SINO-INDIAN WAR 1962–WHERE DO INDIA AND CHINA STAND TODAY?

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Strategic Studies

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The Sino-Indian relationship has become increasingly complex. Both countries view each other within an extremely sophisticated framework of cooperation and antagonism. Cooperation can be seen in a number of areas including trade, government-to-government and military relations. At the same time however, ongoing and unresolved problems continue to plague the relationship. Chinese and Indian aspirations to become first regional and then global powers have serious repercussions for peace and prosperity in Asia. China, a member of the permanent five of the United Nations Security Council, gives the impression that it is interested in having a more powerful role on the global stage. India, a major contributor of military forces to the United Nations, but not a member of the Security Council, perceives this to be threatening. All these developments are such that, one cannot turn a blind eye to them. In the context of present developments in the region it is very important to critically review the situation. This study compares the pre-1962 environment with that of today, and the context is discussed in terms of instruments of national power which are diplomatic, informational, military and economic.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


The Sino-Indian relationship has become increasingly complex. Both countries view each other within an extremely sophisticated framework of cooperation and antagonism. Cooperation can be seen in a number of areas including trade, government-to-government and military relations. At the same time however, ongoing and unresolved problems continue to plague the relationship. Chinese and Indian aspirations to become first regional and then global powers have serious repercussions for peace and prosperity in Asia. China, a member of the permanent five of the United Nations Security Council, gives the impression that it is interested in having a more powerful role on the global stage. India, a major contributor of military forces to the United Nations, but not a member of the Security Council, perceives this to be threatening. All these developments are such that, one cannot turn a blind eye to them. In the context of present developments in the region it is very important to critically review the situation. This study compares the pre-1962 environment with that of today, and the context is discussed in terms of instruments of national power which are diplomatic, informational, military and economic.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

I have been deeply concerned at the deteriorating security environment, specially the nuclear environment, faced by India for some years past. We have an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations with that country have improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem.¹

—Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, “Letter to President William J. Clinton”

China and India are the two most populous nations in the world. They are geographically separated by the highest mountain range of the world, the Himalayas. Despite this significant barrier, these two nations have sown seeds of deep mistrust in their bilateral relations. A study of relations between India and China is important at this juncture in history, as both states have gained considerable strategic importance, not only regionally, but also globally. Any relationship adopted by these two countries influences regional and global peace and stability. Both countries are declared nuclear powers and possess booming economies. Although both the countries have been positive about each other in the international media, they view each other within a complex adversarial framework. Aspirations to become economic powers, to play a dominant role in the regional politics, and a greater desire for influence in the international arena highlight the clashing interests.

Relations between India and China have been up and down since their independence in the late 1940s. Their relations reached the lowest ebb in the early 1960s,

when a border dispute turned into a short-lived war in 1962. The Longju Incident in the eastern sector and the Kongka Pass in the western sector was a prelude to the all-out armed conflict on the border from 20 October to 21 November 1962. A number of reasons can be attributed to the cause of this war, which includes ideology, vested interests of the cold war global powers, interstate relations, and a colonial border legacy. Understanding the causes of war is extremely important today in order to anticipate the chances of a future recurrence. A comparative analysis of pre-1962 relations between India and China with that of today can help to predict where both the countries stand today. In this research, the context is discussed in terms of the instruments of national power, which are diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME).

Historical Background

China and India share a long border, sectioned into three segments by Nepal, Sikkim (an independent kingdom in 1962), and Bhutan (see figure 1). A number of disputed regions lie along this border. At its western end is the Aksai Chin region, an area the size of Switzerland, which sits between the Chinese autonomous regions of Xinjiang and Tibet. The eastern border, between Burma and Bhutan, comprises the present Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh formerly the North East Frontier Agency (see figure 1). The Sino-Indian border rivalry is an outcome of the failure of India and China to mutually agree upon the exact alignment of their common boundary within the complexities of the

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Himalayan Ranges. The entire boundary between India and China has not been formally delineated, however in terms of potential conflict, the Eastern and Western Sectors figure most prominently.

Figure 1. Major Disputed Areas of Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh along Sino-Indian Border


In the Western Sector, the line of actual control runs roughly along the Karakoram Range, conforming to the Chinese claim. The Indian government however, claims that the boundary runs along the Kunlun Range from the Karakoram Pass. The disputed area is the Aksai Chin region between the two ranges, covering a total area of about 33,000
square kilometers. This area falls mainly in China’s Xinjiang Province and part of it belongs to the Ari District of Tibet. The Indian government claims that it is part of its Ladakh area of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This area is sparsely inhabited, serving only as the traffic artery linking Xinjiang and Tibet. Indian logic in support of this argument is based on the inheritance of historical treaties between the British India and Tibet, which China refutes. At the northwestern tip of Aksai Chin lies the important Karakoram pass. Northwest of this point runs the boundary between China and Pakistan’s Gilgit-Baltistan region. India also disputes this boundary, which was delimited between China and Pakistan in 1963.

The middle sector stretches from the southern extremity of Kashmir to Nepal and encompasses the Indian states of Himachal Pardesh and Uttar Pradesh. The pilgrimage route to the Hindu places of worship and the trans-border trade routes in the vicinity of Mount Kailash and Lake Mansrover, both inside Tibet, lie within this sector of the boundary. As this border has been in constant use by traders and pilgrims, over the years, the boundary on the ground has been well known and accepted. As a result, the dispute in this sector is of a minor nature vis-à-vis the other two sectors.

The line of actual control in the Eastern Sector conforms to the McMahon Line, a legacy of the British colonial period. The disputed area between the Pre-1914 Outer Line and the McMahon Line covers a total area of 90,000 square kilometers. According to

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5 Liu, The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations, 47-48.

6 Dalal, 8.
China, this area comprises Tibet’s three districts of Monyul, Loyul and Lower Zayul; and according to India, this area is its Arunachal Pradesh, formerly the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) of Assam.7

The bone of contention is the legitimacy of possession of land areas of the Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. India disputes the Chinese possession of Aksai Chin region; and conversely, China disputes the Indian possession of Arunachal Pradesh. China launched an offensive in October and November 1962 to regain this territory.

Figure 2. All Disputed Areas along Sino-Indian Border


This thesis argues the continuing Sino-Indian conflict was not, and is not, merely a border dispute. There were a number of other reasons associated with this conflict, which take it beyond the realm of a mere border misunderstanding. There are a variety of issues that are at play. The interpretation of the nature of the preferred global system between the communism and capitalism is one factor. The relations of both states with the superpowers and with other states in the South Asian sub-region is also an issue. Finally over time the changing character of bilateral relations between China and India is relevant.

This research will not focus on the military events of the 1962 war, or the tactical skirmishes that plunged India and China into war. It is rather intended to relate present geostrategic circumstances with those which prevailed in 1962, and ascertain whether chances of a future reoccurrence of conflict are likely. The elements of instruments of national power–DIME–will provide the context for this comparative analysis.

Statement of the Problem

The Sino-Indian relationship has become increasingly complex. Both countries view each other within an extremely sophisticated framework of cooperation and antagonism. Cooperation can be seen in a number of areas including trade, government-to-government, and military relations. At the same time however, ongoing and unresolved problems continue to plague the relationship. The old border disputes over Arunachal Pradesh and the Aksai Chin are exacerbated by recent Chinese naval activity in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea, China’s defense ties with Pakistan, and conflicting viewpoints on the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan diasporas, all serve as irritants that hamper cooperation and sow distrust. A comparison of the pre-1962 situation with
that of today could help predict the course of future relations between these two rising powers in Asia.

**Purpose of the Study**

Chinese and Indian aspirations to become first regional, and then global powers, have serious repercussions for peace and prosperity in Asia. The partnership between the United States (U.S.) and India, the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, and U.S. expectations for India to be a major player in world politics, further complicates the security paradigm of Asia. President Barack Obama, during his visit to India in November 2010, further expressed American interests of countering China through India. Despite apparent normality of trade and economic relationships, an air of mistrust still exists between India and China. A recent Chinese claim that Arunachal Pradesh, claimed by India, is in fact South Tibet, is a case in point. The Indian Minister of State for External Affairs, E. Ahmed, stated to the parliament in August 2012 that, “China disputes the international boundary between India and China in the eastern sector and claims approximately 90,000 square kilometers of Indian Territory in the state of Arunachal Pradesh.”

Chinese and Indian associations with Tibet, and growing sea power are additional issues of contention between both countries. Some of the holiest sites in Tibetan Buddhism, including the sacred monastery at Tawang, are in Indian-held territory. The land dispute is countered by Chinese outreach into the Indian Ocean in the backdrop of

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The “String of Pearls Strategy,” and is a growing area of Indian diplomatic concern. A question posed by the "String of Pearls" is the uncertainty of whether China's growing influence is in accordance with the Beijing's stated policy of "peaceful development," or if China one day will make a bid for regional primacy.

China, a member of the permanent five of the United Nations Security Council, gives the impression that it is interested in having a more powerful role on the global stage. India, a major contributor of military forces to the United Nations, but not a member of the Security Council, perceives this to be threatening. All these developments are such that, one cannot turn a blind eye to them. In the context of present developments in the region, it is very important to critically review the situation. Both China and India have developed their militaries to a great extent and both nations are declared nuclear states. Analytical comparison of pre-1962 War environment with today’s environment will help to establish the present status of the relationship between the countries and insights into future developments.

**Theoretical Framework**

The Sino-Indian conflict environment of 1962 will provide the conceptual and comparative framework for analyzing the present relationship between the two states. Moreover, the instruments of national power, to include diplomatic, informational, military and economic will be used to analyze the strategic posture of both countries during pre-1962 and present eras.

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Chinese help to develop port cities of Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Pakistan, which India perceives as an effort to encircle India in the Indian Ocean.
Methodologies

Three methodologies are used to a greater or lesser degree in the preparation of this thesis. First, the comparative analysis within the DIME context will be helpful in reaching conclusive results with regards to the strategic behavior of both countries toward each other. Second, there will be a review of the hegemonic designs of both countries’ territorial sensitivities and bilateral relationships prevalent prior to 1962. The research will ascertain what persists today and determine if these are a recipe for a major catastrophic confrontation, or a lesser conflict between two nuclear nations. Third, a diverse-level of analysis including state level, system level and individual level will be helpful in more fully developing and defining the bilateral relations between India and China.

