NATIONAL GUARD WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS –
ARE THEY READY AND CAPABLE TO SUPPORT THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

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National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams - Are They Ready and Capable to Support the Global War on Terrorism

The Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Civil Support Teams (CST) were created under the auspices of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 1997 which advocated training first-responders to deal with a WMD terrorist incident. The military was tasked to develop and maintain at least one domestic terrorism rapid response team composed of members of the armed forces, capable of aiding federal, state, and local officials in the detection, neutralization, containment, disassembly, and disposal of weapons of mass destruction. So far, Congress has authorized a total of 44 CSTs. The first 10 teams were established in the NDAA for FY 1999. Seventeen additional teams were authorized in FY 2000 and five more in FY 2001 to assist local and state authorities in assessing and evaluating a WMD attack. The first thirty-two have been certified by the Department of Defense to date. An additional 12 teams were included in the Defense Appropriations Bill for FY 2004. The CSTs are located across the country and eventually all 53 State and Territory Governors and the District of Columbia may have one at their disposal. Because of this accelerated timeline and evolution, the CSTs were rapidly developed and pressed into service very early in their life cycle development.
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To my Mom for being so brave.

In Memoriam
Robert Wesley Brown
(22 May 1932 – 2 January 2004)

My Hero…My Mentor
My Fishing and Hunting Buddy
My Best Friend…My Dad
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INTRODUCTION

NATIONAL GUARD WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS – ARE THEY READY AND CAPABLE TO SUPPORT THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

On September the 11th, 2001, terrorists left their mark of murder on my country…. These terrorists target the innocent, and they kill by the thousands. And they would, if they gain the weapons they seek, kill by the millions and not be finished. The greatest threat of our age is nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons in the hands of terrorists, and the dictators who aid them.

— President George W. Bush
November 19, 2003

BACKGROUND

Until the mid 1990s, terrorism was not viewed by the American public as a threat sufficiently serious to our national security as to require decisive action. It was still perceived to be a form of violence that took place in the Middle East, or at least elsewhere. Two events in the early and mid-1990s brought the threat home to our collective consciousness. First, the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in February 1993. Second, the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Those events were accentuated by the 1995 incident in which a Japanese cult group released the nerve agent sarin into the Tokyo subway system and by the bombs that destroyed U. S. military barracks in Saudi Arabia and the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The bombing attacks alone inflicted over 6,000 casualties.1

The Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST) were created under the auspices of Presidential Decision Directives 39 and 62, and the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 1997 which advocated training first-responders to deal with a WMD terrorist incident (Public Law 104-201, 1996). The military was tasked to “develop and maintain at least one domestic terrorism rapid response team composed of members of the armed forces … capable of aiding federal, state, and local officials in the detection, neutralization, containment, disassembly, and disposal of weapons of mass destruction.”2 In 1998, a “tiger team” was commissioned by the Department of Defense (DoD) to develop a strategic plan to integrate the reserve components in the response to weapons of mass destruction (WMD).3 “The plan’s aim was to improve the military capabilities required to effectively support local, state, and federal agency consequence management response to terrorist attacks.”4
For the purposes of this paper, “a WMD incident is defined as a deliberate or unintentional event involving a nuclear, biological, chemical, radiological weapon or device, or a large conventional explosive, which produces catastrophic loss of life or property.”

“Congress authorized and funded the formation of ten WMD-CSTs in October 1998. Over the next 18 months, DoD … organized, trained, and equipped ten WMD-CSTs, while simultaneously developing the doctrine, training programs, and the specialized equipment required to support their mission requirements.”

One of the original ten rapid response teams was located within each of the ten Federal Emergency Management Agency regions. Stationing decisions were based upon criteria designed to make the most of existing facilities and ensure maximum coverage of large metropolitan areas.

Congress has authorized 44 WMD-CSTs (formerly called Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) Teams) using National Guard personnel to assist local and state authorities in assessing and evaluating a WMD attack. “The first ten teams authorized … have achieved the certification required by law and … DoD criterion. Seventeen additional teams were authorized in FY 2000; five more teams were authorized in FY 2001” and approved for funding in the NDAA for FY 2002. The FY 2003 NDAA, section 1403, in part stated that the Secretary of Defense shall establish 23 additional WMD-CSTs and review expanding the mission of the teams. An additional 12 teams were included in the Defense Appropriations Bill and NDAA for FY 2004.

