INDIA-CHINA RIVALRY AND STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR BANGLADESH

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Strategic Studies

by

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India-China Rivalry and Strategic Options for Bangladesh

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This research explores the India-China relations. Historically, China and India have a long legacy of rivalry. Despite the current mutual economic cooperation, India and China failed to resolve their territorial disputes in the last 65 years. This research endeavors to predict the future relationship of India and China. The research finds that India and China are likely to come into conflict in the future.

This research also identifies that amid India-China rivalry, Bangladesh lacks sustainable strategic foreign policy options to secure her national interests. After analyzing different strategic options, the research recommends that ‘flexible and transparent non-alignment’ is the most suitable strategic option for Bangladesh.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

INDIA-CHINA RIVALRY AND STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR BANGLADESH, by Major S M Naimul Haque, psc, 89 pages.

Bangladesh is a small state of South Asia. Like any other small states, Bangladesh also strives to maintain her most two important security interests, those are: territorial integrity, and political independence. Since its independence in 1971, Bangladesh has had disputes with India over land and maritime boundaries, and river water sharing. The political independence is threatened by the inclination of two major political parties either towards India or China and Pakistan. Thus, the threats to Bangladesh’s security interests depend on the security environment of the region which, mostly, depends on the India-China relations.

This research explores the India-China relations. Historically, China and India have a long legacy of rivalry. Despite the current mutual economic cooperation, India and China failed to resolve their territorial disputes in the last 65 years. This research endeavors to predict the future relationship of India and China. The research finds that India and China are likely to come into conflict in the future.

The research also identifies that amid India-China rivalry, Bangladesh lacks sustainable strategic foreign policy options to secure her national interests. After analyzing different strategic options, the research recommends that ‘flexible and transparent non-alignment’ is the most suitable strategic option for Bangladesh.
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ACRONYMS

BAL Bangladesh Awami League
BNP Bangladesh National Party
PLA Peoples Liberation Army
PLAAF Peoples Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN Peoples Liberation Army Navy
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
USA United States of America
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
TABLES

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Background

Though Bangladesh has the sixth largest population of the world, in land area, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and per capita income it reflects all the characteristics of a small state of South Asia (Maniruzzaman 1982). Amongst other indicators of small state status, Bangladesh is highly dependent on foreign aid, has a subsidiary foreign policy, has widespread poverty, and lacks a mature political culture. Geographically, Bangladesh is surrounded by India on three sides and also has a short land boundary with Myanmar (Burma). According to Kautilya, an Indian strategist, all countries with contiguous land boundaries should consider one another as enemies (Rangarajan 2000). Though debatable, the overbearing attitude of India with small states like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal reflects this Kautilyan strategy. Historically, Bangladesh faces basically two broad external threats from India: a threat to territory and a threat to political independence (Buzan and Rizvi 1986). Specific aspects of these threats include, but are not necessarily limited to, a military threat along the borders, diplomatic manipulation, and political subversion. Since its independence in 1971, Bangladesh has had disputes with India over land and maritime boundaries, and river water sharing. Numerous treaties and joint committees were formed at various levels to resolve these disputes. However, arguably, due to the hegemonic attitude of India, the disputes remained unresolved.

Two of Bangladesh’s regional neighbors, China and India, also have a long legacy of rivalry (Buzan and Rizvi 1986). An analyst observed that Sun Tzu, the founder of
Chinese strategy, also devised a similar concept to Kautilya’s in identifying friends and foes. Since the independence of India in 1947, China and India fought a limited war which was followed by two skirmishes. The war was fought in 1962 due to the dispute over land boundaries. Over the same dispute, these two countries had local skirmishes in 1967 and 1987. Present state of India-China relation is dominated by nascent economic interdependence whereas the border dispute remained unresolved. Dominance over Indian Ocean surfaced as a new form of dispute between these two countries.

The spillover effect of this rivalry impacts the regional small states. Though India is the hegemon in South Asia, as regional security is transforming, China is trying to increase its influence over the small states of South Asia (Buzan and Rizvi 1986). Since Sino-India war of 1962, China has been successful in entering the India’s sphere of influence by establishing good relations with the India’s neighbors (Wei 2007). For obvious reason, India remains suspicious about the relations between China and her neighboring small states. Thus, the future trends of the India-China relations, both political and military, and its impact on Bangladesh merit a serious analysis. The impact of India-China relations on Bangladesh has political connotation too.

During its War of Liberation against Pakistan in 1971, India helped the country because the Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) (one of the two major political parties) had an ideology similar to that of the Indian Congress Party (the then Indian ruling party). On 15 August, 1975, a few Bangladeshi army officers assassinated the father of the nation, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founder of BAL. Later, Zia-ur-Rahman built a political party called the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) which won the election and ruled the country. After 1975, India looked away from Bangladesh. Zia-ur-Rahman
requested assistance from China that responded quickly and assisted Bangladesh. Since then, Bangladesh has very good bi-lateral relations with China. As such, many of the Indian politicians view BNP as pro-Pakistani supported by China (Gupta 1983). After independence, one of these two parties has formed the government, except for two terms of the parliament. The changes in the parliament caused a change in India-Bangladesh relations. Changes of government in the Indian Parliament have also influenced this relationship.

With this complex political and security situation, Bangladesh lacks a sustainable strategy. It is assumed that with the rapid growth of both India and China, the strategic context of South Asia is likely to be more volatile. As such, Bangladeshi policy makers have to be very careful about the selection of their strategy to secure the interests of the country. It is necessary for Bangladesh to analyze the regional security environment focusing, especially, on the complexity of China-India relations. As a next step, Bangladesh must formulate suitable strategic options which will promote the interest of the nation, rather than the interest of the political parties.

The Research Questions

The purpose of this research is to formulate and discuss options for Bangladesh amid the China-India rivalry in South Asia. To analyze the aforementioned problem, the research will address one primary question–What are the options available for Bangladesh amid the China-India rivalry in the South Asia? As the primary question is not sufficient by itself to focus on the entire gamut of the problem, the research pursues two subsidiary questions: (1) what is the background and future of China-India rivalry in
South Asia? And, (2) what are the options and implications of the options for Bangladesh?

**Assumptions**

International relations are dynamic. Thus, this problem may take a completely different course within a short span of time. However, this thesis is an analysis of a triangular relationship. Thus, a few assumptions are necessary to carry out the research. These are: (1) India and China will maintain their existing strategic behavior, (2) regarding its impact on South Asia the world, largely, will remain unchanged (3) there is no change in the influence and strategy of the global super power concerning the three countries under discussion, and (4) Bangladesh did not formulate any strategic options. For the purpose of this research, the assumptions are considered to be valid till June 2013.

**Limitations**

Due to the nature of the subject matter, the related information is quite sensitive. So, the researcher does not have access to some key primary documents related to Bangladesh, India and Chinese strategies. Thus, the researcher will rely on the secondary information published in various books and monographs. Considering the nature of the subject, it is necessary to limit the study to two aspects: the security of small states and issues related to China-India rivalry. Though security of small states depends on both internal and external threats to a country, for the purpose of the research, only the external threats will be considered. To be more specific, the security of the territorial boundary and maintaining the political independence will be the focal points. As well,
China and India have a number of issues. This study will only address those relations between India and China which are relevant to their future relations from the security perspective. Those economic issues will only be drawn which have security implications.

**Significance of the Study**

Considering the present complex security environment in South Asia, it is a need for Bangladesh to analyze the future regional environment concerning China-India relations and to formulate policy options. This research will present and analyze options (alliance, neutrality, and non-alignment) for Bangladeshi policy maker to consider. Having provided further breadth and depth to the subject, this research may offer options for Bangladesh which it has long needed.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to review the contemporary literature related to the topic of this thesis to identify the areas which need to be addressed. As stated before the thesis is, broadly, divided into two parts: the trends of India-China relations and options for Bangladesh in relation to India-China relations. In this regard, relevant books will be reviewed to identify contemporary thoughts on India-China relations and options for Bangladesh, as well as to identify the areas which need further attention. Based on the two major parts of the thesis, the literature review is also divided into two parts. The first part of the literature review will focus on contemporary literature concerning India-China relations. The second part will emphasize options for Bangladesh Foreign Policy. Each part of the review will be followed by the researcher’s comments, identifying areas of analysis which need further elaboration or areas which were not addressed in previous analyses.

Literature Related to the Trends in India-China Relations

A good number of books and monographs have been written on China-India relations. Most of the literature treats the history of India-China relations similarly. Though there are differences as to what constitutes contentious issues between these two countries, as a whole the literature provides, if not complete, a substantial list of the problematic issues. Most of the literature skims on predictions about the future of India-China relations. However, with this paucity of prediction in mind, the contemporary
thoughts on the historical, current, and future trends of India-China relations are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

Bhawna Pokharna, in his book *India-China Relations: Dimensions and Perspectives*, 2009, gives a good account of the relations between these two countries, identifies that, historically, border disputes are the main security issue between these two countries. These border disputes led to a war in 1962 and skirmishes in 1967 and 1987. He also notes the exchange of cultural and religious representatives between these two countries during the ancient and medieval eras. Jonathan Holslag in *China and India: Prospects for Peace*, 2010, gives a historical background for these two countries from a security perspective, starting from the independence of India in 1947. He also identifies border disputes as the main issue between the two countries. In addition, he notes the disputes between these two countries over the domination of the Indian Ocean which Pokharna did not mention. While discussing the Indian Ocean issue, he emphasizes the strategic importance of Bangladesh to both the countries from a geographical point of view. Again, unlike Pokharna, Holslag focuses on the history of economic interdependence between India and China. He relates that both the countries have been involved in the competition and cooperation of bi-lateral trade for the last two decades. To emphasize their economic cooperation, he introduces the term *Chindia*. He notes there had been more cooperation than conflicts between these two countries over economic issues. The researcher will address the history of India-China relations in more depth in chapter 4 of this paper. Bearing this glimpse of history, what is the present state of relations between India and China?
About the present state of relations between India and China, T.V. Paul in *South Asia’s Weak States: Understanding the Regional Insecurity Predicament*, 2010, states that following the Sino-India war of 1962, China’s strategy in the South Asia has focused on the containment and encirclement of India through cooperation and alliances with the neighboring countries. This analysis is one of the cornerstones for this study. In another work on the present state of India-China relations, Holslag conducted surveys to reveal the perceptions of the general masses, think tanks, and political leaders of these two countries concerning each other. His surveys indicate a general unease, shared across these groups, about the interdependence between these two countries. He notes this unease is not likely to change soon. About regional security issues, he relates that both China and India have refrained from any sort of cooperation.

Another portrayal of current relations between India and China can be found in George J. Gilboy’s and Eric Heginbotham’s book, *Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior: Growing Power and Alarm*, 2012. Gilboy and Heginbotham make an empirical comparison of Chinese and Indian strategic behavior. The authors compare the behavior over four variables: strategic culture, foreign policy and use of force, military modernization, and economic strategies. The authors opine the strategic cultures of these two countries are quite similar based on, mostly, the military context. China has a history of using force to gain and maintain her interests. The authors also note the same attitude in India’s strategic behavior. In contradiction to many Indian writers, Gilboy and Heginbotham suggest that from 1980 to 2001 both the countries used force for the same number of incidents. After achieving territorial advantages, in a few occasions, China requested India for negotiation. Naturally, India did not come to the terms as the proposal
was disadvantageous for her. About military spending, both the countries have an uptrend in the spending. Of late, both the countries are emphasizing offensive doctrine. India relies on preemptive attack more than China. Pokharna, in contrast, argues that India has been always more defensive concerning security issues related to China than China has been with such issues related to India, despite the fact that India conducted its second nuclear test to deter China. Gilboy and Heginbotham further state both the countries are modernizing their militaries, each in view of a perceived threat from the other. On the economic side, both the countries are striving hard to develop their economies. Though India’s bi-lateral trade with US is one tenth that of China, she has bi-lateral trade disputes with the US similar to those between the US and China. Both states are focusing on the energy resources of rogue states.