Research Questions

Three research questions guide this study. First, what were the underlying reasons for the Sino-Indian war of 1962? Second, do the underlying territorial sensitivities and ideological differences exist today as well? The thesis question is: Does the current geostrategic situation between China and India today foretell a future conflict? This research is a mix of historical and strategic studies. By answering the first question, we get to know the historical perspective of Sino-Indian relations; and by answering the second question, we delve into the strategic perspective. Together they answer the main thesis question.
Limitations

This study acknowledges three limitations. First, the reference material will only be obtained from the Combined Army Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, and the global network. The second limitation is that no classified material will be used regarding present bilateral relations between China and India. However, this will somewhat be mitigated by accessing current affair journals, newspapers and the global network. The third limitation concerns the inherent weakness in drawing comparison between the 1962 and present day environment. Neither India nor China were nuclear powers at that time, but they are now. The likelihood of using nuclear weapons by either nation is questionable in view of the other’s deterrent potential and other factors. The entire security paradigm changes with the introduction of a nuclear element. The assumptions and outcome of this thesis do not delve into the nuclear question.

Delimitations

The Kargil Conflict between India and Pakistan in 1998 is a testimony to the fact that a limited war under nuclear overhang is very much possible in modern warfare. Moreover, technical advancements and the possibility of the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the future, also qualify the probability of a future confrontation in a nuclear environment. In order to limit the focus of the study, intricacies of nuclear confrontation will not be discussed in detail in this research.

Organization of Study

This research study is organized into five chapters. Chapter 1 includes the background, problem statement, purpose, definition of terms, theoretical framework,
research questions, limitations, and the delimitations of the study. Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature. Chapter 3 analyzes the environment from the early 1950s to 1962 using the DIME context. Chapter 4 analyzes the post-1962 environment to present day, focusing mainly on the present day environment, again within the context of DIME. Chapter 5 concludes the analysis carried out in the preceding chapters.
Since their independence, the Chinese and Indian relationship has been a mix of mutual respect, deriving out of the necessity of mutual co-existence; and mutual rivalry, which is an outcome of security requirements. The available literature on Sino-Indian relations can broadly be divided into two main categories of security and economic relationship. A large number of scholars have analyzed the Sino-Indian 1962 war through different analytical frameworks. This chapter aims at highlighting the type and salient aspects of literature available on Sino-Indian relations and Sino-Indian War of 1962.

A variety of material is available on the Sino-Indian relationship and the Sino-Indian War of 1962. A large number of scholars have tried to cover the historical aspects of the war, mostly being guided by the Indian version of the story for three reasons. First, there is easier access to the government policymaking processes in India than in China; second, India emerged as the loser in the conflict; and third, because English is more frequently used as a means of communication in India. A suitable account is also available on the current Sino-Indian relationship. There is however, a need to analyze the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict period in the overall construct of bilateral relations, correlating that to the present day with a view of predicting the chance of its recurrence in future.

This chapter is organized into two segments. In the first section, the literature about 1962 Sino-Indian War from the Indian and Chinese viewpoints will be reviewed. The causes of the war and events leading prior to and following the war from Indian and Chinese perspectives will be discussed at length. This literature helps to depict both the Chinese and Indian perspectives on the 1962 War, and strategic posturing against each
other. The second section will cover literature written by researchers, who are neither Chinese nor Indian. This portion will be deliberated in detail because there is a great possibility of impartiality of viewpoint, as chances of their cognitive biases affecting the outcome of their research are far less than the partial ones.

A number of books, research articles published in reputable journals, dissertations, monographs, theses, newspaper articles, and other unclassified material have been used to understand and describe the individual viewpoints of the belligerents. It is natural that the analysts and research scholars from a particular side of the conflict try to highlight the arguments and events in their own favor and downplay the other side. The major sources, which guided synthesis of Indian and Chinese perspective, will be described in detail in this section only.

Bhim Singh Sandhu is a professor at the Department of Political Science, Westchester University of Pennsylvania. He carried out his research on the Sino-Indian War in 1972. The main purpose behind his research was to analyze Sino-Indian relations before the war, to identify those variables that motivated this armed conflict, to analyze attempted modes to resolve or regulate this conflict, and to evaluate the effects of this conflict. Sandhu has used the systems level analysis as a conceptual framework for his research. The author has recently published an article, “Sino-Indian Relations–1947 to Present: From Conflict to Cooperation,” for *International Journal for South Asian Studies*, dwelling mainly upon the relations between China and India.

A research thesis for Masters in Military Arts and Science of Warfare in 1993, “The Sino-Indian Dispute: India’s Current Options” written by Lieutenant Colonel J. S. Dalal is an excellent effort to delve into the history of Sino-Indian border disputes,
background of the Sino-Indian War of 1962 and the prevalent options for settlement of disputes at that point in time. The paper provides detailed insights into the Indian point of view on the Sino-Indian boundary dispute; however, it failed to bring forth the Chinese perspective on this issue.

A dissertation “Chinas Growing Power and Implications for India: Will it be a Cooperative/Competitive or a Hostile Relationship” written by Brigadier R. K. Jagga for Defense Academy of the United Kingdom in 2012, is a recent addition to the existing literature on present Sino-Indian relations. The natural bias has again limited the other country’s point of view.

Xuecheng Liu’s “The Sino-Indian Border Dispute” is the one of the few available unclassified works written by a Chinese scholar on this subject. His work published in 1994, was the first publication in English by any Chinese scholar. He has analyzed the Sino-Indian relation in the framework of the larger context of U.S.-Soviet-Chinese relations, which he argues, conditioned the nature of the triangular relationship of India-China-Pakistan. Just like the shortcomings of Indian literature, this is also driven by the cognitive biases of the author.

The best analysis of any conflict is that done by third-party scholars and analysts. In the Sino-Indian case, a number of U.S. and British scholars have worked on this subject in detail. This provides a more balanced view of the Sino-Indian War of 1962 and the state of their present day relations as well. The portion of this chapter will describe the work done by authors who are neutral on the subject.
The earliest accounts by academic authors looked upon India as the victim of Chinese betrayal and expansionism, and a pro-Indian school of thought was thereby established. The British historian Alastair Lamb introduced contrary ideas about the historical-legal side of the dispute. However, a more favorable image of China vis-à-vis India did not appear until 1970, when Neville Maxwell’s comprehensive study India’s China War was published. Maxwell developed a new polemic hypothesis contending that India provoked the Chinese to launch a “preemptive attack” and that India’s decision early in the 1950s not to negotiate with China made the conflict almost nonnegotiable diplomatically.

Maxwell is a British scholar who is considered to be an expert on Chinese and Indian affairs. His works include, China’s Road to Development, China’s Changed Road to Development, India–The Nagas and the North East, and India’s China War. India’s China War is one book, which is considered to have forced the international scholarly circles to explore the other side of the story. Born in London, Maxwell was educated at McGill University and Cambridge University. He joined Time Magazine as a foreign

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12 Special article by Dr. Bhim Singh Sandhu, “Sino-Indian Relations–1947 to Present: From Conflict to Cooperation” (Society for South Asian Studies, Pondicherry University, Puducherry, India, 2008), 1.
correspondent in 1955 and spent three years in the Washington bureau. In 1959, he was posted to New Delhi as South Asia correspondent. In the next eight years, he traveled from Kabul to East Pakistan and Kathmandu to Ceylon, reporting in detail the end of the Nehru era in India and the post-Nehru developments. In 1967, he went as a senior fellow to the School of Oriental and African Studies in London in order to write *India's China War*.

Maxwell’s work is mostly based on his interviews with the politicians and officials in the Indian government and military. His basic inspiration however, remained his personal knowledge of the dispute as it was handled in New Delhi. Maxwell is not liked in Indian academic circles. Bhim Sing Sindhu’s recently published article in 2008, “Sino-Indian Relations–1947 to Present: From Conflict to Cooperation” indicates the same. Maxwell himself accepts that the unavoidable imbalance in the book comes from the fact that his access to information has been immensely freer on one side of the dispute than the other. He further asserts that no government is more secretive towards its inner processes than that of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and in tracing Chinese policy formulation; he had nothing to go beyond what was on the public record.

Michael Brecher and Steven A. Hoffmann are two scholars who have analyzed the Sino-Indian Conflict from the leadership perspective, stating that individual personalities and leaders were the main contributory factors towards the war. A detailed account describing their works will be mentioned in the following paragraphs. Krishna

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14Ibid.
Menon was the Indian Foreign Minister during the Sino-Indian 1962 War. His diplomacy and handling of the affairs had a major role in India’s handling of the crisis. Michael Brecher’s book, *Indian and World Politics–Krishna Menon’s View of the World*, is an account of Krishna Menon’s reflections of India’s foreign policy system. Michel Brecher, a professor at McGill University, conducted a series of tape-recorded interviews (17 hours in length) with Krishna Menon. His book provides a great deal of understanding regarding specific attitudes that dominated India’s dealings with the foreign powers. The information regarding the behavior of Indian leadership in matters relating to foreign policy will be helpful in this research.

Steven A. Hoffmann’s, *India and The China War*, is an insight into the Indian State behavior under crisis. This book also provides an analysis of what led to the Sino-Indian border war, as well as the mind-set that influenced Nehru, Krishna Menon, and the Indian decision-making group as a whole. States’ behavior under crisis is a reflection of the crisis management of its leadership. Four crucial aspects of decision-making drive their behavior: information processing, patterns of consultation, decisional forums, and the search for and considerations of alternatives.

