The Asia Pacific Rebalance: Tipping the Scale with Landpower

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Subject Terms:
Landpower, Shape, AirSea Battle, Engagement
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Abstract

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The Defense Strategic Guidance, published in January 2012, describes a rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region and provides implementation guidance. This guidance places high priority on relationships with allies and partners and directs relationship expansion throughout the theater. The AirSea Battle concept has ignited a debate on the role of landpower in the Asia-Pacific, as well as the Army's role in ASB. But the argument should not be “How can the Army get into the Pacific?” The Army is already there and has been for decades. ASB as a strategy, while a useful and necessary approach to portions of the Asia-Pacific security challenge, neglects the reality of partner nation defense establishments which are overwhelmingly dominated by land forces – both in sheer numbers and leadership. The majority of the Asia-Pacific security apparatus is land centric; therefore, landpower is critical to execute the guidance. This paper examines how landpower can be applied to build and strengthen relationships while keeping U.S. forces trained and ready, and the paper demonstrates why landpower could become a main effort in achieving desired end states.
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The Defense Strategic Guidance, published in January 2012, describes a rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region and provides implementation guidance. This guidance places high priority on relationships with allies and partners and directs relationship expansion throughout the theater. In addition, the guidance emphasizes building partner capacity and seeks to achieve these objectives through exercises and rotational units. While there are many rebalance options being debated, one prominent concept under consideration is Air-Sea Battle (ASB). This concept has ignited a debate on the role of landpower in the Asia-Pacific, as well as the Army's role in ASB. The argument should not be "How can the Army get into the Pacific?" The Army is already there and has been for decades. ASB as a strategy, while a useful and necessary approach to portions of the Asia-Pacific security challenge, neglects the reality of partner nation defense establishments which are overwhelmingly dominated by land forces – both in sheer numbers and leadership. The majority of the Asia-Pacific security apparatus is land centric; therefore, landpower is critical to execute the guidance. Through persistent engagement and forward presence, landpower can be applied in ways that build and strengthen relationships, keep U.S. forces trained and ready, and could become a main effort in achieving desired end states.

This paper examines how landpower can be applied to build and strengthen relationships while keeping U.S. forces trained and ready, and the paper will demonstrate why landpower could become a main effort in achieving desired end states. The structure of the paper is as follows: a brief background that describes the overarching guidance from the United States Government, Department of Defense, and
United States Pacific Command, from which U.S. Army Pacific strategy is derived and supports; an overview of the Pacific Theater that describes the current and future environments that must drive the strategy; an explanation of the United States Army and Army Pacific strategies; and a discussion of strategy enhancement options and recommendations.

Rebalancing Toward the Asia Pacific

The guidance to rebalance toward the Pacific, or “Pacific Pivot,” was not initially provided in any of the usual strategic guidance documents. The most recent National Security Strategy (published in May 2010), emphasizes engagement in general and engagement and cooperation with Asia specifically, but does not prioritize effort or resources toward the Pacific. Similarly, the most recent Department of State Strategic Plan provides priorities for East Asia and the Pacific, but there is no indication that these priorities have precedence over the priorities established for other regions (this plan was published by Secretary Rice under the Bush administration). Secretary Clinton, however, in a January 2010 speech at the East-West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii, outlined “the principles that will define America’s continued engagement and leadership in the region” and further expanded upon the U.S. strategy as she defined six key lines of action in a Foreign Policy article, “America’s Pacific Century.” Three of these lines of action – strengthening bilateral security alliances, deepening our working relationships with emerging powers, and forging a broad-based military presence – provide opportunities for the military to play a key role. The January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” recognizes this role and notes: “Accordingly, while the U.S. military will continue to
contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.”

