl,” \textit{The Register-Guard}. Eugene, Oregon, March 7,
2003, page 2.
Wesley Clark demonstrated a natural ability to negotiate with foreign officials while setting conditions for the Dayton Accords. He had negotiated since high school, debated competitively in college, and had refined his skills upon attaining senior rank in the military. Richard Holbrooke and NATO leaders commended Clark for his efforts. General Clark’s diplomatic performance especially showed in the individual efforts taken to maintain the NATO alliance against Milosevic during the escalation of the air campaign in Kosovo. Less known, however, was the diplomacy used by the two CENTCOM chiefs. Where Schwarzkopf chose to brief King Fahd from a knee and remain cognizant of Arab culture, Franks would first stick out his hand mid-waist and insist on a handshake to demonstrate confidence and trust. Both methods were effective in different ways. Franks gained the confidence of heads of state, and some of whom counted him as a friend. King Abdullah II of Jordan gave Franks a Harley Davidson after discovering their shared interest in motorcycles; Pakistan’s Pervez Musharraf called him often; and, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak received Franks on short notice in Cairo when bad weather forced the general to change his route home.\textsuperscript{192} Though less polished than his predecessor, General Tommy Franks “was a diplomat in uniform who vacationed at the seaside palace of Jordan’s royal family.”\textsuperscript{193}

General Schwarzkopf demonstrated the talents of a first-rate diplomat, but in different ways. He achieved cohesion not only among the traditionally parochial U.S. military services but also among the Arab and Western allies with all their conflicting interests. He was especially careful in his dealings with the Saudis. When King Fahd worried about an attack on Riyadh, he wanted reassurance from the top and so

\textsuperscript{192} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid.
Schwarzkopf went directly to the palace. He advised Fahd that his main concern was
the possibility that Saddam could fire Scud missiles with chemical warheads at the
capital. That was not much in the way of reassurance, but the King got the straight talk
he wanted.194

Though wearing the same uniform and having attended many of the same
schools, these three Generals could not have been more uniquely dissimilar in their
diplomatic guise. At different times in their careers, they each were unconsciously
molded for the position of supreme military command and were provided opportunities
to hone diplomatic skills along the way. Some could argue that understanding
leadership, like diplomacy, is ultimately a process of learning how to “influence people
to do something that they would not ordinarily do to accomplish organizational
objectives.”195 Schwarzkopf, Clark, and Franks demonstrated this skill quite masterfully,
regardless of their separate levels of preparation for the job.

**Finding 2: Diplomatic Preparations**

G.K. Cunningham, the current Professor of Joint Landpower at the U.S. Army
War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, knows first-hand what diplomatic preparations
are required for successful coalition combatant commanders. Since 2003, he has
hosted the Joint Forces Land Component Commander’s Course (JFLCC) for potential
two and three star general officers. Regarding the subject of diplomacy used by senior
officers, he explains:

> [It] is especially true for combatant commanders. The Department of
State functions through country teams at individual country level. The
regional Bureaus (contrary to the Department of State’s opinion of itself)

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http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,972270-1,00.html (accessed 1 DEC 09).
195 Kolenda xviii
do not exercise regional control, but act more like the Joint Staff does for the Department of Defense: coordinating and summarizing inputs from the field. Hence, the Department of State really has no structure analogous to the geographic combatant commanders at the theater operational level. As you can imagine, this creates a void, and the void gets filled by the person most capable of filling it, that is, the combatant commander … Essentially, the geographic combatant commander is stuck — he has to be a military diplomat to function.196

In determining to what extent each general was diplomatically equipped to command a multinational coalition, some liberty was taken in qualifying each officer’s ‘schooling.’ The JFLCC did not exist for these three Generals. Thus, limited exposure at the National and Army War Colleges and a unique interest in military history best armed them for coalition command complexities. As far as preparations for being the military diplomat, the lives of Generals Schwarzkopf, Clark, and Franks reveal a pattern worth mentioning.