Hoffmann attributes India’s failure to absorb information about the forthcoming Chinese attack to “a certain mental rigidity,” the “difficulty in learning from negative results of past decisions,” and Nehru’s inability to think in terms of a punitive military

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raid rather than full-scale war for unlimited objectives. In a nutshell Hoffmann attributes the Indian military setback and flawed information processing to Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister; Krishna Menon, the Indian Foreign Minister; B. N. Mullik, the director of Intelligence Bureau; and several generals, notably B. M. Kaul. According to Hoffmann, Nehru and his associates relied heavily on experience in interpreting information about China’s behavior. They also relied on extraordinary and improvised channels of communication in the pre-war phase of the crisis.

Like most of the literature available on the subject, Hoffmann’s is a study of India’s behavior and not of China’s. Nevertheless, it contains many vignettes about the other party as well. He has based his research on interviews conducted between 1983 and 1986 as a primary source. Moreover, insights from extensive literature on foreign policy decision-making and crisis behavior have been used as conceptual framework for analysis.

Aldo D. Abitbol’s article, “Causes of the 1962 Sino-Indian War: A System Level Approach” published in Joseph Korbel Journal of Advanced International Studies, is a good effort to attribute the causes of war to the overall construct of international politics. He concludes that it was certain changes in national interests, geostrategic positions, and the anarchy of the international system that brought both nations closer to the precipice of conflict. The author believes that it was India’s notion of changing a

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17 Brecher, forward.

18 Ibid.

bipolar to a multipolar world and her assertion of being a major power in world affairs, which limited the intervention of either of the super powers in resisting escalation to war. The author disputes the idea that only ideological differences between China and India could have led to war. According to him, if ideology was such an important motivator behind the militarization of the Sino-Indian border dispute, then it is unlikely that the conflict would have waited to develop until 1962.

Jonathan Holslag’s, *China and India–Prospects for Peace*, published in 2010 is the latest addition to existing literature on the Sino-Indian relations, Holslag has attempted to provide a link of economic and security dimension to the existing relations between China and India. His book is an attempt at assessing whether deepening economic integration also fosters cooperation in other areas, such as security, and vice versa. It is believed that economic interdependence can mitigate the security concerns between two nations; however Holslag contests these views in this book. Although this book will not help with an insight into Sino-Indian Conflict, it provides sufficient background knowledge of the present state of Sino-Indian relations tying them to economic and security aspects.

The foregoing literature review indicates that sufficient material is available on the present day Sino-Indian relations and the Sino-Indian War of 1962. This research will be an effort to add to the existing literature in a different context. The instruments of national power–DIME–will be used as a context to analyze whether or not symmetry exists between the pre-1962 environment and that of today. This research is focused on an attempt to determine the status of relations between both countries in a context not used before–DIME.
CHAPTER 3

PRE-1962 CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA

The bilateral relations between India and China encountered both highs and lows from the early 1950’s until 1962. The early part of relations remained quite cordial, based on the theory of “Panjsheela–The peaceful co-existence” as promulgated by the first Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru. However, these relations soon started deteriorating. The suspicions about Chinese intentions started growing in the Indian hierarchy after its appraisal of the construction of the strategically important road link of Tibet–Xinjiang. On the other side, provision of political asylum to the Dalai Lama by India in 1959, after the Tibetan uprising, alarmed the Chinese leadership about the Indian government intentions. In short, the seeds of mistrust had been sown just a decade after the states of India and China came into existence. The focus of this chapter is where India and China stand within the context of DIME in the environment leading from the early 1950s up to 1962.

Diplomatic

The international politics in 1950s had a significant impact on diplomatic posturing between India and China. The early years of relations between communist China and formally non-aligned India were cold and barren until Indian’s foreign policy began asserting its independence of the West in the cold war situation. The declaration of Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence between China and India was a big blow to both power blocs, the Soviet and the U.S. China’s peace offensive during the Bandung Phase (1954-1958) aimed at enlisting the non-aligned, newly free nations against imperialism,
and India’s strong support for the non-aligned movement forced the USSR and the U.S. to enter a phase of détente (which later culminated in peaceful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis). U.S. and Soviet interests started to converge on India in the late 1950s. Knowledge of growing Sino-Soviet differences (which had not reached the stage of open disputation yet) and the willingness of the super-powers to back India, hardened Nehru’s attitude towards the border dispute. India could not have taken a softer stance on this issue because of Pakistan’s attachment to the Kashmir issue. The accession of Aksai Chin, which was part of the Laddakh region of the disputed Kashmir to China, would have weakened India’s claim over that part of the Kashmir region in the possession of Pakistan.

Diplomatic posturing of the political leadership also had an important role in the deteriorating diplomatic relations between India and China. Both India and China accused each other of carrying out the aggression. It is important to take an account of verdicts from both sides. First, the fallacies of Indian leadership and then that of Chinese leadership will be elaborated on to determine the causes of the conflict.

After the appraisal of the construction of the Tibet-Xinjiang Road by the Chinese in the Aksai Chin region, the Indian government decided to adopt a “Forward Policy.” The implementation of this strategy was through the aggressive pursuit of Indian interests. The Indian Prime Minister Jawahar Lala Nehru explained the implementation of this policy in a single phrase in front of the Indian parliament in 1961, “By diplomatic means, by various measures and ultimately if you like by war.” He further stated that

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India would build up her position of strength to deal with the situation.\footnote{Maxwell, \textit{India's China War}, 176.} The Indian Government had started implementing the "forward policy," by sending patrols to probe the Chinese-occupied areas and penetrating the spaces between the Chinese positions without attacking them. The objectives were to block potential lines of further Chinese advance and to establish an Indian presence in Aksai Chin.\footnote{Ibid.}

Nehru’s aggressive personality had a lot of impact on the policy formulation in India. By describing the Chinese presence as an act of aggression, the Indian Government obliged itself to take action, even to use force if diplomatic methods failed. Moreover, the naivety and arrogance of the Indian leadership was one of the reasons pushing India to war. The political leadership in India wanted to settle the score with China through military means rather than diplomatic means. Neville Maxwell has documented that the internal politics of India largely dictated how the Congress Party and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru pushed the Indian Army into combat.\footnote{Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt, eds., \textit{Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949} (New York: M. E Sharpe Inc., 2003), 173.} On his way to Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) on 12 October, Nehru declared at Madras that he had ordered the army to throw the Chinese out. He also disclosed that the order had been issued and the date of its implementation would be decided entirely by the Army.\footnote{Xuecheng Liu, quoted in \textit{The Stateman}, 13 October 1962.} The language used by Nehru was not very well received in the diplomatic circles. Nehru was reported to tell the field commanders that he had good reasons to believe that “the Chinese would not take any
strong action against us.”25 After the fall of Tawang, Major General Niranjan Parsad was called to see the Indian President Radhakirshan. He quoted the Indian President as saying:

> What does Nehru Mean by saying “I have ordered the army to throw the Chinese Out?” Is this the language to be used in international affairs? Is this the manner in which grave national issues is handled?26

The situation in the Chinese leadership was not sensible either. In the early 1960s, China was paranoid of being encircled on two fronts. American support to Chiang Kai-Shek who was then established in Taiwan, an increase in American aid to Taiwan, and appointment of Admiral Alan G. Kirk—an expert in amphibious warfare—as American ambassador in Taipei, were a few of the elements which raised suspicions in the Chinese hierarchy. Facing American–Chiang military pressure in the Taiwan Strait and the Indian’s forward push in the Himalayas, Chinese leaders were concerned about the prospects of attacks from both Taiwan and India.27 On 29 May 1962, in an interview with Japanese journalists, Marshal Chen Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, indicated the linkage of threats facing China from the U.S., Taiwan, and India. He stated that the Pentagon generals might support the Nationalists in starting a “counter-offense on the

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mainland” along the coastal areas. Further, he pointed out that incidents might occur on other borders, suggesting the possible trouble on the Sino-Indian border.28

It can be very conveniently said that it was diplomatic mistrust between Chinese and Indian leadership, which paved the way for an armed conflict in 1962. If China could resolve its border issues with many other countries including Russia and Pakistan, why could it not resolve the same with India?

Information

In this section, an attempt will be made to describe the Chinese and Indian strategic culture as they viewed each other. Strategic culture is defined as the fundamental and enduring assumptions about the role of war (both interstate and intrastate) in human affairs and the efficacy of applying force held by political and military elites in a country.29

China’s View of India

China had presented its image as a peace loving country, which used force only in self-defense. Chinese behavior during the Korean War of 1950-1953 and the Sino-Indian War of 1962 indicates the same, in which Chinese armed forces withdrew to their claimed borderlines or left the country entirely after achieving their goals. Although some analysts suggest that in its conflict with India, China had foregone the option of pursuit


because of increased vulnerability to its overstretched lines of communication. The truth however cannot be ascertained. Moreover, India claims that Chinese actions against India do not fall under the pretext of self-defense, because it was the PLA who initiated the all-out war. However, China maintained that it used aggression as an active self-defense.

India’s View of China

The Indian perception of China was largely formulated through public opinion, which had primarily been conditioned by the Indian politicians. During pre-1962 war period, the image portrayed by Indian media and politicians about China was that of a brother, a phrase on the common man’s tongue “Hindi-Chinese Bhai Bhai”–Indian and Chinese are brothers. This image according to Indians was shattered after the war and Indians felt betrayed by China.

Status of Tibet and TGIE (Tibet Government in Exile)

Professor Jagat S. Mehta, dealing with the Sino-Indian border issue, and later Indian Foreign Secretary, stated that the boundary question was not the trigger to the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations; and that the Indian reaction to the Tibetan revolt angered the Chinese, who then openly made claims to Indian territory for retaliation. The use of this fiery exchange of words on the diplomatic canvas and rhetoric against each other complicated the bilateral relations back in the early 1960s.