Rollie Lal analyzes the present state of India-China relations from a national interest perspective in her book, *Understanding China and India: Security Implications for the United States and the World*, 2006. She points out that understanding the national interest of a country is important to predict that country’s future behavior. China’s primary interest, she explains, is to maintain territorial integrity; while India’s primary interest is independence in decision making within the international system. Growing their economies is another national interest for both the countries. Both the countries adopted socialist ideas but implemented those ideas differently. Both Chinese and Indian strategies emphasize force projection and offensive action. She notes, however, that China modernized her defense forces in order to maintain the unity of state, but India’s forces have no such role. However, later she explains that both India and China are modernizing their defenses to increase national strength with a view to protecting their
respective national interests. Finally, she argues that democracy in India augurs well for the survival of the nation, whereas communism is a weakness for the China.

Though not exhaustively, all the above-mentioned writers, except Pokharna, make comments on the future of India-China relations. He only suggested that both the countries should cooperate with each other to maintain a sustainable regional peace. Holslag predicts competition between these two countries is likely to increase day by day, and though he also concludes neither India nor China are in an arms race at this time, he thinks it likely their ongoing competitions will soon include an arms race. Further, he concludes that economic cooperation cannot nullify a security confrontation. Finally he notes that, gradually, China is penetrating the influence zone of India in South Asia, which may increase the security tensions in the region. Gilboy and Heginbotham predict that India’s ambition, supported by the US, may increase regional security tensions in South Asia. Rollie Lal has a more mixed perception about the future of India-China relations. On the one hand, she is optimistic about the positive trend of India-China relations. On the other hand, she also expresses a fear that instability in the South Asia will increase if the relationship between these two countries worsens.

After analyzing the above literature a few conclusions can be drawn. There was a great degree of agreement among the writers about the history of India-China relationship, and the present bi-lateral relationship is characterized by mainly economic cooperation. The writers also agree neither of the countries made any effort to resolve security-related issues like border disputes and competition to dominate the Indian Ocean. All the writers except Pokharna make scanty predictions about the future of India-
China relations, yet none of them validate their conclusions through any theoretical framework. The researcher will exploit this research gap.

**Literature Related to Options for Bangladesh Amid India-China Rivalry**

Options for Bangladesh will depend on the strategic context set by the major actors of the South Asian region. For the purpose of this research, India and China are the major actors; the strategic context in South Asia is, mostly, set by the relations between these two countries. Only one book has been written on the triangular relations among India-Bangladesh-China. A few books have been written on the relations of India and Bangladesh, and no book has been written on the relations between China and Bangladesh. However, while analyzing the security environment of South Asia, a few of the writers pay a little attention to the Bangladesh-China relation. In this part of the literature review, contemporary thoughts regarding the history of Bangladesh-India relations and Bangladesh-China relations, the strategic context of the South Asia, and options for Bangladesh will be reviewed to identify areas that need attention.

As stated before, Suchita Ghosh in her book *China-Bangladesh-India Triangle  Today: towards A Solution?*, 1996, attempts to analyze the triangular relationship among these three countries. She gives a historical account of Bangladesh-India-China relations since the independence of Bangladesh in 1971. She notes that India helped Bangladesh during its war of liberation against Pakistan (then West Pakistan). She also mentions that China under Mao Zedong condemned the Bangladesh’s war of liberation until 1975. Then, China developed a good relationship with Bangladesh which was reflected by China providing aid to the war-torn country, supporting the reorganization of
Bangladesh’s armed forces, and also contributing to various infrastructure development projects in Bangladesh. Most of the reviewed literature provides similar information about the history of India-Bangladesh-China relation. Given this little historical counts, it is now important to review the literatures related to the strategic context relevant for this study.

To explain the strategic context of South Asia, Paul notes after the cold war the superpower rivalry had terminated but, regional wars and conflicts had surfaced in various regions of the world, of which South Asia is the most volatile. According to Paul, due to the prolonged colonial rule most of the countries of South Asia are yet to be matured socially and politically. He expands that colonial countries suffer from nationalistic problems because nation existed before the states. At the same time, British’s divide and rule policies reinforced the traditional fractions, classes, and clans in the countries of South Asia. Due to the same reason, in general, practice of bureaucracy also did not develop in these countries. As a result, sometimes, elites and influential leaders are found to be more powerful than the government machineries. As the nation was created before the state, the nation will always challenge the state powers and influence the decision making of the state. He also postulated that external major power can exploit the weaknesses of the regional system.

Paul notes that India is one of the most important factors of South Asia’s regional security environment. Paul explains that due to the giant size and the ambition of India to become the regional hegemon, its small neighbors are always anxious about its intentions and thus try to balance against India by getting close with the extra-regional powers. Following the Sino-India War, China has been exploiting this weakness by adopting a
strategy of containing and encircling India by cooperating and allying with the India’s neighbors. As such India has been always suspicious about the intent of its neighbors. Jaynta Kumar Ray and Muntassir Mamoon in their book *India-Bangladesh Relations: Current Perspectives*, 2011 note that India always looks towards the major powers and neglects her smaller neighbors which negatively impacts relations with those neighbors. Ghosh notes the good relations with China of those neighbors creates a huge repercussions in India. She also notes that, after the Cold War, China’s strategy towards South Asia has been to curb India’s expansionism within the region. Within this volatile strategic context, what is the state of India-Bangladesh relations?

The Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) has organized three Bangladesh-India Dialogues for Young Leaders in the last few years during which young politicians and scholars from both the countries were invited to discuss various issues related to the India-Bangladesh relationship. The last meeting was held in January 2006. The proceedings of the meeting were edited by Farooq Sobhan and published as a book, titled *Bangladesh-India Dialogue: Vision of Young Leaders*, 2006. The book provides a contemporary insight into India-Bangladesh relations. The book identifies the contending issues between India and Bangladesh, which include: disputes over boundaries and enclaves, disputes on river water sharing, push back of migrants from India to Bangladesh, India’s characterization of Bangladesh as a fundamentalist country, and India’s claim that Bangladesh provides supports to the Indian insurgents in the northeast of India.

The book mentions that India encircles Bangladesh not only geographically but also in terms of culture and the inter-state rivers. He also notes that despite a promise of
improved relations resulting from the conference by the heads of states during media interviews there was no significant improvement of relations. Every month, there are incidents related to the killing of Bangladeshis, involved in smuggling or illegal border crossing, by the Indian Border Security Forces (BSF). He reports that between July 2000 and April 2005, 387 Bangladeshis were killed in the bordering areas. India showed a hegemonic attitude over a disputed island which she occupied and established a naval base in the 1980s. He also notes that India is constructing a fence along the border which contradicts agreements, named border guidelines, signed between these two countries in 1975. There are also two major agreements over river water sharing: one was signed in 1974 and the other in 1996. India has not abided by these agreements. Further, India is planning a project to divert the water of Brahmaputra River towards its southeastern region which will deprive Bangladesh of water during its dry season. He mentions that owing to the support from one of the major political parties, India influences the domestic politics of Bangladesh. Ghosh also agrees with Sobhan’s opinion.

Ray and Mamoon also note the India’s influence on the domestic politics of Bangladesh. They mention the BAL is seen as pro-Indian whereas the BNP is seen as anti-Indian. The authors explain, historically, the Congress Party of India supports the BAL and other Indian political parties support the BNP. To illustrate the influence of India on Bangladesh’s domestic policy they offer two significant instances as evidence. Before the election of 2001, when the BNP promised to promote Indian interest, India supported BNP to come to the power. As well, before the election of 2009, several Indian ministers publicly declared they would like to see a secular political party comes to the power in Bangladesh; the secular BAL won and formed a government. Sobhan also
mentions that the BNP capitalizes on the people’s anti-India perceptions during its
election campaigns.

About those perceptions Sobhan further emphasizes that over the issues related to
border disputes and river water sharing, Bangladeshis believe that India always
undermine Bangladesh’s key security interests. Very often, the Indian analysts, without
any sustainable facts, portray Bangladesh as an Islamic fundamentalist country or as a
near “failed state” in the national and international media. This, only, makes Bangladesh
more suspicious about the intention of India and deepens the existing mistrust. In this
connection Ray and Mamoon recall that after the surrender of Pakistan military, India
took all the equipment and never provided replacements which it promised to Bangladesh
Army. This created a negative perception about India in Bangladesh’s armed forces. On
the contrary, after 1975, India supported the insurgents of Bangladesh to create unrest in
the country until BAL came to the power in 1996. The counter insurgency operations
caused huge casualties on Bangladesh Army which also affected the perception of
Bangladesh Army towards India. They also note that just after the killing of the leader of
BAL, India initiated 1300 border clashes over two years from 1975 to 1977 where 56
Bangladeshi citizens were killed by Indian border security forces which affected the
perception of general mass regarding India. India’s effort to create instability in
Bangladesh was also referred to by Paul.

Paul mentions that India assisted the insurgents of Bangladesh with weapon and
training facilities. The Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the external intelligence
organization of India, has its wide spread network throughout Bangladesh. Besides,
Indian insurgents disrupt the domestic security situation of Bangladesh. India’s torture of
its minority Muslims creates ethnical unrest in Bangladesh. Even, India tries to push the
Bangla speaking Muslims from the eastern part of the country into Bangladesh by
claiming they are illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.

Paul mentions that, economically, South Asia is the least integrated and
cooporative region in the world. Since 1990, India and China have become more
interdependent but their continuing cooperation cannot be taken for granted, because
trade and security represent separate dynamics. He further notes India remains suspicious
about China-Bangladesh cooperation. Though India is trying to gain global recognition,
thus her foreign policy, but she had been always weary about the threats from its
neighboring states. As such, Indian foreign policies have not emphasized cordial relations
with its neighboring states. Instead, India seemed to prefer force over diplomacy to settle
disputes with those neighbors. David M Malone in his book, Does the Elephant Dance?
Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy, 2011, suggests India should maintain good
relations with Bangladesh by resolving the border and water sharing disputes to secure its
security interests over its north-eastern part.

Ghosh also declares India should recognize and understand the strategic
importance of Bangladesh for India. She notes Bangladesh has been used by Pakistan,
and China in the past to destabilize the north-eastern region of India. She also suggests
that Bangladesh needs to maintain good relations with other major powers to secure her
interest from India. Sobhan also warns that a lack of cooperation between India and
Bangladesh may create a situation for China to exploit Bangladesh’s geographical
advantage against India. The dialogue held in BEI suggests both countries create a Joint
Parliamentary Committee which will evaluate disputes and suggest mitigating measures.
The dialogue also notes that the political leaders have to play the major role to improve the relations. The dialogue further addresses that, in the past, Bangladesh’s foreign policy was dominated by the “India factor” whereas India always looked away from Bangladesh which frustrates the policy makers of Bangladesh. The dialogue recognizes that India failed to realize that if it wants to be global, a friendly relation with Bangladesh is a sine qua non.

About foreign policies of India and Bangladesh, Ray and Mamoon note that Bangladesh’s foreign policy towards India and India’s foreign policy towards Bangladesh have been inconsistent due to the paradigms of policy makers in each country. India has no cordial policy about its neighbors. The foreign policy has, always, been dependent on India’s interests. To improve relations with Bangladesh, India should avoid involvement in the domestic politics of Bangladesh. Ray and Mamoon suggests that India should develop good relations with Bangladesh because it can become the gateway for China to claim Arunachal Pradesh of India which China has desired for a long time (recently more vociferously). They indicate that in various diplomatic meetings, India expresses its hegemonic attitude which is a major barrier to the amicable solutions of the disputes. Likewise, Sobhan identifies Bangladesh also does not have any strategy to meet its national interest. He suggests Bangladesh should formulate a coherent strategy to protect her interests and security. Paul accentuates that the strength and security of the small states are largely dependent on the effective leadership. Poor leadership can degrade the domestic power of a country as occurred in Pakistan, Nigeria, and Equatorial Guinea. Bangladesh has a strong political structure but it suffers from weak leadership. Sobhan further suggests that both India and Bangladesh should strengthen their bi-lateral
relationship through media exchange, educational exchange, joint projects, and cultural exchange. Besides, bi-lateral steps, various writers also note the positive influence of regional cooperation in South Asia on stability in the region.