The civil support teams (CST) are located across the country (see TABLES 1 – 4) and eventually all 53 State and Territory Governors and the District of Columbia may have one at their disposal. Because of this accelerated timeline and evolution of the original teams, the CSTs were quickly designed and pressed into service very early in their life cycle development.

**RESEARCH QUESTION**

What is the role of the National Guard’s WMD-CSTs in the global war on terrorism and are they prepared, properly trained, designed and equipped to accomplish their mission, i.e., are they ready?
### TABLE 1. PHASE I CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS (FY 1999)\(^9\)

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<td>2nd</td>
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TABLE 4. PHASE IV CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS (FY 2004)\textsuperscript{13}

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DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES (MISSION)

The CST is a joint Army and Air National Guard unit designed to support civil authorities at a domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) incident site by identifying CBRNE agents/substances, assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response measures, and assisting with appropriate requests for state support to facilitate additional resources,\textsuperscript{14} both military and non-military, to help save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage. They are not intended to replace the first responder(s) on the scene, typically a firefighter, policeman, emergency medical
technician (EMT) or hazardous material (HAZMAT) crew. The team integrates with the Incident Command System (ICS) in support of the local Incident Commander, providing a crucial capability between the initial local response and follow-on resources.

The Chief of National Guard Bureau (NGB), Lt. Gen. Davis, clearly stated the original CSTs were ready in all aspects of their missioning, during a speech in May of 2001:

One of the most prominent National Guard initiatives in the Homeland Security arena has been the establishment of Civil Support Teams. These teams provide governors with a dramatically improved capability to respond in the event of an incident involving the use of a weapon of mass destruction here on American soil ... these valuable Civil Support Teams are ready and capable. Our initial 10 teams have met all the training standards as they were set out for them. They are confident, capable and have been supplied with appropriate equipment. All 10 teams have successfully completed their external evaluations. All the commanders have assessed their units and deemed them to be operational ready.15

The DoD Inspector General (IG), the General Accounting Office (GAO) and more recently the RAND Corporation cast doubt on their readiness and contribution to homeland security. The following analysis will highlight the CSTs mission and review the Army and Joint domains of doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, materiel, personnel and facilities (DOTLM-PF) as it relates to the CSTs’ readiness posture to either confirm or rebut their findings. Certification was also added as one the areas, because it entails considerable oversight by the State, NGB, Department of the Army and ultimately requires final approval by the Secretary of Defense, before the CSTs are authorized to respond and deploy to a domestic WMD incident.

DOTLM-PF

Each area was rated on its contribution to the CSTs readiness posture using a simple color scheme: green, amber, and red, in determining if the CSTs are ready. RAND used a similar approach but rated the categories as high, medium and low. The DoD IG and GAO did not specifically rate the domains.

DOCTRINE

According to the DoD IG audit report, “doctrine for employing WMD-CSTs was incomplete and coordination between ... Army doctrine developers was very poor. Absence of approved doctrine obviously creates considerable risk of premature or otherwise faulty decisions on training, equipment, manning and mission readiness certification.”16
The 52nd CST Commander and 5th Army personnel also stated that Army or Joint publications that specifically address the role of civil support teams lack in this area. However, the U.S. Army’s Chemical School was identified to undertake this task to correct this shortfall. National Guard Bureau and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) have made substantial progress by establishing Integrated Concept Teams and Working Groups to address the doctrine coordination shortcomings. Besides local tactical standard operating procedures (TSOP), that the various CSTs maintain, the only item that had been published to date is their Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) manual, which identifies the unit mission(s) and those collective tasks that are considered critical in support of domestic and disaster preparedness operations. Recently, the Field Manual 3-11.22 was approved for publication as well. It delineates the WMD-CSTs techniques, tactics and procedures, commonly referred to as TTPs. While these TTPs address numerous issues and provide detailed guidance at the tactical level it does not provide for operational or strategic level guidance for senior leaders. An overarching capstone document derived from the Universal Joint Task List still needs to be formally drafted and approved by DoD for use at senior levels to provide a solid foundation and sound basis for future operational capabilities (FOC) and expansion of the WMD-CSTs’ mission, if warranted.