In Schwarzkopf’s case, his preparations began as early as the age of seven when his father was first sent to Tehran and for three years his mother would read aloud letters telling of palaces, mosques, tribes, diplomatic lunches, and the politics of the Iranian parliament. As a twelve year old living in Iran and later as a teenager living in Europe, Schwarzkopf learned about foreign cultures and sensitivities. He adjusted comfortably to his military assignments as an advisor to the South Vietnamese, as a senior officer in U.S. Pacific Command, as an assistant division commander in Germany, and later as the senior military member of the U.S. Committee at the United Nations.

In contrast, Wesley Clark’s preparations were primarily limited to academic study and staff assignments. True military diplomatic training did not occur until he served as

196 Cunningham, G.K. Email Correspondence. Response to author’s questionnaire received Nov. 16, 2009.
a general officer (J-5) in the Pentagon where he first got his “hands-on immersion course in U.S. foreign policy” and later in Latin America as the regional Commander in Chief. Clark’s success in collegiate debate, diverse experiences at Oxford during the height of the Vietnam controversy, assignment to SACEUR as an executive officer, and White House Fellowship exposure certainly had an impact on this future Diplomat at Arms. He gained the intellectual capacity and personal skills necessary to become a political master of persuasion, while simultaneously wearing a military uniform. For what he did not gain in hands-on experience, Clark learned from mentors along the way. Richard Holbrooke and Alexander Haig stand out as two of Clark’s ‘diplomacy coaches.’

Tommy Franks was perhaps the least prepared, yet arguably the fastest learner. His ‘diplomatic schooling’ occurred very late in his career and really did not begin until his first assignment in the Pentagon as a general officer, later in South Korea as division commander, and finally at ARCENT. As CENTCOM commander, his learning came at rapid pace when only months after taking command it was Franks who had approved Yemen as a refueling site and had to deal with the U.S. congressional and international response after the terrorist attack on the USS Cole.

Three varied levels of preparation for these three quite unique generals. Their honesty, frankness with, and confidence in foreign interactions made favorable impressions overall within their respective regions and stand out as some of the top qualities for Generals Schwarzkopf, Clark, and Franks. Whether learned through life events, formal schooling, or muddy boot hand-shaking, the lesson also observed here is that ‘diplomatic schooling’ remains vital in the selection and training of future coalition

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197 Felix 124.
combatant commanders. In the course of this realization, four top diplomatic attributes stand out above others in defining the *Diplomat at Arms*.

**Finding 3: Defining a Diplomat at Arms**

A *Diplomat-at-Arms* is:

> A military officer who recognizes the high character necessary for true leadership in war; one who can communicate with an international audience in a manner that inspires confidence and unity of allied effort; one who is determined, frank, and brilliant; who embraces the skills of a diplomat and learns to apply those skills at the most appropriate times. The ‘Diplomat at Arms’ combatant commander understands that his true authority and the unity of his coalition is maintained by his *charisma*, reinforced by his *tact*, judged by his *impartiality*, and emboldened by his *standing*.  

**Charisma**

Charismatic leaders have a special insight into the human condition and according to retired brigadier general John Bahnsen, “they know what makes people tick both on a general level and on the level specific to each individual.”

To be most effective as a *Diplomat at Arms*, a coalition commander should have charisma. It helps maintain his true authority and the unity of the coalition. Charismatic leaders are admired, respected, and trusted because they are consistent rather than arbitrary, and they maintain high standards of moral and ethical conduct. Charisma for the coalition commander means that he “reflects the ability to inspire, to motivate, and to expect high performance from others based on strongly held core values … it includes being

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198 Author’s definition of *Diplomat at Arms*, derived from this paper’s research and analysis taken in its entirety.
visionary, inspirational, self-sacrificing, trustworthy, decisive, and performance oriented.”