The purpose of the rebalance and its implementation has been broadly debated within the U.S. and throughout the world. Many saw the rebalance as an effort to contain a rising China. The rise of the Air Sea Battle concept (an anti-access / aerial denial concept under development and well outlined by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment⁷) contributed to this suspicion.⁸ At the Shangri-La Security Dialogue in June of 2012 and again while visiting China in September of 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta sought to allay these fears and reduce tensions by describing a cooperative bilateral relationship as an essential part of the rebalance.⁹ ¹⁰ Yet the Air-Sea Battle debate continues. When it comes to the role of landpower within ASB, however, there should be no debate. The Department of Defense’s Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) document describes ASB: it is nested under the greater concept for how joint forces will approach opposed access environments. The document notes that these operations may require the projection of land forces for establishing access and/or for subsequent land operations.¹¹ As Peter J. Dean describes, “It should not be forgotten that Air-Sea Battle is all about the U.S. getting access to an operational area to achieve an effect. That effect is all about what happens on the land area of the littoral environment.”¹² He notes, “People live on land.” ¹³ Nevertheless, the continuing focus on the role of the Air Sea Battle concept within the Pacific risks distracting the Services and our allies and partners from the more important discussion of an overall military strategy for the Asia-Pacific. As Michael O’Hanlon and James Steinberg noted,
As a military concept, Air-Sea Battle reflects some needed rethinking in response to global changes in weaponry and military strategy in the Middle East and especially East Asia. The challenge for policymakers is not to discard it and replace it within something more seemingly benign but to place it within a broader security strategy for the Asia-Pacific region that preserves stability and protects U.S. interests without becoming unduly confrontational. 14

The Nature of the Pacific

Home to half of the world’s population and covering approximately half of the earth’s surface, the Asia-Pacific theater (as defined by the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR)), includes the world’s three largest economies and the world’s four most populous countries. Of the seven Mutual Defense Agreements that the U.S. is signatory to, five are in the Pacific. 15 As the USPACOM Commander, ADM Locklear, recently noted, “The Pacific Ocean itself is the largest physical feature on the planet. If all the world’s landmasses were placed in the Pacific, there would still be room left over for an additional Africa, Canada, United States, and Mexico.” 16 The ocean transits 50% of the world’s container cargo and 70% of the world’s ship borne energy, which leads some to describe the Pacific region as “water dominated.” 17 Focusing only on the vast ocean and sea borne commerce, however, discounts the reality that land forces dominate most of the militaries of the nations in the Pacific. Of the thirty-six resident nations, of which twenty-seven have militaries, the army is the largest force in twenty-six of them and twenty-one has Army officers as their Chief of Defense. In addition, the AOR is home to seven of the world’s ten largest armies. These characteristics make landpower an essential part of a successful engagement strategy. As noted in the USARPAC paper “Partnering in the Pacific,” “To build the most effective partnerships possible within this broad array of army-dominant forces, America’s Asia Pacific defense strategy must include a well-
resourced ground-centric dimension that is best postured to influence the often overlooked yet critical human domain.”

Strategy for the Asia-Pacific

U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific seeks to keep the region at peace. In remarks at the Von Der Heyden Fellows Program Endowment Lecture Series at Duke University, Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter described the U.S. goal for the Asia Pacific as maintaining the status quo: “We want to keep on keeping on.” He noted that the region has benefitted from peace and stability for 70 years. Roughly six months earlier, Secretary of Defense Panetta stated that the goal “is to work closely with all of the nations of this region to confront common challenges and to promote peace, prosperity, and security for all nations in the Asia-Pacific region.” Secretary Panetta described specific ongoing military efforts in support of this policy, which include relocating Marines from Okinawa to Guam, establishing a Marine and aircraft presence in Northern Australia, and deploying Littoral Combat ships to Singapore. The plan also includes a future rebalance of Naval vessels, which would adjust the Pacific / Atlantic balance from the current 50/50 to a future 60/40 ratio.