RAND rated this area as high “… because, although the entire body of doctrine necessary for this area has yet been developed, TRADOC is well on the way. Task lists are under study and other progress is evident.” In addition, continuing to collect, capture and publish valuable lessons learned and after action reports (AAR) with detailed analysis from the 2nd CST’s experience at Ground Zero in New York City is an important aspect to the doctrine development process.

Also, equally important are the submission and collection of detailed AARs from any and all real-world missions that CSTs respond to, e.g., Kansas’ 73rd CST in April 2003 and Alaska’s 103rd CST in April 2002 at Fort Greely, in order to delineate best practices and pitfalls to avoid, to ensure the process of developing a rich database of knowledge continues for mission essential task list development and FOC determination. These AARs would be a valuable tool for leaders, especially from an environmental and safety perspective and should be posted to a CST Community Page and Knowledge Collaboration Center on the Army Portal – Army Knowledge Online. This would encourage adoption of best practices, improve delineation of performance objectives and ultimately foster improved standardization amongst and between Civil Support Teams.

The area of Doctrine is amber overall.
ORGANIZATION

Each CST is made up of 22 full-time National Guard members organized into six functional sections: command, operations, communications, administration/logistics, medical, and survey.¹⁹

RAND rated this area as medium “in part because of the ambiguity surrounding the utility of the WMD-CSTs … it appears to be of questionable value to localities and states … also it is unclear that the WMD CST can be on-scene in the four hours claimed.”²⁰ Similar concerns were raised by the GAO report, “… officials … expressed concern that this time frame would get the team there too late to be useful … for the incident commander to benefit from the information they could produce, the RAID team would be needed at the scene within the first 1 to 2 hours.”²¹

This point was disproved by the actions of the 2nd CST in New York City. The fact that they arrived more than four hours after the WMD attack did not hamper their usefulness to the local authorities or lessen the importance of what they brought in support of the operation at Ground Zero. The team’s acting commander, Major Kaarlo Hietala explained “the 2nd was one of the first units to conduct air sampling at the World Trade Center wreckage Sept. 11” and “the 2nd’s communications capabilities soon proved invaluable as well.”²² “The 2nd CST’s UCS [Unified Command Suite] provided the FBI with the capability to transmit the first on-scene images of the attack to the FBI’s Strategic Information Operations Center in Washington, DC.”²³

The stationing plan for the first two phases of CSTs strategically arrayed them across the country “27/90/250”. This translates to “27 teams, covering 90% of the U.S. population, within a 250-mile radius” approximating a 4-hour response time capability. Both Continental United States Army (CONUSA) personnel and the 52nd CST Commander felt this did not decrement their readiness or hinder mission accomplishment.

Another issue raised by 1st Army is command and control relationships within the States and the corresponding roles and responsibilities, i.e., who is the day-to-day manager of the Civil Support Team. In some instances the rating chain did not follow the same chain that was used for operational control. Currently, there is no standard type of higher headquarters that the CSTs report to. One potential solution is to explore the need for a CBRNE-like joint headquarters that the CSTs and other military units, e.g., chemical, engineering, medical could fall under, dependent on the mission. This multifunctional headquarters could be established on a regional basis, possibly with Federal Emergency Management Agency or Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assets. One possible model to look at is the recent North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters that was activated last December.
However, the most critical aspect of command and control is the relationship between the CST and the local incident commander, usually a fire or police chief, on the scene. The recent establishment of the National Incident Management System is a step in the right direction to further improve standardization, interoperability and unity of effort.

Also a point for debate and discussion is if the CST requires another three-man survey team to bolster its ability to sustain itself longer during entry operations into a “hot zone” and provide more flexibility to conduct self-decontamination if and when required. This should be accomplished through one or more operational tests and evaluations (OT&Es) conducted at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri or other appropriate site to determine the capability required. This is also an excellent opportunity to evaluate not only the “combat formation” required, but the type of personnel and equipment as well. The natural follow-on to the OT&Es, through the spiral and iterative force development process, is to further refine the CST Operational and Organizational Concept, in order to validate baseline capability requirements.

The area of Organization is rated amber overall.