Paul views cooperation in South Asia as seriously hampered due to the absence of strong norms and institutions within the system. As a result, South Asia is one of the least cooperative regions of the world. Sobhan argues that though the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was formed to address regional disputes, it rarely has proved effective. Ray and Mamoon note both SAARC and the UN have failed to resolve the land, maritime, and river-water sharing disputes between Bangladesh and India due to the influence of India on the international system. They mention that once Bangladesh raised the issue to UN but later, Bangladesh had to withdraw the complaint due to India’s promise of solving the issue at the regional level but this never came to pass.

From the aforementioned review of the literature, it can be concluded that most of the writers have noted an uneasy relation between India and Bangladesh. They explain that Bangladesh’s territorial integrity and political sovereignty have been significantly impacted by India. Based on these issues, the relation between India and Bangladesh is full of distrust and suspicion which is further exacerbated by China’s cooperation with Bangladesh. A few of the writers also note that neither regional nor international institutions have made any tangible progress in resolving these disputes. Contemporary writers, for the most part, suggest bi-lateral approaches to solve these issues. However, none of the writers have elaborated any specific policy options for Bangladesh. The researcher agrees with a few and argues with a few of the conclusions of these contemporary writers.
The researcher agrees that the strategic environment is complex in South Asia as narrated by Paul. He also accepts that SAARC could not make any visible success in stabilizing the strategic environment of South Asia which has been noted by a few contemporary writers. The researcher argues against the claims of a few writers who, narrowly, view India as a threat to the security of Bangladesh. India will attempt to protect her interests like any other state. Logically, she is likely be more comfortable with a political party in Bangladesh who supports India’s interests, will not accept any illegal incursions through shared borders, and will be suspicious of any insurgent’s sanctuary in the inaccessible north-eastern part of Bangladesh. A few of the writers suggest bi-lateral means for improving the relation between Bangladesh and India. The researcher argues that bi-lateral steps may improve the relations between Bangladesh and India but are not a permanent means of insuring the security of Bangladesh. Rather, Bangladesh needs to formulate strategic options to secure her security interests instead of playing a blame game. Here lies the significance of this research.

Conclusions

From the reviewed literature about India-China relations, it can be concluded that economic cooperation between China and India is progressing. However, they have not resolved significant security issues. About the future trends of these security relations, contemporary writers have not made any conclusive predictions, though, in general, they seem to expect future trends to remain similar to those evident at present. Nor did the writers use any theoretical framework to predict the future relations between China and India. This research will attempt to use theoretical framework to predict the future of India-China relationship based on the contemporary theories about international relations.
and regional security. The theoretical framework will be discussed in chapter 3 (methodology).

From the reviewed literature on options for Bangladesh, the researcher argues with the contemporary writers, mostly, who have blamed India for undermining the security of Bangladesh and suggested bi-lateral means for improving the relation. The researcher believes that Bangladesh has to stop the blame game and focus on developing policy options to secure her national interests amid any type of strategic environment. As such, this research will identify the likely options for Bangladesh, in the context of the India-China rivalry, based on contemporary thoughts about the security of small states. The framework for developing options for Bangladesh will be discussed in chapter 3 (methodology).
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Before starting with the research methodology, again, the primary and secondary research questions are: What are the options available for Bangladesh amid the China-India rivalry in the South Asia? (primary); (1) what is the background and future of China-India rivalry in the South Asia? (secondary) and, (2) what are the options and implications of the options for Bangladesh? (secondary). The responses to secondary questions will address the primary question. Based on the secondary questions, the research is, broadly, divided into two parts: background and future of India-China relations and options for Bangladesh amid the India-China rivalry. As such, the methodology is also divided into two parts. First part will focus on the methodology for the background and future of India-China relation. Second part will discuss the methodology for evolving the options for Bangladesh.

Methodology for the Analysis of India-China Relations

Chapter 4 of this paper will focus on the background and future of India-China relations. Background of China-India relations will be discussed based on the contemporary literatures on the history of the relations between these two countries. Future relations will be predicted at the end of the chapter 4. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the contemporary literatures did not use any theoretical framework for analyzing the future trend of the relationship between India and China. This part of the
methodology will construct the framework for predicting the relations between India and China whether they will cooperate or conflict.

Geoffrey Blainey identified seven factors in his book *The Causes of War* (1989), those are: the military strength of the states concerned, as well as their abilities to apply those military capabilities; the views of other nation about the perceived conflicts; the overall perception the nations’ peoples have of each other; the previous history of wars; the ideologies of the states in question; the economic condition of each country and their ability to sustain the war efforts; and the personalities of and paradigms held by the decision makers. Blainey in his book states that any of these factors can cause war or conflicts or peace.

**Methodology for Identifying the Options for Bangladesh**

As mentioned in the previous chapter, contemporary literature does not provide any substantial options for Bangladesh to secure its national security interests which are: territorial integrity and political independence. This research will attempt to formulate policy options for Bangladesh amid the India-China rivalry in chapter 5. This part of the methodology will give out the framework for formulating the policy options and implications of those options for Bangladesh. Initially, the historical relations between Bangladesh and India, and Bangladesh and China will be portrayed based on the contemporary literatures. Finally, the policy options and implications will be analyzed. To identify appropriate framework for policy options, it is important to review the contemporary thoughts on the options for a small state.

Talukder Maniruzzaman (1982), a theorist on security of small states, in his book *The Security of Small States in the Third World* states that small states have two options:
He further argues that a small state cannot just claim to be neutral; rather, it has to meet a few criteria to be neutral. He outlines three criteria: avoiding any war, including avoiding any policy with another nation state which may lead to war, a location that is strategically advantageous for the major powers, and a strong military capable of maintaining territorial integrity. Another option for the small state is to follow a non-alignment. Unlike neutrality, the non-alignment allows a state to participate in the international politics while avoiding a pact with any of major powers which may lead to war. To adopt any of the options, a balance of power is a pre-requisite condition in the region. A balance of power among major states is the most suitable condition for the security of small states. Small states are normally threatened by their neighboring major powers. Weak states together will not be able to form an alliance against major power due to the cost of the war. So, the small states tend to form alliances with major powers.

He also notes that there is a great risk for any third-world country which forms an alliance with a major power because the latter may not assure absolute security for the former. Historically, major powers only support small states until their interests are met. There are two major issues with a small state forming an alliance with a major power: unreliability of the alliance, and the threat the major power poses to the small state’s internal politics. A country with lesser strategic and geographical significance than a major power suffers from the first type of problem. On the other hand, a small state having a border with a major power suffers from the second type of threat. Autonomy in external relations and taking no action which poses a threat to the giant neighbor while
maintaining an effective defense force could be an effective way of executing non-alignment option (Rickli 2008).

Stephen M. Walt in his paper Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning proposes that in a complex security environment, a small state may either balance or bandwagon (Walt n.d). Balancing means alliance with the weaker side and bandwagoning means alliance with the greater power. Balancing is most favorable because the neighbor state of a great power feels insecure. On the other hand when there is no chance of balancing, the weaker state is compelled to bandwagon. States may change preference during the course of a war (Walt n.d).

Paul Sutton (1993) in his monograph “Lilliput under threats: The Security Problem of Small Island and Enclave Developing States” suggests that a small state has four options: neutrality, non-alignment, alliance with a major power, and collective security through international organizations. Sutton further mentions that neutrality is not a viable option for the small state because it is difficult to sustain. He prefers non-alignment instead of neutrality. However, non-alignment is also quite unsustainable for small states. He argues that small states may form two types of alliance, either with one of the great powers or with other small states. Alliance with other small states, usually, does not contribute much in the regional setting. On the contrary, formal alliance with a major power may produce hostilities from other major powers in the region. He suggests that informal alliance with big powers offer the best merits for small states. This allows small states to enjoy freedom and at the same time leverage the advantages of the informal alliance. Among the four options, Sutton suggests that collective security through international organization is another effective option. With regard to this last
point, though in many cases the UN has successfully supported international security, in some cases with regard to the interests of small states, it has not been as successful, yet the UN remains the only alternative open to the small states.

Michael Handel (1990) in his book *Weak States in the International System* uses small states and weak states synonymously. He argues that in an international system a small state may find itself in different international or regional situation. In one situation, the small state can be completely excluded from the international system by the regional hegemon. In this situation, the small states become so dependent that it cannot practice decision making without the consent of the hegemon. In time of need, it also cannot ask help from the international system.

From the above discussions, it can be summarized that a small state has, broadly, three options to secure its security interests: alliance, neutrality, and non-alignment. Options for Bangladesh will be analyzed through these three options. The options will be analyzed to identify the advantages and disadvantages from Bangladesh’s perspective to recommend the suitable option.

**Conclusions**

In summary, this chapter discusses the methodology of the research. The main discussion of the research is divided into two parts: background and future of India-China relations and option for Bangladesh. Background and future of India-China relations will be discussed in chapter 4 whereas options for Bangladesh will be discussed in chapter 5.

In chapter 4, initially, the history of India-China relations will be discussed. Finally, the trend of the relations will be predicted through Blainey’s model.
In chapter 5, initially, the history of Bangladesh-India and Bangladesh-China will be portrayed. Finally, three options will be analyzed: alliance (with the other small states of South Asia, superpower, India, and China), neutrality, and non-alignment. Finally, the chapter would endeavor to recommend the most suitable option for Bangladesh.
CHAPTER 4
PREDICTION OF INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS-CONFLICTS OR COOPERATION?

Introduction

As stated, briefly, in chapter 2, the future trends of India-China relation are important for selecting strategic options for Bangladesh. This chapter endeavors to predict future trends for India-China relations. It is not possible to predict the exact future of inter-state relations. But a probability of the trends may be postulated using a few theoretical frameworks. As stated in chapter 3, the author will use Blainey’s model as a theoretical framework. While doing so, this chapter deals with the first secondary question of the research: what are the trends for India-China relations in the future? It is to be noted that in addition to the security aspects, relevant economic issues will be addressed. This chapter, initially, provides a brief history of India-China relations, followed by predictions of future relations through Blainey’s model.

Brief History of India-China Relationship: From Ancient time to Present

China and India are the two oldest civilization of Asia. Interactions between these two Asian giants have a long history, unearthing of which is not the purpose of the paper. This part will give only a brief history of India-China relation relevant for this study. Their historical relationship is a mix of cooperation and conflict.

Besides the present economic cooperation, China and India had cultural interaction at the beginning of the Christian era. Buddhism spread to China from India. Chinese scholars came to the universities of India, namely, the universities of Nalanda and Taxilla. However, these interactions stopped when Muslims conquered India in the
tenth CE. Since then their history is mostly dominated by conflicts, particularly, during the 20th century. The reasons for the conflicts are the strategic behavior of both the countries, disputes over lands, and the ambition of China.

The strategic behavior of both the countries is a major cause of conflict and competition. Both the Chinese and the Indians have similar strategic concepts which date back two thousand years. “Arthashastra” by Kautilya and “Art of War” by Sun Tzu are seminal works of Indian and Chinese strategies respectively. Both countries consider their immediate neighbors as potential enemies, perhaps owing to, in the Indian case, the Kautilyan concept of “mandala of circles”—which posits that any territory is menaced by a bordering territory—and, in the Chinese case, a similar idea of “concentric circles” by Sun Tzu (Malik 2009). As both the countries share common boundaries, the institution of Kautilyan and Sun Tzu influenced strategies has kept them in conflict. Particularly, China has been more aggressive in executing the Sun Tzu’s strategy against India. On the other hand, India executed the Kautilya strategy with a few neighboring small countries. Immediately after independence in 1947, India was, rather, cooperative with China. China did not reciprocate the same.