The situation in Tibet worsened in early 1959. On 19 March, the rebels in Tibet launched an armed attack against the PLA garrison in Lhasa. Acting on the orders of the State Council of China, the PLA had put down the Tibetan rebellion by 22 March. With

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the assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the U.S. and the Tibetan rebels, the Dalai Lama and his followers fled to India. Political asylum was given to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan rebels were given an impressive welcome as heroes. Nehru paid a warm visit to the Dalai Lama as soon as he arrived at Mussoorie, the Indian hill station where he made his first headquarters.31 This open support for the Dalai Lama, whom China considered as main reason for inciting rebellion in Tibet region, was well received in India. This obviously gave a wrong signal to the then Chinese Government. The TGIE as referred to by Indian authorities, has been established in Indian City of Dharamsala since 1959. The Dalai Lama, with some 100,000 followers, has made his home in India since fleeing Lhasa, Tibet's capital, in 1959.32

It is believed that Tibet was the main source of contention between India and China. The world community failed to recognize that it was not Tibet, but the Tibetan activists under the leadership of the Dalai Lama who were the main source of mistrust between both the countries. The seeds of mistrust were sown back in 1959 when Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru paid no heed to Chinese Premier Zhou En Lai’s warning to not give asylum to the Dalai Lama. This soft-spoken monk is in reality the key catalyst in the development of mistrust between India and China.33

31 Liu, _The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations_, 22-23.


33 Jagga, 10-11.
Military

This section will focus on analysis of the military situation on both sides. After
the division of Indian Sub-Continent in 1947, the Indian military was also divided
between Pakistan and India. The military units, equipment and training infrastructure
were divided between both countries. The Indian military, over the decade preceding the
conflict, was in the process of transition, in terms of improving its military strength and
devising the military doctrine. The Indo-Pak war of 1948, over the disputed region of
Kashmir, had forced the Indian military to keep its primary focus on Pakistan as its
archrival. China had not figured as a potential adversary until the late 1950s, once India
became aware of the construction of the strategically important road of Tibet-Xinjiang.
Thereafter, India was forced to devise a strategy to be able to fight a war on two fronts.
The time lag between this shift in strategy and the war of 1961 was insufficient to
completely prepare the Indian military for war. In his book, India’s China War, Neville
Maxwell says:

After the Longju and Kongka Pass incidents of late 1959, with the realization that
an intractable dispute might develop over the boundary question, the expansion of
the Indian Army became more purposeful and faster. In November-December
1959, 4 Division was hurriedly transferred from the Punjab to the north-east, and
a new division, the 17th was created.\footnote{Mark et al., 178.}

The preparation on the Chinese side was much better when compared to the
Indian side. By the time of the Sino-Indian border war, leaders of the PLA, from squad to
division level, had years in which to become acclimated to the terrain in Tibet. Three
divisions of the PLA 18th Corps had moved to Tibet as early as 1950, as part of the initial
PRC force that established Communist control of the region after the Chinese civil war (a

\footnote{Mark et al., 178.}}
corps was the strength of today’s PLA group army, three division plus support). The 46th Corps moved to Tibet in time for the Sino-Indian conflict, but one of its divisions, the 133rd Infantry Division, had also been part of the initial PLA force that entered Tibet in 1950s. The PLA 54th Corps (Army), one of the premier fighting units in the Chinese armed forces, moved into Tibet in 1959 to suppress an insurrection by the Khampa rebels.35

The Indian military leadership back in 1962 was as aggressive as their political counterparts. In February 1962, Lieutenant General Kaul presided over a meeting in Gauhati, attended by senior civil and military officials who agreed that it was imperative in the national interests of defense to establish as many posts as possible along the border of the eastern sector, despite the attendant difficulties.36 However, it is interesting to note that their forward policy and threat to respond to Chinese aggression by use of force or by war, was based on an erroneous assumption that China would not use force or launch attacks to defend their territorial claim.37

China’s general military objective for the war was to eliminate the Indian positions forward of the line of control and to destroy the organic units of the invading Indian troops. From a political standpoint, this action was designed to “teach a serious lesson” to India about Chinese concerns with sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, China also sought long-term peace and stability on the Sino-Indian border. Significantly, before the war, Mao Zedong predicted that it would win China 10 years of

35Mark et al., 176.
36Dalvi, 60-70.
37Liu, The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations, 32.
stability on the Sino-Indian border. Just as important, the Sino-Indian border war, like China’s actions in the Korean War, conveyed to the world that its pronouncements must be taken seriously, and that China would back up threats with force if challenged.38

**Economic**

Cultural and economic relations between China and India date back to ancient times. The Silk Road not only served as a major trade route between India and China, but is also credited for facilitating the spread of Buddhism from India to East Asia. Formal relations between both countries began in 1950 when India was among the first countries to break relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan and recognize the PRC.

Five principles of peaceful coexistence, popularly known as the Panjsheela Agreement, were basically a trade pact between China and India, streamlining their bilateral trade operations in Tibet. The negotiations for this agreement were held in Beijing between 31 December 1953 and 29 April 1954; at the end of which, this agreement was finally signed in Beijing. This agreement is of significant importance for two reasons: for the first time India recognized Chinese control over Tibet; and this was the only significant bilateral agreement between China and India before the War of 1962.

This agreement denotes the amount of importance both countries gave to developing economic relations with each other. The agreement had six articles, out of which articles I, II, III and V were primarily focused on bilateral trade. Article I specified the cities where both countries could establish trading agencies; New Delhi, Calcutta, and Kalimpong in India; and Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok in China. Article II specified the

38Mark et al., 187.
markets for trade. Article III specified the routes to be used by traders and pilgrims. In addition, Article V laid out rules and regulations for the traders.39

The exact amount of bilateral trade between India and China during this period is not available in the archives or websites of India’s or China’s Ministries of Commerce and Trade. The clauses of the Panjsheela Agreement indicate that both India and China had equal opportunities to mutually benefit from bilateral trade and commerce. In practical terms however, China was the immediate beneficiary of this agreement. India on the other hand, had felt satisfied with its intangible gains. In terms of its concessions, it meant that for the first time, India recognized China’s complete control over Tibet. In this agreement, India voluntarily gave up its military, communication, postal, and other rights which New Delhi had inherited from the British in accordance with the Anglo-Tibetan Treaty of 1904. It is strange that India did not demand any reciprocal concession. In retrospect, this presented a rare opportunity to resolve the rest of the border dispute, which is the only basic problem between these two countries today.40

A severe blow to the seemingly good economic and trade relations and five principals of peaceful coexistence enunciated through the Panjsheela Agreement, was the provision of political asylum to the Dalai Lama by India. This event indicates that ideological mistrust between the countries is so extreme that any incident can severely derail the peace process and smooth trade and commerce between both the countries.


40Ibid.
A very brief background of evolution of relations from the post-1962 environment until today will be helpful in analyzing their present day status. Bilateral relations between India and China remained strained from 1962 until the mid-1980s. India’s nuclear test of 1974 in response to that of China’s in 1964 are two of the major incidents which helped precipitate the increasing enmity in the relationship. Some diplomatic efforts by both countries normalized these relations after the Indian Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China in 1988. A number of working groups were formed to enhance trade and investment, and discuss the boundary issue in the early 1990s. Agreements were signed and confidence-building measures were also enforced along the Actual Line of Contact.\(^4\) Thereafter, came another period of cold relations between the countries, when India exploded its nuclear device in 1998, and used China as a pretext. However, the exponential economic growth of both China and India in first decade of the twenty-first century brought both neighbors to good terms again, which continues to this day with minor exceptions.

“Where do India and China stand today?” is an important question on everyone’s mind. Many analysts, researchers and writers have tried to answer this question in different ways. We shall again use the context of DIME to evaluate the present status of the relationship between India and China.

Diplomatic

International and regional politics continue to shape the diplomatic relations between India and China today as well. After the dismemberment of the USSR, the influence of the Soviet Bloc was considerably reduced, and the U.S. emerged as the sole superpower in the world. Although Russia continues to play an important role in the international politics, its role was considerably reduced in the post-cold war era. The U.S. now sees its relations with both India and China in a new and very complex framework. With the focus of world economy shifting to Asia, these three powers are becoming increasingly important to each other. Progressive improvement of U.S.-India relations is gaining attention in the world, and is being viewed suspiciously by China.

The growth of China’s power in the 1990s had an impact on the U.S. policies towards India and vice-versa. The growing military-to-military cooperation between India and the U.S. especially in the Indian Ocean, is viewed with grave concerns in Beijing, given the growing dependence of Chinese imports transiting the Indian Ocean. China also expressed concerns over the U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear deal, as it undermined the nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, China later showed restraint as this paved way for the Chinese to support Pakistan in the nuclear field.

The strategic equation between Pakistan and China poses a hindrance to any substantive improvement in India’s relations with China. The Sino-Pak relationship is a comprehensive friendship that spans the entire gamut of political, military, nuclear and economic activities. This relationship grew in the 1960s to counterbalance India. In 1963, Pakistan ceded to China the Trans-Karakoram Tract, also known as Shaksam Valley, in the disputed territory of Kashmir. This area links Pakistan to China’s Xinjiang region.
along the Karakoram Highway. China’s upgrade of the Karakoram Highway and its development of railways, as well as other construction including dams and tunnels, enables it to extend its strategic reach to the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf through Pakistan. While Chinese officials ascribe this to economic and infrastructure development in the region, this is a cause of for security concerns in New Delhi.

China and India also remain engaged in an effort to counter each other’s interests in regional politics. China has undertaken a number of development projects in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Nepal. China has also provided sufficient military assistance to these countries to increase their leverage vis-à-vis India. Beijing has sold modern missile boats to Bangladesh and provided military aid to Sri Lanka to help them overcome Tamil insurgency. China’s main interests in Nepal stem from its concerns over movement of large numbers of Tibetans into Nepal. Therefore, India is not only concerned with growing Chinese influence in India’s arch rival Pakistan, but her extensive economic and security relationship with Myanmar, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, and increasing naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Conversely, China views the Indian oil exploration activities in South China Sea in collaboration with Vietnam, and the Indian plan of for the Trilateral Highway between India, Myanmar and Thailand as a source of grave concern.