Retired Army General Ward LeHardy, who was Norman Schwarzkopf’s West Point roommate, insists that “Norm is this generation’s Doug MacArthur … He’s got the tactical brilliance of Patton, the strategic insight of Eisenhower, and the modesty of Bradley.” Although some would take issue with the modesty part, Schwarzkopf certainly knew how to charismatically charm his international partners. His famed temper was nearly always performance-oriented and consistently fueled by expectations that were not met. In this regard, his temper was often overshadowed by his charismatic ‘performances’ and rarely interfered with military diplomacy during the war. Schwarzkopf’s most successful diplomatic performances shown in the previous chapters came largely due to the confidence he embodied through charismatic leadership. “If you’re not confident in yourself, how can you expect anybody else to have confidence in you? You’re not doing it for yourself, you’re not doing it to stroke your ego, you’re doing it in spite of yourself.” This trait worked in favor of the coalition’s initial staging operations in Saudi Arabia, helped maintain allied unity when Iraq attacked Israel with scuds, and helped set the conditions for 100% of the U.N.’s end-of-war criteria being met at the Safwan cease-fire negotiations.

In Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience, the authors suggest that charismatic leaders have “powers of vision, the rhetorical skills to communicate this vision, a sense of mission, high self-confidence and intelligence, and setting high

expectations for followers." After studying Wesley Clark’s performance in the Balkans and his influential relationship with the heads of state throughout Europe, and in particular his sense of mission and self-confidence during the air war in Kosovo, it follows that General Clark may have been the most charismatic of the three studied here.

To be sure, a coalition commander does not necessarily need charisma to be a successful military diplomat, but it equips a Diplomat at Arms with a powerful persuasive attribute. Retired Air Force General Merrill McPeak described General Tommy Franks by saying “[h]e sometimes seems to want to come across as one of these aw-shucks, sneaky-smart kind of guys. It’s impossible to judge whether he’s really sneaky-smart, or sneaky-average …[h]e’s not overly impressive.” Franks’ coalition partners spoke of a straight-shooting leader attuned to achieving victory. His military comrades spoke of a profane, but in a humorous sort of way, cigar-smoking country music fan who was always looking for a better way to solve a problem. What he didn’t have in charisma, Franks made up for in creativity and “down and dirty” soldiering. Despite not being the most charismatic leader, Franks’ dealings with President Musharraf and with the Northern Alliance of Afghanistan demonstrated the impact his presence had over others.

“Charisma” is a top quality for the Diplomat at Arms coalition commander. Therefore, one may define a charismatic General as:

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205 The Register Guard, p. A2.
A military leader who moves international partners with poise and confidence; maintains the ability to draw others with his demeanor and personality; and, excites cooperation and collective action with a strong, measured voice and relaxed tone. The charismatic coalition commander influences with more than just words of precisely articulated quality; he holds a poised yet often understated appearance which seems to fixate not only military officials, but also heads of state and, in some cases, populations.

**Tact**

A gruff, commanding, no-nonsense style can inspire the troops and stir public confidence in wartime, but coalition partnerships sometimes require ‘asking’ and not ‘telling.’ The old saying, “generals are schooled in tactics, politicians in tact” may not necessarily be true for the Diplomat at Arms. A tactful general would have a keen sense of what to do or say in order to maintain unity of effort within his coalition. He also would have a schooled understanding of what is an appropriate response in meeting difficult political situations within the alliance.

Generals Schwarzkopf and Franks were tactful at CENTCOM HQ. They both understood the challenges of the region well and responded to crises within the coalitions quite tactfully. Nevertheless, Wesley Clark may have been the most tactful of the three Generals. As NATO commander he quietly encouraged U.S. troops in Bosnia to arrest mafia-like criminals and strengthen the country’s moderate political opposition, “knowing such moves would draw the ire of his more conservative Pentagon bosses who were opposed to anything that smacked of nation building.”