Though Jawaharlal Nehru dreamt of world leadership in the Asia, combining China and India, as opposed to the West, Chinese policy makers have always believed the old Chinese proverb of two tigers cannot live in the same mountain (Meredith 2008). After the end of colonial rule in the Indian sub continent in 1947, China reinvigorated the Sun Tzu’s strategy and expanded westwards and occupied Tibet in 1959. However, the border disputes between India and China fermented immediately after the annexation of Tibet by China.
As per the McMahan line (the British-drawn border between India and China) Aksai Chin, the northwestern part of India, and Arunachal Pradesh, northeastern part of India, are part of India. But China claims these two areas as part of its territory. After annexing Tibet, China started building road in Aksai Chin. Being suspicious of the neighbor’s intentions, India started patrolling and established outposts on the north of the McMahan line (Cohen 2001) in the Aksai Chin area. Ultimately, this led to a limited war in 1962 between the two countries, followed by armed skirmishes in 1967 and 1987. During 1962, China took control of Aksai Chin.

From that point forward, India has asked for the return of Aksai Chin, and China has maintained its claim over Arunachal Pradesh. A series of diplomatic dialogues have taken place between these two countries since 1981, concluding in the signing of treaties in 1993 and 1996; neither treaty lasted for long. Increased incursions by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into India’s Arunachal Pradesh in 2005 undermined the agreements (Holslag 2010). At the same time, the Chinese demand for Tawang and India’s demand for Kailash-Mansarovar from a religious point of view add fuel to the border disputes. Twang is a district in the northwest part of Arunachal Pradesh in India which is the birth place of sixth Dalai Lama and also holds a large Buddhist Monastery with an eight-meter tall sculpture of Buddha. Mount Kailash-Mansarovar is located in Tibet. In the Hindu tradition, it is the place where the lord Shiva (the destroyer of ignorance and illusion) meditated with his wife Parvati. Thousands of Hindu pilgrims visit this sacred place all year, every year.

Another reason for conflict and competition between these two countries are their ambitions. Historically, each of these civilizations has thought itself to be the strongest
China was the world’s superpower (Malik). Side by side, under the Guptas (320-550 CE) and Mughals (1526-1857), India’s cultural, economic and military powers were significant (Rowland 1968).

China wants its hegemony in Asia to be unchallenged. China sees India as the single gravest threat to achieving its goal. Therefore China has kept the border disputes alive to exploit the weaknesses of India, using Arunachal Pradesh as a bargaining chip while creating pressure through Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. China has initiated good ties with India’s South Asian neighbors with whom India has security concerns. The recent Chinese policy of trying to assert dominance over the Indian Ocean has added fuel to the enflamed relations between these two countries.

Such Chinese strategic behavior antagonized the Indians. As a key result, India developed nuclear weapons to deter China, not Pakistan, in 1998. Preceding the nuclear test the then-Indian defense minister George Fernandes expressed India’s concern about Chinese military activities in Tibet and its alliances with Pakistan and Myanmar and recognized China as India’s biggest potential threat (Lal 2006). India sees Chinese influence in the small states of South Asian region as greatly injurious to her national interests (from a Kautilyan perspective).

Predictions of India-China Relations through Blainey’s Model

Of late, China and India co-operate each other across economic sectors. Despite this cooperation and interdependence, the border dispute has remained unresolved for sixty-five years. With this backdrop, this part of the paper will endeavor to predict future
India-China relations based on Blainey’s model. As stated in chapter 3, Blainey (1989) identified seven factors for his titular model in *The Causes of War*, which are: the military strength of the states concerned, as well as their abilities to apply those military capabilities; the views of each nation about the perceived conflicts; the overall perception the nations’ peoples have of each other; the previous history of wars; the ideologies of the states in question; the economic condition of each country and their ability to sustain the war efforts; and the personalities of and paradigms of the decision makers. Blainey states that any of these factors can cause conflicts, war or peace.

The first factor of Blainey’s model is military strength and capability. The military strength and capabilities of China and India will be analyzed in terms of defense budgets, military doctrines, and their respective military modernization efforts. Both China and India have large defense budgets. The defense spending of these two countries, per the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), are shown below (see table 1).
Table 1. Defense Spending of China and India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>China (in million USD)</th>
<th>India (in million USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>52832</td>
<td>28528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>57390</td>
<td>29165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>63560</td>
<td>33879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>71496</td>
<td>36054</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>84021</td>
<td>36225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>96906</td>
<td>36664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>106774</td>
<td>41585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>128869</td>
<td>48963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>134467</td>
<td>49159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>146154</td>
<td>49634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>157603</td>
<td>48255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>166107</td>
<td>46125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the last 12 years, China has consistently increased its defense spending. Except during 2012 and 2013, India has also consistently increased its defense spending. Both the countries have expansive budgets for defense. So, both the countries are prepared to and will able to bear the cost of a war.

Both countries are also changing their doctrines significantly. There was a paradigm shift in Chinese strategy after 1999. Before 1999, Chinese strategy was defensive which was designed to attrite an invader by use of a layered defense in both land and maritime theaters. *The Science of Campaign* published by China’s Academy of Military Sciences in 1999 emphasizes that Chinese military operations should be offensive (Blasko 2006). This document also indicates initiative should be the core of military operations in general and of air campaigns in particular. The air force should gain the initiative at the outset of hostilities and maintain the initiative throughout.
Defensive operations should be a last resort. Defense, if necessary, should be aggressive whether it is a mobile defense or an area defense. While planning area defense, there should be options for launching multiple counter attacks. Based on this doctrine, China also changed the organization of its ground forces. Ground forces were reorganized into small task forces which are highly mobile and capable of independent operations with optimum use of information systems.

The Chinese military is also emphasizing joint operations. The PLA is conducting frequent joint training with People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) (Blasko). The exercises focus on seizing the initiative through offensive operations. This change in doctrine extends to the PLAN too.

Previously the Chinese Navy relied on coastal defense but now the navy is shifting its focus to defense in depth. The PLAN has formulated a two islands chain operations doctrine (Cole 2001). The first islands chain runs along the Aleutians, Kuriles, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The second islands chain starts from the Kurile Islands and Japan, then runs through the Bonin, Mariana, and Caroline Islands in the east. PLAN plans to build this capability by 2020. It also plans to develop a “blue water navy” by 2050. China has already started constructing deep sea ports in Myanmar and completed the construction in Pakistan and is planning one in Bangladesh to increase the reach of PLAN and ensure its presence in the Indian Ocean. China has developed submarines which can launch missiles when submerged.

The Chinese Air Force, PLAAF, has also developed a more offense-oriented doctrine. The PLAAF is building capabilities to conduct joint offensive campaigns in the vicinity of China’s mainland with more capable aircraft. The PLAAF is also in the
process of adopting a strategy of independent air operations. It emphasizes offensive both at operational and tactical levels to achieve surprise, and seize and maintain initiatives. PLAAF relies on overwhelming air superiority over a limited geographical space for a specific time instead of total air superiority. They think that it will allow them to concentrate combat power at the decisive points. PLAAF is also developing its doctrine of “air deterrence” and “air blockade” (Blasko).

China’s nuclear doctrine emphasizes on no first use but maintain lean and effective nuclear capabilities. The lean means that they will have a small number of weapons. But effective means those should be able to sustain the first attack and remain capable of launching precisely and accurately.

China is developing space and counter space capabilities. There is little officially published on space operations of China. It is assumed that the Chinese do not want to disclose this aspect of their doctrine at length.

In a whole, the new Chinese doctrine, after 1999, emphasizes short but intense battles, or wars along the land and maritime borders. It also integrates joint operations into the planning along with electronic warfare. The new 1999 doctrine is based on a concept known as “offense as a defense.” China emphasizes seizing the initiative just prior to the hostilities, which can otherwise be described as a preemptive attack (Holslag 2010).

Like China, Indian military doctrine has also gone through changes or reviews and is in the process of changes. Following the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, Indian political leaders wanted to quickly deploy the military along the borders with Pakistan to deter Pakistan from supporting Islamic extremist operations in
India. But the military failed to deploy rapidly. The army also failed to mobilize its forces quickly during 1999 Kargil War (Lal 2006). Thus, in 2004, the Indian military adopted a doctrine called “Cold Start” (Ladwig 2008). The concept emphasizes that the military should be capable of launching offensive operations from the beginning of a war with little or no mobilization. That is, the military should be able to launch preemptive attacks on the enemy. Previous Indian military doctrine emphasized attacking deep into enemy territory and to destroy the enemy advance as far back as possible. But the new concept emphasizes the Indian military seizing key geographical terrain before the enemy can react to the situation; the terrain can then be used as a bargaining chip.

The new doctrine says that Indian Army should be organized into eight “integrated battle-group” which will remain deployed in their respective launching areas. The battle groups should be able to launch simultaneous offensives independently along multiple axes. This doctrine will provide three advantages: first, it will focus on the destruction of enemy forces; second, the Indian military will be so rapidly positioned within enemy territory that the enemy will not have the time to launch a nuclear attack; and, third, the Indian military will be able to achieve limited success before international institutions get involved in the conflicts. It is evident that, like PLA, the Indian Army also emphasizes the offensive. At the strategic level, they emphasize preemption and deception (Indian Army Doctrine Part 1 2004).

The Indian Army puts greater emphasize on joint operations too. Joint operations are planned to surprise the enemy and to break the cohesion of the enemy by destroying his logistics, and command and control capabilities at the beginning of the hostilities. The
Indian military conducted a thirty-day exercise in 2007 to test the feasibility of its new doctrine (The Nation 2007).

With regard to the Indian Navy, India believes the dominance of the Indian Ocean is their right. As such, the Naval Doctrine of India mostly focuses on the domination of the Indian Ocean (Bedi 2005). The 2004 Maritime Doctrine of India included an analysis purporting most of the countries in Asia, and particularly China, are strengthening their naval capabilities. So, the doctrine emphasizes strike capabilities in India’s maritime areas, which rely on aircraft carrier forces. In 2007, India published another Indian Maritime Military Strategy. This strategy calls for a shift of doctrine from defensive to offensive and from reactive to proactive (Pokharna 2009). The strategy focuses on power projection; India’s interest in the littorals of the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf and the South China Sea; and strike capabilities. This strategy also notes India’s need for sea-based nuclear capabilities.

After the Kargil War in 1999, the Indian Air Force also revised its doctrine to include an emphasis on joint operations. The Indian Air Force had preferred independent air operations. It emphasized deep strike and air interdiction more than close air support. Preemption and surprise were the two main elements of its air campaigns. The new doctrine developed in 2009 emphasizes the offensive and preemption. The new doctrine also highlights the capacity building for out of area operations which stretches from the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Strait.

India’s nuclear doctrine includes the principles of maximum credible deterrent and no-first use. A former member of Indian National Security Advisory Board recommended that India should have nuclear weapon which can reach the USA. Another
Indian strategist K. Subahmanyam and the former Chief of Staff of Indian Army General K. Sundarji expressed that India should have a nuclear capability to deter the USA and to prevent the USA from interfering in regional issues like the Kashmir crisis (Gilboy and Heginbotham 2012). In addition to increasing defense budgets and the development of new doctrines, both the countries are in a race over modernizing their forces.

India acquired its first aircraft carrier in 1961, while China got its first carrier in 2011 from Russia. From 1980 to 1995, India was the largest arms importer in the world, the total value of which was 65 billion USD. During that period China was the fifth largest arms importer in the world, with imports valued at 33 billion USD. From 1995 to 2010, China was the largest arms importer in the world, with imports valued at 29.7 billion USD. India followed China with an import of 26.9 billion. In 2012, India again became the largest conventional arms importer of Asia followed by China (SIPRI).

Both countries have similar histories of arms import in the past as well. In 1950 and 1960, China imported huge quantity of arms from the Soviet Union, which dropped between 1960 and 1970 due to the strained relation between China and the Soviet Union. China started its arms import again following the Gulf War of 1991 and the Taiwan crisis in 1995. On the other hand, India’s arms imports were low in the 1950s and 1960s, but increased after the 1962 war with China, with this increase continuing up to 1990. India imported the lion share of its arms from the Soviet Union.