A region this diverse and critical to U.S. security strategy demands a comprehensive military strategy as well. Although major combat operations outside the Korean peninsula are considered unlikely in the Asia-Pacific for the next fifteen years, economic interests of the largest economies “will converge in the sea lanes and littoral areas of this region, increasing the already vital importance of mature security relationships, political stability, and the free flow of commerce in Asia.” Secretary Panetta stated, “The core of our rebalance is modernizing our existing network of alliances and security partnerships throughout the region and developing new security
Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, commander of United States Pacific Command, recently described the rebalance strategy in a 6 December address to the Asia Society in Washington DC. He noted that the military was only one part of the overall U.S. rebalance strategy which also includes policy, trade, and diplomacy. The strategy is based on collaboration and cooperation, not containment of China as some have suggested. This strategy is built upon strong relationships, designed to shape a security environment that maintains the peace and stability; however, it cannot be successfully executed solely from the air and sea. The 2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance notes, “Shaping is an enduring, daily requirement and is emerging as a core competency of the Army.” Relationships are built, strengthened, and maintained through human interaction, in the human domain, on land.

Secretary Panetta’s June 2012 speech declared that the Army will maintain a significant presence in Korea; however, the speech does not provide specific guidance for Army efforts in the Pacific.

The Army’s Role in the Asia-Pacific Rebalance

To help USPACOM achieve its goals, the United States Army Pacific developed a Theater Army Strategy that describes how USARPAC “demonstrates the potential for decisive land domain operations in the USPACOM AOR.” The strategy is based on four core tenets. The first tenet, “Trained and Ready Forces,” seeks to ensure that Soldiers are ready to operate anywhere within the AOR and to perform support functions to all USPACOM Service Components. “Persistent Engagement,” the second tenet of the strategy, aims to avert crises that demand military involvement through building relationships, maintaining open communication, and building partner capacity. Tenet three, “Agile Mission Command,” ensures USARPAC is prepared to provide an
adaptable mission command capability to the USPACOM Commander for the full range of potential military operations. The fourth tenet, “Forward Presence,” ensures that Army forces are in position to engage allies and partners while standing ready to respond to a contingency or crisis. Combined, these four tenets “build cooperative arrangements and capacity that facilitate access and mutually support the security aspect of stability. Our forward presence affirms U.S. commitment to the region while deterring aggression and optimizing response to contingencies or threats.”

From these four tenets USARPAC derived six Lines of Effort: Protect, Prepare, Shape, Posture, Sustain, and Care. Figure 1 depicts how USARPAC’s Strategy
links the USARPAC Commanding General Vision to Theater Army Endstates through these four tenets and six Lines of Effort.

To ensure proper oversight is maintained on all Lines of Effort, LTG Francis J. Wiercinski, the USARPAC Commanding General, assigned a two-star general to each LOE, except Shape. Shape activities, which consist primarily of exercises and engagements, are designed to build trust and confidence in U.S. allies and partners and demonstrate U.S. commitment to security and stability in the theater. As the “partner of choice” in the region, the Army’s relationship with the militaries of our partners and allies is an essential component of maintaining their trust and confidence. Demonstrating the importance of Shape, he identified the Shape LOE as the Theater Army’s main effort and personally retained oversight. The USARPAC Theater Army Strategy Summary underscores the unique capabilities that the Army can provide. “Land components in the majority of AOR countries are not only the largest service by far, but usually the most politically influential….Our Asia-Pacific alliances and partnerships, forged during peace and war to form the bedrock of regional security cooperation, provide a means to leverage the wellspring of trust, confidence, access, and influence accumulated through decades of Army engagement.”

A strategy for building and maintaining strong relationships in the Asia-Pacific must include an approach that recognizes the differences in partner capabilities and desires; each bilateral relationship must be considered individually. To guide the development of bilateral goals, USARPAC has identified five categories of country partnerships under the Shape LOE. These categories – Assure, Promote, Enhance, Open, and Sustain – are not designed to permanently label a country partnership as
one type or another, but rather to help focus efforts and resources towards meeting bilateral goals that help maintain security and stability within the theater. As relationships develop or change over time, a country partnership may be reclassified into another category. The categories and priority of effort are captured in the chart at figure 2.\(^{32}\)

![US Army Pacific Theater Engagement and Partnership Design](image)