Besides international and regional politics, bilateral relations between India and China also play a profound role. The formal diplomatic relations remained virtually suspended until the early 1980s. This was a natural outcome of the bitter memories of the Sino-Indian War of 1962. The normalization of diplomatic exchanges and discussion on border disputes began in the 1980s when a series of talks were held. This development
could still not sustain the test of time, as India conducted nuclear explosions in 1998, and used its enmity with China to justify this act. However, bilateral relations again improved in the early 2000s, after high-level visits between the two countries. Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to Beijing in 2003, marked an important breakthrough in Sino-Indian relations as India acknowledged China’s sovereignty over the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR).42 The visits of Chinese President Wen Jiabao in 2005 and 2010, and two visits of the Indian Premier Manmohan Singh to China in 2008, were focused on improving bilateral trade and economic relations between both the countries.43

In 2013, India and China continue to posture against each other instead of continuing to improve their relations. In the article, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Future,” published by the Strategic Studies Institute in November 2002, Brigadier Feroz Hassan Khan mentions Chinese centrality in Indian strategic thinking:

Indian designs on China could be constructed as the following: in the short term, engage China to buy time while maintaining the rivalry in order to receive Western support and to justify an arms build-up—thus narrowing the developmental and technological gap between India and China. In the long term, force China to accept India as a peer competitor with global status.44

Despite continuous efforts by both governments and increased assurances for continued development of bilateral trade and economic ties, there are still some factors


44Brigadier Feroz Hassan Khan, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Future” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002).
which inhibit improvement in the bilateral and diplomatic relationship. China was issuing stapled visas to the residents of Jammu and Kashmir in 2010, and did not put stamps on the Indian passports to reinforce the claim that Jammu and Kashmir was a disputed territory that belong to Pakistan. The issue reached its height when China denied a visa to Indian controlled Kashmir to an Indian general. The defense ties between both the countries were put on hold, and military-to-military exchanges were cancelled.

It was a result of Beijing’s uneasiness over India’s efforts to develop ties with the Southeast Asian countries. Although the issue was later resolved in 2011, it had left unpleasant effects.

In January 2012, China denied a visa to a senior Indian Air Force officer hailing from Arunachal Pradesh, who was to be a part of the defense team travelling to China under a bilateral defense exchange program. The Chinese authorities used this diplomatic overture to further her claim over Arunachal Pradesh, implying that the official was a Chinese citizen, and therefore did not need a visa to visit China. These issues were resolved over a period of time; however, these continuous pin pricks keep creating strained relations. However, they do not indicate any prelude to a major conflict between the countries. They do indicate one thing, that China and India do not see each other favorably. The activities of the last decade have shown a lot of improvement in diplomatic exchanges at the ministerial level and improvement in economic fields, which are examined in the next sections.

45“India, China Solve Stapled Visa Issue; Put off Border Talks,” The Economic Times, 23 December 2011.

Information

In this section, an attempt will be made to describe the Chinese and Indian strategic culture as they view each other today. The focus in this section will be limited to how each country views as its adversary in strategic terms. As already defined in Chapter 3, strategic culture is defined as the fundamental and enduring assumptions about the role of war (both interstate and intrastate) in human affairs and the efficacy of applying force held by political and military elites in a country.

China’s View of India

China does not see India as an ally in the geopolitical sense; the two are not security partners. However, China does view India as a rising power that can help China limit the potential influence of the U.S. in various arenas, especially in international institutions. Profoundly, China views India as its competitor. When it comes to India’s bid for permanent membership of United Nations Security Council, China sends mixed signals as this would rob China of its unique position of being the lone voice of Asia.

China’s posturing against India is also due to prevailing international politics. China thinks that the U.S. is helping India reach a status where it could challenge the growth of Chinese power in the region. President Obama, during his visit in 2010, announced his complete backing for Indian permanent membership in the Security Council.


48Jagga, 16.
Council. His ten day visit to South Asian countries was viewed as putting pressure on China.49

The military and economic aspects of the relationship will be discussed in the appropriate sections, however how China views India economically and militarily will be briefly touched upon in this section as well. Chinese economists and military circles view of India is totally divergent. Chinese economic circles see a lot of potential in bilateral trade and economic ties with India. A majority of Chinese analysts from government research institutes, retired diplomats, think tanks and business circles believe that China should develop normal relations with India and seek ways to resolve bilateral differences through negotiations and cooperation.50

However, Chinese military analysts are wary of Indian development and the modernization of its military. They view the Indian military growth as a challenge in pursuing Chinese economic interests in extending Chinese trade through Sea Lines of Communications in the Indian Ocean, to the Middle East, Africa and Europe. Moreover, they view the Indian nuclear program and development of long-range missile capability as being pointed solely against China.

Indian Views of China

China is paranoid about India’s stance on Tibet. India is also paranoid about any developments China makes in Tibet. India views Chinese progress, specifically military


50Jagga, 16.
modernization, large-scale logistics improvement in Tibet, the ratcheting up of the Arunachal Pradesh border dispute, growing relations with Pakistan, and developing of port facilities in Indian neighborhood with a concern.\footnote{Jagga, 15.}

Stephen Cohen, a South Asia expert with the Brookings Institute, said at a talk in New Delhi:


Indian policy towards China is that of a careful but non-provocative neighbor. New Delhi continues to stress adequacy in defense along the border. It is careful not to be provocative militarily. The only exception to India’s general policy of restraint occurred after the nuclear tests of May 1998, when New Delhi sought to justify the tests in terms of the Chinese threat. While this caused a public diplomatic spat between the two countries, relations were carefully mended thereafter. Since 1988, Indian policy has been to widen the scope of relations with China and not to make everything hostage to the settlement of the border dispute.\footnote{Kanti Bajpai, “Indian Strategic Culture,” in \textit{South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances}, ed. Michael R. Chambers (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002).}
The India China view of each other can be correlated to the Pakistan-India view of each other. Between India and Pakistan, India wants normalization of relations first, and settlement of outstanding disputes later, because India has economic ascendance over Pakistan. Conversely, Pakistan wants to settle the outstanding disputes–Kashmir–first and then normalize the relations, because Pakistan does not want India to benefit from mutual trade. Similarly between China and India, China wants to enhance the trade relations first and then settle the border disputes; whereas, India wants resolution of the border dispute as a necessary pre-requisite for improving bilateral relations.54 This was the Indian stance in the early 1990s, which has changed considerably now. This can also be referred to as India ceding to Chinese economic development over the last decade or so.

Status of Tibet and Tibet Government in Exile (TGIE)

The exile of the Dalai Lama and his political activities are an irritant in Sino-Indian relations even today. He made a public appearance in Gangtok, the capital city of Sikkim in 2011. His presence in Sikkim was in itself a measured gesture of Indian defiance towards China. India annexed the former kingdom of Sikkim in 1975. China long refused to recognize Sikkim's incorporation into India, though since 2004 Chinese maps have shown it as an Indian state, and in 2006, a modest border trade began. The Dalai Lama's eight-day tour of Sikkim was pointedly timed to come just after Wen Jiabao, China's prime minister, had been in Delhi discussing how to improve ties.55

54Dalal, 56.
55“Banyan: The Indispensable Incantation.”
It is an established fact that India has always had an interest in keeping the Tibet issue and the Dalai Lama in the forefront of world politics. However, China has also shown a deep attachment to the Tibet issue. China is paranoia about Tibet. Any development or statement on Tibet by the Indian Government officials is viewed with deep suspicions in China. The Chinese sensitivities towards the Tibet issue are quite understandable in the backdrop of China’s “One China Policy”. However, China does not give credit to the Indian Government for their recognition of Chinese claims over Tibet. India acknowledged Tibet as a region of China consequent to the 1954 Treaty on Trade and Intercourse.\(^{56}\) During the official visit of Indian Premier, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee to China in June 2003, the Indian side once again recognized the Tibet Autonomous Region as part of the territory of the PRC and reiterated not allowing Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in India.\(^{57}\)

The Maoist Insurgency in North East India

While China blames India for creating dissension in Tibet through the Tibetans in exile in India, India openly blames China for supporting the Maoist Insurgency in its North Eastern region. India blames China for clandestine support with the connivance of the Kachin Independent Army in Myanmar, and supplying arms to the Maoists in India through the borders with Nepal, Myanmar and Bangladesh.\(^{58}\)

\(^{56}\)Dalal, 15.

\(^{57}\)Jaibao and Vajpayee.

\(^{58}\)Jagga, 11.
Military

The Chinese and Indian military posturing against each other in the present day environment is discussed in this section. Besides elaborating on military posturing against each other in terms of military balance, deployment of forces, and force modernization; areas of common interests in the military field and their impact on the overall relations between both the countries are explored.

Figure 3. China and India Border Deployment

Present Military Balance

Both China and India have invested quite heavily in defense expenditures over the last decade with a focus on force modernization. China however, has surpassed India by at least three times as far as defense expenditure is concerned. According to the latest statistics, China has increased its defense budget by 10.7 percent to $115.7 billion, which is approximately three times that of India, which stands at about $37.4 billion for 2013-2014.59 These developments are not positive indicators towards lasting peace. However, it is also believed by some that advancement in the defense sector is also a guarantee for stability between the two nations. The military balance between India and China today is in appendix A.

China’s Military Posturing Against India

Although the exact deployments of Chinese Army are not known in unclassified literature, one available source indicates that the PLA’s deployment postured against India comprises four Group Armies divided into two regions of Lanzhou and Chengdu. The Chinese Order of Battle (ORBAT) of these Army Groups is given in appendix B. When corroborated with Google Earth, this deployment shows that it is postured against India and Vietnam. Jonathan Holslag also confirms this deployment in his research paper titled “China, India and the Military Security Dilemma,” published by the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies in 2008. The approximate strength of these forces is 400,000 troops.