TRAINING

According to RAND, “training contains the most shortcomings”, however it only led to a medium assessment. Our concerns about the WMD-CST suggest that it will be quite important for the WMD-CSTs to exercise with local and state first responders to establish whether they are as responsive and capable as they need to be. This training and exercising should be an “all hazards” curriculum and include training across the full spectrum of potential operations, from standard hazmat incidents to chemical and biological WMD incidents.

However, this concern is clearly overstated. “In preparation for possible operations in New York City, the 2nd CST conducted extensive training and coordination with the … Office of Emergency Management and the Fire Department. They were able to alert and recall 18 out of 22 personnel within 90 minutes” on September 11, 2001.

According to the DoD IG report, training is also an area of concern. “Undue reliance was placed on external evaluations (EXEVALs), a unit level training event, to demonstrate the mission readiness of WMD-CSTs. What was actually needed was a rigorous program of operational test and evaluation.”

The 52nd CST Commander and CONUSA representatives also had concerns about training, primarily the “lack of realistic training exercises” and they are not always “geared toward mission essential training.” However, both stated “the training that does take place builds invaluable rapport and teamwork with local, county and state officials.”
Another area of concern is the aspect of sustainment training. Each CST member completes between 500 – 750 hours of technical training by various civilian and governmental agencies. “Therefore, in order to improve the high level of initial training, a comprehensive sustainment training program for the CSTs needs to focus individual and collective training on interagency operations … to improve the essential aspects of civil-military interoperability…”

And, “according to local and federal HAZMAT team leaders, it may be difficult for the RAID [CST] team members to maintain their proficiency after they receive their training.”

Another aspect of training that has not been exercised yet is the concept of more than one team responding and deploying to an incident. This would demonstrate CST standardization and interoperability issues across all of the domains under an Emergency Management Assistance Compact employment scenario, or if federalized in accordance with Title 10 Untied States Code by the President. This is due in part to the CSTs phased activation process over the past five years. As the National Guard’s homeland defense (HLD) and homeland security (HLS) mission responsibilities evolve this type of training will be essential for continued CST program maturation and success.

The area of Training is rated amber overall.

LEADERSHIP AND EDUCATION

This area is one of the best due to the extensive leadership program that already exists for both officers and noncommissioned officers (NCO) in the Army and Air Force. Neither the DoD IG report nor the GAO report had concerns or negative comments about the domain of leader development. RAND further stated “Leadership for domestic preparedness is currently assessed as high because the basic leadership skills in the officer and NCO corps have served well in the domestic preparedness and disaster relief events.”

One aspect of leader development that does require additional emphasis is education about interagency operations, to include nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and private volunteer organizations (PVO), and a more thorough understanding of other governmental and military organizational hierarchies, e.g., DHS and USNORTHCOM. This should occur early for the senior leaders, ideally during a pre-command course and reinforced with multi-echelon training exercises afterward.

Also, mentoring is an important aspect of leadership and education that cannot be overlooked. An informal and high-quality mentoring program is an excellent way to develop leaders who are self-aware and adaptive to an ever-changing strategic environment.

The area of Leadership and Education is rated green overall.
“Human performance in most missions can be enhanced or under-mined by the quality and readiness of the materiel supporting it.”\textsuperscript{31} RAND’s rating for this domain was medium. It was primarily based on four “uncertainties”.

First, was the amount of actual decontamination capability that the WMD-CST brings to an incident and second, the availability of mobility assets to move the WMD CST to the scene of the incident. Third, the stockpiling and movement of emergency stocks of consumables that will be needed in incident responses and fourth, as RDT&E yields much less costly chemical and biological detection equipment, it will be possible to distribute the equipment widely to first responders.\textsuperscript{32}

Two of the four uncertainties, decontamination and stockpiling, are not part of the CSTs mission set nor are they envisioned to be. Therefore, these conclusions are not relevant to this discussion and do not distract from the materiel readiness level of the CSTs. The issue of mobility was previously addressed under organization. Based on lessons learned, the CSTs are still a valuable asset to the local incident commander regardless of their time of arrival. The 2nd CST proved that their core capabilities, agent identification and sophisticated communications, are utilized well beyond the CSTs’ deployment planning factor of three to five hours. The final uncertainty RDT&E and lowered costs for detection equipment is also problematic. This does not directly correlate to their readiness. Granted, it may eventually create redundancy and an overlap of capabilities between CSTs and first responders, but a faulty assumption was made that local communities will have the resources to buy and properly maintain this equipment, even if the price does come down.