“You have to push the envelope,” he told his staff. “If you put this strategy down [on paper] and circulate it, it’s dead.”207 He knew how to work and what to say in order to achieve results while

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207 Ibid.
balancing his SACEUR responsibilities. General Clark’s tact was also evident when he responded to the collateral damage of the air strikes in Kosovo. His personal efforts, in particular, his knowing what to do and say, pulled the alliance through this politically charged debate. NATO ultimately continued its bombings. Thus, to be most effective as a Diplomat at Arms, a coalition commander should have tact. It helps reinforce his true authority and the unity of the coalition.

General Schwarzkopf’s performance at the Safwan negotiations is another example where tact stands out as a top quality. In the transcripts of the negotiations, Schwarzkopf reads his audience well and uses his words to set the tone. He clearly knew the regional interests, the United Nations’ expectations, and found the right verbiage to appropriately convey the coalition’s ceasefire demands.208 Likewise, General Franks’ handling of the Congressional testimony after the USS Cole bombing is a good example of his remaining carefully balanced. He explained the security challenges in Yemen and did not avoid the complexities of the threat in the region, but all the while made it clear that he felt the Yemeni government was most cooperative.

“Tact” is a top quality for the Diplomat at Arms coalition commander. Therefore, one may define a tactful General as:

A military leader who knows ‘how’ and ‘what’ to say ‘when’; he reads each audience separately and masters the proper verbiage for attaining cooperation within his coalition; he applies a varied selection of words with a matching tone to fit every situation; and, he commands authority by not avoiding what’s ‘necessary’ while simultaneously saying what’s ‘appropriate’ to achieve desired results.

208 “Ceasefire Discussions with Iraqis at Safwan Airfield.” Declassified document released April 24, 1996 by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Schwarzkopf and Prince Sultan of Saudi Arabia set the tone by not avoiding what was ‘necessary’ but all the while saying what was appropriate to achieve ceasefire arrangements most amenable to all parties in the coalition.
Impartiality

As coalition commander, a General really has two wars to fight at the same time, one military and one political. The political battle requires a level of impartiality, or at least the perception of neutrality and fairness. Throughout the staging and operational responsibilities of commanding the war, it is necessary, in addition to maintaining allied unity, to deal with numerous problems concerning participating countries.

There is no doubt that nations put strong men and women in their top military positions, those who staunchly hold beliefs and may not quickly accept others’ views. When there are differences of opinions, the clashes are sometimes awkward and the coalition commander often steps in to settle these differences. To resolve conflicts based on nationalistic differences, without showing undue favoritism for either his own country or another, calls for a difficult balance.

An impartial coalition General makes decisions based on objective criteria, rather than on the basis of bias, prejudice, or preferring one member state over another. Just as a judge would hear all sides in court litigation, a coalition commander should keenly study the interests of all its member states. Thus, patience, cultural awareness, and adaptability are traits that serve the strategic leader well in becoming an impartial combatant commander. With today’s globalized, multinational environment, understanding and working across cultures are becoming a necessity as opposed to a nice-to-have in military operations. Studying cultures and learning to convey impartiality is a prerequisite to successful cross-cultural communications in military operations. For a commander to be viewed as impartial, he must be wise in the affairs and national interests of the nations he represents in the coalition. To be most effective as a
Diplomat at Arms, a coalition commander should therefore convey impartiality. It essentially judges his true authority and the unity of the coalition.

The most notable example of impartiality by the three generals studied here came in the form of Schwarzkopf’s ability to weigh the Arab influence in the Persian Gulf War. When perceptions became rigid, negative attitudes (stereotypes) set in. To prevent breakdowns in communications and festering animosities, General Schwarzkopf chose to enhance communication, provide even weight to his Saudi military partnerships, and facilitate positive interaction by accentuating the need for cultural sensitivity. There could be no prejudices in his headquarters. Guidelines for his U.S. Army staff consequently included sensitivity to traditional practices, acceptance of the situation, impartiality, and patience. Writes General Schwarzkopf, “I’m not known for being patient, but to do the job there [Saudi Arabia], that’s just what I was.”209 The unity of the Persian Gulf coalition endured likely due to the impartiality conveyed by Schwarzkopf.