Both the countries have also imported similar types of weapons and armaments. Both China and India have imported aircraft, warships, and missiles. Besides weapon systems, both the countries import jet aircraft engines, avionics, and advanced communication technologies. Based on their new doctrines of preemption and offense
they are increasing their force projection and strike capabilities over all three dimensions: land, air and sea (Holslag 2010).

From the above discussions, it is evident that there is a trend of competition about enhancing of military capabilities between these two Asian giants. The uptick in defense spending indicates both countries may be able to sustain their defense efforts even after compromising budgets for social programs. Both India and China have adopted a preemptive doctrine which is characterized by the offensive. Emphasis on joint warfare by both the countries shows they are enhancing capabilities to apply their military strength. In a nut shell, based on the above mentioned analyses of India and China using Blainey’s first factor (the military strength of the states concerned and their ability to apply those capabilities), it can be concluded that future of India-China relations are likely to be more confrontational from the security perspective.

The second factor of Blainey’s model is the perception of other nations concerning the conflict between the two states concerned. Except for Pakistan, no South Asian small state will want a war between China and India, because the economies of most of the countries depend on China. Pakistan may take advantage of an India-China conflict to annex the entire Kashmir region. The National Security Strategy of the USA emphasizes the desirability of stability in Asia. In this regard, the USA and other Western countries are not likely to support any conflict between India and China. For India, a weakness is that China has influence over countries peripheral to India including, Nepal and Myanmar, while the position of Bangladesh will depend on the political party in power. So, India has to carefully weigh the decision of getting involved in a war. For China, the major concern will be that India’s war effort is likely to be supported by the
western countries. On the other hand, China’s strength is that it can create uncertainty in the decision cycle of India by creating volatile situations through Nepal, Myanmar, and Pakistan. Thus, apparently, if Indian and Chinese policy makers make an in-depth cost-benefit analysis they should not get involved in a war. In a nutshell, based on the above-mentioned analyses of India and China using Blainey’s second factor (views of other nations about the conflicts between the states concerned), it can be concluded that India and China are not likely to engage in a war.

The third factor of Blainey’s model concerns is the perceptions of people of each country about one another. Despite the deep economic ties between these two countries, both peoples’ perceptions about the other are not positive. In 2006, the Chicago Council of Global Affairs conducted a survey with over six thousand samples from the Indian and Chinese population to gauge their responses about the economic cooperation between the two countries. Responding to a question of whether it is good for them when the neighbor gains economically, of the Chinese surveyed, 56 percent replied positively, while 26 percent replied negatively (Holslag 2010). Indians, on the other hand, responded positively and negatively to the same question with 39 percent and 46 percent respectively. In responding to another question related to the gaining of military power by its neighbors, 60 percent of Chinese view it negatively whereas, 40 percent saw it positively. In India, 46 percent and 39 percent saw it negatively and positively respectively (Holslag 2010).

Holslag, an Asia analyst, conducted a review of the writings of ten leading scholars from each country to evaluate their perceptions. He examined the perceptions of
those twenty scholars regarding their discourses about seven questions. The summary of his findings is shown in the table below (see table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is neighbor a threat to the energy security?</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is neighbor a threat to national trade interest?</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is neighbor a Military challenger?</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the neighbor a threat to regional influence?</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is neighbor a threat to the security of the border?</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is neighbor a future competitor in the international affairs?</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is neighbor a current competitor in the international affairs?</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author.

From the above data, it can be concluded that most of the scholars from each country view the other country as a threat or competitor. Holslag also conducted interviews with a few scholars from India and China. Alka Acharya, the head of East Asia studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, commenting on the China-India relations, has stated, though there is scope for cooperation, there is also significant mistrust and a lack of confidence among Indian policy makers concerning China’s foreign policy. Brahma Chellaney, a member of the prime minister’s Policy Advisory Group, compared China’s lecturing on the values of openness with an Al Capone instruction on law and order. A Chinese India expert mentioned that there is a lack of trust and confidence
between these two countries. Other Chinese scholars have expressed their suspicion about the rapid modernization of the Indian military and the expansion of its naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Over the Tawang issue the Chinese think tanks believe that India should return the Tawang to China. Chellanney also mentioned that Chinese control over Tibet could result in the diversion of the upper stream water of the Brahmaputra River by the Chinese, which could give birth to a water war. A few Chinese strategists see the development of Indian naval facilities in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and India joining multinational patrols supported by the USA in the Malacca strait as a threat to China. These strategists believe a cold war structure is developing in which the USA is continuing a proxy war and India is trying to take the advantages out of it.

About economic cooperation, most of the Indian experts believe that Indian economy will be overwhelmed by the Chinese. While China is interested in a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with India, Indian experts are not. Indian specialists think that China draws more benefit from cooperation, because much the of raw material for the Chinese industries goes from or through India, which keeps Chinese industries functioning, creates jobs for the Chinese and strengthens their export earnings (Holslag 2010). From the analysis of survey data, it can be concluded that the general populations, scholars, and think tanks of each country bear negative perceptions about one another. In a nutshell, based on above mentioned analyses of India and China using Blainey’s third factor (popular perceptions of the countries concerning one another), it can be concluded that future India-China relations are likely to be more confrontational both from the security and economic perspectives.
Blainey’s fourth factor is the experience of countries in previous wars. China and India fought a war in 1962. India had the bitter experience of losing in that war which significantly undermined its national prestige. India also has grievances concerning a kind of proxy war by China through its support for Pakistan’s war efforts and its support of Indian insurgents. Though China may claim the victory in the 1962 war, it also counts as a defeat the war between Pakistan, India and Bangladesh in 1971, during which China supported Pakistan’s war efforts (Milam 2009). Thus, both countries have grievances from their experiences in previous wars. Based on Blainey’s fourth factor, it can be concluded that future India-China relations are likely to be more confrontational.

Blainey’s fifth factor is the ideology of the states concerned. This factor has a similarity with the present day’s democratic peace theory which states that democracies do not fight each other. Per this factor, China and India are likely to conflict in the future because India is a democratic country while China is communist. The view, based on this theory, is that the USA is supporting India but criticizing China because of the aforementioned ideological orientations. The USA views India’s modernization of force as positive for the security of Asia but China’s modernization as negative (Gillboy and Heginbotham 2012). This will encourage India to strengthen its military might further which will generate more suspicion among the Chinese policy makers. Ultimately, at some point in time there could be a conflict with China which is not new in India-China relations.

Blainey’s sixth factor is that the probability of war will depend on the sustainability of the economy to continue the kind of war involved. Thus, it is important to analyze the kind of war India and China are likely to fight. The disputes between
China and India concern border demarcation and dominance over the Indian Ocean. So, the theater of war is likely to be limited to the India-China border or, could range from the Malacca Strait to the Persian Gulf through the Indian Ocean. From the geographical point of view, the war is likely to be a limited war. After the advent of nuclear weapons almost all wars between nuclear-capable countries, or countries allied with nuclear-capable countries, have been limited wars. From that perspective also the future India-China war is likely to be a limited war. The only war fought between these countries in 1962 was also a limited war. China and India are the 2nd and 5th largest economies of the world respectively. Further economic development may even make raise the rank of each country economically. So, both the countries would be capable of sustaining a limited war.

The last factor of Blainey’s model is the personality of and paradigms held by policy makers. In researcher’s opinion, this factor is the most significant because even if all the factors so far discussed favor war, if the policy makers of both countries do not initiate any war then there will be no war. If the policy makers of both the countries have a liberalist paradigm they are not likely to wage war. Liberals believe in interdependence and cooperation among the states. They are happy with the absolute gain achieved from the cooperation. They are more concerned about the development of a country than waging war. If the policy makers of both the countries hold a realist paradigm they are more likely to wage war. As both the countries are capable of waging a limited war, if policy maker of either of the countries has a realist paradigm, that country may be more likely to wage war. The realist believes that the international system is anarchical and countries must pursue self-help. To pursue self-help, a country needs
power which the country may have to achieve even resorting to war. The realists believe that genuine, lasting cooperation between two countries is impossible. Even if they cooperate, they will be suspicious about each other’s relative gain which may also be responsible for the initiation of hostilities. So, the personality and paradigms of policy makers are the most important to predict possibility of war or peace between two countries.

In the preceding part of the paper, the probability of conflict between India and China was analyzed through the seven factors of Blainey. Out of those seven factors, only the second factor (perceptions of other nations about the conflict) indicate India and China are not likely to conflict. The remaining six factors show that there is a possibility of conflict between India and China in the future.

Conclusions

Historically, during ancient times, India and China experienced cooperation and cultural exchanges. After the independence of India in 1947, Nehru strived hard to maintain good relations with China but due to the ambition of Mao, the cooperation did not last long. The conflicts began with the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1959. Then onwards to border disputes, China and India fought a war in 1962 followed by two skirmishes in 1967 and 1987. India and China have failed to resolve their border disputes in last 65 years.

With this historical context, this chapter made an effort to predict India-China relations through Blainey’s model. The history and strategic behavior of India and China were analyzed through Blainey’s seven factors. Out of seven factors, only the second factor (perception of other nations about the conflict) indicate India and China are not
likely to conflict. The remaining six factors show that there is a possibility of conflict between India and China in the future. Blainey states that any of these factors can cause conflict between two states. From that perspective, India and China are likely to come into conflict in the future.
CHAPTER 5
OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR BANGLADESH

Introduction

The previous chapter demonstrated the future of India and China is likely to feature conflict. In such an environment, Bangladesh has to be very careful about its foreign policy. At present, Bangladesh lacks the kind of credible foreign policy necessary to achieve her security interests in that volatile security environment. This chapter will attempt to analyze various options for Bangladesh.

Initially, this chapter will give a brief history of Bangladesh-China relations, which will be followed by the history of Bangladesh-India relations. Then, three options, as mentioned in the methodology, for small states will be discussed from Bangladesh’s perspective. The options are: alliance, neutrality, and non-alignment. The options will be analyzed to identify the advantages and disadvantages of those options from Bangladesh’s perspective. Then, all these options will be compared to identify the most suitable option for Bangladesh. At the end, the researcher will recommend the strategic option for Bangladesh.

A Brief History of Bangladesh-China Relations

Until 1975, China did not have good relations with Bangladesh. During the liberation war of Bangladesh in 1971 against Pakistan, China opposed the liberation war of Bangladesh (then known as East Pakistan). Mao Zedong vehemently opposed and criticized the war of independence of Bangladesh and opposed the Bangladeshi leader,
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, during and immediately after the war, until Mao realized the geographical significance of Bangladesh as a counter to its historical rival, India.

Mao did not see the war as a liberation movement but he categorized it as a rebellion, supported by India; he described Sheikh Mujibur Rhaman as “rabidly anti-Chinese” (Ghosh 1995). Thus even after the independence Mujib never looked towards China for any kind of assistance. Though India actively participated in Bangladesh’s war of liberation and Russia helped India, India did not help Bangladesh after the war, nor did Russia. Despite its alliance with Pakistan during the war with Bangladesh, the US responded to a request for aid from Bangladesh. China maintained its negative attitude towards Bangladesh until Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was killed by a group of army officers on 15 August in 1975. After 1975, the relation between Bangladesh and China started become positive.

Following the Mujib killing, Zia-ur-Rhman took over the country with a vision towards the right side of the political spectrum. The Zia-ur-Rhaman government was negative towards Indian and Russian influence over Bangladesh which was aligned with China’s strategic preference (Sobhan 2006). In 1977, Zia-ur-Rhaman made his first visit to China.

During October 1981, military teams from China visited Bangladesh to advice on the development of Bangladesh armed forces. These two countries also signed a protocol to exchange commodities in 1982. A joint commission for the development of trade, economic, technological and scientific cooperation was also formed with members from these two countries in the year of 1983. The mutual cooperation continued through the Zia government and China promised assistance of all kinds including the exploration of
energy for the development of the country in the coming years. The trends continued when Zia-ur-Rahman was replaced by the president H. M. Ershad in 1985.