**Figure 2. USARPAC Engagement and Partnership Design for Shape.**\(^{33}\)

Comprising the main effort of Shape activities, the Assure and Promote categories have the highest priority and receive a larger dedication of resources. Assure, formally defined as “Assure Allies and Partners,” places the highest priority on partnerships with the five defense treaty allies in the Pacific (Australia, Japan, Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand). Exercises and engagements with Assure partners focus on increasing interoperability of land forces at the tactical and operational level. Countries that fall in the Promote category (“Promote Regional Leadership”) desire to increase their
leadership role in the region (if this desire is in a way that is consistent with U.S. goals). Exercises and engagements with Promote countries focus on increasing their ability to take on a leadership role in multinational response to crises (such as Peacekeeping Operations or Humanitarian / Disaster Relief). Countries not designated as Assure or Promote fall into one of three supporting effort categories: Enhance, Open or Sustain. Enhance (“Enhance Critical Capabilities”) efforts focus on countries with limited ability to operate outside their borders. USARPAC Enhance activities strive to increase partners’ ability to participate in multilateral operations such as PKO or HADR to battalion level. When policy constrains the defense activities that are permitted with a country, the country is categorized in the Open category (“Open New Relationships”). Typical activities include senior leader dialogue and subject matter expert exchanges, but these activities must first be approved by USPACOM or OSD. The final grouping of countries is Sustain (“Sustain Traditional Relationships”). Given a constrained resource operating environment, Sustain activities strive to maintain positive relationships and access to countries with limited ability to contribute to regional security. In total, these five categories provide a framework for executing a strategy to support USARPAC’s main effort and help achieve the nation’s strategic objective of maintaining security and stability through stronger relationships throughout the Asia-Pacific.

The combination of strategic emphasis on the Pacific and the reduction of force commitments to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan presents an opportunity to reinforce this strategy through a number of ways, without building new bases or increasing assigned forces. According to LTG Wiercinski, “People want to call it a pivot, a shift, a rebalance. I call it a refocus. They ask what I get from the shift. It’s not what we’re
getting. It’s what we’re getting back. It’s what the PACOM commander is getting back. For the past 11 years he hasn’t had his Army, while they were committed to operations in CENTCOM, and rightfully so. But now we are back.39 The forces that are going back to the Pacific possess years of experience in security cooperation activities and partner capacity building. They also know how to build and strengthen relationships through cultural understanding, transparency, and mutual trust.

The following sections propose a number of options for strategy enhancement: expanding ongoing engagement and exercise activities, focusing efforts to increase access and grow relationships with rising powers, opening relationships with countries where activities have previously been limited by sanctions or policy, and capitalizing on the developing regional alignment of forces (RAF) concept by further aligning forces to specific regions within the theater and developing a personnel assignment mechanism that preferentially assigns those with specific theater experience into units with similar focus and alignment.

Strategy Enhancement Options

Protect the Expansion of Security Cooperation

The more we can do on engagement, the better. It is easy to say no on email, when you do not know someone. But it is much tougher face to face, especially when you have a relationship that has been built over time through personal interaction. These relationships are a critical component of staying in Phase 0.36

Given the relatively inexpensive nature of exercises and engagements and the long term value of strengthening relationships and developing partner capacity, funding for Shape activities should be treated as an inexpensive investment that will help avoid more expensive conflicts in the future. Funding for security cooperation activities has already been significantly expanded in future funding cycles. In Fiscal Year 2012,
USARPAC conducted 177 Theater Security Cooperation Events (consisting of activities such as exercises, subject matter expert exchanges, bilateral defense talks, and other events) with 20 different nations at a cost of $22.6 million. In terms of defense spending, this is a small number, especially considering the costs of overseas contingency operations and the benefit of strengthened relationships.\textsuperscript{37} POM 13-17

Funding for Shape Activities (MDEP XISQ) for USARPAC provides $72.6 million, while POM 14-18 provides $142 million, an increase of $69.5 million that nearly doubled the funding allocated across the POM.\textsuperscript{38} However, in a time of budget deficits and defense budget reductions, there is potential for this funding to be cut or reduced. The funding must be protected.