General Franks was also aware of competing cultures and praised the members of his coalition. Nevertheless, he conveyed partiality in his overall planning for the 2003 war in Iraq. Shown in figure 1, he made no reference to culture, religion, ethnic identity, or moral dimension in the invasion plan. In his memoirs, there is neither mention of formal alliances, ad hoc coalitions, international partnerships, nor any sort of power relationships during the planning phase of the Iraq invasion. Arguably, his inability to show the ‘perception’ of impartiality hurt the unity of effort in Operation Iraqi Freedom. In nearly all public forums, this effort is most often referred to as the “U.S. invasion of Iraq” and not an “allied defeat of the Iraqi regime.” On the other hand, while drafting the

209 Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero p. 334
military annex of the Dayton Agreement in 1995, General Wesley Clark understood the importance of being ‘perceived’ as impartial even when the situation demanded partiality. Clark played a major role that December in putting the final details on the map that would divide Bosnia. To accomplish this, he “spent hundreds of hours arguing with some of the worst, most difficult people in the world, including war criminals” and all the while emphasized impartiality.\textsuperscript{210} In truth, he was ‘perceived’ as being impartial.

“Impartiality” is a top quality for the \textit{Diplomat at Arms} coalition commander.

Therefore, one may define an impartial General as:

\begin{quote}
A culturally astute military leader, who knowingly considers national interests and genuinely balances the military and political objectives for those he commands. The ‘impartial commander’ remains patient, prohibits prejudice, and never exposes his concessions whenever partiality becomes operationally necessary.
\end{quote}

\textbf{Standing}

There is plenty of U.S. doctrine and some NATO/UN alliance doctrine which describes the duties of the coalition combatant commander: JP 5-0, 3-0, 3-08, 3-16, and 3-57 and FM 3-0, 3-07, and 3-24 all cover it to varying degrees. Despite all the Joint Publications and legitimacy of coalitions and alliances, there really are no ‘formal’ rules outlining true authority of a multinational coalition commander. In truth, if the commander has high standing, it should not make any difference. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, perhaps the ultimate military diplomat, held this opinion:

\begin{quote}
No written agreement for the establishment of an allied command can hold up against nationalistic considerations should any of the contracting powers face disaster through support of the supreme commander’s decisions. Every commander in the field possesses direct disciplinary power over all subordinates of his own nationality and of his own service; and disobedience or other offense is punishable by such measures as the commander believes appropriate… but such authority
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{210} Clark, \textit{Waging Modern War}, 182.
and power cannot be given by any country to an individual of another nation. Only trust and confidence can establish the authority of an allied commander in chief so firmly that he need never fear the absence of this legal power.\footnote{Puryear, \textit{19 Stars}, 176.}

For our purposes, a combatant commander’s standing is therefore synonymous with his esteem, reputation, and his position in the eyes of others in the region. His standing gives him the ultimate authority to command a coalition, especially when it is only bound by an \textit{ad hoc} list of agreements without legitimacy. A general with a high reputation as a skilled planner, administrator, and tactical genius; a general who is held in highest esteem by influential political leaders in the region; and, a general whose reputation is one of experience and victory are some of the these key elements. To be most effective as a \textit{Diplomat at Arms}, a coalition commander should therefore have standing. It helps embolden his true authority and the unity of the coalition.