The new president also managed a 100-million Yuan fund for the infrastructure development of Bangladesh. China also provided significant aid in developing the Bangladesh Police force. In 1986, China further supported Bangladesh’s infrastructure development, including the construction of bridges, a textile mill, and a fertilizer plant. Delegation exchanges continued and led to more cooperation. In one account, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping described Bangladesh as like a close relative of China (Sobhan 2012).

In 1987, military delegation exchanges intensified. Following this series of delegation visits, China equipped, organized, and trained one of the first full-fledged divisions of Bangladesh, the 33 Infantry Division, which is still locally known as “Chinese Division.” In the same year China offered two squadrons of aircrafts for the Bangladesh air force and also augmented the navy with gun boats. China also assisted in establishing Bangladesh’s ammunition factory. China-Bangladesh cooperation intensified during the BNP government. Notably, Bangladesh signed a defense cooperation agreement with China in 2002 when the BNP was in power.

**A Brief History of Bangladesh-India Relations**

During the liberation war, India supported Bangladesh. India trained Bangladeshi freedom fighters in their training camps established close to the Bangladesh border. In the latter part of the war, Indian military actively participated. While it is clear India did not support Bangladesh’s efforts just as a good neighbor (Ray and Mamoon 2011), divining India’s real purpose goes beyond the scope of this paper. The important point is after the
war, when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman looked towards India for the reconstruction aid, he neither received any immediate assistance nor any hope. One scholar of India remarked simply that Bangladesh is not India’s market (Ghosh 1995).

However, there were a number of high level delegation visits between these two countries. These visits discussed cooperation, trade, economics, and, most importantly, the sharing of river water. However, the resulting promises never saw light beyond the meeting hall despite a 25 year treaty was signed between Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Indira Gandhi. India-Bangladesh relations further fell apart by the killing of Mujib in 1975.

In 1976, India unitarily constructed a dam over a major international river which deprived Bangladesh of water during the dry season. The dam caused significant damage to Bangladesh’s agriculture and navigation system. The issue was taken to the UN general assembly. India promised to solve the issue but never did so (Ray and Mamoon 2011). In 1980 Zia-ur-Rahman visited India twice to resolve this issue with Indira Gandhi but the attempts were fruitless (Milam 2009). Side by side, India sheltered the insurgents group of Chittagong Hill Tracts who wanted autonomy of that part of Bangladesh (Milam 2009). In 1977 and 1982, again, two agreements related to water sharing were signed but neither was executed (Ghosh 1995). Due to India’s hegemonic attitude towards water control, Bangladesh was impacted by a huge flood in 1987(Sobhan 2006).

In 1992, India pushed back to Bangladesh those who India called illegal immigrants though there was no legal basis for such action (Paul 2010). In 2010, Bangladesh and India were able to solve one issue: a long disputed enclave of Bangladeshi territory inside India named the “Tin Bigha Corridor.” India agreed to allow
access to the population of that area through Indian land to visit Bangladesh for medical treatment and education (Ray and Mamoon 2011). However, boundary disputes over six kilometers, disputes over 100s of enclaves, and river-water sharing disputes remained unresolved.

Analyses of the Options for Bangladesh

As mentioned in chapter 3, three broad options for Bangladesh will be analyzed: alliance, neutrality, and non-alignment. Each of the options will be first explained then the options will be analyzed from Bangladesh’s perspective to identify the advantages and disadvantages. After analyzing each option, the researcher will recommend the most suitable option.

Alliance

As noted in previous chapter, India and China are likely to maintain a confrontational stance towards one another in the future. Thus, South Asia’s security environment will be characterized by a balance of power situation unless China and India wage a war and either country is significantly defeated (Paul 2010). The small states in South Asia have four options for alliance: make an alliance of small states to balance against India or China, alliance with the super power, alliance with China, or alliance with India.

Alliance Among the Small States

Alliance among the small states to balance either India or China is not likely to happen because the small countries of South Asia are mostly economically dependent on China and have security concerns with India. Again, these countries will not be able
sustain a war effort against India or China due to economic and internal political
difficulties. As well, the masses of a given small state will not support a war effort for
another country’s cause. Historically, alliances among small states have not been
successful. Moniruzzaman, a theorist on the security of small states, conducted a survey
of treaties among the third world countries categorized as small states. His research
indicates that between 1945 and 1980, small states of the third world signed 11 treaties.
But these treaties were never put into effect. The major reasons for this general failure
were opposition from the masses and the cost of the perceived war. Historically, this
research indicates it is not be a feasible option for Bangladesh to depend on mutual
defense treaties with other small states of South Asia.

Alliance with Superpower

What of the feasibility of treaties with super powers? In a unipolar world with the
USA as the only super power, would the USA be interested in signing a treaty to ensure
Bangladesh security? Alan Dowty (1974), a researcher on the security of small states,
conducted a study of 84 treaties between small states and major powers, or super powers.
The study demonstrates less than fifty percent of the treaties were put into effect. The fate
of security treaties for a small state depends on two factors: the strategic importance of
the small state concerned for the super or great powers, and the prevailing political
environments within and the public perceptions of both the countries regarding the
security treaty.

As examples: the USSR and China, both contiguous to North Korea, did not want
to lose the entire Korean peninsula to a democratic, pro-US regime, while South Korea
was of strategic importance to the US. Israel and Cuba are the examples of how small
states can achieve importance from the perspective of super, or great powers by serving their interests. The USA has never made any agreement or pact with Israel. Yet, historically the USA has never hesitated to respond to the call of Israel, as it is the only truly secure foothold of the USA in the oil-rich Middle East (Buzan). Cuba was the only forward base of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) which achieved full cooperation from the latter at all times. The Vietnam War is an example of the political environment and the people’s perception. US decision makers saw the Vietnam War as a testing ground for the contest between communism and democracy and thus became involved in the war (Handel 1990). US policy makers could not sustain the war due to the American people’s negative perceptions in the domestic political environment (Buzan). Ultimately, the USA had to withdraw from Vietnam. Based on the above discussion, how important is Bangladesh regarding the USA’s interests in Asia?

China challenges US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. Geographically separate from China, Bangladesh offers no significant advantages to the US for a strategy including physical containment of China. Rather, the Southeast Asian countries are better options (Meredith 2008). Also, Bangladesh, a democracy since independence, whatever its political instability, would never succumb to communism, nor is China likely to promote it. Thus there is no incentive in this regard, as during the Cold War with many countries, for the US to ally with Bangladesh. The USA is not likely to be interested in signing a treaty with Bangladesh. However, the USA would likely to be interested in forestalling Bangladesh from allowing China the use of a Bangladesh seaport which would enhance China’s ability to dominate the Indian Ocean—the life line of China.
From Bangladesh’s perspective what is the advantage of an alliance with the USA? The USA is the world’s preeminent military power. Allied to America, China and India would be dissuaded from trying to use Bangladesh as a means to their ends. The alliance might also facilitate Bangladesh to resolve “Rohinga” (refugees from north western state of Myanmar) issues.

What would be the weaknesses of such an alliance? As the less power partner, the weaknesses, in part, will depend on the national interests of the USA. In Asia, India is the only state which can balance China. As such, India will be a higher priority to the USA; thus, the USA is less likely to stand against India in resolving land and littoral disputes between Bangladesh and India. Given India’s current assets, and its potential for greater power, in the region the US may actually prioritize a government in Bangladesh supportive of India (Gilboy and Heginbotham 2012), as opposed to an alliance with Bangladesh. In turn, India may be able to take the advantage of its relations with the USA to enhance its involvement in domestic politics of Bangladesh (Holslag 2010). Ultimately, Bangladesh will lose its political independence.

Alliance with China

Since 1975, Bangladesh has had good relations with China. China has assisted Bangladesh in developing its armed forces. China’s continuous support in the defense sector was finally strengthened by the China-Bangladesh Defense Cooperation Agreement (details being said ) signed between Bangladesh and China in 2002. Bangladesh has no territorial dispute with China and she has never intervened in the domestic politics of Bangladesh. What are the strength and weaknesses of alliance with China?
Allying with China, Bangladesh might better be able to deter India. India is already nearly encircled by Pakistan, Myanmar, and Nepal, each a country with strong ties to China. A China-Bangladesh alliance would even more complete the encirclement. China would be able to establish a seaport to support the forward basing of PLAN furthering China’s efforts to dominate the Indian Ocean. Making such alliance, Bangladesh would be able to use it as a bargaining chip to resolve its disputes with India, including issues of territorial sovereignty and political independence. Such an alliance would also strengthen Bangladesh’s ability to solve the Rohingya issue with Myanmar. This sort of alliance would also enhance economic cooperation between Bangladesh and China, but this lies beyond the scope of this research. Alliance with China would also pose number of challenges to Bangladesh.

India might go so far as to use force against Bangladesh in the event of such an alliance with China. However, such a drastic option is even less appealing for India due to its military is already being deployed along most of its border. India would also face domestic opposition to such adventurism, particularly from the Muslims. Still, the possibility of war cannot be ignored because in the past India’s policy makers have ignored their people’s perspectives while dealing with foreign policy (Ghosh 1995). An alliance between Bangladesh and China would likely to worsen Bangladesh’s relationships with the West, and particularly with the US. This might, in turn, negatively impact Bangladesh’s relations with the UN and other world humanitarian organizations; relationships which are badly needed by natural-calamity prone Bangladesh. Most importantly, due to ideological differences between democratic Bangladesh and at-least nominally communist China, any alliance is not likely to last for long.
Alliance with India

Bangladesh could align with India if India were to promise a pragmatic approach to solve disputed land and littoral issues. A Bangladesh aligned with India is likely to be more accepted by the USA and other Western democratic countries. Allied to Bangladesh, India may be more amicable to solving the territorial disputes already mentioned.

Yet a look at the historical record belies the benefits of a Bangladesh-India alliance. Sheikh Mujibur Rahaman had a stated non-aligned foreign policy, but he signed a defense cooperation agreement with India in 1971, which was to last 25 years. Mujib had faith in the Indira Gandhi’s leadership. However, during Mujib’s tenure, from 1971 to 1975, there was no solution to the disputed issues mentioned above (Sobhan 2006). After 1975, Mujib’s political party, the BAL was in power for two other periods (1996-2001, and 2009 until now) but still there has been no significant improvement on the disputed issues (Sobhan 2012). So, it is uncertain that being inclined to India, Bangladesh gains any benefit.

Alliance with India may backfire against Bangladesh if, at sometime, the result threatens the territorial integrity of Bangladesh. History shows that big states or the major powers have annexed the neighboring small states. Stalin annexed the neighboring small countries by stating that he needed those to provide geographic depth to USSR. The same happened in the South Asia too. China annexed Tibet in 1959. India annexed Kashmir (1947-49) and Sikkim in 1975. Indonesia did the same with East Timor in 1975 and 1976. While the small neighbors were annexed, what was the response of the other major, or super powers?
Historically, the super powers largely ignored the acts of big powers on the rim. The US remained indifferent when USSR intervened in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. The USSR reciprocated with the same attitude when the USA later interfered in Guatemala in 1954, Dominican Republic in 1965, and Chile in 1973 (Moniruzzaman 1982). In 1959, despite tremendous domestic opposition, Nehru recognized the Chinese occupation of Tibet as a legitimate action (Kodikara 1979). Thus, small states are often at the mercy of their giant neighbors, not finding any protection if those neighbors turn to aggression.

Historically, the BNP (political party of Zia-ur-Rahman) is perceived by India as pro-Pakistani and supported by China (Ray and Mamoon 2011). If Bangladesh inclines to India, it may undermine the BNP, and, to the extent it degrades the current two-party system, may thereby disturb the democracy of the country. So, Bangladesh is not likely to be able to solve the two security challenges under discussion by aligning with India.

Neutral

To be accepted as a neutral state, a state must first have a long history of being neutral. Together with that a state should not be involved in any active war or should avoid such policy which may involve it in a war. Lastly, it must have a strategic geographical position which will facilitate non-interference from the major powers (Buzan). A state should also have a strong military to defend its neutrality.