Over the recent past, China has given considerable attention to modernizing its forces against India. The Military Regions of Chengdu and Lanzhou saw a significant modernization of their capacity, after being overlooked for many years. After stepping up the firepower of the units along the east coast, the Chengdu and Lanzhou regions have now moved new rejuvenation schemes up on the list of priorities. The 13th Group Army, for instance, has developed into a modern rapid reaction force with enhanced logistical capacity, mobile artillery, air defense, communication and intelligence, special forces and intensive training in warfare under exceptional conditions, such as high-altitude combat. Airfields in the Chengdu Military Region underwent an upgrade in the late 1990s. In 2001, the 33th Air Division was reinforced with SU-27UBK aircraft that are currently based in Chongqing. These long-range air defense fighters are equipped with a state of the art radar system, display increased maneuverability, and given their payload of 8,000 kg are better suited for high-altitude tasks.\footnote{Jonathan Holslag, “China, India and the Military Security Dilemma,” \textit{Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies} (2008): 9.}

Closer to the border, China has reportedly built signal intelligence installations in Aksai Chin and on the southern edge of the Tibetan Plateau. Since 2002, it has conducted several counter-terrorism operations and exercises near the Line of Control, one with the participation of Pakistan. According to open sources, China has been carrying out a program to make its military units in Tibet better equipped for rapid reaction operations by investing in new-wheeled armored vehicles and artillery, specialized training and helicopters that are equipped for missions in the heights of the Himalayas. Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese Air Force has renovated its 14 airfields in Tibet with new
communication and command infrastructure, longer landing strips, and depots. Several sources have revealed the experimental deployment of SU-27 multi-role fighter aircraft.61

Is the Chinese build-up specifically aimed at India? The answer is no. The Military Region of Lanzhou prioritizes security in the Autonomous Region of Xinjiang, i.e. suppressing so-called secessionist movements among the Uyghurs, safeguarding energy facilities in the Tarim Basin, and preventing a spillover of extremism and violence from Central Asia. The 13th Group Army of Chengdu is primarily assigned to support the People’s Armed Police controlling Tibet and to monitor the porous and unstable boundary with Myanmar. The SU-27 aircraft are also deployable as a second-tier strike force in case of an armed conflict with Taiwan. Yet, the modernization in the two Military Regions does consider India as a potential challenger. The point of departure remains the so-called principle of “active defense under high-tech conditions.” This implies that the PLA should be able to intervene in neighboring countries whenever China’s sovereignty is in jeopardy. The main difference with earlier decades is that military units are no longer devoted to a specific threat in a specific area. Instead, they should be able to operate quickly in many places, inside and outside the People’s Republic, and to deal with various conventional and non-conventional challenges. “We don’t have the luxury anymore of having to address one single enemy,” a Chinese military expert summarizes, “but for the troops in Chengdu and Lanzhou, a potential war with India is still central in our military planning and scenarios.” Hence, although India is not the sole target, the maintenance of a capacity of 400,000 soldiers, with a strong presence of offensive arms

systems, at short distance from the Indian border remains an important source of conventional deterrence.\textsuperscript{62}

\textbf{Indian Military Posturing Against China}

The Indian Army strength postured against China is over 300,000\textsuperscript{63} organized into three corps under the Eastern Command, and one division under the Northern Command. The ORBAT of these forces is in appendix C.

Just like the PLA, the capacity of the Indian armed forces is severely overstretched. With an alarming proliferation of armed resistance in the northeast, an expansion of the Naxalites’ rebellion in the east of the subcontinent, and unstable states all along the border, the Indian units are struggling to counter these challenges. The Eastern and Northern Commands whose mission is to secure the Chinese border shifted most of their capacity to contain the insurgency in Kashmir and the rebellious northeast. Under the Calcutta-based Eastern Command, the Indian Army has three corps at its disposal, but these are all severely depleted.

After increasing activity of small Chinese units at the end of 2007, the Minister of Defense, the National Security Adviser, and the Chiefs of the Eastern and Northern Command agreed to step up the Army’s strength at the border. This meeting also followed a strategic reassessment of China’s capabilities, which shortened the preparation period for a potential Chinese assault from six months to only a few weeks. In December 2007, the 27th Division from the 33rd Corps was relocated to its home base in


Kalimpong after being deployed for more than 10 years in Kashmir. Located near the strategically important tri-junction between Bhutan, India and China, this move sought to address the mounting presence of Chinese soldiers in this area.\textsuperscript{64}

With regards to the Indian Air Force, strengthening of Eastern Air Command’s capacity has been impressive. It covers the eastern states that border the countries of Bangladesh, China and Myanmar. Yet, most modernizations go far beyond a capability to deal with domestic rebel movements. The Indian government decided to base squadrons of its most potent fighter jets, the SU-30MKI to Tezpur, in the Eastern Sector from 2008 on. These Sukhoi aircraft increase India’s preparedness to launch air-denial operations. Apart from the Sukhoi, Tezpur will be strengthened with new air-defense systems and advanced combat helicopters that are better equipped for high-altitude warfare and the lifting of advanced landing groups. In addition to Tezpur, the Indian Air Force is also in the process of upgrading its other airbases in the Eastern Sector. The length of runway at the base in Kalaikunda in West Bengal state has been extended to back forward operations in Arunachal. The Command is also refurbishing its forward airbases at Chabua, Jorhat and Hash Mara air bases.\textsuperscript{65}

\textbf{Indian and Chinese Force Modernization}

China and India, the region’s two major emerging economies and aspirant powers, want to procure and indigenously develop advanced military systems and improve the effectiveness of their armed forces, and they support expanding defense

\textsuperscript{64}Holslag, “China, India and the Military Security Dilemma,” 11-12.

\textsuperscript{65}Ibid., 12.
budgets for these purposes. In the past year, much media coverage has focused on developments in China’s PLA, notably its aircraft carrier and J-20 fifth-generation combat-aircraft programs. However, other aspects of the PLA’s expanding capabilities, such as its anti-ship missile and submarine programs, are perhaps more strategically significant, particularly for the U.S. Navy. Meanwhile, New Delhi is providing substantially increased funding to develop the capabilities of its armed forces. India’s Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition has been called ‘the mother of all deals’, but the planned procurement of new aircraft carriers, submarines, guided weapons, artillery and space assets will also be key in building India’s broader military capabilities.66

Sino-Indian Military Cooperation

The bilateral cooperation in the militaries of both countries can also be seen in a number of fields. These include the joint training exercises, defense dialogue, establishment of “Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India China Border Affairs,” and service chief level exchanges. Both countries celebrated 2012 as “The Year of India–China Friendship and Cooperation.”

The first Joint Training Exercise between the Indian Army and the PLA, “HAND IN HAND 2007,” was conducted at Kunming, China. One company each from the Indian Army and the PLA participated in the exercise, which was based on the theme of Counter Terrorism. The second India China Joint Training Exercise was held in India (Belgaum) in December 2008 based on the same theme and participation level. In addition to the

ground force exercises the Indian Air Force nine aircraft aerobatics display team, the
SKAT participated in the 7th International Aviation & Aerospace Exhibition (Zhuhai Air
Show).  

Both countries have carried out three rounds of defense dialogues recently. The
first Annual Defense Dialogue between India and China was held in Beijing in November
2007, a second was held in India on 15 December 2008, and the third round was held in
Beijing (China) on 6 January 2010.  

The bilateral exchanges between India and China have been steadily increasing
with greater exchanges of defense delegations. From India, the Indian Defense Ministers
Ministers have visited India in September 1994, March 2004 and September 2012. The
detail of ministerial and service chief level visits is in appendix D.  

Economic

In recent years, both states have enjoyed burgeoning economies: China’s driven
by the production and export of manufactured goods, and India’s by services, led by
Information Technology (IT). Goldman Sachs, looking further ahead, claims that were
China to maintain its pro-growth policies and to manage its economy ‘reasonably well’,
then it could overtake the U.S. as the world’s biggest economy as soon as the late-2020s;

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Embassy of India Official Website, Embassy of India Beijing,
http://www.indianembassy.org.cn/DynamicContent.aspx?MenuId=3&SubMenuId=0
(accessed 21 March 2013).

Ibid.

Ibid.
whilst India might also have overtaken the U.S. by 2050, were it to have pursued vigorous economic reforms during this decade and beyond.  

Economic activity is one area, where India and China have shown remarkable improvement. The bilateral trade between the countries, was as low as U.S. $ 2.92 billion in 2000, reached the maximum in 2011, and in the last decade was at U.S. $ 73.9 billion. China is India’s biggest trading partner at present.

However, China has gained such economic strength over the past decade that India feels itself threatened by the monopoly of bilateral trade between the two countries. By the end of 2009, as a result of the world economic downturn, bilateral trade dropped to U.S.$ 43.27 billion (a decline of 16.54 percent). However, in 2010 bilateral trade reached U.S.$ 61.74 billion, a growth of 43 percent compared to the same period last year. India exported goods worth U.S.$ 20.86 billion (+52 percent) to China and imported goods worth U.S.$ 40.88 billion (+38 percent) from China, resulting in an adverse balance of trade of U.S.$ 20 billion. In 2011, bilateral trade stood at U.S.$ 73.9 billion (+20 percent). India’s total exports to China for 2011 were U.S.$ 23.41 billion (+23 percent) and China’s exports to India reached U.S.$ 50.49 billion (+24 percent). The trade deficit for India for the year 2011 stood at U.S.$ 27.08 billion.

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71 Embassy of India Official Website.
Table 1. China India Trade Balance–2009 to 2011
(All figures in US$ billions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>India Exports to China</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.70</td>
<td>20.86</td>
<td>23.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Growth %</strong></td>
<td>-32.63</td>
<td>52.19</td>
<td>12.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>China Exports to India</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29.57</td>
<td>40.88</td>
<td>50.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Growth %</strong></td>
<td>-6.17</td>
<td>38.25</td>
<td>23.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total India-China Trade</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43.28</td>
<td>61.74</td>
<td>73.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Growth %</strong></td>
<td>-16.55</td>
<td>42.66</td>
<td>19.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trade Balance for India</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-15.87</td>
<td>-20.02</td>
<td>-27.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


On this issue of Indian concerns about China, in an interview Mr. Taylor Fravel said,

Just because one country views another as its ‘enemy number one’ does not mean that such a perception is mutual. More generally, it is important to understand the broader context in which these perceptions have formed. China and India exist in a structural situation where China is much stronger and wealthier than India. In general terms, China can threaten India more than India can threaten China. As a result, Beijing may underestimate concerns in New Delhi about growing Chinese power. For this same reason, New Delhi may exaggerate the threat posed by China, as China sees the United States and not India as its principal strategic competitor.72

Where the economic interests of both China and India have resulted in cooperation, the clash of economic interests often results in heated overtures and rhetoric. In December 2012, the activities in the South China Sea resulted in a fiery exchange of statements between the two countries. Indian state-run Oil and Natural Gas Corp’s (ONGC) is conducting a joint oil exploration venture with Vietnam in South China Sea. The Chinese interference with Vietnamese oil exploration vessels forced the Indian Naval

72Fried.
Chief to send a strong threat of the use of force to protect the Indian interests by all means.\(^73\) China’s moves into the Indian Ocean are not seen by China as a reciprocal to India’s work with Vietnam.