For Schwarzkopf, his international standing came early. “Initially,” says a British commander, “we were taken aback by his gung-ho appearance, but in a very short time we came to realize that here was a highly intelligent soldier -- a skilled planner, administrator and battlefield commander.”\footnote{Time Magazine Feb 4, 1991.} Most of the international community embraced the United Nations’ mission to oust Iraq from Kuwait’s borders and thus field commanders and heads of state alike knew that Schwarzkopf was the supreme commander. His international standing peaked after the Safwan negotiations, where there existed some disagreement with the U.S. Administration on the outcome. The fact that the State Department did not rescind any of Schwarzkopf’s Safwan arrangements is very telling of how much ‘authority’ the general’s standing carried. Likewise, Wesley Clark’s standing in Europe goes without much need for evidence. His reputation and

\footnote{211 Puryear, \textit{19 Stars}, 176.}
\footnote{212 Time Magazine Feb 4, 1991.}
overall ‘standing’ were known throughout Europe well before he became SACEUR via
the Dayton Accords four years prior. At the conclusion of his term as Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe, Clark received more than 20 major awards from foreign
governments, including honorary knighthoods from the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands, as well as the title of Commander of the Legion of Honor from France. General Tommy Franks’ standing as an ad hoc coalition commander unfortunately
never reached the level that Schwarzkopf and Clark enjoyed. Somewhat due to his
notion on how “the world came to recognize America with attitude” approach to
Afghanistan and Iraq, but mostly due to the lack of legitimacy provided by a coalition ‘of
the willing.’ The point is … a multinational coalition benefits greatly when it is led by
a legitimate combatant commander who is held in high standing by multiple audiences.

“Standing” is a top quality for the Diplomat at Arms coalition commander.

Therefore, one may define a General with standing as:

A military leader whose legitimacy is based on trust and confidence; whose reputation is based on performance and competence; and, whose influence is based on respect and international esteem. A General with ‘standing’ is held in the highest esteem by both influential military and political leaders, who without question, view him as a skilled planner, keen administrator, and superb tactician.

Summary

Ambassador Chas Freeman explained, “Like war, diplomacy is too important a
subject to be left to blundering amateurism…. [d]iplomacy is too portentous to be
entrusted to the politicians, but it is too political to be left to the generals. Those who
may be fatally affected by diplomacy’s failures have every reason to demand that only

214 Franks, Tommy. American Soldier 487.
its most skilled, professional practitioners represent their interests." The idea here was to provide some insight into defining four top qualities observed in a study of coalition military diplomacy. If a *Diplomat at Arms* best serves as a combatant commander of coalitions, then it is important to further the study of skills and attributes which define the successful senior military diplomat. It may therefore be observed that diplomatic ‘schooling’ of sorts is paramount for the future coalition commander. But, in no way should it be limited to the four traits specified in this paper. Any emphasis, however, placed on the General’s charisma, tact, impartiality, and standing would only serve to benefit future military coalitions.

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Conclusion

‘Generally’ Speaking

A commander should have a profound understanding of human nature, the knack of smoothing out troubles, the power of winning affection while communicating energy, and the capacity for ruthless determination where required by circumstances. He needs to generate an electrifying current, and to keep a cool head in applying it.\footnote{216}{Hart, B.H. Liddell. *Thoughts on War*, xi, 1944.}

This project was a comparative analysis of three case studies and not a study of *coalition warfare* per se. It was a study focused solely on the diplomatic guise of three senior-most U.S. military commanders who led international coalitions in warfare. To best demonstrate the effectiveness of similar diplomatic traits under dissimilar circumstances, the case studies included formal alliances such as a United Nations-led coalition and a NATO-led coalition, as well as a less formal and ad-hoc coalition. Accordingly, three supreme coalition commanders comprised the bulk of this paper: Generals H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Wesley K. Clark, and Tommy R. Franks. Although the intelligent, forceful, and engaging Schwarzkopf, the genial, instructive, and unifying Clark, and the rudimentary, no-nonsense, and firm Franks practiced separate styles of military diplomacy, they each provided valuable insight into defining the *Diplomat at Arms*.\footnote{216}{Hart, B.H. Liddell. *Thoughts on War*, xi, 1944.}