The only fault found by the DoD IG was “no effective oversight to ensure that sound acquisition practices were followed” and the “WMD-CST equipment chosen … was generally different from standard items already in military inventories.”\textsuperscript{33} However, despite this apparent “fault” the CSTs have led the way in reforming DoD procurement practices and based on the passage below, have set the national standard for equipping other organizations.

The teams were fielded with a combination of 30-percent Army standard equipment and 70-percent commercial off-the-shelf equipment. Interoperability with the civilian first or emergency responders … was a key consideration in the equipment selection process. The [DoD/DOJ] InterAgency Board for Equipment Standardization and Interoperability … used the CST equipment list as the basis for a national standardized equipment list used by the entire interagency community in preparing for, and responding to, WMD terrorism.\textsuperscript{34}

In addition, the level of sophistication that the CSTs have in two of their primary pieces of equipment, the Mobile Analytical Laboratory System (MALS), original ten teams, and the
Unified Command Suite (UCS) is unparalleled in the industry. As previously stated, both of these items proved invaluable at Ground Zero and enhance the CSTs readiness.

Lack of standardization is also an issue for some pieces of equipment across the Civil Support Teams. While it is the “best money can buy” some of the differences that exist could hamper CSTs performing a battle hand-off or relief in place, when crossing state lines in support of another team or if federalized by the President.\textsuperscript{35}

The area of Materiel is rated green overall.

PERSONNEL

The unit is jointly staffed with Army and Air National Guard personnel comprising 14 different military specialties. RAND rated this domain as medium based primarily on lack of experience and soldier preparedness for domestic operations with the nation’s citizens.\textsuperscript{36} Ironically, this is one of the hallmarks of CST capabilities. Many, if not all of the citizen-soldiers and airmen have a thorough understanding of local procedures and practices, because all live in the very communities that they support. This is exactly why the National Guard is uniquely suited and ready to perform this mission.

However, the GAO report did address problems with personnel staffing ratios and potential problems with recruiting and retention of current members. The commander of the 52nd CST echoed this same sentiment. He stated that personnel turnover was a potential issue of concern and that the high “OPTEMPO”, i.e., the unit is essentially on-call 24/7, was one of their biggest challenges. Two points to potentially help correct this are special duty assignment pay and restructuring the organization to allow for more upward mobility within the CST. Both of these would have a positive impact on readiness. The 52nd CST Commander also stated that one of his biggest assets was the quality of people in the unit. Most were either “hand-picked” or volunteered to be a part of the 52nd CST and they all displayed a high level of dedication and commitment to the organization.

Another concern is the individuals assigned to the CST are “one deep” in all of the positions expect for the survey section, which has two like teams. This can create problems when the CST is deployed for two reasons, one if a unit member is not available it creates a void and two once deployed if the CST is faced with continuous 24-hour operations. National Guard Bureau (NGB) should consider reducing the number of specialties to create more redundancy and overlap among the CST members and possibly increasing the size of the CST as well. According to the 52nd CST Commander, the minimum addition should be at least one more three-man survey team.
In addition to ensure upward mobility and retention of the enlisted members a first sergeant position should be created for each Civil Support Team. This would not require an increase in authorizations but simply changing the senior operations sergeant’s title on the table of distribution and allowance (TDA). This will also improve the opportunities for these senior noncommissioned officers to compete for future assignments as command sergeants major, thereby retaining their valuable skills and knowledge in the National Guard, either at the state or national level. This is especially important if CBRNE headquarters are programmed for the National Guard future force.

Another essential element to a well-founded and sustainable CST program is to create a specific active guard/reserve (AGR) exchange program between the states (Title-32 AGR) and the federal level (Title-10 AGR), to provide upward mobility and more flexibility for current members. This would further reinforce retaining these individuals in their field of expertise while potentially providing NGB, First and Fifth CONUSAs, US Army Forces Command, and United States Northern Command with a highly trained manpower pool. In order to provide adequate control and guidance at the operational and strategic levels, a system must be in place to encourage team members to pursue worthwhile and enriching opportunities outside their states.