China’s efforts to develop alternative overland routes to transport oil and gas imports through port facilities at Gwadar in Pakistan, as well as through Bangladesh and Myanmar, have been viewed by India as part of a Chinese “string of pearls” strategy of economic and military encroachment into South and Central Asia.\(^74\) The deep-sea water port of Gwadar is projected to undergo militarization by the Pakistani Navy, which means that Chinese surface and sub-surface platforms could easily be stationed there. With these clear indicators of China’s expanding navy being in a position of obtaining access to the Indian Ocean, both from India’s west and from east, the Sino-Pak-Myanmar axis will continue to be an area of great concern. Beijing’s potential grand strategy of regional dominance has serious security implications for India.\(^75\) For reference see appendix E.


\(^{75}\) Jagga, 22-23.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

This research effort began with the question, “Where do India and China stand today vis-à-vis their relations of 1962?” This research did not examine the tactical military engagements of the Sino-Indian Wars of 1962. Instead, it focused on the underlying reasons for the conflict. Next, using the framework of DIME, the status of the relationship in the pre-1962 environment between the countries was ascertained. Thereafter, the present day environment was also evaluated within the same context of DIME. The answer to the research question will be covered at the conclusion of this chapter. Before concluding the research, it is pertinent to give a synopsis of the preceding chapters.

The first chapter introduced the historical background of Sino-Indian relations and a brief account of the boundary issue between India and China. The boundary issue has been the most sensitive and recurring issue between both the countries. The conflicting claims about the territory of Aksai Chin in the Western Sector and Arunachal Pradesh in the Eastern Sector, have strained their relations. India claims ownership of the Aksai Chin region, which is in Chinese possession; and conversely, China claims ownership of the Arunachal Pradesh, presently an Indian territory. In 1962, the border issue was the main reason the countries chose to go to war. The second reason was mistrust between the countries as a result of Indian support for the Tibet cause. Third, the arrogance of leadership and nationalism on both sides failed to seek a peaceful resolution on a diplomatic front.
The second chapter discussed the available literature. It provided a brief review of documentation available on the subject. A number of books, research articles, master’s theses, newspapers and websites were consulted for this research. The literature was broadly divided into two types: the literature written by the Chinese and Indian scholars, and the literature written by independent scholars. A wide variety of information was discovered on this subject. However, the framework of elements of national power—DIME—is being used for the first time to carry out research comparing two different time periods. This research will be an addition to literature already available.

Using the context of DIME, the third and fourth chapters analyzed the relationship between India and China from 1962 to today. The analysis concludes in this chapter. First, the diplomatic element of national power will be analyzed. Much of the responsibility for both countries going to war in 1962, lies on the shoulders of the leadership on both sides. The path to war could have been avoided if the leadership had behaved sensibly and chosen to engage each other diplomatically. Keeping the diplomatic channels open and giving diplomacy a chance could have helped reduce the war hysteria and ultimately might have prevented the war. The decision by India to choose its forward policy strategy was a major provocative step that infuriated China. The Indian military and political leadership both had a part in that decision-making. Moreover, Chinese paranoia of being encircled on multiple fronts; the U.S. pressure from Taiwan, Japan, and Korea on the east; the Indian pressure from the west; and Russia’s close relations with India, forced the Chinese leadership to take stringent measures to ward off these threats.

The question arises of where India and China stand in the diplomatic arena today. The Sino-Indian relations today are seemingly better than any other point in the last five
decades. The diplomatic and military exchanges at senior leadership levels have remained highest during the last decade. Both countries make frequent use of diplomatic channels to sort out minor differences. However, this does not mean that all hurdles in their relations are over, just that both countries have found some areas of common interests.

The air of mistrust still overshadows the seemingly good relations between the countries. India still believes that the Chinese follow Sun Tzu’s teaching and that their strategic thinking is shaped in “feint and deception,” and ensuring that opponents surrender without a fight. Whereas China believes that India still follows Chanakya’s policy towards the neighborhood, “Your neighbor is your natural enemy state; the neighbor of your neighbor is your friend.”

Another issue haunting Sino-Indian relations is their relationship with the neighboring states. The diplomatic equation between the two countries cannot be solved without taking into account their relationship with their common neighbors. The countries which figure prominently in this relationship are Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. Both India and China are trying to increase their sphere of influence on these countries vis-à-vis the other, with the exception of Pakistan. China is helping Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka to develop their seaports to shorten its lines of communication and outreach to the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. This Chinese move pinches India, as the Indians term it, as an attempt to encircle India in South Asia and limit its sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean.

India on the other side, is trying to explore for energy resources off the coast of Myanmar in the South China Sea, which China views with a wary eye. In regard to relations with Pakistan, it is a different ball game all together. Pakistan and India have
gone to war over the disputed Kashmir region three times. The enmity between India and Pakistan is now ingrained through the mindset of at least two generations. Any improvement in bilateral relations between Pakistan and China is viewed with many suspicions in Indian circles. India believes, and rightly, so, that China extends a helping hand to Pakistan because it wants to keep India engaged on two fronts. Indian military strategists have always been tried to formulate a strategy to be prepared for a two-front war.

As far as Nepal is concerned, both India and China are trying to influence Nepal for their own national interests. China’s main interest in Nepal stems from its concerns over the large Tibetan refugee population; as approximately 20,000 Tibetans live in Nepal, making it home to world’s second largest Tibetan refugee community. Beijing has been pressing Nepal to tighten its borders with Tibet, which has led to a major decrease in the number of Tibetans escaping to Nepal in recent years. Nepal at the same time looks towards India to garner support against Maoist insurgent groups active in Nepal.

Finally, the border dispute figures to be the most significant issue causing a stalemate in improvement of bilateral relations between the countries. The same issue provoked both countries to adopt a hard path of war rather than to find a solution to this problem. There has not been much improvement on this issue since 1962. India and China both use the international media. Recently during the last week of April 2013, India has accused China of violating the integrity of the Line of Actual Contact and
establishing a post 10 kilometers inside Indian Territory. Although China downplayed this incident by stating that this event will not affect bilateral relations between the countries, it is important to note that such minor incidents still continue to show the deep nationalist sentiments of the border dispute between them. Moreover, the improvement in diplomatic exchanges cannot guarantee the avoidance of a recurrence of such incidents and their escalation to a large-scale confrontation.

A definitive answer as to where India and China stand diplomatically today is difficult. The Indian Prime Minister has said that China-India relations remain too complex to be explained in a simplistic format of friend or foe–instead both constitute a mosaic of cooperation, co-existence, coordination, cooperation, competition and even confrontation. India and China are two major powers in Asia with global aspirations and a dynamic array of significant conflicting interests. As a result, some amount of friction in their bilateral relationship is inevitable. The geopolitical reality of Asia makes sure that it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for India-China to be bhai-bhai (brothers) in the foreseeable future. If India and China continue to rise in the next few years, security competition between the two regional giants will be inevitable.

In chapters 3 and 4, the information part of DIME elaborated on the Chinese and the Indian strategic culture against each other and how both use the informational instrument for their national interests. In summary, it is as difficult to draw a definitive

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77 Jagga, 36.
line between cooperative and competitive strategic culture between the countries as it was in the diplomatic sphere.

The Chinese view India as a competitive neighbor and not as a security partner. China views prospects in Indian economic development positively, however it is cautious of the Indian military advancements. Moreover, the growing cooperation between India and the U.S. is also viewed with grave concern in China. The U.S.-India military cooperation, most notably in the Indian Ocean, alarms Beijing as most of the Chinese oil imports pass through the Indian Ocean. China was also antagonized over the civil nuclear deal between India and the U.S., criticizing it as undermining non-proliferation regimes. China believes that the Indo-U.S. nexus can bolster the Indian development to an extent that it can prove to be an effective counterweight to the Chinese influence in the region. During his visit in 2010, President Obama announced his complete backing for Indian permanent membership in the Security Council. His 10-day visit to South Asian countries was viewed as putting pressure on China. Lastly, the bad taste of the Sino-Indian War of 1962 and the unresolved border dispute, has further confirmed the hostility and animus in the Chinese strategic culture against Indian.

The Indian views of the Chinese are not very different from the Chinese view of the Indians. The Indian nation felt itself betrayed after the Sino-Indian War. The very famous term “Hindi-Chinese Bhai Bhai”—Indian and Chinese are brothers—met a striking blow after the war. The discredit of these perceptions was largely the responsibility of the Indian leadership of that time as well. They initially portrayed everything as normal between India and China, despite the fact that they knew it was not. Once China attacked

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78 Arnoldy.
India in 1962, the aura of this friendship not only shattered but also left deep scars in India, which shaped their view of China for decades to come, and even today. However, in the last decade, the Indian business community has been able to overcome these decades-old perceptions. They see a lot of potential in bilateral trade relations between both countries. However, at the same time, the Indian military, much like their counterparts, are cautious of their adversary’s military developments. They view the infrastructural development in border region of Tibet with a great suspicion. Indian military thinkers and scholars are of the view that China has embarked upon infrastructural development only to strengthen its military position vis-à-vis the Indian Army, so that the PLA could quickly carry out inter-theater movement.

China and India have also engaged each other adversely on the information plain. Both countries blame each other for covertly supporting the insurgencies breeding in the opponent’s backyard. China blames India for supporting the Tibet cause, whereas India blames China for supporting the Naxalite Insurgency in its northeastern provinces. It was concluded earlier that the boundary issue was the most significant one causing the countries to go to war. The alleged meddling into one another’s internal affairs figures as the second most significant issue contributing towards the Sino-Indian war of 1962. The irony of the matter is that, like the border dispute, this issue has not been resolved to date either.