Exercises and engagement activities, when compared to the incredible cost of combat operations, are inexpensive and contribute to the readiness posture of U.S. forces. But even exercise costs could be reduced by expanding the number and locations of pre-positioned equipment in the Pacific. Due to the huge distances that must be traversed to participate in an exercise, transportation costs comprise a large percentage of the overall cost. In recent USARPAC exercises the cost of transportation averaged nearly 50%, but was much higher with Yudh Abhyas 12 in India where transportation costs were 89% of the total cost of the exercise. Pre-positioning equipment could dramatically reduce the cost of an exercise, as equipment transportation comprises the majority of the overall transportation cost. Pre-positioning also will decrease response time for operations such as Humanitarian Assistance or Disaster Relief.\textsuperscript{39}

**Expanded SCP focused on building relationships with rising powers**

Historically, security cooperation activities in the Pacific have focused primarily on
treaty allies (Australia, Japan, Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand) and have comprised a majority of funding and major exercises.\textsuperscript{40} This focus was understandable with more limited resources available for security cooperation and the critical importance of our relationships with them. These countries continue to be major contributors to security and stability in the region, and our relationships must be maintained through the sustainment of the strategy of persistent engagement and military exercises.\textsuperscript{41} In fact, the USPACOM theater engagement strategy focuses on strengthening the alliances. According to ADM Locklear, “These alliances are historic, and they underpin our strategy in the region. We are going to put more time and effort into making sure that those relationships are built for the future.”\textsuperscript{42}

Our allies know we are there, and we will continue to be there for them in the future. However, as security cooperation activity expands, the majority of the added resources should be applied in areas that have experienced less engagement in the past, especially with countries whose growing economies portend a greater presence and involvement in the Asia-Pacific of the future. For example, the region is home to China, India, and Indonesia, three rising powers whose importance in the Pacific is growing and with whom the U.S. military has not had a strong relationship over the past years. “These countries are going to be critical in the future, and we have an entire generation of officers who don’t know us, they know something else, because we haven’t been there….it is incredibly important to build relationships with them, and it starts with engagement and building trust, and then exercises, but it is all about personal contact.”\textsuperscript{43} LTG Wiercinski notes that officers of these nations’ armies must know who Americans really are. They won’t get that information from “books, rumors,
or media.\textsuperscript{44}

A country with a rapidly growing economy, Indonesia is becoming an “increasingly important contributor to regional security.”\textsuperscript{45} Since 2008 the United States military’s relationship has steadily improved with Indonesia through cooperation in areas such as maritime security, counterterrorism, and disaster relief.\textsuperscript{46} An expanded security cooperation program that increases engagement and exercises will continue to strengthen this relationship. Like Indonesia, India’s growing economy will almost certainly lead to an expansion of its regional importance and influence. According to ADM Locklear, “Building a strong military relationship with India builds an understanding and deepens established ties that will contribute to the larger Asia-Pacific region.”\textsuperscript{47} He further notes, however, that while maritime cooperation between the U.S. and India was “quite productive,” there are opportunities to expand cooperation in other areas such as counterterrorism and disaster response.\textsuperscript{48}

The opportunity to strengthen military ties with rising powers such as India and Indonesia are too important to neglect. There is, however, no more important rising power relationship than the U.S. relationship with China. According to Secretary Panetta, “China’s rise has brought millions out of poverty and helped make the world a more prosperous place. I believe that it can also make the world a more secure place, if we work together to build an enduring foundation of military to military relations between the United States and China.”\textsuperscript{49} Recent military cooperation exercises such as a U.S.-China counter-piracy exercise last fall\textsuperscript{50} and engagements at senior levels of the military have begun to build this foundation. In addition, USARPAC recently conducted a disaster management exercise with China. According to LTG Wiercinski, “The exercise
was a great example of going forward on things that are critically important to all of us, where we are going to need cooperation, and allows us to build relationships and engage in order to maintain Phase 0 that is critical out here."\textsuperscript{51} Exercises that are focused on areas in which both sides agree, such as disaster management and counter-piracy, are a great way to build a relationship and increase transparency so that more difficult subjects are less difficult to approach. An Asia-Pacific strategy of cooperation and collaboration with an expanded security cooperation program must include a deliberate effort to enhance relations with rising powers whose influence will increase over the coming years. No relationship is more important than the one with China.