The area of Personnel is amber overall.

**FACILITIES**

This domain was not addressed by any of the reports cited. They used the previous standard for Army Domains (DTLOMS), which did not include this category.

The NGB G-4 and logistics community manages building and property maintenance in the Army National Guard and has a well-established practice for procuring military construction dollars through normal funding channels, e.g., the cyclical Program of Memorandum. The Air National Guard has a similar mechanism in place where CSTs are located on air bases.

Some of the CSTs are using existing structures both Army and Air real property, while others are housed in temporary quarters awaiting the construction of new buildings for them to occupy. One item that has been overlooked at the national level is to ensure adequate funding and therefore the necessary space to house all of the CST equipment inside. This problem is especially exacerbated in the northern states where winter weather is problematic. Inappropriate storage of analytical equipment and some reagents could potentially affect test results at a WMD incident site. These issues need to be addressed at the strategic level and incorporated into the CSTs’ capstone reference document.

The area of Facilities is rated amber overall.
CERTIFICATION

This special domain was included based on language contained in the NDAA for FY 1999. In part, it states, “A rapid assessment element team … may not be used to respond to an emergency … unless … the team … possesses the requisite skills, training and equipment to be proficient in all mission requirements.” The Act also required that “the proficiency of each team be certified by the Secretary of Defense.”

The DoD IG report further stated, “The certification criteria developed by the Army for WMD-CSTs were considerably less rigorous than Congress intended and simply not prudent from the standpoint of soldier safety and DoD credibility.” This was due in part to the accelerated development of the unit and the lack of doctrine publications, which was previously addressed.

The commander of the 52nd CST stated that there is currently no recertification process for the CSTs and considered this a potential drawback to unit readiness. However, the CSTs do undergo unit EXEVALs every 18 months to demonstrate their mission readiness. In order to bolster this area a “recertification” program should be implemented to ensure compliance with DoD standards and the original intent of the law. Also, once certified there is no system in place to “decertify” a CST, even if due to personnel turnover or equipment inadequacies, the team is no longer “proficient in all mission requirements.” This has potential safety ramifications if not properly addressed by leaders.

The area of Certification is amber overall.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To ensure the CSTs remain relevant and ready to the global war on terrorism a “thorough review of the WMD-CST initiative, including operational concept, doctrine, equipment, sustainment, personnel assignments and rotations, funding and the certification process,” should be undertaken as prescribed in the DoD IG report.

As part of this process, NGB should establish a Battle Lab and Combat Training Center for CSTs at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri to refine the certification process, develop and implement a rigorous recertification methodology, which includes measures of performance and associated performance levels, and test future operational concepts for the CSTs to employ. At a minimum, this should include agencies from all levels in the experimentation and testing to maximize the utility of CSTs as an early-entry force in support of the local incident commander. In addition Battle Lab Support Elements should be established at the National Guard’s Medical Company Training Sites (MCTS) to leverage existing capabilities and resources at Fort Indian
Town Gap, Pennsylvania and Camp Shelby, Mississippi. The MCTS have well established and vetted programs that currently prepare medical units for rotations at the National Training Center and Joint Readiness Training Center, which could be adapted for CST use.

Besides the suggestions proposed in the previous discussion and analysis the following items are also offered for further consideration and thought by domain.

Doctrine – A strategic-level working group should be established to draft a capstone reference document, which clearly articulates the philosophy, vision and way ahead for the Civil Support Teams. This is the foundation from which the CST program will continue to build upon, without it the CSTs will lack direction.

Organization – A review of the adequacy of the TDA is warranted based on FOCs and whether or not the unit should convert to a table of organization and equipment (TO&E) format. This is particularly important if the CSTs’ mission-set is expanded to include support of OCONUS combatant commanders or if the need arises to respond to an incident along the northern or southern US border. This would also require a statutory change due to the limitations currently placed on the civil support teams to respond to a domestic WMD incident only.

Training – While training with local first responders and incident commanders is vital and clearly must remain as a cornerstone of the program, NGB must also implement a more arduous joint collective training program that stresses sustained and continuous operations, and emphasizes standardization requirements between CSTs, other agencies, and sister military services, both active and reserve. This is particularly crucial in a 9/11-like incident, when catastrophic events occur near simultaneously and in multiple locations. This can be accomplished through a combination of virtual and simulated exercises, and to a lesser extent live exercises.