Just after independence, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman wanted foreign policy of neutrality but soon, instead, agreed to defense cooperation with India for 25 years. Six years following the expiration of the treaty with India, Bangladesh signed another agreement with China in 2002. In fact, historically, Bangladesh has not been neutral.
Regarding the geographical position, the neutrality of Bangladesh would provide a sense of security to India. China, however, may not accept Bangladeshi neutrality because of if China’s ambition to dominate the Indian Ocean. Also Bangladesh’s neutrality could prevent China from securing what would become the only flank from which India can now freely threaten. If we observe carefully, China by itself has occupied the northern flank of India along with Nepal. Supported by China, Pakistan is threatening the western flank of India for more than a half century. In the south eastern flank, Burma is a good friend of China where the latter is planning to construct a sea port. So, Bangladesh is the only gateway left to achieve complete control of India’s east and a seaport in Bangladesh will allow Chinese dominance in the Indian Ocean at the southern part of India.

However, neutrality is dependent on the balance of power in the international system. From the discussion in the previous chapter, it can be assumed that the balance power of the region will be characterized by India-China rivalry in the near future. The chances for the successful neutrality of a small state diminish within a less-than-peaceful balance of power in the region of the small state. Sometime in the future if China or India becomes aggressive, Bangladesh’s neutrality could be at stake. Due to its limited geographical depth, Bangladesh Armed Forces may not be able to defend the country for a prolonged period.

Laos is a good example of a small state failing to maintain neutrality. In July, 1962 during the Geneva Convention, Laos declared its neutrality. But by the end of that year, it went through a civil war. Nationalists and communists fought during civil war with assistance from outside powers that attended the conference and agreed to the
neutrality of Laos (Buzan). Thus, even if the neutrality of Bangladesh is recognized by the major powers, it may be violated to meet the interest of one or more major powers.

The only advantage that Bangladesh would achieve from the neutrality is attaining political independence. As mentioned before, the major two political parties are seen as either pro-Indian or pro-Pakistani supported by China. Neutrality would ensure elimination of the biased nature of those political parties and usher in an era of more effective democratic practice in the country. But territorial sovereignty would be at risk as mentioned before.

Non-Aligned

Non-alignment is different from neutrality. In neutrality, the state detaches itself from international politics by achieving recognition as neutral, whereas non-alignment is a political posture in which the state remains within the system but avoids any military pact with any of the major powers (Buzan). Non-alignment ensures that the state has political independence and can maintain a sustainable relationship with super, or great powers to secure its national interests (Moniruzzaman 1982).

Dowty mentions that non-alignment is a better option for a newly born state, because it can produce political stability. In his example, if the state is aligned towards the west but the population sympathetic to the communist bloc, the people of a country be divided into two ideological blocs which can disrupt the political stability and may even lead to a civil war; Vietnam is an example.

So, from the above discussion, theoretically, non-alignment is the best option for Bangladesh. Through non-alignment Bangladesh should be able to achieve political
independence and may be able to solve its territorial disputes with India by maintaining good relations with the influential international actors.

One of the major problems is that non-alignment is difficult to preserve. Though declaring India to be non-aligned, Nehru made a military pact with the USSR in 1971, and an agreement regarding mutual defense with the USA in 1951 (Cohen 1992). Under this agreement, India received huge military aid from the USA during the 1962 war with China. Tito of Yugoslavia made a defense treaty with Greece and Turkey (Elias and Sutch 2007). A few African countries to include Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Niger, Ivory Coast, and Central African Republic have violated their non-aligned status by joining an alliance with France. So, history shows that it is difficult, if not impossible, to maintain non-alignment.

Historically, Bangladesh also failed to maintain non-alignment. At the nascent stage, though Sheikh Mujibur Rahaman announced a non-aligned foreign policy, he failed to sustain it. After, liberation, to ensure the withdrawal of the Indian military from Bangladesh, Mujib had to sign a defense cooperation agreement with India for 25 years. This has affected the public opinion so much that even after three decades the political party of Mujib is seen as pro-Indian. In 1975, Mujib was succeeded by Zia-ur-Rahman. The new President established a connection with China and the Islamic world to include Pakistan (Ray and Mamoon 2011). Ultimately, Zia-ur-Rahman’s political party is seen as pro-Pakistan supported by China. This perception grew when the BNP, as the ruling government, signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement with China in 2002. These opposing perceptions create instability in Bangladesh. Even at the later part of writing this paper, Bangladesh was going through this rivalry of the perceptions.
Bangladesh failed to maintain its non-aligned status and ultimately suffered. It is likely to suffer till the time the political parties take necessary steps to prove they are not aligned with any country and that, rather, they are each concerned about the interest of Bangladesh.

**Recommended Option: Flexible and Transparent Non-Alignment**

To reiterate, vital national security interests for Bangladesh are political independence and territorial integrity. Having discussed the contemporary options for the small states, this part will make a brief comparison to recommend a sustainable option.

The discussion shows that alliance with the small states of the South Asia is not feasible because of the overmatching capabilities of the two Asian giants and the economic dependence of those small states on those two Asian major actors. The discussion also identified that alliance with a superpower outside the region is also not likely to work because the superpower’s preference will, naturally, be based on her interests not the interests of Bangladesh. Due to the ideological differences, and the risk of being disconnected from the Westerners, alliance with China is not a viable option. Alliance with India also risks Bangladesh into a negative bandwagoning scenario. Based on history, it was seen that alliance with India is thus not a better option for Bangladesh. Therefore, any of these alliances are not good options to help Bangladesh protect her security interests.

As stated before, being neutral, a state disconnects itself from the international system. The preceding discussion demonstrates Bangladesh would not be able to maintain neutrality because of her geographical location, lack of resources, globally dependent economy, and lack of a modern military. Regarding the two interests focused
upon, neutrality may provide domestic political stability but territorial sovereignty is likely to remain at stake.

As said before, unlike neutrality a state does not disconnect itself from the international system when it is non-aligned. A non-aligned state does not make any military pact with another country. As shown in the preceding discussion, being non-aligned, Bangladesh would be able to achieve true political independence and would also be likely to maintain its territorial integrity.

From this brief comparison, it can be deduced that non-alignment is the most suitable option for Bangladesh. Bangladesh had been a member state of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) since 1973 but Bangladeshi policy makers could not succeed in achieving either of the national security interests focused upon in this research. The lack of true political independence is demonstrated by the political turmoil which started in mid-December 2012 and has continued during the writing of this paper. On one occasion, the prime minister said the opposition political party leader should go to Pakistan to draw strength. In reply, the opposition party leader said the prime minister should go to Hindustan (India) to draw required strength to solve the political turmoil (The News at Ten, n TV).

In this volatile political situation, non-alignment is a more sustainable strategic option for Bangladesh. The researcher recommends the policy maker be very delicate in executing non-alignment. To emphasize this delicate execution, the researcher names this option as Flexible and Transparent Non-Alignment. Details about this option follow.
Explanation and Execution of Recommended Option: Flexible and Transparent Non-Alignment

This section will discuss what the researcher means by flexible and transparent non-alignment, why it is a suitable option, and how it ensures the achievement of Bangladesh’s security interests: political independence and territorial integrity. Then, this part will discuss how this option should be executed by Bangladesh.

As explained before, when a country adopts a non-alignment policy the country remains within the international system, but does not make a military pact with any other states. For Bangladesh, this traditional non-alignment foreign policy is not suitable.

Bangladesh is a country with a population of 167 million and significant poverty, insufficient natural resources, dependence on developed countries for manufactured goods including military equipment, and dependence on foreign investment for economic development. Bangladesh relies on the UN to resolve its disputes with other countries and thereby remains subjected to the whims of permanent members of the UN Security Council. The country needs foreign assistance during natural disasters, and is dependent on loans from the World Bank. Thus, Bangladesh needs to maintain good relation with all the developed countries of the world whatever their ideology or interests.

Bangladesh draws support from the USA in terms of FDI, assistance in natural disaster, and military training. China is a major contributor in providing equipment for her armed forces, and readymade garments, which are the main export of Bangladesh, are dependent on China’s FDI and provision of equipment (Sobhan 2012). Therefore, Bangladesh must sign contracts and agreements for both economic and military purpose with countries possessing very different outlooks. Traditional non-alignment allows for economic pacts but not military pacts (Handel 1990). Military pacts come in many forms
starting from an alliance agreement to contracting for defense purchases (Brown and Ainley 2005). Military pacts are ill-defined in the literature on non-alignment.

Following liberation, Bangladesh signed a defense treaty with India for a term of 25 years. In 2002, Bangladesh again signed a defense cooperation treaty with China. As per traditional non-alignment theory, Bangladesh has lost its non-alignment status. The 1971 treaty with India annoyed both China and the USA. The 2002 agreement annoyed India. As such the foreign policy of Bangladesh came under suspicion from major powers.

For Bangladesh both the agreements were necessary. The defense cooperation agreement of 1971 was necessary for ensuring the withdrawal of the Indian military from Bangladesh. The defense cooperation agreement with China in 2002 was necessary to ensure availability of military equipment along with the maintenance support, and training for operating the equipment. Thus, Bangladesh needs to sign treaties and agreement which the traditional non-alignment does not allow for. So, Bangladesh should have a flexible non-alignment.

A close look on to those two treaties will make it clear that neither of them were military pacts which undermined the interests of other nations. The 1971 treaty states that Bangladesh should not allow the use of its geographical territory by any other country which would be against India’s security interests (Ray and Mamoon 2011). The 2002 treaty says that China will provide required military equipment at a low price and make the equipment available as and when Bangladesh requires, while also providing maintenance support and the required training to operate the equipment (Sobhan 2006). But the realities of these treaties were not clarified at the domestic and international
levels. As a result, both agreements have had a tremendous impact on domestic politics as mentioned. There were also international repercussions. In 1971, China did not recognize the independence of Bangladesh due to its military pact with India. In 2002, following the Bangladesh-China agreement, Indian strategist Subash Kapila wrote in the online journal of the South Asian Analysis Group that Bangladesh had signed this agreement to deter India. But the clauses in the agreement were not offensive in nature. Following China’s reaction in 1971 and India’s reaction in 2002, none of the policymakers of Bangladesh protested. Rather, the each political party exploited these treaties against the opposing political party during election campaigns. Thus, these kinds of treaties should be made transparent both at the domestic and the international level. So, the non-alignment of Bangladesh should be flexible and transparent.

The flexible and transparent non-alignment would be able to secure both the security interest of Bangladesh under discussion. Flexible non-alignment will keep Bangladesh actively involved within the international system while not forming alliance with any of the major powers. Through transparency, Bangladesh will be able to justify the flexible non-alignment to the world, remain sympathetic to the super or great powers and achieve the required support and assistance it needs. With support from the major powers, Bangladesh may be able resolve its disputes with India about borders, thus, securing its territorial integrity.

Being transparent at the domestic level, the country will be able to achieve true political independence. As Bangladeshi policy makers were not transparent both India and Pakistan—or at least the Bangladeshis’ perception of India and Pakistan—were able to shape the peoples’ opinions and used in their favor which destabilizes the democracy of
the country. If the policy makers are transparent, they will be able to show that they are not aligned to any other country. As such, outside forces may not be as effective in shaping the peoples’ perception as they were before. Ultimately, Bangladesh will be able to achieve true political independence. Now, the challenge is how this strategic option should be executed.

To maintain flexible non-alignment a few of the domestic requirements must be met. Firstly, the political leaders must believe in this option and practice non-alignment in the domestic sphere. Secondly, they should utilize diplomatic and informational tools of national power to delicately execute this strategic option.

At the domestic level, the politicians guard against careless pronouncements which may enflame domestic tensions during speeches and interviews. They must stop playing India-Pakistan (China) game for electoral advantage during election campaigns breaking the pernicious habits of past 37 years. The political parties must understand that it is not only the responsibility of the ruling party to maintain Bangladesh’s status of non-alignment; rather, it is the responsibility of all. Narrow comments by members of any of the political parties in the national or international media will undermine the legitimacy of this foreign policy. It must be understood that comments by the prime minister and the opposition party leader as mentioned before can be catastrophic for the country.