**Opening relationships with countries currently or previously sanctioned by US Policy**

Recent expansion of security cooperation activities and resources provides an opportunity to expand the U.S. military’s relationship with the major rising powers of the Asia-Pacific. Similarly, there are opportunities to increase military interaction with a number of other countries that have previously been restricted by policy. Consider Burma. The U.S. recently sent a delegation to explore opportunities to open relationships in an area that has had virtually no interaction with the U.S. for years. The USARPAC Commander, LTG Wiercinski, was part of this human rights dialogue and was the first U.S. Army general officer to visit Burma in nearly twenty-five years. Having no U.S. military contact for such a long period of time has created a generation of officers that do not have an understanding of or relationship with the U.S. military. This risks opening a void or creating a gap that can be filled by relationships with another country, in a way that may not be consistent with the national security interests of the United States. Of course, any military activity of this kind must be consistent with U.S.
policy and laws and synchronized with the efforts of the Department of State and other U.S. government agencies. Nevertheless, the rebalance provides an opportunity to begin establishing a relationship through future engagement and exercises as authorized by appropriate authority. It is better to maintain a relationship at some level, rather than having to restart a relationship and to avoid creating another generation of leaders that do not know us.52

Aligning the Force to Execute the Strategy

A critical part of building relationships is developing a deep understanding of the partner nation, which includes an understanding of culture and history and the partner’s historical relationships with other nations. The Pacific is so expansive and so diverse; it is not possible for a military organization to effectively engage and develop constructive relationships with every nation in the theater. Recognizing a need to focus their forces on specific regions, USARPAC is implementing a system, the Regional Partnership Program, that regionally aligns general officer-level headquarters with specific partners throughout the Pacific theater. The program is designed to “leverage increased unit and senior leader availability to enhance, expand, and synchronize Shape engagements at the tactical and individual levels.”53 Under this program, I Corps is directed to focus on the U.S. treaty allies (Japan, Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia). The 25th Infantry Division has primacy for engagements in the remainder of Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Vietnam), as well as Australia and New Zealand. United States Army Alaska focuses on India, Nepal and Mongolia, while Eighth Army remains focused on the Republic of Korea. By focusing these major headquarters on specific regions, USARPAC will be able to “build unit, individual, and senior leader
relationships with partner nations through increased presence, familiarization, credibility, confidence, and trust through the Human Domain.\textsuperscript{54}

The return of the traditionally Pacific-focused units are not the only forces available to execute the engagement strategy. Additional allocated forces, Regionally Aligned Forces, are designed to meet the requirements of the Combatant Commanders for security cooperation and contingency response. According to the 2013 Army Strategic Planning Guidance, these missions “require some understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed.”\textsuperscript{55}

The Regional Partnership Program and Regionally Aligned Forces aim to facilitate building and maintaining relationships through the creation of habitual partnerships and to provide focus for developing a cultural understanding of a specific nation. And although all units remain available for employment throughout the theater for contingency response or participation in exercises, their focus on a specific sub-region or nation will improve their ability to prepare by learning about history, language, and culture. The reality, however, is that the individuals in these units will continue to rotate to other assignments. Over time the institutional knowledge gained through engagements and exercises will erode. To maximize the effect of regional partnership and regional alignment this erosion should be minimized. Lengthening the duration of assignments to a unit would be one approach, but this would be difficult due to professional development requirements (assignments, schooling) and other Army needs. A better approach would be a policy of preferential return assignments, in which an officer or non-commissioned officer is reassigned to regionally focused units where
he or she has experience. According to *Foreign Policy* the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey, wants to develop a program for Asia that is modeled after certain aspects of the Af-Pak Hands program, which sought to develop institutional knowledge through education and experience of a cadre of NCOs and officers.\textsuperscript{56} The details of the program have not been announced; however, when this program is implemented, it should include preferential return assignments to help avoid the erosion of gains made through previous engagements and exercises. Although it will not always be possible, it is important to maximize the benefits of returning an experienced individual, especially at the critical senior command levels.\textsuperscript{57}