After having looked at the diplomatic and informational elements of national power, conclusions will be drawn from the third element - the military. A significant departure from the pre-1962 environment is the improvement in military-to-military contacts between the countries. The joint training exercises, defense dialogue,
establishment of the “Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India China Border Affairs,” and ministerial and service chief level exchanges are some areas where both countries have shown significant progress. These seemingly good military-to-military relations however, are not so good when taking into account their national psyche and cultural view of each other. The continuous growth in their defense budgets over the last few years indicates that they seriously contemplate using the military as an instrument of their national power to safeguard their security interests. Cross border incursions and allegations of frequent violations of the Line of Actual Control are problematic. A minor incident has the potential to flare up and grow into a conflict of limited to medium or high intensity. Given the propensity of a history of mistrust and confrontational posture, the likelihood of such an event cannot be ruled out.

The Indian and Chinese force modernization programs of the last decades also show that both countries are conscious of their security concerns and the need to strengthen this specific element of national power. The rising economic and geo-political importance of both countries in regional and world politics requires them to maintain a military, which is capable of safeguarding their security interests.

Another important aspect which cannot be divorced from the military, is the nuclear capability which both countries possess. Both India and China are not only nuclear powers, but also possess multiple delivery systems. Although this research paper did not explore the details of the nuclear equation between the countries, the military dynamics cannot be completed without considering the nuclear aspects. The chance of an all-out limited-to-medium level intensity conflict between the countries in reduced in the backdrop of the possession of nuclear capability. However, what the future holds in terms
of development of tactical nuclear weapons will have a strong impact on the chances of a military confrontation between India and China.

Finally, conclusions will be drawn on the economy and its impact on the Sino-Indian relations. Economy is one area where both countries have found common areas of interest. The Chinese economy which is based on the export of manufactured goods, and the Indian IT-based economy, have shown remarkable improvement in the past. The magnitude of bilateral economic trade has also shown a burgeoning increase over the past decade. This requirement of mutual economic interdependence has great prospects for furthering the cooperative relationship between the countries.

Converse to the growing economic interdependence and seemingly good economic relations, the chances of the clash of economic interests between the countries cannot be ruled out. India views the Chinese development of economic ties with her neighboring states as a counter to Indian economic interests. The Chinese development of the port cities of Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan (commonly known as the Strings of Pearls strategy) is viewed by India as an effort to strangle India economically. Conversely, the Indian exploration of energy resources off the coast of Vietnam in South China Sea is viewed with deep concerns in China.

The future of the economic prosperity of Asia lies in the economic development of India and China. According to Goldman Sachs, the Chinese economic growth is likely to surpass that of U.S. in 2020, and India’ economic growth will surpass U.S. in 2050. With this economic future, China and India see a lot potential in their economic cooperation. The leadership on both sides has realized this fact and the remarkable
improvement in bilateral trade between both the countries is an outcome of their mutual understanding.

This research paper began by examining the disputes and the relationship between India and China in the 1962 environment. The analysis of the facts shows that since the late 1980s, India and China relations have entered a phase of confidence building and détente that is at a significantly advanced stage today. Although various mechanisms are in place to ensure that border transgressions of a minor nature are amicably resolved, the lasting peace and prosperity is not possible until a formal delineation of border between the countries is established. The unresolved border, coupled with a history of mistrust is a stumbling block in the cordiality of the relationship. Moreover, India regards the Chinese long standing and continually developing ties with Pakistan and other regional countries as an effort to tie India to the sub-continent. Both countries view each other suspiciously for the involvement of the other in their internal affairs. Both have found some common grounds to solve military issues, yet they view each other’s military development with a wary eye.

It is very difficult to define the relationship between India and China. Both have some common grounds for cooperative engagement, yet some issues haunt the seemingly good relations. The basic research question for this thesis was to determine where India and China stand today vis-à-vis the pre-1962 environment. After analyzing the facts, it can be argued that very little has changed between India and China since 1962. Although both the countries have shown some improvement in bilateral relations, the relationship cannot be termed as completely cordial. Both countries have devised a number of mechanisms for conflict resolution. A sense has prevailed in diplomatic, military and
economic circles to find grounds of common interests. However, both countries have failed to address the root-cause of mistrust, which is the border issue. The political and military hierarchies are still sensitive to border incursions. Their military deployments and developments in the bordering regions are still focused against each other. The Tibetan diasporas still continue to haunt China and India’s covert support to the Tibetan cause still continues. India still continues to provide diplomatic asylum to the Dalai Lama. Lastly, the economic cooperation is not the guarantor of peace and security between both countries.

Both India and China now live in a state of cold war with a veil of entente and vacuum of trust. Although both countries have found common ground for cooperation, a plethora of mistrust and competition continues to haunt congeniality and keeps them involved in a cold war which can turn hot any time.

After concluding this research, the findings and outcome of this research would have been more substantial if the impact of the nuclear equation between India and China had also been considered. The introduction of the nuclear dimension to the military changes the dynamics of the approach of belligerents towards each other. Mere possession of nuclear capability by both adversaries does not mean a nuclear parity or limited chances of use by either of them. Therefore, any research on the subject in the future may also consider the nuclear aspect.

Lastly, the comparative analysis of the naval aspect could have provided more clarity to the military component of the DIME in this research. Although, the land component of the armed forces remains more important, especially in view of the border conflict between both the countries, a mention of the naval component is still relevant
considering the emergence of India and China on regional and global affairs. The inclusion of these two factors can bring more vivid and conclusive findings on the subject.
# APPENDIX A

## MILITARY BALANCE CHINA - INDIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CHINA</th>
<th>INDIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Strength</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>1,129,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>255,000</td>
<td>58,350+9550*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air</td>
<td>300,000 to 330,000</td>
<td>1,27,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Missile forces</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Para Military</td>
<td>660,000</td>
<td>1,300,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Missiles Strategic</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
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<td>IRBM</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRBM</td>
<td>122</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SRBM</td>
<td>216</td>
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<tr>
<td>Equipment Army</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Tanks</td>
<td>7400+</td>
<td>5240</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Armored Infantry Fighting vehicle(AIFV)</td>
<td>2350</td>
<td>1805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Arty Guns</td>
<td>12462+</td>
<td>10758+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Helicopters</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Anti –tank Helicopters</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment Navy</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Submarines</td>
<td>68+3(Strategic)</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Aircraft Carriers</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>10. Destroyers</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Frigates</td>
<td>65</td>
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<td>12. Patrol &amp; Coastal Combatants</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>49</td>
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<tr>
<td>Equipment Air Force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Combat Aircraft</td>
<td>1693</td>
<td>665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Helicopters</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### APPENDIX B

**ORBAT OF PLA POSTURED AGAINST INDIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chengdu</th>
<th>Division</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Unit#</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13 Group Army</td>
<td>37 Div</td>
<td>Sichuan</td>
<td>Chongqing</td>
<td>56005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>149 Motor Inf Div</td>
<td>Sichuan</td>
<td>Chongqing</td>
<td>56013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Group Army</td>
<td>UI Div</td>
<td>Yunnan</td>
<td>Kunming</td>
<td>35201</td>
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## APPENDIX C

### ORBAT OF INDIAN ARMY POSTURED AGAINST CHINA

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<th>City</th>
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<td>Calcutta</td>
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<td>Demapur Nagaland</td>
<td>Ranchi</td>
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<td>57 Mountain Division</td>
<td>Silchar</td>
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<td>UI Artillery Brigade</td>
<td>UI location</td>
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<td></td>
<td>IV Corps</td>
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<td>5 Mountain Division</td>
<td>UI Location</td>
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<td>21 Mountain Division</td>
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<td>UI Artillery Brigade</td>
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<td>XXXIII Corps</td>
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APPENDIX D

VISITS BY SERVICE CHIEFS OF ARMED FORCES–2000-2011

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<tr>
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<td>20-26 May 2001</td>
<td>Air Chief Marshal AY Tipnis <strong>PVSM, AVSM, VM, ADC</strong>, Chief of Air Staff</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>20-26 May 2007</td>
<td>General JJ Singh Chairman <strong>PVSM, AVSM, VSM COSC &amp; COAS</strong></td>
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<td>02-07 Nov 2008</td>
<td>Air Chief Marshal FH Major, <strong>PVSM, AVSM, SC, VM, ADC</strong>, Chief of Air Staff</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>18-25 Apr 2009</td>
<td>Admiral Sureesh Mehta, <strong>PVSM, AVSM, ADC, CNS &amp; COSC</strong></td>
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CHINA TO INDIA : 2000-11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S. No</th>
<th>Date of Visit</th>
<th>Name / Designation</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>10-16 Dec 2003</td>
<td>Gen Wu Quanxu, Deputy Chief of General Staff</td>
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<td>23-28 May 2005</td>
<td>Gen Liang Guanglie, Chief of General Staff.</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>25-28 Oct 2006</td>
<td>Gen Qiao Qingchen, Commander PLA Air Force</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>02-05 Nov 2008</td>
<td>Admiral Wu Shengli, Commander PLA Navy</td>
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MINISTERIAL VISITS FROM INDIA TO CHINA : JAN 2000 ONWARDS

<table>
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<th>Remarks</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>20 - 27 Apr 2003</td>
<td>Shri George Fernandes, Defence Minister</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>28 May - 01 Jun 2006</td>
<td>H.E. Shri Pranab Mukherjee, Defence Minister</td>
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CHINA TO INDIA

<table>
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<th>Name / Designation</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Gen Cao Gangchuan, Defence Minister and Vice Chairman CMC</td>
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<tr>
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<td>02-06 Sep 2012</td>
<td>Gen Liang Guanglie, Defence Minister and member of CMC</td>
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APPENDIX E

MAP OF STRING OF PEARLS

Source: Jagga R. K. Brigadier, China’s Growing Power and Implications for India: Will it be a cooperative/competitive or hostile relationship? (A dissertation published by the Royal College of Defense Studies, 2012), 41.
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