In international politics Bangladesh must utilize diplomatic power to the maximum to enforce non-alignment. Effective diplomacy can ensure the transparency of Bangladesh’s intentions. At present, Bangladesh has embassies in 37 countries, which include the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. The
effectiveness of these embassies at present is questioned by the scholars and intellectuals of Bangladesh (Ray and Mamoon 2011).

During the current turmoil, for instance, none of the embassies have arranged any press conference in their respective countries. Seeing a few live telecasts of Bangladesh’s news media, with no diplomatic explanations, might lead to misunderstandings in any country (Trityo Matra, n TV). Some might mistake the current turmoil as a nascent civil war waged between Islamic extremist group and atheists. The consequences of such misperceptions can be disastrous because so much of the Bangladesh economy is dependent upon FDI; for instance, foreign aid and loans greatly contribute to infrastructure development. Misperceptions about the security situation may discourage foreign investors and cause non-Islamic countries to deny foreign aid. Immediate press releases and subsequently following up in the news media of various countries by the respective embassies could reassure other nations and this turmoil reflects a pre-election scenario in Bangladesh, and the violence is not likely to worsen.

As well policy makers in Bangladesh could arrange press releases for the international news and print media to inform the world about the situation in Bangladesh. They could also exchange pertinent information with the appropriate officials of various countries.

At the nascent stage of her economic boom, the importance of diplomacy was recognized by China. The concept should be minimum representation but maximum effectiveness by focusing on the model which China followed. Bangladesh should increase the number of its embassies and improve the effectiveness of those embassies.
The policymakers should understand that the foreign policy is made by the politicians, led by the head of government and authorized by the parliament. Diplomacy, then, is the management and execution of foreign policy by the experts (Smith et al. 2012). Military strategy is the means to maintain the defense of the country when foreign policy has failed. Generally, the small states do not possess a strong war making capability thus strong diplomacy is even more important (Buzan). Diplomacy is a matter of culture and institutionalization (Paul 2010). The small states should have diplomats in all the countries of interests with adequate manpower capable of collecting and analyzing the information and recommending the government.

Unfortunately, an effective culture of diplomacy did not developed in Bangladesh. Having a master’s in any subject, a candidate can appear for a competitive exam to enter in the public services commission of Bangladesh. Though, the top notches among the candidates are sent to ministry of foreign affairs, they are not selected based on their major subjects of study. Candidates with masters in international relations, political science, and strategy should be given preferences as candidates for the ministry of foreign affairs.

The selected trainees are sent for a six weeks training. The training is general for all the selected candidates for the public service commission. The candidates selected for the ministry of foreign affairs should be given with additional training on mass media management and negotiation.

Diplomatic delegations are another aspect of utilizing the diplomacy to promote national interests. At present, most of the diplomatic delegations are organized at the highest levels and are often ceremonial (Ray and Mamoon 2011). More diplomatic
delegations should be arranged for the functional groups that can pursue the interests of Bangladesh at the appropriate level.

Bangladesh is a member state to the United Nation and SAARC, but is not a member of many organizations which contribute to the world economy and global security. As another diplomatic action, Bangladesh should send representatives to the meetings and seminars arranged by these organizations as observers, or spectators. The principle is Bangladesh should be heard widely. Key people of the country should be utilized for this purpose.

Dr. Muhammad Yunus, the only Bangladeshi Noble Prize recipient, received the award in 2006. He has also received the USA’s Medal of Freedom in 2009. Bangladesh should have utilized him as a spokesman for and symbol of its legitimate aspirations. Instead, the political leaders used him as a political pawn. Ultimately, he isolated himself and is now teaching in a university in the USA. Bangladesh could have, instead, utilized the credibility of Yunus’s voice to draw support from major powers and from international institutions.

In short, strong diplomatic effort should be made to publicize the fact that Bangladesh does not support any country’s illegal actions or interests. Rather, she supports her own interests ethically and justly. In general, Bangladesh has to develop a strong diplomatic culture and effective diplomatic practices-a subject which demands separate research.

Information should be another important element of national power Bangladesh uses. Bangladesh has more than 30 channels and more than 200 daily newspapers. While recognizing the necessity of a free media, coordination should be arranged among
national and international media outlets, both a private and government-run, to disseminate information regarding Bangladesh’s legitimate interests. Unbiased journalism should become the core competency of media, which is not the reputation the media enjoys now (Trityo Matra, n TV). The important issue is to use all forms of media to achieve transparency, and thus garner the support of the major powers and the international institutions.

International and regional journals are a vital means of information too. No Bangladeshi scholar is a regular writer in the international journals on security issues. The Bangladesh Institute of International Studies (BIIS) has a good journal on security issues but it is not circulated widely. In the well-regarded journals on security issues like the “Journal of Asian Affairs,” or “Foreign Policy” the numbers of Bangladeshi contributors is too meager. Even in the journal of the South Asian Analysis Group there are more writers from India than Bangladesh. Thus, government should encourage the participation of the writers in the national and regional security journals and also ensure the wide circulation of these security journals of Bangladesh in both paper copies and soft copies on the web.

Conclusions

In this chapter, initially, the history of Bangladesh-India and Bangladesh-China relations were presented. The history shows that Bangladesh typically has not had good diplomatic relations with both the countries simultaneously. When Bangladesh has good relation with India, China was on the outs. Again, when Bangladesh had good relations with China India walked away from Bangladesh. Bangladeshi relations with these two countries were dependent on the political party in charge of Bangladesh Government.
With this backdrop, the chapter, then, discussed various strategic options for Bangladesh as regards to the foreign policy.

The chapter analyzed three strategic options to materialize her security interests: territorial integrity and political independence. The analyzed options are: alliance, neutrality, and non-alignment. The analyses show that none of the options are complete in themselves to meet the security interest of Bangladesh.

Though no option is perfect, this chapter identifies non-alignment, with some changes in execution, is the most suitable option for Bangladesh. The researcher names this non-alignment option as flexible and transparent non-alignment.

Unlike typical non-alignment, this option will allow Bangladesh to sign treaties and agreements with other countries necessary to satisfy the country’s requirements but not injurious to the interests of regional or global major powers. This option mitigates any suspicions aroused by limited defense agreements with transparency concerning those agreements by utilizing the diplomacy and information of the elements of national power. For effective execution of this option, Bangladesh must emphasize on effective diplomacy and foster a favorable information environment. If the flexible and transparent non-alignment option is executed effectively, Bangladesh should be able to achieve both the security interests under discussion: territorial integrity and political independence.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

Like any other small states, the two most important security interests of Bangladesh are territorial integrity and political independence. As shown in the previous chapters, Bangladesh’s security interests are closely related to the regional security environment of South Asia which is primarily dependent on the relations between China and India. As such, the purpose of this research was to predict the state of India-China relations and identify a suitable strategic option for Bangladesh to meet her security interests.

To do so, chapter 1 set the background of the research along with the significance, limitations, and assumption of this study. Chapter 2 analyzed the contemporary literatures about India-China relations and options for Bangladesh. Chapter 3 described the methodology of the research. Chapter 4 made an attempt to predict the India-China relations. At the end, chapter 5 analyzed the contemporary strategic options from the Bangladesh perspective and recommended a suitable option for Bangladesh.

This chapter will summarize the discussions of previous chapters. Then, it will put forward a few recommendations for the Bangladeshi policy makers. Finally, it will recommend the scopes for future researches.

Summary of the Previous Chapters

A good number of books and monographs were reviewed to predict the India-China relations. From the reviewed literatures about India-China relations, it was
concluded that economic cooperation between China and India is progressing. On the other hand, they have not resolved the significant security issue of territorial disputes. About the future trends of this security relationship, contemporary writers have not made any conclusive predictions, though, in general, they seem to expect future trends to remain similar to those evident at present. Nor did the writers use any theoretical framework to predict the future relations between China and India.

From the reviewed literature on strategic options for Bangladesh, it was concluded that most of the writers have noted an uneasy relationship between India and Bangladesh. They explain that Bangladesh’s territorial integrity and political sovereignty have been significantly impacted by India. Based on these issues, the relationship between India and Bangladesh is full of distrust and suspicion which is further deteriorated by China’s cooperation with Bangladesh. A few of the writers also note that neither regional nor international institutions have made any tangible progress in resolving these disputes. Contemporary writers, for the most part, suggest bi-lateral approaches to solve these issues. However, none of the writers have elaborated any specific policy option for Bangladesh.

An attempt was made to predict the future of India-China relations in chapter 4. As discussed in chapter 4, historically, during ancient times, India and China experienced both cooperation and cultural exchange, but have experienced conflict and war in more recent times. India and China have failed to resolve their border disputes for the last 65 years.

With this historical context, the chapter made an effort to predict India-China relations through Blainey’s model, which uses seven factors to analyze the probability of
future relations between two states. Out of seven factors, only the second factor, views of
other nations besides the nations in conflict, indicate that India and China some restraint
on the likelihood of conflict between Asia’s two giants. Blainey asserts issues in any of
the seven factors in the model might result in conflict between two states. From that
perspective, India and China seem likely to have conflict in the future.

Future India-China conflict will make the security environment of South Asia
volatile. However, it was noted that Bangladesh does not have a specific policy to secure
her interests amid the rivalry of India and China. Chapter 5 of this thesis analyzed the
options for Bangladesh. In that chapter, initially, the history of Bangladesh-India and
Bangladesh-China relations were presented. The history shows that Bangladesh did not
have good diplomatic relations with both the countries simultaneously. When Bangladesh
had good relations with India, China did not recognize Bangladesh as a country. Again,
when Bangladesh had good relations with China, India walked away from Bangladesh.
The relations with these two countries were again dependent on the political party in
charge of Bangladesh Government. Against this backdrop, the chapter, then, discussed
various strategic options for Bangladesh as regards to foreign policy.

The chapter analyzed the options of alliance, neutrality, and non-alignment for
Bangladesh to achieve her objectives. The analyses show that non-alignment is the most
suitable option for Bangladesh which to be executed effectively.

After discussing the pros and cons of all those three options, the chapter identifies
non-alignment as the most suitable option for Bangladesh if executed properly. The
researcher re-named the non-alignment as flexible and transparent non-alignment. Unlike
typical non-alignment, this option will enable Bangladesh to sign treaties and agreements
with other countries to satisfy its requirement but not undermining the interests of the regional and global major powers including the super power. The major powers and superpower may be suspicious about the pacts and agreements. But, this option will give transparency to those agreements by utilizing the diplomacy and information elements of national power.

For effective execution of this option, Bangladesh should emphasize effective diplomacy which can be achieved by well trained and educated diplomats who are capable of promoting the interests of the country. The option also suggested that Bangladesh should utilize its print and electronic media to ensure the transparency of the policy option. Government should create favorable condition for the scholars, intellectuals, and key personnel so that they can promote the interests of the country either through their scholarly practices or connections. The chapter also identified that if the flexible and transparent non-alignment option is executed effectively, Bangladesh will be able to achieve both the security interests under discussion here, namely territorial integrity and political independence.

**Recommendations for Policy Makers**

Based on the discussions of the thesis, it is recommended that the policy makers should understand the complex security environment of South Asia based on future India-China conflict. Then, they should immediately stop using China (Pakistan) and India factors in their election manifestoes. The policy makers should evaluate the recommended option which is flexible and transparent non-alignment and immediately execute the actions suggested if found suitable. However, optimum utilization of diplomacy and information should be the core concerns for the policy makers of
Bangladesh to achieve her two primary security interests of territorial integrity and political independence.

**Scope for Future Research**

During the discussions, weak diplomacy was identified as an obstacle to the execution of the flexible and transparent non-alignment. As such, research should be conducted to identify the ways and means to improve the diplomatic power of Bangladesh which may include selection procedures, training, and the enhancement of the negotiation capabilities of diplomats. Research should also be conducted to identify the procedures to utilize the media, both print and electronic, to enhance the information capabilities of the country which is significant to achieve transparency of the flexible non-alignment policy.


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