**Synchronizing the Effort**

Although the rebalance brings added focus and resources to the U.S. efforts in the Asia-Pacific, increased engagement and activities risk overwhelming the ability of partner nations to participate. Each country in the Pacific is different; each has different needs and wants for security cooperation. A successful approach must consider the desire and capabilities of the partner nation and the pace at which that nation can participate in relationship building activity. If not coordinated and synchronized across the services and within the services, allies and partners may view U.S. efforts with suspicion. LTG Wiercinski notes, "It is essential that we are speaking with one voice. Otherwise we cannot hope to build the trust and confidence we need to be successful building a strong relationship."\textsuperscript{58}

Historically, U.S. Pacific Command has not placed great emphasis on detailed synchronization of engagement activities. Instead, they have relied on service components to plan and execute activities based upon broad guidance.\textsuperscript{59} Although USPACOM J4 is designated lead for Theater Security Cooperation Program
coordination, the Combatant Command simply does not have the time and resources to conduct detailed synchronization of land component security cooperation activities. The expansion of security cooperation as part of the rebalance demands greater synchronization, and the strategy would benefit from designating a lead agent for land component synchronization. The logical choice for lead agent is USARPAC due to the elevation of the USARPAC Commanding General to a four-star position (effective mid-2013). USARPAC, as the predominant land force in the Pacific, should lead the synchronization effort and incorporate U.S. Marine activities as well and State Partnership Program activities in a way that coordinates all efforts without overwhelming other nations. This designation should not be perceived as an effort to shut out the Marines. The U.S. Marine Corps possesses capabilities that the Army cannot replicate and are in high demand from Pacific militaries. As LTG Wiercinski notes, “The Pacific is such a huge area of responsibility, there is plenty enough to do for all services and every aspect of every service.”

Conclusion

The Pacific Rebalance recognizes the growing importance of maintaining security and stability in a region whose influence on global economic and security affairs is likely to increase over time. A whole of government U.S. strategy is required, blending Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic efforts. Landpower can make a significant contribution to the Department of Defense’s supporting role. The USARPAC strategy well supports this strategy and should be expanded as part of the rebalance. While the military must always be prepared for conflict in defense of America’s national interests, the Army in the Pacific is optimally positioned to provide a major contribution to achieving desired strategic end states due to the nature of Pacific militaries. The
increased funding for security cooperation and increased availability of Army forces in the Pacific provides an opportunity to build and strengthen relationships with rising powers and to open relationships with other important countries where military interaction has been limited by U.S. policy in a way that supports continued security and stability without detracting from our commitment to our treaty allies. Landpowers’ ability to engage in the human domain will help maintain security and stability in a theater at peace. It will also maintain and strengthen relationships through engagements and exercises which will be a cost far less expensive, both in dollars and blood.

Endnotes


11 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operational Access Concept, (Washington, DC: US. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 17, 2012), 4-6.


13 Ibid.


17 Ibid.

18 The USARPAC Staff, “Partnering in the Pacific,” 2.


28 Ibid, 3.


33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 LTG Frank Wiercinski, telephone interview by author, December 28th, 2012.

36 Ibid.

37 LTC John Lee, “America’s Army in the Pacific, Shaping the Asia-Pacific Theater, Brief for the Army Security Cooperation Planners Course.”


LTC Lee, “America’s Army in the Pacific, Shaping the Asia-Pacific Theater, Brief for the Army Security Cooperation Planners Course.”

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58 Ibid.

59 Personal observation and experience as well as Mr. Tim Conway, USPACOM J35, interview by author, December 11, 2012.

60 LTG Frank Wiercinski, telephone interview by author, December 28, 2012.