The closing paragraphs of this paper stress the importance of ‘diplomatic schooling’ for potential coalition commanders. By 2003, the U.S. Army launched its Combined/Joint Force Land Component Commander Course (C/JFLCC) for potential two and three-star Generals. Still yet, it is considered a “very broad approach to studying coalition warfare” and is focused mainly on “forming the coalition.”\footnote{217}{11 NOV 09 interview conducted with author and LTG Benjamin R. Mixon, a graduate of the JFLCC and current Commanding General of US Army Pacific Command.} The U.S. Army’s *Guidebook for Joint Force Land Component Commanders* emphasizes that “an
understanding of the culture, knowing when to engage and when not to, and how to respond to requests without inadvertently committing to action are all important aspects of the commander placed in a multinational operating environment. As recently as March 2009, four of the top military officers in the United States briefed potential two and three star Generals at the JFLCC on the power of coalition relationships “grounded in trust.” Furthermore, the Multinational Division-North commander in Iraq in October 2007, LTG Benjamin R. Mixon states that “we do not spend enough time at the senior level on the aspects of diplomacy.” He goes on to say that learning “diplomacy and the political aspects within coalitions, the importance of building relationships forged in dignity and respect … in my experience, come strictly from OJT [on the job training].” In other words, there is great emphasis placed on the importance of military diplomacy but little formal schooling occurs until very, very late in the career.

Recent history shows that the broader the coalition, the greater the likelihood of an enduring, and validated end state. Thus, the inclusion of coalition partners in large numbers assures broader and greater international support for a campaign. With many competing national interests and a wide array of language and cultural differences, this only highlights the potential for greater complexities in tomorrow’s coalitions. As demonstrated here, training in military diplomacy relies heavily upon a lifetime of preparations. Does OJT adequately prepare future commanders for these increased complexities?

219 Discussion of Joint Forces Land Component Commander’s Course, dtd 23-27 March 2009. Dialogue between author and Prof G.K. Cunningham as well as LTG Mixon, HQ USARPAC.
220 Mixon Interview with Author. 11 NOV 09.
221 Argued by the Guidebook for Joint Forces Land Component Commanders, Chapter 11.
This study is not definitive, yet suggests that formal ‘diplomatic schooling’ for senior military officers would prove beneficial. Additionally, the paper provides no pat solutions to what traits are absolutely necessary for success. However, the findings which define a Diplomat at Arms in the context of four top qualities act as starting points for continued dialogue. In the interest of educating and training a future Diplomat at Arms, it serves best to teach the military professional “how to think,” versus “what to do” in each circumstance. Without taking away the role of a military commander in preparing to win his nations wars, it is time to more adequately address the complexities of working collectively in a multinational coalition.

Studying Generals Schwarzkopf, Clark, and Franks provided insight into the inner workings of coalition diplomacy. Looking at each commander’s overall ability to handle the multinational disputes and simultaneously maintain his coalition’s unity was very telling. Schwarzkopf’s form of diplomacy differed from Clark’s, who in turn differed greatly from Franks. Where Schwarzkopf mastered the perception of impartiality, Clark was most tactful and Franks demonstrated distinctive charisma. Three uniquely different Generals were tasked to accomplish a mission with uniquely different international partnerships. In the end, a lifetime of preparations is what comprised each commander’s diplomatic guise.

Coalition warfare remains the domain of tomorrow’s way of war, and consequently, military diplomacy will remain the domain of the strong intellect, the dedicated professional, and the secure ego. To lead these coalitions, the international community will accordingly call for a Diplomat at Arms:
A military officer who recognizes the high character necessary for true leadership in war; one who can communicate with an international audience in a manner that inspires confidence and unity of allied effort; one who is determined, frank, and brilliant; who embraces the skills of a diplomat and learns to apply those skills at the most appropriate times. The ‘Diplomat at Arms’ combatant commander understands that his true authority and the unity of his coalition is maintained by his charisma, reinforced by his tact, judged by his impartiality, and emboldened by his standing.
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