Leadership and Education - NGB should initiate a training program for export to proponent schoolhouses and the state’s regional training institutes that clearly articulate the CST program as it relates to the HLD/HLS mission for the National Guard in support of the Nation. This type of information should be become an integral part of the education system for NCOs and officers at all levels.

Materiel – The single most important factor besides standardization and interoperability of equipment is to have a streamlined and timely acquisition process that keeps pace with emerging technology, especially in computers and communications, and detection/diagnostic equipment for chemical and biological agents. In order to do this a “rapid fielding initiative” similar to what the Army currently uses to support troops in Afghanistan and Iraq should be
adopted, while not losing sight of the requirement for acquisition to remain capabilities based and utilize proper oversight where indicated, e.g., JPEO-CBD, for chem-bio equipment.

Personnel – Long-term, to sustain a viable recruiting and retention program for CST members a multi-specialty pay program should be implemented. This could be based on the various skills/level of expertise and certifications team members are required to maintain and number of years they “re-up” for to stay on the Civil Support Team. The Office of the Surgeon General has a well-run program for Army Medical Department officers that NGB could adopt as a model. Also another avenue to consider is the conversion of some of the survey section enlisted slots to warrant officer positions, thereby creating another opportunity to improve upward mobility and retention.

Facilities – The adequacy of buildings to store equipment and house personnel cannot be overlooked or allowed to slip in the funding process. Proper environmental controls must be in place to ensure safe storage of all major pieces of equipment and supporting chests, sets, kits and outfits. Facility designs should also be looked at from an operations and training perspective in order to maximize the CSTs’ efficiency, both pre- and post-deployment.

Certification – In addition to EXEVALs administered by the CONUSAs, NGB should implement a four or five year “recertification” program that would culminate in a multi-echelon CTC-like event at Fort Leonard Wood, one of the Guard’s MCTS, or other suitable location. This would be a proactive approach to the likelihood that responding to WMD incidents will become one of the primary capabilities submitted by combatant commanders as part of the biannual Strategic and Joint Planning Guidance.

**CONCLUSION**

The distance the Defense Department [National Guard Bureau] has traveled with regard to civil support over the last few years is exceptional. It typically takes the department about four years to bring a new unit into operation. The process for planning, staffing, training, developing doctrine, and testing and fielding new equipment is labor-intensive and time-consuming. But DoD [NGB] managed to conceive, develop and field the 10 civil support teams in less than 18 months. This is really remarkable, Cragin says.41

Indeed, it is remarkable what the National Guard has accomplished in a very short amount of time. They have successfully fielded and certified 32 of the 44 CSTs authorized by Congress in less than four years.

Based on the review and analysis of Army DOTLM-PF and Certification (see TABLE 5) the National Guard CSTs are currently ready to support local, state and federal officials in responding to a domestic WMD event.
TABLE 5. CST DOMAIN ASSESSMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Rating</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
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<td>Facilities</td>
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<td>Certification</td>
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</table>

They are a relevant and vital link in the global war on terrorism by building a bridge to civilian first responders and providing a coordinating authority that can facilitate communication between the local incident commander and officials elsewhere, provide on-site technical expertise, and expedite follow-on support from other state and federal agencies, including the military.\(^42\)

However, the challenge that remains is to sustain the CSTs’ readiness to ensure that they can continue to respond in the future. This will require applying some of the lessons learned and to continue those actions and best practices, which currently contribute to their readiness. Ultimately, the National Guard must grow and nurture a cadre of CST leaders who think strategically and innovatively at all levels of war. As evidenced by the recent biological attacks on the U.S. Congress, the global war on terrorism will continue into the unforeseen future and as an integral and crucial part of HLD/HLS, the Guard’s CSTs are indeed capable, relevant, and ready in support of the Nation.

WORD COUNT = 5,535
ENDNOTES


11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

14 National Guard Fact Sheet.


19 National Guard Fact Sheet.

20 Larson and Peters, p. 191.


23 Bogart.


26 Bogart.

27 Lieberman.
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